

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE

1969

Edited by

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With the assistance of

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INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, 1969

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PREFACE

This is the third volume of the *International Documents on Palestine*, published by the Institute for Palestine Studies. It is a collection whose aim is to record the policies of the international community towards the Palestine question. The collection is divided into three sections: International (including Israel), the United Nations and the Arab World. The documents focus principally on the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including attempts to achieve a settlement, during 1969.

The contents of the International and Arab World sections have been selected from among government reports, parliamentary debates, position papers issued by political organisations, joint communiqués, addresses, messages of greetings and support, resolutions of meetings and congresses, and articles and editorials which express official policy. Special attention has been paid this year, as before, to the role of the Big Powers — particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, an attempt has been made to broaden the *Documents'* coverage of the policies and positions of small states not directly involved in the conflict. As to the Arab world, the policies of all the Arab states, as well as major parties and non-governmental organisations, have been presented. Particular attention has been paid, however, to the role of the United Arab Republic and Jordan and to the Palestinian liberation movement.

The United Nations section has been reorganised and expanded. Structurally, it follows as closely as possible the divisions of the international organisation and its various organs. The material selected includes resolutions and reports of UN organs; and speeches, statements, and letters by representatives of member states and international officials. Besides debates on such subjects as violations of the cease-fire and the treatment of the Arab population in the occupied territories, the section also includes the most important United Nations material on the socio-economic conditions of the Palestinian refugees. Finally, included this year is the annual *Report of the Security Council*, which

delineates in a comprehensive way the work of that body concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The documents are arranged chronologically, with a name and subject index at the end of the volume. The word "excerpt/s" is used to indicate that only the part or parts of the text related to the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict have been reproduced. The spelling of names of persons and places is left unchanged in texts which appear in their original, untranslated version. In documents translated from Arabic, names already familiar to the reader appear as they are generally printed in the English language press; others are transliterated according to a system which, while avoiding diacritical marks, reflects the Arabic spelling as closely as possible.

The Institute for Palestine Studies expresses its gratitude to the University of Kuwait, and particularly to its President, and its Secretary-General, for invaluable aid towards the publication of this volume.

The Institute further expresses its gratitude to Dr. George J. Tomeh, Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic at the United Nations, for his valuable assistance in the compilation of the United Nations Documents, as well as in the organisation of that section.

Special thanks are also extended to the United Nations Information Centre in Beirut and especially to its librarian, Mrs. M. Husn, for the kind assistance which she provided.

The International section was compiled by Dr. Walid Qaziha, the United Nations section by Dr. George Dib and Husain Sirriya, and the Arab World section by George K. Nasrallah. Translations from Arabic to English were done by Dr. Tarif Khalidi, Muhammad J. Tutunji, Muhammad Umairi, Ian Howard and Meric Dobson, who was also English language editor for the entire manuscript. The volume was printed with the technical advice of Mrs. Suha Tuqan. The index was prepared by Mrs. Eileen Olmsted.

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Below is a list of the parliamentary records, documentary series, annual reports, radio monitoring services, newspapers and periodicals consulted in the compilation of this book, with their place of publication and frequency:

<i>al-Ahram</i>	Cairo	Daily
<i>al-Ahrar</i>	Beirut	Weekly
<i>al-Akhbar</i>	Beirut	Weekly
<i>al-Alam</i>	Tripoli (Libya)	Daily
<i>al-Amal</i>	Tunis	Daily
<i>al-Anba</i>	Rabat	Daily
<i>Annual Report</i> (Canada, Department of External Affairs)	Ottawa	Yearly
<i>al-Anwar</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>Asian Recorder</i>	New Delhi	Weekly
<i>al-Ba'th</i>	Damascus	Daily
<i>al-Bilad</i>	Jedda	Daily
<i>B.B.C. Summary of World Broadcasts</i>	London	Daily
<i>Canadian Weekly Bulletin</i>	Ottawa	Weekly
<i>Congressional Record</i>	Washington, D.C.	Daily
<i>Current Notes on International Affairs</i> (Australia, Department of External Affairs)	Canberra	Monthly
<i>Daily Bulletin</i> (Lebanon, Ministry of Information; Lebanese National News Agency)	Beirut	Daily
<i>Daily Star</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>Davar</i>	Tel Aviv	Daily
<i>Dawn</i>	Karachi	Daily
<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>	Washington, D.C.	Weekly
<i>Digest of Israeli News</i>	Tel Aviv	Monthly
<i>Documents on Palestine</i> (UAR., Ministry of Guidance)	Cairo	Yearly
<i>al-Dustur</i>	Amman	Daily

<i>External Affairs</i> (Canada, Department of External Affairs)	Ottawa	Monthly
<i>Fateh Annual Yearbook</i>	Beirut	Yearly
<i>Foreign Affairs Bulletin</i>	Berlin (GDR)	Weekly
<i>Foreign Ministry Bulletin</i>	Ankara	Monthly
<i>Free Palestine</i>	London	Monthly
<i>al-Hadaf</i>	Beirut	Weekly
<i>Hansard's Parliamentary Debates</i>	London	Monthly
<i>al-Hayat</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>Hayom</i>	Tel Aviv	Daily
<i>Heilbronner</i>	Bonn	Daily
<i>Herald Tribune</i>	Paris	Daily
<i>al-Hurriyya</i>	Beirut	Weekly
<i>al-Ittihad</i>	Tel Aviv	Twice a week
<i>al-Jarida</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>Jerusalem Post</i>	Jerusalem	Daily
<i>Jewish Observer and Middle East Review</i>	London	Weekly
<i>al-Jumhuriyya</i>	Baghdad	Daily
<i>Kabul Times</i>	Kabul	Daily
<i>Kommunist</i>	Moscow	Semi-Monthly
<i>Moscow News</i>	Moscow	Weekly
<i>al-Muharrir</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>al-Nahar</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>Newsweek</i>	New York	Weekly
<i>New York Times</i>	New York	Daily
<i>al-Nida</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>L'Orient</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>Pakistan Documents Series</i> (Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, D.C.)	Washington, D.C.	Monthly
<i>Peking Review</i>	Peking	Weekly
<i>Pravda</i>	Moscow	Daily
<i>Review of International Affairs</i>	Belgrade	Bi-Weekly

<i>al-Sha'b</i>	Algiers	Daily
<i>al-Siyasa</i>	Kuwait	Daily
<i>Socialist Thought and Practice</i>	Belgrade	Bi-Monthly
<i>Soviet News</i>	London	Weekly
<i>Time</i>	New York	Weekly
<i>United Nations Monthly Chronicle</i>	New York	Monthly
<i>Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents</i>	Washington, D.C.	Weekly
<i>World Marxist Review</i>	Prague	Monthly

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International

Reply by the U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin to a Question Put to Him by the Japanese Newspaper "Mainichi" about the Possibilities of Preventing Nuclear War and Banning Nuclear Weapons.¹ (Excerpts)

Moscow, January, 1969

Q. What possibilities are there, in your opinion, for averting the danger of another war breaking out and for achieving success in banning both nuclear weapons and other means of warfare?

A. Averting the danger of another war breaking out at the present time means eliminating without delay the most dangerous hotbeds in various parts of the world where a threat to universal peace is maturing and it also means taking a number of urgent steps aimed at easing international tension. This would be facilitated, above all, by an end to the aggressive war which the United States is waging against the Vietnamese people, the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression against Arab countries in the Middle East, the creation of an atmosphere of co-operation and a system of collective security in Europe and the taking of further steps in the sphere of general disarmament.

Settlement of the crisis in the Middle East which was initiated by Israel's aggression in June 1967, would be of very great importance for easing tension in the world. We are convinced that a settlement of the Middle East crisis is possible only on the basis of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967. The Arab states have expressed their acceptance of the Security Council's resolution and their readiness to carry it out. Israel, however, is obstinately ignoring this important resolution and a settlement of the Middle East crisis has been blocked by the obstructionist attitude of the Israeli "ultras."

News Conference Statements by the U.S. Secretary of State Rusk on the Middle East.² (Excerpts)

Washington, D.C., January 3, 1969

As we begin the New Year, we in the United States are deeply concerned about the continuing, indeed increasing, violence in the Middle East. The present level of violence has again made peace in the area extremely precarious. To the dismal pattern of cease-fire violations there has been added an extension of the violence beyond the areas of the cease-fire lines to attacks on passengers and aircraft of international civil airlines. The present prospects are therefore serious and require the immediate and prudent attention of all leaders on both sides. There is little question but that a breakdown of the present tenuous arrangements would be catastrophic for all the peoples of the area.

I urge all concerned, in and outside of the area, to do everything possible to reverse the cycle of violence and replace it with a new impetus to help bring about both the climate and the reality of peace.

We call upon the Arab governments to recognize that they must do their utmost to restrain terrorist activity. We call upon Israel to recognize that a policy of excessive retaliation will not produce the peace that Israel surely desires.

An intense search for a Middle East peace has been going on since the November 22, 1967, Security Council resolution which set in motion the Jarring mission.³ There have been too many lost opportunities since the end of the June war. Deep distrust and suspicion have prevented significant progress from being made. But it is surely not too much to hope that as we begin the New Year all peoples in the area will try to put old recriminations behind them and think long and soberly, with imagination and good will, about finding the path to a just and lasting peace.

² U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 20/1/1969, pp. 45-52.

³ For text, See *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 268-269.

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 7/1/1969.

The elements of a peaceful settlement seem to us to be clear. They are contained in the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. If agreement could be achieved on the fundamentals contained in that resolution, the real beginnings of a just and lasting peace could be found. The United States has fully supported that resolution, and continues to do so, as well as the policy principles laid down by President Johnson in his important statements of June 19, 1967,¹ and September 10, 1968.² Those principles continue to be relevant and indeed essential to peace in the area.

It is for those nations which confront each other in the area to work with Ambassador [Gunnar] Jarring and construct the foundations for agreement and peace. Other nations can help by contributing their full support, and the United States will use for this purpose whatever influence it has. I hope, therefore, that in the days ahead all concerned will redouble their efforts to help Ambassador Jarring bring about a just and lasting peace in an area that has known no real peace for so long.

Let me add that I have seen some speculation overnight that somehow the United States is marking time in this matter of peace in the Middle East or perhaps even in Viet-Nam. This is not at all the case. There is nothing which we would desire more than to be able to turn over to the new administration significant advances toward peace, both in the Middle East and in Viet-Nam.

The President and I and our Ambassadors abroad will do everything that we can in the days remaining to advance both these matters several steps toward peace if we can.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in speaking of the Mideast situation, you talk about working within the framework of last November's resolution and so forth. But you say other nations can help. In that connection there have been reports from Paris and London that the Russians are suggesting a Big Four initiative to move this thing forward. Here we are told that they haven't made any

suggestion here. What is the situation as regards the big powers working on this at present?

A. I myself received the Russian Chargé d'Affaires on the 30th and received from him what I suppose is the same communication which was given to London and Paris. It did not propose a special four-power initiative. Nevertheless, the four are the principal permanent members of the Security Council involved in the Middle East.

I have no doubt that full contact among the four could be constructive in helping to bring peace to that area. We do not believe that peace can be found outside the area. This is a matter for the countries who live there to find the basis on which they can live with each other in the long-range future. But nevertheless, there are others who can help. We ourselves have taken a good many initiatives. Many of those initiatives have not become public.

In a situation where almost every detail of a possible settlement is a matter for lively internal debate or controversy on both sides in the Middle East, quiet diplomacy has perhaps a special role to play. But we shall be consulting not only with the parties in the area but with other governments who have some possibility of exercising influence in the area to see if we can begin to put the pieces together.

Now, one of the aspects of the Middle East problem which is — which makes it very complicated is one which is not unfamiliar in diplomacy. Here is a situation which has many component parts, somewhat like a jigsaw puzzle. It is very difficult to arrange one of the parts without reference to the whole, and it is very difficult to take up the whole and settle that quickly.

And so our problem is, Where do you begin? Where are the handles to take hold of? How do you get the process started?

We have probed over and over again to see if we could find one or another handle in order that we could get two or three of the pieces of the puzzle into place and then perhaps by steady work add other pieces to it.

Now, what we really need in this situation is a determination on the part of those who live

¹ See U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 10/7/1967, p. 345.

² See *International Documents on Palestine*, 1968, pp. 122-124.

in the area to cut through the well-known and deep feelings that exist in order to begin to build a peace. I have no doubt that there are many Arabs who think that Israel is bent merely on territorial expansion. I have no doubt that there are many Israelis who believe that the Arabs want the destruction of Israel.

Now, these are questions which have to be penetrated. These are feelings which have to be set aside, and it is up to the parties on both sides to try to dissipate those feelings on the other side which stand in the way of peace.

So we will do everything we can between now and January 20 to move this matter forward, and I hope that we can show some additional progress to the new administration when it assumes responsibility.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement you said that if agreement could be reached on the principles of the U.N. resolution on the Middle East, we could move toward peace. Where does the responsibility lie? Who has not agreed to these principles? And who has? How do you move?

A. I think one of the problems — perhaps I shouldn't try to go into too much detail under these circumstances — but one of the problems is that the November resolution is not self-executing. It doesn't spell out how these various declarations of policy are to be put into effect. Therefore, the implementation of the November resolution must be worked out by negotiation and agreement.

Now, there is some tendency for one side to try to impose upon the other a particular formulation of words. For example, some of the Arabs say that Israel must say that it will accept and implement the November resolution. Now, if that means that Israel must say that it accepts the resolution as interpreted by the Arab side, obviously this is a great difficulty for Israel. Israel has said that it will accept and implement that resolution in accordance with the agreements to be reached in the process of discussion and negotiation — in effect. This is a paraphrase. This is not their exact language.

We believe that in this situation Ambassador Jarring plays a crucial role. Israel has put to

Ambassador Jarring some considerable number of points of substance with which he might be able to work with governments on the other side. There has been some response from governments on the other side, but this process has not yet grappled with the central issues in a way that would find some of those pieces of the jigsaw puzzle that I referred to earlier.

We are going to do everything we can to support Ambassador Jarring's effort and, beyond that, to do what we can in the capitals on both sides to see if we ourselves can help find some of these pieces to the jigsaw puzzle and begin to put this thing into shape.

Q. Is this situation acute enough at the moment to bring Dr. Jarring back from Moscow and get him into play again?

A. Well, I think it's acute. I think that Ambassador Jarring has been talking with the parties about his own arrangements. And I wouldn't want to comment on what those might be.

What concerns me is the continual military activity on the cease-fire lines. The terrorists on the Arab side have to accept a very heavy responsibility for their unwillingness to accept the cease-fire lines and leave the situation in an atmosphere or a mood where some progress toward peace can be made. One can understand how impatient the Israelis get from time to time when these terrorist raids continue, raids for which the Arab governments do not accept direct responsibility. And that leads to action which, again, inflames the situation further.

There have been too many of these incidents. We would like to see both sides act with the utmost restraint here to try to give us a few months in which you don't have this violence occurring in order that we can make a maximum effort through Ambassador Jarring and otherwise to begin to put these pieces together.

Q. But this has not been the experience since June of '67 and, unfortunately, is not likely to be the experience in the time ahead. What can we do despite this?

A. Well, in diplomacy you never throw in your hand. It's true that we have not made as much progress since June 1967, and Ambassador

Jarring has not made as much progress as all of us would have hoped. But there is a very simple answer to that. You try and you try again. You don't give up. Because when diplomacy throws in its hand, then there is nothing left but the guns and the soldiers. And no one wants that answer.

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3

Interview with the U.S. President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Walt W. Rostow, at the White House.¹ (Excerpts)
Washington, January 4, 1969

Q. Are you looking forward to an era where you could cope with problems in the Middle East, Far East, Africa, and so forth, on that kind of basis?

A. Yes. Remember, you must have first a deep political understanding with the countries concerned that they want to have that kind of security relationship. Second, you must have overseas bases which are secure which contain some of the heavy equipment. We are now talking about things that are for the seventies, we are talking of a future trend, not a policy as a fact. But I believe that is the way our military posture will gradually change.

Q. You have touched only a little on the Middle East.

A. It is not up to Moscow or Washington. It is up to the leaders of the Middle East. That means, of course, getting a settlement [with Israel] which they regard as honorable and dignified. And it means that Israel will emerge with a sense of confidence that it is living in an environment of peace and not in an environment of belligerency.

We have bought time for the natural forces of the Middle East to find their way to the judgment that the only realistic, decent option for them all is to make peace and get on with the job of

development. I think they may be a little closer to that judgment than they were a year ago.

This is one of the major unresolved problems we are turning over to our successors. We just must clearly acknowledge that in our time we were not able to use what margins of influence we have over those forces to produce the result we would like to see.

The United States and the Soviet Union simply cannot dictate the outcome. We can work at it. We can exchange views on it. We can try to use our influence with our friends in the Middle East. But it has in the end got to be a judgment of the Middle Eastern leaders that peace is the best realistic option to them.

Q. I am struck in this exposition of the decade of the sixties. The United Nations has played no political role in our outlook at all.

A. The United Nations played a role in many of these problems. It is one of the forums where we do essential business. Certain dimensions of almost all our major policies are carried on in the U.N.

The reason I don't talk about the U.N. separately is because it is woven through the fabric of our total foreign policy in many different directions — many of them important.

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Q. I can't help but feel as you have gone over this whole sphere — I don't mean this unkindly — you are taking a complacent attitude. In the Middle East it is up to the Russians to change their mind, in regard to the Chinese it is up to the Chinese to change their mind. Is there no unfinished business on our side? Are there no further steps that we are to take to make our policy conform to realities of the seventies?

A. On the Middle East, there is an awful lot which we can do and a lot which we are doing. We should not be passive and we are not passive. I don't think we will be passive.

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Q. Do you see any danger in the balance of power in the East and West shifting toward the East?

A. I don't think the balance is shifting their way, but I do think that endless attention has got to be given to making sure that the balance doesn't move in a way which tempts ambitious leaders.

¹ *The New York Times*, 5/1/1969, © 1969 by the New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

Q. This means you can't pull back dramatically either in Europe, the Middle East or Asia?

A. My judgment is that we shall remain as far ahead as we can peer, a critical margin, in the affairs of the world because of our nuclear power and responsibilities, because of our industrial and trading interests, and because of our political influence. The prospect is that if we are steady we can see real movement in the direction of what President Johnson calls a world of partnership and fair shares.

I see no safety in withdrawal, because there are forces in the world that will move into vacuums and move into weakness. There will be men who will continue to be tempted by vacuums and weaknesses.

But we would hope that the vacuums and weaknesses would be filled not by the intrusion of additional American force, although the use of American force in many places can't be ruled out, but by the build-up of local forces, strength and confidence.

That doesn't mean that the prospect is for us to give up our treaties and withdraw. There is a prospect that we can look after our interests and meet our commitments with much more company, and with others carrying more of the burden.

Q. So the diffusion of power which you foresaw, and which is coming back in East and West, is not something that keeps you awake at night. On the contrary, you welcome it?

A. We made a fundamental decision in 1947 that we would take the risks of a more powerful Europe because we did not wish to be so intensively involved forever and because we had faith that, whatever the frictions might be, there would be an underlying congruence of Western European and United States interests.

The same impulses that led us as a nation to make and to reaffirm the judgment that we wanted a strong, united Europe led President Johnson to throw his weight behind the economic and physical integration of Latin America.

We want partners and not clients. I think that these are the directions in which we ought to persist.

4

Casualty List Published by the Israeli Army and the Number of Israelis, Wounded or Killed, and of Casualties of the Palestine Resistance, since the 1967 War.¹

Tel Aviv, January 6, 1969

A total of 281 Israelis were killed and 1,115 wounded since the Six Day War. The dead include 234 soldiers and 47 civilians. The wounded include 785 soldiers and 330 civilians.

The Arab gangs lost 600 men killed and 1,500 captured during the same time. This is in addition to several hundred believed killed inside Jordan (presumably the spokesman was referring to the Karameh and other actions although he did not elaborate.)

5

News Conference Remarks by Former French Minister of Information Gorse following his Meeting with the Lebanese President Helou during his Visit to Lebanon.² (Excerpt)

Beirut, January 13, 1969

Mr. Gorse: "France cannot be indifferent to a new threat to Lebanon."

Q. A few days ago, President de Gaulle reaffirmed France's total support for Lebanon in the critical situation through which the country is now passing. Was this question raised in the course of your conversation with President Helou?

A. Naturally it was raised in our conversation as I have already said, I reaffirm that if Lebanon's existence were ever threatened, France would not be indifferent, both because of our friendship and for the sake of equilibrium and peace.

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 7/1/1969.

² *L'Orient* (Beirut), 14/1/1969.

6

Statement in the Knesset by the Israeli Premier Eshkol on the French Embargo on Arms Shipments to Israel.¹

Jerusalem, January 14, 1969

On June 3, 1967, France imposed a partial embargo which officially applied to all the states in the Middle East involved in the conflict. In fact, the embargo was activated mainly in order to detain the Mirage planes earmarked for Israel, to be precise, before the Six Day War, and not — as is now being alleged — at the end of the war. A little over a week ago, the French Customs authorities began detaining arms consignments and spare parts for Israel.

Only when this became common knowledge, was an official statement issued on behalf of the French Government which said, *inter alia*, that the French Government had imposed a total embargo on consignments of military equipment to Israel in order to avert "the expansion of the conflict in the Middle East."

The statement also said that France had helped Israel until the time when the latter had adopted an aggressive attitude, because Israel was the first to attack. This is a new, second edition of the fabrication invented in May 1967 when Soviet Russia alleged that we had concentrated troops on our northern border for aggression. It may well be that this figment of imagination brought on large-scale Egyptian troop concentrations and dragged the entire region into the abyss of war, I fear that a new libel of this kind is now being excoagitated.

There are several aspects to the decision of imposing an embargo. One of them is the purely commercial one. From this point of view the decision runs counter to all common usage in interstate relations. Agreements have been unilaterally and arbitrarily violated. Funds paid for goods which were not delivered, have been frozen — and all this under weak and irrelevant pretexts. From the general political point of view, this is an act of even graver moral impact.

On another occasion I said that this resembles the case where somebody is tying the hands of

one of the partners to a conflict, whilst the other one remains free to hurt or hit without let or hindrance. Moreover, anybody trying to handicap our strength, is actually hurting the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

At this juncture there are no indications that our opponents will agree to peace based on mutual agreement in the near future. Under such circumstances, our strength to avert any blow dealt us, is the firmest guarantee for peace. If our forces be permitted to weaken, peace itself will suffer. If our opponents should think that they are able to hit us with impunity, they are liable to escalate the situation to the point of renewed all-out warfare against us.

A shocking by-product is the pretext used to tie the embargo to Israel's action of self-defence in the face of resurgent terrorism. There is no need to repeat here what I have said from this rostrum after the raid on Beirut's airport. Let me only stress once more that we are dealing with a double standard of morality according to which foreign property outweighs our blood in value. It turns a blind eye to the basic fact that terrorism is a method of warfare waged by our enemies against us, and that during war it is inconceivable to outlaw self-defence. It may be safely assumed that the embargo decision was linked to Beirut only for the sake of argument — and it does not convince or make sense.

This blow is particularly painful as it is dealt by France. The people of Israel will remember France's support for us in difficult hours, the sympathy of the great French nation and the comprehension evinced by its governments for the decisive task of strengthening Israel to safeguard its existence and security, and in order to maintain peace in the Middle East.

Israel similarly supported France and sympathized with the French nation in its distress. Speaking from the broad historical viewpoint, we feel certain that the French Government will yet find an expression for the sentiments of the French nation in this matter, for the sake of its own glory, greatness and conscience.

For obvious reasons I shall not go into details here concerning the practical significance of the embargo for the Israel Defence Forces. Detailed debates on this matter are being conducted within the Cabinet and the Knesset Foreign Affairs and

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 15/1/1969.

Security Committee. It goes without saying that the Government will do all within its power to avert any blow to our concrete strength. This necessitates alternative sources of supply and enhancing the technology of Israel, both in research and in production. Both will see us through the difficulty.

With special emphasis on this point, I wish to conclude: even if it should prove difficult for us at present, we will have to find ways to allocate the necessary means in order to make up for shortages and to advance our own military industry, as far as possible, in the direction of technological independence. We have never espoused technological dependence on others and many of our efforts were aimed at freeing ourselves from it, and not to be dependent above all, on only one or two sources.

Now we must accelerate the pace and shift the emphasis in our development plans. I trust that in the end we shall attain this target more speedily than we had thought at first.

Israel's defensive strength is the principal factor averting renewed large-scale aggression against us in the Middle East. Our strength is powerful today — we shall see to it that it will increase and grow.

7

U.S. President Johnson's Address on the State of the Union to Congress.¹ (Excerpt)

Washington, January 14, 1969

Finally, the quest for stable peace in the Middle East goes on in many capitals tonight. America fully supports the unanimous resolution of the U.N. Security Council which points the way.

There must be a settlement of the armed hostility that exists in that region of the world today. It is a threat not only to Israel and all the Arab states, but it is a threat to every one of us and to the entire world as well.

8

Joint Communiqué on the Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.² (Excerpts)

London, January 15, 1969

Commonwealth heads of government met in London January 7-15. Botswana, Cyprus, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia were represented by their presidents. Australia, Barbados, Britain, Canada, Ceylon, Gambia, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mauritius, New Zealand, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland and Trinidad and Tobago were represented by their prime ministers. Ghana was represented by the Deputy Chairman of the National Liberation Council; Kenya by its Minister of Finance; Nigeria by the Vice-Chairman of the Federal Executive Council; and Pakistan by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Prime Minister of Britain was in the chair.

They considered that events in the Middle East in violation of the United Nations Charter and the Security Council resolution emphasized the need for the establishment of a durable peace in the area as a matter of urgency. This could be achieved in accordance with the Security Council resolutions of November 22, 1967. The heads of government expressed support for the efforts of Dr. Jarring, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General, and urged all concerned to give him their fullest co-operation. They were encouraged to note the round of consultation now in process among the four permanent members of the Security Council and urged these governments to persist in their efforts to help bring about a settlement in accordance with the November 22 resolution of the Security Council. While the role of major powers was important, other countries, especially those that have an interest in the re-opening of the Suez Canal, including Commonwealth members, could contribute towards a settlement.

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 3/2/1969, pp. 89-91.

² Canadian External Affairs, February 1969, pp. 58-71.

Text of the Reported United States Government Reply to the Soviet Union Government's Proposals for a Peaceful Settlement to the Middle East Crisis.¹

January 15, 1969

We have studied the communications of the Soviet Government presented to Secretary of State Rusk on December 20, 1968. President Johnson has been informed of them and he hopes that this reply of the United States Government will be delivered to Premier Kosygin.

The United States Government has also studied the verbal communication of the Soviet Minister Plenipotentiary, Chernyakov, to the American Under-Secretary of State Rostow on 19 December, 1968.

The United States Government welcomes the Soviet Government's desire to cooperate with it in helping Ambassador Jarring in his efforts to reach agreement on a peaceful and acceptable settlement of the dispute in the Middle East. The United States is all in favour of the exchange of views on the Middle East being continued between itself and the Soviet Union, especially as continued deadlock involves dangers of violence liable to threaten the interests of the United States.

The United States has observed constructive elements in the Soviet Government's latest communications, especially insofar as they reflect recognition of the principle that a settlement must be based on agreement between the parties to establish a just and permanent peace in the Middle East in conformity with the principles and provisions of the Security Council resolution adopted on November 22, 1967.

The Government of the United States observes that other aspects of the Soviet Government's communications reflect attitudes and opinions which do not agree with the United States' view of the responsibility for the outbreak of fighting in June 1967, of the impasse which confronts Jarring's mission, and of the correct interpretation

of the Security Council resolution.

The United States is aware that it is important that there should be no misunderstanding between it and the Soviet Union of this vital issue and consequently submits the following comments:

1. The United States regards it as a matter of highest priority that efforts should be made by the Soviet Union and the United States and by other states to use all their influence to stop the grave increase of Arab terrorist operations in the area, since terrorist operations inevitably lead to retaliatory operations. In the opinion of the United States, operations of terrorism and retaliation are liable to jeopardise the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement through implementation of the United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967. The terrorist activity supported or permitted by certain governments, and the retaliatory actions which they give rise to, constitute a serious violation of the Security Council resolution on the cease-fire.

2. The Soviet communications once again raise the question of Israel's acceptance of the November 22 resolution and her readiness to implement this resolution. It is the view of the United States that Israel accepts the resolution and agrees to its implementation by agreement.

It is clear that the Arabs interpret these expressions differently from the Israelis. In the United States' view, the parties should now follow the course of clarifying their attitudes on the principal objective problems instead of continuing to discuss this point. The United States takes the proposal submitted to us by the Soviet Minister Plenipotentiary, Chernyakov, on December 20 as an indication of Soviet acceptance of this attitude.

3. The United States Government is pleased to observe that the Soviet Government considers the points which Secretary of State Dean Rusk submitted to Foreign Minister Mahmud Riad to include constructive elements.

However, it wishes to emphasise that all the points submitted by the American Foreign Secretary, and particularly that which concerns Israeli withdrawal, were based on the assumption that the withdrawal would be part of a settlement agreed on by the parties, which would lead to a just and permanent peace in the area. The

¹ *Al-Ahram* 19/1/1969. This reply, according to *Al-Ahram*, was handed by the U.S. Secretary of State Rusk to the U.S.S.R. Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington, Chernyakov.

United States does not agree with the view expressed in the Soviet note that the United Arab Republic has responded positively to Secretary of State Rusk's observations. It had expected the United Arab Republic to be more ready to move towards clarifying its position than it has so far been. The United States continues to hope that in the end Secretary Rusk's words will have this consequence.

4. The Soviet notes of 19 and 30 December, 1968 both misinterpret the American view of the meaning of the Israeli reference to the Armistice agreements in Foreign Minister Abba Eban's communiqué to Ambassador Jarring of November 4, 1968. The Armistice agreements state clearly that the armistice lines are not final political frontiers, but can be modified by agreement in the transitional stage of moving from armistice to a state of real peace. The United States also emphasised in its declaration of September 29, 1968, that since November 5, 1967 the core of American policy has been that this transition must take place. The policy of the United States on this point remains unchanged; indeed, this has always been United States policy. As president Johnson stated on September 10, 1968, the secure and recognised frontiers mentioned in the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, cannot, and should not, reflect the extent of the occupation. The Security Council's resolution reflects these principles, when it calls for the establishment of a permanent and just peace, but there is nothing definite in the resolution to state that the secure and recognised frontiers to which the Israeli forces are to withdraw should correspond with the boundaries which existed before June 5, 1967 or any other date. In the view of the United States, the basic aim of the resolution was that there should be a transition to a state of peace and that the parties should agree on its elements, not that there should be a return to the situation which existed before.

The United States is convinced that the continuation of the uneasy truce of the last 20 years will be a burden on world peace. The United States cannot speak for Israel, but we believe that it is important that, for once that she should herself clearly express her point of view on this subject to the Soviet government.

5. In its communication of December 30,

1968 the Soviet government declares that the "basic problem" in a Middle East settlement is the withdrawal of Israeli forces from "the" Arab territories which it occupies in accordance with the cease-fire resolutions, to the Armistice lines of June 5, 1967. The United States does not consider this to be the correct interpretation of the November 22, 1967 resolution. The language used in the Soviet memorandum is not the same as is used in the resolution. In the view of the United States, the resolution requires the withdrawal of Israel "from territories occupied in the recent conflict" to secure and recognised frontiers as agreed by the parties in accordance with paragraph 3 of the resolution. We believe this is the meaning of the second paragraph of the Soviet proposal handed to the United States on December 30, 1968.

6. This proposal appears as a form of "provisional agreement" between the parties, which would deal with the questions defined in the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967. This "provisional agreement" explicitly calls for further consultations between the parties, to be arranged by Ambassador Jarring, which may make it possible to arrive at the conclusive provisions of the "final agreement" which the third paragraph of the resolution call for.

The United States finds the idea of a "preliminary plan" or "understanding" among the parties useful, because it may enable Ambassador Jarring to hold fruitful meetings with the parties and to help them to reach agreement on a "definitive plan" for the implementation of all the provisions of the resolution, and an agreed timetable for the implementation of such a plan.

The United States considers that the agreement, which is the object of this plan, should include all elements for a settlement between Israel and all her neighbours as a "package deal" before any steps are taken towards the implementation of this settlement.

7. While analysing the Soviet proposal, the United States encountered certain problems involving the interpretation of the wording of the provisions. For example, the second paragraph speaks of provisions having been agreed upon with respect to secure and recognised frontiers (with appropriate maps attached).

Similarly; while the fourth paragraph includes a reference to withdrawal to the armistice lines which existed on June 5, 1967, and the second paragraph admits the possible advantage of having demilitarised zones as mentioned in the resolution, the fourth paragraph calls for the entrance of the Arab forces into territories from which Israel withdraws. Paragraph 4 also calls for the return to the situation that existed in May, 1967. But in the view of the United States, this situation was the direct cause of the war. Moreover, the preamble of the Soviet proposal calls for a state of peace, not a state of armistice. Furthermore, there is no reference in paragraph 4 to freedom of navigation for Israeli ships in the Suez Canal. Paragraph 5 implies that the withdrawal of Israeli forces must be completed before the Arab governments carry out their declared obligations. This procedure appears to contradict the second paragraph's recognition of a "package deal", as well as the second paragraph of the preamble which recognises the need for agreement on a plan to implement the other clauses in the Security Council's resolution to be concluded at the same time as an agreement on a timetable and procedure for the Israeli withdrawal.

8. The United States is ready to discuss the form which will express the two governments' points of view on the way in which a package deal between the parties can be achieved, which deal should be negotiated by the parties through meetings with Ambassador Jarring, not between the Soviet Union and the United States.

9. The United States and the Soviet Union agree that, though both governments must do all they can to help Ambassador Jarring and the parties to reach an agreement, they cannot impose peace, as peace must come through agreement by the parties. The United States has no objection to an agreed timetable for Israeli withdrawal, if such a timetable is part of the agreement between the parties; it is of the opinion that a timetable for implementing the agreement between the parties must be one of the questions which Ambassador Jarring should raise with them.

However, the United States feels itself obliged to comment on two problems connected with security raised in the Soviet communications.

10. The second paragraph of the Soviet note of

December 19, 1968, refers to the United States declaration of November 8, 1968, concerning Israel's territorial demands from the United Arab Republic, and we observe that Israel has raised the "question of the necessity for its forces to be in Sharm al-Shaikh". In the opinion of the United States, the process of reaching an agreement and attaining a sound and acceptable settlement — as in the 22 November, 1967 resolution — "must involve negotiations" over the means of implementing all the elements of the settlement, as mentioned in this proposal, including the guarantee of navigation rights referred to in paragraph 2 (a) of the resolution.

It should be clearly observed that the conflict of June, 1967 was triggered off by the question of navigation rights through the Straits of Tiran. The only possible way of achieving our hopes for peace lies through maximum security arrangements to guarantee these rights. It will be for the parties, with the participation of Ambassador Jarring, to choose between the ways in which it is possible to implement paragraph 2 (a) of the Security Council resolution.

11. As regards the demilitarisation of Sinai, the possibility of a decision being reached on this point also depends on the parties themselves. However, the United States finds it difficult to believe that partial demilitarisation, as proposed by the Soviet Union, would provide the necessary security measures for the establishment of peace. The war of 1967 started as a direct result of events in Sinai, while activities in this region led to the outbreak of fighting 10 years before. With this history, it is difficult to see how it would be possible for permanent peace to be achieved by only partially demilitarising this sensitive area.

12. The United States continues to believe that an understanding on levels of armament and the limitation of arms is a vital factor in the achievement of peace in the Middle East. The United States continues to express its regret over Soviet policy in this respect and urges that this question be considered an indispensable element in the peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis.

10

Replies in Parliament by the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Roberts to Questions on the Middle East.¹ (Excerpts)

London, January 20, 1969

Mr. Boston asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement about the developments affecting British interests that have taken place in the Middle East in the dispute between Israel and the Arab States.

Sir B. Janner asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the present position in the Middle East.

Mr. Biggs-Davison asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement about the situation in the Middle East.

Mr. Goronwy Roberts: We are seriously concerned about the situation in the Middle East, not least because the security of our interests in the region requires the achievement of a settlement and the establishment of peace.

My right hon. Friend is in touch with a number of Governments, including those of the United States, the Soviet Union and France, about ways in which Dr. Jarring might be helped to make progress in promoting agreement among the parties.

11

News Conference Statement by the U.S. President Nixon on the Middle East.² (Excerpt)

Washington, January 22, 1969

Q. Mr. President, do you or your administration have any plan outside the United Nations proposal for achieving peace in the Middle East?

The President: As you ladies and gentlemen are aware, the suggestion has been made that we have four-power talks. The suggestion has also been made that we use the United Nations as the primary forum for such talks. And it has also been suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union bilaterally should have talks on the Mideast.

In addition to that, of course, the problem finally should be settled by the parties in the area. We are going to devote the whole day on Saturday to the Mideast problem, just as we devoted the whole day this last Saturday to the problem of Viet-Nam.

We will consider on the occasion of that meeting the entire range of options that we have. I shall simply say at this time that I believe we need new initiatives and new leadership on the part of the United States in order to cool off the situation in the Mideast. I consider it a powder keg, very explosive. It needs to be defused. I am open to any suggestions that may cool it off and reduce the possibility of another explosion, because the next explosion in the Mideast, I think, could involve very well a confrontation between the nuclear powers, which we want to avoid.

¹ Great Britain, House of Commons, *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 20/1/1969, cols. 20-23. (The source is hereafter cited as *Hansard*).

² U.S. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 5, No. 5, 3/2/1969, p. 177. Also in U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 17/2/1969, pp. 141-144.

Message of Greeting from the North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh to the International Conference for the Support of Arab Peoples.¹

Cairo, January 24, 1969

In the name of the Vietnamese people I send the International Conference for the Support of the Arab Peoples my warmest wishes. Our Conference is the expression of the militant solidarity between the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America, the progressive forces in the world and the Arab peoples.

The acts of aggression perpetrated by Israel, supported and encouraged by U.S. imperialism, have intensified the prevailing tension in the Middle East. They are, moreover, a violation of the sovereignty of the Arab States, and a serious threat to peace and security in the world and they are an insolent challenge to world opinion.

The Vietnamese people vehemently condemn the Israeli aggressors; they demand the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories they are occupying, and the recovery of the inalienable and legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The Vietnamese people fully support the Palestinian people's liberation movement and the struggle of the Arab peoples for the liberation of territories occupied by Israeli forces, thus contributing to the support of peace in the Middle East and in the world.

The Vietnamese people is determined to fight the American aggressors until total victory; it is determined to perform its duties to its own nation and to fulfil its obligations to its friends in the fight against imperialism and colonialism, for independence and liberty.

I offer you my sincerest thanks for your support of the Vietnamese people in its struggle against American aggression for their national security.

Lastly, I wish you full success in the work of your Conference.

Article in "Pravda", by Yevgeny Vasiliev, Outlining a Settlement to the Middle East Crisis.²

Moscow, January 25, 1969

The situation that has arisen recently in the Middle East is causing increasing alarm in the world.

Although more than a year and a half has already passed since Israel attacked the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria, to this very day the consequences of the Israeli aggression have not been eliminated and this continues to aggravate the situation not only in the Middle East but on the international scene as a whole.

Extensive Arab territories remain under Israeli occupation, the Suez Canal stands idle, causing losses to international shipping, and the fate of hundreds and hundreds of thousands of Arabs forcibly driven off their land continues to be unresolved.

The United Nations Security Council, on November 22, 1967, adopted a resolution which should have provided a basis for a just and stable peace in the Middle East.

It has been said, however, that the matter of a political settlement is not making any headway. The situation in this area continues to remain unstable, and there is no assurance that the conflict will not flare up with new force, creating a danger to peace not only in the Middle East.

The actions and arguments concerning the Security Council resolution, and first of all on the part of the interested states — the Arab countries and Israel — can now be definitely summed up. This unquestionably can shed light on the true reasons for the current situation in this area.

A number of Arab countries declared their readiness to implement the resolution in all its clauses. This decision was confirmed, in particular, by the leadership of the United Arab Republic.

It was far from simple for a number of Arab countries to take such a decision.

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

² *Soviet News* (London), 4/2/1969. First appeared in *Pravda*, 25/1/1969.

Reactionary elements tried to take advantage of the just indignation at the policy adopted by Israel and the foreign forces supporting her of sabotaging a Middle East settlement and annexing the occupied Arab territories. Their aim was to torpedo the settlement and thereby, in practice, not to allow the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression.

The most important political factor in the efforts of the UAR and a number of other Arab countries to implement the Security Council resolution was the restoration of the combat potential of the army and the creation of sufficiently prepared forces to repulse a possible new aggression. Important results have been attained in this respect.

At the same time, however, the UAR has drawn up and proposed a concrete timetable for the carrying out of the November resolution.

The UAR, Jordan and the Lebanon supported the mission of the U.N. secretary-general's special representative, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, a mission which was charged with preparing the conditions for the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

The flexibility demonstrated by the Arab leaders revealed their qualities as statesmen capable of correctly understanding and seeing the interests of their peoples and the interests of peace and security in that area, and correctly sizing up the real situation.

What then was the reply of the Israeli leadership to those steps?

Israel is resorting to a variety of pretexts in order to evade carrying out the Security Council's November resolution. War fever is being fanned in Israel to an ever greater extent.

Tel Aviv is talking ever more frankly about the plans for the annexation of the seized Arab lands. A number of Israeli leaders holding extremist views call for the continuation of the occupation of these territories.

Here is one of the most recent of such statements. It was made by one of the leaders of the Israeli "hawks," Shimon Peres, who told a correspondent of the newspaper *Le Monde*:

"It is self-evident that Jerusalem cannot be given up and that the Golan Heights (on the territory of Syria) are just as necessary for Israel's

security as the River Jordan. As Levi Eshkol stated, not a single Arab military man will have the right to cross the river.

"So far as Sinai is concerned, the main problem is Sharm al-Sheikh, which dominates the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. It is self-evident that guarantees from the United Nations or any foreign power in respect to freedom of navigation would not satisfy us. From our point of view, the best guarantee would be Israel's presence."

It is quite obvious that this kind of blatant extremism is encouraged by the support and aid rendered by certain imperialist circles in the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Britain.

The decision of the Johnson administration to deliver 50 supersonic Phantom fighter-bombers to that country was of no little importance in strengthening the expansionist aspirations of Israel.

Describing the position of the Johnson administration, the Cairo newspaper *Al-Ahram* the other day said that Johnson "surpassed all conceivable limits in his political degradation," that he had "insulted the Arabs and the United Nations in the worst way," and that a big role was played in his patronage over Israel by the influence of Zionist circles and such people as Eugene and Walt Rostow, who held important government posts.

The press of other Arab countries gives a sharply critical assessment of the actions of the former U.S. government in support of the Israeli aggressors. This is a severe, but a just appraisal. The Arab press has exposed the deal made by the Israeli leaders with the ruling circles of West Germany. The Moroccan newspaper *Opinion* recently carried an article which recalled Shimon Peres' admission that West Germany had provided Israel with free military aid to the value of 500 million dollars.

On the eve of the 1967 aggression, Tel Aviv received a big quantity of heavy arms from West Germany. Last year Bonn and Tel Aviv signed an agreement on the delivery to Israel of 54 tanks and other military equipment to a total value of 3,500 million West German marks.

The West German firm of Thyssen granted Israel credits amounting to 48 million marks to build the Eilat-Ashdod oil line.

Last December, the Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Germany, Ernest Benda, conducted negotiations with his Israeli opposite member on co-ordinating the security services of the two countries.

All this, of course, strengthens the extremist circles of Israel and almost daily provides new proof that the Israeli "hawks" are trying to undermine the resolution on settling the Middle East problem, that they have not the slightest intention of taking a single step towards carrying out the Security Council resolution, and in fact refuse to help Dr. Jarring's mission.

Obviously some Israeli leaders are thinking not so much of ensuring peace and security for their country and her future as of deriving short time benefits out of the aggression committed by Israel, and are thereby undermining the possibility of settling Middle East problems in the interests of peace.

Israel is daily conducting deliberate provocations against a number of Arab states.

One of the most flagrant acts recently was the piratical attack against the Beirut international airport. This was a provocative military and political act planned on a big scale by Israel.

The rulers of Israel deliberately issued an impudent challenge to world public opinion to show that they had no intention of abandoning the expansionist course they have chosen.

The Israeli leadership is deeply mistaken, however, if it believes that their policy can bring any political advantage to Tel Aviv; this policy intensifies the factors acting against the Israeli aggressors. The first of these factors is the growth of the defence capacity of the Arab states. During another provocation against the UAR at the end of last November, the Israeli leadership could not help being convinced that Egypt had gone a long way in raising the defence might of its army.

The second factor is Israel's increasing international isolation. This was especially clearly manifested in connection with the attack on the Beirut airport. Even those circles which usually supported Israel condemned her.

If Israel follows the path of military provocations, it will intensify to an ever greater extent the alienation and hostility towards herself on the part of other countries.

Mention should be made of the wide response that France's farsighted and decisive actions received internationally.

The French government placed an embargo on arms deliveries to Israel. It stated its support of the proposals aimed at implementing the decisions of the Security Council's November resolution, and made a proposal for a four-power meeting to discuss the situation in the Middle East.

Finally, the third factor — the intensification of the liberation struggle in the occupied Arab territories.

The Israeli leaders are hoodwinking themselves if they think that, by their acts of "Vengeance," they will be able to suppress the growing resistance movement of the people in the territories seized from the Arabs as a result of the June aggression, a movement aimed at eliminating the consequences and at restoring the just rights of the Palestine Arabs in line with the U.N. decisions and the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

On the contrary, the policy of raids and subversion against various Arab states leads, and can only lead, to diametrically opposite results.

Due to the effect of all these factors, the absurdity of the conclusion drawn in Tel Aviv that time is working in favour of the Israeli leaders becomes even more obvious.

This is a very dangerous fallacy for which, in the final analysis, a heavy price will be paid by the Israeli expansionists who are placing the interests of their own people in jeopardy.

In the circumstances when Israel is trying at any cost to foil the very possibility of settling the conflict and is following a course aimed at thwarting the U.N. Security Council resolution, new, persistent efforts are required to achieve a stable and just peace in this area.

The start of the Paris conference on Vietnam is conducive to growing understanding of the fact that even the most acute international conflicts, given good will, can be shifted on to the rails of a political settlement.

Great responsibility is placed on many states, in particular on the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

Naturally, this is not a question of forcing on countries from outside certain decisions prepared without them, but of rendering them aid in reaching a settlement on the basis of the complete and effective implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolution.

The implementation of the Security Council resolution is the key to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. Of course the establishment of peace in this area should be based on respect for the lawful rights of the Arab peoples, including the Arab population of Palestine.

Concrete ways of implementing the resolution are the main thing on which all those who would like to establish a just and stable peace, in which each and every state in this area could live safely, should concentrate their efforts.

What can be done in this respect after Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries confirm their agreement with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967?

First of all, an agreement should be reached on simultaneous declarations by the Israeli government and the governments of the neighbouring Arab countries on their readiness for an end to the state of war between them and the achievement of a peace settlement after the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories.

In this connection, Israel would announce its readiness to start the withdrawal of the troops from the occupied Arab territories on a set date.

On the day the withdrawal of the Israeli troops starts, to be carried out under the observation of U.N. representatives, the Arab countries and Israel should deposit with the United Nations their respective documents on the termination of the state of war, on respect for and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in that area, and their right to live in peace within safe and recognised borders — in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council.

In keeping with an agreement that could be reached through Dr. Jarring, it would be expedient to co-ordinate the principles concerning safe and recognised borders, ensuring freedom of navigation on international waterways in that area, a fair settlement of the refugee problem and

the territorial immunity and political independence of every state in the area.

The establishment of demilitarized zones is also possible. Agreement on all these problems, in line with the Security Council resolution, should be regarded as an integral whole, relating to all aspects of a settlement for the whole Middle East area, as a kind of package deal.

So far as the withdrawal of the Israeli forces is concerned, that could obviously be carried out in two stages. During approximately the period of a month these forces would withdraw from the Arab territories to definite intermediary boundaries on the Sinai Peninsula, on the Western Banks of the River Jordan and also from the El-Quneitra district in the territory of Syria.

The day the Israeli troops reach definite boundaries in Sinai, the UAR government would move its troops into the Suez Canal zone and start to clear the canal for the resumption of navigation.

In the course of the second month, the Israeli troops would be withdrawn to the lines they occupied before June 5, 1967.

The administration of the respective Arab country would be completely restored in the liberated territories.

During the second stage of the withdrawal of the Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula, United Nations forces would be deployed in Sharm al-Sheikh and the Gaza Sector, thus restoring the situation existing in May 1967.

The Security Council would adopt a resolution on sending U.N. forces and would confirm the principle of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba for ships of all countries.

Finally, after the complete withdrawal of the Israeli troops to the lines of demarcation between states, the documents of the Arab countries and Israel deposited earlier would finally come into force.

Basing itself on the clauses of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council would adopt a resolution on guarantees for the Arab-Israel boundaries, for which a form of guarantee by the four powers who are permanent members of the Security Council is not excluded.

That is how the stage-by-stage implementation

of the Security Council resolution aimed at the speediest achievement of a just and stable peace in the Middle East might look.

If all the circumstances are weighed up realistically, there are now definite possibilities for a shift in favour of a peaceful political settlement of the Middle East problem.

The obstacle on this path is the aggressive, treacherous policy of the Israeli ruling forces, supported by certain imperialist circles outside the country.

The peace-loving forces cannot allow the possibility of a political settlement to be missed and the narrow, egoistic interests of the Israeli militarists to get the upper hand over the interests of peace.

The development of the situation in the Middle East has reached a point at which events can move either in the direction of a political settlement, or can get out of control and lead to another phase of dangerous aggravation of tension, which would be fraught with the danger of a serious explosion.

The Soviet Union has rendered and will continue in the future, too, to render support to the just struggle of the Arab peoples for their rights against the aggressive policy of the present Israeli leadership.

Peace in the Middle East can and must be established — this is demanded by the interests of the peoples inhabiting this area, it is demanded by the interests of all peace-loving countries and peoples.

14

Interview Statements by the French Foreign Minister Debré on Security Council Resolution of 22 November, 1967.¹ (Excerpts)

Paris, January 25, 1969

[Commenting on Security Council resolution of 22 November, 1967, Mr. Debré said:] "Let us

not play around with words: to want to go on with the occupation is to want the state of war to continue: The sentence is clear; there is absolutely no ambiguity. France cannot remain indifferent towards operations which would tend to jeopardise the integrity of Lebanon."

"At present, the situation which poses the greatest threat to world peace is that of the Middle East. In that area of the world, we can actually see a process of 'disintegration'. In the coming months, or even weeks, either an effort will be made to overcome the situation as it now stands, providing an opportunity for a settlement, or, we will witness a determination of the situation which will have certain unavoidable consequences."

The minister then spoke of France's memorandum to the United States, Great Britain and the USSR calling for a meeting of the four powers to discuss the means for the implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution. According to Mr. Debré, France could act as a "stimulus" to bring about a settlement; she would put forward certain terms for the implementation of the resolution before the Security Council, and assist in the search for a common position.

The minister observed in passing that the Soviet memorandum was indeed "a most satisfactory working paper."

"The fact is that we have come to a point where it appears urgent that we take whatever action we still can to arrive at what we think ought to be a just and lasting settlement.

"In November 1967, the Security Council of the United Nations unanimously passed a resolution. As I have often said, we support that resolution because its aim is not merely to settle the immediate problem such as it appeared in the wake of what has been called the six-day war, but rather because a just and lasting settlement is quite clearly the objective it aims at.

"So far, the resolution has not been implemented in any way. The UN Secretary General designated an ambassador from Sweden to discover the conditions under which the belligerent parties would accept to take the necessary steps for the implementation of the resolution.

¹ *L'Orient* (Beirut), 26/1/1969. ORTF correspondents in Washington, Moscow, Bonn, Jerusalem and Beirut, participated in the interview. The discussion was led by Mrs. Jacqueline Bandrier, ORTF Assistant Director.

"This mission met with so little success that towards the end of last year the Swedish ambassador was hesitant as to whether he should carry on. It was only after pressure had been exerted by several governments and particularly by the Secretary General of the UN that he agreed to do so.

"We cannot indulge in any illusions. We cannot permit ourselves to do so particularly as the non-implementation of the resolution can only lead to a deterioration of the situation, which would have easily been predicted and which I commented on at the UN General Assembly.

"If those who have not lost interest now find that the situation has come to a head, there is only one alternative: either we take the round-about way via the Security Council resolution, or the situation will inevitably deteriorate. It will deteriorate both locally and outside the area for, as the various factions entrench themselves more forcibly in their positions, the chances on the conflict remaining unsolved become more likely.

"In view of the circumstances, France advocates a formula devised by General de Gaulle even before Israel launched her June 1967 offensive.

"France calls on the four nations which by virtue of the UN charter are permanent members of the Security Council to devise a plan of action; in all likelihood, the Security Council would then be in a position to adopt certain measures relating to the details for the implementation of the resolution, and to a timetable for its execution."

15

Message of Support from the Czechoslovak Premier Cernik to the Second International Conference for the Support of the Arab Peoples.¹

Cairo, January 25-28, 1969

In the name of the government of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia, I send you my best wishes for the success of your conference. I am convinced that the basis for the realisation of the legitimate demands of the Arab countries

is the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

The government and peoples of the Arab countries can count on the total support of the government and people of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia, a support which emanates from the principles of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy and which corresponds to the positive attitude of our people towards the struggle of nations for liberty, independence and social progress.

I would like to reaffirm to you, in the name of the government and people of Czechoslovakia, our solidarity and our profound sympathy.

16

Speech by the Indian Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Leader of the Indian Delegation Khadilkar to the Second International Conference for the Support of the Arab Peoples.²

Cairo, January 27, 1969

First we met in Delhi in November 1967 and now we are meeting here in Cairo to reassure the people of the UAR in particular and the Arabs in general, of our full support in their struggle to regain the lost territories and restore a durable peace in this part of the world. By committing blatant aggression on the sacred soil of the UAR, Jordan and Syria, Israel has for the third time in their twenty years' existence disturbed the peace of West Asia and now, in the name of ensuring security with the support of the imperialists, Israel is manoeuvring to retain and consolidate the gains of aggression. It is well known how the state of Israel was planted in the midst of the Arab world. Since the beginning of the 19th century the map of West Asia has been drawn and redrawn by the Imperialist powers so as to serve their economic and political objectives. For the first time in recent history President Nasser symbolised resurgent nationalism in this part of the world and created new consciousness amongst the Arab people. The nationalisation of the Suez

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

² Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

Canal was a master-stroke of self assertion by President Nasser which gave a knockout blow to the traditional vested interests of the Western powers in this region. Since the rise of President Nasser, a conspiracy has been going on to shatter his image so as to re-establish their hegemony over the Arab people. The state of Israel was conceived and brought into being with a long-term design, to serve as a bridgehead of imperialism in the heart of the Arab world. Now, however, Israel is one of the members of the UN and if we take a realistic view of the situation, whether one likes it or not, Arabs will have to live with it. Unfortunately, Zionists of the world rallied round Israel and, since its creation, Israel has assumed an aggressive posture. Instead of living with the Arabs in peace and harmony it maintained an attitude of separateness, as if it was a foreign element that could not be assimilated, nor could it allow itself to be assimilated in the region in which it existed. As a result, naturally there is a certain amount of hostility towards Israel. The leadership of Israel has made so far no effort to win over the Arabs. On the contrary, by driving out the Palestine Arabs from their homeland it has aggravated the situation. The June 1967 attack of Israel on the Arabs was a premeditated act of aggression committed with a nonchalance so as to weaken the emotional rapport that President Nasser has with the Arab peoples as well as cripple them politically and economically. This is the stark reality which we should bear in mind when we in this gathering consider the situation in West Asia, and find out ways and means to meet the challenge posed by Israel. After the six days of war the United Nations was seized of the problem and the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution to restore peace. But unfortunately, Israel is not only not prepared to abide by it; but, without declaring it in so many words, continues to flout the world sanctions behind the Security Council resolution. In this situation we will have to find out how world opinion is brought to bear on the UN so as to see that the Security Council resolution is implemented in the spirit in which it was adopted by that august body. Whatever the weaknesses of the UN we have to explore all the possibilities so as to see that Israel implements the resolution and vacates the aggression committed by it on the Arabs. India has never recon-

ciled to an aggressor being allowed to retain the fruits of aggression. The people of India, therefore, feel naturally concerned and stand solidly with the Arab people in getting the aggression vacated without further delay. This conference, representing people from all the continents and in particular from the Afro-Asian world, stands solidly behind them so that world opinion could be mobilised and moral pressure exercised on those who are in a position to compel Israel to implement the Security Council resolution. The conference should welcome the initiative taken by the Soviet Union in this behalf so as to implement the Security Council resolution step by step. We feel also that the move by President de Gaulle for a four power meeting would undoubtedly help in preparing the ground for the implementation of the Soviet proposals for peace in this region. This is perhaps the primary task. We should at the same time devise a bold strategy of peace to thwart the global strategy of imperialists who are out to disturb peace.

We should not allow imperialism to influence the politics of the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia with a view to re-establish their colonial domination by devious ways. To defeat their game, we have to devise our own plan of action. We must draw out a long term plan of peace. We have to build in the first instance independent national economies and extend the areas of economic cooperation between ourselves. It would perhaps surprise some, but not all, that the oil royalties that the Arabs deposit in the banks of the West in which Zionist influence is predominant, were used to build Western economic hegemony over the developing countries. The terms of trade are becoming more and more unfavourable to the newly independent countries, and preserve the stranglehold of the imperialist countries. The Zionist international tribe also has its control over the publicity media like newspapers, etc. Even President de Gaulle has to face virulent attacks when he takes an independent stand to help restore peace in the Middle East. How would then the developing nations be strong enough to withstand pressures till they become self-reliant independent economies that would strengthen their freedom as well as the bonds of friendship among them.

Before concluding I would like to briefly refer

to the problem of the Palestine refugees. We heard on the opening day of the conference the very moving report of the Al Fatah representative. Even if the Security Council resolution is implemented, so long as the problem of the refugees is not settled, it is likely to continue to prove a threat to peace. After years of suffering and privation, refugees who were deprived of their homeland are naturally in a mood of desperation. The world body that created the theocratic state of Israel and planted it in the Arab world has uprooted the Arabs who are now struggling to recover their homeland. In our opinion the world body, along with the implementation of the Security Council resolution must also initiate a plan of action to settle the problem of the Palestine refugees if they want to have a lasting peace.

We have no quarrel with the people of the Jewish faith, nor with any other religious sect or community. We stand by secularism and we would like people of all faiths to live in peace and amity in this land which has been the home of many faiths for so many centuries. Let the conference take concrete steps in this direction in keeping with our objectives to consolidate freedom and peace.

17

Resolutions of the Sixteenth Conference of the Israeli Communist Party.¹

Tel Aviv-Jaffa, January 30 — February 1, 1969

A Basis for Solving the Israeli-Arab Dispute

The Sixteenth Conference affirms that our Party has throughout the years struggled to reach a political settlement by peaceful means of the Israeli-Arab dispute, and of the Palestine problem, on the basis of the mutual recognition of the just and legitimate national rights of the two peoples of Palestine, the people of Israel and the Palestinian Arab people. We have stated that the Israeli people have achieved their national rights while these rights have been plundered from the Palestinian Arab people.

Therefore, we are of the opinion, and rightly so, that the road to peace lies in the recognition by Israel of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people and, above all, of the right of the Arab refugees to choose between returning to their homeland or receiving compensation, in conformity with United Nations resolutions. We have also stated that the national issue, which includes the territorial problem, must be settled on the basis of the people's right to self determination, and in conformity with the public interest, and with peace, progress and the struggle against colonialism.

The Israeli-Arab dispute and the Palestine issue could have been solved on more than one occasion by peaceful means and on the sound basis of the mutual recognition of the legitimate national rights of the people of Israel and the Palestine Arab people. There have been Arab elements, even in official circles, who have shown their readiness to attempt such an approach; it has been Israel official circles which have caused such attempts to fail.

For the Implementation of the Security Council Resolution

The Conference considers that the most important and pressing duty which our Party and the forces of peace in our country face at the present time is the settlement of the crisis in our area, the crisis which arose from the June War.

Our Communist Party considers that the most important and pressing duty of the forces of peace and national responsibility in Israel, regardless of political views and party loyalty, is to do all they can to prevent a new war breaking out, and to force the government to evacuate all the occupied territories within the framework of the implementation of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

Recent developments confirm that the Arab states, led by Egypt and Jordan, are working in the international field to solve the present crisis by peaceful, political means and that they are ready to set their relations with the State of Israel on a new basis, different from that which has existed for twenty years. The Arab states have declared their readiness to end their state of belligerency with the State of Israel, to recognise the right of Israel to exist within secure and recognised frontiers, and to recognise Israel's

¹ *Al-Ittihad* (Tel Aviv), 4/2/1969.

right to navigate in the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal. The government of Israel, for its part, must agree to withdraw from the occupied territories of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and to solve the problem of the Palestine refugees — that painful human and national problem — in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

The Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 includes these fundamental principles. In the international field there have been proposals for implementing the Security Council's resolution in accordance with a predetermined timetable which would be binding on Israel and the Arab states alike.

The Conference takes a positive view of the proposals for the implementation of the Security Council resolution, in conformity with a predetermined timetable, because they are sound and realistic proposals aimed at reaching a political settlement and at preventing a new war.

The Conference considers that the continued refusal of the government of Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories, within the framework of the implementation of the Security Council resolution, is the main obstacle to finding a solution of the crisis.

18

Joint Press Release on the East German Foreign Minister Winzer's Visit to the United Arab Republic.¹ (Excerpt)

Cairo, February 1, 1969

The two sides agree that the policy of territorial expansion pursued by Israel in that area obstructed peace in the Middle East.

Israel's refusal to realize the UN Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967, and its lasting occupation of the territories of three Arab states confirm that policy of territorial expansion and are a continued and obstinate attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these Arab states, as well as a grave violation

of the basic principles of the United Nations Charter.

The German Democratic Republic and the United Arab Republic declare that the bringing about of peace in the Middle East requires the full realization by Israel of the UN Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967, and the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied after the aggression of 5 June 1967.

The two Ministers pay tribute to the struggle of the Arab people and their heroic resistance against the Israeli occupation. They recognize all rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their legitimate right to self-determination.

19

Statement by the Prime Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden on the Situation in the Middle East.¹ (Excerpt)

Stockholm, February 1, 1969

The development in the Middle East has caused serious concern to the peoples of the five Nordic countries. The executions in Iraq of January 27, 1969, as well as armed clashes and the subsequent reprisals have increased tension in the area.

The Prime Ministers... voice their anxiety over a development which makes it more difficult for the countries to find a peaceful solution and they appeal to the parties to refrain from all actions which might aggravate the situation.

¹ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 17/2/1969.

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 3/2/1969.

20

Message from the Australian Premier Gorton to the Executive Council of Australian Jewry¹. (Excerpt)

Sydney, February 3, 1969

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We believe that all parties to the dispute should, without delay, sit down around the conference table and begin discussions aimed at restoring peace and stability to the Middle East.

Any such settlement must be formally based on the acceptance of Israel as a sovereign nation existing as of right, entitled to live and develop in security, free of constant threat, posing no threat to its neighbouring countries, and using for the good of all rights and opportunities so dearly bought.

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21

Joint Communiqué on the New Zealand Premier Holyoake's Visit to Pakistan.² (Excerpt)

Islamabad, February 4, 1969

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The two leaders expressed their concern over the continuation of the explosive situation in the Middle East. They reiterated their opposition to the use of force for extraterritorial gains. They called for an early solution of the conflict on the basis of the Security Council resolution of 22nd November, 1967.

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¹ Australian *Current Notes on Internal Affairs*, February, 1969, p. 55.

² *Pakistan Documents Series*, vol. VI, No. 1, February 1969. The series is issued by the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

22

Joint Communiqué on the Tunisian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Bourguiba Jr.'s visit to France.³ (Excerpt)

Paris, February 5, 1969

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France's attitude on the Middle East problem received special attention from the Tunisian delegation. The delegation expressed its satisfaction at the attitude of the French government, whose initiative was a major contribution to the search for a just solution which could bring peace to this part of the world for a long time to come, independent of any form of hegemony and based on the peoples' exercise of a free choice.

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23

Reply in Parliament by the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Foley to a Question on British Armaments Policy in the Middle East.⁴ (Excerpt)

London, February 5, 1969

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Mr. Norwood asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in view of the latest developments involving the four major powers in their efforts to secure a settlement in the Middle East and the increasing dangers of further military conflict in the area, if Her Majesty's Government will now cease shipments of arms to any of the countries involved.

Mr. Foley: No. Our present policy is to scrutinise each application by any country in the region for the supply of arms on its merits. I do not believe that any variation in this policy at the present time would contribute to the quest for peace in the Middle East.

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³ *Al-Amal* (Tunis), 7/2/1969.

⁴ *Hansard*, January 31 - February 6, 1969, col. 126.

24

**Statement by the U.S. State Department
Spokesman Robert J. McCloskey on the
Four-Power Talks.¹****Washington, February 5, 1969**

The United States Government informed the Government of France that it is prepared in principle to consider favorably a meeting of United Nations representatives of France, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and the United States within the framework of the Security Council to discuss ways and means to assist Ambassador Jarring to promote agreement between the parties in accordance with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.²

We suggested that there be prompt preliminary discussions, in the first instance on a bilateral basis, for the purpose of developing the measure of understanding that would make an early meeting of the permanent U.N. representatives of the four powers a fruitful and constructive complement to Ambassador Jarring's mission.

States in assuming the initiative. We are not going to stand back and rather wait for something else to happen.

We are going to assume it on what I would suggest five fronts: We are going to continue to give our all-out support to the Jarring mission; we are going to have bilateral talks at the United Nations, preparatory to the talks between the four powers; we shall have four-power talks at the United Nations; we shall also have talks with the countries in the area, with the Israelis and their neighbors; and in addition, we want to go forward on some of the long-range plans, the Eisenhower-Strauss plan for relieving some of the very grave economic problems in that area.

We believe that the initiative here is one that cannot be simply unilateral. It must be multilateral. And it must not be in one direction. We are going to pursue every possible avenue to peace in the Mideast that we can.

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25

**News Conference Statement by the U.S.
President Nixon on the Middle East.³
(Excerpt)****Washington, February 6, 1969**

Q. Mr. President, on the Middle East, now that you have completed your review with the NSC [National Security Council] - you spoke of a need for new initiatives - can you tell us what your policy is going to be now and what initiatives you do expect to take?

The President: Mr. Bailey [Charles W. Bailey 2d, Minneapolis *Star and Tribune*], our initiatives in the Mideast, I think, can well be summarized by that very word that you have used. What we see now is a new policy on the part of the United

26

**Joint Communiqué on the South Yemeni
President al-Sha'bi's Visit to the Soviet
Union.⁴ (Excerpt)****Moscow, February 9, 1969**

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[The Soviet government] also declared that it would continue in the future to come out strongly in support of the just struggle of the Arabs for the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression and for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories.

The Soviet government has informed the government of South Yemen about new steps which it is taking for a settlement in the Middle East.

The two sides pointed out that the consolidation of peace in the Middle East area should be based on respect for the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples, including the Arab population of Palestine.

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 24/2/1969, p. 161.

² For text, see *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 268-269.

³ U.S. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 5, no. 5, 10/2/1969, p. 227.

Also in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 24/2/1969, pp. 157-161.

⁴ *Soviet News* (London), 11/2/1969.

They strongly condemned the neo-colonialist policy of the imperialist powers in Asia, Africa and Latin America and declared their support for the just struggle of the peoples for the complete abolition of the colonial system and for freedom and independence.

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Interview Granted by the French Foreign Minister Debré to the Middle East News Agency on the Middle East Crisis.¹

Paris, February 10, 1969

Q. What is the principle, or principles, which govern French policy on the Middle East Crisis?

A. There are two basic principles. The first is the right of peoples to self-determination. The second is somewhat different from the first, but it is very important in international life; it is the so-called balance of power. When these two principles meet, the foundations of peace can be laid.

Let us begin with the right to self-determination, which is a long standing principle in French political theory. The experiences of recent years, not to mention those of past generations, allow us to affirm that, although this principle is not in itself sufficient to guarantee peace, to ignore it involves a grave risk of starting a war.

Furthermore, it is well known that it is impossible to avoid falling under the control of imperialism or partisanship unless there is a balance between the forces prevailing in the world and in all parts of the globe.

French policy has always been guided by these two ideas. At one stage in the past we stressed the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination in the interests of Israel and of its survival and security. But the events and circumstances of today are different from those of yesterday, even though the principles remain unchanged.

Q. How did things develop to the stage where it became necessary for the Great Powers to play a role in the solution of the Middle East crisis?

A. There are two basic reasons which are clear to all and which support the point of view General de Gaulle has defended since 1967. I myself am convinced of their validity and hope that they will lead to success.

The first reason is that it is difficult for us at present to imagine a direct agreement between the combatants, because the Arab states' refusal to talk about a direct agreement with Israel leaves no alternative to reliance on the Security Council. How do you get the Security Council to move? The task which U Thant entrusted to Ambassador Jarring served to throw light on the problem, but it is clear that the implementation of the Security Council resolution alone will not be sufficient.

It is my opinion that the permanent members of the Security Council — the United States, Russia, France and Britain — must get the Security Council to take action to define the possibilities of a settlement in accordance with the principles approved by the Council in November 1967. However, there is also another reason, nearly as important as the first: every one feels that the situation in the Middle East, which is still a situation of war, is one which creates continuing dangers; and as long as there is danger, we shall be turning a blind eye to the facts if we do not realise that this dispute is liable to spread far beyond its present limits. It seems to me that these two reasons are enough to explain the attitude we have adopted that the four permanent member states of the Security Council should face up to their responsibilities, going so far, should it be necessary, as to supervise and guarantee the implementation of such settlements as the Security Council may decide on.

Q. How would you define the meaning of there being a role for the Great Powers to play in the Middle East crisis?

A. The fact is that the discussion started with a policy and we must beware of using too many legal expressions. For circumstances change and events may sometimes make it necessary to adopt an attitude which may not be acceptable in other situations. It is by evaluating the importance of

¹ *Al-Muharrir* (Beirut), 11/2/1969. The interview was conducted by Mr. Ali al-Shammas, the Middle East Agency Correspondent in Paris.

a situation and the dangers it could involve that nations which appreciate their responsibilities ascertain what action they can take. Furthermore, as regards the situation we are discussing, any action by the Four Great Powers and the Security Council depends directly on how ready the warring states are to make things easier on the contrary. This is my answer to the question.

Q. Is the Soviet project on the same lines as the course followed by the French government as regards the Middle East situation?

A. There is a basis: the Security Council resolution of November of 1967. Why do we regard this resolution as a basis? Because in our opinion it does not only aim at settling the immediate consequences of the Six Day War but it was also motivated by a more far-reaching idea — a legitimate idea, so it seems to us — the essence of which is the search for a permanent settlement, for stable peace and the attaining of a situation which would permit of changes in the living condition of the peoples of the Middle East being introduced every year or every generation.

This then is the resolution which is our charter, and which can be and must be applied; this is the whole problem. The action which, in our opinion, the responsible states, or the four permanent members of the Security Council, must take, is to prepare their proposals with the agreement of the parties concerned and in close and continuous cooperation with the United Nations envoy. These proposals will be difficult to frame, but they are essential and, whether based on our ideas or American or Soviet ideas, must in our opinion, eventually attain the required result.

Q. As the American attitude is so important for the future of the Great Powers' role in the crisis, what are the possibilities of the American attitude developing?

A. I am the French Foreign Minister, and what I am laying before you and your people is our judgement of the situation and of the method that must be followed. As I mentioned before, the situation is, in our opinion, a grave one, because the continuation of a state of war is fraught with perils for the states concerned and for others. This issue also concerns us from another point of view — and I do not mean France's traditional concern for the problems of the Middle East and even more for its people. We believe

that the Security Council resolution which aims at reaching a permanent and just settlement is in conformity with the interests of all — including the Arab states that are at war and those that are not, the interests of Israel and the interests of all to whom the Middle East is of vital importance.

We must work towards the implementation of this resolution.

In my opinion, the attitudes of the two super-powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, and especially that of America, are based on a feeling that the situation is less dangerous than we consider it. It seems to me that the new Soviet trend is based on an analysis which is to a great extent, close to our own. It also seems to me that, now the election campaign is over, the new American President has greater freedom of action than his predecessor had, and that he has at his disposal reports which have aroused concern.

Q. But there is a problem which the Security Council has not dealt with. As your Excellency knows, when the world talked about the Palestinian Problem before June 5 they were talking exclusively about the refugee problem while since the June War the problem has become the problem of the national rights of the Palestinian nation.

A. You are right. There have always been two problems, the first of which was the human problem, the problem of the refugees . . . the refugees after the Six Day War. It is a vital problem, a problem of a people's homeland, where they are to live, a profoundly moving human problem. Then there is the political problem which is not a new one, though it has, to a certain extent, assumed a new aspect as a result of the present situation. There is no doubt that the time which has elapsed since the Security Council resolution, requires that action be taken to implement it to ensure that any permanent settlement takes into consideration the political problem which was perhaps not taken into account during the Security Council meetings, as the text of the resolution shows.

Q. Does the principle of self-determination apply to the Palestinian people?

A. No principle has any value unless it is applied. As I said before, the interpretation of this principle does not depend on any one specific

situation, for the right of self-determination and the right of peoples to live is equally valid in the case of Israel and of all the Arab countries.

Q. There is now resistance in the occupied territories, Your Excellency, to what extent does it affect the present situation and the prospects of solving the problem?

A. This is the great tragedy in war. Invasion does not solve a problem, on the contrary, it makes it more acute, as we are seeing once again with our own eyes. The occupation by one state of the territories of other states does not lead to peace; it complicates matters, as we are seeing now. One of the dangers of the present situation is that refusal to withdraw from the occupied territories will strengthen the resistance and lead to increasing hatred and opposition. Therefore any policy which aims at settling the problem must begin by concentrating on the necessity for withdrawal from the occupied territories.

Q. Can we say now that withdrawal from the occupied territories is the first step towards a solution of the Middle East crisis?

A. That is so; it has already been said that withdrawal from the occupied territories is the first step towards a just and permanent settlement. It is, of course, understood, as was explicitly stated in the Security Council resolution, that this withdrawal from the occupied territories must be to secure and recognised frontiers. Then it will be possible to reach a complete settlement.

Q. As regards Franco-Arab relations, can you say whether France has a policy vis-à-vis the Arab world as a whole?

A. France is bound to have a policy vis-à-vis the so-called Arab world. This is nothing new in our history which has been a long tale of disputes and alliances resulting from the fact that France and the Arab states share the Mediterranean, from the role that France has played in Africa for so long, and, last but not least, from France's links with the Middle East. All this has meant that, among the Western European powers, France has always adopted an attitude of concern for the problems of the Arab states and the other countries and their development. As you know, there is in the Arab world, just as there is in Europe, a variety of states, ideas and trends, so that the expression "political relations" between

France and the Arab World leaves room for attitudes to change, not only with the passage of time and with changing circumstances, but also in accordance with changes in orientation towards one part or another of the Arab World, and towards one state or another in the world. But the general spirit, and especially the spirit of the President of the French Republic — and I am now speaking of the present — is that relations should be such as to allow the Arab states to attain the status of modern nations, both politically and economically. For there are great revolutions in progress in the world and we know, as I said before, that peace in the Mediterranean will be ensured not only by the principles which I have mentioned; shared efforts for economic growth and social progress — are also required. Here the Arab countries, like all countries in the world, are sensitive to many trends; like other countries they are torn apart by conflicts between respect for the traditions which are their spiritual foundations, and the demands of development.

Q. What is the present state of Franco-Egyptian relations?

A. When talking about the relations between two states and two peoples, the relation between the rulers and public opinion must be considered. I believe that though the past years have seen ups and downs in the relations between the rulers, the important thing is that popular feeling has always been based on mutual cooperation and admiration. France's present clearly defined attitude to the dispute and her desire that the Arab States should recover their dignity in the higher interests of peace, and that the doors of development should be opened to them, are a convincing indication that relations are better than they were before. I hope that this French policy will continue to be understood in the future and that our present exceptionally good relations will continue.

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Replies in Parliament by the British Minister of State Mulley to Questions on the Middle East.¹**London, February 10, 1969**

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on his discussions with the Russian Ambassador regarding the Middle East.

Mr. Mulley: My right hon. Friend the Minister of State has just visited the United Arab Republic, the Sudan and Morocco. His visit has not been discussed with the Soviet Ambassador.

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Could the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether, during his right hon. Friend's discussions with the Russian Ambassador in January, the Russian Ambassador argued that the Government of Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories in the Middle East? Can he also tell us whether the Foreign Secretary suggested to the Russian Government that that was a matter for the Government which had itself withdrawn from occupation of Czechoslovakia?

Mr. Mulley: As the House knows, the Soviet Ambassador called on my right hon. Friend on 2nd January and made a communication about the Middle East. Later in the month my right hon. Friend gave our reply to the *chargé d'affaires*. Many of the Russian proposals are constructive and we asked clarification on a number of issues, but it would be wrong in this diplomatic exchange between Governments for the full content of them to be published without the consent of the other party.

Mr. Shinwell: My right hon. Friend has referred to the Minister's visit to the Middle East. But his right hon. Friend the Minister of State only visited the Arab countries. Why did his visit exclude Israel? How is it possible for the Government to make up their minds about a solution of the Middle East problem if Ministers direct their attention only to the Arab countries and avoid Israel?

Mr. Mulley: As has been explained in answer to Questions, my right hon. Friend's visit was

planned a long time ago. It was not in the context of the current Four-Power talks. It was in order to give him first-hand acquaintance with some of the countries for which he is responsible in the Department. On the question of visits to Israel, as was said last week, this is under consideration but there are no plans at present.

29

Replies in Parliament by the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Foley to Questions on the Situation in the Middle East.² (Excerpts)**London, February 10, 1969**

Mr. Shinwell asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the situation in the Middle East.

Mr. Foley: All concerned have now replied to the proposal of the French Government that a meeting of the representatives on the Security Council of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom should be held to discuss ways and means of achieving a settlement in the Middle East. We expect that preliminary discussions to prepare the ground for such a meeting, in the first instance on a bilateral basis, will shortly begin.

Mr. Mayhew: Is the Under-Secretary aware that there are still a number of Arab leaders who are hoping and working for a political settlement along the lines of the Security Council Resolution but that their position is being made rapidly impossible by the failure to make progress on the Resolution, and, in particular, by the insistence of the Israeli Government on permanently incorporating large areas of conquered Arab territory?

Mr. Mayhew: Will he try to reach agreement with the Four Powers, first on a timetable for implementing the Resolution —

¹ *Hansard*, 10/2/1969, cols. 873-874.

² *Hansard*, 10/2/1969, cols. 874-876.

Mr. Mayhew: — and thereafter perhaps on agreement to withdraw arms supplies from any countries which decline to carry out that timetable?

Mr. Foley: I should emphasise that the policy of Her Majesty's Government is that there cannot be a settlement without agreement among the parties. The object of the Four Powers meeting is to seek ways and means of furthering the work of Doctor Jarring to isolate and define the areas of agreement and disagreement, and to proceed in this fashion.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: Can my hon. Friend assure us that the Secretary of State himself will go to these very important meetings?

Mr. Foley: I cannot give that assurance.

Mr. John Mendelson: Will my hon. Friend accept that there will be widespread support for the insistence by the Government and by the United States Government that these four-Power discussions should be carried on under the aegis of the United Nations? Will he further accept that there is confidence that the Government will see to it that the security interests of all Middle-Eastern States will be fully safeguarded?

Mr. Crawshaw: Would not my hon. Friend agree that some of the heat might be taken out of the situation in the Middle East if when aggression were committed by either side we showed equal concern, not just when it happened to be Israel attacking Arab countries?

Mr. Foley: We are always concerned about anything which is harmful to the cause of peace and we equally condemn anyone who takes such initiatives.

30

Press Statement by the Nepali Foreign Minister Rajbhadari on the Middle East.¹

Katmandu, February 11, 1969

"Nepal welcomes attempts by the Big Four to bring peace to the Middle East."

[The Foreign Minister] urged Israel and the Arabs to refrain from raids, reprisals and counter-reprisals.

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 12/2/1969.

"A lasting peace in the Middle East is possible only through a negotiated settlement which recognizes the need for respect of sovereignty of all states in the region, rehabilitation of the displaced indigenous population and ending of the state of belligerency."

31

Joint Communiqué on the Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel's Visit to Tunisia.² (Excerpt)

Tunis, February 12, 1969

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Within the framework of an exchange of views between the two Ministers on the international situation, they reaffirmed their countries' commitment to the principles and objectives of the United Nations Charter.

They expressed their grave concern over the critical situation in the Middle East which could have repercussions dangerous to world security and peace.

They stressed the need for a speedy, just and lasting solution to the problem; in particular, they felt that all parties concerned should be called on to implement the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

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32

Joint Communiqué on the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Marko's Visit to the Soviet Union.³ (Excerpt)

Moscow, February 12, 1969

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... The two sides discussed the situation in the

² *Al-Amal* (Tunis), 14/2/1969. Mr. Harmel paid this visit in response to an invitation from Mr. Habib Bourguiba Jr., Tunisian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The visit lasted from 10-12 February, 1969.

³ *Soviet News* (London), 23/2/1969. First appeared in *Pravda*, 12/2/1969.

Middle East, where the dangerous situation brought about as a result of Israel's aggressive actions against Arab countries still continues to exist. The USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will continue to support a political solution of the crisis on the basis of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967.

33

Joint Communiqué on the East German Foreign Minister Winzer's Visit to Syria.¹
(Excerpts)

Damascus, February 12, 1969

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic endorsed the unanimity of their standpoints on the fundamental issues of the international situation and the endeavours of their governments for preserving peace and safeguarding the security of the peoples. They laid special emphasis on the ambitions of imperialism and Zionism, in different parts of the world with heightened aggressiveness and through exacerbating international tensions, to stem the advance of the forces of socialism and social progress, a fact which requires of these forces concentrated efforts to meet and thwart such attempts.

Both Ministers paid tribute to the incessant struggle of the socialist states of Europe for the maintenance of peace. They corroborated the essentiality of respect for the existing frontiers of the GDR and pointed out that every threat to the GDR or any other socialist state in Europe represents a danger prejudicing world peace. This danger has been conjured up by certain forces within NATO, in Europe through their aiding and abetting West German revanchism, as in the Middle East through their backing to Israel and its pursuit of aggression and expansion.

Both Ministers condemned the imperialist and Zionist policy which has built up Israel into

an aggressive instrument against the rights of the Arab people and their aspirations for liberation and unity.

Both parties agreed in their view that the policy of regional and colonial aggression and expansion pursued by Israel in the Middle East and supported by imperialism, and the perpetuated occupation of territories of three Arab states by Israel constitute a continuation of aggression on the sovereignty and security of these states. Both parties regard this as a flagrant violation of the fundamentals of the United Nations Charter.

Both Ministers reaffirmed the positions of their governments on the imperativeness of setting an end to the Israeli imperialist aggression against the Arab nation and of the unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the occupied lands.

Both Ministers denounced the arms supplies and aids to Israel by the USA and West Germany. They consider these as aggressive acts against the Arab states, aggravating the tensions in this sphere and encouraging Israel's aggressiveness.

Herr Winzer gave the assurance that his government supported the rightful struggle the Arab people are leading in various regions to free themselves from dependence and colonialism and in order to end the exploitation of the wealth of the Arab motherland by imperialism.

He gave the assurance of his government's full support to the people of Palestine in regaining their rights including their legitimate right to self-determination. He expressed the admiration of the people of the German Democratic Republic for the heroic struggle of the Arab resistance movement, especially for the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine against the Israeli occupation, and confirmed the solidarity and support of the GDR people for this struggle.

¹ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 25/2/1969.

34

Radio Interview with the Israeli Premier Eshkol.¹ (Excerpt)**Tel Aviv, February 13, 1969**

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Q. ...We really had in the past few days the disturbing feeling, now that pressure might be mounting from America and at the United Nations, things have not been going too well for us. How are we going to meet this new situation?

A. When we put the United States and the UN in one category — the UN with the resolutions that have been adopted — I think it cancels itself out as a fact that has not had any moral right to judge us or to demand anything ever (sentence as heard). As far as the United States is concerned, with all the problems that we have and the discussions that have been going on and are going on at the present time, there are some things that we do not agree on. The truth is that there have not been any pressures from the United States — and I, I don't accept it as something that must happen. People here, I think, are asking too much about pressure as though it's accepted that there must be pressure. It may be, but so far there hasn't been any sign of it and I hope there won't be.

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35

Interview Granted by the Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol to "Newsweek".²**Jerusalem, February 17, 1969**

Q. How do you justify Israel's continued occupation of Arab lands?

A. We have fought three wars in our brief lifetime of twenty years. If the Arab governments

had accepted, as the whole world did, the establishment of the State of Israel, this would not have happened. In fact, there would have been no need to change our borders one jot. But after the six-day war, it is a miracle that we are still here. So why should we now crawl on our hands and knees to the Arabs and say: Please, do us a favor and take it all back... If we had lost the last war, our lot would have been the same as the nine Iraqi Jews hanged in public last week. Our occupation of the territory is the outcome of war. In 1948, Jordan conquered the west bank contrary to the resolution of the United Nations. In 1967 we conquered the west bank. You seem to forget the Arabs were the first to attack.

Q. The Arabs attacked in 1967?

A. They closed the Strait of Tiran, moved tanks and troops into Sinai, and were headed toward our borders. When they chased the U.N. troops out, we were faced with a blatant act of war; there was no way out for us. I tried to delay, hoping something would happen, something would intervene. It didn't... guarantees proved worthless. Ten years ago, President Eisenhower pledged that the Suez Canal would be open to us and that if President Nasser tried to stop it, the international community would have to deal with the situation with a firm hand. You know what happened.

Q. President Nasser charges that your objective is a greater Israel, from the Nile to the Euphrates. What can you say that would convince him this is not so?

A. It is difficult to say anything that would convince him. During the last two decades, we have repeatedly said we are ready to discuss our problems with Nasser. I am still ready to fly to Cairo tomorrow. I don't want to talk to him as a conqueror. I want to rid his mind of the ridiculous notion of a greater Israel. He cannot base his policy on a phrase that has been uttered by individuals who represent nothing but themselves. Even the Bible doesn't use the phrase. The "river of Egypt" referred to in the Old Testament is not the Nile but the El-Arish River — a muddy stream a few miles inside Sinai. I can pledge my word to Nasser that greater Israel never has been and never will be our policy. I am ready to meet him anywhere, anytime, and I won't quarrel about procedure, agenda, or the shape of the table.

¹ Israel Radio in English, 13/2/1969. B.B.C., P.M.E. / 3256/A/8.

² *Newsweek*, 17/2/1969, pp. 27-32. Copyright Newsweek, Inc.

Q. What about your plans for new Israeli settlements on the Golan Plateau in Syria, on the west bank of the Jordan River, and in Egyptian Sinai?

A. You know what happened on the Golan Heights before the war — the Syrians shelled our settlements from there. Never again. Besides, these are not ordinary settlements but military agricultural outposts.

Q. But why not an agreement to demilitarize Golan rather than settle Israelis in what is part of Syria?

A. What is demilitarization? Who watches over the border? No one knows what demilitarization means.

We had a war. We won it. And as long as Golan remains a dangerous spot, we have to defend it. Besides we have no one to talk to on the Syrian side. They are not even willing to talk with Dr. Gunnar Jarring.

Q. Are you prepared to give up these new settlements in occupied territories as part of a final peace settlement?

A. It is not proper to answer such questions today. We are flexible on everything, but I don't want to get into specifics before negotiations.

Q. Right after the six-day war, Israeli leaders said that they would make generous offers to settle the Palestinian refugee problem. What happened?

A. We were perhaps a little over-optimistic on the chances for a lasting settlement. Clearly the refugee problem can only be settled in cooperation with our neighbors. We must have a dialogue. The refugees are an international problem. We need land and water for them. We are a small nation with only 7,720 square miles of land and an annual water flow of 1.5 billion cubic meters. Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Iraq have between them 670,000 square miles of land and an annual water flow of more than 90 billion cubic meters.

Q. I'm afraid I don't see your point.

A. If these countries are interested in settling the refugee problem, there is much empty territory and much wasted water. We will pay compensation to the refugees or buy land for them to resettle in neighboring countries.

Q. Arab leaders see no chance of peace because they are convinced you are determined to hold on to what you have conquered, come what may. Are they right?

A. I am sure that Nasser knows that the opposite is the case.

Q. How?

A. Through channels I cannot disclose, Arab rulers have heard interesting things from us. They know we want peace.

Q. But would you go back to your frontiers in return for peace?

A. Let me say, clearly and unequivocally, there will be no return to the situation preceding the June war. The present cease-fire lines will not be changed except for secure and agreed lines within the framework of a final and durable peace. We must discuss new borders, new arrangements. The armistice agreements are dead and buried. We don't want any part of the settled area of the west bank — Nablus, Jenin and so on. What we say is that the Jordan River must become a security border for Israel with all that that implies. Our army shall be stationed only on the strip along that border.

Q. You have repeatedly demanded direct negotiations with the Arab states, but if part of your country were occupied by Arab armies, could you afford to sit down with them face to face?

A. Surely. No doubt. No doubt whatsoever. God forbid, but if we had been the losers and — miraculously — were still alive and they were to say "We are ready for peace negotiations," I cannot imagine that we would refuse.

Q. You insist on a permanent peace with the Arab governments as the price of withdrawal. But do you think that is possible without a solution to the refugee problem?

A. For our neighbors, the refugees are a convenient political football, not a life-and-death issue. If they want to begin with the refugee problem, we are ready. We are completely flexible on the agenda. It's all a package deal so it doesn't matter where you start.

Q. The U.N. has said that the refugees should be given a choice between compensation and the right to return to their old homes. What is your stand on this?

A. I would like to remind our friend Nasser that there was a time when we agreed to the return of 100,000 refugees — though I was

against it as I didn't believe it would work out, because Arab leaders needed them as pawns. Today the situation has changed. Any returning refugees would be a time bomb for Israel. We cannot take them back, but we have agreed over the years to the return of 40,000 of the refugees on compassionate grounds. We are ready to pay compensation.

Q. Would you withdraw from the occupied territories if the great powers would guarantee a settlement that gave you freedom of navigation, an Arab declaration of nonbelligerence, Arab recognition of the territorial integrity of Israel, and a demilitarized zone along your frontiers policed by the U.N.?

A. No. We have learned a lesson. Remember the United Nations force in 1967? Nasser whistled and they packed their kit bags. And President Nasser speaks of freedom of navigation in "international waterways." What is "international"? I am sure that he will say the Suez Canal is an Egyptian waterway. He has said it before.

Q. What concessions do you insist upon in return for withdrawal from the Arab lands? Do you insist upon demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula and a permanent military presence at Sharm el Sheikh?

A. We don't insist on anything. Try us out and you'll be surprised on the degree of give and take we are prepared for. We have not made any demands for the demilitarization of Sinai. At Sharm el Sheikh, however, we must be in a position to protect the access to the Strait of Tiran — our backyard. We cannot rely on promises and outsiders to do it for us. We cannot live as a nation without a peace treaty. As for the Golan Heights, we will quite simply never give them up. The same goes for Jerusalem. Here there is no flexibility at all. I regret it. I would be very happy to say yes. But every time I look at the map I shake my head because there is no possible way to compromise on Jerusalem. It is the very heart of our state.

Q. Some Israeli leaders are now suggesting that Nasser and King Hussein are too weak domestically to risk a peace settlement, and that eventually you will have to settle with the Palestinians directly. What do you think?

A. If those two could work together — and if Nasser didn't stab the King in the back from

time to time — I am quite sure they could sell a reasonable settlement to their peoples. I have met at least half a dozen times with Palestinian leaders on the west bank. They said they would go talk to Hussein and to Nasser. They did, but came back empty-handed.

Q. Do you see the Palestinian commandos — Al-Fatah and the fedayeen — as a potentially important political factor in the Middle East?

A. I don't want to brag, but the fedayeen have lost a lot of people. Many are leaving the movement dispirited. I do not believe the fedayeen will become as important as some people in Western countries seem to think. But if Al-Fatah wants to talk to us directly, we would not say no. If one day they overthrow established Arab governments, we would then have a new enemy and a new situation. But I don't believe this will happen because they feel better off as free lances, and are not at all anxious to take on the burdens of government.

Q. You call the fedayeen terrorists. But how do they differ from other resistance movements through history?

A. If people perpetrate terrorist acts they can, of course, call themselves a resistance movement. But what are they resisting? They cannot find shelter on the west bank; the Arabs there are not cooperating with the fedayeen. That hardly qualifies them as resistance fighters.

Q. But in Gaza the local population is resisting your occupation. Doesn't that constitute a resistance movement?

A. As a Jew, I will answer with another question. What difference does it make? Why should I glorify them with their own label? But, more seriously, I would point out that for twenty years Gaza was occupied by the Egyptians. The Egyptians' curfew there was much tougher than ours. The Palestinian refugees in Gaza resisted the Egyptians just as strongly as they resist us.

Q. Do you think that Israelis and Palestinians might one day live together in a binational state, comparable to the Christian-Moslem arrangement in Lebanon?

A. I would not like to be in the same position as Lebanon — that is, on a 50-50 basis. Lebanon could become 60-40 one day... and then what happens to the minority?

It's very important that you and your readers should understand that for 2,000 years we were persecuted minorities around the world. Never again. We must have our own place where we are a majority. Look at Cyprus. Twenty-three percent Turks, and look at what is going on. Is that what you want for us? Israel is and must remain a Jewish state.

Q. In that case, how would you feel about a separate Palestinian Arab state?

A. I am against it. Personally, I think Palestinian connections and ties should be with Jordan; they have the same customs, same religion, same language. But who knows? Jordan's behavior may force them to have a separate entity.

Q. If the Jews are entitled to a homeland, aren't the Palestinians similarly entitled to their own country?

A. What are Palestinians? When I came here there were 250,000 non-Jews — mainly Arabs and Bedouins. It was desert — more than underdeveloped. Nothing. It was only after we made the desert bloom and populated it that they became interested in taking it from us.

Q. You expect Arab governments to disarm or control the fedayeen. But were Jewish leaders capable of controlling Jewish underground groups like the Stern gang at the time of your own struggle for independence?

A. Yes, to a certain degree we were. But how can you compare? The Arabs have established governments with armies and police forces. We had nothing. We were just as illegal as the underground movements you just mentioned. And while trying to control them, we had at the same time to struggle against the British Army.

Q. President Nasser told Newsweek that Egyptian representatives are prepared to sit down with Israelis in joint committees with U.N. observers as they did under the 1949 armistice agreements. What are your objections to resuming such a dialogue — a dialogue, incidentally, which Nasser says your government ended?

A. There was always a third party in these committees and this third party — the U.N. — was the decisive party. The U.N. observer nearly always said he never saw what happened. The arrangement had become a mockery, a travesty

of justice. When Nasser launched the first fedayeen raids more than ten years ago, he acted as though he was free to do as he pleased while we were supposed to respect the armistice agreements. That's why the arrangement broke down. But if Nasser is ready to resume these joint committees and to sit with us there, why isn't he ready to sit with us under the U.N. Security Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967?

Q. Hasn't the time come for some new Israeli peace initiatives?

A. We feel that every day is time for this. The question is what and how. Let's sit down and discuss it. Let's reason together. We have said — and it certainly reached the ears of the Jordanian Government — that if Jordan needs a Mediterranean harbor we are prepared to give them free port facilities in Haifa or Ashdod. We can embark on all sorts of joint endeavors to develop their industry and export business. Go talk to the Arab farmers on the west bank and they will tell you what we have done in a few months to increase their productivity — which had barely changed for centuries before. We dug wells for them where their own people had assured them there was no water. This is what we can offer. But there is a price. Either they maintain a state of war and nothing happens, or they want real peace and then the hopes for the future are unlimited.

Q. If you were President Nixon and trying to counteract Russian penetration of the Arab world, wouldn't you find it necessary to inch a bit closer to the Arab view?

A. It is always hard to put yourself in someone else's shoes, especially those of the President of the United States. But I am convinced that, although we fought alone, the six-day war enhanced the interests of the free world in the Middle East. There is much alarm about Soviet influence, but what do Egypt and Syria have to offer? And the states that do have a lot to offer — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Turkey, etc. — in those states Soviet influence is minimal. The value of Israel to the West in this part of the world will, I predict, be out of all proportion to its size. We will be a real bridge between three continents and the free world will be very thankful not only if we survive, but if we continue to thrive in secure and guaranteed borders.

Replies in Parliament by the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Stewart to Questions on the Situation in the Middle East.¹

London, February 17, 1969

18. *Mr. St. John-Stevs* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement on the latest situation in the Middle East.

45. *Mr. Leadbitter* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the present situation in the Middle East.

50. *Mr. Colin Jackson* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what further progress Her Majesty's Government have made in securing a Middle East settlement in accordance with the Resolution of the Security Council in November, 1967.

66. *Mr. Walters* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the present situation in the Middle East.

74. *Mr. Moonman* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a further statement on the current situation in the Middle East.

80. *Sir B. Janner* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the present position in the Middle East.

81. *Mr. Goodhart* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a further statement on the Middle East situation.

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Michael Stewart): We expect the representatives of the four permanent members of the Security Council to meet to discuss this in the near future.

The preliminary discussions referred to by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary

of State on 10th February are already in progress. [Vol. 777, c. 874.]²

Mr. Mayhew: Will the Foreign Secretary agree that the resolution cannot be implemented if Israel continues in her refusal to withdraw from conquered Arab territories? Would it not greatly help and encourage Israel in her refusal if she were to be sold British arms for use in these conquered territories, and would not my right hon. Friend agree, therefore, that the sale of British arms at this time to Israel for use in conquered Arab territories would be highly dangerous and unprincipled?

Mr. Stewart: Clearly, the resolution cannot be fully carried out without withdrawal because withdrawal is part of the resolution; so, of course, are a great many other things. We must consider applications about arms on their merits, but it has been our object all the time to urge on both parties the importance of doing everything that will show their willingness to carry out all parts of the resolution.

Mr. St. John-Stevs: Will the Foreign Secretary assure the House that he will not be intimidated by Gaullist bullying from continuing his efforts to co-ordinate European policy towards the Middle East, and, in particular, that he will not allow the conference of W.E.U. later this week to be called off?

Mr. Stewart: I think that really arises on the next Question.

Mr. Jackson: Does the Foreign Secretary not agree that there is a distinction between the supply of arms for domestic self-defence and the supply of arms which might be used, for example, in the occupied territories against the Arab peoples? Surely there is a difference between the two?

Mr. Stewart: There is a difference, of course. This is one of many factors which we have to take into account in all transactions relating to arms.

Mr. Thorpe: Will the Foreign Secretary give an undertaking that in any Four Power meeting he will raise again the matter contained in his declaration of June, 1967, calling for a complete suspension of armament supplies by all nations to

¹ *Hansard*, 17/2/1969, cols. 7-10.

² See *ante*, doc.

the Middle East? Will he confirm or deny that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to sell Centurion tanks to Israel? Whilst Israel undoubtedly has the right to defend herself, will this not make our own position as arbitrators in the Security Council very much more difficult?

Mr. Stewart: It has never been the practice to make pronouncements on particular transactions, but we have previously expressed our desire to have a general restriction on arms supplies and our willingness to take part. I have no doubt that this will come up in the Four Power conversations.

Mr. Shinwell: May we have an assurance from my right hon. Friend that in any peace-keeping with which Her Majesty's Government are associated it must be clearly understood that no one from any of the Arab countries will be allowed to interfere with the underpants of a British soldier?

3. *Mr. Mayhew* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will initiate discussions with Italy, France and other Western European countries with a view to co-ordinating policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.

68. *Mr. Wingfield Digby* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement on the special meeting of Western European Union Ministers he called in London for Friday, 14th February.

Mr. M. Stewart: As I said on 13th February, I asked for a meeting of the Permanent Council of Western European Union on 14th February because there was only limited time for discussion on the Middle East at the Western European Union Ministerial meeting at Luxembourg on 6th and 7th February. We felt that there would be advantage in having a fuller opportunity to consult our friends in Europe in greater depth in view of the forthcoming meeting of the four permanent members of the Security Council. Our hopes that the meeting on 14th February would be positively useful were fully justified, and this view was entirely shared by our European partners. — [Vol. 777, c. 1566-7.]

Mr. Mayhew: While thanking the Foreign Secretary for his prompt action following the appearance of this Question on the Order Paper,

may I ask him whether these European countries, in order to encourage Israel to withdraw, might not consider making a special contribution within the United Nations to Israel's security on her old frontiers?

Mr. Stewart: That clearly is a matter that European countries could consider, and it was not necessarily in this connection but because the peace of the Middle East is of concern to so many European countries that I thought it was right to have these consultations.

Mr. Walters: Is the Foreign Secretary aware, however, that if he wishes to co-ordinate the policy and also maintain British influence in the Middle East, which is growing at the moment, it would be a great mistake to supply arms now to Israel?

Mr. Stewart: I am noting, of course, what hon. Members are saying in this matter.

Sir B. Janner: Will my right hon. Friend, in discussing these matters, take into consideration the fact that the U.S.S.R. has been supplying vast quantities of arms to the Arabs and, in the event of discussions taking place, that the U.S.S.R. itself sent a resolution to the Assembly some years ago stating that if in countries saboteurs are trained the country which it is proposed to be attacked has the right not only to react against the offending State but to regard the matter as an act of aggression?

Mr. Stewart: Yes, I am aware of this, and anything that is done on arms will be most useful if it can be done by joint action between the Powers.

Mr. Digby: Will the Foreign Secretary resist any attacks on the Secretary-General of W.E.U. because of the calling of this successful meeting last Friday?

Mr. Stewart: Yes, Sir, and I think that would be the view of all the other members of W.E.U.

Mr. Speaker: Mr. Winnick.

Mr. St. John-Stevas: On a point of order. Since the Foreign Secretary declined to answer my earlier question on the ground that it arose on this Question and not on the previous one, would it not be reasonable to allow me to put my question at this stage?

Mr. Speaker: It would be reasonable but not in order at the moment. Mr. Winnick.

37

Speech by the Pakistani President Ayub Khan at a Banquet in Honour of the Shah of Iran and the Turkish Premier Demirel.¹ (Excerpts)

Karachi, February 19, 1969

[He] said that the 3 countries share the view that the 1967 resolution must be urgently implemented and that aggression should not be allowed to retain fruits of aggression.

"In West Asia, there are no signs of a break in the deadlock and tension continues to mount.

"Turkey, Iran and Pakistan all share the view that the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 must be faithfully and urgently implemented and that no aggressor be allowed to retain the fruits of his aggression."

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38

Joint Communiqué on the Iraqi Foreign Minister Al-Shaikhli's Visit to Turkey.² (Excerpt)

Ankara, February 20, 1969

The two Ministers thoroughly discussed the dangerous situation existing in the Middle East. They outlined the positions of their respective Governments in this problem. They restated their belief in peace based on justice and in the importance of security and stability in the Middle East. They expressed their conviction in the necessity of finding a solution to this problem safeguarding fully the legitimate rights of the Arabs. In this respect they called for the implementation of Resolutions of the United Nations regarding Jerusalem and the refugees.

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¹ *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), 19-25/2/1969, p. 8780.

² *Turkish Foreign Ministry Bulletin*, February 1969, pp. 50-53.

39

Statement by the U.S. President Nixon on his Trip to Western Europe.³ (Excerpt)

Washington, February 21, 1969

There may be, for example, instances in which the United States alone must make decisions which can affect the peace of the world. I want to get the best advice of the European leaders on those decisions.

I can say from experience — and I don't say this simply because I happen to be going to visit these men very shortly — that in previous years I have found there is a great well of knowledge, wisdom, and experience among our European friends, that it is very valuable for an American to go abroad and tap that knowledge, wisdom, and experience.

Consequently, I was delighted to find that when they suggested the agenda items, they were not limited to the bilateral subjects and not limited to the alliance and their relations to it, but that they were keenly interested in discussing a broad variety of subjects involving world policy — world policy where the United States might have the primary responsibility but where they, even though they did not have a substantial responsibility, at least might be able to make a contribution, a contribution in thinking as to how the problem could be solved.

As far as the subjects are concerned, there are some, of course, that will be quite generally brought up.

I should begin with the subject of the Mideast. The Mideast will be brought up in all of the visits that I have. I put a high priority on the subject — as on many others, but particularly on this one — because after we complete this trip, it will then be, it seems to me, appropriate for the United States to make a determination as to how talks should go forward on the Mideast.

As you know, preliminary talks are now going forward in the U.N. on the four-power basis, bilaterally first, with the possibility of four-power talks later coming up.

What I want to do is to have direct discussions with all of the European leaders, but particularly

³ *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, 17/3/1969, pp. 217-219.

with the British and the French on this subject, so that we may be able to find some common principles that will make these talks which will be coming up more effective than they otherwise might be and that will move them along at a faster pace.

I should leave here one thought that I have mentioned before, but I emphasize it again now: This is not with the thought that the four powers are going to dictate a settlement in the Middle East. It is with the thought, however, that if the four powers are going to contribute to a settlement, it will be most useful at this time to have these direct discussions; and that subject is on the agenda. We have prepared it very carefully. We know positions that we are prepared to discuss, and we will be expecting to discuss that with them.

40

Statement on the Middle East by the Soviet Official News Agency "Tass".¹

Moscow, February 27, 1969

The Israeli military have committed a new series of acts of aggression against neighbouring states in recent days.

On February 24, the Israeli Air Force intruded into Syria's air space and bombed populated centres in the vicinity of Damascus. There were killed and wounded, and substantial material damage was inflicted.

Israeli planes and armoured personnel carriers attacked Jordanian troops and deployed in an area south of the Dead Sea; Israeli forces opened artillery fire in the area of the Suez canal.

Israeli officials openly threaten more military actions against Arab countries, including the Lebanon and Iraq.

Tel Aviv government circles seek to justify these abominable Israeli provocations, which are arousing universal condemnation in the world, by spurious references to the need for "massive reprisals" against Arab countries in connection with the growth of people's resistance in the

occupied Arab territories.

In doing so, they boast of the recent piratical raid of Beirut Airport in the Lebanon, although the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned this piratical action and warned Israel that appropriate sanctions would be taken if such actions were repeated.

Israel's latest aggressive actions are taking place at a time when active efforts are being made to achieve a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

These actions clearly show that those who bear the responsibility for Israel's present policy are pursuing a course aimed at aggravating the situation in the Middle East and are fanning tension with the obvious purpose of creating practical conditions which would preclude the possibility of establishing an enduring peace in that region.

It looks as if Israel's extremist circles, blinded by chauvinism, arrogance and enmity for the Arab peoples, want a protracted war in the Middle East and are pinning their hopes on assistance from some of their patrons abroad.

Such calculations, however, may prove to be a great mistake on the part of the ruling circles in Tel Aviv.

As for statements by Tel Aviv politicians about "massive reprisals," they should bear in mind that the struggle of peoples against invaders and occupiers is reasonable and just from the point of view of international law.

The longer the Israeli forces remain in the seized Arab territories, the stronger and wider the Arabs' liberation struggle will mount against the occupiers. This should be borne in mind by those shortsighted politicians, who are heading for a protracted war under the guise of phrases about their readiness for talks.

The Soviet Union firmly stands for an immediate peaceful political settlement in the Middle East in conformity with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

The states and peoples of the Middle East must, finally, have the opportunity to live in conditions of an enduring and just peace, free from violence and the arbitrary use of forces of aggression.

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 4/3/1969.

41

News Conference Statement by the U.S. President Nixon on the Middle East.¹ (Excerpt)**Washington, March 4, 1969**

Q. Can you tell us whether or not, as a result of your talks with President de Gaulle and other government leaders in Europe, you are now encouraged about prospects for maintaining peaceful conditions in the Middle East?

The President: One of the tangible results that came out of this trip was substantial progress on the Middle East. Now, what that progress will be and whether it reaches an eventual settlement — that is too early to predict.

But I know that when I met with you ladies and gentlemen of the press at an earlier time, the question was raised as to the four-power talks, and there were some who thought that I — this administration was dragging its feet on going into four-power talks.

Frankly, I do not believe that the United States should go into any talks where the deck might be stacked against us. Now, as a result of the consultations that we had on this trip, the positions of our European friends — the British and the French — are now closer to ours than was the case before. We have a better understanding of their position; they have a better understanding of ours.

And also, we have had encouraging talks with the Soviet Ambassador. The Secretary of State and I have both talked with the Soviet Ambassador with regard to the Mideast. We will continue these bilateral consultations; and if they continue at their present rate of progress, it seems likely that there will be four-power discussions in the United Nations on the Mideast.

Now, I should indicate also the limitations of such discussions and what can come out of them. The four powers — the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France — cannot dictate a settlement in the Middle East. The time has passed in which great nations can dictate to small nations their future where

their vital interests are involved. This kind of settlement that we are talking about, and the contribution that can be made to it, is limited in this respect.

The four powers can indicate those areas where they believe the parties directly involved in the Mideast could have profitable discussions. At the present time they are having no discussions at all.

Second — and this is even the more important part of it — from the power conference can come an absolute essential to any kind of peaceful settlement in the Mideast, and that is a major-power guarantee of the settlement; because we cannot expect the nation of Israel or the other nations in the area who think their major interest might be involved — we cannot expect them to agree to a settlement unless they think there is a better chance that it will be guaranteed in the future than has been the case in the past.

On this score, then, we think we have made considerable progress during the past week. We are cautiously hopeful that we can make more progress and move to the four-power talks very soon.

42

Joint Communiqué on the Conference of the Mediterranean Progressive Parties in Algiers.² (Excerpts)**Algiers, March 5, 1969**

A consultative meeting of progressive parties took place in Algiers on 3rd and 4th March, 1969. The participants were the Algerian FLN, the Italian Communist Party, the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity, the (UAR) Arab Socialist Union and the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, with the Palestinian Fatah as an observer.

The participants studied the situation in the Mediterranean area as a result of imperialist

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 24/3/1969, pp. 237-247.

² Algiers home service in Arabic 07.30 GMT 5/3/1969. B.B.C., ME/3018/E/1.

aggression. In the Middle East Israel's many acts of aggression against the Arab countries and its refusal to withdraw its forces from the occupied territories are proof of its ambition to expand by means of force and terror. The situation created by imperialism in this region of the world every day increases the hazard of a military clash that cannot be stopped. In that respect the participants deplore the attitudes of Britain and USA which encourage Israel's successive aggressions. The participants deplore the wish of US and European reactionary elements to resurrect NATO in order to continue the American domination over the countries of Western Europe as a peril to the peoples living in the Mediterranean basin.

There are new events which have taken place and should be referred to, such as the Palestinian struggle which has developed in recent months, and which constitutes a new event of great significance which confounds political predictions by placing the Palestinian question in its true perspective. In fact this struggle is at present gathering strength day by day both in the occupied territories and across Palestinian soil as a whole.

The participants in this meeting have recorded with pleasure the development of the Palestinian struggle which proves that any peaceful initiative in the area is based, and must be based, on the national rights of the Palestinian people, the sole masters of their future. The participants declare their absolute support for this struggle to establish a democratic Palestine in which Muslims, Christians and Jews enjoy equal rights without discrimination on account of race or religion, in accordance with the statements by the Fatah representative.

Any measures designed to liquidate the effects of the 5th June aggression and ensure the return of the aggressors to the borders before 5th June 1967, must not lose sight of the national rights of the Palestinian people. For the Middle East question is not a local dispute between Arabs and Jews. It is under the general struggle against imperialism. Therefore the struggle of the European progressive forces against the renovation of NATO is closely connected with the struggle of progressive forces (sic).

The unity of the struggle of the working masses in the European capitalist countries and the

popular masses in other Mediterranean countries springs not only from feelings of solidarity, but results from the domination of American imperialism over Western Europe and the exploitation of the workers of the capitalist countries and the peoples of the third world.

43

Speech by the Israeli Defence Minister Dayan during a Meeting with Histadrut Doctors.¹ (Excerpts)

Tel Aviv, March 5, 1969

With respect to the period which followed the war, two main objectives for peace were defined, and are now accepted by all. The first is the change of frontiers or territorial changes; once again, it is not important how the new lines are determined and I do not believe that any of us have heard any one expressing the opinion that Israel should return to the previous lines. Some want the maximum, some want the minimum, and some want a compromise, but all want the frontiers changed. The second objective is to change the system of relations — to establish peaceful relations with the Arab states instead of returning to the armistice system. Thus two clear peace objectives have been defined, one of form, i.e. the map and the lines, and one of substances, i.e. the system of relations.

Two Attitudes

The reason why there are no objectives is not only because no opinions have been expressed as regards defining them; the basic reason is that there are profound and fundamental differences of attitude in the state of Israel and among its leaders.

One attitude is that we must abstain from any action which involves creating facts, because this will be an obstacle to peace. For example, the Political Committee of the Mapam Party

¹ Dayan, Moshe. *A New Map and Different Relations*. (Hebrew). A collection of speeches edited by Sifriat Ma'ariv. Haifa: Shekmona, 1969, pp. 163-165. An unpublished manuscript in Arabic is available at the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut.

decided on 12 December, 1968 when summarising its debates that:

"To meet present security requirements, military settlements must be established in the territories which we hold until peace comes. However we must not create the facts of permanent settlement as they may present obstacles to peace negotiations."

The same resolution refers to another subject in the same spirit:

"We must oppose any kind of integration brought about by the creation of economic and organisational units comprising the territories which we hold and areas in the state of Israel tending to create the facts of annexation."

This is one attitude, then there is another attitude, the reverse of this, which I share. This attitude requires that during this transitional period we should create facts. But unlike those who fear that this may lead to "our hands being tied" — in the expression used by the secretary of the Labour Party, Minister Pinhas Sapir, in a press interview with Haim Guri — I am in favour of facts which do tie the hands, not only our hands, but also the hands of the other side, and the hands of the actual situation. I am in favour of defining objectives for the transitional period, objectives whose achievement will create a basic situation different not only from the situation prior to the Six-Day War, but also from that which existed after the war. We know what we have now — the territories, the population and relations, but it is now, during this transitional period when the matter is in our hands, that we must make sure to effect basic and essential changes within this varying and diverse frame work. It is this intention to make changes and not any particular peace proposal, that is the only real issue at present. And there are differences of opinion over this issue: What is to be done? Are the doors to be left open and is no attempt to be made to create facts, lest they prove an obstacle to peace negotiations? Or are we to begin to work 24 hours a day to create facts, to destroy facts and to change the situation, to change it in a way which will bring us closer to what we are striving for?

What do I think are the steps which we must take in this transitional period? I will give some examples:

Settlement and Economic Integration

The first step is a traditional one in the State of Israel: settlement. One of the criticisms made of the project which is attributed to me, and I do not disown it, is the following: "Only mad people are ready to live in the mountains near Nablus." My answer is: If the State of Israel really decided, in the present situation and in the situation that is envisaged, to withdraw the army from the Nablus mountains, that would be the result of unawareness of what is going on in the area, now and in the future. The madness lies not in staying there, but in withdrawing from there.

The second step which we must accomplish, and it is one of the most important, is that of economic integration. We must, in this transitional period, weaken the links of the population of the West Bank and Gaza with the Arab States, and strengthen their links with the state of Israel. We must attach the population to us, and integrate them in our economy, thereby providing them with a reasonable standard of living.

I know that many sensible people among us are against the Arabs of the territories working in Israel — and Ben Gurion is against it too — but I insist that we should allow them to work for us. I do not mean that they should live somewhere else. There is no necessity for that, and indeed they do not want it. However they could be brought from the refugee camps of Gaza to live in Judaea and Samaria, this is possible. It would do no harm if thousands of the refugees moved from the "Strip" to the "Bank". But not to Israel. What is intended is that they should work in Israel, not live in it.

In my opinion, the Israeli economy can permit itself to give work to the people of the territories. There are today about fifteen to eighteen thousand Arabs from the territories working among us. In the present work situation it is possible to increase this number to between thirty and thirty-five thousand, and in this way we could provide these workers with a decent standard of living. In addition, and this is not an alternative to the former measure, nor is it incompatible with it, I recommend that the Israeli economy should commission the inhabitants of the territories to work for us, that the "ATA" company should commission the population of Nablus and Gaza

to do tailoring for us, stone, iron and wood-working and every possible kind of production.

Appointment of Arab officials

There is a third step: I was questioned in the Knesset in connection with the press interview granted by the late Levi Eshkol to the American magazine, *Newsweek*, in which he said that we were ready to evacuate areas in the "Bank". I was asked if this kind of talk would not lead to a deterioration of the security situation in the territories, for if we are intending to evacuate the territories, their inhabitants will continue to regard themselves as attached to Jordan, with all that this involves. I agree with what the late Premier said in this interview; as regards what he said, I do not believe that it is this that is upsetting the security situation. It is not this, but something else, which is upsetting the security situation. For years Egyptian law has been enforced in the Gaza Strip, and Jordanian law in the "West Bank"; two years have passed and appointments of mayors are still being made according to Egyptian and Jordanian laws, as are appointments of judges and other officials. This situation has been continued, not for a month or two, but for two years — and we agree to this legal situation and these appointments and resign ourselves to it. This is what creates the impression in the minds of the inhabitants of these territories that our presence there is temporary, and that their relations and attachments to the Arab states, Egypt and Jordan, are permanent.

We therefore have to ask ourselves how we can diminish the psychological factors which create negative psychological currents in the territories. This is the basic fact — not any statement, by the late Premier, or the Foreign Minister, or Minister Begin or myself, — that is decisive. We must look at patterns of life and the situation which we are creating every day, and see them in terms of the effect that they are expected to have in the third year, and the fourth year, and later, from the point of a situation that is desirable and which is starting to take shape.

Questions by the United Nations Ambassador Jarring to the Governments of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and the United Arab Republic on the Provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) for the Settlement of the Middle East Crisis.¹

March, 5-14, 1969

1. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) accept Security Council resolution 242 (1967) for implementation for achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East Question in accordance with the provisions and principles contained in the resolution?

2. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree to pledge termination of all claims or states of belligerency with Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Israel)?

3. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree to pledge respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Israel)?

4. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) accept the right of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Israel) to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force?

5. If so, what is the conception of secure and recognized boundaries held by Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic)?

6. Does Israel agree to withdraw its armed forces from territories occupied by it in the recent conflict?

7. Does the United Arab Republic agree to guarantee freedom of navigation for Israel through international waterways in the area, in particular:

- (a) through the Straits of Tiran, and
- (b) through the Suez Canal?

8. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 24/1/1971. The Questions were submitted by Jarring in the form of separate lists specifically addressed to the Israeli, Jordanian, Lebanese and the United Arab Republic Governments, respectively on March 9, 8, 14, & 4, 1969. The document appearing above embodies the general list applicable to all parties, from which the separate lists were prepared.

Republic) agree that, if a plan for the just settlement of the refugee problem is worked out and presented to the parties for their consideration, the acceptance in principle of such a plan by the parties and the declaration of their intention to implement it in good faith constitute sufficient implementation of this provision of the Security Council resolution to justify the implementation of the other provisions?

9. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree that the territorial inviolability and political independence of the States in the area should be guaranteed:

- (a) by the establishment of demilitarized zones;
- (b) through additional measures?

10. Does Israel agree that such demilitarized zones should include areas on its side of its boundaries?

11. Does Jordan agree that a demilitarized zone should be established in Jordanian territory from which Israel armed forces have been withdrawn?

12. Does the United Arab Republic agree that a demilitarized zone should be established:

- (a) at Sharm e-Sheikh;
- (b) in other parts of the Sinai peninsula?

13. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree that demilitarization of such zones should be supervised and maintained by the United Nations?

14. Would Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) accept as a final act of agreement on all provisions a mutually signed multilateral document which would incorporate the agreed conditions for a just and lasting peace?

45

Joint Communiqué on the Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil's Visit to Morocco.¹ (Excerpt)

Rabat, March 8, 1969

The ministers examined every aspect of the latest developments in the Middle East. The

Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs submitted a detailed report of his government's views in this respect to his Turkish colleague. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs once again expressed Turkey's feeling of sympathy and friendship for the Arab countries. He reiterated his government's opposition to the use of force as a means of acquiring territorial gains and other political advantages. The ministers stressed the need for Israel to withdraw its forces from the occupied territories in accordance with the November 22, 1967, Security Council resolution. They also expressed the hope that current efforts towards a peaceful solution to this conflict would succeed, leading to a just and lasting peace in the area.

46

Address by the Yugoslav President Tito to the Ninth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.² (Excerpt)

Belgrade, March 12, 1969

Israel's aggression against the Arab countries, and everything that followed, seriously jeopardized peace in the Mediterranean area. It is unquestionably in the interests of all the Mediterranean countries for this region to be transformed into a zone of peace and international cooperation.

In its foreign policy, socialist Yugoslavia has always supported relaxation of international tension and pursuit of a policy of active peaceful coexistence. Consistently implementing its foreign policy, based on principles, socialist Yugoslavia has made the maximum effort at the UN, at international gatherings and elsewhere, for the peaceful solution of international disputes in line with respect for the independence, equality and sovereignty of all countries.

... We condemned Israel's aggression against the Arab countries.... Briefly, we have opposed policies pursued from positions of strength for the solution of international controversies, regardless of what arguments are put forward in the attempt to justify such policies.

¹ Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Information, 8/3/1969.

² Yugoslav Review of International Affairs, 20/3/1969.

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News Conference Remark by the U.S. President Nixon on the Middle East.¹**Washington, March 14, 1969**

Q. Mr. President, if I recall correctly, at the last press conference when you were discussing the meeting with General de Gaulle and the Middle East situation, you said you were encouraged by what he told you, because he was moving closer to our position. I wonder if you can tell us what our position is in the Middle East, and if it has changed significantly in the last year?

The President: We have had bilateral talks, not only with the French but also the Soviet Union and with the British, preparatory to the possibility of four-power talks. I would not like to leave the impression that we are completely together at this point.

We are closer together than we were, but we still have a lot of yardage to cover. And until we make further progress in developing a common position, I would prefer not to lay out what our position is. I don't think that would be helpful in bringing them to the position that we think is the right position.

48

Speech by the British Premier Wilson at the Twentieth Anniversary Dinner of the Jewish Vanguard, the Organ of Poale Zion.² (Excerpt)**London, March 14, 1969**

...he suggested that the 1967 UN Resolution could be turned into reality by a "balanced series of measures, each dependent on the other, the totality directed to the solution of all the problems which the resolution was designed to deal with." No nation should be asked to contribute to this realisation except on this basis, he said.

"This must include the problem of withdrawal, the problem of guaranteed frontiers — which themselves make a reality of guaranteed recogni-

tion — the problem of the refugees, formidable indeed before 1967 and still more critical today in human as well as in political terms; the problem of the rights of all nations to peaceful passage through the international waterways of the Middle East, and behind these problems, the rights of all peoples, Israeli and Arab, to live in peace to till their fields, to harvest their crops, to be able to do this without looking over their shoulders in fear of the sniper's bullet, the mortar bombardment or the threat from the air. To plough, to sow and to reap without a rifle slung over the shoulder.

"And this means that on both sides there must be restraint, on both sides an acceptance of concessions in the longer term interests of peace throughout the area."

49

Reply in Parliament by the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Roberts to a Question on the Middle East.³ (Excerpt)**London, March 17, 1969**

Sir T. Beamish asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how much land which was not allotted to Israel in the United Nations partition would become part of Israel on the implementation of the Security Council's Resolution of 22nd November, 1967; and what percentage increase this would represent.

Mr. Goronwy Roberts: It would be neither practical nor helpful to engage at this juncture in calculations of this sort.

The Security Council Resolution lays down certain principles which are required for the establishment of a just and lasting peace. These include "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and the right of every side in the area to live in peace within "secure and recognised boundaries". These boundaries will be determined in the context of a general settlement.

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 31/3/1969, p. 280.

² *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review* (London), 14/3/1969, p. 19.

³ *Hansard*, 14-20/3/1969, col. 3.

50

Statement to the Knesset by the Israeli Prime Minister Meir on her New Government.¹ (Excerpts)**Jerusalem, March 17, 1969**

On Tuesday, March 11, 1969, the President of Israel entrusted me with the task of forming a Government. It was my desire to unite once more, in the Cabinet which today presents itself to the Knesset, all the forces represented in the outgoing Cabinet, and I am happy to state that all parties to whom I appealed have accepted my invitation. On March 16, 1969 I reported to the President on the formation of the new Government, which includes the alignment of the Israel Labour Party, Mapam, the Herut-Liberal bloc (Gahal), the National Religious Party, the Independent Liberal Party, the Poalei Agudat Israel Party, the Progress and Development faction, the Cooperation and Fraternity faction, the Israel Druse faction and the Arab-Jewish Fraternity faction.

We have not thought fit to compile a new programme of new basic principles for the new Government. The outgoing Government, which presented itself to the Knesset on January 12, 1966 and was broadened on June 1, 1967, has enjoyed the confidence of a decisive majority of the Knesset. The need to form the new Government which presents itself today is merely the result of the great misfortune which befell us upon the death of the Prime Minister. This Government will continue to base its operations upon the programme of the preceding Government, which was approved by the Knesset on January 12, 1966.

However, since then a great change has taken place in the position of the State of Israel as a result of the Six Day War. This is why we deemed it natural and necessary to amend the three paragraphs — 1, 4 and 6 — in Chapter F, in order to adapt them to our present situation and the circumstances prevailing in the wake of the Six Day War. The basic principles of the new Government's programme, including the reformulated paragraphs, have been placed on

the Knesset table. Obviously, the Government will continue to act in accordance with the decisions adopted by the Knesset and the Government since the Six Day War.

The central tasks facing the State today, as in the past, are: above all to safeguard security and continue to strive for peace, the development of the state and the consolidation of its economy, the enhancement of the country's capacity to absorb immigrants, to populate desolate areas, to enhance our society's standards in education and culture, as well as its capacity to weather the trials in store for us on the international scene.

The security of the state must remain the principal subject of our concern. Every tree and green field, every industrial undertaking, every educational institution in our country, bears witness to the constructive aspirations which fill the hearts of Israel's people, and demonstrates our aspiration to live at peace with our neighbours. But it has been our fate that while we were engrossed in constructive and creative work, we have had to defend our lives and our achievements, and take up arms against attackers and aggressors.

The secret of Israel's endurance in the struggles and wars that have been forced upon us since we achieved our independence is the inexorable tie between survival and sovereignty, and our consciousness of this tie — for the survival of the Arab states does not depend on the liquidation of our independence or the destruction of Israel, while our very lives and survival — of each of us and of all of us together — depend on the strength of our state. Even more: the survival of the Jewish people, the continuation of Jewish history, depend on the survival of a free and independent State of Israel. For us — and perhaps not only for us — there is no alternative to a resolute confrontation of the struggle and the defeat of the aggressors. We have no alternative to victory.

Our existence in this part of the world is no transient phenomenon. We are not a foreign growth in this region. We can not be uprooted from our homeland.

It has never been our aspiration to win victory in war, but to prevent wars. But it has been demonstrated that, when wars have been forced

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 18/3/1969.

upon us, we have been able to play our part, and there is no doubt in my heart that if a new war is forced upon us again, we shall again be victorious.

On July 12, 1967 — shortly after the end of the Six Day War — the Government of Israel and the Executive of the World Zionist Organization issued a manifesto stating that, for the third time in 20 years, our people had overcome a danger to its very existence. "The Israel Defence Forces, the people's army, confronted deadly perils and, returning blow for blow, overcame and routed its attackers," the manifesto said. "In the advance against the enemy's armies, the siege was broken, the heritage of our fathers was liberated, Jerusalem was redeemed and made into a united city."

After the Six Day War, there were strong hopes that our neighbours would understand this time that they too had no better alternative than to decide to live at peace with us. They are well aware that the fact that we are standing where we stand today, after the Six Day War, is not the result of any expansionist designs, but the direct result of their designs to destroy our State, which, to our good fortune, have failed. It was not with any victorious exultation that we approached them after the fighting, but in a profound and sincere desire to ensure together a life of peace for ourselves and for the masses of the Arab peoples, but also in the iron determination that this time — after three wars — we will not accept any arrangement that is not true peace. This people, which achieved victory in war, has decided that, insofar as it depends on us, we shall not agree to any "solution" which does not guarantee that this war is the last war. Unfortunately, the Arab rulers repulsed the outstretched hand.

We consented to a cease-fire. The Arab states also agreed to the cease-fire. But only a few days passed before the cease-fire lines became front lines of continuous aggression waged against us by the Arab states.

As a matter of fact, the war is not yet over. Day in, day out, our sons are falling at their posts. They are paying the supreme price for the sake of the nation and the homeland. They have fallen for the sake of life and peace. On this occasion, let us express our profound sympathy

with the parents, widows and orphans who have been bereaved of their dear ones. Each of our dead is the son of us all — and whatever we do, their memory is with us always.

The action and utterances of the Arab rulers give no promise of approaching tranquility. In his opening speech to the conference of the Palestinian National Council in Cairo on February 1, 1969, the President of Egypt said:

"The United Arab Republic appreciates the stand of the resistance organizations, which rejects the Security Council resolution of November 1967 — a resolution to which the U.A.R. itself has agreed." In the same speech he went on to say: "The U.A.R. affords the Palestinian resistance every material and moral aid, without limits, without qualifications and without any conditions."

Ten days later he added, in his interview with *Newsweek*: "We have no choice but to help the brave resistance fighters who want to liberate their lands."

This is an attempt to deceive the world and to distinguish between ostensible consent to the Security Council resolution and support of the murderous operations of the terrorist organizations. This deceit, more than anything else, clearly reveals the purpose concealed behind the U.A.R. declaration that it "accepts" the Security Council resolution. We cannot accept such duplicity, and I believe that peace lovers throughout the world will support our stand.

As far as violations of the cease-fire are concerned, we are not prepared to distinguish between aggression waged by regular armies and acts of murder and sabotage perpetrated by terrorist organizations. The responsibility for the saboteurs' activities must also rest squarely on the shoulders of those Governments and States from whose territories the saboteurs go forth to sow mines and lay explosives, under the open protection of the Arab rulers, with one single purpose — to wreak murder in the midst of the civilian population of Israel. No political factor has the moral right to deny us the authority and justification to exercise our right to self-defence against acts of murder and sabotage, irrespective of whether they are perpetrated by regular armies or by terrorist organizations.

The Arab states must understand that the cease-fire lines can be tranquil only if quiet is maintained on both sides of the lines, and not only on one side alone. We want tranquility and the maintenance of the cease-fire, but it depends on the Arab states. The maintenance of quiet must be reciprocal.

The establishment of stable peace in our region depends on the Arab states. Peace will come only when the Arab states agree to conduct direct negotiations with us with a view to concluding peace treaties.

On this occasion it is impossible to ignore the attempt to convene the Four Powers for discussions and recommendations on the problems of the Middle East. One cannot help but wonder that one of the powers considers itself qualified to deal with Israel-Arab affairs as a neutral although it shoulders such a heavy responsibility for the aggressive preparations which brought about the Six Day War.

Another one of the Four Powers is a state whose Government's only constructive contribution to the aid of Israel has been the imposition of an embargo on arms for Israel. All this Government's declarations and measures since the Six Day War are distinguished by blatant one-sidedness.

With all our trust in the good intentions of our friends, with all our comprehension for their desire to reach some kind of understanding for the benefit of the entire world and solution of problems which trouble the powers, we must say, to our friends as well, just as they would never dream of entrusting the solution of their own problems to other parties, the small State of Israel ventures to ask its friends — primarily its friends — to understand that in matters affecting our existence, the conditions for our very physical survival, no decision can be adopted without us, nor can any "recommendation" be formulated without our consent. It is a dangerous illusion to assume that any solution can be found in any arrangements whatever, without real peace between the parties to the conflict.

Many people, including our friends, speak out against an "imposed solution," and we trust them. They say that the intention is not forcible imposition, but merely a recommendation. What is the significance of "a mere recommendation"

once it is agreed upon by the representatives of the Big Powers after negotiations, give-and-take and compromises between them? Just a recommendation? Why should we place our trust in this process when the very existence of Israel is at stake?

Throughout the years of our statehood we have had enough of unsuccessful international arrangements:

In 1949, U.N. observers were posted, but their presence failed to prevent the aggressive initiatives of the Arab rulers.

In 1950 the tripartite declaration was issued, but it failed to remove the over-growing dangers.

In 1957 the maritime powers made pledges in the U.N. General Assembly about the maintenance of the freedom of navigation for Israeli ships, a U.N. resolution was adopted on the U.N. Emergency Force and then the U.S. President, General Eisenhower, made a declaration to the effect that if Israel withdrew, she would be assured of free navigation through the Suez Canal — but if not, the community of nations would have to deal with the matter with determination.

What is left of all these? What must we learn from the state of affairs in May 1967 and from the conduct of the maritime powers? What can we rely upon if not on our own power to defend ourselves against aggressors with our own strength?

Can our desire to be free from threats be considered a luxury? Why should anyone defend our neighbours' refusal to make peace — and fail to understand our desire to put an end to wars and to conclude peace treaties with our neighbours?

We cannot acquiesce in the toleration afforded to the stubborn refusal of the Arab leaders which runs counter to the U.N. Charter and is opposed to all international practice, to sit down with us to negotiate a solution to all problems.

So long as they are not prepared for peace, what is the good of formulae instead of peace?

At any rate, we want one simple and elementary thing, vital to us and our neighbours — peace, in the literal sense of the word, to be reached by face-to-face talks. This is the only way to peace. We need friends and appreciate every

friendship, but friends — even more than others — can and must understand that our fate cannot be determined by others.

Israel, like every independent state, will not permit others to determine its fate. As long as the illusion is being nurtured in the hearts of the Arab leaders that there might be a solution without negotiations between the Arab states and the State of Israel, the cause of peace is not furthered and the solution is only obstructed. Only those who took part in the war can make peace.

In its decisions, which have been approved by the Knesset, the Government of Israel has stated that we want peace, we want treaties of peace which will guarantee agreed, secure and recognized frontiers. When we have called and continued to call for negotiations in order to discuss and arrive at an agreement on all problems, we have said, to the best of my conviction, the main thing that we have to say at this time. We are prepared to discuss peace with our neighbours any day, and on all problems.

As far back as August 1, 1967 the Knesset resolved: "So long as peace has not been achieved, Israel will continue to maintain in full the *status quo* which was established at the cease-fire as a consequence of the defeat of the aggressors by the Israel Defence Forces." The disappointing reply of the Arabs to our readiness — at any time of day or night — to enter into negotiations with them was given in the resolutions of the Khartoum Conference.

On November 13, 1967, the Knesset noted with regret that the Arab states maintained their policy "not to recognize the State of Israel, not to enter into negotiations with it, and not to conclude a treaty of peace with it." The Knesset resolved, further to its decision of August 1, 1967: "In view of this attitude of the Arab states, Israel will continue to maintain in full the situation laid down in the cease-fire agreements, and will strengthen its position in accordance with the vital needs of its security and development. The Government of Israel emphasizes once again that only permanent peace, founded on direct negotiations, between the Arab states and Israel contains the solution to the problems of the area."

These decisions are still in force and the new

Government will continue to act in accordance with them.

We are resolutely determined, as the previous Government was, that there shall never again be a return to the borders and conditions which existed up to the 4th of June, 1967, and which not only enabled our enemies to threaten us with annihilation, but tempted them to believe in their capacity to carry out their plan. We want peace under conditions that will put an end to the temptation to a new Arab aggression.

Israel's absorption for peace and her readiness to achieve it have been clarified in a series of decisions adopted by the Knesset and the previous Government, and given in detail in the plan submitted by Foreign Minister Abba Eban to the U.N. Assembly in his address of October 8, 1967.

We have assisted, and will continue to assist the U.N. envoy, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, in the execution of his task to bring the sides together for the purpose of establishing a permanent peace, as he was instructed to do by the Security Council resolution.

One of the problems, which is a direct result of the aggression of the Arab states, is the problem of the refugees. The Jewish people is the classic people of refugees. Since the rise of the State of Israel, our country has become a model of how a refugee problem can be solved. Immediately on the establishment of the State, we welcomed an immigration of masses, including hundreds of thousands who came to us from the Arab countries, arriving penniless, as well as survivors of the Holocaust from the camps in Europe. We took them in like brothers.

And they themselves became builders and creators, who helped to absorb the immigrants who followed in their wake. We achieved this by sharing with them the little we had, and thanks to the solidarity of the Jewish people abroad.

On the other hand, the Arab states have treated — and still treat — the Arab refugees as weapons in their war against us. They turn a blind eye to the human aspect of the problem. The vast spaces and resources of the oil states have not been utilized by them in order to settle the refugees. The Arab states maintain their selfish attitude. They have done all they possibly could to postpone

the solution of this painful problem, we have announced and we repeat now that the refugee problem can be solved within the framework of a regional settlement and by means of international aid. Israel is prepared to make her contribution to the solution of this problem.

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Many and great are the creative enterprises that challenge our young generation. I am certain that our sons and daughters will respond successfully to the challenges of upbuilding, just as they are valiantly confronting the challenges of self-defence and struggle. The continued upbuilding of Israel, its settlement, its industrialization, its scientific development, its social advancement — all these are still a challenge which calls out to the youth in Israel as well as to the Jewish youth in the Diaspora.

The second most important task, after security, is to step up the rate of immigration. The main point to our independence and its entire logic is to make the State of Israel into a home for the masses of Jews who wish to immigrate to it or who are compelled to immigrate to it. We have had the fortune to absorb hundreds of thousands of Jews from Arab Lands. Only a few remnants still remain in those countries, persecuted, imprisoned unjustly for the sole reason that they are Jews. We witnessed of late the atrocity of the mock trials and the executions by a hanging in Baghdad. The Government will continue to make every possible effort to rescue the Jews from Iraq, Syria and Egypt, and to bring them to a secure haven.

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Replies in Parliament by the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Roberts to Questions on the Middle East.¹ (Excerpt).

London, March 24, 1969

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8. *Sir J. Langford-Holt* asked the Secretary of

State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps he has taken to ensure that the Security Council Resolution tabled by the United Kingdom delegate on the Middle East and freedom of passage of the ships of all nations in peace and in war through the Suez Canal is observed when the Canal is opened.

Mr. Goronwy Roberts: We are continuing to do all we can to bring about a settlement in accordance with the Security Council Resolution of 22nd November, 1967, which affirms the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the Middle East area.

Sir J. Langford-Holt: Will the hon. Gentleman reaffirm that Her Majesty's Government regard the withdrawal to the armistice lines and the acceptance of these frontiers as two propositions which are quite indivisible so far as this Resolution is concerned?

Mr. Roberts: We are in favour of the earliest possible implementation by agreement of the whole of the Resolution, which contains the original points made by the hon. Member and the one he has just mentioned.

Mr. Alan Lee Williams: Does my hon. Friend agree that if the Egyptians do not shortly open the canal it will become a wasting asset? Already 53 British ships sail daily round the Cape, and with big tankers this trend is likely to continue.

Mr. Roberts: The sooner it is opened the better for everyone. What my hon. Friend has said is very much in our minds because we have an interest in its early opening.

19. *Mr. Boyd-Carpenter* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what progress he has made in his efforts to secure the release of the British ships detained by Egypt in the Bitter Lakes.

Mr. Goronwy Roberts: I hope that it will be possible before long to proceed with the survey of the southern exit of the canal.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Is it not perfectly clear after 21 months that at the present rate the ships will never be freed until the canal has silted up? In view of the fact that Egypt has no legal title to the canal, is it not time for international action to clear it on the lines successfully taken in 1957?

¹ *Hansard*, 24/3/1969, cols. 1026-1027.

Mr. Roberts: I will not go into the reasons why this successful action was made necessary at the time. Addressing myself to the last point raised by the right hon. Gentleman, which I know is a serious point, the question of legality here is one of great difficulty and complication. I would add that as of now substantial progress has been made in very delicate negotiations involving both sides, the ship owners and insurers. I hope that before long it may be possible to survey with the intention of evacuating through the southern exit.

Sir J. Rodgers: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that if the canal were cleared the nation most likely to benefit would be Soviet Russia? Even if the canal is cleared the large tankers are likely to go round by the Cape route.

Mr. Roberts: I think everybody would benefit from the release of these ships from the canal.

Mr. Moonman: While I appreciate the delicate nature of the discussions, may I ask whether my right hon. Friend recognises that any agreement should take into account the free passage for ships of all nations when the whole thing is made viable?

Mr. Roberts: That is part of the larger question which in turn is one of the aspects of the general solution which we are striving to achieve. Before such a general solution can be agreed, the point which my hon. Friend has made must be part of it.

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Joint Communiqué on the Iraqi Foreign Minister Al-Shaikhli's Visit to the Soviet Union.¹ (Excerpt)

Moscow, March 26, 1969

...It is the opinion of both sides that the immediate withdrawal of the forces of the aggressor from all occupied Arab territories is necessary for the reduction of tension in the Middle East.

Both sides pointed out that the occupation of Arab territories by Israel, which is a colonial base in the Middle East, and Israel's continued disregard for the rights of the Palestinian people, in addition to its continuous military provocations,

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Baghdad), 27/3/1969.

threaten the security not only of the area but of the whole world. This urgently requires unification of the efforts of all Arab countries in their struggle to remove the traces of Israeli aggression and to establish a stable peace in the Middle East, on the basis of guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the Arab people.

The Soviet Union reiterated its constant support for the just struggle of the Arab peoples. The Iraqi side expressed its appreciation of the Soviet Union's support for Arab causes.

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Speech by the U.S.S.R. President Podgorny at a Dinner during his Visit to Algeria.² (Excerpt)

Algiers, March 27, 1969

The crisis in the Middle East created by the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries was fraught with serious danger for the cause of peace.

The Arab countries are faced with the pressing task of finding effective and realistic ways of solving the Middle East problem. For this purpose it is imperative that they strengthen their solidarity and the coordination and unity of their actions in the struggle against the designs of imperialism and its Israeli agents.

Our two countries come out actively for the elimination of the aftermath of the Israeli aggression.

It is known that revolutionary Algeria is rendering considerable aid to the victims of aggression and exerting great efforts to restore peace and justice in the Middle East.

Seeking to facilitate the establishment of lasting peace in that area, the Soviet Union recently put forward a number of concrete proposals. They are based on a sober and comprehensive appraisal of the Middle East situation and take into consideration the lawful interests of all Arab peoples.

The main one is the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories and a guaranteed lasting peace in the Middle East.

² *Soviet News* (London), 1/4/1969.

The Soviet Union has been and will continue to be on the side of the Arab peoples. We are giving the Arab states substantial aid in their efforts to consolidate their national economies and increase their defence potential.

Our people will continue to provide them with the necessary aid and support in the struggle to eliminate the aftermath of the Israeli aggression.

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Statement by the U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on United States Foreign Policy.¹ (Excerpts)

Washington, March 27, 1969

One of the major problems we have today is how to find a way to bring about peace in the Middle East, a peace which has eluded mankind for the last 20 years. Since the 6-day war in 1967, the Middle East has been in a state of suspended hostility. If the situation continues unabated, it could have the most serious consequences. That is why one of the first policy decisions made by the administration was to approve in principle four-power discussions in support of Ambassador Jarring and the United Nations in its search for peace.

It is increasingly clear that the situation in that area has deteriorated. In the last 20 years the Arabs and Israelis have engaged in major hostilities three times, and despite the repeated efforts of the United Nations, a stable peace has not been attained. Indeed, it is all too clear that if another war should break out, it carries with it the risk of outside involvement. It becomes, therefore, a direct interest of the United States to exercise whatever influence it has, in whatever way would be useful and effective, to help bring a lasting peace in that area.

There fortunately exists a firm and equitable basis for that search: I refer to the unanimous decision of the Security Council of the United Nations recorded in its resolution of November 22, 1967. That resolution will be the bedrock

of our policy. I can think of no better way to describe the results we would like to see in the Middle East than to examine the elements of the Security Council resolution.

First, what is the goal? It is clearly and simply defined as the establishment of a just and lasting peace. The thrust of our effort must therefore be to move forward from the conditions of armistice which have prevailed for 20 years to a state of peace — mutually accepted if it is to be just, and juridically defined and contractually binding if it is to be lasting.

Next, the principles and conditions of the peace. A just and lasting peace will require, as the Security Council's resolution states, withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the termination of all claims or states of belligerency, and the acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. Clearly, withdrawal should take place to establish boundaries which define the areas where Israel and its neighbors may live in peace and sovereign independence. Equally, there can be no secure and recognized boundaries without withdrawal. In our view rectifications from the pre-existing lines should be confined to those required for mutual security and should not reflect the weight of conquest.

The resolution also affirms that free navigation through the area's international waterways must be guaranteed. The attempt to deny such freedom to Israel in one waterway — the Straits of Tiran — was an immediate cause of the 1967 war. Denial of that freedom to Israel in another waterway — the Suez Canal — has been for 20 years a symbol of the absence of a state of peace. We believe that the right of Israel, as of all other states, is to have the right to transit these waterways and that that right must be assured.

The resolution affirms the need for a just settlement of the refugee problem. There can be no real peace without a genuine solution to that intractable problem, now made more tragic by the displacement of even more people as a result of the 1967 war. The human dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been of special concern to the United States for 20 years. Its just settlement can only be one which takes into account

¹ U.S. Congress. Senate. Briefing by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Hearing, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 27/3/1969.

to the maximum possible extent the desires and aspirations of the individual human beings concerned.

As a last principle, the resolution affirms the necessity of guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones. Here again, as in the case of freedom of navigation, the resolution introduces the concept of guaranteeing certain conditions of peace. Despite the imperfections of the past, we believe that ways can be devised for international participation in guaranteeing the terms of settlement as they relate to physical arrangements on the ground, with particular reference to the rights of navigation and demilitarization of strategic areas.

Finally, what is the mechanism for realising the principles and provisions of the Security Council resolution? In its third paragraph, the resolution asks the Secretary General of the United Nations to designate a representative to promote agreement and assist in efforts to achieve a peaceful and acceptable settlement. That representative, to whose competence I wish to pay special tribute this morning, is Ambassador Jarring of Sweden. His mission is to promote agreement — and this can only mean agreement between the parties and among the parties. We lay stress on this point because we do not believe that a peace settlement to which the parties did not agree would be just or lasting or, for that matter, attainable at all. We, for our part, are not interested in imposing a peace.

Regrettably, in the 22 months since the war Ambassador Jarring and the parties have not made significant progress. In these circumstances, we are convinced that the United States has a responsibility to help. Our interests would be ill served in the absence of a settlement. Furthermore, we and the other permanent members of the Security Council were instrumental in forging the 1967 resolution which created the mission of Ambassador Jarring. Historically, the United Nations has played a special role in helping shape the political evolution of the Middle East.

For all these reasons, we have concluded that the United States should play an active role, bilaterally and multilaterally, in support of the

United Nations effort. We are therefore actively engaged diplomatically with the other major powers and in particular with the other permanent members of the Security Council, as well as with the principal parties in the area, in efforts to help Ambassador Jarring accomplish his mission. If there is a genuine will to peace on the part of those directly concerned, we believe that the just rights and legitimate security of all the states and peoples in the Middle East can be realized. In the interests of friendly relations with all states in that area, we shall work to that end in the days ahead.

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. . . I just have one further question, Mr. Secretary. It has to do with the statement you made initially, an excellent statement. You were discussing the crisis in the Middle East, and you spoke of the concept of "guaranteeing certain conditions of peace." You said that "despite the imperfections of the past we believe that ways can be devised."

Now, four-power talks may begin on this matter, and the Soviet Union would be a party to those talks.

When you speak of guaranteeing the conditions of peace, do you have in mind an arrangement under which the United States and the Soviet Union would, in the company of, say, the United Kingdom and France, actually agree on particular boundaries for peace in the Middle East which they would undertake then to guarantee or to police? You see, what I am thinking about is another Berlin.

Secretary Rogers. Yes.

Senator Church. I don't want to see another Berlin where an uneasy arrangement exists, and where every time it is challenged we are looking down an atomic cannon and confronting a third world war. Certainly we don't want that again.

Secretary Rogers. No, Senator, I would not envisage that kind of a guarantee, and I think every statement that we have made in this connection has emphasized our interests and desire to have whatever negotiations are conducted and whatever conclusion is reached be done under the auspices of the United Nations, so that

without attempting to determine just how the guarantee would work out or to have the four powers themselves undertake that task.

So that my answer is that I would hope that any such arrangements would be worked out under the auspices of the United Nations.

Senator Church. So if a guarantor were to be introduced into the area it would be international in character.

Secretary Rogers. Yes, sir.

Senator Church. I concur in that, too.

Senator Symington. In your statement you discuss this Middle East situation. Previously, you talk about a "principle" of the four-power discussion. Based on the record, I am glad it is principle, because it is no secret among my colleagues that for a long time I have been apprehensive about the actions and attitude of General de Gaulle with respect to our problems, the problems of the British and the problems of Israel; and I was glad to note you approved of the efforts of Ambassador Jarring. I have hope in what he is trying to do.

Would you be in favor of the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories they occupied during the Arab-Israel war of 1967 if the Arab states, specifically Mr. Nasser, still refused to recognize Israel as a state?

Secretary Rogers. No, I would not.

Senator Symington. I am glad.

Senator Javits. . . . May I ask you just a question or two on the Middle East? I note with the greatest interest that you have said nothing in the statement about arms balance in the Middle East.

Now, are we to assume that the policy of the United States will continue, as it has up to now, that while you try to work out a resolution of the tremendous difficulty there, a rough arms balance has to be maintained between the contending parties?

Secretary Rogers. I would like, Senator, to answer that question this way. There has been no change in our policy.

Senator Javits. Good. That is all that I have in mind.

Secretary Rogers. When I say no change in our policy, in that regard.

Senator Javits. I understand. I understand.

I notice also in your statement something which ties in with the Middle East. I would like to call your attention to it. It appears under the heading "disarmament," and it says, "... the negotiations on Vietnam and the Middle East command world attention because of the immediacy of the threats involved. . . ." You have already testified to the paramount importance of disarmament and arms limitation in our policy, so I won't go over that ground again. But what "the immediacy of the threats involved," reminds me of, is to ask you this question: I think there has been a rather calculated effort by the Soviet Union to make the situation in the Middle East sound so dangerous in terms of nuclear war, which I think they want as little as we do, so as to perhaps entrap us into going much beyond what you have laid out, which I think is on the whole satisfactory, as the ambit of the four-power negotiations.

Now, how does the Secretary, therefore, evaluate this constant buildup by the Soviet Union that there is the gravest danger of nuclear confrontation in the Mediterranean.

Secretary Rogers. Well, I am not sure, though, Senator, that they have done that exactly. I think they have said that they are concerned about the explosive nature of the situation in the Middle East. I have not happened to read anything along that line that was very strident in tone.

But it is pretty clear that the situation is very explosive, and as you know there is an emergency session in the Security Council this morning dealing with the events in Jordan and I think it is quite apparent that it is a very dangerous situation.

I don't think that the Soviet Union's comments have indicated that they are threatening a nuclear war and I agree with you, I don't think they want a nuclear war any more than we do. No sensible man could ever contemplate a nuclear war because it will be the destruction of mankind. I don't believe they are thinking about that. But wars quite often develop, they don't happen as a result of preplanning, they quite often occur when

people wish they didn't occur. So I think that — I don't think that the Soviet Union is making threats about a nuclear war in the Middle East, but they think and we think it is a very dangerous situation and we ought to do all we can to get started on solving it.

Senator Javits. Mr. Secretary, I gather, therefore, that you do not feel the U.S. negotiating posture will be affected by an exaggerated feeling that we are just before the days of Armageddon and you have to do something.

Secretary Rogers. No, I don't, Senator. I am not overweaned by anything of that kind.

Senator Javits. Good.

The last question I have, is this, Mr. Secretary: You specify in our statement in a very frank and admirable way, the principles and conditions of peace, and you name them all.

Now, do you feel that, in order to effectively bring about a result, in view of Israel's grave concern with what is going on in the four-power talks, and the traditional irresponsibility of a number of radical Arab leaders in adhering to whatever they think the world community has made them do rather than they have done themselves, do you think that in the negotiations, what we must have in mind is that these things depend on each other? In other words, that you can't single out, as the Russians would have us do, the departure of Israel from the occupied areas unless you give at least equivalent attention to the other principles and conditions which you, yourself spell out?

Secretary Rogers. Yes, I do, and I don't think it is realistic you can have a partial agreement and put a partial agreement into effect. I think the agreement should be a complete agreement, it should be contractual and it should be in one package.

Senator Javits. I thank the Chair very much. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

55

Statement by the Israeli Cabinet Declaring Opposition to the Four-Power Talks.¹

Jerusalem, March 30, 1969

Israel's policy will continue to be governed by the political principles which the Knesset recently reaffirmed on the occasion of the formation of the new Cabinet. These principles are as follows:

Israel will make constant efforts to achieve a durable peace with her neighbours, a peace to be based upon peace treaties to be achieved in direct negotiations between the parties. Agreed, secure and recognized boundaries will be laid down in the peace treaties. The treaties will provide for cooperation and mutual aid, the solution by peaceful means of all problems at issue, and abstention from all aggression direct or indirect.

Israel will maintain her readiness to conduct negotiations — without prior conditions from any side — with any of the neighbouring states for the purpose of concluding peace treaties. In the absence of such treaties, Israel will maintain in full the situation laid down in the cease-fire agreements and will consolidate her position in accordance with the vital needs of her security and development.

The Government notes with regret that in contrast to Israel's policy of peace, the President of Egypt has again declared, in a speech on March 27, that the Arab states will not recognize Israel, will not conduct negotiations with her, will not make peace with her, but will continue to perpetrate aggressive acts against her.

Israel entirely opposes the plan to convene the representatives of states which lie outside the Middle East in order to prepare recommendations concerning the region. Such a procedure undermines the responsibility devolving on the states of the region to attain peace among themselves.

Israel opposes any settlement and any procedure which is not agreed upon by the governments concerned. Israel is not, and will not become, the object of power politics, or intra-power politics, and will not accept any recommendation

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 31/3/1969.

which is in conflict with her vital interests, her rights and her security.

Israel calls upon governments and enlightened public opinion in the world to support the advancement of negotiations between the Arab states and Israel for the establishment of a true peace in the Middle East.

56

Joint Communiqué on the Iraqi Foreign Minister Al-Shaikhli's Visit to East Germany.¹ (Excerpts)

Berlin, March 31, 1969

Minister Al-Shaikhli outlined the bases of the progressive policies of Iraq internally and externally. He emphasised especially the results of the 7th Congress of the Regional Leadership of the Socialist Baath Party in Iraq and he stressed Iraq's firm stand and full support to the Arab people of Palestine in their legitimate struggle for liberation and self-determination.

[The two ministers] condemned the close cooperation between West Germany and Israel directed against the Arab states and peoples, especially in the military field and in their striving for nuclear weapons.

Minister Winzer stated that the Government of the German Democratic Republic highly appreciates the consistent struggle waged by the Government and the people of the Republic of Iraq against the machinations of imperialism and Zionism aimed at the liquidation of the political and social achievements of the Arab peoples, and that it firmly stands by the side of and supports the Iraqi Government and people in their struggle to strengthen the political and economic independence from the imperialist powers and their subversive activities.

The two ministers underlined that Israel is a racist, expansionist and aggressive existence and that it constitutes a spearhead of imperialism in the Arab world.

They stated that Israel's expansionist policy and occupation of territories of three Arab states

since 5 June 1967 constitutes a continuous aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab states and are a grave threat to the security of all peoples in the Middle East and in the world.

They exchanged views on the Palestine issue and reaffirmed the views of their Governments that Israel's imperialist aggression against the Arab people must be liquidated and the Israeli troops of aggression be withdrawn unconditionally from the occupied territories. Israel's stubborn refusals to withdraw its armed forces from the occupied Arab territories and to recognize the full and legal rights of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination are main obstacles to a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East. The ministers condemned Israel's continued military provocations against the Arab states invaded on 5 June 1967, as they aggravate tension in the Middle East to the point of danger.

They consider the active support Israel receives from the USA and West Germany, chiefly in the way of arms supplies, as acts leading to increased tension and allowing Israel to continue and escalate its aggressive policy.

The two ministers paid tribute to the heroic resistance struggle of the Arab people, especially the people of Palestine, against the Israeli occupation. Minister Winzer assured Minister Al-Shaikhli that the German Democratic Republic supports in full solidarity the just struggle of the Arab people, and he renewed the recognition of all rights of the Arab people of Palestine including their legitimate right of self-determination and resistance against the Israeli occupation.

The two ministers most resolutely condemned Israel's imperialist policy of force which uses so-called "retaliatory action" to destroy homes, schools and hospitals and to kill or wound peaceful people. These crimes are a flagrant breach and a gross violation of human rights guaranteed by international law and the UN Charter.

Minister Al-Shaikhli paid tribute to the consistent anti-imperialist stand of the Government of the German Democratic Republic and its assistance and solidarity rendered to the Arab peoples in their anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist struggle.

¹ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 15/4/1969.

57

Joint Communiqué on the U.S.S.R. President Podgorny's Visit to Algeria.¹ (Excerpt)**Algiers, April 1, 1969**

A thorough discussion took place on the situation in the Middle East resulting from the Israeli aggression against the Arab states in June, 1967.

The USSR and the Algerian People's Democratic Republic again strongly condemn this aggression against the Arab countries and state that the primary need in order to end the deterioration of the Middle East situation is that the aggressors' troops be immediately withdrawn from all the occupied Arab territory.

Both sides stressed that the Israeli occupation of Arab territory and the continued Israeli military provocations require unity of action on the part of all Arab states and wider support from the anti-imperialist forces for their struggle to eliminate the consequences of the aggression and to restore in the Middle East a lasting peace based on respect for the legitimate rights of all the Arab peoples, and specifically those in Palestine.

58

Speech by the U.S.S.R. President Podgorny at a Banquet in his Honour during his Visit to Morocco.² (Excerpt)**Rabat, April 1, 1969**

... In particular, I should like to draw attention to the situation created in the Middle East as a result of the Israeli aggression. The Soviet Union is firmly behind the Arab states and peoples and is doing everything incumbent upon it to bring about a just solution to the Middle East problem. In keeping with that same policy we put forward a plan for a settlement of the Middle East problem. We remark with satisfaction that

His Majesty King Hasan II and the Government of Morocco support the Soviet Union's steps towards a political settlement of the problem.

However, the machinations of those forces whose policy is to stir up resentment and increase tension throughout the world are seriously jeopardising international relations, which is a cause for concern and anxiety to all peoples. In our age, which is unsettled to an unparalleled extent, the maintenance of peace depends largely on the activities of peace-loving nations, regardless of the continents they belong to. It is the duty of these nations to spare no effort in safeguarding peace against the threat of new hostile tendencies and to open new horizons for cooperation among nations, regardless of the nature of their social orders.

We are deeply confident that, no matter how complicated the problems attending relations between nations, these problems are amenable to a solution by peaceful means, through negotiations rather than through the use of force or intimidation.

59

Text of the Israeli Government's Reply to the United Nations Ambassador Jarring's Questions on the Provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) for a Settlement to the Middle East Crisis.³**Jerusalem, April 2, 1969**

Dear Ambassador Jarring,

Israel's position on all the subjects raised in your 11 questions has been stated in detail in my address to the General Assembly of October 8, 1968, and in the memoranda presented to you on October 15, 1968, and November 4, 1968.

I now enclose specific replies in an affirmative spirit to the questions as formulated. It is my understanding that on the basis of the answers received from the three governments you propose

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 8/4/1969.

² *Al-Anba* (Rabat), 3/4/1969.

³ *Jerusalem Post*, 24/1/1971. The Israeli reply was handed to Ambassador Jarring by the Israeli Foreign Minister. For Jarring's question see *ante*, doc. 44.

to pursue further mutual clarifications in an effort to promote agreement on all the matters at issue in accordance with your mandate. We are ready to join in this process at any appropriate place.

Israel's statements of attitude, including her replies to these questions, has taken into account recent developments in Arab policy including the speeches recently delivered by President Nasser and other Arab leaders. We have noted the specific and emphatic reiteration of their refusal to make peace with Israel, to recognize Israel, to negotiate with Israel, to cease terrorist attacks on Israel or to admit the possibility of sovereign coexistence in any field. It would appear at this time that the effective negation by the U.A.R. of the principles of the Charter and of the Security Council's Resolution is obvious and vehement. We hope that this policy, to which effect is given every day, will change; but these authoritative statements have caused deep concern and have intensified the tension which we would have wished to see relieved.

It is also our view that highly publicized encounters by four member states have weakened the attention which should have been concentrated on the efforts of the parties themselves to move towards agreement. They are causing a duplication and dispersal of effort. They have also encouraged a wrong impression in some quarters that a solution can be sought outside the region and without its governments. Israel recognizes your mission as the authoritative international framework within which peace between the states in the Middle East should be promoted.

I recall the idea which we discussed some weeks ago that the Foreign Ministers of the three governments should meet with you soon at a suitable place to pursue the promotion of agreement. As you will remember, I reacted positively to this idea. I wish to reaffirm that Israel will continue to co-operate with you in the fulfilment of your mission.

Yours sincerely
Abba Eban

Answer to Question One: Israel accepts the Security Council Resolution (242) for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace, to be reached by negotia-

tion and agreements between the governments concerned. Implementation of agreements should begin when agreement has been concluded on all their provisions.

Answer to Question Two: It is the Arab States, not Israel which claimed and originated states of belligerency. They declared themselves for two decades to be in a state of unilateral war with Israel. It is therefore primarily incumbent upon them to terminate the state of war with Israel.

On the establishment of peace with her Arab neighbours, Israel agrees to the termination, on a reciprocal basis, of all claims or states of belligerency with each state with which peace is established. A declaration specifying each state by name would be made by Israel in each case.

The corresponding statement by any Arab state must specifically renounce belligerency "with Israel" and not "with any state in the area." Legal obligations must be specific in regard to those by whom they are bound.

MEANING OF PEACE

Renunciation of belligerency includes the cessation of all maritime interference, the cessation of boycott measures involving third parties; the annulment of reservations made by Arab states on the applicability to Israel of their obligations under international conventions to which they have adhered; non-adherence to political and military alliances and pacts directed against Israel or including states unwilling to renounce claims or states of belligerency with Israel and maintain peaceful relations with it; the non-stationing of armed forces of such other states on the territory of the contracting states and the prohibition and prevention in the territory of Arab states of all preparations, actions or expeditions by irregular or paramilitary groups or by individuals, directed against the lives, security or property of Israel in any part of the world.

The last stipulation is without prejudice to the fact that the responsibility of Arab governments for preventing such activities is legally binding under the ceasefire established by the parties in June, 1967.

Answer to Question Three: Israel agrees to respect and acknowledge the sovereignty, terri-

torial integrity and political independence of neighbouring Arab states; this principle would be embodied in peace treaties establishing agreed boundaries.

Answer to Question Four: Israel accepts the right of Jordan, Lebanon, the United Arab Republic and other neighbouring states to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force. Explicit and unequivocal reciprocity is Israel's only condition for this acceptance. "Acts of force" include all preparations, actions or expeditions by irregular or para-military groups or by individuals directed against the life, security or property of Israel in any part of the world.

BORDERS

Answer to Question Five: Secure and recognized boundaries have never yet existed between Israel and the Arab states; accordingly they should now be established as part of the peace-making process. The cease-fire should be replaced by peace treaties establishing permanent, secure and recognized boundaries as agreed upon through negotiation between the governments concerned.

Answer to Question Six: When permanent, secure and recognized boundaries are agreed upon and established between Israel and each of the neighbouring Arab states, the disposition of forces will be carried out in full accordance with the boundaries determined in the peace treaties.

Answer to Question Seven: (general question 8) The refugee problem was caused by the wars launched against Israel by Arab states, and has been perpetuated through the refusal of Arab states to establish peaceful relations with Israel. In view of the human problems involved in this issue Israel has expressed its willingness to give priority to the attainment of an agreement for the solution of this problem through regional and international co-operation. We believe that agreement could be sought even in advance of peace negotiations. We suggest that a conference of Middle Eastern states should be convened, together with the governments contributing to refugee relief and the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, in order to chart a five-year plan

for the solution of the refugee problem in the framework of a lasting peace and the integration of refugees into productive life. This conference can be called in advance of peace negotiations.

Joint refugee integration and rehabilitation commissions should be established by the governments concerned in order to work out agreed projects for refugee integration on a regional basis with international assistance.

In view of the special humanitarian nature of this issue we do not make agreement on plans for a solution of the refugee problem contingent on agreement on any other aspect of the Middle Eastern problem. For the same reason it should not be invoked by Arab states to obstruct agreement on other problems.

GUARANTEES

Answer to Question Eight: (general question 9) The effective guarantee for the territorial inviolability and political independence of states lies in the strict observance by the governments of their treaty obligations. In the context of peace providing for full respect for the sovereignty of states and the establishment of agreed boundaries, other security measures may be discussed by the contracting governments.

Answer to Questions Nine and Ten: (general questions 10 and 13) Without prejudice to what is stated in answer to Question Eight, it is pointed out that experience has shown that the measures mentioned in Questions Nine and Ten have not prevented the preparation and carrying out of aggression against Israel.

Answer to Question Eleven: (general question 14) Peace must be juridically expressed, contractually defined and reciprocally binding in accordance with established norms of international law and practice. Accordingly, Israel's position is that the peace should be embodied in bilateral peace treaties between Israel and each Arab state incorporating all the agreed conditions for a just and lasting peace. The treaties, once signed and ratified, should be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

60

Joint Communiqué on the First Session of the Four-Power Talks on the Middle East.¹**New York, April 3, 1969**

The Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States met on April 3 at the residence of the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations to begin consideration of how they can contribute to a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East. They based the approach to this problem on Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) which they fully accept and support.² They reaffirmed their support for Ambassador Jarring's mission.

The Four Powers are agreed that the situation in the Middle East is serious and urgent and must not be permitted to jeopardize international peace and security. They have straight away entered into a discussion on matters of substance and have stated defining areas of agreement. There is a common concern to make urgent progress. The Secretary General of the United Nations will be kept fully informed.

Active consultations will continue. These consultations will be private and confidential. All appropriate contacts with the parties primarily concerned will be maintained.

The next meeting will take place on April 8th.

61

Joint Communiqué on the U.S.S.R. President Podgorny's Visit to Morocco.³ (Excerpts)**Rabat, April 7, 1969**

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After exchanging views on topical international questions, both sides again confirmed their adherence to the principle of peaceful coexistence between States with different social systems, and

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 21/4/1969, p. 337.

² For text, see *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 268-269.

³ Rabat home service in Arabic 20.30 GMT. Tass in Russian for Abroad 20.28 GMT and in English 20.15 GMT 7/4/1969. B.B.C., ME/3044/E/2.

expressed their firm determination to fight jointly with other countries for the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of international peace and security in accordance with the principles and aims of the UN Charter. Both sides noted with satisfaction the identity [or closeness; Tass version only] of their views on a number of international problems. ...

.....

Special attention was given to the situation in the Middle East caused by Israel's aggressive actions against the Arab countries. In resolutely condemning Israel's stubborn refusal to withdraw from all occupied Arab territories, including the [annexed; Tass version only] Arab part of Jerusalem, both sides believe that the aggravation of the situation in the Middle East is a serious threat to international peace, and believe that a lasting settlement of this conflict can be found only if appropriate resolutions of the UN are observed and attention is paid to the lawful interests of all Arab peoples, in particular those of Palestine.

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Statement by the U.S.S.R. President Podgorny to the Moroccan Press during his Visit to Morocco.⁴ (Excerpt)**Rabat, April 7, 1969**

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Talks on international problems again showed an identity or similarity of views between the Soviet Union and Morocco on the key questions which today concern the mind of the people throughout the world. The most important thing, in our opinion, is that both countries are determined to continue together with other peace-loving States to fight for relaxation of tension and for strengthening peace and international security. It is not only the forces of peace that are active in the world; first in one region, then in another, aggressive States impose their imperialist policy on

⁴ Rabat home service in Arabic 07.30 GMT, Moscow in Arabic 14.00 GMT, Tass in Russian for Abroad 11.30 GMT and in English 11.43 GMT 7/4/1969.

the peoples. Their machinations breed tension, and complicate international relations. This is exemplified by the situation in Vietnam, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Therefore, it is the duty of all peace-loving States to redouble their efforts against the imperialist policy of aggression and revenge, against colonialism and neo-colonialism. There is no nobler aim than that of strengthening peace and saving the peoples from the threat of a new world war. Our greatest impression of your country is the confidence that the Moroccan people, like those of the Soviet Union, will spare no effort to preserve peace in the name of prosperity for all peoples.

63

News Conference Statements by the U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on the Middle East.¹ (Excerpts)

Washington, April 7, 1969

Q. Mr. Secretary, two top leaders of the Israeli Government again yesterday attacked the whole concept of the four-power talks in the Middle East. The new Prime Minister has done the same thing. Exactly how far do you think this four-power approach can go in view of Israeli total opposition to the whole approach?

A. Well, I regret the fact that the Government of Israel is so strongly opposed to the idea of the four-power talks. We have made it perfectly clear to the Government that we are not — we do not intend and will not seek to impose a settlement on Israel. On the other hand, we do think it is vitally important, particularly in view of the fact that so little progress has been made by the Jarring mission, that major countries concerned in the area should play a part in attempting to get the parties to reconcile their differences, and we think that it may be that by this process we can influence the parties to come to some sort of a permanent settlement. Twenty years have gone by and there has not been a permanent settlement

and we think it is very important to make an effort to see if this can be resolved. We recognize the difficulties. We recognize the dangers that the Government of Israel cites; but we do think it is important to proceed along this line, and we intend to do it.

Q. There were reports of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that they would not get mixed up in any fighting in the Middle East.

A. I don't know of any such agreement. Obviously, the Soviet Union and the United States are both anxious to avoid a confrontation in that area, and we have had discussions about that, the fact that it is an explosive situation. That is one of the reasons, of course, that we have engaged in the four-power talks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke of hoping that the four-power mechanism in New York can influence the parties in the area. How do you expect to influence them without appearing to be imposing something on them?

A. Well, I think the question answers itself. There are lots of ways to influence people without making them do it. I think that the force of reasoning and the force of public opinion has a lot to do with influencing nations. There is no doubt about that — even some of the situations here in the United States. So if the world community should agree on a certain general formula for the settlement of the Middle East, then I think the governments in that area would want to think long and hard before they turned it down.

Now, if you notice in our proposals, we believe that somewhere down the road there will be — there will have to be some direct negotiations between the parties and we think that the only way you can get a settlement there is to have the parties agree on the terms. But I think it is pretty obvious that governments are influenced by public opinion.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to these big-four negotiations, there has been talk on our side about great-power guarantees for the boundaries, the access to the waterways, and so forth. Isn't that what we had the last time? Isn't that what blew up in 1967? What makes us think it would be more successful now?

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 28/4/1969, pp. 357-363.

A. Well, the fact that you have an analogy of that kind that didn't work doesn't necessarily mean that there aren't ways to improve it. When we talk about guarantees, obviously we are not — we don't have any particular thing in mind at the moment in precise terms. What we are thinking of principally are some guarantees, probably by the United Nations, which would be — which would be more satisfactory, more lasting than the previous ones. The fact it hasn't worked in the past doesn't mean we can't try again.

Certainly they have worked pretty well in Cyprus and in the Congo the United Nations is helpful, and it may well be that if we could work out a peace settlement we could have some guarantees that would be successful.

I might say in this connection that the most important factor in the Middle East and the most — the one factor that would guarantee a successful result would be a willingness on the part of all the nations to say, "We want to live in peace" and that "Israel is a nation and has a right to exist and will continue to exist and we recognize it." There is no reason why the problems in the Middle East can't be resolved peacefully if all the nations are willing to approach it in that spirit.

Now, in the absence of that spirit, all it is is an armistice. If some nations say we want to destroy a nation as soon as we are able, that is not a peace. That is just an armistice.

If we can find a way to get the parties to say, "Yes, it is to everybody's interest to have peace in this area, and we are willing to recognize everybody's right to exist, and we are going to provide for secure and recognized boundaries," than we think the guarantees would be a lot less important and necessary.

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64

Joint Statement on the Jordanian King Hussein's Visit to the United States.¹

Washington, April 10, 1969

H.M. King Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, visited Washington at President Nixon's invitation April 8, 9 and 10. During this time, His Majesty and members of his delegation had friendly and constructive discussions on matters of mutual interest and common concern with the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and other senior United States Government officials.

The principal topic of the discussion was the common United States and Jordanian desire for a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The United States informed the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of its efforts, bilateral and multilateral, to help bring about peace in the Middle East.

H.M. the King explained that the explosive nature of the situation in the Middle East is caused by the continued occupation of Jordanian and other Arab territories, and expressed his conviction that peace can only be achieved by the early withdrawal of the forces of occupation in the context of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.²

For its part, the United States called to the attention of the Government of Jordan and reaffirmed the statement made by Secretary Rogers on this point and on other points before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 27.³

Both the United States and Jordan reaffirmed their strong support for Ambassador Jarring's mission and for all the principles and provisions of the Security Council Resolution. Both Governments recognize the compelling need to seek actively a just and lasting peace in the area.

The United States reaffirmed its support for the political independence and territorial integrity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

¹ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 28/4/1969, p. 365.

² For text, see *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 268-269.

³ See *ante*, doc.

The discussions renewed and deepened the close and friendly relations which exist between the two countries.

His Majesty the King extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The President expressed his gratitude for the invitation and said he hoped to be able to make this visit at an appropriate time.

65

Radio Interview with the British Leader of the Opposition Heath on the Middle East.¹ (Excerpt)

Jerusalem, April 10, 1969

Interviewer: ... [Mr.] Heath is concluding his present Middle East tour as Leader of the Opposition. This afternoon, he gave us his two main conclusions from this tour.

Heath: It is not my impression that war is imminent, nor do I believe that any of the great Powers wish to become involved in a conflict. From talking to those concerned, I am now quite convinced that any settlement must be a contractual peace treaty if it is to last.

Interviewer: I asked Mr. Heath what he thought of the four-Power meetings for talks on the Middle East.

Heath: The four-Power conference, I think, can also help. Of course, it cannot work out solutions and just say to the countries: Take these solutions, because it cannot impose any solution of any kind. The four Powers have not the capability of imposing these solutions on the countries involved.

Interviewer: The British Conservative leader met President Abdel Nasser in Cairo last Tuesday, but he refused today to divulge the contents of these talks. He also refused to tell us anything about his talk with Mrs. Golda Meir in Tel Aviv. Heath had talks with Palestinian leaders, on

their initiative, in East Jerusalem. These personalities, who met the British statesman in Anwar Nusaybah's house, submitted to him complaints about their situation.

Heath: I do not want to go into detail about the complaints, because they have also been made known to the authorities and they were telling me, as a visiting politician, what they thought were the difficulties of living under the present conditions.

Interviewer: We returned to the topic of Britain. We asked Mr. Heath what the Middle East policy of the Conservatives would be when they formed the Government.

Heath: Britain's interest here is to see a permanent settlement of this long continuing conflict. That is our only interest. We are a great trading nation. We therefore like to see peace in the world because it is only in these conditions that we (words indistinct) that trade will increase. If Britain can be helpful in any way, then we of the Conservative Government would like to do it. And if there is no part for us to play, then we shall quite understand.

Interviewer: In that case, I asked, why does Britain continue supplying arms to States in this region?

Heath: The policy of the British Government has long been to try to keep a balance in arms in the area. Other people suggested there should be arms limitations. It has never been possible to achieve this and so we have always followed the policy, which we will continue, of trying to keep a balance.

Interviewer: Our last question was whether Mr. Heath would visit Israel again if the Conservative Party assumed the Government.

Heath: I have very much enjoyed this visit to Israel. It has been all too short. I can never commit myself to visit particular countries once I become Prime Minister. It is difficult enough to get away as Leader of the Opposition. It seems even more difficult when you are Prime Minister.

¹ Israel home service in Hebrew 18.30 GMT 10/4/1969. B.B.C. ME/3046/A/1-2. The Interview was conducted by Mr. Ya'aqov Ahimeir.

66

Address by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Sisco, on the Arab-Israeli Dispute.¹

Philadelphia, April 11, 1969

I am pleased to be with the American Academy of Political and Social Science this evening to discuss the Arab-Israeli dispute.

For 20 years peace, which is so sorely needed by all peoples in the area, has been elusive. One side sees in the creation of the State of Israel an act of aggression introducing outsiders into the Arab homeland. The other side sees the creation of the State of Israel as an act of destiny, an historic right, and a response to the world's conscience.

Each side argues its case with firmness and passion. Israel has insisted upon direct negotiations and a peace treaty; the other side has adhered to the Khartoum formula of "no peace, no negotiations, and no recognition." Somehow ways must — and I believe can — be found to get around this impasse. If the climate of distrust can be replaced by an attitude of coexistence and live-and-let-live, enduring peace could in time become a reality. Such a fundamental change is the goal of our efforts. As Secretary of State Rogers said the other day:²

... the one factor that would guarantee a successful result would be a willingness on the part of all the nations to say, We want to live in peace...

It is a fair question to ask why instability in the Middle East need concern the United States.

The most direct answer is that in a shrunken, interdependent world, areas of instability are too dangerous and could become the source of major-power conflict. In this connection, we are keenly aware that the expansion of Soviet influence in the area in the past dozen years, and more particularly since the June war, has added a new dimension and complexity. Our own interests require an effective presence in the area. We have strategic interests arising from the

simple fact that the Middle East is there — a crossroads of the world which the United States as a nation with global interests must take fully into account.

We have long been involved in the area. We have roots in the Arab world which go back to early educational and missionary activities in the days before World War I, when the area was all part of the Ottoman Empire. Those roots were widened as American private enterprise acquired interests in developing the area's petroleum resources in the 1920's and 1930's.

Our roots are also intertwined with the establishment and development of Israel. The United States Government endorsed the Balfour Declaration of 1917, was first to recognize the new State of Israel in 1948, and has supported the security and well-being of Israel for two decades with a constancy rarely surpassed in the history of relations between nations.

The question therefore is not whether we should concern ourselves with the Middle East, but how.

We have pursued our interests in four principal ways:

First, we have constantly sought to prevent outright hostilities. To this end, we have looked primarily to the United Nations, and we have given full diplomatic and material support to its peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East. Three outbreaks of war in the area in the last 20 years, regrettably, reveal that we have had only limited success; nevertheless, in each instance it was possible to help localize the conflict before it broadened into more dangerous proportions.

Second, we have sought to maintain free and mutually advantageous relations, to the extent possible, with all nations and peoples of the area and we have sought to encourage those nations to conduct their mutual relations in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter. This attitude is consistent with our deep and abiding interest in Israel and our enduring interest in friendly relations with the Arab states and their hundred million people.

Third, we have sought to slow the arms race, and we have hoped thereby to avoid becoming a major supplier of armaments. But we could

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 5/5/1969, pp. 391-394. The address was delivered at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

² See *ante*, doc. 58.

not ignore large-scale deliveries of Soviet arms to some states in the area. Accordingly, from time to time, we have provided limited quantities of arms on a selected basis to such states as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon, and Israel. At the same time, the United States has continued to explore possibilities for agreement on limitation of arms in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the Soviets have shown no serious interest since the June war in discussing this matter with us.

Finally, we have sought a stable peace — one which would help free the vast resources of the area, both material and human, for the good of the entire region.

Our immediate concern is that rather than making progress toward a peaceful settlement, the parties are gradually being drawn again toward a vortex of violence and recrimination. The present opportunity for settlement could slip away unless present trends in the area are reversed.

In recent days we have seen border incursions and raids by Arab commandos, terrorist bombings in supermarkets and at a university, prolonged artillery duels across the Suez, and retaliatory strikes from the ground and the air. Attacks on Israeli civil aircraft have posed grave risks to innocent people at international airports at Athens and Zurich.

Both sides today seem to be seeking to justify their positions in more strident and menacing words; both stick tenaciously to strongly held positions. From the U.A.R. have come statements which indicate it does not feel bound by the U.N. cease-fire resolutions; from Israel has come verbal and actual evidence of a policy of "active defense" against suspected Fedayeen bases.

This is a somber picture, I know. It helps to explain why high priority has been given by President Nixon to the Arab-Israeli dispute. These are some of the principal steps taken by President Nixon since January 20:

There has been an intensive overall review of U.S. policy in the area, and a number of National Security Council meetings have been devoted to it.

President Nixon made the Middle East conflict a prime topic of discussions during his recent European trip.

There have been serious exchanges of views with the high-level representatives of the principal parties, including King Hussein of Jordan and Foreign Minister Eban of Israel. Nor has the lack of diplomatic relations impeded a free exchange with the U.A.R., including talks with Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, President Nasser's adviser for foreign affairs, who has been in Washington during the last 10 days.

Intensive exploratory conversations are being pursued in Washington between representatives of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to see whether common or parallel views and actions can be agreed upon to promote a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the Security Council resolution of November 1967.¹ While it is too early to make a judgment regarding their prospective outcome, these talks and other bilateral diplomatic efforts are being carried forward in a serious vein, free of invective and propagandistic overtones, and have helped set the stage for four-power talks which are in train at the United Nations.

And finally, President Nixon decided to pursue the new four-power approach in the belief that the present situation in the area has deteriorated, that the parties left to themselves have not been able to narrow their differences, and that the major powers have an interest and a responsibility in trying to do everything possible to help bring calm to the area, to avoid another general renewal of hostilities with all of the risks that would be involved, and to encourage steps towards peace.

For the United States the framework for peace is contained in the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. If there is a short answer to what U.S. policy is, it is that resolution in all its provisions. I say "all its provisions" because each side likes to emphasize the parts it likes while de-emphasizing or disregarding the provisions it dislikes.

First: What is the objective?

The resolution is very clear: The objective is a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, not a fragile armistice arrangement. If a peace is to

¹ For text, see *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 268-269.

last, if it is to be just, it must be juridically defined and contractually binding.

Second: What should be the content of peace?

I need only to repeat here precisely what Secretary Rogers said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 27.¹ He said:

"A just and lasting peace will require, as the Security Council's resolution states, withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the termination of all claims or states of belligerency, and the acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. Clearly, withdrawal should take place to established boundaries which define the areas where Israel and its neighbors may live in peace and sovereign independence. Equally, there can be no secure and recognized boundaries without withdrawal. In our view rectifications from the preexisting lines should be confined to those required for mutual security and should not reflect the weight of conquest."

The Council's resolution also affirms the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area. It was the denial of such freedom to Israel through the Straits of Tiran which was the proximate cause of the 6-day war. For 20 years, Israel has been denied transit through the Suez Canal. A permanent peace must include the right for all states to traverse these waterways without discrimination.

We deeply believe, too, that an overall settlement must provide for a just solution of the refugee problem. Consistent with past U.N. resolutions, the refugees should be given a choice between repatriation and resettlement with compensation. Our hope is that a just settlement of the refugee problem can be achieved which takes into account the tragic human element and the concerns and requirements of both sides. There is need for a fundamental not an ephemeral solution.

The Security Council resolution also affirms the need to guarantee the territorial inviolability

and political independence of every state in the area through a variety of measures, including the establishment of demilitarized zones. We hope that practical arrangements can be made on the ground which will help guarantee a peaceful settlement. We hope, too, it will prove possible for the U.N. to perform a useful function in this and other respects. We are fully aware of the limitations and imperfections of the world organization. But the fact of the matter is that the U.N. Emergency Force helped maintain quiet along the demarcation lines for over a decade, and it may prove possible to have the U.N. involved in ways which will not make it possible for one party to eliminate its presence unilaterally.

Third: How can such elements of a settlement be put into effect in order to achieve a permanent peace?

Operative paragraph 3 of the U.N. Security Council resolution calls on Ambassador Jarring "to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement." His job, therefore, is to promote agreement between the parties. We underscore this because we are convinced that if a peace is to be lasting, it will require the assent and full cooperation of the parties in the area.

Our hope is that the four-power talks which began last week will find ways to reinforce future efforts of the U.N. representative with the parties. This will be no easy task. We realize that common ground between the major parties cannot be achieved quickly — and indeed may not be realizable at all. We submitted some concrete substantive ideas at the opening meeting, as did some of the others. The early sessions indicate that all four powers agree the situation in the Middle East is serious and urgent and there appears to be considerable concern over the continuing wide gulf between the parties. Whether this concern can be translated into common or parallel positions which could be conveyed to Ambassador Jarring and the parties for their consideration, only further time and explorations will tell.

We do not conceive of the four-power approach in lieu of Ambassador Jarring's efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council resolution. Our purpose is to help him buttress

¹ See *ante*, doc. 54.

future efforts with the Arabs and the Israelis.

We do not see four-power talks as a mechanism to impose peace. As President Nixon has said¹:

The four powers... cannot dictate a settlement in the Middle East. The time has passed in which great nations can dictate to small nations their future where their vital interests are involved.

We do not see a four-power solution as a substitute for agreement between the parties.

But common or parallel four-power views could influence the parties at least to narrow their differences and to make progress toward peace which ultimately could enhance the security of both Israel and the Arab states. As Secretary Rogers said on April 7: "... the force of reasoning and the force of public opinion have a lot to do with influencing nations."

We are determined to use all appropriate approaches, bilateral and multilateral, to seek a rational and enduring settlement which will advance U.S. national interests, insure Israel's survival, safeguard legitimate Arab interests, and take fully into account the interests of the world community. If there is to be a settlement, there must be compromises on both sides; this is the essence of negotiated settlements.

I cannot predict the results. We have no illusion about the difficulties ahead. But I am reminded of a remark of a great American when he said: "Optimism is to the diplomat what courage is to the soldier." We have no prescription for instant peace. I am certain, however, that no opportunity to achieve a fair settlement, so necessary and potentially beneficial to all the peoples of the region, will be overlooked by the United States.

¹ See *ante*, doc. 41.

Interview Statements by the West German Foreign Office State Secretary Jahn on the Middle East.² (Excerpt)

Bonn, April, 1969

Our policy towards the Arab countries and our attitude in the Middle East conflict, which is governed by the principle of non-intervention, is still being distorted in some Arab countries. Groups with an axe to grind repeatedly accuse the Federal Republic of Germany of pursuing a one-sided policy in the Middle East.

However, many Arabs are beginning to realise that these charges are only intended to disrupt relations and that our policy is not directed against the Arab nations. I am confident that all Arab countries will, in the long run, arrive at a sober appraisal of our policy based on the facts.

We realise that some countries in the Arab world are faced with greater difficulties than others in this respect. This should not, however, stop any from taking a step towards a general improvement in Arab-German relations.

Press Conference Statements by the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban Rejecting the Jordanian King Hussein's Proposals for a Peaceful Settlement to the Arab-Israeli Conflict.³ (Excerpt)

Beit-Egrom, April 13, 1969

[Addressing King Hussein:]

You chose to join in the war against Israel in June, 1967. If you now want peace, you will have to bring your proposals to the negotiations table.

² *Heilbronner Stimme*, (Bonn), 15/4/1969.

³ *Davar* (Tel Aviv), 14/4/1969. King Hussein's proposals were embodied in his talk at the National Press Club in Washington on April 10, 1969. See the Arab World Section, doc. 390.

You will also have to listen to our observations and our points of view.

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69

Replies in Parliament by the British Premier Wilson to Questions on the Middle East.¹ (Excerpt)

London, April 15, 1969

Q2 *Mr. Henig* asked the Prime Minister if he will make an official visit to the Middle East.

Q6 *Mr. Hamling* asked the Prime Minister what consultations he has now had with Heads of Government with a view to bringing about a settlement in the Middle East.

The Prime Minister: I have no plans to visit the Middle East at present. Since the beginning of this year I have discussed the Middle East situation with a number of Heads of Governments, including President Nixon, King Hussein, and Chancellor Kiesinger, and during the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in January and with senior representatives of Middle East states below Head of Government level.

Mr. Henig: Can the Prime Minister say at what point in the Big Four talks now going on the various parties to the Middle East conflict will be consulted? Whilst recognising that those parties will have to make some concessions in the interests of peace, may I ask my right hon. Friend to confirm that there is no question of dictation on one side or the other?

The Prime Minister: On the first part of the question, I think that my hon. Friend can assume that the four nations involved in these very important talks at the United Nations are very fully apprised of the position of the various Middle East countries concerned and that there are facilities for continuing contact to deal with any changes in the situation.

The answer to the second part is that there is certainly no question of dictation. The purpose of the four-Power talks is to strengthen the

initiatives taken by Dr. Jarring over the past year and a half since our Resolution at the United Nations and to bring these initiatives to fruition.

Mr. Hamling: Does the Prime Minister agree that one of the difficulties of the United Nations' observers in all this, and the United Nations, is the failure of some of the great Powers of the world to support the United Nations in this area?

The Prime Minister: We made very clear our attitude to the treatment of the United Nations' observers at that critical time just before the Middle East war of 1967 began. We shall be ready, and I am sure that other great Powers will be ready, to give full support to the United Nations' observers, recognising the difficult task that they now have in seeking to prevent outbreaks of fighting and the even more difficult task they might have to police any settlement which comes out of the four-Power talks and the negotiations between the States concerned.

Sir C. Osborne: As the Soviet Union is likely to be the greatest influence in preserving peace in the Middle East, is the right hon. Gentleman in close touch with Moscow on this issue?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that we welcomed the initiative of the Soviet Government about bilateral talks and four-Power talks. We are in close touch with them, and my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has maintained close contact with the embassy in this country, and I have exchanged messages with Mr. Kosygin.

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Joint Communiqué on the Iraqi Foreign Minister Al-Shaikhli's Visit to East Germany.² (Excerpt)

Berlin, April 20, 1969

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Both ministers denounced the close cooperation between West Germany and Israel particularly

¹ *Hansard*, 14-17/4/1969, col. 983.

² *Al-Jumhuriyya*, (Baghdad), 3/4/1969.

in the military field, which is directed against the Arab countries and the Arab people. They also denounced the all-consuming desire of these two countries for nuclear armament.

Minister Winzer underlined the great admiration of the German Democratic Republic for the tireless struggle of the government and people of the Republic of Iraq against imperialist and Zionist organisations which seek to liquidate the political and social achievements of the Arab peoples. The minister also gave assurances that his government stands solidly by the side of the government and the people of Iraq and supports them in their struggle to consolidate political and economic independence and to escape the destructive activities of imperialist powers.

Both ministers emphasised the fact that Israel is a racist, expansionist and aggressive entity and that it is the spearhead of imperialism in the Arab homeland. They agreed that Israel's expansionist policy and its occupation, since June 5, 1967, of territories belonging to three Arab states are continued violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those Arab states. They added that these factors also constitute a serious threat to the security of all the people of the Middle East and to world peace.

The two ministers exchanged views on the Palestine issue and reaffirmed their governments' standpoint that the imperialist Israeli aggression against the Arab people must be completely stopped and that the Israeli forces of aggression must withdraw unconditionally from the occupied territories.

They added that Israel's obstinacy, its constant refusal to withdraw its armed forces from the occupied Arab territories and its refusal to acknowledge the full and legitimate right of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination, are the main hindrances to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Both ministers condemned Israel's constant military provocation of the Arab states which were the victims of the June 5, 1967 aggressions in view of the fact that these provocations have raised the tension in the Middle East to a critical point.

The two ministers affirmed the fact that active support, particularly the arms supplies which Israel receives from the United States and West

Germany, contributes to the rise of tension, allowing Israel to persist in its aggressive policy and even making it possible for it to attempt the escalation of its aggression.

Both ministers praised the heroic resistance of the Arab people, particularly that of the Palestinian people, against Israeli occupation. Herr Winzer affirmed to Mr. Al-Shaikhli the German Republic's support for the just struggle of the Arab people and its total solidarity with that people. He once again expressed recognition of the right of the Arab people to Palestine, including their legitimate right to self-determination and resistance to Israeli occupation.

The two ministers strongly condemned imperialist Israel's use of the technique of violence in its so-called "punitive actions," for it is demolishing houses, schools and hospitals, and killing and inflicting injuries on peaceful citizens. These measures constitute a flagrant violation of the rights of man, sanctioned by international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

71

Joint Communiqué on the Shah of Iran's visit to Tunisia.¹ (Excerpt)

Tunis, April 21, 1969

The two heads of state hailed the determination of the Palestinian people to recover their legitimate rights. They expressed grave concern over the deteriorating situation in the Middle East. It is their opinion that the occupation of parts of the territories of several of Arab states through force and violence constitutes a flagrant violation of international law which threatens both the security of the area and the safety of the world. They drew attention to the inescapable necessity for a just and lasting solution to that painful problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

¹ *Al-Amal* (Tunis), 22/4/1969.

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**Message From the Israeli Premier to the
Diaspora on Israel's "Independence Day."¹
(Extracts)**

Jerusalem, April 21, 1969

It is now almost two years since the Six Day War. I am convinced that you have asked yourselves — those of you who have not visited Israel during these past years — how does Israel live in these days?

You probably read every day about terrorist activities. You hear it on the radio and see it on television. But this is not all that happens in Israel. As a matter of fact, many of our visitors who had heard all about terrorist activities are immediately struck by the quiet and the calm of this country. The important things that we have always followed in Israel go on. Farmers in the agricultural settlements on the Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese borders, despite all the attempts of the terrorists, are working in their fields and, moreover, carry on their social and cultural activities as though it was absolutely normal.

Not one single family has left any one of these villages, despite the fact that there are some where children have now for over a year and some for a year and a half slept in shelters because of shelling from the other side. They go on with their schooling, sometimes within the shelters; but life goes on as though there were no other problems.

Development in Israel has progressed. Industrial and other investments have increased by 45 per cent. This is something extremely encouraging, because many of these investments have come from Jews outside Israel. They too, as we here, cannot be scared away because our Arab neighbours refuse to make peace with us. There is full employment in the country; building goes on.

I wish that some of you who have not been here would come and see what is happening on Mount Scopus and see the life in the campuses of the Universities, the large number of students. Nothing that can happen in Jerusalem, or any other part of the country, can scare these youngsters away from their studies, from their work,

from their army service. This is the greatest asset that Israel has: its people.

When you come here and walk through the streets, you will find no sign whatsoever of fear or panic. Everybody is very conscious of the situation, everyone knows that peace has not yet come. Everyone knows that our neighbours do not listen to our call for peace as yet. Everyone of us is convinced that the time must come when our neighbours too, tens of millions of Arabs — men and women, young people and old — would finally come to the conclusion that they, as well as we, at least as much as we, if not more, are in need of peace.

In the meantime, we have to go on with our life, working, developing and strengthening our Defence Forces, so that as long as there is no peace, we must be strong in order to defend ourselves.

A great burden is placed on our people. Those younger people who are not serving in the army are called up for reserve duty for much longer periods than in normal times. They accept it. Of course, our defence budget is much greater than a small nation can carry. Our people accept it, knowing there is no choice. Herein lies our strength.

One of the most important and happy things that has happened to us is the increase in aliya from the free world. Young people, people with children, families, come and settle here.

There is no problem of employment for them. As soon as they know a bit of Hebrew, they take their place in the building of the country. It is a great joy to us to have this increase in aliya. In fact, Israel's great need at this time is more people, more and more people to come and be with us, not only to face danger with us, but more even than that, to work with us, to build with us, to share the joy of Israel with us, not only the dangers and the struggle.

We are now also engaged in a political struggle with friends and we are doing everything possible to make our friends understand that peace in this area really can be attained only by those that are involved in the struggle of this area. As far as Israel is concerned, all its people, without any exception whatsoever, have no greater wish, there is no greater prayer in their soul, than that there

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 22/4/1969.

may be peace on our borders, peace with our neighbours, and cooperation with our neighbours. But our neighbours must accept the existence of the State of Israel as a normal factor in the Middle East, be prepared to live in peace with us, and be prepared to negotiate with us. It cannot be something that can be decided by others. We cannot accept that even our friends can sit down with other powers and decide our fate for us.

Therefore, at this time, the Government of Israel and the people of Israel are involved in a very serious dialogue and discussion with our best friends. We hope that eventually they will understand that the policy that the Israel Government has followed from the very first day after the war until this present hour is one of search for a real peace with our neighbours. They are convinced that that will come. Until then we have to be strong.

You Jews in all parts of the free world, who are with us in absolute solidarity, in full understanding, are one of our great sources of encouragement and strength.

Let us hope that during the next year you and we will see one of the great aspirations of all of us realized: that the Jews from Russia will be allowed to do what they want to do. All those that want to, come and join us and be with us.

Let us hope that the small groups of Jews in Arab countries, suffering at the hands of their governments, being discriminated against with their lives very often in danger, that they too will be allowed to leave those countries, come to us and join with us.

I wish all of you "Hag Sameah!" and "Shalom!"

73

Statement by the Australian Premier Gorton on Israel's "Independence Day".¹

Melbourne, April 22, 1969

All Australians want an enduring peace, that the Arab nations should sit down, talk, discuss and reach an agreement with Israel. My Government will support and influence, where it can, moves toward this end.

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 27/4/1969.

74

Press Conference Statements by the Israeli Premier Meir Expressing her Objection to Discuss the Arab-Israeli Borders Except through Peace Negotiations.² (Extracts)

Tel Aviv, April 23, 1969

... We will not agree to accept 'promises', or proposals for demilitarized zones, but only plans that will radically alter the situation, whether four or 40 meet.

The 1967 borders are out of the question, just as the 1947 partition lines died in the War of independence. The Arabs always yearn for the previous borders they lost by their own fault.

[Asked to comment on King Hussein's statements in the U.S., the Premier observed:] Hussein says he wants the 1947 lines but will compromise on those of 1967. Both he and Nasser told Ambassador Jarring, in identical replies, that they insist on the 1947 borders. Anyhow, I am not sure whether he really speaks for Nasser. Moreover, he does not speak of a peace treaty, nor of agreed borders, nor of solving all the problems together. Hussein wants us to get out and hand over Jerusalem, and put our trust in him. He also said that the shelling of Eilat was part of the fight against us. He promises that if we give him everything he wants, then the Fatah, too, will thank us very much — I, for one, have my doubts.

Let us tackle things at the conference table, but we will not forgo Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and some other places. We will not rely on others to protect our shipping rights.

Another aspect is the difference between us and the Arabs. Ostensibly the Arabs have a patron — the Soviet Union, with France also pushing its nose in. On the other hand, our friends are the Americans. What I wish to emphasize here is that the Arabs expect the Russians to do their work for them. The Arabs want us to withdraw from the territories, they do not have the force to make us do that, and they trust that the Soviet Union, by tying the U.S. to its chariot, will do it for them.

With a slight exaggeration, we could say that the opposite is true of the situation between us

² *Jerusalem Post*, 20/4/1969.

and the Americans, with the Americans expecting us to do the job for them. We don't want them to do anything for us. They, by their affinity with us, demand that we do this or that, because it meets or serves U.S. interests... This is not only an interesting, but a major difference, which I would like to emphasize as the source of my optimism, because we can thereby argue with the Americans without forgoing our essential interests.

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Address by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Sisco, on the Arab-Israeli Confrontation.¹

Washington, April 23, 1969

I welcome this opportunity to speak to the annual policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee about one of the most pressing and complex challenges to international diplomacy and American statecraft: the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

President Nixon has launched a period of very active American diplomacy in the belief that the parties, left to themselves, have not been able to find common ground, that the opportunities which may exist for settlement could be lost if some progress cannot soon be made in narrowing deep-rooted differences between Israel and the Arab states.

I regret to say that developments in the area seem to be moving in the opposite direction.

The rhetoric on both sides has become inflamed; suspicion and hatred have not abated. The cycle of attacks and reprisals continues. We need only recall the recent fedayeen commando rocket attack on Elath and the Israeli use of counter airstrikes as part of its policy of "active defense." And in turn, last week the Cairo newspaper Gomhouria spoke of Egyptian-initiated artillery duels across the canal as a policy of "preventive defense" to check Israeli concentrations in Sinai.

On the political front, Israel has insisted upon direct negotiations and a peace treaty, although it has engaged in substantive discussion under Ambassador Jarring's [Gunnar Jarring, the U.N. Secretary General's special Middle East representative] auspices. The Arabs have not abandoned the Khartoum formula of "no peace treaty, no negotiations, and no recognition."

A way needs to be found out of this political impasse. Somehow we must find a way to help change the climate of intransigence and suspicion to a willingness to coexist on a live-and-let-live basis; somehow a durable and equitable peace must emerge in this tension-weary area that has commanded far too many headlines of despair, destruction, and death. Such a change, I am sure, would be in everybody's interest. It is the achievement of this basic change that is the ultimate goal of our efforts. Secretary of State Rogers observed recently that the one factor which would guarantee a successful result of such efforts would be the willingness of all nations to say "We want to live in peace" and that "Israel is a nation and has a right to exist and will continue to exist and we recognize it."²

What is needed, too, is a spirit of compromise and conciliation. Such a spirit would require exceptional courage and a remarkably high order of statesmanship. The alternative, a failure of statesmanship and courage, is grim. We recognize that compromises are painful and that they encompass an acceptance of some degree of calculated risk. But compromise need not prejudice either side's legitimate interests. It is not only in the Middle East that we are faced with this reality. We seek a peace which would give security to both sides. Security in the Middle East — as elsewhere — is relative, not absolute. The road to such security is embraced in the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 1967.³ It meets requisite needs of both sides: (1) a just and lasting peace; (2) agreement between the parties; and (3) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces to agreed and secure boundaries.

It is both fair and important to set forth the

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 26/5/1969, pp. 443-446. The address was delivered before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee at Washington, D.C.

² See *ante*, doc. 63.

³ For text, see *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 268-269.

reasons for United States concern for and interest in the area.

The most salient and direct response is that in a 20th-century jet-propulsion age of more than 120 interdependent nations, areas of conflict and constant instability are potential sites for big-power confrontation and conflict. Recent deployment into the Mediterranean of units of the Soviet North Atlantic Fleet brought the total of Russian naval units there to an all-time high of more than 50 ships. This is only one aspect of the expansion of Soviet influence in the area in recent years and particularly since the third Arab-Israeli war, of June 1967. This Soviet presence and influence in the Mediterranean is yet another complicating dimension to the Middle East problem. For our part, we must and will maintain an effective and positive presence in the area. Our strategic interests emanate from the self-evident fact that the area is a crossroads and confluence of the world which the United States as a nation with global interests must take fully into account.

Our direct involvement in the area is long standing.

Our close relationship with Israel goes back to the very establishment of Israel and throughout its remarkable and creative development into a modern progressive state. The United States Government was the first to recognize the new State of Israel in 1948. With an unprecedented degree of constancy, we have supported the security and well-being of Israel since it entered the community of nations. We have recognized the importance of preventing a military imbalance in the area, and as a consequence, we have provided Israel as well as Arab states with limited amounts of arms. Our ties with Israel and our continuing dialogue with its people and leaders bear the special warmth and candor characteristic of democratic states who share mutual aspirations of free societies.

We also have close associations with the Arab world, which go back to early educational and missionary activities before the First World War. These associations were widened as American entrepreneurs acquired interests in developing the area's vast petroleum resources in the 1920's and 1930's. Since World War II, the United States has contributed substantially to the

economic, technological, and social development of Arab nations.

The question therefore is not whether we should concern ourselves with Israel and the Arab nations, but the manner in which we do so.

We have pursued our interests in four principal ways:

First, we have been persistent in our efforts to prevent hostilities by giving full diplomatic and material support to U.N. peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East. Three times in the last 20 years peacekeeping efforts admittedly failed, but the area of conflict was at least localized.

Second, we have sought to maintain free and reciprocally beneficial relations with all nations and peoples of the area.

Third, we have sought international agreement on arms limitation in the area; but the chief supplier of such arms — the U.S.S.R. — has so far indicated no willingness to discuss this matter until a political settlement has been achieved. This is important, because when Soviet objectives in the Middle East are analyzed many factors must be weighed: We welcome their willingness to engage in serious talks on the Middle East, and we will make every reasonable effort to make progress; however, we must also keep in mind not only Soviet arms policy but its stepped-up activities in the area, the need for greater impartiality on its part on this issue in the political arena of the U.N., and its long-range objective of increasing its own influence in the area and reducing thereby that of the West, and the United States in particular.

Finally, we have sought an enduring and equitable peace, one which would provide the environment and stimulus for the development of the area's largely untapped human and material riches.

I know that the picture I paint of developments in the area is in dark and somber hues. But it provides an insight into why President Nixon has given high priority to the Arab-Israeli confrontation. In searching for ways to assist Ambassador Jarring and the parties to achieve a durable and just peace, the President has taken a number of steps, among which are:

— Prompt and exhaustive review of U.S.

policy in the Middle East and several National Security Council sessions on the subject.

— Discussion of the Middle East conflict with European leaders during his recent trip.

— Frank and meaningful exchanges of views with high-level representatives of the contending parties, including Jordan's King Hussein and Israel's Foreign Minister [Abba Eban]. Mr. Eban eloquently and determinedly presented Israel's hopes for peace, the Israeli view on the essentials of a peace settlement, and his nation's apprehensions about current developments. King Hussein, on his part, made a genuine contribution to an understanding of the Arab viewpoint and the perils of failure in the search for peace. We welcomed his reaffirmation of support for the November 1967 Security Council resolution.

Intensive exploratory conversations are being pursued in Washington between representatives of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to see whether common or parallel views and actions can be agreed upon to promote a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the Security Council resolution. While it is too early to make a judgment regarding their outcome, these talks and other bilateral diplomatic efforts are being carried forward seriously, free of propagandistic overtones, and have helped set the stage for four-power talks being held at the United Nations. We have made a bit of progress; our views are somewhat closer together, but there is a good distance to go.

Finally, President Nixon decided to pursue the new four-power approach in the belief that the major powers have an interest and a responsibility in trying to do everything possible to encourage steps towards peace. Here, too, the discussions have focused on the relevant elements of a permanent peace within the framework of the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 1967, and modest progress has been made.

If there is a short answer to what U.S. policy is, it is the November 22, 1967, Security Council resolution in its entirety. I emphasize *its entirety*, because each side is inclined to emphasize the parts it approves and disregard the provisions it disapproves.

The Security Council resolution of November

1967 is clear: The objective is a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, not a fragile armistice arrangement. If a peace is to last, if it is to be just, it must be juridically defined and contractually binding based upon agreement reached by the parties in a spirit of compromise.

Secretary Rogers outlined the elements of peace before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 27.¹ He said:

"A just and lasting peace will require, as the Security Council's resolution states, withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the termination of all claims or states of belligerency, and the acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. Clearly, withdrawal should take place to established boundaries which define the areas where Israel and its neighbors may live in peace and sovereign independence. Equally, there can be no secure and recognized boundaries without withdrawal. In our view rectifications from the pre-existing lines should be confined to those required for mutual security and should not reflect the weight of conquest."

The Council's resolution also affirms the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area. It was the denial of such freedom to Israel through the Straits of Tiran which was the proximate cause of the 6-day war. For 20 years, Israel has been denied transit through the Suez Canal.

We believe, too, that an overall settlement must provide for a just solution of the refugee problem. Consistent with past U.N. resolutions, the refugees should be given a choice between repatriation and resettlement with compensation. There is need for a fundamental solution which takes into account the human element and the concerns and requirements of both sides.

The Security Council resolution also affirms the need to guarantee the territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area through a variety of measures, including the establishment of demilitarized zones. We hope that practical arrangements can be made

¹ See *ante*, doc. 54.

on the ground and political action taken which will help guarantee a peaceful settlement.

The U.N. Security Council resolution calls on Ambassador Jarring "to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement." His mandate, therefore, is to promote agreement between the parties. We underscore this because we are convinced that if a peace is to be lasting, it will require the assent and full cooperation of the parties in the area.

As I have indicated, our hope is that the four-power talks will find ways to strengthen future efforts of the Jarring mission. This is a delicate and difficult task. We realize that common ground between the major parties cannot be achieved overnight — and indeed may not be achievable at all.

We are under no illusions that a dispute which has proved intractable for over 20 years will suddenly be made more tractable because of major-power discussions. This group can probe formulas to reconcile issues, but no formula will work without the agreement and cooperation of the parties. Whether common positions which could be conveyed to Ambassador Jarring can be achieved, only time and patient discussions will tell. For our part, we feel that the need for a permanent peace in the Middle East is compelling.

We do not conceive of the four-power approach in lieu of Ambassador Jarring's efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council resolution. Our purpose is to help him buttress future efforts with the Arabs and the Israelis.

We do not see four-power talks as a mechanism to impose peace. As President Nixon has said:¹

"The four powers . . . cannot dictate a settlement in the Middle East. The time has passed in which great nations can dictate to small nations their future where their vital interests are involved."

We do not see four-power common ground as a substitute for agreement between the parties.

But common or parallel four-power views could influence the parties at least to narrow

their differences and to make progress toward peace which ultimately could enhance the security of both Israel and the Arab states.

I know there are some who say we should not engage in these discussions with the other major powers. Let me make clear we are not there to bargain away the security of any state in the area. We must bear in mind that there is the ever-present risk that local disputes can mushroom into something bigger carrying the risk of involving the major powers. It becomes, therefore, a direct security interest of the United States to exercise whatever influence it has, in whatever way would be useful and effective, to help bring a lasting peace to the Middle East.

This is the principal reason why President Nixon has decided that our efforts should be channeled through all appropriate avenues to peace, including bilateral and multilateral exchanges. In our efforts, our purpose will be to insure Israel's security, safeguard legitimate Arab interests, and take fully into account our own and the world community's security and other interests.

Much of what needs to be achieved depends on the spirit of compromise among the parties. Compromise is, in the final analysis, the hallmark of productive negotiation. Compromise implies that neither side will gain all that it desires; on the other hand, neither side would be expected to surrender its vital interests.

Much is still obscure about the future course of events, and I am unable to predict what those events might produce. We, for our part, will press ahead without illusory expectations of an instant peace. Because much remains to be done, no opportunity to achieve an equitable settlement will be overlooked by the United States.

76

Resolutions of the International Islamic Conference Held in Kuala Lumpur, on the Issue of Jerusalem.² (Excerpt)

Kuala Lumpur, April 27, 1969

1. Having carefully studied the issue of the

¹ See *ante*, doc. 41.

² *The Kabul Times*, 8/5/1969.

Holy City of Jerusalem where the Moslems have for centuries been responsible for preserving the sacred places of the Moslems and the Christians alike. 2. And noting the strong sentiments expressed by delegates to this Conference. 3. This Conference condemns Israel for having usurped the Arab territories and in particular the Holy City of Jerusalem — which includes the first Qibla and the third sacred mosque of the Moslems and place of ascension of the Holy Prophet. 4. Calls upon all Moslem states and peoples to support the Palestinian people and the Moslem countries — which have been the victims of Israeli aggression — in their efforts to recover Jerusalem and their usurped territories and for restoration of the legal rights of the Palestinian people. 5. Appeals to all Moslem nations to hold as soon as possible a Conference at high political level to discuss the issue of Jerusalem in all its aspects. 6. Appeals to all nations of the world to uphold the Charter of the United Nations which clearly condemns the acquisition of territories by force and denies the fruits of aggression to the aggressor.

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77

Replies in Parliament by the British Minister of State Mulley to Questions on the Middle East.¹ (Excerpt)

London, April 28, 1969

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33. *Mr. Shinwell* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what decision has been reached by the four-Power conference on their efforts to promote a settlement in the declared war by the Arab States against the State of Israel.

Mr. Roy Hughes asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the progress of the four-Power talks on the Middle East.

Mr. Mulley: Representatives of the four Powers have had four meetings since their first meeting

in New York on 3rd April. It is clear that all four wish to make a success of the talks, but the House will not expect me to disclose details about their discussions.

Mr. Shinwell: Is it not clear that the Israeli Government have stated that no settlement is possible unless as a result of negotiations between themselves and the representatives of the Arab States? Further, how is it possible, for example, for the Soviet Union to adopt an objective attitude in view of their sending a large consignment of arms to the Arab States and, moreover, encouraging anti-Semitism in Russia?

Mr. Mulley: As my right hon. Friend will know, I cannot give answers on behalf of the Soviet Government. However, I think that the talks will serve an extremely important purpose if they succeed in their aim, which is to reach and define agreements on all matters dealt with in the Security Council resolution of November, 1967, which, the House will recall, was promoted by Her Majesty's Government. There is certainly no question, as my right hon. Friend knows, of the four Powers seeking to impose a solution, but if we could get four-Power agreement on these main issues arising from the resolution it will be an important step forward.

Sir A. V. Harvey: Does not the Minister of State agree that perhaps a good way to start this business would be to free the ships of Britain and the other nations which are tied up in the Bitter Lakes? A few weeks ago the Government were very optimistic that something was about to happen. When will it happen, and what is being done?

Mr. Mulley: Seven nations are in the unfortunate situation of having their ships detained in the Lakes. We have taken a leading part in trying to find a solution. It is a great disappointment that no solution has yet been found. This is one of the issues which would fall for solution if we could, through the four-Power talks, find a solution to the wider problem.

Mr. Mayhew: Are the four Powers carefully studying the peace proposals of King Hussein, which provided for the acceptance of Israel by the Arab countries and are a good example of the King's courage and good sense? While accepting that a settlement cannot be imposed, is it not

¹ *Hansard*, April 25 - May 1, 1969, cols. 928-929.

clear from Israel's rejection of these proposals and also her rejection in advance of any settlement by the four Powers, that something more than persuasion will be needed if a settlement is to be reached?

Mr. Mulley: We had better postpone consideration of how best to implement the recommendations until we have the recommendations. I can assure my hon. Friend that the four Powers will be discussing the proposals of King Hussein, because, as I understand them, they are exactly in line and essentially the same as the items in the Security Council resolution.

78

Editorial on the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China, by the Journal of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee *Kommunist*.¹ (Excerpts)

Moscow, April, 1969

The Maoists... obstruct the efforts of the socialist countries to solve the disarmament problem and their measures to attain a relaxation of tension in Europe, in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean area.

The policy conducted by the Maoists in the Third World of stirring up conflicts and of encouraging extremist, nationalist circles has been clearly manifested in the Arab countries, where the Mao Tse-tung group is attempting to strengthen its influence on Palestinian organisations which come out against a political settlement of the Middle East conflict.

Several centres on Chinese territory are engaged in providing military and political training for rebels from the developing countries; incidentally, they are being trained not so much for waging struggle against colonialism as for carrying out Peking's special aims in the Third World.

¹ *Kommunist*, (Moscow), No. 5, 1969. Also in *Soviet News* (London), 29/4/1969.

China is modifying its methods of penetrating into the developing countries, striving to undermine the latter's ties with the socialist countries, to transform them into its own sphere of influence and to make the developing countries a tool in conducting their policy. Thus, the fight of imperialism and of reaction against the forces struggling for national and social liberation is being helped.

The activities of the Mao Tse-tung group as regards the world communist movement are characterised by the employment of new methods of subversion.

79

Joint Communiqué on the Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski's Visit to Algeria.¹ (Excerpts)

Algiers, April 29, 1969

... Concerning the situation in the Middle East, both sides expressed their conviction that the removal of the traces of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries, and particularly withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied by Israel, is the basic condition for a solution of the Middle East dispute.

Both sides condemn the severe repression practised by the forces of aggression against the Palestinian Arab people whose resistance and struggle for their legitimate rights have earned deserved admiration and support.

Both sides observe that the occupation by Israel of Arab territories and the continuing struggle by anti-imperialist forces to eliminate the consequences of aggression and to establish a permanent peace in the Middle East, entail respect for the legitimate rights of all the Arab peoples.

¹ *Al-Sha'b* (Algiers), 30/4/1969.

80

Statement by the Singapore Government on its Establishing Diplomatic Relations with Israel.¹

Singapore, May 5, 1969

[The statement said that] the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel did not imply a departure from its policy of friendship to the Arab peoples. Diplomatic ties with Israel did not mean that Singapore endorsed all aspects of Israel's policy. Singapore supported United Nations efforts to find a solution to the Middle East conflict.

"In this search for peace there is a need to see that justice is done to the peoples and countries of the Middle East, including the Palestinian refugees, and the right of the State of Israel to exist needs to be acknowledged."

81

Statement to the Knesset by the Israeli Premier Meir on the Current Political and Security Aspects of the Situation between the Arab States and Israel.²

Jerusalem, May 5, 1969

On March 17 of this year the Government was presented to the Knesset, and the principles of the Government's policy were outlined. In that address I repeated Israel's call to the Arab states to meet us in order to establish peace in the Middle East, and until the present situation is replaced by permanent peace, to fully uphold the cease-fire arrangements. Our appeal failed to obtain the hoped-for response, but in the political and security arena, events have taken place to which I must make reference.

As you will recall, in February a consultative framework on the Middle Eastern situation was set up by the four Big Powers. With this, Arab leaders began and continue intensive activities on three planes: First, they have endeavoured

to terrorize international public opinion with the imminence of all-out warfare which could spread outside the region.

Secondly, in order to enhance the impact of this propaganda, regular Arab armies in the south and in the east began to aggregate the situation on the borders by unprecedented violations of the cease-fire. Egypt even went as far as to cast doubts upon the very existence of the cease-fire. The terrorists were ordered to step up their activities.

Thirdly, to win the sympathy of world public opinion, the Arab rulers made a series of deceptively moderate statements centred around King Hussein's recent visit to the U.S.

Appearing before the Press Club in Washington on April 10, King Hussein said, *inter alia*, and I quote: "Before the war, on June 1, 1967, Arabs had agreed to put an end to the state of belligerency with Israel, to afford her access, in exchange for guarantees, to Sharm el-Sheikh and the Suez Canal, to recognize her rights to live in peace and security and to agree to conditions which would ultimately resolve the refugee problem" — if the Arabs had agreed to such conditions on the 1st of June 1967, such a step would have been dramatic, constituting such a great concession on the part of the Arabs that Israel could not have failed to recognize the generosity of the proposal, nor could any one else throughout the world.

The Arabs today "were offering Israel precisely this proposal and the Israelis rejected it."

We read these words in bewilderment. According to the concepts customary among civilized nations, peace is not a favour bestowed by one party upon the other, but even by the lights of King Hussein, we must ask: Why did he not make this proposal to us?

PREPARING FOR WAR

The answer is now well known: on June 1, 1967, the Arab rulers were thoroughly occupied with feverish preparations for war, firmly hoping that this time they would be able to destroy us once and for all, as they have themselves declared.

At that time the King put his army under the command of the Egyptian High Command for

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 12/5/1969.

² *Jerusalem Post*, 6/5/1969.

the purpose of attacking Israel. In those days a Jordanian operational order was formulated, code-named Ra'ad, for the purpose of carrying out an attack on the village of Motza, destroying it and killing all its inhabitants. This "peaceful operation" was to have been carried out upon receiving the appropriate pass-word from regimental headquarters.

A copy of this "glorious" order was found in the Hashemite Jordanian regimental headquarters near Ramallah, together with a few other files containing operational plans for raids on Israeli villages, designed to destroy them and to murder their inhabitants.

If only the King had understood the true needs of his country, if only he had not thrown away his independence, if only he had refrained from his adventure, even without displaying toward the Government of Israel the generosity he evinced at the Press Club, he would have saved his country and its people the disaster which he brought upon them by his fatal decision at the beginning of June.

But that is not all. The 1st of June, 1967, was followed by the 1st of June, 1968. If the King had had the courage to get up and announce then that he was ready to negotiate peace with Israel he would have done his country yeoman service. But he missed the opportunity again on June 1, 1968.

In that speech King Hussein tried to prop up his argument by referring to President Eisenhower, through selective quotations from the latter's statements made in February 1957, after the Sinai Campaign.

For some reason or other King Hussein forgot to quote the public announcement made by the U.S. President in 1957 which stated that there were no grounds for assuming that Israel's right to sail her ships in the Suez Canal would be violated, but if it were violated, the family of nations would have to act vigorously.

King Hussein speaks of "If," which never existed in the first place, but he turns a blind eye to the state of affairs which really existed in the early days of June 1967, developments which were caused by him. He deliberately ignores a political fact, the historic importance of which can scarcely be overestimated: On June 5, 1967,

the Jordanian King received a message from the Prime Minister of Israel, the late Levi Eshkol. In this message which was transmitted by means of Gen. Odd Bull, the Prime Minister promised, as King Hussein himself states in his book of memoirs, that if Jordan refrained from intervening, no harm would come to her. If he had complied with this appeal, matters would have been different.

The Jordanian King goes on talking about Jerusalem. Since when has the city been under Arab rule? Jordanian rule was imposed on part of Jerusalem by violence, by military occupation. The Jordanian Army expelled the Jews from the Old City to the very last man, desecrated Jewish shrines, destroyed synagogues and cemeteries.

The Jordanian Government refused to comply with the Armistice Agreement it had signed. Jews were deprived of the right to worship at the holy sites which have been deeply anchored in Jewish history since long before the Arabs came to the Land of Israel and long before Transjordan became a state and had a king . . .

At the Press Club in Washington the King said that he was not obliged to stop the *fedayeen*, the terrorists, and their raids against Israel. The world is aware of the activities of the terrorists whom the king, according to himself, is not obliged to stop: The placing of infernal machines in places where crowds congregate, in markets and supermarkets, terminals, firing upon civilian aircraft, continuous shelling of peaceful villages, sniping at farmers in the fields in the Jordan Valley.

After preparing the ground with these words, King Hussein introduced a so-called six-point plan for a settlement in the Middle East which was a sort of climax to the Arab campaign of moderation. His plan was presented to world public opinion as a major contribution and a turning point. Anyone glancing at the six points will soon realise that they contain nothing but an Arab interpretation of the Security Council resolution. And indeed, they were so described by King Hussein himself on his return to Amman, when he admitted to his listeners that his speech contained no change from the previous Arab position. The expression "all states of the region" appears repeatedly in the six points of the plan.

This terminology was also used by Egypt, but the actual name of Israel is not mentioned at all. In his speech he entirely disregarded the main burden of the Security Council resolution, namely, agreement between the parties, for the advancement of which Ambassador Jarring was appointed. Needless to say, the six points contain no mention of negotiation between the parties, without which no settlement can be reached. Arab propaganda gave Hussein's speech the mighty name of a peace plan, but this speech contains not one word about a peace treaty or normal relations between states. I believe there is no precedent in the history of nations for the establishment of peaceful relations according to the formula of these six points.

King Hussein announced that he was presenting his plan in Nasser's name as well. Let us see how Nasser himself interpreted this plan. In an American television interview broadcast on April 21, Nasser announced that he had in fact given his blessing to King Hussein's six points, but was quick to explain that, even after the execution of the plan (and I quote): "This is not all — it should be realized that we support the struggle of the Palestine liberation fighters whose duty it is to liberate their native country." Nasser stated further in that interview: "It is out of the question for us to sit down at one table with the Israelis for direct peace talks." Indeed, in his address of January 20, 1969 to the Council of State, Nasser already expressed his own appreciation of the Security Council resolution as follows: "This resolution may possibly wipe out the traces of the aggression carried out in June, 1967, but this resolution is insufficient in so far as the Palestinian fate is concerned." In his address on February 1, 1969, at the opening of the Palestinian National Council, he stated: "The U.A.R. (Egypt) appreciates the stand of the resistance organizations rejecting the Security Council's resolution of November, 1967 — a resolution accepted by the U.A.R. itself."

The Arab leaders' talk of so-called acceptance of the Security Council resolution of November 22, appears to us to be a calculated attempt to throw dust in the eyes of the world. At times they pick points from the resolution to suit their own convenience, disregarding other points, but in the main they violently oppose the establishment

of an agreed peace and the summoning of the parties to negotiate an agreement, which is the core of the Jarring mission.

Already on November 23, 1967, the day after the resolution was passed, Nasser stated *inter alia*, in addressing the Egyptian National Convention: "We shall not recognize Israel. We shall not make peace with her or conduct negotiations with her. We shall not permit Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal." These three noes have been and are being repeated by Arab leaders to this very day. Anyone following the behaviour of the Arab rulers concludes that a typical pattern may be discerned in it: They close their eyes to the process of history, and upon reaching a blind alley, they will not turn to the road that leads to peace, but rather try to put the clock back. They are trying to turn back the wheels of history to a point to which there can be no return without even admitting their responsibility for the destruction and the blood, and without taking a realistic road leading to peace and progress for their peoples and the entire region.

The time has come for the Arab rulers to learn the real lesson from an analysis of "what would have happened if . . ." — in order to avoid future inevitable failures resulting from their own futile policies. In any event, Israel is determined to draw a lesson from her own experience, as well as from those of other nations, and these lessons are embodied in her policy. No one can turn the wheel back to the position of June 1, 1967, just as no one can bring back to life our dear ones who were killed in those days of June, 1967, in a war which the Arab leaders — headed by President Nasser, who was joined by the Jordanian King — forced upon Israel and the Arab states, instead of heeding the call of Israel's Prime Minister. I know of no precedent in military history of a country which, having been attacked by its neighbours and having succeeded in overcoming its attackers, continually begs the vanquished aggressors to agree to peace, while the defeated aggressors remain obdurate. This rejection is the source of the lack of progress towards peace and the aggravation of the situation in the region.

Simultaneously with the propaganda campaigns in the world's capitals in which the Arab rulers attempt to appear as pious lovers of peace, we have witnessed the stepping up of the firing

on the borders and along the cease-fire lines. The Israel Defence Forces have repulsed all attacks and have repaid the aggressors their due along the borders and in the interior. We mourn our dear ones who have fallen. The aggressors have not achieved even one of their objectives and have paid a heavy price for their aggression.

On the Jordanian front, we are closely following events in the areas from which the terrorists fire their bazookas and Katyushas. The Israel Defence Forces can clearly discern when and how the artillery of the Jordanian Legion starts firing and when the Iraqi batteries join in. It is a fact that the saboteurs enjoy the protection of the Jordanian army who not only turn a blind eye to their activities but even provide active assistance with artillery fire. We have stated more than once that we shall follow the principle of reciprocity along the cease-fire lines. We shall hold fast to this principle.

If the Jordanian authorities are anxious for the safety of their citizens, civilians and soldiers in these areas, let them not evade their duty to put a halt to the activity of the saboteurs. Let them stop all the assistance the regular army gives to the terrorists, prevent the intervention of Iraqi units, and cease all acts of aggression. If this criminal activity continues, we shall not be able to absolve the Jordanian authorities from responsibility. We are convinced that if the Jordanian authorities wish to act they have the power to do so; but if they do not wish, or by now are unable to prevent the mounting aggression, why do they denounce Israel for defending herself? What is needed here is not pious speeches outside Jordan, but vigorous action in Jordan itself.

The attempts at aggression by regular Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal have increased. These operations are intended to reinforce the ominous talk of the so-called imminent danger of war if a settlement is not imposed as the Arabs demand, even without peace. In fact, the Egyptian Government acts as if the cease-fire did not exist, as if they had never recognized the cease-fire agreements. The Egyptian ruler continues to act with no consideration for human life. He has ordered acts as a result of which many of his own people have been injured and hundreds of thousands of people have been uprooted from

their homes in the Canal cities and condemned to a life of idleness and homelessness.

Nasser is not in the habit of informing his people of the price of these bloody adventures. On the contrary, he seeks to raise artificially the morale of his people and his army by vainglorious announcements of victories and successes which have never been achieved.

After the defeat of 1967 it was to be hoped that Nasser would tell the truth to his people, but in his speech on May 1, this year the Egyptian ruler said: "The objective of the armed forces was to destroy the 'Bar-Lev line' which, Israel has contended, is an indestructible, fortified line. After this period of battles at the Canal, Minister of War Fawzi informed the Government and myself last week that our armed forces have thus far succeeded in destroying 60 per cent of the 'Bar-Lev line' — of those fortresses set up by Israel along the Suez Canal. Fawzi informed us in the Government that the armed forces will continue to carry out their plan until they complete the destruction of the remaining 40 per cent of the 'Bar-Lev line.'"

Members of the Knesset, I do not know if this was the report that, in fact, the Egyptian Minister of War made to Nasser, or if Nasser invented it on his own. All I can say is that I hope that in future his so-called victories are of the same type as those claimed in this false report. Anyone who has visited or visits the Canal zone can see for himself that there is absolutely no foundation for this claim.

In the same speech Nasser stated (and I quote): "We consider once, twice, three and four times" so that "Israel shall not be given the opportunity to achieve a victory of any kind."

I recommend that he think five times before he decides to embark upon another adventure which will end in yet another defeat.

False reporting is a malignant and growing disease in the Arab countries. It is causing military decisions and policies which are destined to failure. We tell our people the whole truth. The Israel Defence Forces report the whole truth to the Government, and the Government reports the whole truth to the people.

This fact explains the confidence which exists in Israel in everything connected with matters

of security. We do not believe in hiding the truth from the nation and we cannot live under a system of mendacious information. We shall continue to follow the system of true reporting, even if we have to make depressing announcements.

There is no substitute for our consolidation along the cease-fire lines in view of the fact that the Arabs still refuse to make peace. In the absence of peace the cease-fire lines are the best guarantee for Israel, even if firing from the other side has not ceased.

The *fedayeen* and Fatah were not born in June 1967. Criminal attacks on our people and our settlements did not begin only after the Six Day War. The Arab demands for retreat from the cease-fire lines, without peace and without agreed secure borders are not intended to stop the firing. They will not bring peace to our borders, nor will they bring peace any nearer.

I cannot promise the people that we shall shortly see an abatement in the situation on the borders and along the cease-fire lines. I am relying on the people, and on our readiness to withstand everything inherent in maintaining our position, as in the past.

And we rely on the Israel Defence Forces to do everything possible to keep the attacks to a minimum and deter the aggressors. Israel's basic security was never as strong as it is now. Our hearts are filled with gratitude and praise to the Israel Defence Forces, for the ingenuity and power they have displayed, for the extent of the security they have obtained for Israel in the north, east, and south.

The nation's trust in the Israel Defence Forces fortifies every man and woman in the nation in withstanding the trials confronting us. The Israel Defence Forces know not only how to carry out the military task of defending the settlements, but also to establish with the members of the settlements warm, comradely relations, relations of a family of settlers and defenders.

We salute the Israeli men, women and children living in the border towns and villages for not having forsaken a single habitation, for their dauntlessness, and for the fraternal relations between them and the Israel Defence Forces.

The Israel Government will know how to lead the entire nation to be ready and vigilant and to

keep their morale high — as our soldiers and settlements in the front lines deserve.

Occasionally our region is portrayed as being on the point of an explosion which may spread beyond this area. There is no justification for this contention. We live in this region, and we are perfectly familiar with the actual state of affairs. Israel cannot permit herself to err in her evaluation of the situation or underestimate the gravity of the dangers, nor can it exaggerate them. We have learnt not to create pipe-dreams.

To the best of our judgment the Arab countries cannot at present permit themselves to wage total war. This assessment has a firm foundation, but our forces are ready for any eventuality, even for the eventuality of a mistake in this forecast.

Arab propagandists are spreading in the capitals of the world misleading forecasts as to what is likely to happen in this region in the coming months if a settlement dictated by the Arabs is not reached. I do not intend to refute these assessments, I prefer to deal with the main subject which occupies this region at this historic period.

For 20 years our region has been the focus for unrest and war. And now, more than ever, after June 1967, the trenchant question arises: Is this situation unavoidable or is there any possibility of opening a new chapter in the life of the region — a chapter of peace and cooperation?

This subject stands at the forefront of the political struggle, which has now lasted for nearly two years. During this period we have withstood serious political tests — in the Security Council, at the emergency session of the United Nations, at ordinary sessions of the General Assembly, and in consultations with Envoy Jarring, as well as in our contacts with governments and power blocs throughout the world.

In this campaign we have overcome dangers and distractions by a firm and constant demand for our rights and our principles. But the campaign is not yet over. It is being renewed and is becoming fiercer as time goes on. It is centred upon the efforts of our rivals to formulate international policy into demanding our retreat from the cease-fire lines and the refusal of our just demands for peace, including the fixing of agreed and secure frontiers for peace.

So far these efforts by our enemies have failed on the political scene. Israel has never ceased to call for a true peace of mutual respect between our neighbours and ourselves. But, to our great sorrow, we have found that the Arab leaders regard the deliberations of the Four Powers as an escape from the need to take the road to peace, as an opportunity to persevere in their obstinate refusal to progress towards peace.

The Arab leaders interpret the very existence of Four-Power talks as meaning that they have no reason to despair of extortion. They draw the conclusion that here is a chance to use their powers in order to escape from the obligation to make peace.

The statesmen and formulators of public opinion in the world must not become accustomed to the Arab refusal of peace. They must not treat it with such leniency as to absolve the Arab leaders from the obligation to which every responsible statesman of every nation is bound: namely, the responsibility for his own actions. They must not regard every unbinding statement by one Arab leader or another, about a cessation of belligerency, etc., as a manifestation of moderation and acts of charity towards Israel.

For two years there have been various moves to find a substitute for peace treaties, such as a "peace arrangement"; some say it be sufficient for each state to declare its intention of peace; others are satisfied with "cessation of belligerency"; there are suggestions for demilitarization, for guarantees and all kinds of arrangements — all this without demanding Arab leaders to make peace with Israel, plain peace . . . peace as it exists between the majority of nations.

The Arabs for 20 years have refused to make peace with Israel, with Israel being used as an experimental ground for all possible arrangements except a contractual peace. The time has now come to put an end to agreeing to Arab refusal to sign a peace contract.

In the absence of peace there have been various attempts at substitution which did not bring forward a solution. Armistice agreements, demilitarized zones, U.N. observers, UNEF, and so on. Did all these guarantee peace, or tranquillity, or freedom of navigation? What happened to the 1957 arrangements after the Sinai Campaign? There is no denying that these arrangements

were nothing but an ineffectual substitute for a basic solution and their collapse was one of the reasons for the 1967 war.

Now proposals are again being made that we put our trust in arrangements that do not satisfy our simple demands for full and genuine peace agreements. Israel is not prepared for this. No nation which has not experienced the danger that hung over our heads has the right to demand that we should agree to any plan that does not constitute a genuine peace settlement, in its simplest meaning, to be achieved as the outcome of mutual talks, according to accepted political and legal principles of relations between nations and countries.

There are some who attempt to refute our attitude on the question of peace, and ask: Why do you insist on direct negotiations and mutually-signed peace treaties? Why do you place so much trust in the signatures of the Arab rulers after they have violated the agreements to which they put their hands all these years?

Such questioners contradict themselves. If there can be no reliance on signed treaties of peace, how can we rely on verbal declarations which could easily be denied? We are well aware how the Arab peoples are being educated to hatred and imbued with aspirations for vengeance and destruction. It is just because of the poisonous education that has been continuing for 20 years that we attribute educational and social significance of the first rank to the very fact of direct conversations, leading to mutual signatures of peace treaties.

We believe that when the Arab representatives overcome their reluctance and reach the stage of direct negotiations the transformation will be so profound that they themselves and their people will come to realize how many are the advantages that they and not only Israel can derive from peace. The summoning of the parties to direct negotiations is the only way out of the present deadlock in which the region finds itself because of the Arab leaders.

It is possible that in our struggle for peace we shall face most severe political tests. We shall not give our consent to illusory and ephemeral solutions.

The only situation that can replace the cease-fire is permanent peace — the final and declared

liquidation of the Arab-Israel conflict. Peace must be expressed in signed peace treaties between Israel and each of the neighbouring states.

The Governments of the region, and not external factors, are responsible for working out and drafting the peace treaties. The peace treaties must include agreement on agreed, secure and recognized boundaries.

The peace treaties must annul claims of belligerency, blockades, boycotts, interference with free navigation and the existence and activity of organizations or groups engaged in preparing or executing sabotage operations from bases and training camps on the territories of the states signatory to the peace treaties.

No state will sign a treaty with any other state aimed against its neighbour which is a co-signatory to the peace treaty. Within the framework of peace we must strive for a system of relations to be based on wide regional cooperation for the development and prosperity of the Middle East.

These definitions suit the principles of peace which are accepted and executed everywhere among states maintaining normal mutual relations among themselves.

I hope and trust that, over the sound of the canons and the tumult of hostility, the voice of Israel calling for peace will reach the ears of lovers of peace in the Arab world. This call goes out not in any meek or apologetic tone.

Aggression, the threat of war and international pressures will not deter us. We shall not tire of our just struggle, nor shall we relinquish our aspirations and striving for peace.

82

Speech by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Sharp at the Brotherhood Banquet of the Beth Emeth Bais Yehuda Synagogue.¹ (Excerpt)

Toronto, May 5, 1969

Or consider the situation in the Middle East, which is so near to the hearts of many of you in

¹ Canadian *External Affairs*, July, 1969, pp. 269-273.

this audience. Nowhere is there a better illustration of the fundamental and dangerous conflicts intensified by mutual distrust and suspicion that can exist between states and between peoples. Even the right to exist of the state of Israel has been challenged in the name of justice, notwithstanding its membership in the United Nations. These Arab-Israeli differences exist and somehow or other they must be resolved; otherwise peace cannot be secured in that troubled area.

Canada has actively supported the efforts of the United Nations to resolve this conflict, and has shared fully the burden of responsibility which has resulted from these efforts. Yet the problem — and the danger — is, if anything, greater than before. It is for this reason that we must continue to encourage the patient efforts of Ambassador Jarring, to which it is my hope that the current talks among the permanent members of the Security Council in New York will make a constructive contribution. In the meantime, we should hope that both sides would avoid statements and actions which could only inhibit and delay the achievement of a settlement.

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83

Resolution by the Regional Councils of the Israeli Herut Movement and the Liberal Party at a Meeting Marking the Celebration of the Fourth Anniversary of the Establishment of Gahal.² (Excerpt)

Jerusalem, May 6, 1969

Any project or suggestion leading to the repartition of the lands of Israel ought to be rejected. The urban as well as the agricultural project for the settlement of Jews in Judaea, Samaria, Gaza, the Golan Heights and Sinai is of 'paramount' importance.

² *Hayom*, (Tel Aviv), 7/5/1969.

84

Joint Communiqué on the Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhivkov's Visit to East Germany.¹ (Excerpt)

Berlin, May 9, 1969

The two parties confirm that they consistently support the just struggle of the Arab peoples and states to protect their sovereignty and independence against imperialist aggression and extortion. The German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Bulgaria state that the continuing Israeli aggression — inspired and promoted by imperialist states including the West German Federal Republic — against the Arab countries constitutes a serious threat to peace. The two parties decisively demand that the armed Israeli provocations — directed at extending the aggression — against the United Arab Republic, Jordan, and Syria be stopped. They insist that Israel withdraw its troops from the occupied Arab territories without delay. The two parties assure the peoples and governments of the friendly Arab states of their continued full support in their struggle to eliminate the effects of the Israeli aggression and to restore peace in this area.

85

Joint Communiqué on the East German Foreign Minister Winzer's Visit to Iraq.² (Excerpt)

Baghdad, May 10, 1969

The two Ministers confirmed the statement already made on the occasion of the visit of Minister al-Sheikhly to the German Democratic Republic in the Joint Communiqué that they advocate identical or similar views in the main questions of the international situation, especially with regard to the necessity of maintaining international peace and international security. In this connection they underlined anew the commonness of the fight of the two friendly Governments

and peoples against the forces of imperialism, neo-nazism, colonialism, and zionism and stressed the necessity of a still closer consolidation of the two states and peoples as well as of all anti-imperialist forces to foil the manoeuvres of imperialism and zionism.

The two Ministers condemned the continuous aggressive military provocations of Israel against the Arab states and the permanent violation of the international conventions on human rights by Israel, the campaign of terror and suppression against the Arab population and its evacuation by force. Israel is a racist, imperialist, reactionary and aggressive existence. It constitutes a spearhead of imperialism in the Arab world and threatens peace and international security. Against this situation the peoples of the German Democratic Republic and Iraq are struggling firmly in a common front.

The two Ministers stressed that the active military and political support which is rendered to Israel by the USA and West Germany is considered as an aggressive act which leads to an increase of tensions and enables Israel to activate its aggressive policy.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic confirmed the sympathy of the Government and the people of the German Democratic Republic for the just struggle of the Palestine Arab people against the Israeli aggression. The German Democratic Republic supports the just struggle of the Arab people and confirms its recognition of all rights of the Arab people of Palestine including its legitimate right to self-determination and resistance against the Israeli occupation.

86

Reply in the Knesset by the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban to a Question on the Arab Territories Occupied by Israel during the 1967 War.³

Jerusalem, May 13, 1969

Three demands which Israel will not waive

¹ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 27/5/1969.

² G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, (Berlin), 27/5/1969.

³ *Digest of Israeli News*, May, 1969. Also in *Jerusalem Post*, 14/5/1969.

are a permanent presence at Sharm el-Sheikh, a unified Jerusalem despite concessions to Jordan over the Holy Places, and a Golan Heights for ever out of Syrian hands.

87

News Conference Statements by the East German Foreign Minister Winzer Following the Signing of the Joint Communiqué on his Visit to Iraq.¹ (Excerpts)

Baghdad, May 10, 1969

Mr. Winzer said that Israel was the spearhead of imperialism in the Middle East and that Israel policy was the product of the alliance between imperialism and Zionism and an offshoot of expansionistic imperialist interests... Israel's military provocations directed at Arab states and its violations of human rights as set forth in international law have not ceased. Israel is practising terrorism and tyranny against the Arab people of the occupied territories. In this way, Israel poses a threat to the safety and security of the Arab world and to world peace.

[Concerning the Four-Power talks he said]:

"We believe that we ought to support and enhance whatever might serve to expose all the means and factors which would isolate Israel from the world. World public opinion increasingly denounced the Israeli acts of aggression. It is well known that Israel opposes the Big Four-Power talks in New York. By rejecting all the attempts which might lead to the withdrawal of its aggressive forces, Israel is revealing its policy of aggression."

88

Commentary on the Middle East in the Chinese Official Weekly Peking Review.²

Peking, May 16, 1969

A "four-power meeting" of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain is going on

in New York. Purported to be a meeting for "settling the Middle East question," it is actually an intensified effort in plotting a "Middle East Munich" so as to realize the criminal ambition of the imperialist and revisionist powers — primarily the United States and the Soviet Union — to dominate the Middle East.

Delegates of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain to the United Nations have held seven meetings since early April in an effort to put together a plan for a "political solution" of the Middle East question to be imposed on the Arab people. It is their hope that, through this "Middle East Munich," they will be able to force the Arab countries to come to terms with and capitulate to Israel, a tool of imperialist aggression, completely liquidate the Palestine cause of liberation, and stamp out the flames of the Palestinian people's armed struggle. This plot is an important part of the counter-revolutionary political deal being made between U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionist social-imperialism in their wild attempt to redive the world.

The convening of the "four-power meeting" is a continuation and development of the "political solution" fraud on the Middle East question which U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism have been pushing for the past two years. In order to forcibly effect in the Middle East a "political solution" which is resolutely opposed by the Arab people, France, which is anxious to "return to the Middle East," proposed in mid January this year with the support of the Soviet revisionists that the "four powers" hold a meeting within the framework of the United Nations to work out a formula. Beginning in February, delegates of the four countries had frequent behind-the-scenes "bilateral contacts" to sound out each other's intentions in preparation for the meeting. In early April, the United States, which was said to be "encouraged" by its "bilateral contacts" with the Soviet revisionists, proposed that the four countries meet without delay. So, starting from April 3, delegates of the four countries to the United Nations met once or twice a week, which served as the curtain-raiser for the current counter-revolutionary "four-power meeting."

U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionist social-imperialism are playing the main role in this counter revolutionary sinister meeting. Before the

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Baghdad), 11/5/69.

² *Peking Review*, 16/5/1969, pp. 23-24.

meeting started, U.S. President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin had held talks which Nixon described as "inspiring." After that, Dobrynin called at the U.S. State Department and held 11 secret talks with Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, plotting back-room secret deals. This shows that the "four-power meeting" is actually a meeting between U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism to divide the spoils, with Britain and France merely playing a minor role in the hope of getting a few crumbs from the table.

Fully revealing its hideous features, U.S. imperialism has been most arrogant and blustering inside and outside the "four-power meeting." After consultations with Israel, the United States dished up on March 24 a "nine-point working paper" on the so-called "solution of the Middle East question" which was to be the basis for bargaining at the "four-power meeting" side by side with the "five-point plan" put forward by the Soviet revisionists at the end of last December. It was revealed that the U.S. imperialists openly proposed putting down the armed struggle of the Palestinian people and forcing the Arab countries to cede territories to Israel in the name of "border adjustments" (including the cession of the Golan Heights of Syria and Jerusalem), granting Israeli vessels the freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran, and recognizing the "sovereignty" of Israel. In addition, it also proposed the stationing of a so-called "U.N. force" in the "demilitarized zone" to carry out "supervision" with a view to facilitating control by the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists.

Soviet revisionist social-imperialism, on the one hand, is contending with U.S. imperialism for spheres of influence in the Middle East, infiltrating into the Arab countries politically, militarily and economically by means of sham assistance but real control. To stage a show of force and step up its expansion, in April it once again sent a large number of warships to the Mediterranean, and the number of Soviet warships there was at one time boosted to nearly 60. On the other hand, it has been eagerly seeking collaboration with U.S. imperialism in the Middle East and co-ordinating with it in pressuring the Arab countries to compromise and surrender, in an attempt to

strangle the armed struggle of the Palestinian people. For this purpose, the Soviet revisionists proposed a "five-point plan" at the end of last year and, inside and outside the "four-power meeting," are now going a step further in betraying the interests of the Arab people. In the past, the Soviet revisionists still held on to the sign-board of demanding Israel's withdrawal to the cease-fire line prior to the June 1967 war; which in fact tolerated Israel's occupation of large tracts of Arab territory. But now, as revealed by the Western press, "the negotiators" at the "four-power meeting," including the Soviet revisionist delegate, "have reached the point where they no longer insist that Israel should withdraw to the frontiers existing in June 1967." Moreover, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin had indicated agreement to U.S. Assistant Secretary Sisco on "minor adjustments" of the border of the Arab countries, or, in other words, on the cession of Arab territory to Israel.

While plotting a "Middle East Munich," U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism have spared no efforts to intimidate and cajole as well as split and disintegrate the Arab countries. Soon after the opening of the "four-power meeting," King Hussein of Jordan put forward a "six-point plan" for a so-called "peaceful solution of the Middle East question." This plan has been denounced by Arab public opinion as one of capitulation and has met with strong opposition from the Arab people. The Lebanese authorities have likewise been denounced by Arab public opinion for openly supporting Hussein's "six-point plan" and repeatedly persecuting and suppressing Palestinian commando units. Mass demonstrations have broken out on a large scale in Lebanon protesting the government's suppression of the Palestinian guerrillas, and the Lebanese Government was forced to resign.

The Palestinian people, who are fighting for the just cause of national liberation, and the masses of the Arab people and Arab public opinion have resolutely exposed and denounced the "four-power meeting" for plotting a "Middle East Munich." They will never allow imperialism and social-imperialism to decide their destiny.

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization has declared in a statement that neither big powers nor other countries

have the right to interfere in the Palestinian cause. It has reiterated its rejection of the U.N. Security Council resolution, the Soviet plan and the U.S. "working paper," and stressed that the Palestinian people are firmly determined to continue their armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine. The "Voice of Assifa" radio of Al-Fatah (the Palestine National Liberation Movement) has denounced the conspiracy being concocted in New York by the four imperialist powers, "whose aim is to strike at the Palestinian revolution and agree on a conspiratorial settlement and a solution of capitulation to be imposed upon our people and our nation." A representative of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine and a leading member of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine have issued statements exposing and condemning the "four-power meeting" conspiracy. Syrian papers and radio in their commentaries have strongly opposed the scheme of the "four-power meeting" to impose a "political solution" devised by the United States and the Soviet Union on the Arab people. The Iraqi paper *Al-Thawrah* said that the days are gone for ever when the "four powers" could impose their will on the people of other countries and that it is the Arab people, not the bosses of any country or the United Nations and its Security Council, who will decide the Palestine issue.

The great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "Working hand in glove, Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism have done so many foul and evil things that the revolutionary people the world over will not let them go unpunished. The people of all countries are rising. A new historical period of opposing U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism has begun." The conspiracies and counter-revolutionary moves of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionist social-imperialism may create some difficulties and make the revolutionary people encounter twists and turns on the road forward, but they can never prevent the revolutionary torrent from surging forward. Final victory surely belongs to the valiant Palestinian and other Arab people who are determined to persist in the struggle against aggression.

89

Joint Communiqué on the Iranian Premier Hoveida's Visit to Pakistan.¹ (Excerpt)

Karachi, May 16, 1969

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their anxiety over the grave situation in the Middle East arising out of continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories. They reiterated their firm opposition to the use of force to secure territorial gains. They called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories and the restoration of the holy city of Jerusalem to its previous status. They also affirmed their full support to the struggle of the people of Palestine in securing their legitimate rights in accordance with the UN resolutions. The President and the Prime Minister felt that the resolution of 22nd November, 1967, provided a sound basis for a settlement. They further expressed the hope that the Four-Power talks currently taking place in New York would help in resolving the crisis.

90

Speech by the Congolese President Nguabi during his Visit to Algeria.² (Excerpts)

Algiers, May 16, 1969

... As for the Palestine problem, our position is quite clear. We support the just cause of the Palestinian people and the Arab world. We ask that Israel withdraw its forces from the occupied Arab territories in accordance with the November 22 Security Council resolution. We furthermore ask for a just solution for the Palestinian problem.

Mr. President, Your Excellency, these are the basic principles of our country's policy, in keeping with our socialist choice, the independent choice of the Congolese people and all the undaunted

¹ *Dawn* (Karachi), 17/5/1969.

² *Al-Sha'b* (Algiers), 17/5/69. The speech was made in response to the Algerian Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister Boumedienne's speech.

forces of our sacred revolution as defined during the popular upheaval of August 13, 14 and 15, 1963.

91

Interview Granted by the Israeli Premier Meir to "Time".¹

Jerusalem, May, 1969

How do you read President Nasser's mood?

We don't find any difference, really. The only time he said anything new was immediately after the war, that great speech of his, when for a moment, I think, he was prepared to take the blame on himself. But I must say to his credit, he recovered very quickly and became true to himself again.

How close is the Middle East to another round of war?

Let us differentiate between two things. You know our position is that war is not imminent. But we have to be prepared also in case we misjudge. We can't risk it. Many people have lost wars in history and many people's countries have been occupied by foreign powers. Our history is much more tragic. Hitler took care of 6,000,000 Jews. If we lose a war, for us that is the last war. Then we are not here any more. If one doesn't understand this, then one doesn't understand our obstinacy.

Speaking of the 6,000,000, the Arabs were not responsible for their fate. It is often said by Arabs that history is taking it out on them, by having so many Arabs displaced from this country 20 years ago, and more recently.

The Arabs created a refugee problem. This is the truth. We didn't throw them out. In 1949, immediately after the war, the Cabinet of Israel decided that within a peace settlement with the Arab countries, we will take back about 100,000 refugees. The Arabs wouldn't listen. For 20 years the refugees were kept in camps. The textbooks printed with the money of the United

Nations were full of hatred toward Israel, with wonderful arithmetic examples of how there were five Israelis, we killed three, how many are left? Now the little boy who was five is now 25. He is maybe Fatah [an Arab commando] now. Now we are asked to give them a free choice to come back. This is a fifth column that we are asked to take.

Do you really feel that the refugee problem, so-called, is entirely created by the Arabs themselves?

One hundred per cent.

Does it disturb you that the American public, from having been 99 % pro-Israel and enormously enthusiastic about the results of the June war, now seems slightly vexed with Israel?

If I am to choose a good press in the world with many good things about an Israel that isn't here any more, or unfair criticism of an Israel that is still in existence, then I choose the latter. We were the people who were attacked. The attacked won the war. Certainly we would be much happier if the U.S., and other countries in the world, would see the situation as we do. I am convinced that every one of these countries in our position would act exactly as we are. I understand American interests. Not only as citizens of Israel, but as citizens of the world, we are vitally interested that there should be an understanding between America and the Soviet Union. But, to say it very bluntly, not at our expense.

How do you visualize a settlement?

Agreed, secure boundaries. Both adjectives have equal importance.

What would such be, from your point of view?

We don't draw maps. Why should I create a Jewish war before there is any hope whatsoever of peace with the Arabs? What do I mean? There are differences of opinion among this people. When the day comes when we sit with Nasser, he will say here, and we will say here, and the negotiators representing Israel will think, well, maybe not exactly this, maybe here, maybe there. They will bring it to the Cabinet, and the Cabinet will have to discuss it and take a position. The Cabinet will break up. We will go to the Knesset and have new elections. But why should I do it now?

¹ *Time*, 23/5/69, p. 1. Reprinted by permission from *Time*; copyright *Time* Inc., 1969. The interview was conducted by *Time* editor-in-chief Hedley Donovan and managing editor Henry Grunwald.

We say, come and negotiate with us for secure and agreed borders. Now, I say 'secure' because we have lived with those borders for 20 years. Anybody that tells us that we should step down so that the Syrians again can put their guns in position and to say to our people down below, don't budge, stay there — I want to see that hero. It is not moral. It is not decent.

What will you do if the Big Four agree on a Middle East settlement that Israel does not like?

I have no illusions. The U.N. Security Council will say, of course, this is wonderful: the big powers agree. It doesn't happen twice a week that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are in agreement. And we will say no. Then it will go to the Assembly, and maybe a special assembly — and we will say no. It won't be easy.

You have mentioned Arab perfidy several times. What makes you think they will keep any signed agreement? Isn't there a paradox here?

That's why we said 'secure borders.' When I say secure borders, I mean one thing: no natural advantage to our neighbors in the borders, because we have had all that. Because if Hussein's army, without crossing the border, can shell Tel Aviv — it wasn't so serious, one or two shells — but there can come more. And if Natanya, in the middle of the country, with only twelve miles between the sea and the former border, if that is cut, we are also through. On that I'm prepared to stand for elections — that this cannot happen, that these twelve miles can't be any more, and that the Golan Heights can't be any more. And I am not prepared that anybody should safeguard for me the free shipping through the Straits of Tiran.

I have reasons to envy Mr. Eban as Foreign Minister for many things. But I envy him more for one thing: namely, he will never have to do what I had to do in 1957: to stand before the United Nations and say, we will withdraw. I did it on behalf of the government, but that was not my greatest hour.

So you visualize the secure border as something that is self-enforcing, that is not, in fact, enforced by a signed treaty, but that the border itself enforces?

Yes, but with a signed treaty. But since signed treaties have not always prevented war — why

do all countries who have peace treaties with their neighbors still guard their borders? — borders also mean something. What we ask our friends is, to my mind, a very simple thing: tell Nasser and Hussein, sit down with the Israelis, negotiate peace with them. For 20 years, we have tried everything. Now it is your responsibility, not the Soviet Union, not the United States, not France, not England. Mr. Nasser, it is your responsibility. You are responsible for the war. You must take the responsibility for peace.

92

Interview Statements by the Congolese President Nguabi to the Algerian News Agency.¹ (Excerpt)

Algiers, May 20, 1969

Q. What is your country's attitude to current threats to world peace and security, particularly with reference to areas of tension such as Vietnam and the Middle East? Your country has always led the way in the attitude it adopts to these matters.

A. The international horizon today is stormy. Imperialism has sown the seeds of discord and tension in Vietnam, the Middle East and Africa . . . The unconcealed actions of the imperialists and their stooges are a threat to world peace and security. The Congo, which harbours no ill will against any people, has always taken the side of those whose cause is just. It was on this basis that we strongly condemned the barbaric aggression of the United States against the courageous Vietnamese people, and Israel's occupation of Arab territories by force of arms. We deplore the inhuman conditions under which the people of Palestine have to live, deprived of their right to their homeland. We have constantly reiterated that negotiations are the only path to peace and security in the world, albeit not an easy one. The repeated attacks of the imperialists and their shamelessness and their cruelty pose a serious threat to peace.

¹ *Al-Sha'b* (Algiers), 21/5/1969.

93

Remarks by the French Presidential Candidates on the French Arms Embargo in the Middle East.¹**Paris, May 22, 1969**

M. Pompidou reaffirmed that Israel had every right to be "a state in the complete sense, recognised as such by its neighbours." He emphasised the need for a solution of the Palestinian problem.

"As for arms," he said, "I support the view that no one should make arms deliveries to anyone." He stated that he was ready to propose a formula of this kind, adding: "If reactions are negative, France too will have to reconsider its position." Finally, he declared that under his government, France had delivered arms to no one. Some arms deliveries had been envisaged for certain Arab countries, he said, but not in the immediate future and, in any case, not to those states in direct contact with Israel.

He concluded: "We certainly do not wish to see the state of Israel destroyed; quite the contrary."

As for M. Poher, he stated on television that he was in favour of France returning to the Geneva Disarmament Convention, and that he opposed all "discriminatory" measures in the Middle East. "It is time", he added, "that we restore the image of a France that is impartial and loyal to all its friendships. I cannot agree to any discriminatory measures."

94

Reply in Parliament by the British Minister of State Mulley to a Question on the Status of Jerusalem.² (Excerpt)**London, May 23, 1969**

Mr. Hooley asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent representations have been made by the British Government to the Israeli Government in pursuit

of the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 4th July, 1967, which called upon Israel to cancel all measures taken to alter the status of Jerusalem; and if Her Majesty's Government will now seek to raise this question in the Security Council.

Mr. Mulley: We have consistently made it clear that we cannot accept the validity of any action by Israel which tends unilaterally to alter the status of Jerusalem. We have been in touch with the Government of Israel on the subject, but details of our exchanges must remain confidential.

We do not consider that it would serve a useful purpose to raise the subject in the Security Council in present circumstances.

95

Article on the Palestinian Resistance Movement in the Chinese Official Weekly "Peking Review".³ (Excerpts)**Peking, May 23, 1969**

In the Middle East, the rise of the armed struggle of the Palestinian people and its subsequent development have opened up a new situation in the national-liberation struggle of the Arab people. Formed by the heroic sons and daughters of Palestine, the guerrillas have won victory after victory, dealing telling blows at Israel, U.S. imperialism's tool of aggression, and bringing about tremendous changes in the struggle in the Middle East. The struggle of the Palestinian people has knocked the bottom out of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionist social-imperialism whose counter-revolutionary conspiracy of peddling the so-called "political solution" of the Middle East question is aimed at dominating and carving up the Middle East. The victories of the Palestinian people have inspired the Arab people in their fight against imperialism and aggression.

Instigated and backed by imperialism, Israeli Zionism has unleashed three barbarous aggressions against the Arab countries since 1948. The Arabs in Palestine were driven from their homeland where they had lived for generations. Up-

¹ *L'Orient* (Beirut), 23/5/1969.

² *Hansard*, 16-23/5/1969, col. 151.

³ *Peking Review*, 23/5/1969, pp. 23, 29-30.

rooted, they are forced to live in humiliation as refugees in other countries.

Groping and exploring for a way out through the years, the disaster-ridden Palestinian people finally arrived at the great truth — "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Through their experience in the crucible of struggle, it became clear to them that their only way to win liberation and return to their homeland is to take up the gun and resolutely wage an armed struggle. They realized they must never rely on the "charity" or "ruling" by a United Nations under U.S. imperialist and Soviet revisionist manipulation.

The Palestinian guerrillas are a new emerging force fighting in the forefront against U.S. imperialism and the Israeli aggressors. The single spark kindled by this rising force led to a prairie fire, and the Palestinian guerrillas have grown rapidly and strong in battle. They have established many bases and training camps in the Arab countries neighbouring on Israel and also set up mobile bases in Israeli-occupied zones. Active on the west bank of the Jordan River, in Beisan Valley, the mountainous parts of Nablus, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the Negev area, these commandos launch extensive attacks on the Israeli aggressors.

These guerrillas who hit the aggressors only once a week on the average in the initial stage now mount three to seven attacks in a single day. Last year, they mounted a total of 1,000 attacks on the enemy. At the beginning of this year, on two nights alone, they raided the enemy 48 times. Al-Fatah (the Palestine National Liberation Movement) has proudly announced in a communiqué: "There is no place beyond the reach of the Palestinian guerrillas on Israeli occupied land."

Following the principle "to learn warfare through warfare," the Palestinian guerrillas have raised their level of strategy and tactics higher and higher, proving themselves agile and flexible in battle. A veteran fighter in the Al-Assifa commandos said: "We act in accordance with the following principles in every battle: first, we concentrate a force superior to that of the Israeli troops; second, we strive to encircle and wipe them out; third, we gather accurate information on the enemy before battle and surprise him at an appropriate moment." Al-Fatah announced last January that in the past four years its Al-Assifa

commandos killed more than 3,600 enemy troops in action, including 44 officers, and destroyed more than 700 enemy vehicles, 40 ammunition depots, 74 military strongholds, 70 military posts, 16 airplanes, 4 military trains and scores of oil, electricity, hydraulic and radio transmitting and receiving installations. Other Palestinian guerrilla units have also fought many heroic battles and scored tremendous victories. A united organ has been established among the guerrilla units to co-ordinate operations.

To push their armed struggle on, the Palestinian commandos have set up scores of training camps in a number of Arab countries, where thousands of youth receive political education and are taught ways to fight the enemy. In some training camps, many fighters eagerly study Chairman Mao's theory on people's war and guerrilla strategy and tactics, as well as "the Three Main Rules of Discipline" and "the Eight Points for Attention" and his other wise policies.

Our great leader Chairman Mao says: "The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people." Embodying the hope and will of the Palestinian people, the guerrillas have the warm backing and support of the masses. Streams of Palestinian workers, peasants, students and women keep coming to the guerrilla units to serve in the struggle to liberate their homeland. Risking their lives, group after group of young men and women in Israeli-occupied zones crossed mountains and made for the guerrilla training camps. There were many moving scenes of people sending off their dear ones to the front in Palestinian refugee camps in the Arab countries. One old Palestinian woman gave her youngest son to the guerrillas after her other two sons were killed by the Israeli aggressor's bombs. She said to him: "Go, revenge our motherland and our family!" Another Palestinian woman wiped away her tears and sent her five sons to join the guerrillas upon learning that her husband had died heroically in action. Later, when her youngest son also fell in battle, she left home and joined the guerrillas herself. All this vividly shows that the Palestinian people are an inexhaustible source power for the development and growth of the Palestinian guerrillas.

The broad masses of Palestinian people in Israeli-occupied zones risk their lives to serve as guides for the guerrillas, shield the guerrillas,

furnish them with information, bring them food and water and care for the wounded. A guerrilla fighter who was being pursued by the enemy was hidden by an old Palestinian woman in her home. When Israeli soldiers burst into the house to search, she pointed to her own son and said calmly: "There he is." The marauders took her son away. The guerrilla fighter was moved to tears when he learnt what had happened. But the old woman told him: "You are a commando fighting for us. My son is not a commando. So you are more important than my son." Speaking of the support given them by the masses, the guerrilla fighters said: "There is no dense jungle to give us cover but the masses of the people are our jungle." This jungle of the people gives the guerrillas their most reliable cover from which they make raids on the enemy...

At present, the vigorous mass movement in the Israeli-occupied zones against enemy occupation provides powerful co-ordination for the armed struggle of the guerrillas. Palestinian workers, peasants, students, women and merchants in the occupied zones have since the 1967 war constantly been on strike and demonstrations to battle with the fascist Israeli troops and police. Women students and housewives stoned Israeli soldiers to death and smashed Israeli military vehicles. This is a new front opened up by the Palestinian people against the Israeli aggressors.

The victorious development of the armed struggle of the Palestinian people has struck terror into the hearts of the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionist social-imperialists, who are feverishly plotting a "Middle East Munich." Working hand in glove, they are stepping up their collusion at the current "four-power meeting" and sparing no efforts to peddle their despicable fraud of "political solution" for the Middle East question. This is a preposterous attempt by the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists to stamp out the raging flames of the Palestinian people's armed struggle, liquidate the Palestine liberation cause and realize their criminal design of joint domination over the Middle East. With this end in view, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism intimidate, throw their money around, and try to divide and split the Arab countries. They are looking for agents in the Arab countries to serve their sinister scheme of strangling the armed struggle of the Palestinian people.

Our great leader Chairman Mao pointed out while dealing with the war situation in the early stage of China's War of Resistance against Japan that there may be "setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises and other such reverses. Therefore it should be realized that the war will be arduous and protracted." On the road to victory, the Palestinian people, too, will face a protracted, arduous and tortuous struggle.

The Palestinian people, steeled and grown strong in the armed struggle, have awakened. They will never allow themselves to be bullied and sold out. The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization in a statement on April 10 strongly condemned the "four-power meeting," categorically rejected any "political solution" formula and reiterated the Palestinian people's rejection of the U.N. Security Council resolution, the draft of the Soviet Union and the U.S. "working paper." The statement stressed: "The Palestinian people are firmly determined to continue their armed struggle, to strengthen and develop this struggle to liberate their whole homeland, Palestine."

Al-Fatah guerrilla fighters have put it well: "Palestine's struggle in the past year or more has proved that Chairman Mao's brilliant thought on people's war is the most powerful weapon for the Palestinian people fighting for national liberation."

Chairman Mao says: "Perseverance means victory." So long as the Palestinian and other Arab people strengthen their unity and persevere in struggle, they will surely win victory for their national liberation in the end.

96

Joint Communiqué on the U.S.S.R. President Podgorny's Visit to Mongolia.¹(Excerpt)

Ulan Bator, May 24, 1969

Both sides again strongly condemn Israel's aggression and state that the withdrawal of the forces of aggression from all occupied Arab territory is the prime condition for easing tension in the Middle East.

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 27/5/1969.

97

Joint Communiqué on the Congolese President Nguabi's Visit to the United Arab Republic.¹ (Excerpt)

Cairo, May 25, 1969

The two Presidents discussed the situation in the Middle East that has resulted from the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries on June 5, 1967 and Israel's aggressive, expansionistic policy which is a threat to world peace.

Both sides declare that Israel's refusal to implement the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and its continued occupation of the territories of three Arab states confirm Israel's expansionistic policy, and constitute a continued aggression against the sovereignty and security of these states, which is a violation of the basic principles of the United Nations Charter.

The two Presidents agreed that the achievement of peace in the Middle East requires that Israel should implement Security Council resolution of November 22, 1969 and withdraw its forces from the territories it occupied on June 5, 1967.

President Nguabi affirmed the support of the government and people of the Congo-Brazzaville for the attitude of the United Arab Republic and the other Arab states towards the Israeli colonialist aggression. He also affirmed Congo-Brazzaville's support for the just cause of the Palestinian people, for their legitimate rights to their land and for their struggle against and resistance to aggression and occupation.

98

Address by the U.S. Representative Yost to the United Nations.² (Excerpts)

Washington, May 26, 1969

A frequent criticism of the United Nations

efforts in the cause of peace is that it limits its efforts to patching up quarrels instead of getting at the causes — what might be called the "band-aid" approach to peacemaking. Of course its authority is limited — limited to what its 126 member states and particularly the great powers will permit it to do. It cannot impose peace or terms of a settlement, much though the world as a whole might profit if it could. But even within its present limitations there is much that it does do.

In the Middle East also, as we all know, the normal processes of diplomacy have been tragically inadequate. Time and again in these 20 years the intervention of the United Nations has been required to patch up the tragic failures of bilateral and regional diplomacy and to prevent wider and even more disastrous conflict.

Surely in the case of the Middle East no one can now fairly charge the United Nations with treating symptoms and neglecting causes. Since November 1967 the Security Council has been on record as calling for nothing less ambitious than "a just and lasting peace" in that area. It has set forth unanimously the basic principles on which such a peace can be built. A special representative of the Secretary General, Ambassador Jarring, has labored long and patiently to assist the parties in their search for such a peace. When this effort, after more than a year, came to naught and fighting resumed and spread, the four permanent members of the Security Council, conscious of their responsibilities under the charter for international peace and security, conscious also of their own vital interests in avoiding a wider war, decided to lend the weight of their influence to bringing about a just and lasting peace. It is hard to see how under the circumstances they could have done otherwise without abdication of their responsibilities and grave danger to their own security.

Whether the four powers, and the United Nations, will succeed or fail in this most urgent of present peacemaking tasks depends less on them than on the governments and peoples of the Middle East, who are after all, and most of all, masters of their own fate and future. In this case, at least, the resources and the authority of the United Nations, limited as they may be

¹ *Al-Muharrir* (Beirut), 26/5/1969.

² U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 30/6/1969, pp. 564-566. The address was delivered to the Capital Area Division of the United Nations Association of the U.S.A.

in the present state of the world, are being and, I am confident, will be fully applied in the pursuit of peace.

99

Appeal by the Executive Secretariat of the Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organisation to all Revolutionary Forces and Socialist Countries to Support the Arab and Palestinian Peoples' Struggle against Israel's Aggression.¹

Havana, May 29, 1969

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the June War, the Cuban representative to the Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, who was visiting Syria with a delegation from the Organisation, read the following appeal:

Two full years have passed since the June 5 aggression was launched by Israel, the military and political tool of American imperialism and of the other imperialist nations. The aggression was meant to undermine the existence of an Arab people; it resulted in the occupation of new territory belonging to the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan.

These events clearly indicate that Israel is a tool for aggression against the Arab people. Israel's acts of aggression and crimes are steps in the implementation of a plan drawn up by the imperialist powers which stand behind Israel and goad it on. Foremost among these is American imperialism, which uses Israel to protect its economic, military and political interests in this part of the world. Events have also clearly disclosed the attitudes and objectives of the Arab forces of reaction which advocate cooperation between all forces in the Arab world and acceptance of peaceful solutions, with the intention of toppling the revolutionary regime which is the mainstay of the people of Palestine and of the Arab people in all parts of the Arab world. They are seeking

to steer the issue toward conciliations, compromise and treason . . .

The first few months which followed the so-called "June 5 War" witnessed the emergence of subjective factors and strong reactions to the plan for aggression on the part of the Arab people of Palestine. The Palestinian people, and the Arab people as a whole, started an armed revolution in the occupied areas that is constantly escalating. This revolution was the first decisive and serious expression of that determination to continue the struggle which was born when the imperialist powers created Israel by usurping Arab territories, violating the rights of thousands of members of the Arab people of Palestine and mercilessly killing them regardless of the most elementary human principles and values . . .

The heroic resistance of the Arab people of Palestine and the other Arab peoples in the occupied territories is therefore the correct response to Zionist aggression.

Acts of oppression, repressive measures and constant attacks on the Palestinian and Arab peoples have failed to sap the strength of Palestinian armed resistance; they have made it more defiant and determined, to recover the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The American imperialists, West Germany, Britain and the other imperialist nations have continued to support Israel with all their strength, through diplomatic manoeuvres at the United Nations, by providing that Zionist base with the most modern and murderous weapons and by using reactionary Arab leaders in attempts to overthrow the revolutionary regimes in Arab countries.

Meanwhile, not only has Israel not shown the slightest intention of withdrawing from the territories of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan it has occupied; on the contrary, it has been issuing insolent declarations about its plans for the final annexation of the occupied Arab territories and its intention of occupying further territories; it has continued its attacks on neighbouring areas in the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, using all sorts of heavy weapons, fighter planes, napalm bombs and other incendiary materials in the pursuit of its objectives. It is also continuing its savage campaigns of persecution and liquidation campaigns against the

¹ *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus), 5/6/1969. The appeal was read by the Cuban representative to the organisation at a press conference called by the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation.

Arab population of the occupied territories, with the object of total genocide, carrying out mass arrests and killings, acts of arson and demolishing houses and entire villages...

In view of this situation, the Executive Committee of the Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organisation has organised a delegation to tour the world on the anniversary of the June 5 war to express the Organisation's solidarity with the Arab people whose present struggle constitutes a major and most significant front in the struggle of African, Asian and Latin American peoples against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.

We hereby issue an ardent appeal to all member organisations of the Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organisation and to all revolutionary forces in the world, and in particular to the governments of independent nations in Africa and Asia, and the socialist countries, to increase their support for and affirm their solidarity with the people of Palestine in their heroic struggle to liberate their homeland. We must strengthen the hand of the Palestinian organisations and provide them with all they need in the way of material and moral support. The Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organisation also makes similar appeal for support for the Arab people who are standing up to Zionist aggression and for full solidarity with them...

Secretariat General of the Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Organisation.

100

Joint Communiqué on the Italian Foreign Minister Nenni's Visit to Yugoslavia.¹ (Excerpt)

Belgrade, May 29, 1969

The two ministers established that there was a similarity in views on the situation, and a common interest in preserving peace, in the Mediterranean where they intended investing every possible effort in promoting co-operation among the countries of this region.

¹ *Yugoslav Review of International Affairs*, 5/6/1969.

They voiced their anxiety at the situation in the Middle East and after outlining the positions of their governments agreed that it was necessary to search for a solution that would preserve peace.

101

Commentary in the Chinese Official Weekly "Peking Review" on the United States and the Soviet Union Plans for a Settlement to the Middle East Crisis.²

Peking, May 30, 1969

The U.S. imperialists' "nine-point working paper" is dished up before the "four-power meeting" of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain to set the tune for a "Middle East Munich" plot which is being hatched by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. The putting forth of this "working paper" by the new chieftain of U.S. imperialism Nixon less than three months after he took office fully shows that U.S. imperialism is quickening its tempo in contriving a "Middle East Munich" in collusion with Soviet revisionism. The essence of this plot is to completely liquidate the Palestine liberation cause, strangle the armed struggle of the Palestinian people and force the Arab countries to compromise with and capitulate to Israel, the U.S. imperialist tool of aggression, so as to realise the criminal designs of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism to dominate the Middle East.

The U.S. "nine-point working paper" dished up on March 24 after six weeks of "quiet diplomacy" between the United States and the Soviet Union and the "five-point plan" put forward by Soviet revisionism at the end of last year are now serving as the basis for collusion and bargaining between imperialism and social-imperialism inside and outside the "four-power meeting."

Although the full text of the "working paper" has not been officially made public, it could be seen from what has been revealed by the Western press that with the co-ordination of Soviet revisionism, U.S. imperialism is imposing harsher terms of surrender on the Arab countries. It is even more vicious and more undisguised than the U.N. Security Council's November 1967

² *Peking Review*, 30/5/1969, pp. 20-21.

"resolution," jointly concocted by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, and U.S. imperialism's "seven-point proposal" put forward to the United Arab Republic in November 1968. This has completely ripped off the new U.S. imperialist chieftain Nixon's mask of professed "impartial" policy on the Middle East and exposed him in his true colours as the sworn enemy of the Arab people.

In the "working paper," U.S. imperialism harshly pressed the Arab countries to satisfy the aggressive designs of Israel by ceding territories to it. It openly declared that it was impossible to restore the "cease-fire lines" existing before the war of aggression launched by Israel in June 1967 and that Israel should only withdraw to "secure" boundaries. It should be pointed out that the "cease-fire lines" came into existence only after Israel had occupied large tracts of Arab territory by means of war and that the Palestinian and other Arab people have never recognized them as "boundaries." U.S. imperialism has now gone further and pressed the Arab countries to cede to Israel the territories it had seized in the aggressive war of 1967, including Syria's highly strategic Golan Heights and the Arab sector of Jerusalem. It hypocritically said that this was "for mutual security" and does "not reflect the weight of conquest." This is out-and-out gangster logic of imperialism. It shows up more glaringly what U.S. imperialism wants to hide.

It is worth pointing out that the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, which has all along pretended to be the supporter of the Arab countries, is working hand in glove with U.S. imperialism in forcing the Arab countries to seek peace by giving up territories. Western news agency reports disclosed recently that Soviet ambassador to the United States Dobrynin had indicated to Joseph Jack Sisco, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, in their secret talks that "minor adjustments" could be made on the borders of the Arab countries. This shows that Soviet revisionist social-imperialism is also following the gangster logic of the "jungle law" and reveals more clearly the hideous and shameless features of the Soviet revisionists in their efforts to sell out further the interests of the Arab people in collusion with U.S. imperialism.

Another sinister purpose of U.S. imperialism's

"working paper" is to strangle the vigorous armed struggle of the Palestinian people and liquidate their liberation cause. It flagrantly proposed a ban on all military activities in this area and particularly on the Palestinian guerrillas and their activities. In order to realize this scheme, U.S. imperialism especially stated in the "working paper" that after the "adjustment" of boundaries between the Arab countries and Israel, "demilitarized zones" should be set up along all the revised boundary lines on the east bank of the Suez Canal and the west bank of the Jordan River and that these zones are to be "patrolled" by the "United Nations force." This is mainly aimed at protecting Israel from the strikes of the Palestinian guerrillas and at serving the criminal scheme of placing the Middle East under U.S.-Soviet control.

Like the "five-point plan" of the Soviet revisionists, the U.S. imperialists' "working paper" tried to write off at one stroke the national rights of the 2 million Palestinian people to liberate their homeland. It alleged that "the desires and aspirations of the individual human beings concerned" should be taken into account. This is an attempt to deny the existence of the Palestinian people as a whole and to divide them. In fact, the guerrilla fighters of "Al-Fatah" and other Palestinian nationalist organizations have in recent years told the whole world in clear-cut terms what the desires and aspirations of the Palestinian people are by their armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine! Yet, the U.S. imperialists' "working paper" treats these valiant guerrilla fighters as "individual human beings" and "refugees" some of whom should be "repatriated" while the majority should "resettle" in Arab countries. In other words, in the eyes of the U.S. imperialists, the Palestinian people have no national rights whatsoever and there are only two alternatives before them: either become the slaves of Zionism or continue to live as "refugees" in other Arab countries as they did in the past twenty years. What is this if not sheer imperialist gangster logic?

Imperialism and revisionism have long been plotting to stamp out the raging flames of the Palestinian people's armed struggle. As early as mid January, the then Johnson Administration, in reply to the Soviet revisionists' "five-point plan," notified the Soviet revisionists that "the U.S.

views, as a matter of top priority, the undertaking of the Soviet Union and the United States and other countries to use their influence to stop the grave increase of Arab terrorist operations [should read: the Arab people's just armed struggle — *Ed.*] in the area." An AP dispatch from Washington on April 8 said: "U.S. experts of the area [the Middle East] agree with the King [of Jordan] that something has to be done soon or things might get out of hand. The main concern now appears to be that the Fedayeen and other irregular guerrilla organizations grow stronger every day." In prompt response, the Soviet revisionists set in motion their propaganda machines and brought their "influence" into play to openly attack and slander the just struggle of the Palestinian guerrillas. In some Arab countries, the activities of the Palestinian guerrillas have been obstructed and suppressed. These trends merit attention and vigilance.

In the "working paper," U.S. imperialism also urged the Arab countries to make a "package deal" with the Israeli aggressors by signing with the latter a "contractual agreement." This is a diabolic attempt to impose on the Arab people, in the form of a legal document, the various monstrous demands mentioned above and other harsh terms (for example, the recognition of Israel's "sovereignty" and the opening of the Suez Canal and Tiran Strait to Israeli ships).

All this boils down to the fact that both the Soviet revisionists' "five-point plan" and the U.S. imperialists' "nine-point working paper" are based on their own imperialist interests and serve their counter-revolutionary strategy. The "Voice of Assifa" Radio of "Al-Fatah" (the Palestine National Liberation Movement) said in a recent commentary: We reject these plots, no matter whether they are based on the U.S. "working paper," the Soviet "plan" or the U.N. Security Council "resolution." "For us there is only one way in one direction, that is, the way of armed struggle leading to all-round liberation and complete victory; there is no other way."

The Palestinian and other Arab people will definitely not allow the imperialists and social-imperialists to dictate their destiny. They will resolutely fight for victory in their cause of national liberation.

102

Interview Statements by the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Stewart during a Stopover at Beirut International Airport.¹

Beirut, May 30, 1969

Q. In view of the British withdrawal from east of Suez by 1971 could you please tell us the role of Britain and CENTO in the Gulf.

A. CENTO of course, will certainly remain. This has been for a number of years, a useful alliance helping to provide stability in the region and enabling the regional members of the Alliance to engage in useful economic cooperation. After our withdrawal, of course, Britain will have the special position it has in the Gulf now. The security of the Gulf will be a matter for the States who border on it. I think this is very well understood by them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, news agencies are reporting that the big four powers have reached agreement on some basic points, whereas Israel still claims that the big four are deadlocked. Now could you please give us the correct picture?

A. I think that the position is that the big four are making progress. I think it would be premature to say agreement had been reached on all points yet. But certainly there has been progress in the talks.

Q. Could you please give us some basic points, if any, on which progress has been achieved?

A. This would be a matter for a full statement when the time is ripe.

Q. Israel has refused to implement the Security Council resolution and rejected the big four talks out of hand. Now how can any solution by the big four be implemented?

A. Well, if the big four can reach agreement, which must be an agreement in line with the Security Council resolution, they will then be able to put to Dr. Jarring for him to put to the parties concerned actual proposals for getting the resolution carried out. Now I do not think Israel has rejected the resolution. She has of course

¹ Lebanese National News Agency, *Daily Bulletin*, 30/5/1969. Published by the Lebanese Ministry of Information.

pressed that there ought to be direct talks about how it's being implemented. That has not proved possible and that is why the four powers proceeded. I regret that Israel took the line she did about the four power talks. But if agreement can be reached among the four, I think, nonetheless, the chances of getting agreement among the parties concerned would be good.

Q. Israel has repeatedly insisted, as you said, on direct talks between the parties concerned, now if the big four hope to put any solution to the two parties in conflict, are there any new factors which might influence Israel's position.

A. I think it will be a new factor, if you got agreement on how the resolution could be carried out, agreement among the four. I think we'd better wait to see what further progress is made by them.

Q. U Thant, the U.N. Secretary General has warned the big four talks in New York that unless they come up with a speedy formula soon, a solution just might be impossible. Now do you think he was referring to the growing commando activity, etc...

A. It has been the British government's view that the many incidents there do add to the danger of the whole situation, and make it important that agreement should be reached as soon as possible.

103

Joint Communiqué on the U.S.S.R. President Podgorny's Visit to Afghanistan.¹ (Excerpt)
Kabul, May 30, 1969

Both sides condemn Israel's unceasing military provocations against the Arab states and believe that without the complete withdrawal of all Israeli troops from the Arab territories which they have seized, there can be no lasting and just peace in the Middle East.

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 3/6/1969.

104

Joint Communiqué on the U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin's Visit to Pakistan.² (Excerpt)
Rawalpindi, May 31, 1969

The two sides noted with deep satisfaction that their views coincided on a number of important international issues.

Both supported the settlement of the Middle East question on the basis of the Security Council resolution of 22nd November, 1967, and called for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all occupied territories.

105

Joint Communiqué on the Cambodian Foreign Minister Phurissara's Visit to East Germany.³ (Excerpt)
Berlin, June 2, 1969

The two Ministers exchanged the views of their Governments concerning the situation in the Middle East. They declared their solidarity with the just struggle of the Arab states for the defence of their sovereignty, national independence, and territorial integrity, for overcoming the aftermath of the aggression inspired and supported by the imperialists, and supported the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations of 22 November 1967.

² *Pakistan Document Series*, vol. VI, No. 4, June 1969.

³ *G.D.R. Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 16/6/1969.

106

Statement by an East German Foreign Ministry Spokesman on the Situation in the Middle East.¹

Berlin, June 5, 1969

The stubborn refusal by ruling quarters in Israel to fulfil the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 and to withdraw the occupation troops from Arab territories, illegally occupied, constitutes a serious breach of the most elementary principles of international law. The policy pursued by the Israeli Government to gradually annex the territories occupied in 1967 and terrorise their Arab inhabitants is a challenge to all peace-loving people.

The Government of the GDR has always supported the just struggle of the Arab peoples against the Israeli policy of expansion and for the liquidation of the aftermath of the Israeli imperialist aggression and granted solidarity and help to the victims of the aggression. In contrast to this, the West German Government has never stopped its wide political, military, economic and propaganda support for Israel but rather encourages the ruling circles of Israel to continue their aggression. The fact remains that Bonn has been, is and will remain one of those who are to blame for Israel's crimes against the Arab peoples.

Imperialist circles use the Israeli aggression, Iran's provocation toward Iraq at the Shatt al-Arab and the setting up of a NATO fleet in the Mediterranean to threaten the Arab peoples now with a view to preventing their development along the road of social progress.

In this situation, the Government and people of the GDR continue to stand firmly by the side of the Arab peoples in the anti-imperialist struggle for the liquidation of the Israeli aggression. They condemn Israel's annexationist efforts and terrorist measures against the Arab population resisting the occupants. The GDR reaffirms its support for the efforts for a political settlement of this conflict which envisages the unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli aggressor troops from the occupied Arab territories.

¹ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 16/6/1969.

107

Address by the East German Foreign Minister Winzer on the Signing of the Agreement Establishing Diplomatic Relations with Syria.² (Excerpt)

Damascus, June 5, 1969

We are signing these agreements on the anniversary of the perfidious aggression by Israel against its Arab neighbours. The establishment of diplomatic relations and the agreements on the further cooperation between our two states are effective blows against the alliance of the forces of imperialism and zionism in the Middle East, particularly against the alliance of aggressive West German imperialism and aggressive Israel.

German imperialism, re-established in the West German Federal Republic, was defeated in two world wars and is now trying to continue its expansionist policy in the Middle East. This is the chief cause why West German imperialism and militarism supported actively and is still supporting the preparations and the actual launching of Israeli aggressions against the Arab states.

Different from West German imperialism and its anti-Arab policy, the socialist German state has always shown itself a true and reliable friend of the Arab states. This is why we mark the anniversary of the Israeli aggression of 1967 by further consolidating and extending our relations with the SAR and at the same time our steadfast and consistent solidarity with the Arab cause.

This country's Government and people have been profoundly interested in the Arab people's cause both in prosperity and adversity. They have always and everywhere actively supported the struggle of the Arab peoples for their national liberty and independence. On this anniversary of Israel's aggression, we repeat that the continued occupation of Arab territories is a brazen infringement on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab states.

The continued aggression by Israel is a menace to the security of all the peoples in the Middle East also jeopardizing world peace. This is why we call for the Israeli aggressor's withdrawal from

² G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (Berlin), 25/6/1969.

the occupied Arab territories and an effective guarantee for the Arab peoples' right to self-determination.

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108

Joint Communiqué on the East German Deputy Premier Titel's Visit to Sudan. (Excerpts)

Khartum, June 5, 1969

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The Sudanese side emphasised that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Sudan constitutes a foreign policy measure that fully corresponds with its policy of neutrality. It also stressed that this step reflects the appreciation of the Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan for the consistent support given by the German Democratic Republic to the Arab peoples' struggle for their national independence, freedom and overcoming the aftermath of the Israeli imperialist aggression.

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Both sides underlined the close connection between the struggle for peace and security in Europe and in the Middle East.

They condemned in this connection the increasing political, economic and military support which the Governments of the USA and the West German Federal Republic are rendering to the aggressor, Israel, in order to keep it as a bridgehead against the national liberation movement of the Arabs. This policy is aimed against the sovereignty and security of the Arab states and consequently against world peace.

Both sides stressed the need for putting an end to the Israeli imperialist aggression against the Arab people and for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli troops of aggression from the occupied Arab territories on the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution of

22 November 1967. They recognise all rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to self-determination, and reaffirm their solidarity with their resistance against foreign occupation.

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109

Joint Communiqué on the East German Foreign Minister Winzer's Visit to Syria² (Excerpt)

Damascus, June 5, 1969

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In the course of their exchange of views both Ministers conformably condemned the continued aggressive provocations of Israel against the Arab states, the measures of terror and suppression against the Arab population as well as their forcible expulsion from their homes. They also agreed that Israel is a racist, colonialist, and aggressive entity, that it is the spearhead of imperialism against the Arab nation, and a threat to peace and security.

Both Ministers emphasized the necessity to end the Israeli imperialist aggression against the Arab people and demanded the unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. The peoples of the German Democratic Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic lead a determined struggle in a joint front to achieve this.

Both Ministers stressed that the active military and political assistance rendered to Israel by the United States of America and West Germany is an aggressive action. This policy is aimed at strengthening Israel as a military base of imperialism in the Arab region and at intensifying its aggression against the Arab people. Both Ministers pointed out that they support the legitimate Arab resistance against the Israeli occupation and that they consider it to be an essential means for the liberation of the occupied territories. This resistance is linked with the struggle of the peoples in other parts of the world against colonialist and imperialist oppression and for their liberation.

¹ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 25/6/1969.

² G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 25/6/1969.

Both Ministers condemned the policy of the United States of America, West Germany and Israel in the Middle East which is aimed at enforcing the imperialist interests concerning oil in the Arabian Gulf and at dealing a blow against the anti-imperialist forces in this area. This policy violates international law and the Charter of the United Nations Organization, and it is furthered through the unilateral annulment by Iran of the 1937 border convention with Iraq.

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Address by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Sharp at the Negev Dinner in Winnipeg.¹ (Excerpts)

Winnipeg, June 5, 1969

... In relation to the Middle East, for example, there is no question of the immense sympathy in Canada for Israel as well as our compassion for the people of the Arab countries. Individual Canadians can, and do, make their own contributions in various ways and the Canadian Government constantly seeks to assist in the search for a lasting peace. Yet, of the international controversies which have attracted attention since the Second World War, few have proven as intractable as the Arab-Israeli dispute. The 21 years since the establishment of the State of Israel have seen three major outbreaks of hostilities and an ebb and flow of violence in between.

Two years have now elapsed since the fighting in 1967 and violent clashes continue in the region at a level that is without precedent except during time of war. It is a depressing and, indeed, a dismaying record when we recall the high hopes entertained by us all 21 years ago as we welcomed Israel into the family of nations. The hopes that an early reconciliation would be effected, that the Arab states and Israel would come to live in harmony to their mutual benefit, and that agreement on just arrangements would enable all those — on both sides — who had suffered from fear,

deprivation and homelessness to assume lives of dignity and self-respect.

Too many of these hopes have been disappointed. Yet we should not ignore what was accomplished during the past 20 years. The people of Israel have accomplished remarkable nation-building feats. There have been periods of calm. Through the United Nations, efforts have been made by the international community to promote conditions of peace and to alleviate human suffering, particularly by assisting the Arab refugees. The United Nations did contribute to the maintenance of an equilibrium in the region for some years. Wiser counsels among the interested parties might have prevented the destruction of that equilibrium or halted the train of events which led to war. As we all know, the removal of the United Nations Emergency Force which, for ten years helped to create conditions of calm along the Israel/UAR lines, was followed — with frightening swiftness — by a new outbreak of hostilities. The breakdown of those arrangements should not, however, be allowed to obscure what they did achieve.

There have, in short, been gains and losses, and it would be futile and certainly unprofitable to try to strike a balance.

The past lies too heavily on the Middle East. It provides grounds for endless recrimination. The countries directly involved owe it to themselves to look to the present and to the future. They owe it to themselves to seek a better basis for peace than has been found in the past.

The search for a settlement has been difficult and long. The delay has been frustrating. It reflects the fears and hesitations on both sides — on Israel's part, fear of continued Arab hostility which threatens its security, and on the Arab side fear of territorial expansion at their expense. For those directly involved, there may be risks in pursuing a settlement — as there are in the prevailing circumstances of raid and reprisal, action and counter-action, death and destruction. It is right that the parties themselves and the international community should seek a settlement that is more definitive, clearer and less ambiguous than the previous arrangements so that all may have greater assurance that peace will endure. It is right that they should insist on a *just settlement*, involving:

¹ *Canadian Weekly Bulletin*, 2/7/1969.

1) The establishment of secure boundaries which are mutually recognized;

2) a withdrawal of forces from occupied territories;

3) genuine mutual acceptance — by acknowledgement of the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of all states — which has not been seen before in the Middle East;

4) freedom of navigation for the ships of all states through international waterways — the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal;

5) and, not least, a fair and just settlement of the refugee problem.

What is crucial, however, is that neither Israel nor the Arab states — nor all those interested in the Middle East — should lose hope in a settlement or lessen their efforts to achieve one. There will be no settlement, there will be no peace, unless it is earnestly sought; unless all the governments concerned muster all their magnanimity, understanding and tolerance — and venture on a new course.

I do not expect that the roots of mutual fear and antagonism will be removed at one stroke. But it is only through a settlement, and the new conditions it creates, that these obstacles to genuine peace will wither and die away. That is the realistic as well as the courageous approach. If Israel and its neighbours do not move forward to peace, they will be in constant danger of slipping back to war.

The Canadian Government continues to lend its full support to the United Nations effort, in particular the mission of Ambassador Jarring, to promote agreement on a peaceful and accepted settlement. We also endorse the efforts of the four powers, in the light of their responsibilities as Permanent Members of the Security Council, to assist Ambassador Jarring in his task. That is indeed how the four powers have defined their role — to assist Ambassador Jarring in his task — not to replace his efforts nor to substitute for them. The four powers, in their own words, are considering "how they can contribute to a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East". A peaceful political settlement requires agreement and consent on the part of Israel and the Arab states; it cannot be imposed by force. And the four powers have made it quite clear that they are

not interested in what one of them has called "a mechanism to impose peace", if such a thing were conceivable. What they are interested in is a peaceful and *accepted* settlement, as described in the Security Council resolution. We all recognize that the day is past when great powers might impose their arrangements on the Middle East heedless of the vital interests of those directly concerned.

It would be wrong, however, to assume that the four powers, with their extensive interests and responsibilities, have nothing to contribute to the achievement of peace in the Middle East. We hope they may help to meet the doubts and apprehensions in Israel and in the Arab states which pose obstacles to the attainment of a settlement. They may be able to use their influence in a constructive way to bridge the gap of silence between the parties. They would be remiss in their duty if they did not try to help Israel and its neighbours to reconcile their differences.

The four powers' effort may well progress slowly in support of the Jarring Mission. Pursuing this joint effort may require a further exercise in tenacity. But the stakes are too great, the price of failure too high, for either Israel and the Arab states or the international community to falter in their efforts. They cannot afford to stop short of a just and lasting peace, and the benefits it will confer on all.

The Middle East is racked by blind fears and destructive myths. But I for one believe in the capacity of man's unconquerable mind to overcome those fears and myths. This can only be done by the long, difficult but sure process of education. Surely it is not beyond man's ingenuity in the shorter term to find enough common ground on which to build a secure and lasting peace in the Middle East, a peace that will guarantee to Israeli and Arab alike the quiet enjoyment of their lives and lands.

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Speech by the U.S.S.R. Communist Party Secretary-General Brezhnev at the International Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties.¹ (Excerpts)**Moscow, June 7, 1969**

The Soviet Union has rendered and will continue to render all-round assistance to the Arab states subjected to aggression. We firmly demand the full implementation of the provisions of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, which opens the way for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

112

Statement by the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Support of the Arab Peoples.²**Moscow, June 7, 1969**

Two years ago Israel was guilty of open aggression against the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria. Since that time the ruling circles of Israel, supported by imperialism, and above all American imperialism, and by world reaction and Zionist circles, have continued to occupy Arab territories seized as a result of aggression and to refuse to carry out United Nations decisions, including decisions of the Security Council; they have gone on pursuing a policy of expansion and annexation, carrying out repressive acts against the Arab population in the occupied areas and continually engaging in further military provocations.

The International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties resolutely condemns Israel's continuing aggression, which constitutes a gross violation of the national rights of Arab peoples, including the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, and a gross violation of the United Nations Charter, which condemns aggression.

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 10/6/1969.² *Soviet News* (London), 10/6/1969.

In their just struggle against aggression, the Arab peoples have the effective support of socialist countries, and first and foremost the Soviet Union. In this struggle they are supported by the world communist movement, the national liberation forces and ever wider circles of public opinion in the capitalist countries.

The Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties is of the opinion that peace and tranquility in this region can be established only by the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories and the full implementation of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967.

The conference calls on all progressive forces throughout the world to intensify their effective support for the Arab peoples and their solidarity with their just struggle.

113

Statement by the World Communist and Workers' Parties Congress Condemning the Israeli Aggression against Arab Countries.³**Moscow, June 7, 1969**

Two years ago Israel launched an open aggression against the UAR, Jordan and Syria. Since then, the Israeli ruling circles, supported by the imperialists, above all by the U.S. imperialists, world reaction and Zionist circles, continue to occupy Arab territories seized as a result of the aggression, refusing to fulfil the UN decisions, including those of the Security Council; they are enforcing their expansionist and annexationist policy, perpetrating acts of repression against the Arab population in the occupied areas, and incessantly committing fresh military provocations.

The International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties resolutely condemns Israel's continued aggression, which is a gross violation of the national rights of the Arab peoples, including the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine, a gross violation of the UN Charter, which condemns aggression.

In their just struggle against aggression the Arab peoples have the effective support of the

³ *World Marxist Review*, July 1969, pp. 32-33.

socialist countries, primarily of the Soviet Union. In this struggle they are backed by the world communist movement, the national-liberation forces and ever growing sections of the public in the capitalist countries.

The Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties holds that peace and tranquility in this area can be established only provided Israeli troops are withdrawn from all occupied Arab territories and the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 is fully implemented.

The Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties appeals to all progressive forces throughout the world to increase their effective support for, and enhance their solidarity with, the Arab peoples in their just struggle.

114

Statement by the Israeli Defence Ministry Head Miron Disclosing the Number of Israeli Soldiers Killed between 10/6/1967 and 1/4/1969 as a Result of Shelling, Sniping and Guerrilla Attacks.¹ (Excerpt)

Tel Aviv, June 8, 1969

In the two years since the six-day war, Israel has lost nearly as many soldiers as it lost during the war itself.

Shelling, sniping and guerrilla attacks had cost the lives of 669 Israeli soldiers between the war's end on June 10, 1967, and the beginning of April of this year.

In the war itself, Israel lost 780 dead.

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Statements by the French Presidential Candidate Pompidou on Revising France's position Regarding its Arms Embargo on the Middle East.²

Paris, June 9, 1969

In reply to a question on the sale by France of

bombers and tanks to Lebanon after the restoration of the arms embargo, Mr. Pompidou said: "If it is established that effective embargo of all belligerent parties is a snare — and this is a fundamental point that I shall make a point of emphasising constantly — France will have to reconsider her position. It is certain that there will not be two weights and two measures."

In response to a comment on the sending of spare parts by France to Syria and the United Arab Republic, he said: "I do not believe that what you say about these spare parts is correct. Since I have not been in touch with these matters since July 1968, I have not been able to consult the appropriate files. I will study them. As regards Lebanon, one must say that it seemed really to be out of the armed conflict, granted what you are saying."

"France will always defend Israel's right to exist in independence and security. This right must be definitely recognised by all the countries concerned. Meanwhile, France's role is to do all she can to contribute to the diminishing of the risks of a new Arab-Israeli conflagration which could have appalling consequences for humanity. No country should deliver any material, least of all any which is liable to be used for military purposes, to countries that are at war."

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Statements by the French Presidential Candidate Pompidou Supporting a Total French Arms Embargo on the Middle East.³

Paris, June 10, 1969

I have already affirmed, and I now reaffirm, Israel's right to exist as a state, to be recognised, to have frontiers which allow it to live in security and which are guaranteed, to enjoy freedom of navigation with all that this involves, and the right to be a state recognised by all others.

I have also said that the Palestinian problem must be solved. This problem is first and foremost

¹ *Herald Tribune*, 9/6/1969.

² *L'Orient* (Beirut), 10/6/1969. These statements were made to the French newspaper *L'Aurore*.

³ *L'Orient* (Beirut), 11/6/1969. These statements were made in reply to questions by the Committee for Franco-Israeli Solidarity.

a human problem; it is also a problem of security for the whole of the Middle East.

As for arms, I am in favour of refusing supplies to all parties. I am quite ready to state this and to propose it. If a formula of this kind could be arrived at, it would probably be possible to succeed in ensuring peace more quickly. We have absolutely no wish to see the state of Israel destroyed, on the contrary, but I believe that all in that part of the world should be willing to live together. Peace is the first objective. As negotiations and events develop, there will be progress towards this peace. The good will of the whole world will be needed if this aim is to be achieved.

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**Statements by the French Interim President
Poher on the French Arms Embargo on the
Middle East.¹**

Paris, June 10, 1969

It is impossible to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict if one of the parties involved — refusing to recognise its adversary's right to exist — does not agree to negotiate or to sign a peace treaty.

The four-power talks now taking place in New York can contribute towards encouraging contacts and a rapprochement of points of view, but the talks must on no account result in a solution imposed from outside.

As I said before, French policy as regards the Middle Eastern belligerents must on no account favour one party at the expense of the other.

It would have been a good thing if all the powers had imposed a general embargo on the Middle East against all the belligerents at the time when, in 1967, the French government took its unilateral decision to impose an embargo. But the French government's unilateral action probably did not contribute to the relaxing of tensions in this part of the world.

The delicate problem of the "Mirages" has a moral as well as an economic aspect. On the one

hand, in my opinion, a contract is always a contract and cannot be suspended when its execution is already far advanced by a unilateral decision. On the other hand it is not a good thing that those who have had dealings with our industry should be disappointed by the breaking of commercial contracts. This is liable to stop — indeed it has already stopped — other exports which are necessary for our balance of payments. As President of the European Assembly, I have supported Israel's association with the European community. In the future I shall continue to support this association, just I shall support the association of Tunisia and Morocco.

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**Press Conference Statements by the French
President Pompidou after having been Elec-
ted President of the French Republic.²**

Paris, June 10, 1969

"Only the four powers can guarantee a settlement in the Middle East."

[He maintained that the aim of French Policy] "is not to sell arms but to work for a balance of forces in the Middle East."

[He also alluded to] "the rights of the Palestinian People."

[He made the point] that the general embargo on the delivery of arms to the Middle East would be maintained for the present and that if this policy had to be reviewed in the future such revision would certainly not go beyond a selective embargo, such as was in force before the Israeli raid on the Beirut Airport on December 28, [1968].

Finally President Pompidou emphasised the importance of the four power talks "which alone could work out and, what was more important, guarantee a comprehensive and final settlement."

¹ *L'Orient* (Beirut), 11/6/1969. These statements were made in reply to questions by the Committee for Franco-Israeli Solidarity.

² *L'Orient* (Beirut), 11/6/1969.

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Article on the Middle East in the Chinese Official Weekly "Peking Review".¹**Peking, June 13, 1969**

Acting on the orders of U.S. imperialism, the Israeli Zionists launched a full-scale war of aggression against the Arab countries on June 5, 1967, two years ago. Large tracts of Arab territory came under Israeli occupation. U.S. imperialism then worked in league with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique to coerce the Arab countries into accepting a "ceasefire" and the fait accompli created with the Zionists through military aggression. The revolutionary Arab people were unsubdued. They held high the standard of armed struggle and pitted their strength against aggression, against control, against betrayal and against surrender. They fought heroically for two years against U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionist social-imperialism and the running dogs of both, and have won very big victories.

The Middle East region is one of the focal points of world contradictions today and also a major storm centre of the world revolution where head-on blows are struck at imperialism, revisionism and reaction. The revolutionary Arab people are now waging a sharp and complicated struggle in this region against imperialism, revisionism and reaction.

At present, two different courses face the Arab people. One is to maintain independence and keep the initiative and persist in armed struggle by the people against aggression. The other is to allow themselves to be bossed by the imperialists and revisionists and yield to their plot for a so-called "political settlement" which involves national humiliation and abdication of sovereign rights. Only the first course can lead to genuine national liberation, preservation of national independence and a thorough frustration of the scheme to carve up the Middle East by the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists. The second means abandonment of the cause of national liberation, loss of national independence and submission to the tender mercies of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. The fate and future of the Arab people are bound up with the struggle between

these two courses.

By their brilliant victories in the past two years, the heroic, revolutionary people of Palestine have proved that armed struggle by the people is the only correct way to win national liberation. From their protracted struggle the Arab people have come to realize that they can never count on the United Nations which, manipulated by the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists, is simply their tool to undermine the people's revolutionary struggle in various countries. They also know from experience that so-called "political settlements" and "favours" from "big powers" are utterly illusory. Upholding their independence, they march steadily along the road of armed struggle, unafraid of the bluff and bluster of the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists.

Growing in strength from day to day, the Palestinian guerrillas are acknowledged the "key force" in the Arab people's struggle today. What worries the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists most is the growth of the Palestinian people's armed struggle, which they regard as the biggest obstacle to their "political settlement" fraud and plot to control and divide up the Middle East between themselves. The Israeli aggressor army itself admits that the Palestinian guerrilla attacks have become a problem that requires "greater attention" on its part.

The development of the Arab people's struggle against aggression once again testifies to Chairman Mao's wise thesis: "Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive." The Palestinian guerrilla units have neither aircraft nor tanks. The "Assifa" guerrillas started with only one machine-gun and 30 hand-grenades. But by relying on the people's revolutionary fighting will, the bravery of guerrilla fighters, the support of the broad masses and a flexible strategy and tactics, the Palestinian guerrillas have grown from strength to strength and scored victory after victory.

From the course of their struggle, the Palestinian people now realize that oppressed nations must rely on people's war to defeat the aggressors and not make a fetish of aircraft, guns, tanks or guided missiles. Putting blind faith in modern weapons, instead of relying on the broad masses, and trying to counter modern weapons with

¹ *Peking Review*, 13/6/1969, pp. 25-28.

modern weapons, can only court reverses. This is a profound historical lesson. The law of development of revolution has made it plain that a revolutionary armed force, though poorly equipped, can defeat reactionary forces armed to the teeth. The historical experience of the revolutionary wars waged by the Chinese people and the people of other countries in Asia as well as in Africa and Latin America has proved conclusively that it is people, not weapons, that are the decisive factor in war. The Palestinian people's armed struggle once again verifies this truth.

While selling out the interests of the Arab people, the Soviet revisionist social-imperialists are doing all they can to spread the poisonous theory that "weapons decide everything" in the Middle East. They want to scare the Arab people and strangle the revolutionary people's armed struggle. At the same time, in the name of giving "arms aid" they use this theory to pave the way for penetrating into the Arab countries. Taking advantage of the difficulties facing the Arab countries, the Soviet revisionist renegades flaunt this "arms aid" signboard in every way possible to gain control over them. Their rabid ambition is to carve up and share the Middle East with U.S. imperialism.

What is required to ensure victory in the Arab people's struggle, as shown in the fighting of the past two years, is to arouse and rely on the broad masses of the revolutionary people, to steadily develop the revolutionary forces and expand their ranks, to unite with all those who can be united and to organize a mighty revolutionary army for national liberation.

Our great leader Chairman Mao teaches us: "In order to attack the forces of the counter-revolution, what the revolutionary forces need today is to organize millions upon millions of the masses and move a mighty revolutionary army into action." The fighting ranks of the Arab people are growing steadily. There is closer cooperation between different Palestinian guerrilla organizations. Unity between the guerrillas and the Palestinian people and between the Palestinian people and the people of other Arab countries is developing swiftly and widely.

The truth is beginning to be seen more and more clearly by the Palestinian and other Arab people that the unity of the Palestinian and

other Arab people is very important to the struggle to liberate Palestine and to the liberation struggle of the Arab nation as a whole. This is due to the specific conditions of the Arab people's struggle today, and to the fact that the bulk of the Palestinian people, driven from their homeland by the Israeli aggressors, are scattered in various Arab countries. The Palestinian and other Arab people are brothers sharing the same fate, going through thick and thin together, facing the same enemies and having the same objective in struggle.

There is little doubt that the unity of the Arab nation today should be unity against aggression, unity for persisting in armed struggle, unity against compromise and capitulation, unity against the plot for a "political settlement" hatched by the imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries. Without this as its common basis, there can be no genuine unity for the Arab nation. In the past two years, the Palestinian and other Arab people have maintained ties of unity with and, at the same time, kept up a struggle against some persons in power in certain Arab countries, taking them severely to task for being pusillanimous and wavering before the imperialists and revisionists — submission to coercion and bait, afraid of war and suing for capitulation; and for taking a reactionary stand — passive towards the war of resistance against the Israeli aggressors and active in restricting and suppressing the guerrilla forces. To persist in the war of resistance and oppose compromise and to persist in unity and oppose division — this remains today's fighting task for the Arab people.

They certainly can organize on a broader scale an army of revolutionaries in the course of the struggle and mount fiercer attacks on the enemy.

The past two years have seen repeated struggles by the Arab people against various counter-revolutionary plots of the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionist social-imperialists. In these struggles, the Arab revolutionary people foiled plot after plot for a "political settlement" on the Middle East question engineered by the imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries. They took the wind out of their sails and raised the revolutionary people's morale.

Our great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "The unbridled violence of all the forces of darkness, whether domestic or foreign, has brought

disaster to our nation; but this very violence indicates that while the forces of darkness still have some strength left, they are already in their death throes, and that the people are gradually approaching victory." For the past two years, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionist social-imperialism have worked hand in glove to push with all their might their "political settlement" fraud on the Middle East question. They did so because they wanted to seize oil, markets, important strategic points and spheres of influence in the Middle East, suppress the Arab national-liberation movement, and meet the needs of their counter-revolutionary strategy in the Middle East and the whole world.

At present, the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists are energetically working out a Middle East "Munich," with the political aim of liquidating the cause of liberation of Palestine and the military aim of destroying the Palestinian armed forces. For this purpose, they are holding a "four-power meeting" in New York and at the same time making "bilateral contacts," — contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union — in Washington in order to bring their dirty, counter-revolutionary political deal to a speedy conclusion. They are trying, by pressure and bribery and by division and disruption, to browbeat the Arab countries into swallowing humiliating conditions and forfeiting their sovereign rights. It is the way they hope to carry out their "Middle East Munich" plot. What they hate most is the armed struggle waged by the Palestinian people, and they intend to liquidate their liberation cause and put out the flames of their armed struggle by treating the cause as a "refugee problem" and "solving" it through "repatriation" and "compensation."

However, as our great teacher Chairman Mao has pointed out: "From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful." Today, it is absolutely not the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionist social-imperialists but the people, the great, awakened 100 million Arab people, who will determine the destiny and future of the Middle East.

Thanks to the resolute struggle of the revolutionary Arab people, the "resolutions" of the United Nations, the "formula" of U.S. imperia-

lism, the "plan" of Soviet revisionism, and the "missions" of U.N. "envoy" Jarring have all failed over the last two years. Painstakingly contrived by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, the plot for a "Middle East Munich" will eventually be completely discredited.

The Arab people who have won great victories in their struggle against aggression have a bright future. However, there will be many difficulties ahead and twists and turns in the course of crowning their struggle with victory. The U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists, acting out their counter-revolutionary global strategy, will certainly try to carry out counter-revolutionary two-faced tactics with increasing intensity to strangle the Arab nation's liberation struggle, primarily the Palestinian people's armed struggle. They are stepping up the "Middle East Munich" plot, and this is a grave threat to the Arab people, who are now confronted with a stern struggle.

The Arab people who are growing in strength through struggle know how to tackle difficulties in the correct way. They will be fully prepared ideologically and will take into full account all possible difficulties, analyse them and overcome them with abiding tenacity.

Our great leader Chairman Mao has said: "The reactionary forces and we both have difficulties. But the difficulties of the reactionary forces are insurmountable because they are forces on the verge of death and have no future. Our difficulties can be overcome because we are new and rising forces and have a bright future."

The general trend in the world today is that "the enemy rots with every passing day, while for us things are getting better daily." The Arabs are a great, staunch and powerful people. Their righteous struggle has the firm support of the 700 million Chinese people and all the other revolutionary people of the world. Victory will definitely go to the Arab people so long as they ride out every difficulty and go on fighting.

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Joint Communiqué on the U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko's Visit to the United Arab Republic.¹ (Excerpt)

Cairo, June 13, 1969

In the opinion of both sides, Israel's refusal to implement the November, 1967 Security Council resolution and its continued occupation of one third of the territory of an Arab state serve as confirmation of that expansionist policy. This occupation constitutes a continuous infringement of the sovereignty and security of that state and a violation of the basic principles of the Declaration of Human Rights.

Both parties reviewed recent developments in the Middle East and international efforts for a peaceful settlement in the region. Both the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic once again declare that if there is to be a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, all sections and provisions of the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution will have to be implemented and Israel will have to withdraw its forces from all Arab territories occupied as a result of the aggression it committed on June 5, 1967.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. once again declares its full support for the just struggle of the United Arab Republic and the other Arab states to remove the traces of that aggression. Furthermore the government of the U.S.S.R. expresses its appreciation of the attitude of the United Arab Republic on this issue and praises the U.A.R.'s declaration accepting the Security Council resolution and expressing readiness to implement it, as well as its declaration of support for international efforts to implement the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution.

The government of the United Arab Republic expresses its great appreciation of the steps taken by the government of the U.S.S.R. toward the removal of the traces of the Israeli aggression and in defence of the legitimate rights and independence of the Arab peoples, in order to bring about a stable and just peace in the Middle East.

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 14/6/1969.

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Joint Communiqué on the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Marko's Visit to East Germany.² (Excerpts)

Berlin, June 14, 1969

Both parties confirm their support for the just struggle of the Arab states for overcoming the aftermath of the Israeli aggression. In this connection they referred to the serious threat to peace resulting from the continuous Israeli provocations and emphasized that they will support any initiative aimed at restoring peace and solving the Middle East problem on the basis of the resolution adopted by the U.N. Security Council on 22 November 1967.

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Statement by the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties Appealing for United Action by the Forces Struggling against World Imperialism.³ (Excerpts)

Moscow, June 17, 1969

In the "Middle East" a grave international crisis has been precipitated by the Israeli aggression against the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan. Through this aggression, imperialism, that of the U.S. above all, tried to crush the progressive regimes in the Arab countries, undermine the Arab liberation movement, and preserve or regain their positions in the Middle East. This they have failed to do. Nevertheless, supported by world reaction, including Zionist circles, the ruling forces of Israel continue to ignore the demands of the Arab states and of the peace-loving peoples, and the United Nations decisions on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories, persist in their policy of expansion and annexation, and ceaselessly commit fresh armed

² *G.D.R. Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 4/7/1969.

³ *Soviet News* (London), 20/6/1969.

provocations. This policy is opposed by the Communist Party and other progressive forces of Israel.

The Arab peoples resolutely continue the struggle to uphold their freedom, independence and national progress, to recover the occupied territories and for recognition of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The resistance movement against the occupation is growing, assuming diverse forms, and is enjoying ever greater support. On the side of these peoples are the USSR and other socialist states, the international communist movement, the solidarity of the forces of national liberation, and ever wider public circles in the capitalist countries.

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The Arab liberation movement is playing an outstanding role in the battle waged against world imperialism. It is exerting a positive influence on the entire movement against imperialism and neo-colonialism in the Middle East and Africa. The struggle of the Arab peoples against imperialism and the Israeli aggression is a part of the general struggle between the forces of freedom and socialism throughout the world, on the one hand, and world imperialism, on the other.

The growth of the movement for national liberation, and the social progress of the peoples in this area, which is strategically important and is rich in oil, evokes the violent hatred of the imperialists and the oil monopolies, which are weaving a web of intrigues and plots against this movement and are resorting to wars and aggressive actions.

To repel these actions and safeguard all the gains, the deepening of the social and economic changes, the progressive national fronts and the democratic freedoms for the masses and for the activity of the progressive national forces are, among other things, of great significance.

Social differentiation is developing in the newly independent countries. There is a sharpening conflict between the working class, the peasantry and other democratic forces, including patriotic-minded sections of the petty bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and, on the other imperialism and the forces of domestic reaction, the elements of the national bourgeoisie which are increasingly ac-

cepting a deal with imperialism.

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We communists call for united action against all imperialist acts of aggression, against recourse to local wars and other forms of intervention by imperialism in any area of the world. In face of the aggressive policy pursued by the imperialists and the ruling circles of Israel, we pledge solidarity with the Arab peoples who demand the return of the territories occupied by the Israeli invaders, this being an urgent demand and an indispensable condition for establishing peace and achieving a political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the complete implementation of the November 1967 resolution of the United Nations Security Council.

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We communists again call on all honest men in the world to unite their efforts in the struggle against the man-hating ideology and practices of racialism. We call for the broadest possible protest movement against the most ignominious phenomenon of our time, the barbarous persecution of the 25 million Negroes in the USA, the racist terror in South Africa and Rhodesia, the persecution of the Arab population in the occupied territory and in Israel and against racial and national discrimination and against Zionism and anti-semitism, all of which are fomented by reactionary capitalist forces and which they use to mislead the masses politically.

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News Conference Statements by the U.S. President Nixon.¹ (Excerpt)

Washington, June 19, 1969

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Q. Mr. President, 5 months ago at your first news conference you described the Middle East as a dangerously explosive situation in need of defusing. In the 5 months since that time, do you think there has been any

¹ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 5, No. 25, 23/6/1969, p. 883. Also in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 7/7/1969, pp. 1-5.

defusing that you can measure, or do you think the situation has become acutely worse?

The President: I would have to admit that I see very little defusing. The situation is better only from the standpoint that we do have some four-power talks going, and we would trust that from those talks we might get some basis of communication between the two sides and particularly that we might get all parties involved, including the Soviet Union, to use their influence to defuse a crisis. The talks will serve that interest if they serve no other interest.

Also in that connection, I would like to say that I, as you know, have met already with the King of Jordan, and I am hoping to meet sometime within the next month with the Prime Minister of Israel.

We intend to have bilateral talks, multilateral talks — anything that we can do to attempt to defuse the situation.

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Interview Granted by the West German Foreign Minister Brandt to the Lebanese Daily "Al-Hayat".¹ (Excerpt)

Beirut, June 27, 1969

In the past, many influential Arab political leaders have shown their understanding of the burden that has weighed down German-Israeli relations. There have been various indications of this understanding, as, for example, in connection with the German-Israeli Reparations Treaty of 1952. I am well aware of the great disappointment experienced in the Arab world in connection with arms deliveries to Israel and to the particular sensitivity of the Arab World on this issue. You know, however, of the German government's decision, in the spring of 1965, following the arms deal, that under no circumstances would arms be delivered to areas of tension in the world. This decision is being implemented in its entirety.

Allow me at this point to say a few words on the subject of diplomatic relations between the Federal German Republic and Israel. I have always been of the opinion that it was preferable even from the Arab point of view that relations with Israel should be normal, rather than a situation in which Israel had special and extraordinary representation in Federal Germany.

I think that it is a mistaken idea to believe that our continued delay in exchanging diplomatic representation with Israel, though it is a member of the United Nations, and recognised by East and West alike was due to consideration for the Arab point of view . . . Had we established frank and regular relations with Israel at that time, perhaps certain things that are now hampering German-Arab Relations could have been avoided (meaning the consequences of the arms deal).

Q. You are known to have always been in favour of developing friendly relations with all the countries of the Arab world, not only in your present post of German Minister of Foreign Affairs but even before when you were in the opposition as leader of the S.D.P. [Social Democratic Party]. The public statements made by your party colleague, Herr Wehner, Minister for All-German Affairs, . . . during the past few days and weeks, have reaffirmed your views which you have already mentioned. They also demanded that the Federal German government's political efforts as regards the Arab world should be more obvious and energetic. The same demand was made by the S.D.P. paper. What is your view, your Excellency?

A. The activation of German Middle East policy is unfortunately being hampered by a number of Arab Governments, which reject cooperation with us and prefer contacts with the communist-ruled part of Germany. This will not induce me to change my mind, however, or to follow an anti-Arab policy. The Federal government will continue its efforts to cooperate with the Arabs in solving their current economic and social problems. We have not, and never shall, aspire to a sphere of influence in the Middle East, in spite of tendentious propaganda to that effect the reasons for which are well known.

Our dialogue with the Arab states which broke off diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic four years ago was interrupted as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and the problems that arose from it. My meeting with a prominent

¹ *Al-Hayat* (Beirut), 28/6/1969. This interview was also summarised in *Heilbronner Stimme* (Bonn), 8/8/1969.

Arab personality, Secretary General of the Arab League, Mr. Abd al-Khaleq Hassuna, a week before the outbreak of hostilities was a good start to that dialogue.

I believe that all the parties concerned, whether German or Arab, would do well to bear in mind the value of direct contacts and the exchange of views between them. I assure you that we are doing all that we can to restore and normalise friendly relations with the Arab world.

Q. The joint communiqué issued following your recent official visit to Turkey indicates that the Federal government continues to regard the implementation of the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution as the appropriate solution for the Middle East crisis. Can you clarify this view, particularly with regard to the occupied Arab territories? Do you think the Federal government could contribute towards the implementation of the resolution in view of its good relations with the Western powers?

A. Although two years have passed since the June war, the Middle East conflict has not de-escalated in the least. I therefore hope that the representatives of the Big Four now in New York will be able to find the way to a peaceful solution to the crisis. In my opinion, the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution is still the best basis for such a solution. Now it is a question of effectively translating the resolution into action. This also means the withdrawal of the forces of occupation as the first clause in the resolution states. The possibilities of the German Government exerting its influence are limited, but you can be sure that we shall urge a solution based on the Security Council resolution in our talks with the Western and the other powers.

A few days ago I said in London that the legitimate rights and interests of the Palestinian people must be respected; this does not mean, however, that I agree to the destruction of Israel and the annihilation of its people.

On this occasion I should also like to point out that, twenty-two years after World War II, the German question is still awaiting a solution. It would be a good thing if the Arab governments, which are on close terms with the Soviet Union, would support the right of the German people to self-determination, or acknowledge that right in the course of their statements.

Q. What can Federal Germany do on its own in this field?

A. The German Government immediately sent aid to the victims of the June war in the summer of 1967, in addition to the aid collected by a number of private German organisations. Furthermore, about a year ago, the Government introduced a DM 50 million aid programme for Palestinian refugees; at the time, the Federal German ambassador to Amman held talks with the Jordanian Government to find out in what areas this aid was most needed, and I sent one of my personal aides to Amman for the same purpose. In response to a request of the Jordanian Government, the German Government decided to finance the building of permanent housing in the largest refugee camp in Jordan. We did not build large stone houses, but units in keeping with the needs of the refugees for shelter, storms, rain and cold. Another aid programme was put into effect last year which provided 550 scholarships to Palestinian refugee students at Arab Universities who were cut off from their families as a result of the June War. In the near future, a third programme will come into effect for building a technical and vocational training school.

I understand very well that these measures taken by the German Government will provide some relief for the Palestinian refugees, but that they do not in any way provide a solution to their problem. The German Government's first consideration in these refugee aid programmes is the humanitarian aspect of the matter. Young people will always have to work for a better future, no matter where they live. We would like to be of help to them in this by training and educating them. We hope that the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution will cope with this human tragedy and produce a just solution and lasting stability and the German government will give all possible aid to this end.

Q. During the last few weeks, three Arab states, Iraq, Sudan and Syria, have extended full diplomatic recognition to the German Democratic Republic. What do you think of this development, and do you share the opinion that these states have fallen under Communist domination?

A. The recognition of East Germany by three Arab states is a result of the fact that a solution

has not yet been found for the Middle East conflict. This was the incentive for that hasty action. I would not like to say whether the move accords with the long term interests of these states you have mentioned. Undoubtedly, such a step does not facilitate the restoration or the normalisation of relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.

The view that Iraq, Sudan and Syria have fallen under communist domination does not tally with the facts or with the great desire of the Arab peoples for independence. As I said, the event must be seen in connection with the Middle East crisis and with the strong position of the Soviet Union in a number of Arab states.

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Joint Communiqué on the Tunisian Foreign Minister Bourguiba Jr.'s Visit to Pakistan.¹ (Excerpt)

Islamabad, June 29, 1969

[The two sides] expressed their deep concern at the grave situation in the Middle East and the continued threats to peace and stability in the area. They called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories and the restoration of the Holy city of Jerusalem to Jordan. They stressed the necessity of prompt implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22nd November, 1967.

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Statement on the Conflict in the Middle East by the Representatives of all Religions in the Soviet Union for Co-operation and Peace among Nations.²

Zagorsk, July 1-4, 1969

We, the participants of the Conference of re-

¹ *Pakistan Document Series*, vol. VI, No. 6, July 1969.

² Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

presentatives of all religions in the USSR for co-operation and peace among nations held in Zagorsk from July 1-4, 1969, express our full solidarity with the brotherly Arab people fighting for freedom and independence of their countries against Israeli aggression.

In order to normalize the situation in the Middle East, in the land sacred for the believers of various religions, and proceeding from our religious responsibility, we consider it necessary to demand:

a) Immediate implementation of all the provisions of the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, concerning the withdrawal of all military troops of Israel from the occupied territories;

b) Unconditional cessation of armed provocations of the Israeli aggressors against the neighbour Arab states;

c) Returning home of the Palestine refugees and compensation of material values lost by them.

We note with bitterness that the support rendered to the Israeli policy of expansion by the U.S., German Federal Republic and several other states of the West, promotes to maintain the threat for freedom and independence of the Arab nations.

We urge leaders of all religions in every country of the world to sponsor co-operation of believers with all peace-loving forces in support of the Arab peoples, and to strengthen this support.

We address to all the men of good will a fervent appeal to demand that the main principles of the U.N. Charter and resolutions aimed to defend the Arab peoples from Israel should be observed.

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News Conference Statements by the U.S. Secretary of State Rogers.³ (Excerpts)

Washington, July 2, 1969

Turning just for a moment now to the Middle East, I have been giving the problem of the

³ *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, 21/7/1969, pp. 41-49.

Middle East a good deal of my time lately. Although the four-power talks in New York have recessed for a while, we are going to continue consultations with the other three major powers. I expect the U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks to remain particularly active in the immediate future. We intend to persist in our efforts, since we are convinced that peace in that area of the world is of such vital and overriding importance.

As you know, we believe that a permanent peace should include an agreement covering borders, withdrawal from occupied territories, respect for the sovereignty of every state in the area, and freedom of navigation, a solution of the difficult refugee problem, and practical security arrangements.

In short, peace should be based on all the elements of the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 1967.¹

We recently received some proposals from the Soviet Union in response to some concrete plans which we gave them in May — concrete points, actually, which we gave them in May. There are some advances in these proposals, but there are, without any doubt, very substantial remaining difficulties.

We intend to continue these talks with the Soviets in the hope that these difficulties could be resolved. Our objective is to get Ambassador Jarring [Gunnar Jarring, U.N. Secretary General's special representative to the Middle East] back to work with the parties on a possible settlement based on the Security Council resolution.

I hope that we can avoid adding up the box score on these talks. This is a tough and intractable problem which has escaped solution for nearly 20 years. We want to help the parties move toward a permanent peace as quickly as we can. But in the last analysis, the views of the parties principally concerned in the area are going to determine whether these efforts will succeed or fail. As I say, in the months ahead we are going to be very actively pursuing these bilateral talks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East, you said that you had detected some advances in our talks with the Soviets?

A. Yes.

Q. And yet the public picture that we have is that on the key issue of the territorial question and on the refugee question, we are about as far apart as we were when we started the conversations back in February. Can you share with us some of the reasons why you sense advances here when the public picture seems to be quite the opposite?

A. Well, as I said, Mr. Smith [Hedrick L. Smith, New York Times], it's difficult to conduct negotiations and keep a public box score about how you're making out. When you say the key issue is borders — there are a lot of key issues. That is one of them. The refugee problem is another. Withdrawal of troops is another. Status of Jerusalem is another.

So there are a lot of key issues. And it is true that in some of these issues, very little progress has been made. But in other issues, it seems to us that some progress has been made. And we are going to proceed in that belief, certainly in that hope that we can make further progress.

Q. Well, without going into the details, can you indicate the areas where there is some progress?

A. I don't think I will. [Laughter.]

Q. The President has said often that he wishes to replace the policy of confrontation with accommodation. Have you noted — can you give us illustrations of any success in that policy?

A. Well, I think it would be premature to try to rack up successes. I think the most we could do at this stage is to point to efforts underway, of which certainly a notable example is our attempt to bring about a negotiated settlement in the Middle East.

Q. What's going on?

A. Well, as you know, there have been conversations both at the four-power level and also between representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. We have submitted various suggestions for principles that might form the basis of a settlement, so that the Soviet Union has given us their responses to these suggestions. We have their responses under study, and we anticipate that there might be another round of discussions which could take place in Moscow.

Q. What do you mean by that? Why Moscow?

A. Well, it was suggested at the beginning

¹ For text, see *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 268-269.

of our conversations with the Soviet Union that there be some shifting back and forth, that not all the conversations on the subject take place in Washington, and we recognize that it may be appropriate at this time to change the base with this in view. We would expect, perhaps, that thereafter they would revert to Washington.

There is real reason to be concerned that the situation is, if anything, deteriorating, and of course, this lends urgency to the talks. On the other hand, we are hopeful while the talks are underway that we, on the one side, and the other three powers associated in discussions with us can exercise a moderating influence which may help to contain the process — at least keep it from getting out of hand.

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Remark by the French Government Official Spokesman Hanon in Response to Comments made on the change in French Arms Policy towards Israel.¹

Paris, July 2, 1969

(Referring to the statements made by the French Interim president Alain Poher on June 10, 1969,² Mr. Hanon said:)

The comments made about a change in French policy with regard to the delivery of arms to Israel belong to the realm of hypothesis.

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Joint Communiqué on the East German Premier Stoph's Visit to Czechoslovakia.³ (Excerpt)

Prague, July 3, 1969

The Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers and the Chairman of the CSSR Government

agreed upon the fact that the continuous Israeli acts of aggression against the Arab countries represent a great danger to peace. They stressed that their countries will continue to support actively the just struggle of the Arab countries to overcome the consequences of the Israeli aggression, and to support any initiative directed towards the peaceful solution of the Middle East problem on the basis of the resolution of the United Nations Security Council of 22 November 1967.

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Statement by the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban Rejecting the Security Council Resolution of 3 July 1969 on Jerusalem.⁴

Jerusalem, July 4, 1969

In expressing criticism of Israel the Security Council lays itself wide open to criticism. It is the Security Council which did not lift a finger when Israel was in mortal danger in 1967, and did not do anything to assist Israel during the War, when Israel was threatened with annihilation.

No voices were raised when our houses were destroyed and our synagogues defiled. It is the same Security Council which took no action during the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which does not take any interest in the war in south-east Asia, and does not do anything about the humanitarian disaster now taking place in West Africa.

As in any other resolution concerning Israel, the scales were hopelessly weighted against us in advance. But political decisions are made outside the Security Council, as I have mentioned in the example given before.

This resolution, therefore, leaves the Security Council in a weakened moral position. We have made our position on Jerusalem clear.

¹ *L'Orient* (Beirut), 3/7/1969.

² See *ante*, doc. 117.

³ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 15/7/1969.

⁴ *Jerusalem Post*, 6/7/1969.

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Statement by the U.S.S.R. President Podgorny at a Luncheon in Honour of the Syrian President Atasi.¹**Moscow, July 5, 1969**

Our country will continue to help by every possible means to strengthen progressive regimes in the Arab States, to develop their economy and culture, and to raise the combat efficiency of their armed forces.

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Report by the U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko to the Supreme Soviet on Soviet Union Foreign Policy.² (Excerpts)**Moscow, July 10, 1969**

The situation in the world is immensely influenced by the situation in the Middle East. The Soviet Union has been paying a great deal of attention to the Middle East. This area still remains a breeding-ground of danger which may have serious consequences for the cause of peace. What is the main danger at the present time? It lies in the fact that Israel has still failed to get out of the territories occupied by her in Arab states — the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan.

The fumes of chauvinism apparently went to the heads of some leaders in Israel to such an extent after June 1967, that two years have not been sufficient for them to acquire the ability to take a more sober view of things. Taking a more sober view means admitting that it is impossible to keep foreign territories seized as the result of aggression, and that it is necessary to return them to their owners.

Pinning one's hopes on military superiority, as they are doing in Israel, is a short-sighted policy. The only reliable way would be to resolve the problem on the basis of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories, with simul-

taneous recognition of the right of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, to an independent national existence and the establishment of lasting peace in that important zone.

This is the stand of the Arab countries. This is the stand of the Soviet Union and our allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, and also of many other states in the world.

At the present time, governments concerned, including those of big powers that are permanent members of the Security Council — the USSR, the United States, France and Britain — are exchanging opinions on the ways of achieving a settlement of the situation in the Middle East. It is not yet possible to say how this exchange of opinions will end. But two conclusions already suggest themselves.

The first is that all those taking part in the exchange of views are fully aware that it is a great risk to leave the situation in the Middle East as it now is.

The second conclusion is that of the two sides directly involved in the conflict, one, namely the Arab side, is expressing its readiness for a settlement of the situation on a durable basis, ensuring peace in that area. The other side, Israel, with a stubbornness bordering on some sort of automatism, is rejecting any proposals aimed at a settlement.

Israeli leaders often say that they want a settlement such as will ensure that Israel can exist in conditions of peace. But their words do not tally with their deeds, because they actually reject this kind of solution and in preference to it, they would rather have Israel existing in a state of war. It must be emphasised, however that this is a slippery path and that the risk it entails for Israel cannot be eliminated either by inordinate self-assurance — and Tel Aviv has enough of that to suffice for 10 great powers — or by an abundance of all sorts of unfounded ambitions.

The Soviet Union is of the opinion that every opportunity should be used to settle the situation in the Middle East. Procrastination is dangerous and does harm to everyone. It does political harm, because the danger of complicating the situation in this area is indeed great. It does economic harm, in the first place because the Suez Canal, that important international shipping route under the

¹ *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), 20-26/8/1969.

² *Soviet News* (London), 15/7/1969.

sovereignty of the United Arab Republic, remains idle.

There is another aspect to the problem — an aspect of principle. One must not permit, if one does not want to connive in aggression, a situation where a state which has attacked other countries and which is occupying part of their territories as a result of having used force, continues the occupation, flagrantly ignoring the United Nations Charter and the appropriate resolution of the Security Council.

The Soviet government took an important initiative and worked out proposals aimed at a political settlement in the Middle East. These proposals, including those put forward very recently, are continuing to play an important part in the search for ways of bringing peace to that area.

We would like the United States government, on whose policy Israel is leaning, to adopt a more realistic attitude on this matter and to be guided by long-term interests instead of merely temporary considerations. All countries, large and small, cannot but be interested in a settlement in the Middle East. A solution to this problem would also have a favourable influence on the international situation and would certainly tip the scales in favour of peace.

Considerable success has been achieved recently in developing friendly relations with the Arab countries. Our country's friendship with the states of this area is being shaped in joint political struggle against the forces of aggression, in defence of the independence and progress of these countries.

We have particularly close relations, as is well known, with the United Arab Republic in all spheres of inter-state relations, regular consultations at various levels, and co-ordination of our respective actions in the international field. The relations between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic are characterised by mutual confidence and such confidence is a necessary condition, and it may be said, the heart and soul of true friendship and co-operation.

Mutual esteem and friendship link the Soviet

Union with Syria, whose delegation, led by the head of state Nureddin Atassi, is winding up a very beneficial visit to our country — a visit which has further strengthened the relations between the two countries. The exchange of views between the Soviet leaders and the head of the Syrian Arab Republic will undoubtedly go a long way towards further developing the ties between the two countries. We have good relations with Iraq, the Arab Republic of Yemen, the People's Republic of South Yemen and other Arab states.

The warmth and the friendly character of the relations between the Soviet Union and Algeria were strikingly demonstrated during the recent visit paid by the President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade Nikolai Podgorny, to that country, just as in the course of his visit to Morocco the readiness of the Soviet Union and Morocco to develop cordial relations with each other was confirmed. Way back in the time when the Algerian people were waging a heroic struggle for independence, close ties of solidarity were established between them and the Soviet people. They were strengthened in the subsequent close co-operation between the Algerian People's Democratic Republic and the USSR both in the international field and in a number of spheres of bilateral relations. The Soviet Union stands for the further all-round expansion of this co-operation.

Soviet people view with great sympathy the efforts of the new leadership of the Sudan to strengthen the independence of that country, to create the prerequisites for social progress and to develop relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. For our part, we are ready to develop relations with the Sudan in all spheres on a friendly basis.

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Joint Communiqué on the East German Deputy Premier Weiss' Visit to South Yemen.¹ (Excerpt)

Aden, July 10, 1969

Viewpoints of the two sides agreed on the racist, colonialist and aggressive nature of Israel, and considered it to be a spear-head of imperialism. The two sides condemned the continued Israeli aggression against the Arab countries and the terrorist measures against the Arab population in the occupied territories. The stubborn refusal of Israel to withdraw its troops of occupation from the Arab territories and its measures to annex Jerusalem constitute a violation to the basic principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and its resolutions.

The two sides condemned the political, economic and military support which the imperialist forces, in particular the Governments of the United States of America and West Germany, are granting Israel, the aggressor, now as before.

The German Democratic Republic reaffirmed its active support for the just struggle of the Arab people and recognizes all rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their legitimate right to self-determination and their struggle manifested in the Palestinian organisations' resistance against Israeli occupation.

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Communiqué on the Consultative Meeting of Special Government Representatives of Non-Aligned Countries.² (Excerpts)

Belgrade, July 11, 1969

The governments of the following countries participated at the meeting: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, the

Central African Republic, Ceylon, Congo Brazzaville, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Chad, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Yemen Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

The governments of the following countries were represented by observers: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Having heard the representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the participants reaffirmed the resolution of 1964, in which the Heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, endorsed the full restoration of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their usurped homelands. Participants declared full support to the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle for liberation from colonialism and racism and for the recovery of their inalienable rights.

In reviewing the present international situation they considered that the continued occupation of territories of three countries, members of this group, constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations, a challenge to the aims of non-alignment and a grave threat to peace. Consequently, they reaffirm the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all the Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967, in accordance with the Resolution of the Security Council of November 22, 1967.

¹ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 25/7/1969.

² *Socialist Thought and Practice* (Belgrade), July-September, 1969, pp. 52-56.

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Message from the U.S.S.R. Leaders to the United Arab Republic President Nasser on the Anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952.¹ (Excerpt)**Moscow, July 22, 1969**

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Fraternal friendship and close all-round co-operation have been established and consolidated between the USSR and UAR during these years. They are developing successfully for the benefit of the peoples of our two countries in their joint struggle against imperialism and in the cause of the freedom of the peoples, progress and universal peace.

The Soviet Union has rendered and will go on rendering all-round assistance to the UAR and other Arab states subjected to Israeli aggression.

The USSR unswervingly supports the demand of the Arab states for the fulfilment of the United Nations decisions on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories and for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

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Commentary on the American-Soviet Bilateral Talks on the Middle East, by the Chinese Official Weekly "Peking Review".²**Peking, July 25, 1969**

When U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism held their bilateral talks in Washington from April to early July, the U.S., Soviet, French and British representatives to the United Nations met in New York 15 times to work out plans for a so-called "political settlement" of the Middle East question. This was done in an attempt to write off the Palestinian question completely, stamp out the flames of the Palestinian people's

armed struggle and force the Arab countries into total capitulation to Israel so as to realize the rabid ambition of the imperialist and revisionist "big powers," chiefly the United States and the Soviet Union, to control the Middle East. However, because of the Arab people's solid opposition to compromise and capitulation, the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists could not carry out their plot as swiftly as they had hoped. The representatives of the four countries announced after their July 1 meeting that "because of important consultations on the Middle East now taking place among the four governments, the date of the next meeting of the representatives will be set at a later time." They also announced that the "working group" formed by their aides would continue to meet.

Under these circumstances, the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists are making further behind-the-scenes counter-revolutionary deals on the Middle East question. U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers blatantly told a press conference on July 2, "I expect the U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks to remain particularly active in the immediate future." From July 12 to 17, Joseph Jack Sisco, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, held a round of secret bilateral talks in Moscow with the Soviet revisionists.

Worthy of particular attention is the fact that the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists are hatching up a more diabolical plot to stab the Palestinian people's armed forces in the back, and urging Israel and certain reactionaries in Arab countries to mount pincer attacks on and wipe out the main forces of the Palestinian guerrillas. The recent attempt on the life of Arafat, leading member of Al-Fatah (the Palestine National Liberation Movement), was part of this plot. At the same time, they are applying both soft and hard tactics against the authorities of certain Arab countries by coercion and cajolery, creating dissension and disintegration, and carrying out subversion and sabotage so as to effect a breakthrough and pave the way for the realization of their "Middle East Munich" plot. People should be very much on the alert against this.

A series of manoeuvres by the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists before and after the recess of the "four-power meeting" have further

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 29/7/1969.

² *Peking Review*, 25/7/1969, pp. 23-24.

bared the criminal nature of their "political settlement" of the Middle East question and the hideous features of their collaboration. The Cairo paper *Al-Ahram* recently disclosed the main points of the "13-point plan" for "the solution of the Middle East problem" put forth by the United States last May and later brought to Cairo by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. To counter the Palestinian people's surging armed struggle, the plan blatantly calls for "the halting of all aid to the Palestinian guerrillas" by Arab countries. It insidiously advocates that the Palestine liberation cause be written off as a "refugee problem." It presents the Arab countries with a series of humiliating conditions which will forfeit their national sovereignty. For example, it stipulates that the U.A.R. territory occupied by Israel must be "demilitarized" after Israel's withdrawal, that the Gaza Strip be placed under the "guardianship" of U.N. "special envoy" Gunnar Jarring and its future status subjected to negotiations by Jarring, the U.A.R., Jordan and Israel, that the Arab countries end their boycott of Israel and their "political propaganda," that Israeli ships be allowed free and unhindered navigation in the Aqaba Gulf and the Suez Canal, and that there must be "direct Arab-Israeli contact" at some time and "any final settlement" must be signed by both sides. This plan makes no mention of Jerusalem and Syria's Golan Heights which are occupied by Israel, implying that Israel may continue to occupy these Arab territories. This U.S. plan also provides for a "settlement" to be "guaranteed" by the U.N. Security Council, which is manipulated by the United States and the Soviet Union. Provisions in this respect include the stationing of an "international force" to ensure U.S.-Soviet domination of the Middle East, while the Arab countries have no say at all concerning this occupation force, which will be withdrawn only on orders from the Security Council. All this shows that the "13-point plan" is an outright plan for forcing the Arab countries to capitulate. As pointed out by one Arab paper, it is a shameless plan in which Israeli aggression is rewarded and which aims at strangling the Arab national-liberation movement. It is absolutely unacceptable to the Arab people.

Facts show that the U.S. imperialists' plan is a product of their collusion with the Soviet revisionists.

The Western press revealed that the outlines of this "package" plan were put together by Sisco and Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin during their bilateral talks in Washington. Soon after the United States formally presented the plan to the Soviet revisionists in the latter part of May, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko hurried off to peddle it for all he was worth in Cairo with very tricky double-dealing tactics. Pretending to be merely transmitting the U.S. plan, Gromyko hypocritically made it known that Moscow would never agree to a settlement which is unacceptable to the Arab countries. But in private he did his utmost to plead for the plan and defended the secret deals made by the United States and the Soviet Union in their backstairs talks, "subtly" putting pressure on the Arab countries and trying to induce and force them to accept the plan jointly concocted by the United States and the Soviet Union. Following Gromyko's Cairo trip, the Soviet revisionists handed U.S. imperialism a "package peace plan" on June 17. According to news reports, this Soviet plan differs from the U.S. imperialist plan only in procedure and in certain conditions, without any difference whatsoever in fundamental principles; in particular, they are in complete agreement concerning suppressing the Palestinian guerrillas. This clearly shows that the plans of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism are of the same stuff. They are traps to enslave the Arab people. Both aim at strangling the Palestinian people's just struggle and bringing the Middle East question within the framework of U.S. imperialist and Soviet revisionist collaboration for world domination.

The Arab people are vigilantly watching the criminal plots of the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists. In a joint statement on July 4, Palestinian commando organizations reiterated their firm stand of rejecting the "political solution" to the Middle East question. The statement said that the big-power meetings and the sinister manoeuvres in some Arab countries following these meetings proved that imperialism and its reactionary puppets were continuing to plot against the Palestinian Arab people and the Arab nation behind their backs. It expressed the determination to smash all plots of imperialism and its running dogs to stamp out the Palestinian resistance movement.

137

Complaint by the Israeli Ambassador in Britain, Remez, about Partiality in Reports by the British Broadcasting Services.¹

London, August 1, 1969

Israel radio broadcast the following report in the home service . . . "Israel's Ambassador in Britain, Aharon Remez, met the Director General of the BBC in connection with Israel's complaint about partiality in reports by the British broadcasting services. Our correspondent Vardi Ben Ya'akov says the meeting was held last night. The BBC Director was accompanied by several heads of departments from the radio and television services. The Director of the BBC announced at the meeting that he was ready to examine any complaint, but our correspondent says the discussion was inconclusive. Our correspondent says Remez was told that Arab announcements often reached the BBC before Israeli versions arrived."

138

Joint Cuban-Syrian Communiqué on the Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade Wohut's Visit to Syria.² (Excerpt)

Damascus, August 2, 1969

The two parties were in agreement in supporting the Arab boycott. This is an issue that we have to take account of and because of it we must increase our efforts to confront Israel's Zionist tactics. We must reconsider the course the Arab boycott is following, and decide what measures and attitudes must be adopted to ensure that it is given the powerful impacts it needs to become more efficient in confronting the constant activity of Zionism which today is becoming increasingly voracious and malignant.

¹ Israel home service in Hebrew, 20.00 GMT, 2/8/1969. B.B.C., ME/3143/i.

² *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus 3/8/1969).

139

Toast of the Rumanian President Ceausescu to the U.S. President Nixon.³ (Excerpt)

Bucharest, August 2, 1969

... Romania also believes that it is necessary that all efforts should be made to solve the conflict in the Middle East in the spirit of the Security Council resolution of 1967, aiming to bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied territories and to ensure the right of every state in the area to independent existence, to development and progress.

140

Toast of the U.S. President Nixon to the Rumanian President Ceausescu.⁴ (Excerpt)

Bucharest, August 2, 1969

... We seek a stable peace in the Middle East, a peace in which all the countries of the region, and those outside of it, can repose confidence — and a peace which no one, whether inside the region or outside, will seek to exploit for narrow purposes.

141

Speech on the Prospect of Peace in the Middle East and Israel's Security Borders by the Israeli Premier Meir at the Labour Party Convention.⁵ (Excerpts)

Tel Aviv, August 5, 1969

... if the prospect of peace should arise, none

³ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 25/8/1969, pp. 169-171.

⁴ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 25/8/1969, pp. 171-172.

⁵ *Jerusalem Post*, 6/8/1969.

of us will be ready to forgo one inch of land if it means endangering Israel's security borders.

... Together we will measure every centimetre to ascertain which border in truth will ensure us peace. There will be disagreements, but the decisive thing is what will ensure us peace not only for one day but for always, and that we will not be forced to tremble night and day.

Mr. Eban was right when he said that we are not alone in the world, but then we are certainly not pampered by friends who stand by us on vital issues. We need strength to stand up to friends and even to oppose them.

142

Joint Communiqué on the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Delegation's Visit to Hungary.¹ (Excerpt)
Budapest, August 5, 1969

[The two sides] declared that the Middle East situation could only be settled by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the unlawfully occupied territories, with the simultaneous recognition of the right of all states of that area to independent national existence.

143

Statements by the Israeli Premier Meir on the Fire at Al-Aqsa Mosque.² (Excerpts)
Jerusalem, August 21, 1969

[Addressing the secretary of the "Waqf" (Islamic Religious Trust), Mr. Hasan Tubtub:] "It is painful to see what took place here. All Israelis join with the Arab population in their

sorrow. Israel knows how to respect the holy places of the Jews and of other peoples. That has been proved since the Six-Day War."

[In reply to questions by the press as to whether the fire would have a harmful effect on relations between Arabs and Jews, she said:]

"There is no room for that sort of thing, if one is referring to straightforward and rational men. Fire also breaks out in other holy cities throughout the world."

144

Statement by the Israeli Government on the Fire at Al-Aqsa Mosque.³

Tel Aviv, August 21, 1969

The government met in extraordinary session on the occasion of the fire which broke out in part of the Aqsa Mosque.

Further to the statement released by the Prime Minister immediately after she heard of the fire this morning, the government has decided to set up a commission of inquiry to look into the circumstances attending the fire, after which it will publish its findings. The government has asked the President of the Supreme Court to appoint the members of this commission and a judge who will act as its chairman.

The government praises the action of the firemen and all those who assisted them — Jews and Arabs alike. Their devoted action made it possible to confine and extinguish the flames, thus saving the building, so that it will be possible to continue prayers in the Mosque.

The police immediately initiated an energetic investigation, in which it is continuing.

The Israeli government is prepared to offer every assistance or co-operation that may be required in repairing and restoring the damaged sections, and in particular, to assist Muslim engineers and experts from outside the country.

The government expresses its profound regret for the fire which broke out in this Muslim holy place. Fires have broken out in the holy places at different times in the past, in particular, the

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 12/8/1969.

² *Davar* (Tel Aviv), 22/8/1969. The statements were made during Mrs. Meir's visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque.

³ *Davar* (Tel Aviv), 22/8/1969.

fire which broke out in the Aqsa Mosque in 1963,* but this is the first time that there has been an attempt to stir up resentment. The government strongly rejects the efforts now being made by certain official elements in Arab countries falsely to assign the responsibility for the fire to Israel. This criminal attempt to exploit the fire as a pretext for stirring up religious and political resentment must be condemned by any one who supports the truth.

145

Statement by the U.S. State Department on the Damage to Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.¹

Washington, August 22, 1969

We would like to express our sorrow and regret at the damage caused by fire to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, which is among the most sacred holy places of Islam. The damage to that historic shrine is a loss to all men. We sincerely hope that the high spiritual purposes of all religions represented by the holy places in Jerusalem will prevail in the aftermath of this sad event.

146

Statement on Israeli National Integration and Development by the Kenyan Defence Minister Kiano during his Visit to Israel.² (Excerpts)

Tel Aviv, August 24, 1969

It [national integration] is a very difficult problem indeed. That is why I admire Israel so much — the way in which you have managed to achieve national integration of people with so many different backgrounds. In Kenya, we are trying to merge people of different ethnic groups and religious backgrounds into one solid

* [The 1963 fire was small and very limited. It broke out 400 metres from the Dome of the Rock, in the northern end of the spacious courtyard of Al-Aqsa Mosque. The fire was a result of welding of aluminium sheets used for the renewal of the Dome, and workers and firemen put it out immediately before any damage was done. Ed.]

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 15/9/1969, p. 245.

² Jerusalem Post, 25/8/1969.

nation. The example of Israel gives us great hope that it can be done.

That is the other thing about Israel which inspires Africans with hope — the rapidity of change. In 1960, I was taken to Kiryat Gat — on my first week-end here this time, I went back. I could not recognize the place. This pace of development shows that a small, poor country can achieve great things if it has the will.

147

Telegram from the Gambian Premier Gawara to the Jordanian King Hussein on the Fire at Al-Aqsa Mosque.³

Amman, August 27, 1969

His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan, Amman:

It pained me deeply to hear the distressing news of the fire at the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque. The Government of Gambia is concerned over the increase in tension in the Middle East and will continue to support all efforts to secure a just and lasting peace in the area.

148

Telegram from the Somali President Shermarke to Jordanian King Hussein on the Fire at Al-Aqsa Mosque. (Excerpt)⁴

Amman, August 27, 1969

His Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Amman:

Your Majesty's communication has left me desolate and grief-stricken. The Somali people and I were shocked at the news of Israel's criminal act of setting fire to the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque. We share Your Majesty's alarm and anxiety in the face of Israel's acts of aggression and its occupation of the beloved land of Palestine, and our holy city as well as other areas of the territory of sister Arab states. I am deeply conscious, Your Majesty, that the continuation of Israel's despicable presence on our holy lands and in the midst of our beloved countries sullies the honour and integrity of the entire Islamic community.

³ Al-Dustur (Amman), 28/8/1969.

⁴ Al-Dustur (Amman), 28/8/1969.

Immediately upon hearing of the grievous incident of the setting fire to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, my government got in touch with the Secretary General of the United Nations requesting that he call a meeting of the Security Council, and further requesting permission for our permanent delegate at the United Nations to give the Council our views on the matter. We have now been informed that Your Majesty's government has also called for a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the critical situation arising out of Israel's premeditated act of arson in Jerusalem. Our delegate at the United Nations has been instructed to cooperate fully with Your Majesty's delegate in presenting our case there.

I, my government and the Somali people are by your side, along with our other Arab brethren, in the armed conflict against the expansionist designs of the world Zionist movement and the so-called state of Israel. As Your Majesty knows, we have been in a state of war with Israel since the June 1967 war. We are fully prepared to stand by your side and to take part in whatever you and the other Arab leaders may decide. We are prepared to undergo all the consequences necessary to restore our dignity and our territory. I pray, together with Your Majesty, that the Almighty may grant us strength and endurance in fighting for our sacred cause.

149

Statement by the Soviet Official News Agency "Tass", on the Fire at Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.¹

Moscow, August 29, 1969

It was with indignation that the Soviet public learned that the Al-Aqsa Mosque — one of the most ancient and unique monuments of Arab architecture in the Middle East and a place of pilgrimage for many believers, revered as one of the Moslem sacred shrines — had been set on fire in the Arab part of Jerusalem occupied by the armed forces of Israel.

This crime has given rise to a wave of justified

anger and indignation in countries of the Middle East, Asia and Africa.

The Israeli government and the imperialist forces supporting the Israeli aggression, cannot escape responsibility for this act of vandalism. Moreover, the occupying forces are continuing provocative actions against peaceful citizens. The Israeli authorities meet peaceful demonstrations of protest by the Arab population in Jerusalem, Nablus and other occupied towns by sending paratroopers and men with sub-machine guns to deal with the demonstrators.

Relying on the support of imperialist and Zionist circles in the West, the present Israeli leaders refuse to take world opinion into account; they are trampling on the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law and are seeking to wreck any settlement of the Middle East conflict.

The latest events in the Arab sector of Jerusalem, including the fire at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the systematic demolition by the Israelis of entire blocks occupied by the Arab population, once again confirm the need for urgent measures on the part of all peace-loving countries and peoples aimed at eliminating the aftermath of the Israeli imperialist aggression, and, in the first place, the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied during the aggression in June 1967.

The Soviet public, sharing the just indignation of the Arab peoples over the barbarous actions of the Israeli authorities in the occupied Arab territories, calls on all people of good will who are concerned for the preservation of peace, to come out in favour of the speediest political settlement in the Middle East and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in that area, in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, and in the interests of the countries and peoples of that area.

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 2/10/1969.

150

Annual Report by the Australian External Affairs Department Covering the Period 1 July 1968 — 30 June 1969.¹ (Excerpt)**Canberra, August 30, 1969**

The Arab-Israel War of June 1967 has heightened tensions in the region. Recurrent hostilities along the cease-fire lines, already in evidence by late 1967, have mounted in scale and intensity. All of these cease-fire lines have been affected in various degrees, and those between Israel and the United Arab Republic and between Israel and Jordan in particular. There have been frequent exchanges of artillery and rocket fire across both of the latter lines, and the development of a pattern of strike and counter-strike has encouraged the multiplication of violent incidents. On 21 April 1969 the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that 'the only conclusion to be drawn is that the Security Council cease-fire has become totally ineffective in the Suez Canal sector and that a virtual state of active war now exists there'. A complicating factor has been the expanding activities inside and outside of Israel of organisations of Palestinian irregulars, or fedayeen aimed at undermining the Israel occupation of the Arab territories captured in June 1967, and at maintaining constant pressure against Israel itself by terrorist and sabotage actions. As the exponents of active resistance to Israel, the fedayeen have gained prestige in the Arab world since 1967, and are not answerable to Arab governments.

One disturbing aspect of the Middle East dispute has been its extension to the field of international civil aviation. On 28 July 1968 an El Al airliner in flight from Rome to Israel was commandeered by Palestinian irregulars and forced to land at Algiers. The aircraft was released by the Algerian Government on 1 September 1968. On 26 December 1968, a machine-gun attack was made on an El Al airliner at Athens airport, in which one passenger was killed. Israel responded two days later with a raid by helicopter-borne commandos against the civil airport at Beirut where

a large number of aircraft belonging to Arab airlines was destroyed on the ground. In Zurich on 18 February 1969 terrorists attacked an El Al airliner taking off from the airport. These occurrences aroused widespread concern over the dangers to international air traffic and air travellers, and drew statements of protest and alarm from many governments. After the last of the attacks, the one in Zurich, the Minister for Civil Aviation, the Hon. R.W.C. Swartz, M.P., in a statement on 24 February deploring it, went on to state the general Australian viewpoint:

"The Australian representative to the International Civil Aviation Organisation Council has been instructed to join other countries in seeking urgent talks on the continued unlawful interference with the safety of international air navigation . . . Australia had already expressed at ICAO meetings last month its strongly-held views on the need to ensure the safe movement of international airline traffic. The use of destructive force against passengers, airline personnel and equipment, and the consequent threat to safe operation, had been deplored.

"In the light of recent developments ICAO must now, as a matter of urgency, find ways of having it recognized universally that international air services must be allowed to operate entirely free from the threat of interference and attack. The Government condemned all such incidents, no matter where they took place or who was responsible, and urged restraint on all concerned in the present situation."

International efforts to encourage a political solution of the Middle East crisis have continued to revolve around the United Nations Security Council's resolution of November 1967, in which essential provisions of an Arab-Israel settlement were outlined. During much of the past year, Mr Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, who in accordance with the terms of the resolution was designated by the Secretary-General as his Special Representative in the Middle East, maintained frequent contact with the governments principally involved in the Arab-Israel dispute. His principal achievement has been to obtain statements on the part of the Governments of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, variously indicating their acceptance, in principle, of the Security Council resolution

¹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report*, 1 July 1968 — 30 June 1969, pp. 35-36.

of November 1967. As to the practical steps required for carrying out the resolution there has, however, been no sign of any agreement. On 9 April 1969 the Secretary-General announced that Mr Jarring's assignment was, for the time being, suspended. A series of private discussion on the Middle East situation began in New York on 3 April 1969 between the Permanent Representatives at the United Nations of Britain, France, the USSR and the United States. The four powers have stated that their object is to examine the means available to them to contribute to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. They have not so far announced any concrete proposals towards this end.

In the absence of a peace settlement, other major issues connected with the Middle East dispute — the future of the Suez Canal and the question of Arab refugees — remain unresolved. It has proved impossible to disengage the Suez Canal from the general complex of Arab-Israeli issues, or indeed to procure the limited measure of co-operation required between Israel and the United Arab Republic to arrange for the release of the shipping still trapped in the Canal. The continued closure of the Canal is a major inconvenience to international maritime traffic, which is, however, increasingly accommodating itself to the use of alternative routes and transport methods, by such means as the construction of oil pipelines between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, increasing emphasis on overland routes between Europe, the Middle East and South Asia, and the universal trend towards the construction of supertankers.

The large increase in the number of Palestinian refugees resulting from the Six Day War of 1967 imposed further demands on the resources of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which has responsibilities for the care of displaced persons in the Middle East. In response to an appeal by the Director-General of UNRWA to donor governments for contributions of aid additional to their normal pledges, the Minister for External Affairs, on 6 December 1968, announced the Australian Government's decision to provide UNRWA with 2,100 metric tons of flour valued at approximately \$ 125,000. This gift is additional to Australia's regular cash grant to UNRWA of \$ 180,000 per

annum.

Australia is not a party to any disputes in the Middle East and is not directly involved in the trouble there. It is, however, concerned to see peace maintained there and a just and stable outcome that is acceptable to all concerned. A renewal of large-scale hostilities in the Middle East could endanger peace everywhere, and could risk the involvement of the great powers. Australians also have humanitarian sympathies for the people who are displaced or otherwise suffering.

The Prime Minister, Mr Gorton, during the past year has expressed the Australian Government's support for the principle of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and for the efforts of the United Nations towards that objective. He has said that the terms of such a peace settlement are a matter for the Middle East governments themselves, and has expressed the hope that the achievement of political stability will permit Israel and its Arab neighbours to engage in co-operative measures for the development and advancement of the region.

On 3 February 1969, Mr Gorton said:

"We believe that all parties to the dispute should, without delay, sit down around the conference table and begin discussions aimed at restoring Peace and stability to the Middle East. Any such settlement must be formally based on the acceptance of Israel as a sovereign nation existing as of right, entitled to live and develop in security, free of constant threat, posing no threat to its neighbouring countries, and using for the good of all, rights and opportunities so dearly bought."

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151

Statement by the U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on the Hijacking of a TWA Airliner.¹

Washington, August 30, 1969

We have learned that the Government of Syria has detained the six Israeli passengers aboard the TWA aircraft hijacked yesterday to Damascus.

¹ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 15/9/1969, p. 246.

Other passengers were taken to Athens by a TWA-chartered aircraft of Alitalia, except for those passengers bound for other destinations and one injured American woman and her four children. The captain of the hijacked aircraft has remained behind with the damaged airliner and the remaining passengers.

During the past 36 hours, since learning of this piracy, the United States Government has been in continuous and close touch with the Government of Italy, which represents United States interests in Syria and which has been most cooperative and helpful. We have also been in touch with numerous other governments which have relations with Syria as well as with international organizations concerned with air travel. We shall continue vigorous efforts through all available channels on behalf of all the remaining passengers of this United States-flag aircraft.

With respect to the forcible detention of some of the innocent civilian passengers aboard this aircraft, the United States Government is astonished that a government which is a member of the United Nations, having its own international airline and obviously benefiting from and dependent upon the freedom and safety of air travel, would choose to condone and associate itself with this criminal act. Such action could only have the result of creating a situation of anarchy, lawlessness, and danger to all air travelers of all nations regardless of nationality or ideology.

We hope and expect the Government of Syria will promptly give due weight to the consequences which could flow from this situation and immediately take steps to release the detained passengers.

152

Joint Communiqué on the Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil's Visit to Algeria.¹
(Excerpt)

Algiers, September 7, 1969

As regards the situation in the Middle East, the two sides affirmed the necessity for the with-

drawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories and they expressed their unqualified support for the just struggle of the people of Palestine to liberate their usurped homeland. The two sides strongly condemned the dangerous policy of expansion and aggression that Israel is pursuing in the Middle East and expressed their firm belief that armed struggle alone would enable the Palestinians to regain their legitimate rights, return to their homeland and recover their honour.

153

Joint Communiqué on the U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko's Visit to Yugoslavia.²
(Excerpt)

Belgrade, September 9, 1969

Consideration was also given to the situation in the Middle East resulting from aggression and provocations by Israel against the Arab countries. Both sides repeated their conviction that the Israeli troops should withdraw without delay from the occupied territories and that implementation of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, was a matter of the utmost urgency.

154

Statement by the African Summit Conference Expressing Concern over the Situation in the Middle East.³

Addis Ababa, September 10, 1969

[The African Heads of State and Prime Ministers announced their] "grave concern over the increasingly critical situation in the Middle East resulting from the refusal of the Israeli forces of occupation to withdraw from the region despite United Nations and Organisation of African Unity resolutions on the matter."

² *Yugoslav Review of International Affairs*, 6/9/1969.

³ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 11/9/1969.

¹ *Al-Sha'b* (Algiers), 8/9/1969.

155

Telegram from the Chairman of the African Summit Conference and President of the Cameroon Republic Ahidjo to the United Arab Republic President Nasser.¹

Addis Ababa, September 10, 1969

His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic:

On behalf of the Conference of African Heads of State and Prime Ministers, meeting in its sixth session, it is my privilege to inform you and the people of the United Arab Republic of our strong feeling of solidarity with you in the face of the brazen and perfidious act of aggression committed by the Israeli armed forces against the United Arab Republic.

The Conference regards this act by Israel as more provocative and clearly defined than previous attacks. The Conference discussed this matter in its debates on vital problems and passed a resolution condemning this new act of aggression.

156

Reply by the Indonesian President General Suharto to the Jordanian King Hussein's Telegram on the Fire at Al-Aqsa Mosque.²

Amman, September 13, 1969

I wish most respectfully to inform your Majesty of the receipt of your telegram informing me that the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque had been set on fire. I was stunned by the news, as were the government and the people of Indonesia. This act is an offence, not only to the Islamic conscience, but to all human beings throughout the world.

This criminal measure against the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque, which is sacred to every Muslim, has pained and angered the Muslims of Indonesia. I assure your Majesty that I, the government and the people of Indonesia share in the affliction your Majesty and the government and the people of Jordan have suffered. We join in denouncing

this barbaric sacrilege for which the Israeli authorities must be held responsible. This criminal incident makes it imperative for the UN Security Council to implement its resolution on Jerusalem without delay, and we shall strive to secure this end with all our might. I shall instruct Indonesia's permanent delegate at the United Nations to play an effective part, along with the delegates of other Arab and Islamic States, in a joint measure to protect and to rescue the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque. Instructions of a similar nature have already been issued to all Indonesian diplomatic missions abroad. May God grant us the strength to emerge victorious from this critical situation.

Assuring Your Majesty of my highest esteem.

157

Joint Communiqué on the Indian External Affairs Minister Singh's Visit to the Soviet Union.³ (Excerpt)

Moscow, September 17, 1969

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The two sides discussed the situation in the Middle East and expressed concern over the fact that it is endangering world peace. They believe that Israel's refusal to comply with the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, and her repeated provocations are the root cause of a serious worsening of the situation.

Both sides reaffirmed their support for the Security Council's resolution and agreed to co-operate with each other and with other peace-loving states towards the implementation of that resolution.

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¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 11/9/1969.

² *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 15/9/1969.

³ *Soviet News* (London), 23/9/1969.

158

Joint Communiqué on the Indian External Affairs Minister Singh's Visit to Yugoslavia.¹ (Excerpt)

Belgrade, September 18, 1969

The two sides reviewed the situation in the Middle East and expressed their grave concern over the continued occupation of Arab territories and the recent aggravation of tension in the region. They felt that urgent steps should be taken for the implementation of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 for the restoration of peace in that area. The two sides agreed to cooperate with each other and other peace-loving nations for the speedy implementation of the Security Council Resolution.

159

Statement on the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, France, Britain and the United States with the Secretary General U Thant.² (Excerpt)

New York, September 20, 1969

They paid attention to the situation in the Middle East, which they assessed as becoming increasingly serious and urgent.

1. They confirmed the need to support and implement Resolution 242 adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1967.

2. They agreed that stable peace must be established in the Middle East.

3. They reaffirmed that all states in the Middle East have the inalienable right to exist as independent and sovereign states.

4. With the above objectives in mind, the conversations and contacts already established will be continued.

¹ Yugoslav Review of International Affairs, 5/10/1969.

² Soviet News (London), 23/9/1969.

160

Joint Communiqué on the Talks Between the Yugoslav President Tito and the Rumanian President Ceausescu.³ (Excerpt)

Djerdap, September 20, 1969

Voicing their anxiety at the constantly mounting tension in the Middle East, the two sides again stated that efforts should be stepped up to solve this crisis through urgent application, by all the countries concerned, of the Security Council Resolution of November 1967.

161

Interview Statements by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Sisco on a "Voice of America" Broadcast.⁴ (Excerpt)

Washington, September 20, 1969

Q. Mr. Sisco, aside from this question of arms limitation, what are the other elements of difference between ourselves and the Soviet Union that you've alluded to before without specifying them?

A. Well I would like to again, Mr. Cook, without being too specific and too direct because after all I think you could appreciate that a number of these matters are the subject of current negotiation but let me try to respond in this way. First of all the United States feels quite strongly that what is required in the area is a stable peace, not just an old armistice arrangement which was in existence for something like twenty years, and which really resulted in three outbreaks of hostility so that any agreement then, between the parties, has to be based on a specific, formal commitment to peace, in other words we're talking about a peace agreement. Secondly, we feel that one of the fundamental questions is the

³ Yugoslav Review of International Affairs, 5/10/1969.

⁴ "To Establish a Just and Lasting Peace." Pamphlet distributed by the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, September, 1969, pp. 16-17.

question of refugees. We have never quarreled with the principles that were adopted by the U.N. over the last twenty years, in fact, the United States has supported for twenty years United Nations resolutions calling for a choice to be given to the refugees, to be repatriated to Israel or alternatively, to be resettled in the area with compensation. However, we do feel that in order for any final agreement to be feasible that not only must this principle be taken into account, but the reality that there are well over a million refugees and that some understanding has to be achieved as to what refugees in fact would be repatriated, what refugees in fact would be resettled. Third, obviously this question of withdrawal is key. Our position is a very simple one, we support the U.N. Security Council resolution of November nineteen sixty-seven. We believe firmly and strongly that there must be withdrawal of Israeli forces, in the words of the Security Council resolution, "to secure and recognized borders." The U.N. Security Council resolution did not define what those borders would be. The Security Council resolution called for agreement between the parties, so our position, very simply is, that there has got to be a commitment to withdraw forces to that secure and recognized border. But it's up to the parties to find the common ground, in other words, to agree on what that final border is, and we find that we believe that this position is totally consistent with the Security Council resolution of November nineteen sixty-seven. So these I think are really three key issues on which there is not an entire meeting of the minds.

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Message From 30 Muslim Countries in Support of the Soviet Union Stand on the Palestine Question and the Burning of Al-Aqsa Mosque.¹

Moscow, September 22, 1969

We have noted with satisfaction the just stand

¹ *Daily Star* (Beirut), 23/9/1969. The message was signed by Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Cameroon, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Leba-

of the government of the USSR on the question of Israel and its statement of Aug. 29 on the burning of the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

We are confident that the government of the USSR will continue to exert its great influence both within the United Nations and outside that body to implement all the Security Council resolutions relating to the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem and for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories in the interest of world peace.

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Message from Pope Paul VI to the Moroccan King Hasan II on the Islamic Summit Conference in Rabat.²

Vatican City, September 24, 1969

We are anxious to inform you how pleased we were to learn of the intentions of the prominent personalities who will be meeting with you in Rabat. In particular, we appreciate their desire to take peaceful measures in connection with a settlement of the painful conflict that occasioned this meeting, and their desire to turn to their faith in God in their search for a just and honourable issue from the present situation.

The act of turning to one's religious convictions ought not be an occasion for dissent but a unifying principle providing men with the opportunity of surmounting their propensities, whether political or military, and leading to peace and harmony. In this way a regrettable incident such as the fire in the Al-Aqsa Mosque may in the long run make it easier to seek a solution which glorifies God, does honour to the holy places and ensures the peace and understanding that are so earnestly desired by the world insofar as such an incident serves to awaken religious sentiments and provides an incentive for an unsparring effort to safeguard the unique and sacred status of the City of Jerusalem.

non, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somali, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen and South Yemen.

² *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 25/9/1969. The message was sent on September 22, but the Vatican announced it on September 24, 1969.

Resource to violence is all the more lamentable for the fact that nowhere on earth is closer to God than the blessed land of Palestine, the focal point of the memories and land of the holy places that are dear to the three monotheistic faiths.

We therefore believe that the representatives of the three faiths which believe in one, merciful God, should come to an agreement recognizing the unique and blessed character of the holy places, particularly the City of Jerusalem.

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Communiqué of the First Islamic Summit Conference.¹ (Excerpt)

Rabat, September 25, 1969

The heads of Islamic states and governments and their representatives, having discussed the criminal burning of the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque and the situation in the Middle East, assert the following:

The grievous event which took place on August 21, 1969, when fire caused enormous damage to the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque, has aroused feelings of deepest anxiety in the hearts of more than six hundred million Muslims throughout the world.

The acts of sacrilege against one of the most sacred religious relics of mankind and the demolition and profanation of other holy places have occurred while Jerusalem has been under armed Israeli occupation. This city has a religious significance for all who profess Islam, Christianity or Judaism and such acts have increased tension in the Middle East and caused revulsion among all peoples of the world.

The heads of states and governments and their representatives declare that Israeli military occupation threatens Islamic holy places in Jerusalem.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 26/9/1969. The conference was held from 22-24 September and was attended by the heads of the following Muslim states and governments Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, South Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, Yemen and representatives of Indian Muslims, with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organisation as observers.

In order to protect the sacred character of these places and to guarantee access to them and free movement in them, Jerusalem must recover the status it had before the aggression of June, a status which 1300 years of history have confirmed.

Accordingly, they declare that their governments and peoples are determined to reject any solution of the Palestine Problem which does not guarantee the status of the city of Jerusalem as it was prior to the aggression of June, 1967.

They likewise call upon all governments that are deeply anxious about continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories overrun in June 1967 and about Israel's refusal to pay the slightest attention to appeals addressed to it by the Security Council and the U.N. General Assembly, requiring it to rescind the measures it has taken to annex the city of Jerusalem.

Faced with this serious situation, the heads of states and governments and their representatives strongly urge all nations, and especially the Great Powers who hold a special responsibility for the preservation of peace, to expend greater efforts, both singly and jointly, to ensure Israeli withdrawal from all the lands occupied after the June war of 1967, in conformity with the principle of law which forbids the acquisition of lands by military conquest.

In view of their deep concern for the tragedy of Palestine, they offer the Palestinian people their support in regaining their usurped [homeland] and in their struggle for national liberation. They reaffirm their dedication to peace, provided it is based on honour and justice.

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Exchange of Toasts between U.S. President Nixon and Israeli Premier Meir during the Latter's Visit to the United States.²

Washington, September 25, 1969

President Nixon

As I look around this room, I see several Members of the Senate and the House who have

² *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, 13/10/1969, pp. 319-321.

been here before during this administration's dinners in this state dining room and who have seen the heads of state and heads of government who have been here.

All of them were very distinguished leaders of their countries; but as you know, this is the first time in this administration we have had the honor to receive the head of government of another state who also is a woman.

Now that, naturally, should give a great deal of opportunity for a President of the United States, in welcoming the Prime Minister, to remark about her unusual capabilities not only in her official capacity but as a woman. I can only say this, that I am reminded of the fact that David Ben-Gurion, in referring to our very distinguished guest this evening, referred to her as the best man in his Cabinet.

I also recall the old Jewish proverb to the effect that man was made out of the soft earth and woman was made out of a hard rib.

I do not mean by these references to indicate that the Prime Minister whom we honor tonight is one who does not have those very remarkable and unique qualities that we admire in the women of her country and the women of our own country and the women of the world. But what I would like to say very simply is this: that throughout the history of her people, a history that we know very well in this country, a history that we heard even the Marine Band and our Strolling Strings attempt to represent by music very briefly a few moments ago, we know that very capable women and strong women have played a remarkable and important part in that history.

In Biblical terms, we remember Deborah, 3,000 years ago. The Bible tells us very little about Deborah, except that she loved her people and served them well. Then, if I may paraphrase, it concludes with this one thought: That there was peace in the land for 40 years.

Madam Prime Minister, as we welcome you here at this dinner, and as we meet with you today and tomorrow on the occasion of this visit, what is really deepest in our hearts is the hope that history will record that after your service as Prime Minister there was peace in the land for 40 years and longer.

When we think back on your people, a war every 10 years, when we think back on your people going back through the century, how they have suffered, we know how much the word "peace" means.

We can say to you that while it is fashionable in the great councils of the world to talk rather casually about peace, and while it is, of course, expected that at events like this we use that term almost in an offhand way, we feel it very deeply here. We feel it because the people of Israel deserve peace. They have earned peace, not the fragile peace that comes with the kind of a document that neither party has an interest in keeping, but the kind of peace that will last, one that will last for 40 years or even longer.

I say that for another reason, too. I have had the privilege and I know that many of our friends around this room have had the privilege of seeing what the people of this very small country have done in Israel, and it is a remarkable story. With this immense military burden, with this tremendous budget that they have to bear in that respect, how they have made that land bloom, how they have made it productive.

But also I have seen what the people of this country have done in other lands, in Africa, in Asia, in Latin America. People have gone from the State of Israel to those other lands in their own programs of assistance and advice; and this kind of genius, this kind of ability, is very rare in the world. It is desperately needed in the world. It is desperately needed for the works of peace.

And for these and so many other reasons, we simply want to say that we are very honored to have the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and others in this distinguished party here in this room tonight. We are honored to pay tribute to a very brave and courageous people. We hope that as a result of our meeting we will have taken a significant step forward toward that peace which can mean so much to the people of Israel, to the people of all the Mideast, and also to the people of the world.

Now I would like to ask you, in affirming that sentiment, to rise and raise your glasses with me to the Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Meir

There is no use in my trying to hide the fact that this has been an exceptional day in my life. One reads sometimes that representatives of big powers get together, try to solve problems, make certain decisions; and we know it is important.

Then one sentence reads that representatives of little countries, not very powerful, not very much, not very able to give each to the other — one has a feeling, well, they got together, they at least shared troubles and problems, they at least feel sorry for each other. That helps sometimes.

But I think that this world would be entirely different if there was a possibility of meeting between the big and powerful and the small in an atmosphere and a feeling not of one asking for something and one giving something but in an atmosphere that in this world there must be a real partnership between large powers and small, rich and poor.

This world has become too small and too full of problems and troubles for any one of us to feel that he by himself can either separate himself from the world and be happy in his home, isolated because he is powerful, or that it doesn't matter.

There can be some that are secure and strong and resourceful, and there are others that are small and poor and troubled, as though it did not affect all of us, what happens in any corner of the earth.

We have become too advanced in science. If any trouble is discovered in the moon, Mr. President, I am afraid it will affect us on earth. We are all a part of everything that is good and everything that is dangerous.

To me this has been a great day. Not because I have come representing the people that has no worry in the world, that has no problems, that needs nothing, but this is a great day for me because I represent a small country, a small people. I represent a people that throughout its history for 2,000 years has known persecution, has known discrimination, has been driven from place to place. And for 2,000 years this people has refused to give up a dream, an ideal that someday it will come back to its home and rebuild it.

It is tragic that this happened when 6 million of our people were gone. Those 6 million in Eastern and Central Europe — those were the centers of culture, of religion, of Zionism, of faith — withstood everything, all hardships, and did not give up their faith. They are gone.

Every one of us feels that he has to make up and he owes it to them, not only to those who are alive, those remnants that have remained, but owes it to them who are gone.

Those who went to the gas chambers went singing: "I believe the Messiah will come." They knew that they were going to their death, and we feel that they left us a legacy that we must implement and put into life, that which they believed in and that for which they died. It is not simple in this world, in the neighborhood in which we live.

When I say this was a great day for me, Mr. President, I shall remember it always, because you made it possible for me to speak to you, to bring before you all of our problems, all of our worries, all of our hopes and aspirations, and if you will forgive me, I did not have a feeling for one single moment that I, representing little, tiny Israel, was speaking to the President of the great United States. I felt I was speaking to a friend who not only listens — in Hebrew we have two words, a word that means only listening and a word that means that it really is absorbed — and I felt that you were not merely kind to listen to me but you shared what I was saying, what our worries are.

We discussed the problems of Israel as though they were our common problems. This means a lot. Israel has known in its short number of years too many hours when we felt we were all alone. And we made it.

In 1948, when we were attacked by six Arab armies and had nothing to fight with, but thank God we did not lose our sense of humor, we said: yes, but we have a secret weapon and our secret weapon is, there is no alternative, we must win because we have nowhere to run to except the sea. Therefore we chose to fight and to fight it out and win. We had no alternative. We had many hours that were dark, the hours before the 5th of June in 1967, none of us will ever forget them.

But we believe. We have not lost our confidence. We have faith not only in the life and existence and development of Israel, but we believe honestly and sincerely that the day will come when there will be peace in the area. The day will come when across the borders there will not be tanks and one will not listen only to the shelling, to the shells that will be sent from across the borders into villages killing men and women and children.

But I am convinced that the day will come when farmers from Israel, young men and women who have left their homes and left their towns and went to the desert and went to the hills at Galilee and brought life to the desert when nothing has bloomed for hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of years and have brought forests to the hills and have absorbed human beings shattered in body and spirit after the Second World War and made them alive again, and they straightened their backs and the children who came to us with eyes full of fear are happy now and they sing. These men and women and these scared children who have now become young men and women have made it possible for us to develop the desert, to do what we have done, and there is song on their lips and they teach and they study and they farm and they build.

No greater day can we envisage than when these people merely step across the border and with a farmer of Jordan and with a farmer in the Nile Valley and with a farmer in Syria — not when we are on the Golan Heights and we see what was not done in the villages of the Golan Heights — and we will just step across the border and bring with us not only the fruits of our experience but the joy in being alive together, we and they, and making it possible for their children, too, to live as human beings and to hope for a life where one will bring joy to everyone around and where we can erase from the minds of young people, where we can erase the horror of mothers that they bring children into this world and, who knows, maybe when they are just beginning their life they will be sent into the battleground.

We believe in that, Mr. President, honestly and faithfully. We are a people who for 2,000 years believed in the impossible. And here we

are, a sovereign state, accepted in the family of nations, with many problems, many troubles, but here we are.

And here we are speaking in the United States. Here I am as a guest of the President of the United States, having full understanding of what this day means, and yet I will come home and I will tell my Cabinet and I will tell my people and I will tell our children and our young people: Don't become cynical, don't give up hope, don't believe that everything is just judged only by expediency.

There is idealism in this world. There is human brotherhood in this world. There is a great and powerful country, the United States, that feels that the existence of Israel is important to it because it is important that we all live and all exist, no matter how small and how troubled we are.

Mr. President, thank you, not only for your wonderful hospitality, not only for this great day and every moment that I had this day, but thank you for enabling me to go home and tell my people that we have a friend, a great friend and a dear friend. It will help. It will help us overcome many difficulties.

When the great day comes when this dream comes true, you will have had a great share in it.

Thank you very much.

To the President of the United States.

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Remarks by U.S. President Nixon at a Ceremony of Welcome for the Israeli Premier Meir.¹

Washington, September 25, 1969

It is a very great privilege for me, speaking in behalf of the American people, to welcome you, Madam Prime Minister, in a very personal sense, because you were raised in this country. You have been to this country many times, but we are particularly proud that for the first time we welcome you as Prime Minister of Israel.

¹ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 13/10/1969, p. 318.

Speaking to you in that capacity, as the head of government of a very courageous people, a people who are determined to maintain their independence, who also are determined to achieve a lasting peace in the area in which they live, I look forward to the talks we shall have individually and also with other members of your party.

It would be less than candid for me not to say that the problems of the Mideast are terribly complex and not susceptible to solution in one meeting or two or three, or even more, at the level at which we will be talking.

But it is also proper to say that the Mideast — and peace in the Mideast — is of interest not only to your nation and your neighbors but to the whole world because of what could happen in the event that war were to break out there, the repercussions that that could have all over the world.

We know that you and your people want peace. We know that your neighbors want peace. Certainly the majority of the people in the whole area want peace. The question is how to achieve it. On this we shall have discussions that I hope will be helpful: the real peace, the peace that is not simply one of words, but one which both parties will have a vested interest in maintaining.

I would say finally, Madam Prime Minister, that a very famous British Prime Minister once said: "One should always talk as much as possible to women, because this is the best school."

I can assure you that I recognize the tremendous complexity of the problem we will be discussing. I recognize that it is necessary to get the very best answers that we can to find a solution to these problems, and I realize that in talking to you — not just because you are Prime Minister but because you are one of the outstanding women in political leadership in the world — I will be truly going to the best school today and tomorrow.

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Reply by the Israeli Premier Meir to the U.S. President Nixon's Welcoming Remark.¹

Washington, September 25, 1969

Mr. President, needless to say, I am deeply moved by the reception and by the words that you have spoken. Every official guest from abroad to the White House must surely sense the significance of the occasion. May I say that this is particularly so for a representative of a people small in numbers and in resources.

May I say that in receiving me here in friendship and equality you are affirming that the attitude of the United States to other peoples is not determined by physical factors.

The history of Israel reborn, in the years preceding statehood and the more than two decades since its achievement, cannot be told without reference to the unwavering support and friendship shown by successive American Governments and by the American people.

Within hours after the proclamation of our statehood, the United States Government recognized Israel; and Jewish remnants from the Nazi death camps, who had been largely liberated by the American forces in Europe, came to our shores.

Mr. President, the ties between our two countries are rooted in the Biblical heritage and in the common dedication to human dignity, freedom, and to democracy.

We have done everything in our power to translate these ideals into the fabric of our national life. It is this sense of affinity that has encouraged us to ask for America's understanding and support in difficult times.

The story of modern Israel is essentially the story of the return to the ancestral homeland of exiles from persecution, insecurity, and fear in quest of freedom, human dignity, independence, and peace.

Today, no Jew need remain homeless because of oppression and insecurity. I am gratified to be able to say this here in this great land which

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 13/10/1969, pp. 318-319.

has been a haven for the oppressed, including many of my own people.

I shall be able to tell you, Mr. President, of Israel's progress in many fields. Tragically, peace is still denied us. But that same faith that has sustained us down the ages instills within us the confidence that the hour of peace will come.

I look forward to the day when an Israeli Prime Minister will be able to come here bearing to the President and the people of the United States the tidings that the Middle East has entered a new epoch of amity and regional cooperation.

Mr. President, the prayers and hopes of my people are with you in the heavy responsibility you carry not only for your great country but for freedom-loving mankind at large. We follow with deep sympathy your efforts for regional and world peace, the phenomenal scientific advance of America under your leadership, the results of which are open to all nations, and your interest in economic and social advancement for all peoples.

I am privileged, Mr. President, to convey to you the best wishes from the President, the Government, and the People of Israel, together with their deep appreciation for your invitation to me and for your interest in our welfare and progress.

From Jerusalem, the city of prophecy and universal inspiration, I bring you the traditional Hebrew greeting: *Shalom*.

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Declaration of the Rabat Islamic Summit Conference.¹

Rabat, September 25, 1969

The Heads of States and Government and Representatives of the Kingdom of Afghanistan, Algerian Democratic and Popular Republic, Republic of Chad, Republic of Guinea, Republic of Indonesia, Empire of Iran, Hashemite Kingdom

of Jordan, Kingdom of Morocco, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, State of Kuwait, Republic of Lebanon, Arab Republic of Libya, Malaysia, Republic of Mali, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Republic of Niger, Republic of Senegal, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Republic of Somalia, Popular Republic of Southern Yemen, Democratic Republic of Sudan, Republic of Tunisia, Republic of Turkey, United Arab Republic, the Yemen Arab Republic and of the Moslem Community of India, met at the First Islamic Summit Conference held in Rabat from 9 to 12 Rajab 1389 (22 to 25 September 1969).

Representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Organization attending as observers.

Convinced that their common creed constitutes a powerful factor bringing their peoples closer together and fostering understanding between them,

Resolved to preserve the spiritual, moral and socio-economic values of Islam which remain one of the essential factors for the achievement of progress by mankind,

They affirm their unshakable faith in the precepts of Islam which proclaim the equality of rights among all men,

They reaffirm their adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and fundamental Human Rights, the purpose and principle of which are to establish a basis for fruitful cooperation among all peoples.

Determined to strengthen the fraternal and spiritual bonds existing between their peoples and to safeguard their freedom and the heritage of their common civilization founded in particular upon the principles of justice, tolerance and non-discrimination,

Anxious to promote everywhere welfare, progress and freedom,

Resolved to unite their efforts for the preservation of world peace and security,

To these ends hereby declare

Their Governments shall consult together with a view to promoting between themselves a close cooperation and mutual assistance in the economic, scientific, cultural and spiritual fields, inspired by the immortal teachings of Islam.

Their Governments undertake to settle by

¹ *Pakistan Document Series*, vol. VI, No. 8, December 1969.

peaceful means any dispute which may arise between them in such a manner as to contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security, in accordance with the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Having considered the act of arson in the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the situation in the Middle East, the Heads of State and Government and Representatives *hereby declare*:

The grievous event of 21 August 1969 which caused extensive damage by arson to the Sacred Al-Aqsa Mosque, has plunged over six hundred million followers of Islam throughout the world into the deepest anguish.

This sacrilege against one of Humanity's most venerated shrines and the acts of destruction and profanation of the Holy Places which have taken place under the military occupation by Israel of Al Quds — the Holy City of Jerusalem, sacred to the followers of Islam, Christianity and Judaism, have exacerbated tensions in the Middle East and aroused indignation among peoples throughout the world.

The Heads of State and Government and Representatives declare that the continued threat to the Sacred Shrines of Islam in Jerusalem is the result of the occupation of this City by the Israeli forces. The preservation of their sacred character and unimpeded access to them require that the Holy City should be restored its status, previous to June 1967.

They therefore declare that their Governments and peoples are firmly determined to reject any solution of the problem of Palestine which would deny Jerusalem the status it had before June 1967.

They urge all Governments particularly those of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to take into account the deep attachment of the followers of Islam to Jerusalem and the solemn resolve of their Governments to strive for its liberation.

The continued military occupation of Arab territories by Israel since June 1967, the refusal by Israel to pay the slightest heed to the calls by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations to rescind the measures purporting to annex the Holy City of Jerusalem to Israel, have caused their peoples and their Governments

the most profound concern.

Having considered this grave situation, the Heads of State and Government and Representatives urgently and earnestly appeal to all members of the international community, and more particularly to the great Powers which have a special responsibility to maintain international peace, to intensify their collective and individual efforts to secure the speedy withdrawal of Israeli military forces from all the territories occupied as a result of the war of June 1967, in accordance with the established principle of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by military conquest.

Moved by the tragedy of Palestine, they affirm their full support to the Palestinian people for the restitution of their rights which were usurped and in their struggle for national liberation.

They reaffirm their adherence to the principle of peace, but peace with honor and justice.

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Remarks by the U.S. President Nixon Following his Talks with the Israeli Premier Meir.¹ (Excerpt)

Washington, September 26, 1969

Madam Prime Minister, it seems that you have just arrived; and of course, your visit has been a short one. But in the brief hours you have been in Washington we have had very extended talks, private talks, on the relations between our two countries and, beyond that, I want the members of the press to know, on problems in the world generally.

This is the first opportunity I have had to talk to the Prime Minister, although I have known of her work in the field of diplomacy and in other areas over many, many years. She is, naturally, an expert and an advocate of the great principles that concern her own country, but she has a very deep understanding of those issues that divide the world.

It has been very valuable for me to have the benefit of her counsel on those problems all

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 13/10/1969, p. 322.

over the world, including even the problems of youth, which we discussed at some length last night, although we found, I must admit, no solutions.

I would like to say, too, that in these talks we have discussed all of those matters that have been speculated about in the press. We will not announce any decisions at this time. There is no formal communique.

This was a meeting where we thought it was very important for us to have a direct discussion of, first, our past relations, where we are now, and what course of action should be followed in the future.

I think we have a very good understanding as to the positions that we both take, and I think growing from this meeting could come some progress toward a solution of the terribly difficult problems we confront in the Mideast. I say "could" because I want to be very realistic. I find that one thing the Prime Minister and I have in common is that we are no-nonsense kind of people. We talk very directly, and we cover a lot of subjects in a very brief time.

The problems in the Mideast go back over centuries. They are not susceptible to easy solution. We do not expect them to be susceptible to instant diplomacy. On the other hand, we must try — and I was glad to find a willingness on the part of the Prime Minister and her colleagues — try to find a way to peace.

We have no new initiatives to announce, but we do think that we have a better understanding of how we should move from here on out in attempting to meet this very difficult problem.

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Reply by the Israeli Premier Meir to the U.S. President Nixon's Remarks Following Their Talks.¹

Washington, September 26, 1969

I only want to express my extreme appreciation for the opportunity that I have had to spend so much time with the President. It was an exceptional opportunity for me personally.

The President says he knew about me.

You would not be surprised, I suppose, if I said I knew about you, Mr. President.

Also, representing my country, speaking to the President of the United States, I am happy that I can go home and, without any announcement of news, say that I found in the President of the United States a friend of Israel and found full understanding for our problems and difficulties and that there is something that we share in common; that is, that everything should be done that is possible to bring real peace in the area, knowing that the interest of peace is for the welfare of all in the area — not only Israel but the tens of millions of Arabs and others in the various Arab countries.

It is good to know that in the search for peace, both of us, both of our countries, the populations in both of our countries, are deeply interested and dedicated to this quest — not something that is makeshift, but something that is real peace in the area of the Middle East and all over the world.

Mr. President, I don't know how to thank you for the time that you have taken, for the privilege that I have had to discuss many problems with you in an atmosphere of friendship and frankness, for the opportunity that you gave me to place upon your shoulders, that are carrying such a heavy burden for the entire world, also the burdens of a little country somewhere put away in the Middle East but that you have made me feel means something to you and to your people.

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 13/10/1969, p. 322.

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Statement by the Israeli Premier Meir at a Dinner in California, Revealing the U.S. President Nixon's Stand on Arab-Israeli Direct Negotiations.¹

Los Angeles, October 2, 1969

[She said that] she had been given assurances by President Nixon that the United States would not attempt to budge Israel from its position that there must be direct, face-to-face negotiations with the Arabs to insure a Mideast peace.

"There was not the slightest sign that any pressure will be brought on Israel. There's no sign that the United States has any intention to ask us to move one inch until there's a permanent peace.

"What the Arabs want from us, cannot be settled by compromise — they want us dead. We have decided to remain alive.

"The initiative for peace must be from the Arabs. Just as it was their decision to make war and attack us, so we can't make peace until they're prepared to do so."

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Joint Communiqué on the Italian President Saragat's Visit to Yugoslavia.² (Excerpt)

Belgrade, October 6, 1969

The two presidents exchanged views on Mediterranean problems in the light of the most recent events, and particularly expressed a common interest in promoting cooperation between all the countries in that area. The two sides expressed their anxiety at the continuing deterioration in the Middle East situation and agreed to do everything in their power to support every international action within the framework of the United Nations and on the basis of the Security Council Resolution designed to search for a peaceful, just and lasting solution to the present crisis,

taking account of the vital interests of all parties concerned in that area.

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Statement by the Vatican Following the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's Visit to the Former.³

Vatican City, October 6, 1969

In the course of discussions lasting about an hour, the Pope and the minister reviewed problems related to the current situation in the Middle East, particularly the question of peace and understanding between the people of the region and matters which are of profound concern to His Holiness, such as the question of the refugees, the holy places, the unique and sacred character of the City of Jerusalem and the various religious communities living in the Holy Land.

The meeting enabled the Pope personally to explain and affirm the attitude of the Holy See on these matters, an attitude based exclusively on the loftiest religious factors, on Christian and human love and on a desire for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and for the creation of a fraternal and fruitful family in conformity with the religious and civil rights of all involved.

The Pope listened carefully when the minister submitted a full report on Israeli efforts to secure the peace which is so earnestly desired, on the various questions mentioned above, on the Jews remaining in the Arab countries and other humanitarian issues.

His Holiness renewed his standing offer of friendly cooperation and his willingness to be of service which he had conveyed to the representatives of other peoples who are involved in the conflict.

¹ *Herald Tribune*, 3/10/1969.

² *Yugoslav Review of International Affairs*, 20/10/1969.

³ *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 7/10/1969.

174

Speech by the Yugoslav President Tito at a Mass Meeting Marking the Celebration of the 15th Anniversary of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.¹ (Excerpt)

Zagreb, October 10, 1969

Developments in the Near East are also extremely ominous. Instead of peaceful solutions based on the respect of the rights and interests of all countries of this region which would be welcomed by progressive people throughout the world, the situation is deteriorating steadily and threatens to provoke dangerous complications. From the occupied Arab territories Israel is embarking on new aggressive moves against the Arab countries. Not only is there no truce but permanent warfare is actually being waged in this region. By rejecting the Security Council Resolution Israel is attempting to secure permanent hold of the occupied territories and this should not be permitted by the international community.

The aggravation of the crisis in the Near East requires renewed effort aimed at devising an equitable political solution based on the Security Council Resolution as soon as possible. Needless to say, the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories without delay is a prime condition therefor.

175

Statement by a United States State Department Official Expressing his Government's Concern over Incidents of Violence along Lebanon's Border.²

Washington, October, 1969

"The United States is very concerned over recent incidents of violence along Lebanon's border because it attaches great importance to

that country's national independence and territorial integrity," a State Department official said during the course of a two-day conference in Washington sponsored by the Middle East Institute.

The official said: "We would view with the greatest concern any threat to that integrity from any source."

He said that the United States has long enjoyed a "very warm friendship with Lebanon" and "we value and welcome" its traditions of democracy.

"Lebanon's moderate government," he said, "should be welcomed and esteemed by all countries in the Middle East area."

176

Interview Statements by the U.S. Secretary of State Rogers.³ (Excerpt)

Washington, October 12, 1969

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, you had a number of meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko on the Middle East particularly. Did you make any progress at all?

Secretary Rogers: Yes, I thought we made some progress.

Mr. Spivak: Significant progress?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I have used that word once in this program. Let's just say we made progress. We developed the thought that the parties have to negotiate. We have to have more active negotiations and we have developed what is known as the Rhodes formula, which we think could lead to more active negotiations.

Mr. Spivak: Haven't the Egyptians just repudiated that?

Secretary Rogers: We are not too sure about that. There was an editorial in the paper that suggested that, but we have no reason to think that is the attitude of the government as yet.

¹ Yugoslav Review of International Affairs, 20/10/1969.
² Statement issued by the U.S. Embassy in Beirut on October 13, 1969.

³ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 27/10/1969, pp. 345-350.

177

Replies in Parliament by the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Stewart to Questions on the Middle East.¹ (Excerpt)

London, October 13, 1969

Mr. Judd asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement on developments in the Middle East.

Mr. M. Stewart: We are concerned about the continuing serious situation in the Middle East. We have always believed that a settlement is urgently needed and that there can be no prospect of a just and lasting peace in the absence of a general political settlement. I discussed the Middle East situation with other Foreign Ministers in New York last month; we expect the Four Powers to re-convene soon and shortly thereafter to provide guidance for Dr. Jarring.

Mr. Judd: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that reply. Does he agree that the principles set out in the November 1967 Resolution at the United Nations remain the only basis for a sound and lasting peace in the area? Will he assure the House that, whatever the pressures, the British Government will not become involved in escalation of arms supplies to the area?

Mr. Stewart: We have to doubt that that Resolution provides the essential foundation of a settlement. With regard to the second part of my hon. Friend's question, he will remember that immediately after the war it was the policy of this Government not to supply arms at all in the Middle East. We should have persisted in that policy if other Powers had taken the same view. I described to the House the principles on which our policy is now based in the debate to which earlier reference has been made.

Sir B. Janner: What progress has been made with regard to a settlement being arrived at by the two parties meeting together? Is not my right hon. Friend aware that unless they do meet together and thus negotiate with each other,

which Israel is quite prepared to do, as he knows, there is very little hope of a settlement?

Mr. Stewart: I said recently at the United Nations that if the parties could meet so much the better. I have also said in this House that it was difficult for people to understand the reluctance of some of the parties to engage in direct negotiations. But I must add that if direct negotiations for any reason are not possible at present we should not assume that no other way of making progress can yield any hope in the present situation. Therefore, we must endeavour through the Four Powers to strengthen the hands of Dr. Jarring and enable him to resume his work.

178

Statement on Events in Lebanon, by the Soviet Official News Agency "Tass".²

Moscow, October 25, 1969

The events taking place in the Lebanon are arousing the concern of the Soviet people. The firm belief is expressed in leading circles in the Soviet Union that no foreign power must encroach on the sovereignty of the Lebanon and its right to settle its internal affairs, nor interfere in matters within the competence of the Arab states themselves.

The conviction is also expressed that the leaders of the Arab countries will be able to find ways of preventing the worsening of the internal situation in the Lebanon and will not allow anybody to sow discord among the Arab peoples or set Arab states at loggerheads.

The United States Embassy in the Lebanon, in a statement circulated the other day under the pretext of expressing concern about "the independence and territorial integrity of the Lebanon," in fact proclaimed the right of the United States to interfere in the internal affairs of the Lebanese Republic. It said that "the interests of the United States of America in that area exceed the interests of any other individual state."

¹ *Hansard*, 13-16/10/1969, cols. 24-25.

² *Soviet News* (London), 28/10/1969.

The aims pursued by the United States are evident from the statement itself. It recalls the old colonial practice when great powers referred to violations of their interests in some part of the world in order to interfere in the internal affairs of states and peoples and to deprive the peoples of their inalienable right to settle their own affairs.

No outside interference by a great power in events in the Lebanon can be justified.

The Lebanese Republic is an Arab country closely connected with the other Arab states and nobody is better placed than the Arab states themselves to decide problems arising over the Lebanon. They know their interests and their aims best.

It is understandable why the public of Arab countries, including the Lebanese public, have received the United States statement with indignation, rightly regarding it as an attempt to impose a sort of American patronage over the Lebanon.

The events around the Lebanon are undoubtedly a result of the mounting tension in the Middle East caused by the Israeli aggression, the aftermaths of which have not yet been eliminated.

Israel is not carrying out the decisions of the United Nations and is continuing the adventuristic policy of provocations against the Arab states, while some western powers, and the United States in the first place, are encouraging this Israeli policy.

A considerable role in these plans is given to undermining the unity of action of the Arab States, making use of the forces of domestic reaction in the Arab countries and pushing them to oppose the national-patriotic forces.

It is apparent that a web of intrigues is again being spun and attempts are being made to turn the blows against the wrong targets in the Middle East and in connection with the Lebanon in particular.

Were the United States really interested, as it asserts in its statement, in the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Arab states, it would have directed its efforts first of all at ensuring the speediest fulfilment of United Nations decisions on the settlement of the situation in the Middle East, which provide for the

withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories and a just solution of the problem of the Palestinian refugees, as well as of other outstanding issues.

179

Statements by the Israeli Deputy Premier Allon Revealing Israel's Reaction in case of Foreign Intervention in Lebanon.¹ (Excerpts)

Tel Aviv, October 25, 1969

[He said that] the fall of Lebanon would undermine the cease-fire agreement with Israel.

"Israel would have to take all possible measures to guarantee her security on the northern borders."

"Israel cannot be indifferent to what is happening in Lebanon. We cannot ignore a change for the worse in the status quo of this neighboring country."

180

Joint Statement on the Visit of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and State Delegation to the Soviet Union.² (Excerpt)

Moscow, October 27, 1969

The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia come out in solidarity with the struggle of the Arab peoples against the aggression of Israel, which is supported by imperialist circles in Europe and America. They insist on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories belonging to Arab countries and on a just settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of the resolution adopted by the Security Council in November 1967.

¹ *Herald Tribune*, 25-26/10/1969. Statement made at Givat Brenner, a kibbutz south of Tel Aviv.

² *Soviet News* (London), 4/11/1969.

181

Text of the United States Proposals for an Agreement between Israel and the United Arab Republic as Part of a General Plan for the Settlement of the Middle East Crisis.¹

Washington, October 28, 1969

Egypt and Israel, in view of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations,

And as proof of their commitment to the Security Council resolution No. 242 of November 22, 1967 and as an expression of their willingness to implement all the articles of the said resolution in all good faith,

And in recognition of the fact that the acquisition of territory by means of war is inadmissible,

In recognition, moreover, of the need for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, within the framework of which each nation in the region can enjoy security,

Agree that their representatives, acting under the supervision of Ambassador Jarring and in accordance with the lines of procedure followed by both sides in Rhodes in 1949, shall formulate, without delay, and on the basis of the following terms, a final agreement to be mutually binding on both sides, dealing with the means for the implementation of Security Council resolution No. 242 of November 22, 1967, for the establishment of a just and lasting peace.

Agenda

Point No. 1: Both sides, in coming to a final agreement (to be set down in a finalised document or documents) on a comprehensive settlement in accordance with these same basic principles (the ten points of this draft proposal) shall decide on an agenda and suitable measures for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1967 conflict. Withdrawal shall be effected to frontiers to be determined in accordance with point no. 3 stated below. A plan is also to be formulated for the implementation of all the articles of Security

Council resolution No. 242.

Point No. 2: The states of war and belligerency between Egypt and Israel shall be terminated; there shall be an official state of peace between them. Each side shall refrain from actions not in keeping with that state of peace or with the cessation of the state of war.

i) Each shall refrain from any act of aggression on the part of its armed forces (ground, naval or air forces). Each agrees to refrain from posing threats to the civilian population or the armed forces of the other side.

ii) Each side shall undertake to do all in its power to guard against aggressive or warlike acts on the part of government bodies, government personnel, private organisations or private individuals. Each side furthermore guarantees that no such actions shall take place within its territory.

iii) Each side shall refrain from direct or indirect intervention in the international affairs of the other, regardless of the cause for so doing (whether political, economic or of some other nature).

iv) Each side shall guarantee that mutual dealings between them shall be in keeping with the principles set forth in paragraphs 3 and 4 or Article No. 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Determination of Secure Borderlines

Point No. 3: Both sides shall agree to the determination of secure and recognised frontiers between their territories and that these frontiers shall be determined on a map (or maps) acceptable to both and shall become an inseparable part of the final agreement.

As a part of the comprehensive framework for peace there shall be an agreement between the two sides for the establishment of demilitarised zones, effective security measures shall be adopted in the Sharm al-Shaikh area to guarantee freedom of navigation through the Tiran Straits and effective security measures shall be adopted (and a final settlement reached) in the case of the Gaza Strip. Within this comprehensive framework for peace, the old international frontiers between Egypt and the territory of Palestine at the time of the Mandate shall become the secure and recognised frontiers between Egypt and Israel.

¹ *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 9/12/1969. These proposals were rejected by the United Arab Republic on the ground that they compartmentalise the Arab-Israeli problem. The proposals were also submitted to the Soviet Union from which the United States was awaiting a reply. There were reports (denied by Amman) that similar proposals were submitted to Jordan but were rejected.

Point No. 4: In order to guarantee the territorial integrity of both sides and the security of their common frontiers, the two sides shall come to an agreement, in accordance with the procedure mentioned in the last paragraph of this document (viz. along the lines of Rhodes), concerning the following problems:

i) Which areas are to become demilitarised zones and the measures to be taken to ensure their demilitarisation.

ii) What effective security measures are to be adopted in the Sharm al-Shaikh area to guarantee freedom of navigation through the Tiran Straits.

iii) What effective security measures are to be adopted and what final settlement is to be reached in the case of the Gaza Strip.

The Straits of Tiran as an International Waterway

Point No. 5: Both sides shall agree to the following points which shall then be endorsed by the Security Council:

i) The Straits of Tiran are an international waterway.

ii) Freedom of navigation for the ships of all nations, including Israel, is to apply to the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Point No. 6: Egypt shall guarantee that, within the exercise of its sovereignty over the Suez Canal, the ships of all nationalities, including Israeli nationality, shall have the right to pass through the Canal freely without either discrimination or hindrance.

Point No. 7: Both sides shall comply with the conditions necessary for a just solution to the refugee problem, similar in nature to the agreement to be finalised between Jordan and Israel. Both sides shall agree to take part in formulating the articles of that settlement in accordance with such manner as Ambassador Jarring shall see fit.

It is to be understood that there shall be an agreement between Jordan and Israel, the counterpart to the one between Egypt and Israel, which shall include a mutual understanding on a just solution to the refugee problem. Neither of the two agreements shall come into effect until such time as a comprehensive settlement is agreed on.

Mutual Recognition of Sovereignty

Point No. 8: Both Egypt and Israel agree to recognise the sovereignty, the political independence and the right of the other state to live in peace within secure and recognised frontiers free of threats or acts of violence. Both sides moreover agree to respect the sovereignty and the right of the other to exist.

Point No. 9: The finalised agreement is to be set down in a document to be signed by the two sides and to be deposited directly at the United Nations. When they have done this both sides shall immediately inform the Secretary General of the United Nations of the matter.

The moment the document is so deposited it becomes binding upon both sides and irrevocable and both sides shall begin to implement and observe its provisions. There shall be an understanding between the two sides, regarding the implementation of the final agreement, that their commitments shall be mutually and independently binding. The finalised agreement by either of the two sides grants the other the right to take such a violation as due justification for suspending the implementation of the agreement, in its entirety or in any of its parts, until such time as the violation shall cease.

Point No. 10: Both sides agree to submit the finalised agreement to the Security Council for ratification.

It is to be understood that France, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union shall submit an appropriate resolution to the Security Council and shall support that resolution. They furthermore pledge to dedicate their efforts in the future to aiding both sides in complying with all the articles of the finalised agreement or agreements.

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Statement of Policy by the West German Chancellor Brandt. (Excerpt)¹

Bonn, October 28, 1969

Of the present centres of tension the conflict

¹ *Heilbronner Stimme*, (Bonn), 4/11/1969.

in the Middle East gives particular cause for alarm. The Federal Government thinks that it would be in the interests of the nations concerned to try to find a solution as offered in the Security Council's Resolution of 22 November 1967. We wish to have good relations with all states in that area, and we confirm our resolve not to supply weapons to areas of tension.

183

Statements by a French Foreign Ministry Official in Support of Lebanon's Territorial Integrity.¹

Paris, October 28, 1969

[He said] that France regards Lebanon's territorial integrity as essential to peace in the Middle East and called for a settlement to the present crisis to be urgently worked out by the neighbouring Arab states. The French government has followed the developments of the situation in Lebanon with concern and shares Lebanon's apprehension as regards the disturbances caused by the commandos' warlike activities against Israel and Israeli reprisals against Lebanon.

"We cannot see that peace in the Middle East can gain anything from actions of this kind. The French government had drawn the Arab nations' attention to the seriousness of the situation. The integrity and tranquillity of Lebanon must be preserved in the interests of peace. Apart from the fact that Lebanon is a friendly state, this will serve the cause of peace in the Middle East."

[In reply to a question, the spokesman said that] Lebanon had not asked for military aid from France.

¹ *L'Orient* (Beirut), 29/10/1969.

184

Address in Parliament by the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Stewart on the British Government's View of the Situation in the Middle East.² (Excerpt)

London, October 30, 1969

I want now to try to set out Her Majesty's Government's view of the Middle Eastern problem. First, there is an imperative need for a political settlement. If any of the countries in the region imagine that they have anything to gain by merely prolonging the present situation, I believe that they are disastrously mistaken, because as long as the present situation continues there will be a steady hardening of opinion both in Israel and in the Arab countries, which will make an ultimate settlement more difficult. We see this already in certain events that have occurred in the Arab world. I do not think that anyone in this country can have anything but a feeling of great sympathy for the Government and people of the Lebanon at this time. We have long had friendly relations with that country. Its contribution to the whole Middle Eastern area, cultural and material, has been of great benefit to the Middle East, and we must hope that the Lebanese, together with their Arab neighbours — for this is an Arab affair — will soon be able to restore their country to its usual peace and prosperity.

But what is happening there and what has happened in some other parts of the Arab world illustrates that unless there is a political settlement in the near future opinions will harden to the point where such a settlement will never be possible. I think that it is fair to say that the Government of Israel should give particular attention to this aspect of the situation. I shall seek in whatever I have to say not to be a partisan of either Israel or the Arab States, because I believe that the overwhelming interest of this country, not only moral but material, is in an agreed settlement. This matters far more to us, and to mankind, than an attempt to secure some precise advantage on this point or that for one side or the other.

² *Hansard*, 30/10/1969, cols. 361-366.

Mr. Eric S. Heffer (Liverpool, Walton): Does my right hon. Friend agree that one of the basic problems in the whole question of a Middle East settlement is that none of the Arab countries will accept that Israel should exist as an independent State? If they would give that assurance it seems that there would then be a basis for accepting the United Nations Resolution.

Mr. Stewart: I shall be coming to that very shortly. My hon. Friend has made a valuable and important point.

I was stressing the enormous importance of reaching a settlement soon, before opinion has hardened to the point where no settlement is possible, and saying how that is in the interests of the countries in the area, as the example of the Lebanon shows, in the interests of Great Britain and many other countries, and in the interests of the very many refugees who live in such distress, dependent on international charity.

What are the mechanics by which one could reach such a settlement? I believe that the basis must be the resolution passed by the Security Council in 1967. Ever since then the task has been to try to turn it into a practical timetable of actions to be performed by all the parties concerned, at the end of which the whole resolution, and not just those bits which please one side or the other, would be carried out.

We had hoped that Dr. Jarring's mediation would bring that about, but so far he has not been successful. In consequence, Her Majesty's Government thought it right to take part in the four-Power discussions, the object of which is to try to create by common counsel such a body of guidance and proposals for Dr. Jarring as would enable him to turn his mission into a reality.

For a time the four-Power talks have been in recess while two Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have talked together. I believe I am right in saying that they have made some progress which will produce a settlement. I think that it is right therefore that before long the four Powers should meet again and that we should try to frame effective guidance to Dr. Jarring.

As to what that guidance should be — and here I take up the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) — it seems to me that an essential item in the content

of a settlement, an essential item in any proposals that Dr. Jarring or anyone else can put to the parties concerned, is that there must be, as the Resolution itself says, a just and lasting peace with all that that implies — and it implies exactly what my hon. Friend said — namely, a clear recognition of the right of Israel to exist.

My hon. Friend may have noticed that after the informal, or semi-informal, meeting in New York to which I referred, a short statement was issued. One of the points — and to this all four permanent members committed themselves — was a clear statement of the right of Israel to exist as a State in the Middle East along with her neighbours. It is the measure of the Middle Eastern tragedy that one should regard a statement like that as being of significance. One might have thought that it ought to be taken for granted, but, in the circumstances as they are, to have had that clearly accepted by all four permanent members was, I believe, a significant step, and certainly neither Her Majesty's Government nor any of the others of the four Powers would depart from the proposition that an essential element in a settlement is the undoubted recognition not only of Israel's right to exist but of her right to be at peace with all that follows from being at peace — the use of the international waterways, and anything else.

Mr. Will Griffiths (Manchester, Exchange): I agree with everything that my right hon. Friend has said. My reason for intervening arises from his reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer). My right hon. Friend referred to the content of the Security Council resolution. Is it not a fact that that resolution was accepted from A to Z, in the words of our own representative at the United Nations, by Egypt and by Jordan?

Sir Tufton Beamish (Lewes): And by the Lebanon?

Mr. Stewart: That is true. I think that my hon. Friend knows that merely to make that point does not solve all the rights and wrongs of it, but as far as it goes that is so.

Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton): How can there be an acceptance of that proposition by a Government who say that they will not in any circumstances negotiate with the country whose existence they agree to recognise?

Mr. Stewart: I have said before that the fact that the Arab countries are not prepared to engage in direct talks with Israel is something that is extremely hard for people of this country to understand.

Mr. Paget: It is wholly inconsistent, is it not?

Mr. Stewart: Because this method of direct and immediate negotiations is not available now, I do not think that either we or Israel ought to say therefore that we will not attempt any other method. I think that we have to try to remember this problem cannot be dealt with in the dimension of reason alone. Behind this lie deep suspicions and hatreds on both sides, which in time we have to resolve. My hon. and learned Friend has presented a splendid logical dilemma, but I do not think that that is the dimension in which this problem, with all the emotions attaching to it, can be solved.

I repeat that I believe that it would be a great advance if the Arab countries would say, "We will negotiate direct with Israel," but I say also that Israel would be mistaken if she said that because they will not do that she will not make any move towards a settlement. That is not the spirit in which the answer can be found.

I have stressed strongly that one part of any useful guidance to Dr. Jarring must be the doctrine of a just and lasting peace. Another part must be secure and recognised borders between Israel and her neighbours. Third — and this will be more welcomed on one side than on the other — there must be no doubt at all about the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories of her neighbours. It is on this point that the Arab countries have professed profound misgivings as to Israeli intentions. It is to this point that Israeli policy must be directed. Is it possible to marry together somehow the insistent and legitimate demand by Israel for a just and lasting peace and security, and the insistent and legitimate demand by the Arab countries for withdrawal? It ought not to be impossible. The other element that there must be in such guidance is a real move forward to relieve the distress of the refugees.

I do not think that it would be possible to devise a package that would meet all those requirements without some willingness on the part of all the

parties concerned to be content with less than 100 per cent. of what they want and I believe that they all know that. The question they have to ask themselves is: although a settlement might not give them 100 per cent. of what they would really like, is not there within reach a settlement that is infinitely better for them all than the continuation of what is going on now?

It seems to me that this is particularly Britain's concern. We, whose interest, not through any special virtue of our own, but as a plain matter of fact as a great trading nation, in the common interest of mankind, and an agreed, workable, and lasting settlement, have to try, in the four-Power talks, to get enough agreement there to provide Dr. Jarring with solid and useful propositions that he can put to both parties. We must hope that the parties concerned will realise how much they have to gain from immediate settlement, and the ultimate disaster that hangs over them all if they lose the opportunity.

Having spoken of the Middle East, I ought to refer to the matter of British arms policy in this area. Here I must remind the House of the principles that I set out governing the policy when I spoke in the debate on 17th June. First, it is not the practice of Her Majesty's Government to reveal the details of particular arms transactions. We have stuck firmly to that, and I think that we are right to do so. Second, immediately after the war of 1967 in the Middle East we adopted the policy of not selling arms anywhere in the Middle East. We would have persisted in that policy if all the other powers had done the same. Failing that, we have now had to say that we must judge any particular request on its merits, and by "on its merits" I mean two things. First, we do not want a situation to arise in the Middle East in which any one nation is so confident of its military superiority that it may be tempted to quick and violent military action. Second, in deciding to say "Yes" or "No" to any particular request, one thing that we must take into consideration — probably the main thing — is what will be the effect of our answer, whether "Yes" or "No", on the prospects of a peaceful settlement? It would not be right to disclose our decision in each particular case. I must ask the House to believe that when we take these decisions we take very much into account what will be the effect on

the prospect of a settlement of whether we say "yes" or "no" to any particular request.

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183 A

Resolutions of the Eleventh Session of the Constituent Assembly of the World Islamic League.¹ (Excerpts)

Mecca, October 29, 1969

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b) The Constituent Assembly observes with regret that some of the Muslim States did not attend the Islamic Summit Conference, and hopes that their reasons for not being represented at the Conference will soon disappear; the Council also hopes that these states will participate in this Islamic enterprise whose object is the rescue of Muslim territory from Zionist aggression, and will join in all the efforts and dispositions made to ensure the implementation of the resolutions and recommendations of the Islamic Summit Conference in the future.

c) The Constituent Assembly of the Islamic World Foundation supports the resolutions of the Islamic Summit Conference which declare that it is the duty of the Muslim countries to assist the Palestine people by all available means to recover all its rights in Palestine.

d) The Constituent Assembly supports the decision of the Islamic Summit Conference as regards aid to the commando organisations which are struggling for God and for the rescue of the homeland, and as regards assistance to their holy war with all material, technical and moral resources, so that they may achieve the highest standards of resistance as regards arms, training and endurance, and become an army with the strength required for it to play a decisive part in the battle of liberation and in the recovery of Palestine by its legitimate owners.

e) The Constituent Assembly supports the conclusion reached by the Islamic Summit Conference through its thorough grasp and sound

understanding of the facts, to the effect that Zionism constitutes danger not only to Palestine, but to other parts of the Islamic homeland, if the Islamic countries are negligent and allow aggression to establish itself and expand. The Assembly also draws the attention of the Islamic countries to the means employed by the occupiers to consolidate their aggressive presence in Palestine in accordance with a well-knit plan whose object is the stifling of popular resistance, the dissolution of the Arab population, the disfigurement of Islamic holy places, and the construction of colonies, fortifications and defence lines. The Assembly fears that these operations will, with the passage of time, help to consolidate the occupation. This is especially important as there are many indications that in accordance with their Middle East policy, the major foreign states, for reasons of their own, are making every effort to prevent the outbreak of another war, under the pretext of pursuing the delusive aim of a peaceful settlement which can only serve the long-term objectives of Zionist aggression.

It is the Assembly's view that the only way to eliminate this mortal peril and to frustrate all conspiracies is to mobilise all necessary human and material potentials and resources, and to prepare for rapid and conclusive action on behalf of complete liberation, regardless of international political conspiracies inasmuch as these set their special interests above those of the Palestinian people.

f) The Constituent Assembly is of the opinion that commando action based on Islamic holy war, is the means of weakening the enemy, and exhausting his strength. At the same time the cause of the usurped must be kept in the minds of Muslims, world opinion and the Muslim states, which must prepare themselves with all necessary resources so that they may be capable of protecting the homelands of the Muslims and defending their Holy Places.

g) Because it thoroughly appreciates and absolutely supports commando action, which it regards as the vanguard in the complete liberation of Palestine, The Constituent Assembly urges that this action should continue on a basis of the Islamic faith and the interests of the Palestine cause only, and that it should not allow its ranks to be infiltrated by alien ideas and suspect faiths

¹ *Al-Bilad* (Jedda), 7/11/1969. The session was held from 10-25 October, 1969.

which do not believe in God and have no connection with the sources of the moral strength of the Islamic faith, and whose loyalty is to foreign centres of leadership and influence which work for their own international aims; it is no concern of theirs that Muslims should be strong and independent, or that their homelands and holy places should be protected.

h) The Constituent Assembly views with the greatest concern attempts that are being made to divert commando action from the pursuit of the objective of liberation to others which are liable to divide the ranks and undermine the unanimous support of all Muslim peoples enjoyed by commando action as being a sound means of rescuing the holy places and the Islamic homeland.

It is in fulfilment of its duty and from its zeal for the sacred cause that the Constituent Assembly records this concern. At the same time it wishes to place on record its satisfaction at the vigilance of the commando leaders and their awareness of the dangers of the situation, which give ground for hope that the commando movement in its entirety will maintain its integrity, unity, and faith, and the enthusiasm required for the achievement of total victory God willing.

i) The Constituent Assembly supports the intention of the Islamic Summit Conference to establish a permanent staff for its Secretariat-General, whose function will be to follow up the implementation of resolutions and recommendations and to find means of achieving profounder understanding and closer cooperation between the Islamic countries in all fields, with the object of protecting their interests and beliefs. In view of the dangers of the present situation and the urgent need for rapid action, the Assembly requests that a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic countries may be held at an early date to establish this permanent staff and decide on a line of action to confront the Zionist challenge.

j) The Constituent Assembly supports the resolution of the Summit Conference on the status of Jerusalem, which resolution rejects all attempts to Judaize or internationalise the Holy City, and emphasises the necessity for the restoration of its former status, which lasted many centuries and allowed all religious denominations to enjoy their civil and religious rights. The Constituent Assembly believes that the United Nations has a

special responsibility to implement its resolutions on Jerusalem, especially resolution No. 2253, of July 4, 1967, which invalidates all Israeli measures taken with the object of annexing the Holy City or changing its historical and actual character and Israel's criminal attempts to achieve the gradual destruction of the holy places, under whatever fraudulent pretext, as happened in the case of the international burning of the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque.

The Constituent Assembly believes that the continued inability of the United Nations to implement these resolutions will inevitably lead to the United Nations losing the respect of all the Islamic peoples and all other peoples and the collapse of its fundamental role as guardian of international peace and the rights of peoples.

k) The Plenary Council believes that all the attempts made to achieve a peaceful solution of the Palestine Question have led to no positive result, and that the formulas for such a solution at present being discussed can only result in the Palestinian people being denied their rights and in Israel achieving a permanent and legitimate status. Much as the Islamic peoples love peace and hate wars, if peace is a way to the right and a safeguard for justice, they believe that to continue these futile efforts will consolidate the roots of aggression, and therefore call on the people of Palestine to continue their heroic resistance.

The Assembly therefore believes that it is the duty of the Islamic and Arab countries, in view of these attempts, to confront their peoples with the undeniable truth and with their full responsibilities, without procrastination or further loss of valuable time, inasmuch as armed aggression can only be defeated by continued armed resistance.

l) The Constituent Assembly believes that if the Islamic holy places remain under Israeli occupation, their safety will be constantly threatened, especially as the enemy makes no secret of his intention of taking every opportunity of removing them and building Jewish synagogues on their ruins. The deliberate burning of the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque, the excavations under its foundations and in the Dome of the Rock and the Mosque of Abraham, and other holy sites and places of worship, are only the first steps in the execution of this criminal plan, which makes it

incumbent on the Islamic countries to view the matter with the gravest concern.

The deliberate burning of the Al-Aqsa Mosque has caused a tragedy which cannot be estimated in financial terms, just as compensation is impossible for the appalling loss sustained when enemy fire consumed the precious and ancient dome of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and other historical monuments. There is moreover, the moral loss, the humiliation felt by Muslims at the thought that the most beloved of their holy places has been stricken. The Council calls on the Islamic countries to contribute financial and artistic aid to the rebuilding of the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque. Moreover, in view of the appalling destruction that has already occurred, and of the fate that awaits the holy places as long as the Jewish occupation continues, it also calls on them to take every possible measure, at the United Nations and elsewhere, to prevent the recurrence of such incidents and to ensure that excavations are stopped, and impresses on them the need to establish an Islamic Guard to take care of the holy places and protect them from aggression.

184 A

Statements in Parliament by the British Foreign Secretary in the Shadow Cabinet Douglas-Home Proposing Guarantees for a Middle East Settlement Plan.¹

London, October 30, 1969

[*Sir A. Douglas-Home.*]

The final possibility of Russian cooperation with the West, which the right hon. Gentleman dealt with at some length, is in the Middle East. So far, the Soviet Union has sought to stir up trouble wherever it could be found, in the Yemen, in Aden and elsewhere, and to exploit in particular the Arabs' dislike and fear of Israel. But in two respects their calculations have gone somewhat awry. First, they are over-committed in Egypt. They did not mean to commit themselves so far, but they have become over-committed and, what is more, on a losing side. Secondly, the Palestine guerrillas are now less of a threat to

Israel than they are to Jordan, Lebanon, and other Arab countries.

The Foreign Secretary gave some account — I understand why he could not do more — of the four-Power talks in New York. The right hon. Gentleman asked whether this might not be made the occasion for an alternation in the policy which Britain pursues of supplying arms to Arabs or to Israelis. I can see so sense in altering the policy at present. But if there was four-Power agreement, then would be the opportunity to ration arms into the Middle East. I think that is what the right hon. Gentleman really meant.

Mr. M. Stewart: That is what I meant.

Sir A. Douglas-Home: This should be done, and it is possible that we are moving in that direction.

The Secretary of State once more recommended the United Nations Resolution, sponsored by the United Kingdom, as a basis for a possible peace in the Middle East. The intentions of that resolution were admirable. I am not sure that it could have been better drafted. Nevertheless, like most resolutions that go to the United Nations, it is capable of at least two interpretations. To the Arabs it means that Israel withdraws immediately and unconditionally to pre-war boundaries in return for a promise of recognition. To the Israelis it means a phased withdrawal to security positions to be negotiated and a complete documented plan supervised and guaranteed at every stage.

There is a world of difference between those two interpretations. But whether one is pro-Arab or pro-Israeli — and, like the right hon. Gentleman, I hope that I have a reasonable neutrality in the matter — one fact of life must be accepted, because unless it is accepted, there will be no solution. The Israelis will not move from their present military positions unless such a plan is presented and carried through in its entirety. Therefore, it seems that if the deadlock is to be altered by international action, it is necessary to realise that physical security for Israel, on the one hand, and for Egypt, Syria and Jordan, on the other, is the absolute essence of this matter.

Therefore, any international plan — of course, bilateral negotiation would be best, but that seems out of the question — must include demilitarisation of sensitive areas, a United Nations force adequate for the purpose of policing, and

¹ *Hansard*, 28-30/10/1969, cols. 383-385.

this time a United Nations presence guaranteed by the four Powers to stay for the period which would cover the total settlement. But most necessary and vital, indeed, to any settlement whatever would be early warning systems against air attack for Israel on the Suez Canal and for Egypt on the Israeli frontier. I doubt whether we will ever get any settlement without that, because for Israel — or for Egypt for that matter, the difference between four-minutes warning and 40 minutes warning of air attack may mean the difference between the life and death of that country, and every Israeli knows it.

Therefore, while I am well aware that international action is very much second best to a directly negotiated peace, and, in a way, less likely to last, if there is to be a peace it must be an international peace plan, and nothing short of the kind of provisions for security that I have mentioned will have any chance whatever of success.

Mr. Shinwell: This is intensely interesting, at any rate to myself, and no doubt to other hon. Members. But is there anything in the Security Council's Resolution which demands the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories which provides, on behalf of the four Powers, a firm guarantee of Israel's security to be implemented in the event of any possible aggression by any of the Arab States? If not, what is the use of it?

Sir A. Douglas Home: I do not know what the right hon. Gentleman's answer would be — he is obviously acquainted more immediately with the matter — but my answer is that there is no such detailed plan. I imagine that this is what the four Powers are working on. If not, then there will be no settlement. If they can find a plan containing the kind of details and guarantees that I have mentioned there is the possibility — I cannot put it higher — of a peace. But it would have to be a plan dealing with these security matters: a phased withdrawal to eventual frontiers with guarantees.

I come back to a proposition that I have made in this House before. I do not believe that even the four Powers together will guarantee frontiers in an area like this, because we cannot identify the aggression. But I believe they could guarantee that if an international force is put into a demilitarised zone they would ensure that that force

was neither attacked nor by-passed. This seems a possibility.

185

Press Conference Statement by the U.S.S.R. Foreign Affairs Ministry on the Situation in the Middle East.¹

Moscow, October 31, 1969

The situation in the Middle East is continuing to worsen to a serious degree. Israel is not stopping her military provocations against the Arab states. The provocations involve ever larger armed forces, which employ heavy weapons, rockets, aviation and tanks. Territories of the Arab countries are continuing to be bombed and shelled. The cease-fire line is actually being turned by Israel into a front line. The provocations by the Israeli Army in the Suez Canal zone, on the banks of the River Jordan and on the Golan Heights are a continuation of the Israeli aggression against the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan.

In the Arab territories which have been temporarily seized, Israeli troops are terrorising the peaceful Arab population and pursuing a policy of colonialism. Israeli leaders are urging Israeli citizens to settle in the occupied Arab territories. The other day a statement to this effect was made by Moshe Dayan, who emphasised that the settlement of Jews in those territories must be Israel's main objective. In other words, Moshe Dayan is proclaiming the annexation of Arab territories to be Israel's state policy.

All this, as well as Israel's deliberate wrecking of any proposals aimed at a political settlement in the Middle East, confirm the fact that the intentions of the Israeli leaders lie not in the direction of peace but of further complications in the area. This is the only possible interpretation of Israel's attitude to the decisions adopted by the United Nations Security Council, including its resolution of November 22, 1967. The statement by Israel's Prime Minister Golda Meir on October 21 in which she actually said that Israel would

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 4/11/1969. The Statement was read out by the head of the Press Department of the Foreign Affairs Ministry Leonid Zamyatin.

reject any advice to rely on the United Nations, is evidence of the fact that the Israeli government is steering a course aimed at blocking a political settlement, presumably expecting Israel to succeed in keeping the Arab lands that have been seized.

This adventurist policy of the Israeli ruling circles is a manifestation of the imperialist plans directed against progressive regimes in the Arab states and against the national independence and freedom of the Arab nations. Imperialist circles of the western powers, and above all those in the United States of America, are encouraging the aggressive Israeli policy in the Middle East and are giving Israel financial and military assistance.

The fact that Israel is receiving active support, in her reckless course, from the United States ruling circles is borne out by the talks recently held in Washington between the Israeli Prime Minister and the U.S. leaders, which resulted in a new shipment of arms to Israel, i.e., to a state which has committed aggression and which is continuing to stage provocations against the Arab countries.

The decision by the U.S. government permitting Americans who enrol in the Israeli Armed Forces to retain their American citizenship is a dangerous step encouraging Israel to embark on new military adventures. By virtue of this measure the U.S. government is offering Israel an opportunity to obtain not only military aircraft but also American pilots and personnel for technical maintenance. There is no doubt that this decision by the U.S. government can lead to serious complications in the Middle East.

The question arises: How can all these actions be compatible with the declarations which are being made in the United States about the need to seek a political settlement? Is it the case, perhaps, that some people would like to use diplomatic corridors to cover up their support for Israel and her aggressive actions? This is the question that comes to mind.

Two years have gone by since the Security Council's decision which made it obligatory for Israel to withdraw her troops from the occupied Arab territories. That decision is aimed at establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The principal and, in fact, the only obstacle in the way of agreement on a political settlement

is the attitude of Israel and of those circles outside Israel, and above all in the United States, who are actually conniving in the claims of the Israeli extremists.

Claims are frequently made to the effect that the Israeli leaders are defending the right of their state to an independent national existence. That is a false claim. Some personalities in Tel Aviv and international Zionist circles are trying in that way to camouflage Israel's adventurist plans aimed at keeping the Arab lands seized in June 1967. If the Israeli leaders were really concerned about the security of their nation, the best solution for them would be to recognise and implement the Security Council's resolution. That resolution proceeds from the premise that all nations in the area are entitled to an independent existence and development. This applies equally to Israel.

By torpedoing a political settlement on the basis of the Security Council's resolution, the Israeli ruling circles are more and more entangling the Israeli people in the criminal and onerous struggle against the Arab peoples. Such policies create a serious threat to the destinies of the peoples in the Middle East and first and foremost to the Israeli people themselves.

The present serious situation in the Middle East demands immediate measures to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied Arab territories is the principal step in order to achieve this objective. Otherwise there cannot be a just or lasting peace in the area. The Soviet government, proceeding on the basis of its firm conviction that the Security Council's resolution must be implemented, has stated, in the course of the consultations within the framework of the United Nations, a number of considerations aimed at an interlinked implementation by the sides concerned of all the provisions of the Security Council resolution. It should be emphasised that together with other issues, the problem of the Palestinian refugees must also be given a just solution.

As is well known, there are contacts among various countries aimed at facilitating the implementation of the Security Council's resolution. The Soviet Union is taking part in those contacts.

We are in favour of a continuation of the contacts that have been established, including a

resumption of meetings by the representatives of the four powers which are permanent members of the Security Council, the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and France — bearing in mind, in this connection, the fact that such meetings should make a speedy contribution to the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression. So far, unfortunately, it cannot be said that the contacts which have taken place have produced tangible results. The reason lies in the obstructionist line of Israel and the one-sided attitude taken by the representatives of some western states, who assume that Israel should benefit from the aggression she has committed. This approach is in contradiction with the Security Council's resolution, which clearly proclaims the inadmissibility of acquiring territories through war and the need to withdraw the Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied at the time of the June conflict. We would like to hope that further contacts will bring positive results and that the achievement of such results will not be protracted.

As for the Soviet Union, it will firmly continue to pursue its policy directed towards a settlement in the Middle East on the basis which has been repeatedly advocated by the Soviet Union and which is compatible with the decisions of the United Nations.

The Soviet government considers that effective measures must be taken to implement the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967. The United Nations and its bodies have at their disposal sufficient means for that purpose.

Failure to implement the Security Council's resolution would, in fact, mean encouraging aggression and would discredit the United Nations and lead to a further dangerous aggravation of the situation in the Middle East.

At a time when the enemies of the Arab peoples are counting on undermining the unity of the Arab states, the strengthening of the unity and cohesion of the Arab states is of particular importance in the opinion of the Soviet Union. As the latest developments around Lebanon have shown, a web of intrigue is being woven in the Middle East; plans are being hatched in order to undermine the unity of Arab states and peoples and to divert their attention from solving vital problems of the present day.

The situation in the Middle East urgently demands the unity of all Arab countries in order to achieve the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression and the safeguarding of the national rights and gains of Arab peoples.

The need to have the aggression in the Middle East ended was again stressed in the address by the general secretary of the central committee of the CPSU, Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, at the Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship meeting. The interests of all peace-loving nations demands that a lasting peace be ensured in that part of our planet. This attitude of the Soviet Union is fully supported and approved by the Arab countries, by other peace-loving states and by progressive opinion throughout the world.

The Soviet government considers it necessary to reiterate that it will continue to extend comprehensive aid to the Arab states which are struggling to maintain the progressive gains of their peoples against the encroachments of Israel and her imperialist protectors. The Soviet government has always advocated a speedy political settlement of the Middle East crisis in the interests of establishing lasting peace in the Middle East and in the interests of world peace.

186

Speech by the Chinese Vice-Premier Hsieh Fu-Chih at a Reception Marking the 15th Anniversary of the Algerian Revolution.¹ (Excerpt)

Peking, November 1, 1969

Imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism have always been the common enemy of the Afro-Asian peoples. At present, U.S. imperialism and its accomplices are intensifying efforts to carry out their policies of aggression and war on a global scale. In the Middle East, they continue to plot their "Middle East Munich" scheme, trying to bring about so-called "Rhodes-type" negotiations so as to induce and force the Arab countries

¹ *Peking Review*, 7/11/1969, p. 3.

to capitulate; at the same time, they more openly support the Zionists in continued aggression and war provocations against the Arab countries and incite the reactionary forces in certain Arab countries to carry out frantic military suppression of the Palestinian people's armed forces in co-ordination with the Zionists, vainly attempting to put out the raging flames of the anti-imperialist struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab people. Just as the Chinese people's great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "All reactionary forces on the verge of extinction invariably conduct desperate struggles. They are bound to resort to military adventure and political deception in all their forms in order to save themselves from extinction." The various schemes and persecutions by U.S. imperialism and its accomplices against the Arab people can only further awaken the 100 million Arab people and lead to revolutions on a broader and more intense scale. He added: Enjoying the support and assistance of the people of the whole world, the Palestinian and other Arab people will certainly foil any schemes of imperialism and its accomplices and win final victory in their struggle so long as they all nurse feelings of hatred for the enemy, strengthen their unity and persevere in the struggle.

187

Statement by a Senior Israeli Official of the Military Government Threatening the Arabs in the Occupied Territories with Military Measures because of their Collaboration with "Infiltrators and Subversives".¹

Tel Aviv, November 4, 1969

[Referring to the seizure by the Israeli authorities of 26 Arab shops in a street where an Arab commando had thrown a grenade at a military vehicle on November 4, 1969:]

You can call it collective punishment. We call it defensive measures. There is more collaboration with terrorists recently. At least it is passive

acceptance of terrorism, because the local people are afraid.

We are saying to them, 'If terrorism continues, life will be unbearable and our defensive measures will make life unbearable.'

If it becomes unbearable, then they will have three choices: Either fight the terrorists themselves or denounce them to us or suffer.

188

Joint Communiqué on the Pakistani President Yahya Khan's Visit to Iran.² (Excerpt)

Islamabad, November 5, 1969

The two leaders condemned the desecration of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and expressed deep concern over the continued deadlock in the Middle-East. Reaffirming the recent declaration on the Rabat Muslim Summit, they welcomed its decision that the Governments concerned should take measures with a view to promoting among themselves close co-operation and mutual assistance in the economic, scientific, cultural and spiritual fields.

They observed that the Islamic Summit Conference had fulfilled a historic necessity. They were sanguine that the process of mutual consultation and co-operation among Muslim countries set in motion at the Conference, will gather momentum with the passage of time. Further reaffirming the Rabat Summit declaration, they agreed that the sacred character of the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem should be preserved and appealed to the Major Powers and all members of the international community to intensify their collective efforts to secure the speedy withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories. In this connection they called for an early implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolution of 22nd November, 1967. They also expressed anxiety over the growing trend towards sacrilege of Muslim holy places and stressed the need for preserving their sacred character.

² *Pakistan Document Series*, Vol. VI, No. 7, November 1969.

¹ *Herald Tribune*, 5/11/1969.

189

Press Conference Statements by the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lipkowsky during a Stopover at Beirut International Airport.¹

Beirut, November 5, 1969

"First and foremost it is always moving for a Frenchman, and for me in particular, to be here in Lebanon to which, like all the French, I am deeply attached. I have come from Saudi Arabia where you can imagine with what anxiety I followed the events which have been taking place in Lebanon, and I learnt yesterday at Riad, of the agreement reached on the subject. Of course, I do not know the essential points of this agreement, but what I can say is that we support anything likely to strengthen the independence and stability of this country.

France, which, there is no need for me to emphasise, is linked to Lebanon by traditional friendship, has followed the events which have taken place in this country with close attention and grave concern. Once again, I repeat that we approve of everything capable of consolidating Lebanon's independence and maintaining its sovereignty."

Q. The Cairo agreement between Lebanon and the Palestinian organisations had provoked new Israeli threats against Lebanon. What is France's attitude to this subject?

A. "France's attitude is well known. We are always opposed to aggressions and you know our attitude in this respect. This is precisely the aim of the conference of the "Four", convened on France's initiative to try and stop further acts of violence taking place in this part of the world, in the hope of finding a solution to the crisis. We believe that the longer the situation lasts, the greater the danger. What has happened in Lebanon — as the spokesman of the French government has said — is in fact a consequence of the Six-Day War which started the troubles in this area. And as long as an agreement based on the resolution of November 22, 1967, is not reached we are bound to be anxious. The situation may become even worse and give access to new acts

of violence of the kind we condemn. We are doing all we can to establish peace on an equitable and just basis, that is on the basis of the November 22 resolution."

Asked whether France would take the initiative in getting the four powers to impose the implementation of the resolution, M. Lipkowsky answered:

"France is strongly in favour of close cooperation between the four because she believes, as she has often said, that the Great Powers should impose the foundations of a settlement. If a direct dialogue were possible between Israel and the Arab states, we should not resort to other means. But we are realistic, and we believe that right now such a dialogue is not possible at present and that it will not be possible unless the Great Powers, and I am not speaking of France, lay aside their rivalries. This is what disturbs us although these powers are agreed on the foundations of a settlement. These are the conditions on which the settlement can eventually be made. This is why we are strongly in favour of close cooperation between the four, and we do not want it to founder or become lethargic. This is why we have decided to give it new life, and I think that the negotiations between the four will be resumed about the 15th of this month."

190

Speech by the Yugoslav President Tito during his Visit to Algeria.² (Excerpt)

Algiers, November 5, 1969

Imperialist and reactionary forces are obstinately trying, by exerting various kinds of pressure, by interfering in the internal affairs of foreign countries and even by inciting local wars, to arrest or delay the inevitable march of events towards the political and economic progress of peoples. But it must be clear to every one that no peace or stability in the world can be permanent without proper respect for equality, national independence and sovereignty and without pro-

¹ *L'Orient* (Beirut), 6/11/1969.

² *Al-Sha'b* (Algiers), 6/11/1969.

viding the right circumstances for the best kind of economic growth in the world.

The government and people of socialist Yugoslavia are making determined efforts to secure permanent application of these principles which, in fact, are the essence of peaceful and positive co-existence. The realisation of these same principles in international relations will help progressive forces in every country to fulfil their historic mission unimpeded by outside pressures or interference.

Naturally, the struggle for a positive policy of co-existence requires the rapid solution of difficult international problems and first and foremost removal of tensions that may lead to war. One of the most dangerous of these tensions at present is the Middle East. There, two years have now elapsed since Israel attacked and occupied Arab territory and in that time it has even been launching new attacks which may at any moment lead to new and more perilous conflict. Hence, a solution must be found to end this unnatural state of affairs in the Middle East, for its continued existence cannot be tolerated. This implies, before all else, the return of the occupied territories to the Arab countries and the realisation of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine. Only in this fashion will it be possible to bring about a situation of general and lasting stability and peace which will be in the interests of all countries in the area.

191

Statement by the French Foreign Minister Schumann on the Situation in the Middle East and Lebanon.¹ (Excerpt)

Paris, November 5, 1969

Essentially, France is anxious for the maintenance of the status quo, that is the unity and independence of Lebanon. Any attempt to upset the established order will inevitably result in a disequilibrium prejudicial to the already preca-

¹ *L'Orient* (Beirut), 6/11/1969. These statements were made during a meeting of the French Council of Ministers.

rious situation in the Middle East. A just and peaceful solution to the present conflict would restore calm to Lebanon. The grave problem constituted by the presence of the Fedayeen on Lebanese territory and by their action against Israel from its territory would become less acute.

France believes that the best method of reaching such a just and peaceful settlement, is still the resumption of the four power talks, which have been suspended since last summer. It was understood, at the meeting of the four foreign ministers of France, Britain, the USA and the USSR in New York on September 20 that these talks might be resumed on about October 20. Mr. Jean de Lipkowsky, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, during his stopover in Beirut on his way to Paris indicated that the four power talks would be resumed on November 15 at the latest. The fact that this date has been confirmed would seem to indicate that the Russian-American bilateral discussions between Mr. Joseph Sisco, the US Under-Secretary of State responsible for Middle East Affairs and Mr. Anatole Dobrynine, the Soviet Ambassador have advanced.

192

Speech by the U.S.S.R. President Podgorny at a Kremlin Meeting Marking the 52nd Anniversary of the October Revolution.² (Excerpt)

Moscow, November 6, 1969

Our effective solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of the United Arab Republic, Syria and other Arab states against the machinations of the Israeli invaders and their imperialist patrons is well known.

The situation in the Middle East is getting worse as a result of the unceasing armed provocations by Israel.

The Tel Aviv government is trying to block a political settlement and is blatantly disregarding the decisions of the United Nations. In this it enjoys the support of the imperialist circles of

² *Soviet News* (London), 11/11/1969.

certain western states, including the United States of America.

The aims of imperialism in the Middle East remain unchanged. They are: to remove progressive regimes, to hold back the liberation movement of the peoples of the Arab East and to restore its domination in this area.

Not least in these imperialist schemes is the attempt to fan up new conflicts, to divide the Arab peoples, to set them against each other and to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab countries, as was shown in the recent events around the Lebanon.

The position of the Soviet Union is firm and consistent — we give aid to the Arab states in their just struggle against aggression and for freedom and independence and we do all we can to attain a political settlement in the Middle East and to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression.

The main condition for a political settlement is the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories they are occupying, as demanded by the well-known resolution of the United Nations Security Council. Without this, there can be no lasting peace in that area.

193

Article on the Palestinian Revolution in the Chinese Official Weekly "Peking Review".¹

Peking, November 7, 1969

Strongly supported by the people of various Arab countries and the world's revolutionary people, the Palestinian people, who are persevering in their armed struggle for national liberation, have become stronger than ever in the course of fighting over the past two years. With their guns, they have brought about an excellent situation and struck U.S. imperialism and Zionism heavy blows. Inspired by the armed struggle of the Palestinian people, the Arab people's anti-imperialist movement is surging ahead daily. These two mighty revolutionary currents have

frustrated the criminal plots of U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism to stamp out the flames of the Palestinian people's armed struggle and to occupy and divide the Middle East between them.

The heroic Palestinian guerrillas are fighting in the van of the Arab people's struggle against U.S. imperialism and Zionism. In the past two years and more, they have been active in all Israeli-occupied and ruled areas. Relying on the support of the broad masses of the people and learning warfare through warfare, they have unfolded guerrilla warfare on an ever growing scale and are steadily gathering greater strength. Since the beginning of this year, their attacks on the Israeli aggressors have become more frequent and fierce. The number of attacks has been increasing month by month, reaching 480 in September alone, almost equal to those in six months last year. Recently, the guerrillas successively raided and damaged the radio station and chlorine factory in Tel Aviv, the heart of Israel, the oil refinery and pipe lines in Haifa, and the airports in Eilat and Jerusalem. These attacks inflicted heavy losses on the Israeli aggressors and left them in a turmoil.

The Palestinian guerrillas have had repeated victories in repulsing the enemy's large-scale offensives. In some of their attacks, they have begun to be capable of concentrating a superior force to encircle and wipe out enemy forces in a given place. In the battle of Karameh on the east bank of the Jordan River in March last year, the Palestinian guerrillas, fully supported by the local inhabitants and employing flexible tactics, defeated the enemies one by one and routed 15,000 Israeli aggressor troops. In early April this year, the guerrilla forces under the command of the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Al-Fatah) and other nationalist organizations formed the Palestine Armed Struggle Command which began co-ordinating the guerrilla forces' military operations and organizing combined actions against the enemy. This marked a further development in Palestinian guerrilla warfare. The guerrilla forces launched an offensive on a considerable scale against the enemy stationed in the green belt of the northern Jordan valley on August 8 this year. This is one instance of the outstanding victories they have won in combined actions. Three guerrilla units under a unified command during the battle broke through what the Israeli

¹ *Peking Review*, 7/11/1969, pp. 18-20.

aggressors boasted of as an "insurmountable defence line" consisting of a mine-field, electrified barbed-wire entanglements and electronic warning installations. They then concentrated a superior force and completely wiped out the enemy troops in three important strongholds. Not long ago, the "Al-Assifa" commandos launched a hard-hitting offensive against 14 Israeli positions along a front stretching 45 kilometres in the Jordan valley and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.

The armed struggle of the Palestinian people has not only hit U.S. imperialism and Israeli Zionism hard militarily but also politically and economically. Israeli "Prime Minister" Golda Meir not long ago declared gloomily that Israel is facing a protracted "war of attrition." Israel's military spending in fiscal 1968-69 soared to 800 million U.S. dollars, accounting for over one-third of the total budget. Israel's financial deficits in the same fiscal year totalled 600 million U.S. dollars. Israel is now gripped by inflation and a serious financial-economic crisis. This has aggravated the contradictions within Israeli ruling circles which are embroiled in endless squabbling. All this is the severe punishment meted out to the Israeli Zionists by the armed struggle of the Palestinian people.

The development of the Palestinian people's armed struggle has been a heavy blow to the criminal designs of U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism to seize the oil-rich and strategically important Middle East area. Thus, U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism harbour inveterate hatred and hostility towards the Palestinian guerrillas. To realize their ambition of carving up and dominating the Middle East, they are working out a "Middle East Munich" conspiracy in an effort to write off the Palestine question, squelch the armed struggle of the Palestinian people, and force the Arab countries to come to terms and surrender through a "political settlement." For this purpose, imperialism and revisionism are taking advantage of the current session of the U.N. General Assembly to step up their criminal collaboration in openly hatching the scheme for "Rhodes-type talks"¹ so as to force the Arab countries to again accept humiliating surrender terms and thus strangle the Palestinian people's armed struggle.

The Palestinian people and guerrillas have

resolutely opposed all U.S. imperialist and social-imperialist frauds for a "political settlement" of the Middle East question. In an important political statement, the Palestine National Council recently reaffirmed "the Palestine people's insistence on refusing all solutions of surrender, and in particular the Security Council's November 22, 1967 Resolution." Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization's Executive Committee and official spokesman of the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Al-Fatah), told a Hsinhua correspondent not long ago: "Our people categorically reject any results reached both at the four-power talks and the Soviet-U.S. bilateral talks on the Middle East question, because they are against the will and aspirations of our people."

The Palestinian people have come to realize profoundly from their struggle that only by firmly grasping their guns can they carry the national-liberation struggle through to the end. Embroidered on the flags and emblems of many guerrilla organizations, the gun has become a symbol of their strength and victory. The flag and emblem of the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Al-Fatah) bear the following clear-cut slogan: "Revolution till victory!" Abu Khalia, commander of an "Al-Assifa" commando base put it well when he told Hsinhua: "It has taken us 20 years to find the great truth that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' No force on earth can make us lay down our arms. The 'peaceful solution' plot hatched by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism cannot alter our determination to fight to the very end."

In their fight against the "political solution" plot, the Palestinian people have more and more clearly seen through the ugly features of social-imperialism. While making behind-the-scenes counter-revolutionary political deals with U.S.

¹ Incited by U.S. and British imperialism, Israel in 1948 launched an aggressive war against the Arab countries and occupied the Palestinian areas where the Arab people originally lived, ousting more than 1,000,000 Arab people from their homeland. The armies of the Arab countries fought back. In 1949, the United Nations intervened in the Palestine problem at the dictate of U.S. and British imperialism. It compelled the Arab countries to hold "indirect talks" with the Israeli aggressors on the Island of Rhodes in Greece and an "armistice agreement" beneficial to the Israeli aggressors was reached. This is the so-called "Rhodes-type" negotiations. [Footnote in source text.]

imperialism in a vain attempt to strangle the Palestine liberation cause, social-imperialism has cranked up its propaganda machine and, either by insinuation or openly, attacked the Palestinian guerrillas as "extremists" who are "not taking into account the present condition of the Arab East," and taking "Trotsky's stand," etc. This has aroused great indignation on the part of the Palestinian people.

What warrants attention is that U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism are now redoubling their efforts to use different despicable methods to sabotage the armed struggle of the Palestinian people. They have instigated the reactionaries of some Arab countries to suppress the Palestinian guerrillas and revolutionary people in those countries. For instance, U.S. imperialism has recently collaborated with the Lebanese authorities to feverishly put down the Palestinian armed forces. They have groomed and set up phoney guerrilla organizations to make trouble and engage in sabotage, or used various tactics in an effort to control and split the guerrillas. In its political statement, the Palestine National Council pointed out: "The Palestinian people are conscious of the attempts at encirclement and the schemes worked out against the Palestine cause and revolution." Redoubling their vigilance, the heroic Palestinian people are waging a tit-for-tat struggle against the schemes of imperialism, revisionism and all reaction.

NEW STORM OF ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT.

The revolutionary fighting will of the Arab people has been greatly encouraged by the vigorous development of the Palestinian people's armed struggle. The Palestinian people in the Israeli-occupied zones and the people of various Arab countries have launched a more extensive anti-imperialist mass movement spearheaded directly against U.S. imperialism and Zionism. They support each other in struggle and have merged into an irresistible mighty current.

To protest the sentences passed by the Israeli authorities on three young Palestinian women, 5,000 women students in the city of Gaza in the Israeli-occupied zones waged a powerful anti-persecution struggle in February this year. This gave rise to a storm which swiftly engulfed the whole Gaza Strip and many main cities and towns

on the west bank of the Jordan River. It spread from protest demonstrations to strikes by workers, students and businessmen. Tens of thousands of Palestinian people in Gaza took to the streets to set up barricades and road blocks and fought back with bricks and stones against the Israeli troops and police sent to suppress them. When they surrounded the headquarters of the Israeli occupation forces, the Israeli occupation authorities were thrown into great fright and confusion.

Sharing the joys and sorrows of the Palestinian people, the people of various Arab countries have all along stood on the side of the Palestinian people, regarding their struggle as an inseparable part of the anti-imperialist struggle of the entire Arab people. In different ways they give the most enthusiastic support to the Palestinian people's armed struggle. Since the 1967 "June 5 war,"¹ many Arab youths have ardently requested to join the Palestinian guerrillas. Some 40,000 Arab youths asked to be enrolled in the Palestinian guerrilla forces in less than half a month after the battle of Karameh last year. The Arab people have also held one demonstration after another to voice their strong opposition to the aggression by U.S. imperialism and Zionism and to all the frauds concocted by U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism for a "political solution" to force the Arab countries to compromise and surrender to liquidate Palestine's liberation cause.

The August 21 incident in which the El Aqsa Mosque in Israeli-occupied Jerusalem was burnt, stirred the Arab people to wage a massive struggle against U.S.-Israeli aggressive crimes. On August 23 alone, more than one million Arab people in the Israeli-occupied zones downed tools and closed their shops. In the week August 23-29, more than 100,000 people in Syria, the United Arab Republic, Sudan, Jordan, Lebanon and other Arab countries staged mammoth demon-

¹ On June 5, 1967, U.S. imperialism instigated its instrument for aggression in the Middle East, Israel, to launch a large-scale war of aggression against the United Arab Republic, Syria and other Arab countries. Large sectors of Arab territory were occupied. In six days, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip, the west bank of the Jordan River, the Sinai Peninsula of the United Arab Republic, Syria's Golan Heights, and other areas, which total more than 65,000 square kilometres. This was the third large-scale war of aggression launched by the Israeli Zionists against Arab countries under the instigation of U.S. imperialism. [Footnote in source text.]

trations against U.S.-Israeli crimes of aggression. Demonstrators shouted: "Oppose U.S. imperialism!" "Oppose Zionism!" "Long live the Palestinian people's armed struggle!" and other slogans. Workers in Arab countries such as Iraq and Kuwait also went on strike to protest and angrily denounce U.S.-Israeli crimes.

The recent atrocities committed by the U.S. imperialists in league with the Lebanese authorities in trying to put down the Palestinian guerrilla forces have aroused strong indignation among the people of the Arab countries. Tens of thousands of people in Beirut, the capital, and other parts in Lebanon held demonstrations in spite of the brute force used against them. They raised the standard of Palestine on the roofs of many buildings and bravely attacked government organizations, and fired back to resist the suppressive actions of the authorities. Demonstrators in Tripoli, a port in the northern part of Lebanon, took up arms in self-defence, occupied the "old town" of the city and drove the Lebanese troops to the outskirts. Several hundred thousand Arab people in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Algeria, the United Arab Republic, Libya, Sudan and other Arab countries demonstrated in quick succession, angrily denouncing U.S. imperialism's criminal designs.

The great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "The people are the decisive factor. By relying on the people's unity and struggle we can definitely defeat imperialism and its lackeys and achieve lasting world peace."

The vigorous and powerful struggle waged by the people of Palestine and other Arab countries marks the new awakening of the Arab people.

194

Statement by the U.S. State Department on Foreign Military Service by U.S. Citizens.¹

Washington, November 12, 1969

Questions have been raised in the past few weeks regarding the U.S. government policy with respect to service by private American citizens in foreign armed forces.

¹ *The Daily Star* (Beirut), 13/11/1969.

The Department of State strongly opposes such involvement by private Americans as contrary to the foreign policy interests of the U.S.

Federal statutes long in force prohibit certain aspects of foreign military service originating within the United States. For example, section 958 of title 18, U.S. Code, prohibits acceptance and exercise within the U.S. of a commission to serve in the armed forces of a state at war against a state with which the U.S. is at peace. Section 959 prohibits enlistment within the U.S. for foreign military service. These sections carry penalties of fines or imprisonment or both.

The reason that, as a matter of policy, the Department of State opposes service in foreign military forces is that such service can raise serious problems for our government in the conduct of its foreign relations. Service in foreign military forces risks involvement by U.S. citizens in hostilities with countries with which we are at peace.

We recognize that each state has the authority to determine who shall be entitled to its citizenship as well as the power to determine who, within its territories, shall be subject to compulsory military service. However, the Department of State hopes that individual Americans will do all that is legally possible to avoid foreign military service with its attendant risks for the overall national interest as well as their own personal welfare.

The Department of State is actively considering whether there are additional steps that might be taken to support more fully the policy objectives of our government on this matter.

195

Joint Communiqué on the Sudanese Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Premier Numairi's Visit to the Soviet Union.² (Excerpt)

Moscow, November 12, 1969

An exchange of views took place on the Middle East situation in connection with the unceasing military provocations by Israel against Arab countries.

² *Soviet News* (London), 18/11/1969.

Both sides agree that the present situation in the area calls for urgent steps to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression. As the first step to achieve this aim, Israeli troops should be withdrawn from all occupied Arab territories, without which there can be no lasting and just peace in the Middle East.

The two sides believe that effective steps should be taken to put into effect the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967.

The non-fulfilment of this resolution in practice encourages aggression, discredits the United Nations and leads to a further deterioration in the Middle East situation, which is dangerous to the cause of peace.

The strengthening of the unity and solidarity of the Arab states is particularly important for thwarting the plans of the imperialist powers against progressive regimes in Arab countries and against the national independence and freedom of the Arab peoples.

The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of the Sudan will press for the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine, to be ensured.

196

Replies in Parliament by the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Stewart to Questions on the Arab-Israeli Dispute.¹

London, November 17, 1969

29. *Sir T. Beamish* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what indications have been given by the Israeli Government of their willingness to implement the 1967 Security Council resolution; and if he will make a statement on the progress towards a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Mr. M. Stewart: The Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Abba Eban, spoke about Israel's acceptance of the 1967 Security Council resolution in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly

on 19th September. The full text of Mr. Eban's speech is in the Library of the House.

Sir T. Beamish: What success has the right hon. Gentleman had in persuading the Israeli Government that a United Nations guarantee of new frontiers after withdrawal from Arab-occupied lands and an end of the state of war could be relied on next time?

Mr. Stewart: I think that it is well known that the Israeli Government's doubts about the certainty of such a guarantee are one of the difficulties in reaching a settlement. But this is by no means the whole story in reaching a settlement. What we must do through the four-Power talks and Dr. Jarring is to try to make out a workable settlement on the lines of the Security Council Resolution.

Mr. Rose: Is it not right that Mr. Eban has also said that nothing is not negotiable, and that the Israelis have modified their position and agreed to Rhodes-type talks, which were subsequently dismissed by the Egyptian Government? Does my right hon. Friend agree that recent blood-and-fire speeches do not help to lower the temperature in the area?

Mr. Stewart: My hon. Friend is quite correct on his first point. He also correctly describes the Rhodes-type talks. There seems to be some misunderstanding and disagreement about exactly what that phrase means. As to the speech of President Nasser to which my hon. Friend refers, a speech of that kind is unhelpful and drives home how important it is to obtain a settlement before the danger becomes more acute.

Viscount Lambton: What is the British interpretation of the wording of the 1967 Resolution? Does the right hon. Gentleman understand it to mean that the Israelis should withdraw from all territory taken in the late war?

Mr. Stewart: No, Sir. That is not the phrase used in the resolution. The Resolution speaks of secure and recognised boundaries. Those words must be read concurrently with the statement on withdrawal.

Mr. Mayhew: Can my right hon. Friend say precisely how far the Israelis have discussed the question of security if and when they return to their old territories? Is not this a case where

¹ *Hansard*, 14-20/11/1969, cols. 843-846.

perhaps the French and British could take an initiative, since the Americans and Russians seem to have become bogged down in commitment to one side or the other?

Mr. Stewart: There has been some progress in the talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. I agree that it would be desirable for the Four to resume their talks to try to work out at least the beginning of a settlement that would conform to everything in the Security Council resolution.

Mr. Longden: Is not the situation in the Middle East drifting towards inevitable disaster? Cannot the British Government take an initiative? Would not an additional guarantee such as that suggested in my later Question on the Order Paper increase the confidence of Israel that any settlement would be honoured?

Mr. Stewart: It would be better to wait until we reach that Question.

Mr. Shinwell: In view of the recent declaration by Colonel Nasser that the Middle East problem can be resolved only by force, and the attitude of another Arab Government, that of Libya, towards Great Britain, is not the United Nations resolution just a farce? Will my right hon. Friend take into account the fact that the only country in the Middle East friendly disposed towards Great Britain is the State of Israel?

Mr. Stewart: There has been some criticism in the House of hon. Members trying to advance their Questions by linking them with others. There are Questions later about Libya. I have already expressed my view about President Nasser's speech. I do not believe, despite that speech, that we should regard a disaster as inevitable, and certainly we should not set aside the Security Council Resolution as the basis of a settlement. If any settlement that is workable and will last is reached, it will be broadly on the basis of that Resolution.

197

Statement in Parliament by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Sharp on his Visit to the Middle East.¹

Ottawa, November 19, 1969

... I rise to report upon my visit to the Middle East, which took place last week.

Canada has been closely concerned in Middle Eastern affairs since we participated in the activities of the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine, which drew up the Palestine partition plan of 1947. We voted for the United Nations resolution setting up the State of Israel in 1948. Recognition of the right of the State of Israel to exist remains an essential feature of our Middle Eastern policy. At the same time, we try to maintain an objective approach to the current problems of the area. Our essential objective is that all states there should be enabled to live in peace and security, free from threats of war or territorial encroachment.

For two decades, Canada has had military personnel in United Nations peacekeeping operations in the area. Canada is also the third-largest contributor to the United Nations agency working for the relief of the Arab refugees.

Our Middle Eastern policy has largely found expression though the United Nations in New York. It was there that we took part in the steps which led to the birth of the State of Israel; it was there that the United Nations Emergency Force was established. More recently, as a member of the Security Council, it was there that we took part in drafting Resolution 242 of November 1967, the resolution that we feel offers the best available framework for progress toward peace in the area.

My visits were a reflection of our long involvement in the affairs of the Middle East, in response to invitations from the Foreign Ministers of Iran, Israel and the United Arab Republic, and in return for visits paid to Canada by the Shah of Iran, the President, the late Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel, and the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic. More particularly, I wished to learn at first hand the

¹ *Canadian External Affairs*, December 1969, pp. 451-453.

attitudes and policies of the governments concerned with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

I return from my visit both saddened and discouraged. Prime Minister Meir and President Nasser both told me that they seek a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is very hard to see how useful negotiations can begin when the preoccupations of the parties are in direct confrontation. Israel is preoccupied with the security of its boundaries and its insistence upon direct negotiations with its neighbors. The United Arab Republic is preoccupied with the withdrawal of Israel to its pre-1967 boundaries and the fate of the Arab refugees. I can see no immediate resolution of this confrontation.

When I went to the Middle East, I had no solution to offer and no proposals to make; I went to inform myself on the situation as seen by Iran, a nation which does not take sides, and by the two main protagonists. In every country visited we were received with great courtesy by the head of state, the principal minister and the foreign minister. In each country, the heads of state and their ministers devoted many hours to concentrated conversations. The views I expressed in outlining Canadian policy were given thoughtful consideration and the questions I asked answered fully and forthrightly. Wherever I went, I found a manifest wish to have Canada understand the positions taken. This reminds us of Canada's special standing as a peace-seeking and peace-making nation and is evidence, perhaps, of the need for understanding on the part of the nations in conflict.

My first visit was to Iran, where I saw a nation preoccupied with the advancement of its economy and the improvement of the conditions of life of its people. Its geographical location requires Iran to be intimately involved in the problems of the Middle East. I found a nation some 6,000 miles from Canada, in the heart of the Middle East, pursuing a Middle Eastern policy closely parallel to our own. In my subsequent visits, I found my discussions in Tehran most useful both for the information I drew from them and for the political attitudes expressed.

In Israel, I was moved, as anyone must be, by the sense of pride in nationhood that characterizes that country, and deeply impressed by what has been achieved in nation-building in 20 years. In Egypt, I saw a nation where the evidences of

ancient glory are very much present, contrasting cruelly with the present-day struggle to evolve a better standard of living for its people.

The situation in the Middle East today is tragic. There is so much to be done in that part of the world and the will and technology are there. The tragedy is that, in so many of the countries, the resources needed for development are tied up in an arid confrontation which threatens to burst into violent conflict.

I left the Middle East with a profound sense of disquiet. Effective negotiation is not an immediate prospect. Escalation of the conflict is an immediate danger. In these circumstances, perhaps the best role for Canada to play in the foreseeable future is that of an understanding, compassionate and objective observer, ready to assist if and when there is a specific task for us to undertake at the instance of both sides.

Let us hope that, notwithstanding the present difficulties, counsels of moderation will prevail, and that someday, somehow, peace will come to the Middle East.

It would not be appropriate in a statement on motions to review in detail the bilateral discussions we had in each capital. There are great trading opportunities, particularly with Iran and Israel, and some important possibilities with the United Arab Republic. All three countries are eager for increasing contact with us. Perhaps one of the ways we can help is to be more of a presence in the Middle East, a part of the world that needs friends and cherishes friendship.

198

Joint Communiqué on the Turkish President Sunay's Visit to the Soviet Union.¹ (Excerpt)

Moscow, November 21, 1969

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Both sides reaffirmed their serious concern with the dangerous situation still remaining in the Middle East. They once again come out against

¹ *Moscow News*, 20/12/1969. First appeared in *Pravda*, 22/11/1969

the use of force for territorial acquisitions, as well as against the use of the *fait accompli* policy as a means for settling issues. They emphasized the need for withdrawing Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories, in keeping with the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, which is still an acceptable foundation for a political settlement of the conflict and the establishment in the given area of a just and lasting peace. They consider that this resolution should ensure the lawful rights and interests of the Arab countries.

199

Report on Yugoslavia's Foreign Policy by the Yugoslav Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Tepavac to the Federal Assembly.¹ (Excerpt)

Belgrade, November 26, 1969

The prolongation of the occupation of Arab territory in the Middle East is obviously increasing the difficulties in the way of a political settlement. Two years have passed since Israel's aggression and it is two years since the Security Council approved a resolution which was accepted and endorsed by an overwhelming majority of states and by far the greatest section of world opinion. It is becoming increasingly obvious that it would be impossible for Israel to disregard the Security Council's resolution without the public and secret political and material support of a large number of western states which linked some of their interests with those of Israel's annexationism. History will not forgive Israel for resorting to arms with the purpose of usurping foreign territory and for depriving the Palestinian population of the conquered regions of their elementary rights. The Arab countries are in the process of uniting and developing into a force which will inevitably involve Israel in a long and cruel war from which she cannot emerge as the victor.

200

Statement by the Communist Parties and Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia on the Situation in the Middle East.²

Moscow, November 27, 1969

In the Middle East area of late there is again a dangerous growth of tensions, as a result of the aggressive policy of the most bellicose circles of imperialism.

Israel is organizing armed provocations against the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan and other Arab states on an ever-increasing scale. Increasingly larger armed forces employing heavy guns, aircraft and tanks are being involved in these provocations. On the occupied Arab territories, Israel is pursuing a policy of colonialist plunder, oppression and violence with respect to the Arab population. These actions on the part of Israel are extremely perilous, they are impelling developments in this area towards a new armed conflict.

This provocative Israel policy, which places obstacles in the way of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, is an expression of designs directed against the progressive regimes in the Arab countries, against the liberation movement of the Arab peoples, which is playing a preeminent role in the struggle against imperialism. The imperialists seek to regain the positions they have lost in the Middle East in order to go on plundering the national riches of the Arab countries, and first of all their resources of oil. It is precisely for this reason that the imperialist circles of certain Western powers, first and foremost the USA, are vigorously encouraging the Israel policy of annexations in the Middle East, and are giving Israel ever-increasing financial, military and other aid. Large quantities of the latest types of armaments, including aircraft, missiles, etc., are being placed in the hands of the aggressors.

Two years have elapsed since the Security Council adopted a resolution directed towards the establishment of a just peace in the Middle

¹ *Yugoslav Review of International Affairs*, 5/12/1969.

² *Moscow News*, 6/12/1969. First appeared in *Pravda*, 27/11/1969.

East, and obliging Israel to evacuate its troops from the occupied Arab territories. However, this resolution has still not been carried out, because of the brazen, adventuristic position of Israel, which is stubbornly ignoring the will of the United Nations Organization, and the will of the world public.

Israel and its patrons are deliberately thwarting the possibilities afforded for a political settlement, in the hope that they will be able to annex the captured Arab territories. Only thus can one qualify Israel's attitude to the imperative demands of the broad world public and to the decisions of the UN Security Council, including its November 22nd, 1967 resolution. Following the recent general election in Israel, which proceeded in an atmosphere of chauvinistic hysteria, the positions of frankly reactionary, extremist forces that are prodding the Israeli people to continue and deepen the conflict with their Arab neighbours, have gained in strength in that country.

By thwarting a political settlement of the Middle East conflict, Israeli ruling circles are increasingly involving the Israeli people in a criminal drawn-out struggle against the Arab people. This policy creates a grave danger in the first place for the Israeli people themselves, and is also pregnant with a threat to universal peace.

This aggressive policy of Israel and those circles in the West which inspire and instigate the Israeli aggression is arousing growing indignation in the world.

The world public is pressing for effective measures to implement the Security Council's Resolution of November 22nd, 1967. The failure to fulfil this resolution is encouraging the aggressor, and leading to the discredit of the United Nations and a dangerous aggravation of the Middle East situation.

The present grave situation in the Middle East demands acceptance of urgent steps. The peoples of the world must compel Israel to pull its troops out of the seized Arab territories. There can be no lasting and just peace in that region without the settlement of this issue. The package deal must also include fair guarantees for the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab people of Palestine, who are waging a courageous national-liberation and anti-imperialist struggle.

Events show that the imperialists continue their attempts to topple Arab progressive regimes by using the ruling Zionist circles of Israel as their instrument for this purpose. The enemies of the Arabs are counting on a weakening of Arab unity. For this reason closer unity of Arab states is assuming special importance in the efforts to eliminate the aftermath of the Israeli aggression.

The socialist countries, sincere friends of the Arab states at all times, are expressing fraternal solidarity with the Arab peoples who are fighting in defence of their national independence, sovereignty and freedom.

Our Parties, peoples and states are fully determined to do their best to frustrate the plans of the aggressors in the Middle East. The socialist countries will continue giving every assistance to the Arab states, struggling to preserve the progressive gains of their peoples and to beat off the encroachments of Israel and its patrons.

On behalf of our Parties, peoples and states we are urging all nations, all peaceloving states to give effective support to the Arabs in their just struggle for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, for freedom and independence, and against the intrigues of the imperialist forces in the Middle East, and for a just settlement of the Middle East crisis, in the interests of establishing a durable peace in that region, in the interests of peace in the entire world.

201

Replies in Parliament by the British Premier Wilson to Questions on the Middle East.¹

London, November 27, 1969

Q4. *Mr. Eadie* asked the Prime Minister what arrangements for dealing with policy matters by Her Majesty's Ministers have been made as a result of the prolongation of the war in the Middle East.

The Prime Minister: There has been no change in the arrangements, Sir.

¹ *Hansard*, 21-27/11/1969, cols. 614-616.

Mr. Eadie : Is my right hon. Friend aware that U Thant is reported to have said that we are probably in for another hundred years' war in the Middle East? As we are so dependent on the Middle East for such a large slice of our oil supplies, would not my right hon. Friend agree that this is a further illustration of how the White Paper on Fuel Policy is redundant? What does my right hon. Friend propose to do about it?

The Prime Minister : I do not think that anybody in this House, nor U Thant, would want to use that remark to show that nothing should be done about trying to get a settlement in the much nearer future. I know that my hon. Friend would not want his question to be misinterpreted as meaning that he is concerned only with oil supplies. There is a much stronger moral reason why we should all try to seek a settlement —

Mr. Biggs-Davison : Like in Nigeria.

The Prime Minister : Yes, like in Nigeria.

Hon. Members : And in Rhodesia.

The Prime Minister : This is a very difficult problem, almost an intransigent one. We are pressing for an early resumption of the Four-Power talks in which we have an important stake.

Mr. Walters : Bearing in mind the increasingly deteriorating situation and the threat that it could bring to British interests, should not the Prime Minister now consider a new British Government initiative, possibly in association with France?

The Prime Minister : I hope that the hon. Member will feel the right answer is that since France and ourselves are both engaged with the United States and the Soviet Union in Four-Power talks, that this is the right forum for pressing what I know the hon. Gentleman genuinely has in mind.

Dr. Miller : Would the Prime Minister not agree that the full implementation of a cease-fire in the area would be the most valuable contribution to the solution of the problems there?

The Prime Minister : The United Nations has repeatedly called for a cease-fire on both sides. That is really aimed at preventing the situation from getting even more dangerous than it is. The future solution of the problem, which we hope will be at a much earlier date than has been

mentioned this afternoon, must depend on the full implementation of the Security Council Resolution, which we moved there.

Mr. Heath : The Foreign Secretary told the House, I think on 17th November, that his interpretation of the United Nations Resolution was that withdrawal from territories did not mean all territories which were occupied in the six-day war and that this had to be read in conjunction with the words "there should be secure frontiers as a result of a settlement." Is this not a most important interpretation of the Resolution, and can the Prime Minister say whether this represents any change in British policy? Is this interpretation accepted by the other three Powers with whom we are having private talks in the United Nations, and is it accepted by the Israelis and the Arabs?

The Prime Minister : The right hon. Gentleman is right to draw attention to what my right hon. Friend said, but that is the interpretation we have put on it all along and made clear at the time of the acceptance of the Resolution. It has been the basis of Dr. Jarring's talks. It has also been the basis of our approach in the Four-Power talks. It is a question of concurrence, not necessarily in terms of time, but an agreed package from the beginning, so that if point A happens point B automatically follows, including the security of frontiers and the security and the right to live, of countries in that area who have not been granted the right even of recognition. As to what the areas from which withdrawal would be appropriate may be, that is still an unsolved problem between the Four. We have made our position clear, that it must be a package as a whole. If one thing begins the rest must follow.

202

Communiqué by the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France, on the Situation in the Middle East.¹ (Excerpt)
New York, December 2, 1969

They confirmed that they regard the situation

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 4/12/1969.

in the Middle East as increasingly serious and urgent, and reaffirmed their conviction that this situation must not be permitted to jeopardise international peace and security.

Their objectives remain unchanged, to promote the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East through supporting the resolution of the Security Council (No. 242) of November, 1967, which should be carried out in all its parts.

They are also acting pursuant to the statement made by the four Foreign Ministers at their meeting with Secretary-General U Thant on September 20, 1969.

They expressed their readiness to consider at their meeting specific questions concerning the implementation of the resolution in all its aspects as a 'package deal' relating to the entire region of conflict in the Middle East.

Bearing these agreed aims in mind, the permanent representatives wish to assist the Secretary-General's special representative (Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring) to resume as soon as possible his task of promoting agreement and assisting efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242. The permanent representatives will pursue their endeavours with all possible speed.

203

Joint Communiqué on the Danish Foreign Minister Hartling's Visit to the Soviet Union.¹ (Excerpt)

Moscow, December 2, 1969

Both sides expressed concern over the complicated situation in the Middle East. They voiced deep anxiety over the fact that a just and stable peace on the basis of the Security Council resolution of November 22nd, 1967, has not yet been established. They support the mission of Amba-

sador Jarring, special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant.

204

Interview Granted by the West German Chancellor Brandt to the Egyptian Daily "Al-Ahram".² (Excerpt)

Bad Godesberg, December, 1969

Q. In your policy statement, you said that the situation in the Middle East was one of the areas of tension which caused you "the profoundest concern", and in an earlier statement you condemned "the occupation of territory through war". Would you care to add anything to these statements, as far as the occupied territories in the Arab World are concerned? What, in your opinion, are the best means for realising the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967?

A. As you know, Mr. Haqqi, the Federal Government said in its policy statement that, in its view, a solution to the dispute in the Middle East must be reached on the basis of the resolution unanimously adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1967. This resolution calls for a peaceful settlement which takes two principles into consideration, the withdrawal of armed forces from the occupied territories and the right of all states to live in peace and to have their sovereignty and independence respected. We call for the implementation of both these principles because our foreign policy is based upon the general conviction that in our day and age force must not be employed as a means to achieve political objectives. We also realise that our own ability to help find a peaceful solution in the Middle East is limited. We are neither a member of the United Nations nor a great power with world-wide political influence, nor do we seek such influence. But we do express our views, in our talks with other governments, whenever the opportunity arises. We hope that the efforts being

¹ *Moscow News*, 20/12/1969. First appeared in *Pravda*, 2/12/1969.

² *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 12/12/1969. The interview was conducted by Mr. Muhammad Haqqi during the first week of December 1969.

made to find a just and peaceful solution to the problem in the Middle East will prove successful.

Q. The Palestinian entity is now emerging as one of the most important elements in the Middle East situation. You have always supported the right of all peoples to self-determination. When you spoke of the refugees, you stated that West German aid was only intended to alleviate a part of their distress and such aid was not a solution to their problem. You also expressed your hope for a "just and lasting" solution to this problem. Would you care to comment on what you conceive to be "a just and lasting solution"?

A. The Germans know, from their own experience, how hard is the lot of refugees, for after the war they had to find homes and work for twelve million refugees. As a result of the economic prosperity and the efforts of the government, the problem was solved in a relatively short space of time. I do not presume to suggest German proposals as solutions to this problem which falls within the scope of the United Nations, which has dealt with it, in fact, in a number of resolutions. The Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, which you have mentioned, has also affirmed the necessity of finding a just solution to the problem of the refugees.

As you know, in 1967 the Federal Government offered DM 50 million as special aid to Palestinian students, constructing a large vocational school, and supplying a large part of their needs. There are other programmes under preparation. We hope that in this manner we shall be able to make an effective contribution.

Q. In your policy statement, you spoke of refraining from sending arms to areas of tension in the world, including the Middle East. Does this mean a German embargo on arms shipments to Israel, similar to the French embargo?

A. The Federal Government clearly affirmed in its policy statement that it was not going to send any arms to areas of tension. This, at least, must apply to the Middle East. We intend to pursue a policy in support of a real peace, commensurate with our potentialities. This was my view when I was Foreign Minister and it naturally remains my view as Chancellor.

Q. You have found it more appropriate to create normal relations with Israel on the assumption that, from

the Arab point of view, this is preferable to the continuation of a relationship based on an ambiguous attitude. Does this step mean the beginning of a "new look" and an end to the West German practice of dealing with one nation on a "privileged position" basis, and the treatment of all states in the region on an equal footing?

A. I am convinced that with the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel a few years ago, an important step was taken towards normalising Israel-German relations. Perhaps many of the difficulties that have attended Arab-German relations could have been avoided had that decision been taken earlier. The object of the policy of the Federal Government in the Middle East is to create a balanced relationship with all states concerned. This, however, has not been achieved, due to the absence of formal relations with all the Arab States.

Q. You have always favoured frank and direct talks as the best means of overcoming obstacles between peoples. As regards the Arabs, it was a deep sense of disappointment with a friend that led to the breaking of the relations between us. Today, five years later, relations are still broken despite the great reserves of good feeling between our peoples and the traditional cultural bonds and friendship between us. A dialogue began in fact when Mr. Abd al-Khaleq Hassuna, Secretary-General of the Arab League, visited Bonn in April, 1967; what are the steps you deem necessary to rebuild the bridges of confidence between us and then to restore our relations to normal?

A. Yes, I feel that frank and direct talks are the best means of overcoming obstacles among nations. Good relations can only be established on the basis of mutual confidence and understanding of the problems and views of others. We want to restore good relations with all Arab states, even if this is not possible overnight. I well remember the visit of the Arab League Secretary-General. This visit may well mark a positive beginning.

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**Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers
on U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East.¹
(Excerpt)**

Washington, D.C., December 9, 1969

I am going to speak tonight about the situation in the Middle East. I want to refer to the policy of the United States as it relates to that situation in the hope that there may be a better understanding of that policy and the reasons for it.

Following the third Arab-Israeli war in 20 years, there was an upsurge of hope that a lasting peace could be achieved. That hope has unfortunately not been realized. There is no area of the world today that is more important, because it could easily again be the source of another serious conflagration.

When this administration took office, one of our first actions in foreign affairs was to examine carefully the entire situation in the Middle East. It was obvious that a continuation of the unresolved conflict there would be extremely dangerous, that the parties to the conflict alone would not be able to overcome their legacy of suspicion to achieve a political settlement, and that international efforts to help needed support.

The United States decided it had a responsibility to play a direct role in seeking a solution.

Thus, we accepted a suggestion put forward both by the French Government and the Secretary General of the United Nations. We agreed that the major powers — the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France — should cooperate to assist the Secretary General's representative, Ambassador Jarring, in working out a settlement in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations of November 1967.² We also decided to consult directly with the Soviet Union, hoping to achieve as wide an area of agreement as possible between us.

These decisions were made in full recognition of the following important factors:

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 5/1/1970, pp. 7-11. Also in *The New York Times*, 10/12/1969. The address was delivered at the 1969 Galaxy Conference on Adult Education.

² For text, see *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 268-269.

First, we knew that nations not directly involved could not make a durable peace for the peoples and governments involved. Peace rests with the parties to the conflict. The efforts of major powers can help, they can provide a catalyst, they can stimulate the parties to talk, they can encourage, they can help define a realistic framework for agreement; but an agreement among other powers cannot be a substitute for agreement among the parties themselves.

Second, we knew that a durable peace must meet the legitimate concerns of both sides.

Third, we were clear that the only framework for a negotiated settlement was one in accordance with the entire text of the U.N. Security Council resolution. That resolution was agreed upon after long and arduous negotiations; it is carefully balanced; it provides the basis for a just and lasting peace — a final settlement — not merely an interlude between wars.

Fourth, we believed that a protracted period of no war, no peace, recurrent violence, and spreading chaos would serve the interests of no nation, in or out of the Middle East.

U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS

For 8 months we have pursued these consultations in four-power talks at the United Nations and in bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union.

In our talks with the Soviets we have proceeded in the belief that the stakes are so high that we have a responsibility to determine whether we can achieve parallel views which would encourage the parties to work out a stable and equitable solution. We are under no illusions; we are fully conscious of past difficulties and present realities. Our talks with the Soviets have brought a measure of understanding, but very substantial differences remain. We regret that the Soviets have delayed in responding to new formulations submitted to them on October 28. However, we will continue to discuss these problems with the Soviet Union as long as there is any realistic hope that such discussions might further the cause of peace.

The substance of the talks that we have had with the Soviet Union has been conveyed to the interested parties through diplomatic channels. This process has served to highlight the main roadblocks to the initiation of useful negotiations among the parties.

On the one hand, the Arab leaders fear that Israel is not in fact prepared to withdraw from Arab territory occupied in the 1967 war.

On the other hand, Israeli leaders fear that the Arab states are not in fact prepared to live in peace with Israel.

Each side can cite from its viewpoint considerable evidence to support its fears. Each side has permitted its attention to be focused solidly and to some extent solely on these fears.

What can the United States do to help to overcome these roadblocks?

Our policy is and will continue to be a *balanced* one.

We have friendly ties with both Arabs and Israelis. To call for Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the U.N. resolution without achieving agreement on peace would be partisan toward the Arabs. To call on the Arabs to accept peace without Israeli withdrawal would be partisan toward Israel. Therefore, our policy is to encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement and to urge the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territory when their territorial integrity is assured as envisaged by the Security Council resolution.

BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION

In an effort to broaden the scope of discussion we have recently resumed four-power negotiations at the United Nations.

Let me outline our policy on various elements of the Security Council resolution. The basic and related issues might be described as peace, security, withdrawal and territory.

Peace Between the Parties

The resolution of the Security Council makes clear that the goal is the establishment of a state of peace between the parties instead of the state of belligerency which has characterized relations for over 20 years. We believe the conditions and obligations of peace must be defined in specific terms. For example, navigation rights in the Suez Canal and in the Strait of Tiran should be spelled out. Respect for sovereignty and obligations of the parties to each other must be made specific.

But peace, of course, involves much more than this. It is also a matter of the attitudes and inten-

tions of the parties. Are they ready to coexist with one another? Can a live-and-let-live attitude replace suspicion, mistrust, and hate? A peace agreement between the parties must be based on clear and stated intentions and a willingness to bring about basic changes in the attitudes and conditions which are characteristic of the Middle East today.

Security

A lasting peace must be sustained by a sense of security on both sides. To this end, as envisaged in the Security Council resolution, there should be demilitarized zones and related security arrangements more reliable than those which existed in the area in the past. The parties themselves, with Ambassador Jarring's help, are in the best position to work out the nature and the details of security arrangements. It is, after all, their interests which are at stake and their territory which is involved. They must live with the results.

Withdrawal and Territory

The Security Council resolution endorses the principle of the nonacquisition of territory by war and calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war. We support this part of the resolution, including withdrawal, just as we do its other elements.

The boundaries from which the 1967 war began were established in the 1949 armistice agreements and have defined the areas of national jurisdiction in the Middle East for 20 years. Those boundaries were armistice lines, not final political borders. The rights, claims, and positions of the parties in an ultimate peaceful settlement were reserved by the armistice agreements.

The Security Council resolution neither endorses nor precludes these armistice lines as the definitive political boundaries. However, it calls for withdrawal from occupied territories, the nonacquisition of territory by war, and the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries.

We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established, and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the preexisting lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security. We do not

support expansionism. We believe troops must be withdrawn as the resolution provides. We support Israel's security and the security of the Arab states as well. We are for a lasting peace that requires security for both.

ISSUES OF REFUGEES AND JERUSALEM

By emphasizing the key issues of peace, security, withdrawal, and territory, I do not want to leave the impression that other issues are not equally important. Two in particular deserve special mention: the questions of refugees and of Jerusalem.

There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those Palestinians whom the wars of 1948 and 1967 have made homeless. This human dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been of special concern to the United States for over 20 years. During this period the United States has contributed about \$ 500 million for the support and education of the Palestine refugees. We are prepared to contribute generously along with others to solve this problem. We believe its settlement must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the governments in the area.

The problem posed by the refugees will become increasingly serious if their future is not resolved. There is a new consciousness among the young Palestinians who have grown up since 1948 which needs to be channeled away from bitterness and frustration toward hope and justice.

The question of the future status of Jerusalem because it touches deep emotional, historical, and religious wellsprings, is particularly complicated. We have made clear repeatedly in the past 2 1/2 years that we cannot accept unilateral actions by any party to decide the final status of the city. We believe its status can be determined only through the agreement of the parties concerned, which in practical terms means primarily the Governments of Israel and Jordan, taking into account the interests of other countries in the area and the international community. We do, however, support certain principles which we believe would provide an equitable framework for a Jerusalem settlement.

Specifically, we believe Jerusalem should be a unified city within which there would no longer be restrictions on the movement of persons and goods. There should be open access to the unified city for persons of all faiths and nationalities. Arrangements for the administration of the unified city should take into account the interests of all its inhabitants and of the Jewish, Islamic, and Christian communities. And there should be roles for both Israel and Jordan in the civic, economic, and religious life of the city.

It is our hope that agreement on the key issues of peace, security, withdrawal, and territory will create a climate in which these questions of refugees and of Jerusalem, as well as other aspects of the conflict, can be resolved as part of the overall settlement.

FORMULAS FOR U.A.R.-ISRAEL ASPECT OF SETTLEMENT

During the first weeks of the current United Nations General Assembly the efforts to move matters toward a settlement entered a particularly intensive phase. Those efforts continue today.

I have already referred to our talks with the Soviet Union. In connection with those talks there have been allegations that we have been seeking to divide the Arab states by urging the U.A.R. to make a separate peace. These allegations are false. It is a fact that we and the Soviets have been concentrating on the questions of a settlement between Israel and the United Arab Republic. We have been doing this in the full understanding on both our parts that, before there can be a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there must be agreement between the parties on other aspects of the settlement — not only those related to the United Arab Republic but also those related to Jordan and other states which accept the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

We started with the Israeli-United Arab Republic aspect because of its inherent importance for future stability in the area and because one must start somewhere.

We are also ready to pursue the Jordanian aspect of a settlement; in fact the four powers in New York have begun such discussions. Let

me make it perfectly clear that the U.S. position is that implementation of the overall settlement would begin only after complete agreement had been reached on related aspects of the problem.

In our recent meetings with the Soviets we have discussed some new formulas in an attempt to find common positions. They consist of three principal elements:

First, there should be a binding commitment by Israel and the United Arab Republic to peace with each other, with all the specific obligations of peace spelled out, including the obligation to prevent hostile acts originating from their respective territories.

Second, the detailed provisions of peace relating to security safeguards on the ground should be worked out between the parties, under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, utilizing the procedures followed in negotiating the armistice agreements under Ralph Bunche in 1949 at Rhodes. This formula has been previously used with success in negotiations between the parties on Middle Eastern problems. A principal objective of the four-power talks, we believe, should be to help Ambassador Jarring engage the parties in a negotiating process under the Rhodes formula.

So far as a settlement between Israel and the United Arab Republic goes, these safeguards relate primarily to the area of Sharm al-Shaykh controlling access to the Gulf of Aqaba, the need for demilitarized zones as foreseen in the Security Council resolution, and final arrangements in the Gaza Strip.

Third, in the context of peace and agreement on specific security safeguards, withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory would be required.

Such an approach directly addresses the principal national concerns of both Israel and the U.A.R. It would require the U.A.R. to agree to a binding and specific commitment to peace. It would require withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from U.A.R. territory to the international border between Israel [or Mandated Palestine] and Egypt, which has been in existence for over a half century. It would also require the parties themselves to negotiate the practical security arrangements to safeguard the peace.

We believe that this approach is *balanced* and fair.

We remain interested in good relations with all states in the area. Whenever and wherever Arab states which have broken off diplomatic relations with the United States are prepared to restore them, we shall respond in the same spirit.

Meanwhile, we will not be deterred from continuing to pursue the paths of patient diplomacy in our search for peace in the Middle East. We will not shrink from advocating necessary compromises, even though they may and probably will be unpalatable to both sides. We remain prepared to work with others — in the area and throughout the world — so long as they sincerely seek the end we seek: a just and lasting peace.

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Statement by the Israeli Government Embodying a Reaction to the U.S. Secretary of State Rogers' Address on United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East.¹

Tel Aviv, December 11, 1969

The Israel Government discussed in special session the political situation in the region and the latest speech of the U.S. Secretary of State on the Middle East.

The Government states that the tension in the Middle East referred to by Mr. Rogers derives from the aggressive policy of the Arab governments: The absolute refusal to make peace with Israel and the unqualified support of the Soviet Union for the Arab aggressive stand.

Israel is of the opinion that the only way to terminate the tension and the state of war in the region is by perpetual striving for a durable peace among the nations of the region, based on a peace treaty reached through direct negotiations which will take place without any prior conditions by any party. The agreed, secure and recognized boundaries will be fixed in the peace treaty. This is the permanent and stated peace

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 12/12/1969. Rogers' Address was delivered at the Galaxy Conference on Adult Education, Washington, D.C., December 9, 1969

policy of Israel and is in accordance with accepted international rules and procedures.

The Six Day War, or the situation created in its wake, cannot be spoken of in terms of expansion or conquest. Israel cried out against aggression which threatened its very existence, and used its natural right of national self-defence.

In his speech, Mr. Rogers said that states outside the region cannot fix peace terms; only states in the region are authorized to establish peace by agreement among themselves. The Government states regretfully that this principle does not tally with the detailed reference in the speech to peace terms, including territorial and other basic questions, among them Jerusalem. Jerusalem was divided following the conquest of part of the city by the Jordanian Army in 1948. Only now, after the unification of the city under Israel administration, does there exist freedom of access for members of all faiths to their holy places in the city.

The position of Israel is: The negotiations for peace must be free from prior conditions and external influences and pressures. The prospects for peace will be seriously marred if states outside the region continue to raise territorial proposals and suggestions on other subjects that cannot further peace and security.

When the Four Power talks began, the Government of Israel expressed its view on the harmful consequences involved in this move in its statement of March 27, 1969. The fears expressed then were confirmed.

Peace was not promoted, Arab governments were encouraged by the illusion that an arrangement could be reached by the exertion of external influences and pressures with no negotiations between the parties. In this period Egyptian policy reached the most extreme expressions, especially in President Nasser's speech in which he spoke of rivers flowing with blood and skies lit by fire. In this period, the region has not become tranquil. In an incessant violation of the cease-fire arrangement, fixed by the Security Council and accepted by all sides unconditionally and with no time limit, the Egyptians have intensified their attempts to disturb the cease-fire lines. Conveniently, Arab aggression in other sectors continued and terrorist acts, explicitly encouraged by Arab governments, were intensified. Even the Jarring mission to

promote an agreement between the parties was paralysed.

The focus of the problem as stated by Mr. Rogers lies in the basic intentions and positions of the governments of the region to the principle of peaceful coexistence. The lack of intention of the Arab governments to move towards peace with Israel is expressed daily in proclamations and deeds. The positions and intentions of the parties towards peace cannot be tested unless they agree to conduct negotiations as among states desiring peace. Only when there is a basic change in the Arab position, which denies the principle of negotiations for the signing of peace, will it be possible to replace the state of war by durable peace. This remains the central aim of the policy of Israel.

In his forthcoming talks with the Secretary of State, the Foreign Minister will explain in detail the position of the Government of Israel concerning the situation in the region.

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Declaration in the Knesset by the Israeli Government on the Basic Principles of its Foreign and Domestic Policies.¹ (Excerpt)

Jerusalem, December 15, 1969

The following will be the central objectives of the Cabinet:

3. Constant endeavour to achieve lasting peace with our neighbours, based on peace treaties. Strengthening and consolidation of our defences in order to deter and repulse aggression.

5. Development of Jerusalem, Israel's capital, the consolidation of its unification, the maintenance of its integrity and a more rapid increase in its population.

The Government will work towards the enactment of a constitution during the tenure of the

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 17/12/1969. Principles agreed upon by the Israeli coalition parties.

Seventh Knesset. The constitution will be based on the existing basic laws and the basic laws to be adopted by the Seventh Knesset — including the judiciary law and the law of human and civic rights.

These laws will assure full and absolute equality of rights and obligations for all residents of Israel, regardless of sex, community, status, nationality and creed.

Freedom of conscience and religion will be maintained.

The freedoms, rights and obligations of the citizen will be safeguarded: freedom of association and of written and oral expression will be assured, with due regard for the security and independence of the State.

The democratic regime will be protected from attack by violence and other means, whilst strictly maintaining the rights of the citizen and the limits of jurisdiction of the three principal authorities: legislative, judiciary and executive. State and army secrets will be protected and emergency powers laid down for the security of the State.

Immigration to Israel is a necessity for both the Jewish People and the State of Israel. Therefore :

1. The Government of Israel will continue to work for the establishment of close ties between the State of Israel and all communities of the Jewish People in the Diaspora. The Government will join its efforts with the Zionist Movement and other Jewish organizations in order to foster the unity of the Jewish People, ensure its continued survival, and deepen its affinity to its historic homeland.

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Joint Communiqué on the Visit of a Party and Government Delegation from the United Arab Republic to the Soviet Union.¹ (Excerpt)
Moscow, December 13, 1969

The talks, which were conducted in an atmos-

phere of complete understanding and friendship, covered the relations between the USSR and the UAR, and questions of the present international situation which are of mutual interest.

Particular attention was devoted to the situation in the Middle East in connection with the aggression of Israel which is still continuing with the support of imperialist forces, the USA pre-eminently, against the UAR and other Arab countries. All this presents a grave threat to peace and security, not only in that area, but in the entire world.

Israel's refusal to observe the Security Council's resolution of November 22nd, 1967, is a challenge to world public opinion, and obstructs a political settlement of the Middle East conflict and the establishment of peace in that area.

The United Arab Republic took the main force of the blow from Israel, has held out in the fight against Israel's aggression and continues to grow and gain strength. An important part in this was played by the efforts of the Government of the UAR, and the Arab Socialist Union, guided by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, which were directed towards the strengthening of the defence capacity of the country, towards the development of cooperation with the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and other peace-loving states, and towards Arab unity in the struggle against aggression.

Both Sides agreed that the situation in the Middle East calls for urgent and constructive measures liquidating the consequences of Israel's aggression.

The Soviet Side stated that the Soviet Union will continue to support the just cause of the Arab countries, the victims of aggression, and will continue, both within the United Nations Organization and without, to struggle for a political settlement in the Middle East, and for the observance of the Security Council's resolution of November 22nd, 1967, in all its aspects. An indispensable condition of this settlement is the withdrawal of Israel's troops from the occupied Arab territories, the liquidation of other consequences of Israel's aggression, and the institution of a lasting peace built on respect for the lawful rights and interests of all Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine.

¹ *Moscow News*, 20/12/1969

The recent Statement of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties and Governments of six European socialist countries expressed comprehensive support for the just struggle of the Arab peoples, and the firm resolve to work for a lasting peace in that part of the world.

The Party and Government delegation of the UAR stated that this joint action of socialist countries was a great support for the Arab peoples which are waging a fight against the forces of imperialism and aggression, for the liberation of the occupied Arab territories, and the institution of a lasting and righteous peace in the area.

The two Sides noted with satisfaction the broad development of comprehensive friendly cooperation in different spheres between the USSR and the United Arab Republic. They agreed on practical measures for the further development of this comprehensive cooperation.

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Speech by the Turkish President Sunay in Reply to the Jordanian King Hussein at a Banquet in Honour of the Turkish President.¹ (Excerpt)

Amman, December 16, 1969

Your Majesty,

Jordan, which your Majesty represents with such honour and ability, has won the support of world public opinion, through its constructive tenacity and the fact that it is a factor for stability in the Middle East. Within this framework, we believe that the political and territorial freedom of Jordan constitute a basic element in bringing about peace in the Middle East. Turkey is delighted with the strong and cordial links that bind it to Jordan. These strong links whose strength and inspiration are rooted in the varied experiences of history, and whose essence lies in our common creed, moral values and traditions have undoubtedly arisen as a result of our common efforts. But we believe firmly that we can achieve a still higher degree of cooperation in the various economic, commercial, cultural and social fields.

I assure you that henceforward Turkey will feel in duty bound to perform its share in these fields. The encouragement and support given by your Majesty to these efforts increases the affection and request felt by our people for your esteemed person.

Your Majesty,

Since our last meeting in Turkey the dangerous situation in the region still persists despite the efforts being made to solve the crisis resulting from the armed clash in June 67. Allow me to stress the constructive efforts made by your Majesty in the international sphere in the past two years with the object of finding a solution to the problem and of explaining the Arab case correctly. Your efforts have demonstrated to the whole world your sincere intention to use political means to reach a solution which would guarantee the legitimate interests and rights of Jordan which is pursuing a policy of peace.

We too are convinced of the necessity of achieving a just and honourable solution to the struggle in the Middle East, which will protect the legitimate interests and rights of our Arab brethren. Such a solution would not only put an end to the dispute but would also finally resolve the tragedy of the refugees in Jordan and the neighbouring Arab countries, who have been denied their homes and property.

As we have stated on numerous occasions, Turkey, like Jordan, believes that the U.N. Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, contains all the elements necessary for a peaceful solution. We oppose any attempt aimed at solving the dispute by the use of force and achieving territorial or political gains through military means, because such gains can be employed by one side to exert pressure for the object of ensuring that solutions are accepted. We do not subscribe to the use of the *fait accompli* as a means of forcing a solution, whether in the Middle East or elsewhere. We do not accept the *fait accompli* that is being manufactured now in the Holy City despite the Security Council resolutions on its status. We are fully aware that Jerusalem is sacred to Muslims and to the whole world.

We sincerely hope that the efforts being made to bring peace to our region will yield positive results, leading to quiet and peace of mind.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 17/12/1969.

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Speech to the Knesset by the Israeli Premier Meir on Presenting her New Cabinet.¹**Jerusalem, December 16, 1969**

Since January this year, the great powers (in the framework of the Four or the Two) have taken up the task of finding a solution to the Israel-Arab conflict. In this period, the Arab rulers have not changed their basic attitude towards Israel's existence. They have refused to recognize her deep roots in the area, in which she was born and where she has renewed her sovereignty, and refused to treat her as a state with equal rights in the community of sovereign states. The Arab states have continued to see Israel only as an object of hostility — not as a partner in a dialogue on peace.

That is the principal reason that we have said from the outset that all efforts being made outside the region cannot bring about peace so long as the Arab leaders remain faithful to their deliberate denial of Israel's right to exist. The Arab leaders must themselves change this attitude of theirs, in their own consciousness. No one can do this for them. The Arab leaders — who have three times led their peoples to war — must lead their peoples onto the road of peace. Any international attempt to absolve them from this responsibility — or any blatant leniency towards their refusal to establish peace — makes them more obstinate in their refusal and perpetuates the tension.

There can be no substitute for negotiation and agreement between the parties. Arab states which will not agree to speak with Israel about peace — will not agree to live with Israel in peace. Those who try to absolve them of this obligation, are knowingly or unwillingly confirming the Arab right to continue to ignore Israel's existence and the principles of peace.

Our opposition to the talks among the powers is derived also from the fact that the participants include a power whose responsibility for the war of 1967 barely falls short of that of the Arab leaders. The Soviet Union was a central factor in the encouragement and inflaming of the crisis in the spring of 1967. It was and is the main

supplier of the tools of slaughter given to Nasser and other Arab states, in spite of their declarations that they were intended for the destruction of Israel. The Soviet Union exalts the terrorist activities of the saboteurs. It supports every hostile Arab initiative in the institutions of the U.N. and international forums. It serves without reservation as a mouthpiece for the Arab demands. It reveals a blatantly hostile policy towards Israel. It is not only implicated in the responsibility for the outbreak of the war, but is also a central factor encouraging the continuation of tension and the absence of peace. Genuine and lasting peace in the region is not compatible with basic Soviet interests. If the conflict is eliminated, if in place of tension and warfare, peace prevails, it will be deprived of one of the central reasons for Soviet influence and for the supply of munitions and the maintenance of thousands of military experts and advisors in the region.

Nor can two of the three Western states taking part in the discussions amongst the powers be said to be objective.

Since the eve of the Six Day War, the French Government has pursued a one-sidedly anti-Israel policy. Like its predecessor, the new French Government continues to disavow a written signed contract for the sale of Mirage aircraft to Israel, after we had bought and paid for them. And this when she knows that Israel's enemies are arming themselves for war.

Recently, Great Britain has announced her decision to prevent the sale of Chieftain tanks to Israel, after she had agreed to this in principle in 1968. At the same time, she is continuing with her efforts to sell tanks of this kind to Libya, which professes open hostility to Israel and whose existence is threatened by no one.

In the discussion in the Security Council on the fire in the Al-Aqsa mosque, Britain voted for a resolution which contained — and not indirectly — an attribution of guilt to the Government of Israel. One-sidedness was apparent also in other British votes in the U.N. In the four-power talks, Great Britain is trying to be a mediator between the standpoint of the U.S. and that of the Soviet Union. If the interests of Britain and France, economic and otherwise, as they see them, dictate to them a policy which demands a conciliatory attitude to the Arab states at our expense, that

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 16/12/1969

is their affair. But they have no right to adjudicate our essential interests, and we do not regard them as fit to discuss ways to a solution between Israel and the Arabs.

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Speech by the Turkish President Sunay on the Close of his Visit to Jordan.¹ (Excerpt)

Amman, December 17, 1969

I take this opportunity to explain once again Turkey's view of the struggle in the Middle East which is already well known. Turkey does not accept that others should be compelled to accept a *fait accompli*, nor does it accept the use of force to acquire political or territorial gains. We do not approve the unilateral measures taken to change the status of Jerusalem. We condemn these measures. We believe in the necessity of withdrawal from the Arab occupied territories, in accordance with U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. We also hope that it will be possible to reach at a just and permanent solution to the problem of the area which will preserve the legitimate rights of our Arab brethren. We are aware of the critical conditions in which the refugees are living, after having been expelled from their homes and property. We support their case before the United Nations and are doing all we can to put an end to their sufferings as soon as possible.

I must express my admiration for the splendid progress achieved in all fields under the wise rule of King Hussein. I hope that Jordan will prosper in all fields without any hindrance.

The importance of achieving stability and peace in the world in general and in the Middle East in particular is the basis of cooperation and friendship between Jordan and Turkey. Our greatest desire is to see these relations become much closer in the future. The good impression I carry away with me as I leave your beautiful country is a valuable present which I shall give to the people of Turkey. This gift is the feeling

of friendship and brotherhood entertained by the people of Jordan for the people of Turkey.

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Statement of Support by the Panamanian Ambassador to Israel Ortiz at a Luncheon Given by the Israel-Latin America Chamber of Commerce.²

Tel Aviv, December 17, 1969

The Government of Panama has supported Israel in the past and will continue to do so, without reservation, in the future.

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News Conference Statements by the U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on the Middle East.³ (Excerpts)

Washington, December 23, 1969

Secretary Rogers: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Merry Christmas.

Mr. Hensley [Stewart Hensley, United Press International]?

Q. Mr. Secretary, my question has to do with the U.S. formula for approaching a settlement between Israel and Jordan. The Israeli Prime Minister has said they can't accept the ideas embodied in that formula because this would be treasonous from Israel's standpoint. They charged that the U.S. formula constitutes appeasement of the Arabs. Would you care to comment on that, sir?

A. Well, I would like to comment on the proposal generally. We think that the proposals that we have had, both insofar as U.A.R. and Jordan are concerned, are fair proposals. We think they are comprehensive. We think they are entirely consistent with the Security Council resolution,⁴ which we supported; and we would hope that they would provide a framework which

² *Jerusalem Post*, 18/12/1969

³ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 12/1/1970, pp. 21-28.

⁴ See *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 268-269.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 18/12/1969

would permit the parties to negotiate under auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

I would only comment on one word in your question, and the word is "appeasement." I think it is an unfortunate word. It suggests that the Arabs are enemies of the United States and somehow we are appeasing them. Of course that isn't true. We have had friendly relations with the Arab states for a number of years, for many years. We are on friendly terms with many of the Arabs now, and our position is that we hope that the parties could begin negotiating under the provisions of the Security Council resolution — hopefully to end this conflict that has existed for so many years in this Middle East.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a report on the wire this morning from Israel suggesting that the United States may limit arms shipments to Israel because Israel has refused to accept this proposal.

A. No, we have not had any discussions of that kind at all. And as I said to answer Mr. Hensley, our proposals we think are fair. They are carefully thought through, and we have offered them in the hope that the parties will begin to negotiate.

Now, nothing has happened since the Security Council resolution in terms of negotiations since 1967, and we believe that if these proposals are studied, thought about, fully considered, there is a possibility that the parties, under the Rhodes formula, could start negotiations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any linkage between the pending request for additional aid and Israel's attitude toward the U.S. proposals; and if not, what are the criteria under which this request is being considered?

A. Well, there is no linkage. Secondly, we are considering the request made by Israel carefully, with full consideration of their problems and in full realization that we have an obligation, as do the other nations in the United Nations, to support the sovereignty of Israel and its future security.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Israeli Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have also made a personal comment about you: that in a 2 1/2 hour conversation with Mr. Eban you failed to discuss this Jordanian proposal in any way. Is that true, and what was your reasoning behind that?

A. Well, I don't want to get involved in a discussion about everything that transpired in a conversation, and I don't think it serves any useful purpose. We have tried consistently to consult with all interested countries to keep everyone advised about what we are doing, why we are doing it, and we have followed that in the past and we intend to do it in the future.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what portion of the administration's Middle East policy is now being governed by concern for an erosion in America's economic and diplomatic position in the entire area?

A. I don't think any. I mean, obviously, these are considerations that occur to you. But the position of the United States in both these papers — both the U.A.R. paper and the paper on Jordan — are consistent with the Security Council resolution that the United States supported. And they are an honest attempt to do what we can to bring the bodies together in negotiations.

So we have been talking about these things in private for some time. We have made every effort we could; and because our position was being distorted in some parts of the world, we thought it advisable to present the policy of the United States, which we did in the statement that I made.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you reply to the Israeli criticism that the American role should be to get the Arabs and the Israelis together for direct negotiations and that it should not be the American function to suggest specific proposals which the Israelis feel prejudice their case?

A. Well, we just don't agree with that. We think we have a role, as a member of the Security Council, to play in these discussions. We have made that clear from the very first. We are a member of the Security Council; we have a responsibility to do all we can to bring the parties together to see if a peaceful settlement can be worked out.

Now, that doesn't suggest that we want to impose a settlement. We have always made it clear that we are not going to do that. The proposals that we have made make it clear that on the important security arrangements that have to be worked out between the parties, that that has to be done in the negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis.

So I think it is quite clear that the United States had a very important role to play. We played it all these years — 20 years. In fact, we have provided the majority of support for the refugees in the area. So I can understand why Israel is concerned and why they don't necessarily agree with everything we do. But we have to conduct our foreign policy in a way that we think is best for our national interests.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your speech on the Middle East was vague on the specific subject of Jerusalem, which has led to some worries in Israel that an eventual proposal would envisage some Jordanian role in the new sector of the city. Are those fears justified?

A. Well, we have left the Jerusalem aspects in the form that we set them forth in the paper deliberately, because we think those things have to be worked out. The arrangements for Jerusalem have to be worked out between the parties. We do not want to suggest what we think that final solution might be. We have indicated the framework, we think, that suggests how they might work it out. But we don't want to suggest that, and we don't intend to.

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Television Interview with the U.S. Secretary of State Rogers.¹ (Excerpt)

Washington, December 23, 1969

Q. Now, what about the Middle East? As the thing stands now, you have really caused a considerable stir with one or two of your speeches recently, which seemed to many people to be the strongest, most specific American statements about the actual issues involved now between Israel and the Arab states, and a lot of flack from the Israelis. The Prime Minister [Golda Meir] is now saying that the American position in relation to them has been eroding. I'm not quite sure what she means,

unless one assumes we're going from an essentially pro-Israeli stance here to some kind of real neutrality. How do you define this change of policy?

A. Well, I don't think it is a change. I think what she means is probably that we just don't agree with her. The fact of the matter is that the statement that I made is entirely consistent with the Security Council resolution of '67, and we voted for that resolution². We are very anxious to do all we can to get the parties into a negotiating stance, and we don't think that it's possible to bring them together face to face yet. And what we're doing is to do all we can consistent with our previous statements. And by that I mean we're not going to attempt to impose a settlement on the parties, but to force the parties into negotiations, because the only way that this can ever be settled is between the parties.

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Text of the Soviet Union Reply to the United States Proposals of 28 October, 1969, for a Settlement to the Middle East Crisis.³

Moscow, December 23, 1969

The ever-deteriorating situation in the Middle East area, brought about by continuing Israeli aggression against the neighboring Arab states as well as by its non-fulfillment of the provisions of the Security Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967, demands urgent steps to promptly establish just and stable peace in that area.

In these circumstances the Soviet Union, as before, advocates further active efforts on the part of the big powers — permanent members of the Security Council — within the framework of bilateral and four-power contacts for the purpose of finding mutually acceptable ways of a Middle East settlement.

A careful study has been made in Moscow of the recent American proposal on Middle East

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 19/1/1970, pp. 53-58. The interview was conducted by Eric Sevaried, C.B.S. News Correspondent, and broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System television network.

² For text, see *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 268-269.

³ *The New York Times*, 13/1/1970.

settlement. The Soviet Union has already had an opportunity to set forth its general appraisal of the new American plan. We believe that in its present form the document is of a one-sided, pro-Israeli character. Some of its provisions, moreover, alter the position taken earlier by the United States. In view of this, the American plan of Oct. 28 cannot facilitate finding ways of resolving the Middle East situation.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS GIVEN

As for our comments on the contents of the American plan of Oct. 28, both as a whole and on separate provisions, they are basically as follows:

We do not see sufficient grounds for a joint Soviet-American document — we, naturally, are not abandoning the idea of jointly working one out — to be in an abridged form, to contain the so-called “neutral formulas” and in effect to shift the main emphasis, in working out an agreement on basic aspects of the settlement, over to contacts between the parties through Ambassador Jarring. Such an approach is especially unwarranted under the present circumstances when the situation in the Middle East has sharply deteriorated in view of the delay of the settlement, because of Israel.

As we understand it, the objective of a joint Soviet-American document should be as far as possible a sufficiently detailed elaboration of the essence of the fundamental aspects of the Middle East settlement. Also, it would hardly make sense to negate the work already done, aimed at working out agreed positions of our countries, by following the United States proposal to limit ourselves to “neutral formulas” alone.

The new American draft, as before, does not mention anything concerning the essence of the key question of the settlement, namely the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the occupied Arab territories (in the U.A.R.-Israel settlement, from the whole Sinai peninsula and from the Gaza sector). It only mentions that the parties themselves shall determine a timetable and a sequence for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces to boundaries to be agreed upon in advance. We even see here certain departures of the American side from its own positions previously outlined to us, since points 1 and 2 of the American document of July 15, 1969, for example, specifi-

cally state when the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will start and how long (approximately) it will take.

TROOPS LINKED TO STATE OF WAR

The question of the withdrawal of troops is directly connected with that of the cessation of the state of war. We have already repeatedly pointed out that our proposal, a *de facto* cessation of the state of war simultaneously with the beginning of the withdrawal of armed forces and *de jure* cessation of the state of war after completion of the withdrawal, would correspond to the interests of both sides and would remove their mutual suspicions.

In the course of Soviet-American contacts, the American side expressed its understanding about the advisability of such an approach. Therefore the absence of a corresponding formula on this question in the new American document is regrettable.

One might note certain progress on the formula for the boundaries between the U.A.R. and Israel. We understand the American formula, naturally, as meaning that sovereignty of the U.A.R. over Sharm-el-Sheik is not called into question and such a provision must be clearly recorded in the joint Soviet-American document.

As to the Gaza sector, which is Arab territory and must be restored within the borders existing before the 1967 conflict, a provision to that effect should also be included in the joint document. The participation of Israel in determining the future of this territory has no justification whatsoever.

In regard to demilitarized zones, we believe that the Soviet Union and the United States should express their definite opinion on this question, confirming the understanding reached earlier to the effect that these zones should not give any advantage to any of the parties and their administration shall contain limitations only of a purely military nature. For practical purposes, this would mean recognition of the principle that such zones can possibly be established on both sides of the border.

In implementing a “package” settlement we proceed from provisions of the point in the Security Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967, on the

cessation of the state of war, respect and recognition of sovereignty, territorial independence of each state in the area in question.

Both our countries stated repeatedly their intention to achieve a settlement which would insure a lasting peace in the Middle East area rather than restore the situation of an unstable armistice. Therefore, in working out formulas on the cessation of the state of war and on ensuing consequences, it is necessary to adhere strictly to the provisions of the November resolution of the Security Council and to avoid formulas which may be, even beforehand, unacceptable to one of the sides.

On the question of settlement of the refugee problem, we stand on our previous position that Israel must fulfill United Nations decisions on this question. Even if the Arabs agreed that the question of a just settlement of the problem of Palestine refugees would be worked out in detail at the time of a final accord between Jordan and Israel, even then it would be necessary to confirm in other final documents the necessity of implementing the well-known General Assembly resolution on the Palestine refugees.

As before, we proceed from the necessity of recording the principle of freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal for the vessels of all countries in conformity with the Constantinople Convention of 1888 now in effect.

Questions of navigation through the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba must be considered and solved in conformity with generally recognized principles of international law, which will guarantee to a sufficient degree free passage for the vessels of all countries through those waterways.

As for the procedure and form of the Arab-Israeli contacts through Dr. Jarring, it would not be expedient to move this question to the forefront in view of the sharp differences which have recently emerged in interpretation by the sides of the so-called "Rhodes Formula."

So far as we know, this corresponds to the opinion of Dr. Jarring as well. We are convinced that once an understanding is reached on the principle aspects of settlement, it should be possible to find a proper form — acceptable to the sides — of the intermediary role for Ambassador Jarring,

provided he will discuss questions of settlement separately with each side, as well as the procedure for the signing of a final document or documents. We believe that now it is necessary to focus attention on the key questions of settlement in order to achieve a speedy agreement.

At the same time we would like to emphasize once more that the Soviet side views settlement in conformity with the Security Council resolution as something complete, related to all its aspects and to the entire area of the Middle East, as a "package." In this connection a U.A.R.-Israeli settlement is considered by us, naturally, as part of the whole, inseparable from a settlement concerning other countries directly involved in the conflict.

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Statement in the Knesset by the Israeli Premier Meir on the U.S. Proposals of 28 October and 18 December 1969, for the Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Dispute.¹

Jerusalem, December 29, 1969

Since my address in the Knesset on presenting the new Government, there have been a number of developments which make it necessary to present a statement to the Knesset.

I referred in my speech two weeks ago to the statement of the American Secretary of State on December 9, 1969, in which he outlined in public a plan for the solution of the Israel-Arab dispute. We sincerely appreciate the manifestations of friendship that have characterized the attitude of the U.S. to Israel since the establishment of our State, and especially in the trials we have faced since the War of 1967. The U.S. still gives voice, through its authorized representatives, to its concern for Israel's security and sovereignty and its support for the advancement of peace in our area. But friendship between free countries makes it particularly incumbent on them to be sincere and candid in expressing criticism of measures which they regard as undesirable and dangerous. It is in this spirit that I wish to make some remarks on things that have happened and

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 30/12/1969.

come to knowledge since the debate in the Knesset on December 15, 1969.

On October 28, the U.S. submitted to the U.S.S.R. detailed proposals in regard to a settlement between Israel and Egypt. The proposals were handed to us only about six weeks later. On December 18, the U.S. submitted, within the framework of the four-power talks, detailed proposals for a settlement between Israel and Jordan. These proposals were handed to us on the day they were submitted.

The main points of the proposals regarding Egypt and Jordan have been published in the press. These documents refer to the principal details in the Israel-Arab dispute. They deal with the nature of the settlement, the fixing of the boundaries, the problem of the refugees, the future of Jerusalem. Under these proposals, the parties will have nothing to do except to conduct negotiations, on the pattern of the Rhodes talks and under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, on mere technical and marginal matters.

From the beginning of the talks between the powers, we expressed our opposition to the very fact of their being held. When the U.S. representative started raising proposals, we did not accept them and warned of the danger that these proposals, too, would undergo a process of erosion for the purpose of achieving a Soviet and Arab response. And, indeed, their first casualty has been the very principle of negotiations between the parties, which is the key to true peace. The U.S. has repeatedly declared that it supports the principle of negotiation and agreement between the parties. This basic attitude has found expression in various declarations since June, 1967, most recently in the speech by the Secretary of State, who said: "Nations not directly involved could not make a durable peace for the peoples and governments involved. Peace rests with the parties to the conflict... an agreement among other powers cannot be a substitute for agreement among the parties themselves."

The American proposals, which deal in detail with each of the subjects, are in direct contradiction to this very principle. The process of erosion is also apparent in other parts of the latest American proposals.

Regarding the form of the agreement, a peace of a contractual nature is no longer explicitly

mentioned. There is mention of a "state of peace" which will find expression in a document entitled a "final accord," without it being even stated that this settlement will be of a contractual nature. Nor is there any clear statement on the need for direct contact between the parties themselves. Instead, the American proposals, in effect, lay down the Armistice lines as Israel's borders with Jordan and the international boundary as her border with Egypt.

An example of the degeneration in the American attitude is to be found in the various formulae adopted by U.S. representatives at various stages of the discussions with the Soviet Union. In the first stage, the U.S. used a formula which stated that the international frontier need not necessarily be excluded, but it has arrived at the latest formula under which the international boundary is the "secure and recognized border"; according to these proposals, moreover, Jordan will be co-opted, as a prize for her aggression in 1956, to the discussion on the future of the Gaza Strip, which was under Egypt's rule as a result of her aggression in 1948.

The proposals accord all the Arab refugees the right of choice between return to Israel and resettlement in the Arab countries with compensation. It is stated that Israel and the Arabs will have to agree on the numbers and the procedure, but those included in the first quota will have to arrive in Israel at the latest three months from the date when the overall agreement enters into force — otherwise, the Arab side will be freed from all its obligations. In this context, moreover, mention is made of an international committee which will determine the procedures for the act of choice. These clauses are formulated as if Israel were not a sovereign state, which enacts its own laws for entry into and departure from its territory.

It is important to point out that the Arab states bear the responsibility not only for the creation of the refugee problem but also for its perpetuation. While Israel has absorbed hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Arab countries the Arab states have refused to absorb the Arab refugees and have exploited their plight as a political instrument with which to damage Israel. They have rejected every international constructive proposal for solving the problem —

including the Hammarskjöld plan of 1962 for the absorption of the refugees within the framework of a regional development plan. Israel has always expressed her readiness to contribute her share towards the resettlement of the refugees within a regional framework. She has stated her willingness to pay compensation and contribute of her knowledge and experience in a concerted effort to solve the problem.

At the height of the continued aggression of the Arab states, Israel's Foreign Minister proposed from the rostrum of the U.N., in October 1968, that an international conference of all the countries involved should be convened immediately — even prior to the advent of peace — to work out a solution for the refugee problem. The Arab states disregarded the proposal, just as they disregarded other proposals aimed at putting an end to this human problem.

Each of the American proposals — concerning borders and the return of the refugees — is prejudicial to Israel's security. The two of them together, if they were carried out, would constitute a grave danger to our very existence. This would be a return to the geography of 1967 and the demography of 1947. In effect, it would give the saboteurs and the terrorist organizations the right of choice to decide whether to shell Israel from the other side of borders convenient for attack, or to attack her from within after returning as refugees.

It is to such a situation that Nasser aspires. In his speech of February, 1969, he said: "This resolution (of the Security Council) is perhaps sufficient to liquidate the aggression of 1967, but it does not suffice to achieve the destiny of Palestine." In other words, as a first stage, Israel's forces are to withdraw to the 1967 borders, and then will come the second stage of achieving "the destiny of Palestine" — namely, the liquidation of Israel's sovereignty. Obviously, this is not the intention of the U.S. which sincerely wants peace in the Middle East. But since it is Nasser, and not the U.S., who will be the party to the settlement, the U.S. must consider how Nasser will exploit the proposed development as a lever to attain his ends.

As for united Jerusalem, the proposals refer to equal rights for Israel and Jordan in the economic religious and civil spheres. Jordan, which has

never had any rights in Jerusalem, except those she took by force of conquest in 1948 — Jordan, the only state in history to deny Jews access to their holy places, and which attacked the city again in 1967, is now, according to this proposal, to be a partner in the administration of the united city.

For the past two and a half years, since the city was united under Israeli sovereignty, there has been free access in Jerusalem for adherents of all faiths, without discrimination, to their holy places, and the religious life of all communities is being conducted in orderly fashion without any interference. The Government of Israel has expressed its readiness to make permanent arrangements, together with the heads of the faiths, to safeguard the religious status and the universal character of the holy places.

United Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel.

The American proposals do not involve any real obligation on the part of the Arab states to put an end to the hostile operations of the terrorist organisations. The undertaking required of the Arab States is even less than what was required of them in the Armistice Agreements, and we know how that undertaking was observed on our borders. While the Armistice Agreements laid down categorically and without reserve the responsibility of the Arab governments for preventing any operations whatever by irregular forces from their territories against Israel, the American proposals call upon the Arabs merely to do all in their power to prevent these operations. And of course we hear from time to time of statements from across the borders that the authorities are doing "all in their power" to prevent the terrorist operations. About the "efficacy" of these efforts at restraint there is certainly no need to talk at any length.

To sum up: the proposals do not obligate the Arab states expressly to recognize Israel's sovereignty, they do not advocate the delineation of secure, recognized and agreed borders by free negotiations between the parties, they do not obligate the Arab states effectively to put an end to terrorist activities from their territories. On the other hand, they involve a violation of Israel's sovereign rights in regard to Jerusalem and a

danger to Israel's security in the proposed arrangement about the Arab refugees.

If we carried out these proposals, Israel's security and peace would be most gravely imperilled.

Members of the Knesset, we are witness to an effort by the U.S. to reach agreement with the Soviet Union and convince the Arabs that the U.S. is friendly to them. We have never demanded of the U.S. that the friendly relations existing between us be exclusive. We have never expected that power, which has interests throughout the world, to refrain from maintaining friendly relations with our neighbours. Nevertheless we have the right to demand that the policy of the U.S. should not be conducted at the expense of our essential interests. It is the Arab states who are insisting that the U.S. accept their policy, which is built upon hostility to Israel. No nation should be required to adapt its policy to the will of states which aspire to destroy another state.

International experience proves that there is no political sense in measures which are likely to be interpreted by the Arab states as attempts to appease them. In a desire to preserve her interests in the Middle East, Britain tried for many years to appease the Arab states — but all this did not improve her position, nor did it preserve her status in the area.

In 1957 the U.S. acted in concert with the Soviet Union to impose a settlement on Israel and to bring about her retreat. It is clear that this settlement did not bring peace to the region. It disintegrated the moment Nasser thought he was ready for a new war. The U.S. did not win the grateful appreciation it desired from the Arab states. On the contrary, the success of the U.S. in persuading Israel to retreat without peace in 1957 was attributed by Nasser to the Russians alone. According to him, the Soviet Union succeeded in bringing about American pressure on Israel. The U.S. was the lever, the Russians were the activators, Israel was the victim — and Nasser the winner, who continued to slander the U.S. The U.S. will never be able to win the race against the Soviet Union for the acquisition of Arab friendship by turning a blind eye to the interests of Israel. It will not be able to do this because it means the abandonment by the U.S. of her own principles, which lie at the basis of its policy and its society.

It is becoming steadily clearer, even to those who disagreed with our view, that all the Russians are trying to do is to bring about the erosion of the American attitude and to bring pressure to bear on Israel, so that they — the Russians — may be able to strengthen their influence on their Arab clients. There is no possibility at all of appeasing the Russians and their clients — except by restoring the *status quo ante* and imperilling Israel's security. It is natural, therefore, that the Soviets, in the wake of the Egyptian dictate, should reply in the negative to the latest American proposals. For the same reason, too, it may be expected that in the course of further contacts between the powers, the Russians will continue their efforts to bring about a further deterioration in the American attitude. After the Rabat conference, as before it, the Russians will persist in brandishing the Arab threat that, unless there is a settlement on Arab terms, the area will be plunged into war. But the true reason why Nasser has not opened all-out war is that he is well aware that Israel has it in her power to repulse and rout him again.

In the Arab effort to bring about an erosion in the American attitude, it is also argued that the preservation of the so-called moderate Arab states requires conciliatory American approach towards them. This is an attempt to present a distorted picture of the confrontation that exists in the Arab world by picturing it as an outcome or result of the dispute with Israel. The Rabat conference, however, has shown there is no foundation whatever for this assumption.

There are fundamental differences between Nasser and Faisal which do not derive from the Israel-Arab dispute — for instance, the problem of South Yemen. Faisal has many reasons for his reluctance to strengthen Nasser and help impose his domination on the Middle East. Nor are the differences between Algeria and Egypt the outcome of the relations between Egypt and Israel. Neither of them belong to the so-called "moderate" Arab states. When Nasser tries today to weaken the integrity of Lebanon, ostensibly in order to broaden the front against Israel, the Lebanese Government, no doubt, is mindful of the fact that in 1958 Nasser tried to undermine Lebanese integrity for reasons not connected with the dispute with Israel.

As I have said, the ferment within the Arab countries and the tensions between the Arab states are not a projection of the Arab-Israeli conflict. When Nasser fought for five years in the Yemen, employing gas against his Arab brethren — it was not in order to solve the “Palestine” problem. For years, when Nasser tried to subvert every state and every regime in the Middle East, and many African states, it was not in order to bring about a “political solution” in our region. When Nasser incited for the assassination of Arab leaders and threatened attempts on the lives of heads of states — it was not in order to bring back the refugees. Nasser’s subversive and aggressive policy has independent roots, inherent in the essence and nature of his regime, and not necessarily connected with the relations between Israel and the Arab states. The hostility of the Arab states to Israel is well known, and yet the Rabat conference ended as it did. It was not the degree of hostility to Israel that weighted the scales at the discussions, nor the pro-American or anti-American attitude. It was an inter-Arab struggle, not differences of opinion with regard to Israel, which led to the failure of the Rabat summit. It was mainly the failure of Nasser, who wished to impose his attitude and leadership on the Arab world.

Furthermore, a concrete factor was involved: namely, the struggle for Libya. Nasser’s enhanced efforts and activity, ever since the revolution in Libya, to draw the revolutionary regime into the Egyptian sphere of influence, have not escaped the attention of the other Arab states.

Both progressive and conservative states saw in this the danger of a change in the inter-Arab political balance of power, as well as a danger to their own importance in the Arab arena. These were the reasons for the failure of the Rabat conference.

Egypt’s main efforts are now devoted, on the one hand, to the integration of Libya and her potential into the war against Israel and, on the other hand, to the strengthening of the military coordination between Israel’s Arab neighbours. For this purpose a meeting between Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan is expected in the early months of 1970.

When we discuss the entire picture of our relations with the U.S., it is our duty to clarify two fundamental principles: There is a profound and

basic friendship between Israel and the U.S. This friendship is founded not only on a long tradition of devotion to common values, of democracy and liberty — the values which it would be wrong to underestimate even in the world of today — but also to a sincere aspiration and an unremitting effort for peace. The U.S. has endeavoured to ensure that Israel shall be secure and strong, capable of repelling aggression and maintaining a free and democratic society in this area.

At the same time, however, we must not ignore the differences of opinion that exist and the implication for Israel’s peace and security of the kind of settlement proposed. With all our friendship and all our esteem for this great friendly state, we must clearly declare that we reject in the most categorical manner the course of the talks between the powers, and certainly the proposals that have been submitted. The Government of Israel, expressing the will of her people, cannot even consider proposals of this kind.

When the Government of Israel decided on its policy immediately after the Six Day War, the third war which we have withstood in a generation, it made it clear that it was determined to strive for true and durable peace, and that there is no other way to reach such a peace but through direct negotiations between the parties involved in the conflict. We did not see this as a matter of tactics. There was no element of bargaining in our position. We had no desire to appear as victors wishing to dictate conditions to the vanquished. We decided on our policy in the light of a clear and basic conviction that we must strive for a Middle East in which there is equal room for the rights and sovereignty of every Arab state. We have not endangered the existence of a single Arab state. We wished and still wish to be at peace with them, but we will not lend our hand to any settlement, nor will we accept any proposal that will enable our neighbours to persist in their aggressive policy.

We drew great encouragement for our position in those days from the spontaneous and instantaneous reaction of the masses of the Jewish people in the Diaspora, and of broad circles in world public opinion and the world press. We received demands and requests from the Jews of Europe, Latin America and the U.S. to call them together

in Jerusalem to express encouragement to the State of Israel and endeavour to strengthen and fortify her.

The rejection of the latest American proposals by the Soviets, at the inspiration of their Arab clients, ought to draw once again America's attention to the fact that the aim of the Russians and their Arabs partners is not peace, but to the creation of convenient conditions for aggression.

It ought also to make it clear, even to sceptics, that the whole purpose of the Soviet Union is to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Israel and to undermine America's support for the way to peace.

We hope the U.S. will draw the proper conclusions from the lack of response to her efforts and will return to the only road that can lead to true peace through the deployment of all her power and influence for negotiations between the parties.

This may seem to be a long road, but there is no shorter one. Such an attitude is true and just, and it is the only one that in the last analysis can bring about a true and enduring peace between Israel and the Arab countries. All the shortcuts that have been tried have led in other directions, in which there was no justice and which did not lead to peace.

Members of the Knesset, we have said on many occasions that the time might come when, in addition to our struggle with our enemies, we might also have to face a trenchant debate with our best friends. The struggle with our friends requires from us unlimited devotion, such as is shown hour by hour in the valiant stand of our soldiers on the front and our villages on the bord-

ers. The dispute with our friends also calls for endurance. In order that we may be able to bear the heavy burden that is a condition of our success, every single one of us and every section of our people must realise that we have to adapt our way of life to the circumstances.

We must rally for a struggle which may be prolonged — the struggle of a small nation, surrounded by enemies, which is not prepared to give up its survival, its security, and its right to true peace.

The Jewish people in general, and in Israel in particular, have often faced similar situations. In the past, too, we have proved that a small nation which was prepared to undergo grave trials need not give in. Our very existence as a free nation, in an independent state, has proved this.

We are now required to bear the burden of a prolonged war, the absorption of a welcome immigration, the development of the economy and concern for those strata of the population whose standard of living does not correspond to Israel's social principles. We cannot confront these challenges while continuing to maintain a standard of living appropriate to days of peace and calm. A wise nation will be able to draw the requisite conclusions in respect of every single individual.

In our hands lies not only the destiny of the State, but the hope of the Jewish people. History has entrusted our generation with the establishment and protection of Israel's renascent independence. If we take the right action and follow the right policies — wisely and with a knowledge of the full weight of our responsibility — we shall be able to attain the longed-for genuine peace.

United Nations

PART I

Documents Preceding the Opening of the General Assembly

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Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1968-15 June 1969.¹ (Excerpt)

The item entitled "The situation in the Middle East" was included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its twenty-third session, but at the closing plenary meeting, on 21 December 1968, the President announced that his consultations with various delegations had given him to understand that it was the general feeling that the item should be deferred until the next regular session. Accordingly, the Assembly decided without objection to include the item in the provisional agenda of the twenty-fourth session.

The material covered in this chapter, therefore, deals with developments in the Middle East between 16 June 1968 and 15 June 1969, principally in connexion with matters submitted to and considered by the Security Council, which are described in greater detail in the annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. The chapter has been organized in such a manner as to deal as concisely as possible with developments in connexion with the status of the cease-fire ordered by the Council in June 1967, the problem of the treatment of civilian populations in Israel-occupied territories and related matters, the situation in and around Jerusalem and its Holy Places, other matters brought to the attention of the Security Council in connexion with the situation in the Middle East, and reports of the Secretary-General on the progress of the mission of his Special Representative to the Middle East.

A. STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE ORDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN JUNE 1967

1. Complaints by Israel and Jordan

As stated in last year's annual report of the Secretary-General, the Security Council, which

had been requested by Jordan and Israel to consider the situation created as a result of violations of the cease-fire, had adjourned on 5 June 1968 after having included the respective complaints in its agenda.

During the month of June, Jordan submitted complaints of cease-fire violations in which fire had been directed across the Jordan River at civilian centres. In June also, Israel charged that armed personnel had crossed the river to lay mines and attack villages. In July Jordan charged that Israel had attempted to force refugees from Gaza to cross the King Hussein Bridge into Jordan. In its reply, Israel stated that it was Jordanian forces that had opened fire on the Israeli military positions on the west bank without provocation.

Meetings of the Council in August 1968

In early August, Israel submitted charges of continued violation of the cease-fire from Jordanian territory by paramilitary terror units operating from Jordan with the co-operation and encouragement of the Jordanian authorities. On 4 August Jordan charged that Israeli military aircraft had bombed areas west and south of the city of Salt, nineteen miles west of Amman, using napalm bombs and causing casualties among civilians. On the same day Israel reported that its aircraft had taken action against two terrorist bases in the Salt area because of continued acts of aggression from those bases.

On 5 August the Security Council met in response to requests made on that date by Jordan and Israel. Jordan's letter referred to the attack in the vicinity of Salt as well as to its complaints about attacks on the city of Irbid, inscribed on the agenda on 5 June, while Israel's letter asked for further consideration of its complaint of 5 June about firing and infiltration across the cease-fire lines from Jordan territory.

The Security Council considered the two complaints at seven meetings held between 5 and 16 August 1968. Besides the representatives of Jordan and Israel, the representatives of Iraq, Saudi

¹ U.N. doc. A/7601.

Arabia, Syria and the United Arab Republic were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

The representative of Jordan began the debate by saying that Israel's premeditated attack on 4 August against the civilian population of the areas around the city of Salt was similar in nature to Israel's previous action against Irbid on 5 June 1968. In that attack, thirty-four Jordanians had been killed and eighty-two seriously wounded. The areas involved were Jordan's most productive sections, on which the country depended for a great part of its agricultural needs. Israel's repeated attacks clearly indicated that country's aim to coerce the Arab States into submission. The Security Council had already given numerous warnings to Israel against acts of military reprisal. In view of Israel's continued defiance, the representative of Jordan urged that the Security Council take effective measures, as envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

The representative of Israel stated that his Government had constantly drawn attention to the warfare that was being carried out against its territory and people from across the cease-fire line. It had also explained that the inequitable Security Council resolutions only increased intransigence and bred more violence. Since the adoption of Council resolution 248 (1968) of 24 March 1968, terrorist raids and armed attacks had increased greatly. It had therefore become inevitable for Israel to take action in self-defence. The targets of Israel's counteraction of 4 August had been limited to terrorist bases. The town of Salt and Jordanian army camps had remained outside the scope of that action. It was imperative for the Council to raise its voice against the continuous warfare being waged by terrorists against Israel from Jordanian territory and to impress on Jordan the vital necessity to abide by its cease-fire obligations.

In the ensuing discussion in the Security Council, all of the members emphasized the need for an early settlement of the Middle East situation and condemned the Israeli attack of 4 August, which they considered would hamper the efforts of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, to secure agreement on the implementation of Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. They all ex-

pressed their full support for Mr. Jarring's efforts and urged the parties to give him their fullest co-operation.

Some members of the Council, among them Canada, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the United States, said that there appeared to be a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence and that the Security Council should condemn all acts of violence. The representative of the United States suggested that, in view of the charges and countercharges with which the Council was faced, it would be helpful to establish United Nations observers in the area. The presence of such observers, besides providing the Council with accurate and factual information, would serve as a deterrent to further incidents. Other representatives maintained that it would be unjust to equate the small, sporadic and spontaneous acts of resistance of the people of the occupied territories with the carefully planned, large-scale military operations of Israel. To equate them thus would amount to condoning military reprisals. The USSR representative stated that the purpose of Israel's military action was to create obstacles to a political settlement in the Middle East. Israel's latest attack had taken place at a time when the United Nations, through the Special Representative, was engaged in the next stage of consultations for a peaceful settlement.

On 16 August the President of the Security Council announced that as a result of consultations among members of the Council, a draft resolution had emerged which reflected their views on the course the Council might adopt. Under it, the Security Council would: (1) reaffirm its resolution 248 (1968), which, *inter alia*, declared that grave violations of the cease-fire could not be tolerated and that the Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts; (2) deplore the loss of life and heavy damage to property; (3) consider that premeditated and repeated military attacks endangered the maintenance of peace; and (4) condemn the further military attacks launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and resolution 248 (1968) and warn that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would duly take account of the failure to comply with the present resolution.

On 16 August the draft resolution was adopted unanimously as resolution 256 (1968).

After the adoption of the draft resolution, the President of the Council stated that he had taken note of the widespread support that had been expressed for the efforts of the Special Representative, and that with the consent of the Council he would request the Secretary-General to convey to Mr. Jarring the Council's expression of support.

Subsequent Communications

On 21 and 26 August following the adoption of resolution 256 (1968), Jordan made further charges of attacks against civilians by the Israeli forces and listed, *inter alia*, twenty-seven incidents of Israeli attacks on Jordanian villages and farms.

In a letter dated 26 August, Israel charged that a large-scale military attack had been carried out against Israel from Jordanian territory using mortars and small arms.

On 17 September Jordan charged that Israeli forces had shelled the city of Irbid and had used heavy artillery. On the same date Israel charged that 103 attacks had been made against it from Jordanian territory involving the use of small arms, bazookas, mines and rockets.

During October and November, Jordan submitted a number of complaints related to cease-fire violations. On 10 October it complained that Israel had attempted to change the armistice demarcation line in the Aqaba area, but Israel denied the charge in a letter dated 21 October. On 15 October Jordan charged that Israeli soldiers had penetrated to the East Bank of Jordan, had laid mines and fired upon mosques and schools.

On 23 October Israel complained of intensified attacks from Jordanian territory. On 3 November it informed the Security Council that those attacks had culminated in the shelling of the city of Elat on 2 November and on 5 November, charged that the 23 October shelling had come from Iraqi artillery and was directed at the area of Ashdot Ya'aqov. Iraq denied Israel's allegations and indicated that its troops were in Jordan at the request of that Government and were under a joint command whose attitude towards the cease-fire was governed by the position of the Governments of Jordan and the United Arab Republic.

Jordan complained that in attacks in mid-February 1969, villages had been shelled by mortar and field artillery, and that a ninety-minute napalm bomb raid by Israeli jets and helicopters had left six Jordanian soldiers dead and ten others wounded.

Both parties presented complaints of even more frequent and serious incidents during March, with Jordan asserting that Israeli air attacks were coming closer to the city of Amman and Israel insisting that it had been compelled to take counter-measures to defend itself from ever more persistent armed attacks by regular and irregular forces coming from terror organization bases in Jordan.

Meetings of the Council in March and April 1969

On 26 March Jordan charged that Israeli jet fighters had attacked villages and civilian centres in the area of Salt, causing the death of seventeen civilians and the wounding of twenty-five more. Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider such continuous and grave Israeli violations and to adopt more adequate measures to check them and restore international peace and security. The following day Israel also requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider continual violations of the cease-fire by terrorist groups operating from Jordan.

On 27 March the Security Council included the two complaints in its agenda as separate items, and considered them in the course of eight meetings held between 27 March and 1 April.

In describing the incident at the opening of the debate, the representative of Jordan said that Israel jet fighters had attacked rest homes and winter resorts in Ein Hazir, one kilometre from Salt, and had bombed and strafed the main roads connecting the villages around Salt and the city itself. He added that that raid was part of a series of attacks that Israel had continuously carried out against his country and to which the attention of the Security Council had been drawn regularly by his delegation. During the preceding six weeks Israel had intensified its daily raids under a policy which its leaders had called euphemistically "active self-defence". In spite of that continued aggression, Jordan had been reluctant to submit a new complaint to the Security Council so as

not to prejudice the peaceful efforts of the four permanent members of the Council. However, it appeared that unless effective measures were taken in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter Israel would continue its aggressive policy.

The representative of Israel stated that in spite of the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council, the Arab leaders had continued to exhort their people to warfare against Israel. The cease-fire was being violated by regular Arab forces and also by irregular commandos. Thus, in the absence of effective United Nations action, Israel had no choice but to defend itself. It was precisely for that reason that on 26 March Israel had taken action against an El-Fatah base at Ein Hazir, which was an isolated site quite far from the settlements of civilian population. Jordan's responsibility for the activities of the terrorist organizations was well established as they had received protection and encouragement from the Government of Jordan. If Jordan wanted peace in the area, it had to put an end to terrorist activities, as sabotage and killing would not lead to peace.

After further statements by the representatives of the parties, by members of the Council and by the representative of Saudi Arabia, who had been invited to participate in the discussion at his request, the President of the Council announced on 29 March that a draft resolution had been submitted by Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia. The three-Power draft was later revised by the sponsors and was adopted on 1 April by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (Colombia, Paraguay, the United Kingdom and the United States), as resolution 265 (1969). Under its operative paragraphs the Council (1) reaffirmed resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968); (2) deplored the loss of civilian life and damage to property; (3) condemned the recent premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions, and warned once again that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would have to meet to consider further more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such attacks.

Subsequent Communications

Since the adoption of resolution 265 (1968) on 1 April 1968, Israel and Jordan have continued

to address complaints to the Council. On 8 April 1969 both parties complained of attacks on the cities of Elat and Aqaba, Israel asserting that following a rocket attack against Elat from the area of Aqaba, it had taken air action in self-defence, and Jordan charging that Israeli aircraft had raided Aqaba with rockets and bombs. Both sides reported casualties in the exchange.

Charges by Israel in the latter part of April reported mortar fire from Jordan territory on an Israeli post in the Golan Heights, exchanges of fire across the Jordan River, engagements with saboteur units infiltrating from Jordan and the intensification of artillery attacks, with the participation of Iraqi artillery stationed in Jordan, timed to coincide with an Egyptian campaign in the Suez Canal area.

Jordanian complaints towards the end of April and early in May charged that Israeli forces had opened fire on villages in northern Jordan, shelled areas from their positions in occupied Syrian territory, and intensified their attacks in the whole northern area by use of heavy mortar shells, heavy artillery, rockets and napalm.

On 6 May the representative of Iraq rejected the Israeli charges against his country, reiterated his Government's policy and blamed the present situation on Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories.

On 16 May Jordan charged that Israeli forces had been using the farm of an Arab orphanage in the Jericho area to shell Jordanian positions. Israel denied the charge in a letter dated 21 May and stated that it was only a pretext for Jordan shelling against civilian targets in the Jericho area.

On 22 and 23 May, Jordan submitted more charges of Israeli aerial and ground attacks against the villages of Safi, Feifa and the area of Dair Alla in the north. On 25 May Israel complained of attacks against the Ethiopian monastery south of Allenby Bridge, and listed fifty-seven others against its territory from Jordan between 11 and 17 May. In a further letter dated 29 May, Israel charged that the orphanage of the Arab Development Society had also been shelled again from Jordan.

2. Complaints by Israel and the United Arab Republic

The Secretary-General continued to submit to the Security Council supplemental information

concerning the observance of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector based on reports received from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Lieutenant General Odd Bull. During June those reports concerned exchanges of fire across the Canal with small arms, and efforts by United Nations military observers to arrange a cease-fire on each occasion. On 8 July a report was submitted concerning an exchange of artillery, machine-gun, mortar and rifle fire across the Canal. The same incident was cited by the United Arab Republic, in a letter of 10 July, as an act of aggression against the civilian inhabitants of the city of Suez which had caused heavy casualties and property losses, while Israel claimed that the United Arab Republic in its letter had disregarded the findings of the United Nations military observers that Israeli forces had acted with restraint and in self-defence.

Meetings of the Council in September 1968

On 28 August Israel complained to the Security Council about an incident on 26 August in which two Israeli jeeps were ambushed while on patrol along the Suez Canal, damaged by mines and attacked by the ambush party, which killed two soldiers and abducted a third.

This incident was the subject of reports from the Chief of Staff, dated 29 August and 4 September, which indicated that United Nations military observers had heard explosions and firing and seen flares on 26 August. Israel had complained of the ambush to the Chief of Staff and demanded the immediate release of the soldier alleged to have been kidnapped. An inquiry by United Nations observers had indicated that an Israel Defence Force patrol had been mined and ambushed, but they had not been able to verify that two Israeli soldiers had been killed, having been told that the bodies had been removed from the area for burial. In meetings with the Chief of Staff on 28 and 29 August, the United Arab Republic authorities had categorically denied any involvement of their forces in the incident or any knowledge of the alleged kidnapping.

On 2 September Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider that incident, and the Council included the matter in its agenda at a meeting held on 4 September.

During the discussion in the Security Council,

the representative of Israel stated that in violation of the cease-fire established by the Council and in breach of the arrangements prohibiting military activities in the Canal, a well-planned military attack had been carried out against Israel by United Arab Republic forces operating from the west bank of the Canal. Israel would like to know whether the United Arab Republic was prepared to take the necessary measures to prevent such attacks in the future and whether it would return the captured Israeli soldier.

The representative of the United Arab Republic, after reiterating his Government's denial of the involvement of its forces in the alleged capturing of an Israeli soldier, stated that in making those charges Israel might in fact be creating a pretext to start large-scale operations against his country. Moreover, Israel should not be allowed to hold every Arab Government responsible for acts of resistance by the people of the occupied territories.

After further statements by the parties and by members of the Council on 5 September, the Council adjourned. On 8 September it reconvened and added to its agenda further complaints received on that date from Israel and the United Arab Republic and relating to new incidents of heavy firing across the Suez Canal. Discussion continued at four meetings between 8 and 18 September.

When the Security Council met in the evening of 8 September, the Secretary-General stated that in three brief cable messages he had received that afternoon, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization had informed him of a heavy and prolonged exchange of fire across the Suez Canal that day. The first of those messages stated that exchange of fire in the Canal area had ceased and since 1650 hours GMT United Nations observation posts had nothing more to report. The Secretary-General added that in view of the fact that no reports of further firing had been received, it was safe to conclude that the cease-fire arranged by the United Nations military observers had been holding since it became effective at 1650 hours on 8 September. He then read out the text of a report just received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO with details of the exchange of fire observed by the military observers at different observation posts along the Canal, the weapons used and the attempts made

at securing a cease-fire. The reports also contained accounts of damage to UNTSO installations and the wounding of a United Nations military observer.

After some discussion in the Council, the representative of the United Kingdom proposed that in view of the urgency of the matter he would suggest that the Council might recess for a brief period in order to hold consultations on what immediate action it could take. The United Kingdom suggestion was later submitted in a formal proposal, under rule 33 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, by the United States representative and was approved.

When the Council resumed its meeting the same night, the President of the Council stated that after extensive consultations he was authorized to make the following declaration:

"The Security Council, having met urgently to consider the item on its agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1448/Rev. 1, having heard the reports of General Odd Bull presented by the Secretary-General, and having heard the statements of the representatives of Israel and of the United Arab Republic, deeply regrets the loss of life, and requires the parties strictly to observe the cease-fire called for by the Security Council's resolutions."

On 10 and 11 September, the Security Council continued its consideration of the complaints before it. All the members of the Council expressed their concern over the situation prevailing in the area as reported by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and the grievous loss of life and damage to property on both sides. They believed that the Security Council had a special responsibility to demand that the cease-fire should be fully respected. However, only a political solution could put an end to the incidents whose repetition could very well engulf the whole area once again in disaster. They pointed out that the elements of that solution had been laid down in the Council's resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. The only hope for peace in the Middle East lay in its earliest implementation.

During the period from 9 to 17 September, the Council continued to receive reports from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO containing supplemental information on the status of the cease-fire in the

Suez Canal sector. The Chief of Staff also reported that on 16 September he had addressed letters to the appropriate authorities in the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic protesting strongly against the damage to UNTSO installations and property and against actions which had placed the United Nations staff in grave danger.

On 18 September, when the Council resumed its debate, the President stated that, as a result of continuous consultations with a view to determining the Council's action with regard to the items on its agenda, and in the light of the discussion in the Council and the reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, he was able to present to the Council a draft resolution reflecting the agreement of the greatest possible number of members of the Council. He then read out the text of a draft resolution under which the Security Council would (1) insist that the cease-fire ordered by the Council in its resolutions must be rigorously respected; and (2) reaffirm its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, and urge all the parties to extend their fullest co-operation to the Special Representative in the speedy fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to him under that resolution.

The Security Council adopted the draft resolution on 18 September by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (Algeria), as resolution 258 (1968).

Subsequent Communications and Reports

Following the adoption of resolution 258 (1968), Israel continued to submit complaints of further incidents during the month of September in the course of which, it charged, United Arab Republic forces had crossed the Suez Canal and attacked Israeli forces. Reports from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO indicated that two incidents involving mines had been the subject of Israel complaints to UNTSO, and that inquiries into them had been conducted by United Nations military observers, who saw in each case one Israeli military vehicle damaged by a major explosion and footprints leading from the scene of the incident to the bank of the Canal.

Meetings of the Council in November 1968

On 26 October Israel complained that United Arab Republic forces had opened artillery fire on Israeli positions along the entire length of the

Suez Canal that afternoon, and that firing had ceased only after two attempts by United Nations military observers to arrange a cease-fire. The following day, Israel reported, the attacks had continued, fire having been intensified after an attempt by United Arab Republic forces to cross the Canal to the east bank in the vicinity of Port Tawfiq. Israel asserted that Algerian forces stationed in the Suez Canal Zone had participated in those attacks.

The United Arab Republic also submitted a complaint on 26 October, charging that Israeli forces in the Suez Canal area had launched an attack against Port Tawfiq with ground-to-ground rockets, resulting in the loss of lives and damage to property.

On 1 November both the United Arab Republic and Israel submitted urgent requests for a meeting of the Security Council. The United Arab Republic complaint charged Israeli aircraft with infiltrating deep into United Arab Republic air space on the night of 30 October and with bombing civilian targets, including the Nag Hamadi Bridge and an electric power station. Israel charged that since 10 September the United Arab Republic had been carrying out a series of premeditated and unprovoked acts of firing, mine-laying and incursions by land and air, which were related to its recently announced policy of "preventive military operations".

Reports were submitted to the Security Council containing information received from the various United Nations observation posts about the exchanges of fire on 26 and 27 October, as well as on investigations, made by the military observers, of Israeli charges concerning mining incidents and canal crossings.

On 1 November 1968, the Security Council included the complaints of the United Arab Republic and Israel in its agenda. Their representatives and also the representative of Saudi Arabia were invited to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council discussed the matter at two meetings, held on 1 and 4 November.

The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the fact that the Israeli air attack had been directed against installations constituting part of the economic structure of his country clearly showed that Israel was trying to under-

mine the economy of the United Arab Republic. While carrying out those and other destructive acts against its neighbours, Israel was at the same time waging a publicity campaign about its peaceful intentions and constructive approaches. However, Israel's refusal to declare its acceptance of and its readiness to implement resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November spoke more eloquently about its real intentions. Considering Israel's defiance of the Security Council's resolutions and its continuous acts of aggression against the Arab States, it was incumbent upon the Council not to content itself with just another condemnation of Israel, but to apply the required enforcement measures as envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter.

The representative of Israel stated that although the Security Council, as far back as 1948 and more recently on 22 November 1967, had called upon the parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to conclude a permanent peace settlement, the United Arab Republic had continued its policy of belligerency towards Israel. It had now initiated a policy of so-called preventive defence, under which it had started a series of unprovoked acts of open fire, mine-laying and incursions by land and air across the cease-fire lines. After prolonged and patient restraint, Israel was left with no choice but to act in self-defence. The action taken by an Israeli commando unit on 30 October had been limited to blowing up a power station and two bridges on the Nile between Aswan and Cairo. That action had carefully avoided densely populated areas and had not attacked United Arab Republic troops. Its sole purpose was to bring home to the Government of the United Arab Republic that its army could not ignore its cease-fire obligations with impunity. The obligations to maintain the cease-fire were of a reciprocal nature and must be mutually observed.

In the statements that followed, some members of the Council stated that the latest violations of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector, resulting in loss of innocent civilian lives, again underlined the need of increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations cease-fire observation operation. They considered that tension in the area had been greatly increased by the United Arab Republic's policy of "preventive defence" and Israel's policy

of military reprisals. Although the cease-fire was not a substitute for peace, its observance would strengthen the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to transform it into a just and lasting peace on the basis of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.

Other representatives maintained that the main cause of tension in the Middle East was the occupation of Arab territories by Israel. It was not enough for the Council merely to ask for observance of the cease-fire or to condemn its violation. The important thing was to insist on the full implementation of resolution 242 (1967), which the Council had unanimously adopted on 22 November 1967. It was a matter of regret to them that the application of that resolution had not been accepted in equal fashion by all parties, and they hoped that all parties would make an equal effort to facilitate the Special Representative's work.

After its meeting on 4 November, the Council did not resume consideration of the above complaints.

Subsequent Communications and Reports

Further incidents of cease-fire violations in the Suez Canal area were the subject of reports from the Chief of Staff during the month of November. One involved the penetration of United Arab Republic aircraft into Israeli-controlled territory and firing by United Arab Republic anti-aircraft at jets flying on the east side of the Canal. Another incident involved an explosion on the east side of the Canal on 26 November, which was investigated by United Nations military observers, who reported having seen an Israeli half-track damaged by an apparently recent explosion, and mines with no visible inscriptions still in the ground. Other incidents of firing across the Canal on 28 November and 11 December were the subject of reports from the Chief of Staff and of a complaint to the Security Council by Israel.

Between 11 December 1968 and 26 January 1969, the Chief of Staff reported only one incident of light machine-gun fire across the Suez Canal, on 2 January, and the parties complained of no specific incidents. On 25 January the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel drew the Council's attention to a statement by the President of the United Arab Republic to the National Assembly on 20 January praising the action of the Palestinian

resistance forces, pledging to place all his Government's resources at their disposal, and expressing appreciation of Palestinian organizations' rejection of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. In the view of the Foreign Minister of Israel, that policy statement had deeply disturbing implications regarding the maintenance of the cease-fire and the establishment of a just and lasting peace as called for in resolution 242 (1967). By giving political and material support to terrorist organizations operating from their territory, he asserted, the United Arab Republic and other States concerned were repudiating the responsibilities they had undertaken in accepting the cease-fire.

The Secretary-General submitted to the Council a series of reports from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning incidents of firing across the Suez Canal between 5 and 11 February. In his report of 11 February, the Secretary-General indicated that in reporting recent firing incidents in the Suez Canal sector, the Chief of Staff had expressed his concern at this development and believed the situation to be serious.

On 13 February 1969, Israel submitted charges that eighteen mines had been found along the east bank of the Canal, and complained to the Council about repeated sniping attacks by United Arab Republic forces during 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 February, which created serious security dangers and were designed to undermine the peace-making efforts of the United Nations. Also on 13 February the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council stating that, despite the Council's adoption of resolution 242 (1967) for the peaceful settlement of the situation, which the United Arab Republic had accepted and was ready to implement on the basis of its call on Israel to withdraw from all Arab territories occupied as a result of its aggression, Israel continued to refuse to implement the resolution and insisted on continuing its occupation. He urged the Council to take the positive steps necessary to implement resolution 242 (1967).

During the second half of February, the Secretary-General continued to transmit to the Security Council reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector. During this period the United

Nations military observers had reported machine-gun fire and rifle shots across the Canal, and a mining incident involving an Israel truck on the east side of the Canal. In his report of 28 February concerning an exchange of fire on that day, the Secretary-General stated that General Bull had expressed concern, which he shared, that the continued firing in that sector, if not checked, might result in a still more serious breach of the cease-fire.

Reports received from the Chief of Staff indicated that firing had continued between 1 and 7 March and that only small arms had been used.

On 8 and 9 March, General Bull reported that heavy exchanges of fire had broken out with mortar, tank and artillery fire employed by both sides. He also reported the aerial activities observed in the Suez Canal sector on the morning of 8 March. In the course of the heavy exchanges of fire, General Bull reported, UNTSO buildings, observation posts and vehicles suffered damage and one observer was slightly injured. In view of the failure of numerous efforts to obtain adherence to a cease-fire, General Bull had appealed to the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic to observe the cease-fire and to suspend all military activities in the area.

On 9 March the United Arab Republic charged that when four of its fighter aircraft were proceeding on a routine flight over the Suez Canal area, eight Israeli Mirage planes had intruded and fight had ensued, following which Israeli forces had shelled several cities in the Suez Canal area and subsequently extended the firing all along the Canal.

Again on 11 March, both complaints from Israel and the United Arab Republic and reports from the Chief of Staff indicated that outbreaks of heavy firing along the whole length of the Canal had occurred throughout the day, that weapons ranged from small arms to artillery, tank and rocket-fire, that numerous efforts to obtain a cease-fire were unavailing, and that once more United Nations buildings, facilities and vehicles sustained damage. Subsequently, Israel charged that Algerian armed forces had participated in these attacks and it noted Algeria's continuing refusal to accept the cease-fire established by the Security Council resolutions of June 1967.

During the remaining part of March, additional complaints received from the parties and reports submitted by the Chief of Staff indicated that outbreaks of heavy firing had occurred on 12, 13, 18 and 24 March, sometimes extending across the whole length of the Canal, involving small arms, mortars, automatic and heavy weapons and causing damage to UNTSO installations and casualties on both sides.

During the month of April, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Council reports from the Chief of Staff relating to firing incidents which took place on an almost daily basis in the Suez Canal sector. During the first half of the month, these incidents were also the subject of complaints to the Council by the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic, each blaming the other party for initiating attacks and noting the efforts by the United Nations military observers to arrange for cease-fires. Both parties complained also, during this period, of penetration of aircraft of the other party into their air space and reported engagements to compel the invading aircraft to depart.

On 15 April the United Arab Republic complained to the Council that Israeli forces had shelled the cities of Suez, Port Tawfiq and Ismailia for three consecutive hours, and charged that the daily attacks against civilians and civilian installations formed an integral part of Israel's aggressive policies. A further letter of 18 April charged Israel with similar attacks on civilian centres on 16 and 17 April.

The reports received daily between 16 and 30 April from the Chief of Staff indicated that the number of firing incidents observed by United Nations military observers persisted at a high level, that in the majority of cases firing was initiated by United Arab Republic forces, that guided missiles were being employed by the United Arab Republic forces on some occasions, and that on several occasions firing was directed at United Nations observation posts and military observers, on one occasion at a United Nations ambulance.

On 21 April the Secretary-General, in a special report to the Security Council, called attention most urgently to the prevailing situation in the Suez Canal sector, which he regarded as grave. Since 8 April, particularly, observance of the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions had been

degenerating steadily and daily for twelve successive days there had been major breaches of the cease-fire. The United Nations military observers, who were operating under great danger and difficulty, exerted every effort to bring a quick end to each instance of firing, but it quickly erupted again. In the circumstances it was only possible to conclude that the cease-fire had become almost totally ineffective and that a virtual stage of active war existed in the Suez Canal sector.

According to a complaint submitted to the Council by Israel on 21 April and to UNTSO on 22 April, United Arab Republic commando units crossed the Canal on the nights of 19, 21 and 22 April and attacked an Israeli position in the first incident and two Israeli patrols in the latter two incidents.

In a telegram dated 30 April, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic complained that on the preceding evening two Israeli planes had attacked civilian installations in the United Arab Republic hundreds of miles away from the military front. Although the aggression had failed to attain its objectives and no damage had been caused, the attempt emphasized the gravity of Israel's persistence in trying to destroy economic installations and attack civilian targets.

On 2 May the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council on developments threatening the effectiveness of the United Nations observation operation in the Suez Canal sector, which had exposed United Nations personnel to grave danger and caused heavy damage to United Nations installations, vehicles and equipment. He quoted the texts of identical letters he had addressed to the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic on 21 April drawing attention to the daily accounts of heavy exchange of fire reported by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO which constituted serious violations of the cease-fire and impaired the United Nations observation operation. The letters recalled that on several occasions the Chief of Staff had complained to the authorities on both sides that United Nations installations and facilities, although clearly and unmistakably marked, had been repeatedly fired upon by both sides and that observation posts had been heavily encroached upon by military positions of the parties, reducing the capability and endangering the lives of the military observers.

The Secretary-General had therefore requested both representatives to convey his views to their Governments and asked that instructions be given urgently to the military forces concerned to avoid as far as possible actions which restricted the observation operation or endangered the safety of United Nations personnel, in particular by encroaching on United Nations observation posts and by firing at United Nations installations and facilities. He had further requested that the construction of new shelters for United Nations personnel should be completed as a matter of urgency. In his report the Secretary-General also reproduced the replies he had received on 23 April from the representative of Israel and on 25 and 30 April from the representative of the United Arab Republic, as well as his further letters to the two representatives dated 1 May.

In a reply of 23 April, the representative of Israel stated that his country's forces were under strict orders to do all within their power to prevent danger to United Nations personnel and installations. He added that it was clear that the United Arab Republic forces had recently been opening fire intentionally on United Nations military observers and United Nations installations and transport in order to inflict injury, damage and destruction on them. In a second letter on the same day, the representative of Israel added that it was beyond dispute, which was borne out in the latest series of reports from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, that the Israel armed forces were punctilious in respecting the status and duties of the United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector and that they were co-operating fully with General Bull and doing their utmost to reduce to the absolute minimum any risks to the observers and their equipment and to United Nations installations. He added that his Government therefore regretted that the Secretary-General in his letter had referred indifferently to "parties" in general terms, which was liable to convey a misleading impression that the two parties were equally responsible for the situation in the Suez Canal sector. After referring to General Bull's reports relating to the incidents in the Suez Canal sector, the representative of Israel further stated that with one exception, all damage to United Nations installations had been on the Israeli side, owing to attacks by Egyptian armed forces.

The Government of Israel also regretted that the Secretary-General's observation that assistance for the improvement or for the construction of shelters for United Nations personnel had been "inadequate" might convey the impression that it was equally applicable to Israel, an impression that would be misleading inasmuch as the Israeli authorities had exerted their utmost endeavours to expedite the construction of shelters and would continue to do so to the extent that Egyptian acts of aggression did not impede it. Israel believed that the simple answer to the difficulties to which the Secretary-General had referred was the faithful and scrupulous observance of the cease-fire.

In a letter dated 30 April, the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that his Government had affirmatively responded to the proposals submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and had already taken the necessary steps towards strengthening the shelters assigned to the observers all along the west bank of the Suez Canal with a view to making them safer and more secure for the observers against Israeli fire from across the Canal. The responsibility for the deteriorating situation and aggravation of conditions in the Suez Canal sector lay clearly with Israel, which, after having committed its aggression of 5 June 1967, was insisting on a policy of annexing the Arab territory it had occupied and in particular refusing to implement the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.

On 1 May the Secretary-General had addressed a further letter to the representative of Israel denying Israel's claim that from 12 March until the end of the period under review no damage whatsoever had been caused to the United Nations observation posts on the United Arab Republic side. The Secretary-General added that the purpose of his letter had not been to start a discussion on the responsibility for the events in the Suez Canal sector, but rather to secure as far as possible increased co-operation in facilitating the task of observation and the provision of all possible assistance and protection to United Nations personnel in carrying out their duties. He expressed appreciation for the co-operation which the United Nations military observers had received.

In his letter dated 1 May to the representative of the United Arab Republic, the Secretary-General, after noting the offer of continued co-

operation in the building of shelters for United Nations military observers, stated that the representative of the United Arab Republic had not made any specific reference to two other matters which continued to concern him and which he had raised in his letter of 21 April, namely, the question of encroachment on United Nations observation posts and incidents of firing near United Nations personnel, installations and vehicles. Since 21 April, the day on which he had addressed identical letters to the two parties, exchanges of fire had continued to take place daily in the Suez Canal sector. Encroachment on United Nations observation posts had continued and some of those posts had been hit. After giving details of some of the recent incidents, as reported to him by General Bull, the Secretary-General stated that his concern over the safety of United Nations military observers had been unhappily borne out by an incident on 22 April, when a United Nations military observer had been seriously injured as his vehicle struck an anti-tank mine. Efforts by General Bull to secure assurances from the United Arab Republic that the wounded observer could be safely evacuated either by helicopter or by ambulance were unsuccessful, and in fact a clearly marked ambulance flying a United Nations flag came under fire from United Arab Republic forces on the west bank of the Canal before reaching the scene of the incident. The observer had thereafter been evacuated by an Israeli helicopter and was reported to be in good condition. The observer had been wounded at a time when he was proceeding with a second military observer to assist two others whose vehicles had, earlier that morning, struck a mine while en route to a United Nations observation post, and the relief of the team of observers at that post had to be postponed for almost a week, owing to the mining and continued firing in the area.

The Secretary-General went on to state that the Chief of Staff of UNTSO was approaching the authorities on both sides in order to discuss with them practical measures to facilitate the observation operations in the Suez Canal sector and to secure all possible assistance and protection for the United Nations military observers and personnel in the performance of their duties. One of the proposals that General Bull had in mind was the establishment of safe perimeters around United

Nations installations. General Bull had considered, and the Secretary-General agreed, that each of the United Nations control centres and observation posts should be surrounded by a free area of agreed dimensions, which should be clearly marked and free of any manned or unmanned firing positions and of any military personnel and equipment. The Secretary-General also agreed with another proposal of General Bull that, with the agreement of the two parties, UNTSO should be provided with a United Nations craft to be used for the relief of United Nations personnel at observation posts when relief by road was not possible, and to evacuate United Nations personnel if necessary. Finally, the Secretary-General paid special tribute to the United Nations military observers and Field Service personnel, who continued to carry out their tasks with a high sense of duty, great courage and with accuracy and objectivity.

In a letter dated 8 May, the representative of the USSR, referring to the Secretary-General's report of 21 April 1969 on the situation in the Suez Canal sector, expressed his delegation's satisfaction that the Secretary-General had brought that matter to the attention of the Security Council at an opportune moment. He added that the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East could not fail to arouse grave concern and that the reason was Israel's desire to frustrate the efforts towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, as provided in the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. Israel's attitude towards the current four-Power consultations also indicated the same policy. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, however, those consultations could be an effective means of reaching a settlement on the basis of the Security Council resolution. The Soviet Union believed that if the situation in the area was to be brought back to normal, it was also necessary that the Security Council resolutions on the cease-fire be strictly observed.

In a letter dated 13 May, the representative of the United Arab Republic referred to meetings between General Bull and the Under-Secretary of State of the United Arab Republic in which General Bull had been informed that the fortification of the military observers' shelters along the west bank of the Suez Canal was under way, that the United Arab Republic was prepared to un-

dertake the fortification in accordance with specifications submitted by General Bull, and that other steps had been taken to eliminate the exposure of the United Nations military observers to Israeli fire. The United Arab Republic was ready to respond positively to any suggestion which was consistent with its defences in the area. In conclusion he reiterated that Israel bore sole responsibility for the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, owing to its persistent aggression, avowed intentions and systematic attacks on cities and towns and destruction of economic installations.

In a letter dated 15 May, the representative of Israel commented on the views expressed in the letter of 8 May from the representative of the USSR, asserting that the vilification contained therein was an expression of established Soviet policy and threw additional light on the reasons for Israel's opposition to the current talks between the four permanent members of the Council. If the Soviet Union were in fact interested in the maintenance of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal area, he indicated, it would be well advised to impress upon the United Arab Republic its responsibility for the persistent violation of the cease-fire, as was clear from the reports submitted by General Bull. Israel, he pledged, would continue to observe scrupulously the cease-fire on the basis of reciprocity, and hoped that the United Arab Republic would do likewise.

On 17 May the representative of Finland expressed appreciation for the Secretary-General's efforts to protect the observers. As one of the Governments which had made military personnel available to serve as United Nations observers in the Suez Canal sector, his Government hoped that the arrangements initiated would ensure, with the co-operation of the Governments concerned, the continued effectiveness of UNTSO, which was an indispensable means of maintaining the cease-fire.

Four communications received from the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic during the month of May and until 15 June are summarized in the following paragraphs.

A letter dated 7 May was received from Israel commenting on United Arab Republic complaints of 25 and 30 April which, it said, contained familiar propaganda versions of the twenty-one years

of Arab war on Israel and distorted United Nations records and resolutions. The reports of General Bull and of the Secretary-General made it clear that Israel was trying to reduce to the minimum any risk to the observers while the United Arab Republic forces had initiated gross military assaults on them. The letter asserted that the United Arab Republic campaign against the cease-fire was an aspect of its proclaimed doctrine of offensive military actions against Israel, that the constant exchange of fire and raids into Israeli-held territory were part of a general planned operation, and that Israel was forced to take measures of self-defence but was committed to the observation of the cease-fire on a reciprocal basis.

Two letters dated 12 and 15 May were received from the United Arab Republic complaining of three days of shelling against cities and villages along the west bank of the Canal, concentrating on civilian centres and economic installations, and of an attempt by an Israeli force to cross the Canal in rubber boats in order to infiltrate positions on the west bank. Along with its campaign against civilians, it was charged, Israel had intensified the fortification of its positions on the east bank of the Canal in order to be able to fire on the city of Port Said. That action had seriously aggravated the situation in the Suez Canal area to the point of a threat of explosion.

A letter dated 19 May was received from Israel contrasting the letters of the United Arab Republic representative blaming Israel for tension in the Suez Canal sector with statements by United Arab Republic leaders openly proclaiming its policy of maintaining tension along the cease-fire line. Israel charged that the United Arab Republic, having decided to sacrifice the welfare of its population along the west bank and turn the sector into a daily battlefield, had evacuated civilians from the sector and turned the localities into bases for a campaign of intensified aggression.

A letter dated 13 June from Israel drew the attention of the Security Council to the fact that units of the armed forces of Kuwait were stationed in Egypt and were participating actively in the Suez Canal sector. After pointing out that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait had, on 8 June 1967, officially informed the Secretary-General that the Government of Kuwait would not "observe nor adhere to" the cease-fire reso-

lutions that had been adopted by the Security Council, the letter added that the same Minister had, according to Radio Kuwait on 5 June 1969, stressed that Kuwait completely rejected the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

Reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO from the beginning of May until mid-June indicated that firing incidents continued to take place on a daily basis in the Suez Canal sector, although the intensity of firing in general decreased after mid-May.

3. Complaints by Israel and Lebanon

On 27 October 1968, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that in a complaint to the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, Lebanon had stated that on the night 26-27 October forty mortar rounds had been fired at the village of Al-Majidiyah, and it had requested an inquiry. In the course of the inquiry, the United Nations military observers had found bloodstains which were said to be of a wounded man, as well as fifty craters in the village area, and the bodies of numerous livestock which were reported to have been killed by the shelling. On 28 October Lebanon also submitted a complaint to the Security Council, stating that on the preceding day Israeli forces had shelled the above-mentioned Lebanese village with one hundred mortar shells. On 29 October the Chief of Staff reported that Lebanon had presented another complaint of Israeli mortar fire on 28 October in three areas, and added that the United Nations military observers had conducted three inquiries and found twenty-two mortar tailfins in the impact area with markings in Hebrew.

On 6 November, in reply to Lebanon's complaints, Israel stated that the cease-fire had first been violated from the Lebanese side and that Israel had had to take action in self-defence.

Meetings of the Council in December 1968

On 29 December the representative of Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider its complaint concerning an act of aggression committed by Israeli air forces against the Civilian International Airport of Beirut for which, the representative of Lebanon said, Israel had admitted its responsibility. On the same day, Israel also requested an urgent meeting

of the Security Council to consider its charges of the constant violation by Lebanon of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council.

When the Council met the same day to consider the two requests, it also had before it two reports from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO.

The first reported that early in the morning of 29 December the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission had received a complaint from the Lebanese delegation stating that on the previous evening Israeli troops brought in by helicopter had destroyed thirteen civil aircraft at the Beirut International Airport. The report added that in discussion with the Chief Operations Officer of UNTSO, the Assistant Israel Liaison Officer had stated that fourteen aircraft had been destroyed or damaged.

The second report stated that in an inquiry conducted by United Nations military observers eleven witnesses had been interrogated who provided an account of the attack at the Beirut International Airport, and of the physical damage and injury received by some of the personnel at the airport. The United Nations military observers had seen evidence of an attack, including thirteen destroyed aircraft.

The representative of Lebanon stated that Israel's attack on the defenceless Civil International Airport of Beirut, damaging its installations and civil aircraft, constituted a threat to the peace and security of the Middle East and the world as a whole. Since Israel's aggressive act was committed in flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter and in defiance of previous Security Council resolutions, another condemnation of Israel would not be enough, and the Council must take effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. After it had fully assessed the damage done, Lebanon would further request the Council to take the necessary measures to make Israel compensate for the damage.

The representative of Israel stated that on 26 December, an Israeli civil airliner en route to New York had been attacked by bombs and machine-guns at the Athens International Airport. The assailants, who used hand grenades, had come from Beirut and had opened fire indiscriminately, killing one passenger and gravely injuring one member of the crew. The Government

of Lebanon bore the responsibility for that attack because, in spite of its obligations under the Security Council cease-fire resolutions, it had permitted terrorist organizations to conduct their activities against Israel from its territory. An attack on Israeli aircraft was as much a violation of the cease-fire as an attack on Israeli territory, and entitled the Government of Israel to exercise its right of self-defence. It was in the exercise of that right that on 28 December a commando unit of the Israeli defence forces had landed at Beirut airport and struck at a number of aircraft belonging to Arab airlines.

During the discussion in the Council, a majority of members strongly condemned the attack on the Beirut Civil International Airport, which they considered to be entirely disproportionate to the act which had preceded it. Furthermore, there was a fundamental difference between the acts of the two individuals who had attacked the Israeli airline plane and those of a sizable military force operating directly under Government orders. Several members expressed sympathy with Lebanon and stated that reparations should be made for the damage suffered by it. Some members also expressed concern about the recurrence of violent acts which led to further violence and also about the non-implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967.

Some members stated that in view of the serious situation prevailing in the Middle East an element of restraint should be introduced and that that could be done only if the permanent members of the Security Council combined their efforts for peace in the Middle East. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Security Council had repeatedly urged on the parties the acceptance and implementation of the principles and purposes of its resolutions. However, it was feared that if left to themselves alone, the parties might never come to an agreement despite the best efforts of the Special Representative. Therefore, the permanent members of the Security Council should not allow the declared aims of the Council to be frustrated.

On 31 December the President of the Council announced that after intensive consultation among members of the Council, agreement had been reached on the text of a draft resolution which was then being submitted to the Council. The

draft resolution was adopted unanimously on 31 December as resolution 262 (1968).

Under the operative paragraphs of this resolution concerning the Israeli attack on the Civil International Airport of Beirut, the Security Council: (1) condemned Israel for its premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions; (2) considered that such premeditated acts of violence endangered the maintenance of peace; (3) issued a solemn warning to Israel that if such acts were to be repeated, the Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to its decisions; and (4) considered that Lebanon was entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it suffered, responsibility for which had been acknowledged by Israel.

Subsequent Communications and Reports

On 3 January 1969, the Secretary-General received a report from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector, which he transmitted to the Security Council the following day upon receipt of the summary of an inquiry made by United Nations military observers. The inquiry was made in response to a request from the Lebanese delegation to the effect that during the night of 2-3 January mortar and artillery shells had been fired on two occasions from Israel territory against four Arab villages in Lebanon. In the course of their inquiry the United Nations military observers had interviewed three witnesses and had seen physical evidence of mortar impacts and two broken telephone wires, but had found no evidence of artillery shelling or casualties.

In a letter 22 February, the representative of Lebanon complained that on the previous day Israeli military planes had violated Lebanese air space on twelve occasions, sometimes in pairs or in groups of four. Lebanese anti-aircraft artillery and air force units had taken action against the intruders. The Lebanese representative stated that the action should be viewed in the light of Israel's repeated threats against Lebanon, its efforts to implicate Lebanon in the incidents at the Zurich and Athens airports, and other unjustified and unprovoked acts which revealed Israel's aggressive designs against Lebanon.

The Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported on 22

February that the Lebanese delegation had submitted complaints to the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission concerning the above incidents of Israeli penetration of Lebanese air space, and added that twice on 21 February a United Nations military observer in the area had observed two Mirage-type aircraft flying south from one of the Lebanese villages concerned.

4. Complaints by Israel and Syria

During the past year communications have been addressed to the Security Council by the representatives of Israel and Syria complaining of violations of the cease-fire by the other party, and the Secretary-General has circulated reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning the observance of the cease-fire in the Israel-Syria sector.

On 5 September Israel complained of incidents in which, it charged, Syrian soldiers and saboteurs had infiltrated across the cease-fire line on 30 August and 2 September.

The Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that United Nations military observers in the sector had witnessed an exchange of fire on 30 August and firing by Israeli forces on 2 September. General Bull also reported that Syria had complained to the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission regarding the incident of 2 September in which it asserted two Syrian soldiers had been killed and one wounded.

Further reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO indicated that exchanges of fire had been observed by the United Nations military observers.

On 6 October the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported on two incidents which had occurred on 5 October in the Israel-Syria sector. Syria had complained to the Mixed Armistice Commission that during the morning of 5 October, Israeli military positions had opened fire on Syrian women at work and had killed one.

With regard to the second incident, on the afternoon of 5 October, both parties had submitted complaints. In a complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission, Syria charged that two Syrian soldiers had been shot after running into an Israeli ambush, while Israel informed General Bull that a group of three armed Syrian soldiers had crossed

the no-man's land, penetrated into Israel-held territory and opened fire on an Israeli patrol. United Nations military observers on duty at the time had heard several explosions and heavy machine-gun fire and seen five illuminating flares. During the inquiry on this incident, United Nations military observers were told by Syria that members of a Syrian patrol were new in the area and had become lost, and by Israel that its patrol had been fired on by unknown persons and had returned the fire and that a search had revealed two bodies in uniform, which should be returned to Syria by the Red Cross. General Bull later reported that the handover of the bodies of the two Syrian soldiers had taken place on 8 October in the presence of two United Nations military observers.

On 21 November the Chief of Staff of UNTSO submitted a report concerning a Syrian complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission to the effect that one Syrian civilian had been killed and two were missing following a shooting incident on 19 November.

On 7 February 1969, the Chief of Staff reported that a light aircraft had been seen crossing the Israeli forward defended localities by United Nations military observers and that rounds of ack-ack and heavy machine-gun fire had been heard at the same time. On 8 February the Chief of Staff reported that the Israeli authorities had informed him that a land mine had exploded under an Israeli vehicle south of the village of Rafid in the Israel-Syria sector and that one Israeli soldier had been killed and another wounded.

On 14 February the Chief of Staff reported that United Nations military observers had witnessed aerial activity and anti-aircraft and machine-gun fire from both sides in the Israel-Syria sector. Each party had charged that jet aircraft belonging to the other side had violated its air space and that following an air engagement Israel had claimed and Syria had admitted the loss of one of the Syrian jets.

On 24 February the Chief of Staff submitted a report regarding several overflights from west to east on that day, several of the planes having been identified as Israeli Mirage aircraft. The report added that Syrian anti-aircraft guns had opened fire on some of those planes. In a subse-

quent report, the Chief of Staff stated that he had received a message from the Syrian delegate to the Mixed Armistice Commission complaining that jet fighters and bombers had attacked civilian installations in two areas in Syria, and that twenty civilians had been wounded. The Chief of Staff later reported that at the request of Syria an inquiry had been conducted by United Nations military observers into the Israel air attack of 24 February. During the inquiry the observers had seen material damage and visited thirty-one hospitalized persons who were reported to have been injured in the air attack.

On 25 February Syria complained to the Security Council about the same incidents, charging that on the previous day a number of Israeli bombers and fighters had launched air attacks on two towns and a suburb of Damascus. In the attack with bombs and rockets fifteen people had been killed, forty wounded and a number of houses, factories, a youth summer camp, a customs-police station and other civilian installations had been destroyed. Private vehicles, including the car of the Ambassador of Hungary to Syria, had been attacked on the road and two Syrian and three Israeli aircraft had been lost in the engagement.

On 28 February Israel stated in reply that on the morning of 24 February, it had taken air action in self-defence to disable two El-Fatah bases in Syrian territory, which were the central bases of the terrorist organizations in the two towns on the road between Damascus and Beirut. The Government of Syria had for years, it charged, openly sponsored, organized and encouraged terror warfare against Israel.

In a letter dated 4 March, Syria denied that the targets of the Israeli attack of 24 February were El-Fatah bases and adduced evidence to prove that the targets of that planned attack had been civilian installations.

On 11 March the representatives of Hungary and the USSR also sent communications relating to the above incident. The representative of Hungary transmitted a protest to the Government of Israel against the Israeli air attack on 24 February during which the life of the Ambassador of Hungary had been endangered and his car demolished. In the *note verbale*, the Hungarian Government had termed the armed attack a grave violation of international law and had reserved its right to claim

full compensation. The letter from the USSR transmitted a statement dated 28 February from the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) protesting the acts of provocation committed by Israel against the Arab countries and stating that those acts showed that Israel was pursuing an aggressive policy with the aim of aggravating the situation in the Middle East and creating conditions which would preclude the possibility of establishing a lasting peace in the region.

During March, April and May, the Security Council continued to receive from time to time complaints by the parties on cease-fire violations in the Israel-Syria sector as well as reports of the Secretary-General based on the information submitted to him by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. Exchanges of fire in the sector were reported by United Nations military observers on 3, 5 and 28 March.

In letters dated 5 March, and 4, 8 and 11 April, Syria complained to the Security Council that Israeli forces in occupied Syrian territory were deliberately destroying homes and villages, which it termed violations of the cease-fire lines and the buffer zone. In reply to those charges, Israel asserted in a letter dated 15 April that Syria had no grounds for complaint over defence measures taken by Israel on its side of the cease-fire line in the face of Syrian violations by its regular forces and by marauders and saboteurs. Syria in turn protested on 17 April that so-called defence measures could not justify the razing of villages, demolition of houses and mass execution of shepherds, and called attention to Israel's refusal to accept the dispatch of a special representative of the Secretary-General in accordance with Council resolution 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968. A letter from Israel on 25 April declared that since Syria's policy had remained one of war with Israel, Syria had no basis for advising Israel on how to defend itself, and a reply from Syria on 9 May transmitted further charges of the destruction of houses by Israeli authorities as well as charges of opening anti-tank fire across Syrian cease-fire positions.

Additional reports from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO relating to firing across the forward defended localities in the area were circulated on 9 April and 14 May, and on 8 April Syria charged in a letter to the Council that six Syrian shepherds had been captured and murdered by Israeli sol-

diers on 5 April in an area they had occupied in the buffer zone.

During the period between March and June 1969, several communications to the Council dealt with the presence of Iraqi troops in Syria. On 19 March Israel called attention to the reported entry and stationing of Iraqi armed forces in Syria, which, it said, would further aggravate the situation in the area, as there was no assurance that they would observe the cease-fire. Israel requested the Secretary-General to obtain from Iraq an assurance that the Iraqi forces would respect the cease-fire. On 26 March Syria stated that in view of Israel's policy of aggression, in particular since June 1967, and its oppression of Arab residents in occupied territories, it was but natural that the Arab countries should co-ordinate their defence and it was for that reason that they had formed an Arab common defence pact. On 1 April Iraq, commenting on Israel's letter of 19 March, stated that the entry of Iraqi armed forces into Syria had taken place at the specific request of the Syrian Government and under the Joint Defence Agreement between Iraq and Syria. It added that the Iraqi troops had been stationed at a considerable distance from the cease-fire line in Syrian territory and that their presence was in accordance with the right of self-defence recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and by international law. On 10 April Israel noted that the Government of Iraq had refused to accept the cease-fire ordered by the Council in June 1967 and continued to proclaim a policy of waging war against Israel. Accordingly Israel considered that Governments which permitted the maintenance of the Iraqi expeditionary forces on their territory should bear full responsibility for the consequent aggravation of the situation. Israel further stressed the urgency of efforts by the Secretary-General to obtain assurances that Iraq accepted the cease-fire resolutions and that its forces would respect the cease-fire. The position of Iraq in this matter was reiterated in letters dated 24 April and 5 May and that of Israel in letters dated 29 April and 12 May.

B. TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS IN ISRAEL-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND RELATED MATTERS

During the past year the Security Council received a series of communications concerning the

treatment of civilian populations in territories occupied by Israel and the Israeli countercharges. Communications from the Arab States complained about Israel's policies in occupied Arab territories which were said to include the arrest, detention, torture, dispossession and expulsion of Arab civilians from their homes, and the establishment there of Israeli settlements.

Jordan drew attention in particular to the deteriorating conditions of more than 400,000 expelled refugees living on the East Bank of Jordan, and complained of the alleged intention of the Israeli authorities to expel and deport another 50,000 Arab refugees from the Gaza Strip to the East Bank, a matter that aroused the concern of the Sudan also.

Syria charged that the Israeli occupying authorities were demolishing Arab villages in occupied Syrian territory with a view to annexing the Golan Heights and integrating them into Israel. It decried the apathy of international public opinion on the matter and warned that any condonation of such Israeli policies presented a threat to world peace.

Israel rejected the charges contained in the communications from the Arab States. With regard to the condition of the Arab refugees on the East Bank of Jordan, Israel stated that it was the Jordanian authorities that had failed to effect a return of 3,000 refugees a day to the West Bank following a humanitarian agreement signed by the two countries on 6 August 1967. It also complained about the treatment of Jewish citizens in Arab countries, particularly of the execution by Iraq of nine Jews, among others, in January 1969, a matter that evoked correspondence from countries other than those directly involved in the conflict in the Middle East.

1. *Report of the Secretary-General of 31 July 1968*

On 31 July 1968, the Secretary-General, pursuant to Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V), and subsequent to his earlier note of 19 April 1968, issued a report containing the texts of *notes verbales* exchanged between him and the parties concerned between 2 May and 30 July relating to his suggestion to send a second mission to the Middle East on humanitarian questions.

The representative of Syria, noting the assertion in Israel's reply contained in the Secretary-General's earlier note of 19 April, to the effect that the Special Representative in the projected mission would look into the situation of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries in the area of conflict, had reaffirmed in a note to the Secretary-General that such an interpretation was totally unacceptable to his Government.

In his exchange of notes with the Secretary-General, the representative of Israel had insisted that before the decision to dispatch the projected second mission Israel would have to have assurances that the Arab States would help the Secretary-General's Special Representative this time to investigate the condition of the Jewish communities in the area of conflict, including Iraq and Lebanon. He said that the second mission should have the same scope as the first under Mr. Nils Gussing, which had included a mandate to investigate the condition of the Jewish minorities in the Arab States in the area, although Mr. Gussing's efforts to carry out that part of his mission had not been successful.

The Secretary-General in his replies had stated that the question raised by Israel at such a late date would extend the scope of the projected mission beyond the provisions and intent of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions establishing it, and was bound to delay the commencement of its work. No such question had been raised by Israel at the time of the first mission. Moreover, the projected mission was not intended to deal with minority groups in the area: the Arab people in the area were not a minority but virtually constituted the total population of the territories under military occupation, whereas the members of the Jewish communities in the Arab States, though certainly a minority on religious grounds, were for the most part citizens of the States in which they resided. A brief legal analysis included in the Secretary-General's note to the representative of Israel stated that operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and of General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) applied to the areas occupied by Israel since June 1967. Moreover, there was no legal basis under which the precedent of the Gussing mission, which had inquired into questions relating to the Jewish minorities in Syria and

the United Arab Republic, could be extended to Iraq and Lebanon.

Noting that the position taken by Israel constituted a condition of acceptance of the second mission by that State, the Secretary-General had appraised the Governments of Syria, Jordan and the United Arab Republic of the situation before submitting his report on the matter to the Security Council and to the General Assembly. In their replies the three Arab Governments had expressed their readiness to receive and co-operate with the projected mission in implementation of the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. But they all rejected Israel's attempt to extend the scope of the mission as *ultra vires* the provisions of those resolutions, which had specifically called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities.

In view of the above positions of the parties and the legal interpretation of the two relevant resolutions, the Secretary-General had concluded that there was no basis upon which the mission could proceed. He felt that it would not be proper to ask a responsible person to undertake a mission of that kind without the agreement of the parties on its basic functions. As far as the situation of the Jewish community in Iraq was concerned, it already had been the subject of a series of discussions between him and the representative of Iraq; and as for the situation in Lebanon, he had never received any reports that there had been anything on the treatment of the Jewish community of that country that needed to be examined.

The Secretary-General regretted that the well-being of a great many people could not be given sufficient priority and considered sufficiently urgent to override the obstacles that the projected second mission had so far encountered.

2. *Meetings of the Security Council in September 1968*

In a letter dated 17 September the representatives of Pakistan and Senegal requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the report of the Secretary-General of 31 July 1968. The Council considered it at two meetings held on 20 and 27 September.

When the Council met on 20 September, it had before it a draft resolution submitted by Pakistan and Senegal on the previous day, which was subsequently revised. In accordance with the revised draft, the Security Council would: (1) request the Secretary-General urgently to dispatch a special representative to the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June 1967, and to report on the implementation of resolution 237 (1967); (2) request the Government of Israel to receive and co-operate with the Special Representative and to facilitate his work; and (3) recommend that the Secretary-General be afforded all co-operation in his efforts to bring about the implementation of the present resolution and of resolution 237 (1967).

The draft was introduced on 20 September by the sponsors, who expressed regret that Israel had created obstacles to the implementation of resolution 237 (1967) by introducing entirely alien and irrelevant conditions into the procedure which the Secretary-General was authorized to follow, thus denying the Security Council the opportunity of discharging its moral duty. They added that the discussion prior to the adoption of resolution 237 (1967) had made it quite clear that the Council's concern was for the inhabitants of the occupied areas where military operations had taken place. Urging the adoption of their draft resolution, they stated that the people left under military occupation should not be denied their fundamental rights.

During the ensuing discussion on 20 and 27 September, the representatives of Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic maintained the position that it was urgently necessary to dispatch a special representative to the areas under Israel's military occupation, as the condition of the inhabitants of those areas was deteriorating. The representative of Jordan listed a number of charges of violation of civil rights committed by Israeli authorities in the occupied territories and stressed that if Israel should deny those charges, that would reinforce the necessity of finding out the truth by on-the-spot investigation.

The representative of Israel said that Israel was not unwilling to co-operate with a second representative on a fact-finding mission within the context of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V),

but that it had asked only that the mission should have an equal opportunity to investigate the situation of Jewish communities that were being persecuted in the Arab countries since the recent conflict. Israel could not accept a deliberate disregard for the fate of those Jews in distress.

The representatives of France and the United Kingdom supported the Secretary-General's idea of sending a new representative to the area in accordance with resolutions of the Council and the General Assembly, but regretted that certain obstacles had made it impossible to effect the humanitarian purpose so clearly expressed by the Council after the June hostilities. France had always urged a speedy end to the military occupation by Israel, but while that occupation continued the Council must be informed with regard to the conditions prevailing there.

The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that Israel had not heeded the warning contained in resolution 237 (1967) but had only continued to commit acts of lawlessness in occupied Arab territories and had established a régime of arbitrary oppression there. What was happening in those territories emphasized the need for the speediest possible liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression, and any further delay by the Council in coming to a decision on the matter was inadmissible.

After further consideration of the question on 27 September, the two-Power draft resolution was put to the vote and adopted by 12 votes to none, with three abstentions (Canada, Denmark and the United States), as resolution 259 (1968).

Immediately after the vote the Secretary-General informed the Council that he had been ready for some time to designate a Special Representative who would undertake the second humanitarian mission and that the Special Representative would proceed to the area with minimum delay once there was assurance that he would have the access and co-operation indispensable to the fulfilment of his mission.

The representatives of Canada, Denmark and the United States, explaining their vote, stated that they had abstained because, while fully supporting resolution 237 (1967) and sharing the deep concern about the safety and welfare of the inhabitants in the area of conflict, they nevertheless felt that the two-Power draft resolution had taken

an unnecessarily restrictive view of the second projected mission instead of keeping its scope similar to that of the first mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. By narrowing the terms of reference of the mission, the sponsors had hampered the chances of its achieving any practical results.

3. Report of the Secretary-General of 14 October 1968

On 14 October the Secretary-General, in pursuance of paragraph 1 of resolution 259 (1968), submitted a report containing the texts of letters exchanged by him with the representatives of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic. On 28 September he had addressed a letter to the representative of Israel seeking assurance that the Government of Israel would receive, co-operate with and facilitate the work of the Special Representative to be designated by him. On the same day, he also wrote to the representatives of the three Arab States to obtain the co-operation of their Governments for the Special Representative.

In their replies, the representatives of Jordan and the United Arab Republic had given assurances of their Governments' fullest co-operation with the Special Representative. The representative of Syria, after stating his Government's understanding that under resolutions 237 (1967) and 259 (1968) the Special Representative had no mandate over Syrian citizens of Jewish faith, also assured him that the Special Representative would be afforded all co-operation in his efforts. The representative of Israel reiterated his Government's stand that the task of the Special Representative should, in accordance with its interpretation of resolution 237 (1967), include the question of treatment of both Arab and Jewish persons in the States which were directly concerned because of their participation in the war. He added that, as soon as the Secretary-General had received assurances from the Arab Governments that had participated in the June war that the Special Representative would have the access and co-operation indispensable to the fulfilment of his mission concerning Jewish minorities in those countries, Israel would be ready to discuss the arrangements for the mission.

In his reply to the representative of Israel, the Secretary-General pointed out that his request

for co-operation had been made under resolution 259 (1968) which, in paragraph 1, referred exclusively to "Arab territories under military occupation by Israel", and in paragraph 2 made a request to Israel which envisaged implementation without conditions. The Secretary-General concluded that since Israel's reply did not afford him a basis on which to dispatch the Special Representative, he had no alternative but to report accordingly to the Security Council.

In conclusion, the Secretary-General stated that, as would be seen from the correspondence, he had not been able to give effect to the Council's decision.

C. SITUATION IN AND AROUND JERUSALEM AND ITS HOLY PLACES

During the period under review a number of communications were received regarding the situation in Jerusalem and its Holy Places. The Secretary-General also submitted a report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) relating to the status of Jerusalem. This report and some of the communications are briefly noted below.

In a letter dated 11 October 1968, Syria transmitted to the Secretary-General a message from some of the religious leaders in Syria condemning the desecration of the Holy Places by the Israeli occupying forces. On 6 November Jordan also brought to the attention of the Secretary-General charges of continuous Israeli acts of demolition and change of character of historical and religious buildings in Jerusalem, and transmitted a letter from the Mayor of Jerusalem containing an account of Israel's measures in that respect. On 11 February 1969, Jordan transmitted a list of protests submitted to the Israeli authorities by religious leaders and institutions against the measures taken by the Government of Israel and concerning the conduct of some Israeli citizens in Jerusalem.

On 8 February Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council "to consider the continued Israeli defiance of Security Council resolution 252 (1968)" which, among other things, called upon Israel to desist from taking any action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem. Jordan stated that despite that clear warning, Israel had enacted, against Arab opposition, legis-

lation designed to destroy the character of the city and incorporate the Arab life and institutions into Israeli life. The legislation was to take effect on 25 February and would create a situation which threatened not only the economic life of Christians and Moslems of Jerusalem, but also international peace and security.

In a note dated 10 February, the President of the Security Council stated that since the Government of Israel had decided to postpone until 23 May 1969 the putting into effect of the legislative provisions which formed the subject-matter of Jordan's complaint, the meeting of the Security Council which had been fixed for 11 February had been postponed.

On 10 February Jordan transmitted the text of a memorandum addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel by a group of Arab lawyers in Israeli-occupied territory, in which they had protested against Israeli legislation aimed at completing the process of Israel's annexation of Jerusalem and its environs.

On 13 February Jordan sent a letter to the Secretary-General stating that the postponement allowed for an extension of the time-limit during which efforts could be made for the repeal of the legislation and thus avoid confronting the world with a *fait accompli*. Jordan also requested the Secretary-General to furnish the Security Council with a progress report on the implementation of resolution 252 (1968).

On 11 April the Secretary-General, in a report submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 252 (1968), stated that since the termination of the mission of his Personal Representative in Jerusalem in September 1967, he had had no means of obtaining first-hand information upon which he could base a report. On 13 February he had sent a note to Israel in which he recalled that under resolution 252 (1968) the Security Council had considered that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tended to change the legal status of Jerusalem, were invalid and could not change that status; urgently called upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from any further action which tended to change the status of Jerusalem; and had requested the Secretary-General to report to the

Security Council on the implementation of the resolution. He had stated that he must in the main look to the Government of Israel for the information necessary in the discharge of his responsibilities under the resolution and requested the Government of Israel to provide him with such information. In his reply of 25 March, the representative of Israel informed the Secretary-General that the position of his Government continued to be the same as set forth in the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel of 10 July 1967 and in the statements which had been made on that subject by the representatives of Israel in the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The Secretary-General then stated that the only other source of information of an official nature pertinent to the implementation of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) which had been available to him was the *Israel Official Gazette*, published originally in Hebrew. According to that *Gazette*, the Israel Parliament, on the basis of a bill submitted by the Government of Israel, had adopted on 14 August 1968 the Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law, which related to the situation in Jerusalem. Regarding the implementation of this law, the Secretary-General recalled that the President of the Security Council had indicated, in his note on 10 February 1969, that Israel had decided to postpone until 23 May 1969 the putting into effect of this law. An unofficial translation of the law and of the relevant bill and explanatory notes was annexed to the report.

D. OTHER MATTERS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN CONNEXION WITH THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. *Communications concerning an attack on an Israeli civil aircraft at Zurich airport*

On 18 February 1969, a spokesman of the Secretary-General stated that the Secretary-General had heard with dismay and deep concern of the attack that day on an El Al airliner at Zurich airport. The Secretary-General believed that that attack, as well as the one at the Beirut airport two months previously, was a matter of urgent concern to all Governments and peoples. He also hoped that that act would not be followed by an attack of retaliation, but rather by constructive international action to prevent acts of violence against international civil aviation in

the future.

In a letter dated 20 February, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel protested to the Secretary-General against an armed assault on the crew and passengers of an El Al aircraft at Zurich on 18 February 1969, two months after a similar attack on another Israeli aircraft at Athens airport. He believed that those actions were the work of organized groups of saboteurs operating with the support and co-operation of Arab Governments which were Members of the United Nations and Members of the International Civil Aviation Organization. After noting that the Security Council resolution of 31 December 1968 had not said a word against the attack on an El Al aircraft at the Athens airport, the Foreign Minister expressed the view that the latest attack had taken place "in the atmosphere of international indulgence thus created". After referring to the above statement of the spokesman of the Secretary-General, he expressed interest in what constructive international action the Secretary-General had in mind to prevent those actions against international civil aviation.

In a letter dated 26 February, the Secretary-General stated that even before the receipt of the letter of the Foreign Minister of Israel he had been in touch with the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Air Transport Association regarding the Zurich incident and had since kept himself in touch with ICAO. He had also consulted certain Members of the United Nations with a view to finding a means to prevent those acts. He believed that improved methods of international police co-operation and regulation of a national as well as international character might contribute towards the prevention of those acts of terrorism and violence. The Secretary-General considered, however, that the only sure way of bringing an end to terrorist acts would be some substantial movement towards a peaceful settlement of the major issues underlying the Middle East conflict. In that respect it was his strong conviction that the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 offered the only practical basis for the promotion of a just and lasting peace in the area, and an essential first step towards that end would be a declared readiness by the parties to implement that resolution.

In a letter dated 5 March, the Minister for

Foreign Affairs of Israel, noting the Secretary-General's reply, said that his country was vitally interested in the promotion of improved methods for international police co-operation and regulation of a national and international character, and would actively associate itself with the meeting of the Council of ICAO. He believed, however, that it would be wrong to ignore the responsibility of Member States in that question. He charged that the attacks at the Zurich and Athens airports and the hijacking of an Israeli airliner to Algiers had been acts not of individuals, but of terrorist organizations supported and encouraged by Arab States in violation of their international responsibilities. The question therefore arose whether constructive international action to safeguard civil aviation should not include an undertaking by all States to prevent and condemn actions on their soil designed to endanger civil aviation. He regretted that the Secretary-General had not conveyed his Government's request to certain Arab Governments to condemn those attacks and dissociate themselves from them and to take required steps against the organization which had carried them out. With regard to the question of accepting and implementing the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, the Foreign Minister of Israel said that his Government's position in that respect had been set forth by him on 8 October in the general debate at the last session of the General Assembly, and added that his Government would continue to co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to promote an agreement for the implementation of that resolution.

In a letter dated 10 March, the Secretary-General referred to the observation of the Foreign Minister of Israel that the two questions of his Government had not been transmitted to certain Arab Governments, and recalled that in his aide-mémoire of 20 February to the Permanent Representative of Israel he had indicated that it would not be helpful if his good offices were used to transmit questions or messages of a political nature from one Government to another unless the parties concerned had previously agreed to that procedure. He was, therefore, unable to carry out the request, but had suggested that the Government of Israel might bring those questions to the attention of those concerned through a communication to the Security Council. The Secretary-

General added that he continued to believe that a declaration by the parties of their readiness to implement the 22 November resolution would constitute a helpful first step towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Five other communications were addressed to the Security Council by the representatives of Finland, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States between 19 and 25 February concerning the attack on the Israel airliner at Zurich airport. All those communications expressed the grave concern of their respective Governments at the threat to the safety of international civilian air travel. They appealed to all the parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exercise the utmost restraint so as to avoid the chain of action and reprisal, and not to jeopardize the efforts in search of peace in the area.

2. Communications concerning archaeological excavations in occupied Syrian territory

In a letter dated 23 May 1969, the representative of Syria stated that Israel was continuing its excavations in occupied Syrian territory and was misappropriating Syrian cultural property. Those excavations were being carried on in the areas of Banias and Fiq where Roman temples had been found, and in the area of Jibbin where an archaeological hill had been destroyed as a result of the opening of a road. After asserting that very important archaeological pieces had been removed from their places of origin, the representative of Syria added that those illegal acts constituted a violation of articles 4 and 5 of the 1954 Hague Convention and of article VI, paragraph 32, of the recommendations adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1956. The representative of Syria further recalled his delegation's letter of 7 July 1967, in which it had complained initially to the Secretary-General about Israel's excavations in occupied Syrian territories and the looting of historical properties, to which Israel had replied on 14 July that the Syrian charges were unfounded and that a representative of UNESCO, who was then expected in Israel, would be invited to visit the site referred to by Syria. The representative of Syria concluded by requesting a report on the question of excavations and "theft of cultural property of Syria".

Only a report by the Director-General of UNESCO submitted in 1969, with specific

reference to Syria's complaints of 1969, could be cited in answer to Syria's charges.

In a reply dated 29 May, Israel stated that no Israeli scientist had carried out any excavation in any of the sites mentioned in the Syrian letter, and that the historic altar from the town of Banias had been temporarily removed but immediately restored to its site after arrangements for its safety had been taken. Such Syrian allegations had been dismissed by the Commissioner-General appointed under the Hague Convention of May 1954 in his letter of 6 February 1968 to the Director-General of UNESCO, and also in the latter's report to the Executive Board of UNESCO at its seventy-eighth session, indicating that the investigations carried out, "where the information supplied had been sufficient to make inquiries possible", had indicated that the complaints had proved groundless. Israel added that the Commissioner-General had since then twice visited the area in question and found no reason for any complaint.

In a letter of 10 June, Syria noted that the report of the Director-General of UNESCO to its Executive Board had been dated 16 May 1968 and referred to complaints formulated in 1967 and 1968, whereas the Syrian complaints were lodged in 1969. Accordingly, the complaints submitted by Syria on 23 May remained unanswered, and the Israeli occupying authorities were still accused of theft of cultural property and excavations in the occupied territories in disregard of the Hague Convention as well as the recommendations of the 1965 General Conference of UNESCO.

E. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE PROGRESS OF THE MISSION OF HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST

On 29 July 1968, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a fourth report on the progress of the efforts of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, his Special Representative to the Middle East, covering his activities after 29 March 1968. It stated that during that period Mr. Jarring had held discussions with the Governments of Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Israel and Lebanon. In addition to reporting to the Secretary-General regularly on those meetings, he had also met him at Teheran on 22 April 1968, when it was agreed

that the Special Representative would return to New York for further consultations. He stayed in New York between 15 May and 21 June, during which time he held consultations with the Secretary-General and the permanent representatives of the parties concerned. During the period between 21 June, when he left for Europe, and 22 July, when he returned to New York, Mr. Jarring met with officials of some of the parties in various cities of Europe. In the light of his discussions he had arrived at the conclusion, which was endorsed by the Secretary-General, that it would be advisable for him to extend further his contacts with the parties and for that purpose he would return to the Middle East.

On 3 December 1968, the Secretary-General submitted a fifth report on the Special Representative's mission, covering his activities after 29 July. In accordance with his intention, as indicated in the previous report, Mr. Jarring arrived in Nicosia on 15 August for a further round of discussions with the Governments concerned. On 23 September he arrived at United Nations Headquarters, where the Foreign Ministers of the parties had gathered for the twenty-third session of the General Assembly. Mr. Jarring first met with them, both informally and formally, and at the end of the discussions received written communications from the Foreign Ministers of Israel and the United Arab Republic. On 26 November Mr. Jarring wrote to the Secretary-General stating that, as had been agreed, he was leaving New York on 27 November for a further round of talks with the parties. He added that he intended to invite the parties to begin a new round of talks in the middle of January 1969. In his reply of 27 November, the Secretary-General, after concurring with Mr. Jarring's programme, expressed his gratification on the Special Representative's willingness to continue his efforts with the parties towards a peaceful settlement. The Secretary-General once again put on record his appreciation of the sterling qualities of wisdom, tact and patience that Mr. Jarring had brought to the task entrusted to him.

During the period under review, no further reports were issued by the Secretary-General on the mission of his Special Representative in the Middle East.

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Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation.¹ (Excerpt)**July 1, 1968-June 30, 1969**

62. During the past six months there has been a marked deterioration of the situation in the Middle East. This period has seen the highest level of armed conflict in the area since the June 1967 war. Although the extent of such violence has been greater in the Suez Canal sector, in the sense of the frequency of exchanges of heavy fire by both sides, there have been various kinds of recurrent breaches of the cease-fire in all sectors of the Middle East conflict. War actually is being waged throughout the area, short only of battles between large bodies of troops. Patrol and guerrilla activity have become common, as have raids and counter-raids by land and at times by air or sea, bombardments of suspected centres of guerrilla activity and explosive charges on roads and in civilian structures. This is a pattern of activity which recently, in part at least, has extended to the Israel-Lebanon sector — an area that had been relatively quiet. In the Suez Canal sector, in particular, the increased use of armed force has taken place despite the cease-fire called for by the Security Council, repeated warnings by the Secretary-General and the ceaseless efforts of United Nations military observers to maintain the cease-fire. Indeed, I have twice in recent months taken the unusual step of submitting special reports to the Security Council (on 21 April and 5 July 1969) warning the Council of the almost complete breakdown of its cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector and the virtual resumption of war there, despite the unceasing and valiant efforts of the United Nations military observers, who are exposed to great danger, to maintain the cease-fire.

63. There can be no doubt that this constant resort to force is to a considerable extent connected with the present impasse in the search for a peaceful settlement and the absence of an early prospect for the implementation of Security

Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. The hopes for such a settlement, which were widely prevalent after the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of this resolution, have thus far been unfulfilled in spite of nearly two years of effort by the United Nations and other parties.

64. This continuing situation is, first of all, a disaster for the Middle Eastern countries directly involved. It is a grim reflection of the state of affairs in the Middle East that, despite all the activities of Governments, of the United Nations and of various individuals, the prospect of even a first step towards a peaceful settlement now still seems remote, and the emotional climate for progress towards peace is no more favourable than ever.

65. This situation also creates, to a considerable extent, a crisis of effectiveness for the United Nations and for its Members. Developments in the Middle East, particularly since June 1967, have posed acutely the challenging problem of how States Members of the United Nations can fulfil the obligation to ensure that decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly will be respected and given due effect. In the ultimate sense, this can be achieved only by the sovereign Members themselves.

66. For twenty-two years, the Middle East has presented the United Nations with its greatest opportunity as well as its sternest challenge. It is noteworthy that, within the United Nations at least, all the parties to the conflict have stated on numerous occasions that they seek peace. The Security Council's unanimous resolution of 22 November 1967 provided a possible basis upon which this desire for peace could have begun to be realized, although it soon became all too clear that widely divergent interpretations of its meaning and practical applications prevailed among the parties who had accepted it.

67. Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, my Special Representative in the Middle East, is universally respected and trusted and he has made, and continues to make, persistent efforts to achieve at least a first step towards a settlement. However, experience has painfully demonstrated that in these efforts Ambassador Jarring has found himself acting largely on his own with little or no

¹ U.N. doc. GAOR, 24th Session, Supplement No. 1, A(A/7601/Add. 1).

effective support from other sources in the sense of helpful guidance and backing on the resolution of specific issues. I do not accept the narrow interpretation of the role of Ambassador Jarring, as my Special Representative in the Middle East, as being exclusively or even primarily to bring the parties together around a common negotiating table. There can be no question that this would be highly desirable, if it could be done. On the other hand, it cannot be said positively at this juncture that it can be done. If, however, it cannot be done immediately, it is not to be concluded that there is nothing else for Ambassador Jarring to do. There is more than one procedural route to peace. Ambassador Jarring has also the function of seeking to bring the positions of the parties together by such means and efforts as he may find possible. In my view, the parties have the duty to co-operate with him in this respect and to provide him with all information concerning their positions and demands necessary for the conduct of fruitful discussions, exchanges and negotiations.

68. In addition to the efforts of the Security Council and of Ambassador Jarring, in recent months four permanent members of the Security Council, on the initiative of their Governments, have engaged in consultation in an attempt to strengthen Ambassador Jarring's hand in his quest for a solution to the problem. This is a development which should have been greeted universally as an encouraging and auspicious step.

69. Despite all these efforts, the rising tide of violence in the Middle East creates still further bitterness and hatred and widens the gulf between Arab and Jew. The severe damage by fire on 21 August to the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, whatever may have been its origin, has also served to increase bitterness and tension in the area. Deep emotions, as well as vital interests, are factors to be reckoned with in dealing with the Middle East problem. In some other conflict situations, however, where such emotions and interests have been heavily involved, the international community has been able to assist in restoring quiet and moving along the road to peaceful settlement when the parties to the conflict have been willing to co-operate with it in some degree towards this end. A will to attain peace by the parties themselves is the decisive

factor. In the Middle East, regrettably, international assistance in finding a settlement has thus far not met with an adequate response of this kind. Instead, violent exchanges, the building up of armaments of all kinds, propaganda and a constant exchange of recriminations prevail.

70. In a situation as grave as this, attempts to assign blame or responsibility to this or that party or the exchange of recriminations for past actions or present policies can only be counter-productive. If a way out of the existing impasse and this deeply ominous state of affairs is to be found, the crux of the problem must be attacked. It is, certainly, the right of every State to exercise control over its own territory, free from alien occupation. Every State is equally entitled to enjoy the right to exist within recognized boundaries which are secure from attack or threat of attack. But, before it is possible to have fruitful discussions on this and related problems, it is indispensable to have some idea of the location of the future boundaries. This relates most directly to the question of the termination of occupation and how these boundaries are to be made secure. It seems to me that the only hope of breaking out of the present impasse must lie in a determined effort to overcome these basic obstacles.

71. What is now at stake is the future of the whole Middle East area and everyone in it. This sombre fact alone should discourage any tendency towards either too much bargaining over substance or bickering over procedure. The issues, admittedly, are extremely vital to the parties. But, given the alternative, can any issue be more vital than peace? It is no exaggeration to say that, failing some early progress towards a settlement, there is a very real danger that this great and historic region, the cradle of civilization and of three world religions, will recede steadily into a new dark age of violence, disruption and destruction. The words of my predecessor, in the context of another international crisis, are relevant to the present Middle East situation. On 24 October 1960, Dag Hammarskjöld said, "no matter how deep the shadows may be, how sharp the conflicts, how tense the mistrust reflected in what is said and done in our world of today as reflected in this Hall and in this house, we are not permitted to forget that we have too much in common, too great a sharing of interests and too much that

we might lose together, for ourselves and for succeeding generations, ever to weaken in our efforts to surmount the difficulties and not to turn the simple human values, which are our common heritage, into the firm foundation on which we may unite our strength and live together in peace". It seems clear enough to me that no one of the parties to the Middle East conflict, no matter what temporary military or other superiority it may enjoy at any given time, can hope in the long run to emerge as the victor from the struggle now under way.

72. Moreover, the Middle East conflict is now being extended far beyond the area itself in some ways that are irresponsible and indefensible. No political end, however worthy it may seem to its proponents, can justify means such as the hijacking of commercial passenger aircraft or terrorism against civilians. This trend, if unchecked, could introduce the conditions of the jungle in considerable and important areas of human activity. All Governments have an overriding, long-term, common interest in protecting and preserving the framework of peaceful international communications and the simple rules of responsible behaviour on which human society is necessarily based. Only sovereign Governments can take the indispensable measures to this end.

73. There are many innocent and helpless victims of the situation in the Middle East. I feel impelled to mention in particular one very large group for which the United Nations has specific responsibility and concerning which it has taken firm decisions in principle — the Palestine refugees and the persons displaced by the 1967 hostilities. The reports of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and some of my own recent communications to Member States give a comprehensive view of the task which faces the Agency and of its critically meagre resources in dealing with this huge task. Until there is some new and more hopeful turn of events in the Middle East, it is essential that the General Assembly take urgent and effective action to reinforce the Agency and to give it the resources needed to provide for even the minimum requirements of the refugees and the persons displaced by the 1967 war. It bears emphasis and reiteration that the problem of the Palestine

refugees, which has persisted now for a score of years, should be regarded as one of the most pressing and urgent of all international problems demanding solution.

74. I share the widely-held concern for the plight of another, smaller group of helpless persons. Although I have no direct means of knowing exactly the conditions of life of the small Jewish minorities in certain Arab States, it is clear that, in some cases at least, these minorities would be better off elsewhere and that the countries in which they now live would also be better off, given the prevailing circumstances, if the departure of those who would wish to leave could be sanctioned and arranged, since their continued presence is a source of both internal and international tension. I hope very much, therefore, that it may soon be possible to find sensible ways of solving this largely humanitarian problem. The approach to the situation can be based only on humanitarian considerations and the lessening of tension in the area, since these Jewish people, being citizens of the countries in which they live, are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Governments of those countries.

75. For all these reasons, therefore, the continuation of the struggle in the Middle East is a prospect which all of the Members of the United Nations should contemplate with the utmost concern and for which the United Nations itself inescapably bears a heavy responsibility. It is imperative and urgent that some way be found to reverse the present trend towards catastrophe.

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Report of the Security Council, July 16, 1968 - July 15, 1969.¹ (Excerpt)

A. COMMUNICATIONS, REPORTS OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND DISCUSSION BY THE COUNCIL CONCERNING THE STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

1. COMPLAINTS BY JORDAN AND ISRAEL

(a) *Communications to the Council from 16 July to 5 August 1968 and requests for a meeting*

¹ U.N. doc. A/7602.

1. In a letter dated 17 July 1968 (S/8683), Israel replied to a Jordanian letter of 8 July (S/8674) charging Israel with an attack on 4 June against concentrations of civilians on the East Bank of the Jordan. The reply stated that Jordan could not continue its attacks against Israel villages and civilians and at the same time claim immunity for military positions and bases that were purposely established close to inhabited areas.

2. In a letter dated 29 July (S/8698), Jordan charged that Israel, in attempting to force the expulsion of busloads of Arab refugees from Gaza across the King Hussein Bridge to the East Bank of the Jordan River (see section B, below), had fired on Jordanian observation posts, which had foiled the attempt. Later, Israel had conducted an operation under the supervision of the Military Governor of Jericho District and supported by tanks and military units; that mass expulsion, in defiance of Security Council resolutions, was a grave threat to peace and security. In a letter of 31 July (S/8701) Israel replied that Jordan had distorted the facts and that the Jordanian forces had opened fire on Israel military positions on the West Bank without provocation.

3. In a letter dated 2 August (S/8716) Israel submitted to the Security Council charges of continued violation of the cease-fire from Jordanian territory, both by regular Jordanian troops and by paramilitary terror units with the co-operation and encouragement of the Jordanian authorities. Israel enclosed a list of 104 cease-fire violations that it charged had taken place from Jordanian territory between 23 June and 1 August.

4. In a letter dated 4 August (S/8719) Jordan complained to the Security Council that Israel forces had committed another act of aggression on that date when Israel aircraft had bombed areas west and south of the city of Salt, nineteen miles from Amman. In a letter of the same date (S/8720), Israel stated that in view of persistent attacks against Israel from Jordanian territory, it had become necessary for Israel to act in self-defence. Its air attack had been directed exclusively against two terrorist bases in the Salt area, including the central headquarters of the El Fatah organization, stores of ammunition and sabotage equipment, training facilities and

barracks. In a subsequent letter of 8 August (S/8739), Jordan charged that Israel aircraft had used napalm bombs in its attack and attached pictures to show that the Israel attack had been aimed at civilians.

5. In a letter dated 5 August (S/8721), Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation "resulting from the continued Israeli acts of aggression".

6. In a letter dated 5 August (S/8724), Israel also requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to resume consideration of the previous Israel complaint regarding "the grave and continued violations of the cease-fire by Jordan" which had been submitted by his delegation on 5 June 1968 (S/8617).

(b) Consideration by the Council at the 1434th to 1440th meetings (5 to 16 August 1968)

7. At the 1434th meeting, on 5 August, the President of the Council stated that the meeting was convened at the urgent requests of Jordan and Israel and that their previous requests (S/8616 and S/8617), which had been on the provisional agenda on 5 June 1968 when the Council had adjourned its meeting in tribute to the late Senator Robert Kennedy, were also included on the provisional agenda. The provisional agenda of the 1434th meeting was then adopted.

8. The representatives of Jordan, Israel, the United Arab Republic, Iraq and subsequently the representatives of Syria and Saudi Arabia were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without vote.

9. The representative of Jordan stated that Israel's premeditated attack on the previous day, which had included air bombardment and shelling, had been carefully directed against the civilian population of the areas around the city of Salt and had been similar in nature to Israel's earlier attack on 4 June 1968 against civilian centres in Irbid and neighbouring villages. Incomplete reports indicated that thirty-four Jordanians had been killed and eighty-two seriously wounded in Israel's latest attack. There could be no doubt that it had been planned at the highest level and Israel officials had been issuing dire warnings to Jordan. It was also clear that

the attack was primarily directed against the civilian population, as shown by the large number of civilian casualties and the extensive damage to civilian property. Israel wished to destroy the agriculture of the East Bank of the Jordan River and to terrorize the people of that area. The attack was part of the effort to intimidate Jordan. Having already turned more than 450,000 people into homeless refugees, Israel was trying to do the same to the residents of the northern part of the Jordan Valley on the East Bank. The areas attacked were Jordan's most productive region upon which the country depended for a great part of its agricultural needs. In the past the Security Council, while warning Israel against actions of military reprisal, had at the same time promised to consider more effective measures as envisaged in the Charter. It was therefore incumbent upon the Council to take more effective measures to cope with the problem, otherwise more Israel attacks were to be expected.

10. The representative of Israel said that despite the cease-fire obligations undertaken by the parties warfare against Israel was being continued from Jordanian territory. Israel had repeatedly asked the Council to take effective action to stop Jordanian violations of the cease-fire, and had explained that the cease-fire could not be a screen for Arab aggression and that Israel had to take measures to defend itself. It had also emphasized the impact of Security Council deliberations on the region and had repeatedly stated that the adoption of resolutions lacking in equity would increase intransigence and breed additional violence. The Council's resolution 248 (1968) of 24 March 1968, in spite of its denunciations of cease-fire violations, had promptly been interpreted by Jordan as non-applicable to Arab acts of hostility against Israel. On 4 April, the Security Council had expressed its concern at the deteriorating situation. Since then, military attacks and armed incursions from Jordanian territory had continued unabated. Jordan had become the principal base for Arab aggression against Israel. Special military camps had been established there to train saboteurs and recruiting centres had been opened in Amman. Officers and men of regular Egyptian and Syrian army units had been trans-

ferred to Jordan and assigned to terror operations, while Iraqi troops had been given full freedom to operate as they wished. Two types of warfare were being conducted from Jordanian territory: terror raids and armed attacks from military positions, and both were being carried out from across the cease-fire line. Those two methods had been developed because the Arab Governments had been unable to use Arab inhabitants in the areas under Israel control as instruments of war. The shelling of Israel villages had reached a climax in May and June. On 4 June, a large-scale assault had been launched by Jordanian artillery resulting in extensive damage to the villages and to the central part of Beit Shean, as well as civilian casualties. It had therefore become necessary for Israel aircraft to take action. Since Jordan had used inhabited centres, such as Irbid, as locations for its artillery positions, civilian casualties on the Jordanian side had become inevitable. Since then, there had been a change in the Arab warfare tactics. It was currently being carried out more and more by terrorist and sabotage raids which had steadily increased in intensity and had become a daily occurrence. In July alone, ninety-eight acts of aggression had been committed. Israel had repeatedly emphasized Jordan's responsibility for that unabated warfare and had called on its Government to put an end to those attacks, but to no avail. Since Israel's security was in danger and its people were under constant threat it had no alternative but to take action in self-defence. It was for that reason that on 4 August Israel aircraft had taken action exclusively against two terrorist bases in the Salt area, which included the central headquarters of the El Fatah organization, stores of ammunition and sabotage equipment, training facilities and barracks. Only faithful and reciprocal observance of the cease-fire and an effort by the parties to reason together and work together towards a peaceful agreement could break the vicious circle of the twenty-year war. The Security Council could also help by impressing on Jordan the vital necessity to abide by the cease-fire obligations and to terminate all acts of aggression from its territory against Israel.

11. At the same meeting, the representative of Iraq, after expressing the concern of his

Government and people over the continued violation of the cease-fire and its effect on the prospects of the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, stated that Israel had advanced the same excuses and justifications for its acts of aggression as it had done in March 1968. The Security Council had then rejected those arguments and, on 24 March, had unanimously adopted resolution 248 (1968) stating that Israel's military action in Jordanian territory had been of a large-scale and carefully planned nature. Israel's latest aggression fell entirely within the scope of the 24 March resolution and confronted the Council with a situation in which it had to act in accordance with its past decisions.

12. The representative of Algeria stated that the basic problem of the Middle East was the conflict between an aggressive Power which was supported by imperialist interests, and the Palestinian nation which was determined to regain its rights. Any real solution must lie in the implementation of pertinent United Nations resolutions and the general principles of law. The Council's attention had been drawn to the probable intentions of Israel concerning the territories east of the Jordan River and fear had been expressed that in the light of the international situation and the active complicity which Israel could count on, it might show additional greed concerning further territorial acquisitions. Certain friendly nations were currently more concerned with bringing peace to the Middle East in a way that would leave Israel most of the fruits of its conquest than in helping the Security Council to fulfil the mission entrusted to it. Those Powers had stated that a solution must be found, but they now said it must be one that would satisfy all interests at stake. That attitude, based on eternal compromise, could not serve as a guideline for the United Nations or its Members. The United Nations owed it to itself to return to the application of its basic principles and avoid confusion whereby the complaint of the victim and the statements of the aggressor were placed on an equal footing. Israel's latest act of aggression was aimed at the destruction of the Jordanian region which was its major source of grain supply, thus forcing Jordan to bow to Israel's orders. It was

therefore all the more necessary that the Security Council should insist on full implementation of its previous decisions, which could not be implemented under military occupation or under threat of destruction or famine.

13. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recalled that in its resolution 248 (1968) of 24 March 1968 the Security Council had stated that it would be obliged to consider more effective steps in accordance with the Charter in order to ensure that acts of military reprisals did not take place. Israel's latest act of aggression made clear its attitude to Security Council resolutions and its disregard for principles of international law. Israel's new act of aggression was in effect a continuation of Tel Aviv's policy which was to achieve its imperialist aims in the Middle East, use military blackmail to intimidate neighbouring Arab countries and force them to become reconciled to the results of Israel's military aggression by making cynical use of military strength and flouting all standards of international law. Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories constituted a standing violation of all the principles of the Charter and the people of those territories had every right to resist that occupation. Besides continuing its aggressive acts, Israel had also continued creating obstacles to a political settlement in the Middle East and preventing implementation of the 22 November 1967 resolution. Israel's latest act of aggression had come precisely at a time when the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, was carrying out the next stage in a series of consultations regarding a peaceful settlement of the Middle East situation. That could only be regarded as a deliberate attempt to disrupt the Jarring mission. The Soviet delegation emphatically urged the Security Council to condemn Israel for its criminal acts against the Arab States and, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, to take such measures to halt and punish the aggressor as would deter the high-handed warriors of Tel Aviv from continuing their military provocations. No one must doubt the Soviet Union's determination to put an end, in collaboration with other peace-loving countries, to Israel aggression, to eliminate all its results, to return to their lawful

owners the territories seized as a result of the aggression of 1967, and to bring about the necessary political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence in that region.

14. The representative of the United States of America said that his Government did not condone the major military attack of the previous day by Israel against Jordan but neither did it condone the terrorism and sabotage which had been launched with increasing frequency from Jordan in the past weeks. Those acts should not be judged as isolated events, they were a concerted effort that could not help but have a cumulative impact. The incidents had violated the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions, killed not only military personnel, but also civilians and had fed the tension and fear that had frustrated the search for a peaceful settlement. The Council once again found itself confronted not with facts but with charges and counter-charges, making it impossible for it to fulfil its role with objectivity. That again underlined the need for some mechanism that could enable the Council to act in a truly informed manner when events such as the current incident occurred. It would be helpful if the parties were to reconsider their positions and agree to the presence of United Nations observers in the area. Their presence, while not prejudicing the rights or claims of either side, would serve as a deterrent to further incidents. A solution to the Middle East situation could be found only through the instruments and processes of accommodation and agreement, which were readily available, particularly in the person of Ambassador Jarring.

15. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland stated that his delegation had previously stressed that all acts of violence must be deplored wherever they occurred and in whatever circumstances. His Government strongly deplored the latest serious and deliberate attack, just as it had deplored the acts of violence preceding it. The United Kingdom Government believed that resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and Ambassador Jarring's mission still offered the best basis for a settlement. Currently

the Council's efforts must be directed towards breaking the vicious circle of violence and counter-violence and advancing gradually towards a settlement which could be accepted by all.

16. The representative of Jordan said that whenever Jordan had submitted to the Council a situation dangerous to peace in the area, Israel had always attempted to confuse the issue by making counter-charges. Some members of the Council were trying to raise the question of observers. In that respect it might be recalled that there was already machinery in the area, the Mixed Armistice Commission, which should prove effective. One could not ask for observers only on the cease-fire lines while ignoring violations in the occupied territories. If observers were to be appointed, they should be all along the entire Armistice Demarcation Line, including the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Syria-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line and Jerusalem. Jordan would favour such deployment of observers.

17. At the 1435th meeting, on 6 August, the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that Israel had put a remarkable emphasis on the cease-fire and its observance. The circumstances that had led to the adoption of resolution 235 (1967) showed that the cease-fire was only a temporary measure. At that time the representative of the United States had clearly stated that his Government considered the cease-fire as a first step towards the establishment of peace in the area. With the adoption of the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, a second step had been also taken towards that goal. Containing the basic elements of a permanent settlement, that resolution was based on fundamental principles of the United Nations and its Charter. But there was no official indication that Israel had accepted it and was prepared to implement it. A planned military attack by one country against another, whether under a cease-fire régime or not, was clearly a case of aggression. Israel's defiance of the Security Council resolutions undoubtedly constituted a serious threat to international peace and security. Since 24 March, when the Security Council had unanimously adopted resolution 248 (1968), Israel had twice engaged in retaliation and massive reprisals.

The time had come, therefore, when it was necessary to consider taking more effective measures as envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter to avoid recurrence of further violations.

18. The representative of France said that his Government had learned with deep concern of the bombing of Salt by the Israel Air Force and deplored the loss of human life and damage to property. It was also seriously alarmed by the repetition of such incidents in spite of the appeals and decisions of the Security Council. The attack on Salt and the earlier attack on Irbid could not be justified by claims of legitimate defence, since they were reprisals, and the very idea of military reprisals was unacceptable to the French Government. It was equally condemned by the United Nations and its Charter. The opposite road to military reprisals — that leading to a peaceful settlement — was shown by resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 which must serve as the basis for a settlement in the Middle East. The French delegation had followed closely the laudable efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, in the fulfilment of his mission. At a moment when Ambassador Jarring was doing his best to accomplish the task entrusted to him, military operations, such as the bombing of Salt, could only render it more difficult. The Security Council, while condemning such actions, should try to prevent their recurrence by ensuring the effective application of the 22 November 1967 resolution.

19. The representative of Canada said that his delegation regretted the military operation in Jordan on 4 August and any loss of life involved in that operation. It appealed to all concerned to observe scrupulously the cease-fire and to avoid positions or undertakings likely to make more unstable the fragile peace which was precariously maintained in the Near East. Such acts of violence, as reported to the Council, could not foster a propitious atmosphere for the task entrusted to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring. The decision of the Security Council might well have a far-reaching impact on his vital work, which was currently the only hope for a peaceful solution.

20. The representative of Pakistan said that

the latest attack of Israel was the fourth large-scale aggression by Israel against Jordan since March 1968 when the Security Council had adopted resolution 248 (1968). While there was general condemnation for that act, one could, however, discern two trends in the discussion which might impede the Council's objectivity and render its deliberations totally fruitless. The first was the tendency to be overimpressed by the fact that the Council was faced with charges and counter-charges and had no independent knowledge of the truth. In the case at hand, confusion was unwarranted, however, as Israel itself had admitted its military action. The second trend was the tendency to equate the military actions of Israel with all other violations of the cease-fire and, in so doing, to strike a posture of justice and even-handedness in disregard of the human realities of the area. To equate the small, sporadic and spontaneous acts of resistance of the people of the occupied territories with the carefully planned and large-scale military operations of the armed forces of Israel was to ignore a startling disparity of magnitude and quality and to confer equal rights on the aggressor and its victim. In the current instance, that would amount to condoning military reprisals. Moreover, it was unrealistic to think that there was a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence between Jordan and Israel for which both parties were equally responsible. There was no means for Jordan, short of waging a war against its own people, to prevent the so-called violations of the cease-fire. To make progress towards a solution of the situation in the Middle East it was necessary that a measure of balance be introduced by first checking Israel's aggressive actions. Pakistan also shared the anxiety of other members of the Council that the latest developments in the area should not adversely affect the progress of the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring.

21. At the 1436th meeting, on 7 August, the representative of Jordan repeated that as long as Israel remained in the Arab territories, there would be resistance, struggle and sacrifices for freedom, as was to be expected in the circumstances. Resistance against occupation had precedents in every country ever occupied.

The situation in Angola, Rhodesia and South Africa was no different from the struggle of the Arabs of Palestine. Europeans had resisted Nazi occupation in a similar manner and lost millions of lives in the struggle to regain their homelands.

22. The representative of Syria said that the latest Israel attack against Jordan was not an isolated incident but a link in a long chain of violence against Arab States. Three important things directly related to the Jordanian complaint and the question of Palestine in general needed to be emphasized. First, that if Israel had not driven out the Arabs of Palestine through terrorism and massacre, it could not have been the exclusive Jewish State its leaders wanted it to be, for the Arab and Jewish populations would have been equal in number. Secondly, that, in accordance with the last report of the Mandatory Power to the United Nations in 1947, Jewish ownership in Palestine had amounted to only 5.66 per cent. The Arab people of Palestine were still the legal owners of the land of Palestine from which they had been forcibly expelled. Thirdly, that the term belligerence could not be applied to a people who were defending their legal rights against a brutal conquest.

23. The representative of Denmark said that his delegation considered that all violations of cease-fire must be deplored unreservedly as such violations, besides resulting in loss of human life, also impeded progress towards peace. The case before the Council was not likely to be solved unless one faced the fact that certain actions by either party might result in counter-action by the other party to the detriment of peace and reason and in contravention of the efforts of the Council and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. It should be brought home to the parties concerned that the Security Council expected them to adhere scrupulously to the cease-fire because further violence in the area might well bring in its train disastrous consequences going far beyond the area. It was necessary that all concerned support the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, because it offered the best hope for a just and lasting peace based on an accepted settlement, as called

for in the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

24. The representative of Iraq stated that in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations the Security Council had unanimously condemned acts of military reprisal. It could not but condemn another act of reprisal. However, the Council must determine once and for all that the activities of the so-called infiltrators could not be equated with those of the Israel armed forces. The dangerous implications of equal treatment could not escape anyone, especially the rulers of Israel who would interpret it as a vindication of their stand. There could not but be sympathy and support for a people struggling for their freedom, and their actions could not be compared with the large-scale military action by the regular armed forces of a State. The Security Council could not abdicate its responsibility for taking effective action. Such action alone could meet the needs of the current situation.

25. The representative of Hungary stated that there was no justification for the serious violation of the United Nations Charter which had occurred when Israel military aircraft and shells bombed the territory of Jordan. Israel had advanced the pretext of "self-defence"; however, that argument could not hide the fact that the so-called terror raids were the direct consequence of the illegal occupation of Arab lands and that resistance to that occupation did not entitle Israel to attack its neighbours. The latest act of aggression of the Israel policy-makers and the expulsion of 50,000 Arabs from the Gaza Strip clearly showed that they had no interest in decreasing tension. As to the idea of deploying United Nations observers along a certain line, when Israel felt free to send its aircraft deep inside its neighbour's territory, observers would not be able to fulfil their mission, and to send them in the existing circumstances would only prolong Israel occupation of Arab territories.

26. The representative of Senegal said that a mistaken concept of self-defence could lead to a world conflagration. Leaders in Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa were watching the Security Council's reaction to the Israel interpretation of the concept of self-defence. As his

delegation saw it, the victim of aggression must respond immediately and on the same location and with all the means at its disposal. In the light of its delegation's conception of self-defence, Israel's action in bombing two of Jordan's towns could not be interpreted as self-defence. Jordan had been attacked and therefore it was not the aggressor. The basic problem, however, was the settlement of the destiny of the Palestinian refugees and the evacuation by Israel of the territory that it had occupied by force. Senegal placed great hope in Ambassador Jarring's mission for securing implementation of the resolution of 22 November 1967, and condemned the raids and military operations which could only jeopardize his efforts.

27. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that the rulers of Israel were using religion for political ends. The Zionists had taken Palestine, and the people of Palestine had risen against that occupation. The Palestinians, though displaced and living in refugee camps, were a people with a separate identity of their own. Neither the United Nations nor anybody else, including the Arab Governments, had any right to tell them to forget about their homeland and live elsewhere. There were some 16 million Jews in the world, over 1,000 million Christians and about 600 million Moslems. The Christians and the Moslems held the land as holy to their religion, as did the Jews. The Zionists' claim for exclusive rights to Palestine was unacceptable. Under no circumstances would the people of Saudi Arabia accept Zionist domination of Jerusalem. The situation could be settled only if the Zionists were to agree to live in the State of Palestine, containing both Arab and Jews, without Israel domination, as citizens of the Holy Land under a Palestine banner.

28. At the 1437th meeting, on 9 August, the representative of Paraguay said that strict observance of the Security Council resolutions of 1967 on cease-fire was the minimum condition required to ensure the success of the efforts of the Secretary-General and Ambassador Jarring. No peace could be built on the use of force or the threat of force and the acquisition of territory. The Paraguayan delegation had previously deplored the fact that there was no United Nations presence in the sector where the cease-

fire had most often been violated. Such a presence might be helpful in avoiding the recurrence of new acts of violence and in providing the Council with impartial evidence. Whatever decision the Council might adopt, it must appeal to the parties to avoid new violations of the cease-fire.

29. The representative of China said that the Israel action was contrary to the spirit of the Charter and that in the past the Security Council had censured it. At the same time, the Chinese delegation saw no justification for such acts of violence from the other side, since they only led to more violence. The first order of business was therefore to stop violence. The cease-fire must be scrupulously maintained and steps taken to prevent the recurrence of violence. His delegation had previously urged that United Nations observers be deployed in the Israel-Jordan sector. Inasmuch as Security Council resolution 242 (1967) had stressed the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and the eventual "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict", their presence should not have the effect of freezing a temporary situation or hardening the cease-fire lines. On the contrary, the lack of United Nations presence would make it difficult to bring about a climate conducive to a peaceful settlement in conformity with resolution 242 (1967).

30. The representative of India, after expressing his delegation's concern over the bombing of the city of Salt and the heavy loss of life, stated that the incident clearly showed the precarious nature of the cease-fire in the area. Since the adoption of its cease-fire resolution, the Council had had to meet on a number of occasions to consider acts violating those resolutions and to condemn them. The current incident, which was similar to the one that the Council had condemned in March by its resolution 248 (1968), must be similarly condemned. India had held the view that there could be no peace in west Asia until Israel withdrew its armed forces from the occupied territories. That was one of the fundamental principles contained in the 22 November 1967 resolution of the Security Council. The international community should make every effort

to see that that resolution was fully implemented. The United Arab Republic and Jordan had already indicated their willingness to implement that resolution in full. Israel was expected to make a similar commitment. In the view of his delegation, the representative of India concluded, the Security Council must condemn violations of its cease-fire resolutions 236 (1967) and 248 (1968) and demand their strict observance. At the same time, it should insist that all parties in the area extend their full and active co-operation to Ambassador Jarring's mission.

31. The President, speaking as the representative of Brazil, stated that his Government viewed the recent incidents with the utmost concern. Those developments were clear and undisguised violations of the cease-fire which, at the same time, showed complete disregard for the Security Council's authority and constituted constant violations of the cease-fire by both sides. The Security Council should place its full weight and prestige behind the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to secure agreement for the implementation of its resolution 242 (1967), which was one of the most positive actions taken by the Council to restore peace and order in the Middle East. Short of enforcement action, the Security Council had gone as far as it could and had laid down the basis for a just and lasting peace. A better political climate would be created if the major Powers harmonized their actions and interests in the area through an understanding on the supply of armaments, either through total cessation of military assistance or through an accorded regulation and balanced limitation on supplies of defensive equipment.

32. At the 1438th meeting, on 12 August, the representative of Jordan said that Israel had often asserted that its military operations and air attacks were directed against what it described as "terrorist bases" and not against civilian installations. That, however, was not the real position. After giving details of Israel's attack of 4 August 1968, the representative of Jordan said that the bombings of a public works camp, coffee shops and farmers and their crops and trucks could not be said to have been directed against the so-called terrorist bases. With re-

gard to Israel's allegations that Jordan had become the principal base for attacks against Israel, he had been instructed by his Government to state that no recruitment centres had ever been opened in Amman, that there were no *fedayeen* bases or special training camps in his country and that Iraqi army units were in Jordan for defensive purposes against any Israel aggression and that they did not help or train *fedayeen*. There was also no truth in the Israel allegation that there was co-ordination among the Governments of Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Syria and Iraq, on the one hand, and the *fedayeen* on the other, or that El Fatah had Iraqi officers. Israel had wanted to convince the world and the Security Council that Palestinians were happy with its usurpation of their rights and their homes and that there was no resistance from them but only from the Arab States.

33. The representative of Israel stated that his Government had decided to release confidential information illustrating the involvement of the Jordan Government in the terror warfare against Israel. This showed that the Jordanian authorities had not limited themselves to general support of the terror operations but had participated directly in those operations. There was full operational co-ordination between the Jordanian Army and the raider commandos to prevent clashes as a result of mistaken identity and for that purpose the commandos were given special guidance concerning the location of Jordanian mine-fields on the East Bank and of Jordanian Army ambushes. The Jordanian Army Command had also issued instructions to its forces to assist the raider units in determining the best timing and route for crossing the cease-fire line as well as military intelligence with regard to Israel mine-fields, defence installations, patrols and posts and by giving them covering fire. Moreover, a supreme co-ordination committee of the Jordanian Army and the terror organizations had recently been established. The raiders were well-trained military commandos, sometimes of Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi origin, frequently transferred to terror operations from the regular army units of the Arab States. Those organizations were artificially maintained and

encouraged by the Arab Governments as an expression of their belligerency and would crumble the moment the Arab Governments decided to abide by their cease-fire obligations.

34. The representative of Jordan said that there was no agreement between Jordan and Israel which could be described as a "cease-fire agreement". There was, however, an international agreement, the Mixed Armistice Agreement, that had created the armistice machinery, which the United Nations jurisprudence continued to regard as valid and binding on both Israel and Jordan. With regard to the cease-fire, there was a decision by the Security Council, and Jordan was abiding by that decision. However, Jordan could not be held responsible for the rise of liberation movements inside the occupied territories. The violation of the cease-fire came from Israel's actions in occupied territories.

35. At the 1439th meeting, on 15 August, the representative of Ethiopia said that no appreciable progress had been made since the unanimous adoption of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, despite the dedicated efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, to reach an agreement for the implementation of that resolution. In fact, the situation remained as dangerous as ever, with the prospect of another conflict beginning to loom large. The deplorable and repeated incidents of the previous ten months were the inevitable consequences of the deadlock that had been reached in the progress of those efforts, and the only way to get out of the vicious circle of violence and conflict was for the Security Council to see that its 22 November 1967 decision was faithfully and effectively acted upon. All members should support the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative; the special responsibility of the permanent members in the peace-making efforts was too obvious to require detailed elaboration. Meanwhile, the Council must call for the strictest observance of the cease-fire and censure all violations of it. It should also warn that repeated violations of the cease-fire would call unavoidably for its action under the relevant Chapter of the United Nations Charter.

36. The representative of Israel said that during the current discussion of the Middle East situation resulting from Jordan's aggression and his country's defence action, attacks from Jordan had continued. During the period 5-14 August there was almost daily mortar fire and shelling from Jordanian military positions. In spite of those military actions, the Arab representatives and their supporters had suggested that the Security Council should address itself only to Israel's defence action and provide immunity to the Arab States for their acts of aggression. Such a course would be a miscarriage of justice, and Israel, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, would not accept it. After citing further evidence to show the involvement of Jordan and other Arab States in the activities of the commandos, the representative of Israel said that the situation in the Middle East was likely to become even more grave unless warfare against Israel from Jordanian territory ceased and Jordan ensured the strict observance of the cease-fire.

37. The representative of Jordan said that the representative of Israel had once again described the resistance movement to Israel occupation as acts of terrorism and cited certain so-called evidence to show the involvement of Arab States. In that respect the truth could easily be found by letting the Secretary-General's representative visit the Israel-occupied territories. The implementation of resolution 237 (1967) so far had been held up by Israel.

38. The representative of Israel said that a representative was welcome to come to Israel but that the Arab Governments themselves were barring such a representative from investigating the question of oppression and discrimination to which the Jews in the Arab lands were being subjected.

39. At the 1440th meeting, on 16 August, the President announced that as a result of consultations, agreement had been reached on the text of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel,

"Having noted the contents of the letters of the

representatives of Jordan and Israel in documents S/8616, S/8617, S/8721 and S/8724,

"Recalling its previous resolution 248 (1968) condemning the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions and deploring all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire,

"Considering that all violations of the cease-fire should be prevented,

"Observing that both massive air attacks by Israel on Jordanian territory were of a large scale and carefully planned nature in violation of resolution 248 (1968),

"Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting therefrom,

"1. Reaffirms its resolution 248 (1968) which *inter alia*, declares that 'grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts';

"2. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property;

"3. Considers that premeditated and repeated military attacks endanger the maintenance of the peace;

"4. Condemns the further military attacks launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and resolution 248 (1968) and warns that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would duly take account of the failure to comply with the present resolution."

Decision: *At the 1440th meeting on 16 August 1968, the draft resolution was adopted unanimously (resolution 256 (1968)).*

40. After the vote, the President of the Council took note of the widespread support that had been expressed for the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Gunnar Jarring, in the mission entrusted to him. With the consent of the Council, he requested the Secretary-General to convey to Ambassador Jarring that expression of support.

41. The representative of the United States said that while his Government could appreciate

the difficulties of restraining terrorist elements in the emotional climate that prevailed in the area, every Government there was, nevertheless, responsible for maintaining the cease-fire. Moreover, acts of violence inevitably gave rise to retaliation and repression. The main thrust of the resolution just adopted by the Council was directed against those excessive acts of retaliation undertaken in disregard of its resolution 248 (1968). The Council had also considered that acts of violence and specifically such repeated air attacks endangered peace in the area; this was an expression of concern couched in the language of Chapter VI of the Charter. The United States Government hoped that the parties would do their utmost to abide by the resolution. The way to peace, however, lay through agreement of the parties to implement the resolution of 22 November 1967, which the Council had adopted unanimously.

42. The representative of Algeria said that his delegation regretted that the Council, in balancing the grievances brought before it with so-called counter-grievances, was failing to live up to its obligations under the Charter. The Security Council thus could not respond to the question of Israel aggression with the firmness required of it. That was due to the fact that there were forces whose interests were directly threatened by the national liberation movements not only in the Middle East but in South-East Africa and even Latin America. Nevertheless, the Council's unanimous resolution had warned Israel that if those attacks were repeated, the Council would have to contemplate more effective additional steps in accordance with the Charter.

43. The representative of Denmark said that the resolution just adopted by the Council was very explicit in the assessment of Israel's military action and left no doubt that those actions should not be repeated. It was equally clear that all violations of the cease-fire should be prevented. The resolution, however did not contain any reference to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the important mission which had been entrusted to him. It was, therefore, a great satisfaction to his delegation that the President of the Council had taken note of the support that was extended to the Special

Representative in the Council. That expression of support made it clear that it was imperative upon the parties to extend their full and unconditional co-operation to Ambassador Jarring. Only in this context could the Danish delegation support the resolution, which did not meet with all its wishes. It was to be hoped that the vicious circle of violence would be broken so that an atmosphere might prevail conducive to real progress for the efforts to achieve a peaceful and acceptable settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

44. The representative of Pakistan said that the resolution just adopted was a compromise text resulting from intensive consultations and, therefore, not entirely satisfactory to all delegations. His own delegation had expected a resolution which would have been the logical sequel to resolution 248 (1968), in which the Council had pledged itself to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter, to ensure against repetition of premeditated and massive military attacks. Pakistan had, nevertheless, voted for the current resolution because it condemned Israel's military attacks on Jordan and also warned Israel against repeating those attacks. The Security Council considered that their repetition constituted a danger to the maintenance of peace. The Council's responsibilities in that respect had been spelled out in the Charter.

45. The representative of Canada welcomed the fact that the Security Council was sending a message to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General expressing widespread support for his efforts. The full co-operation of all the parties concerned was essential to the success of Ambassador Jarring who could help them to attain a settlement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). The main responsibility for such a settlement lay, however, with the parties directly concerned; the present gravity of the Middle East situation resulted from breaches of the cease-fire on both sides.

46. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that all members of the Council wished to see immediate advance on the basis of the purposes and principles of the resolution unanimously adopted in November 1967; the urgency for pressing ahead with that initiative

was made all the more compelling by the recent events.

47. The representative of France said that the French delegation had followed with great interest the activities of Ambassador Jarring under resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. The French delegation paid tribute to Ambassador Jarring's patience and perseverance in the performance of his duties, and hoped that his mission would receive the full support of the Security Council, especially its permanent members.

48. The representative of Senegal said that the resolution just adopted showed that the Council was even more resolved not to tolerate incidents of that sort in the future. In the opinion of his delegation, the Arab delegations had exhibited moderation during the negotiations over the text of the resolution. Israel should realize that it was dangerous to depend on concepts like that of "legitimate defence".

49. The representative of Paraguay observed that the resolution was a compromise which did not entirely coincide with the views of his delegation. Paraguay had voted for the resolution in favour of unanimity. It considered that in prevailing conditions the only real possibilities of a lasting peace in the Middle East were based on the fulfilment of resolution 242 (1967). An essential condition for this was the co-operation of the parties and, as a prerequisite, all the parties must obey the cease-fire ordered by the Council in 1967. The reciprocal respect and respect for the decisions of the Council would give the minimum basis for the success of Ambassador Jarring's mission.

50. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the resolution contained the minimum conditions required. The Soviet delegation had supported the resolution because unanimity in the Council might serve as a barrier to Israel aggression. The resolution, however, lacked a number of important provisions which might have strengthened it and enhanced its significance. The possibility of reaching a political settlement on the basis of the resolution of 22 November 1967 depended on Israel, since the Arab States for their part had stated clearly that they were

prepared to accept and fulfil all the provisions of that resolution and to set up a timetable for its implementation. Those States which continued to support Israel and which had even condoned its aggressive actions also bore responsibility for any lack of progress in the implementation of that resolution. The Soviet Union was convinced of the need for a swift settlement to the Middle East problem on the basis of the 22 November resolution and supported the mission of Ambassador Jarring.

51. The President, speaking as the representative of Brazil, observed that the Security Council resolution deplored all violations of the cease-fire while laying stress on the premeditated military attacks of Israel against Jordan. After expressing full support for the efforts of Ambassador Jarring, he added that his delegation wished to reiterate its appeal of 9 August 1968 to the major Powers to reach an understanding on the question of supply of armaments to the parties involved in the crisis of the Middle East.

52. The representative of Iraq expressed the hope that the Security Council resolution would be the last warning to Israel. He noted that the Council had refused to equate the actions of the so-called infiltrators with those of Israel's armed forces. The activities of the Palestinian patriots, which had never been controlled by any Arab Government, could not fall under the cease-fire resolution, which was addressed to Governments. By its actions in the occupied territories, Israel had left the Palestinians no alternative but to fight and resist. They were fighting to preserve their identity as a distinct national Arab community.

53. The representative of Israel said that the debate had shown that the attitude of the Arab States to Israel remained one of intransigence and belligerency and left no doubt of their direct responsibility for the terror warfare. The resolution adopted showed the inadequacy of the Council's handling of the situation. Israel had the inalienable right to defend itself against the continued warfare waged by the Arab States and would discharge its responsibility for the security of the population in territory under its control. If the Arab Governments took action to terminate all military attacks, by regular or irregular forces, against Israel, the cease-fire

would be effectively maintained. Israel would pursue its efforts to attain a just and lasting peace through negotiations and agreement and would co-operate with Ambassador Jarring towards that objective. It expected the Arab States to do the same.

54. The representative of Jordan expressed satisfaction at the constructive approach of members of the Council, all of whom had condemned the Israel premeditated large-scale military attacks. As to the question of observers, emphasis should be placed on the withdrawal of Israel forces from the occupied territories not on any idea which might help to freeze the situation. The continued Israel presence and the arbitrary measures being taken in the occupied territories were a grave violation of the cease-fire, which was a temporary arrangement. Moreover, there was no evidence implicating the Government of Jordan in terrorist attacks against Israel but Jordan could not be expected to protect Israel against resistance. Jordan had hoped that the Council this time, besides condemning Israel, would have faced Israel aggression with the only effective remedy — sanctions, especially since the latest attacks were aimed at civilian centres. Leniency by the Council could only encourage Israel and lead to a further deterioration of the situation and a loss of faith in the Security Council. Jordan had co-operated with Ambassador Jarring and would continue to do so. It would continue to accept the 22 November 1967 resolution, while Israel had not accepted that resolution in its entirety.

(c) Communications to the Council between 5 August 1968 and 26 March 1969

55. During August, Jordan continued to make charges of Israel attacks against Jordanian villages and farms. A letter dated 9 August (S/8741) contained a list of twenty-seven such attacks since 17 June 1968. In letters of 21 and 26 August (S/8755 and S/8773), Jordan charged that Israel had, on 20 and 25 August, shelled villages and centres of civilians in the northern part of the Jordan valley resulting in civilian casualties and destruction of a school, a mosque, part of the East Ghor Irrigation Canal and houses in a number of villages. These attacks, it was stated, had taken place only a few days

after the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 256 (1968).

56. In a letter dated 26 August (S/8774), Israel charged that a large-scale military attack with mortars and small arms had been carried out on 25 August from Jordanian territory against Israel villages in the Beit Shean and Jordan valleys, and that Israel forces had returned fire. The letter listed fifteen cases of alleged cease-fire violations preceding this attack which had been carried out between 18 and 23 August both by regular and irregular forces from Jordanian territory.

57. In a letter dated 28 August (S/8787), Jordan advised the Security Council that Israel was contemplating and preparing for a large-scale attack against it. Israel on 30 August (S/8793), rejected that charge, stating that it was designed to divert attention from the continued attacks from Jordan's own territory.

58. In a letter dated 17 September (S/8817), Jordan stated that the city of Irbid had been shelled again by Israel heavy artillery; and Israel, in a letter of the same date (S/8818), stated that Jordanian forces had opened fire on Israel forces in the Beit Shean valley which had replied in self-defence. Israel charged that 103 attacks had been made against it from Jordanian territory in the period between 18 August and 17 September, involving small-arms fire, bazookas, mine laying and rocket shellings.

59. In a letter dated 10 October (S/8845), Jordan complained that Israel was embarking on changing the Armistice Demarcation Line in the Aqaba area and was continuing to encroach on Jordanian territory. Moreover, it had refused to attend the emergency meeting requested by Jordan of the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission on the ground that "it does not recognize the continued validity of the General Armistice Agreement of 1949". That, it was stated, showed Israel's disrespect for international agreements. On 21 October Israel replied (S/8862) that there was no factual basis to the Jordanian complaint and that it was incongruous for the Jordanian Government to invoke the Armistice Agreement of 1949, which collapsed when that country had initiated hostilities against Israel on 5 June 1967.

60. In a letter dated 15 October (S/8856), Jordan listed fifty-one military attacks by Israel, most of them directed against Jordanian villages and farms, from 5 August to 29 September.

61. On 23 October Israel complained (S/8865) of more attacks from Jordanian territory on the Israel civilian population and on Israel defence forces, partly by Jordanian forces and partly by terror warfare organizations, and listed 108 Jordanian violations of the cease-fire since 16 September 1968. In a further communication dated 3 November (S/8884) Israel stated that those incidents had culminated on 2 November in the shelling of the city of Elath from across the cease-fire lines. Israel also submitted a list of thirty-six violations of the cease-fire since 23 October.

62. In a letter dated 5 November (S/8886), Israel stated that examination of the area of Ashdot-Yaacov following an attack on 16/17 October had revealed that the shells had been fired by artillery of Iraqi army units on the East Bank of the Jordan. In a letter dated 8 November (S/8894), Iraq categorically denied the involvement of the Iraqi forces stationed in Jordan in the shelling of the Israel-occupied territory on the night of 16/17 October. Iraqi forces, it was stated, were stationed far from the cease-fire lines, and it was Israel which had been firing long-range artillery shells on the Iraqi positions as had happened on the night of 27/28 October. The Iraqi troops were in Jordan at the request of the Government of Jordan and were under the joint command, whose attitude to the cease-fire was governed by the position of both the Governments of Jordan and the United Arab Republic. In a letter dated 18 November (S/8902), Israel replied that the Iraqi letter showed the evasive attitude of the Government of Iraq towards the cease-fire, concerning which the Council's resolution had been officially communicated to it.

63. On 2 December, Jordan complained (S/8911) of several attacks by Israel on the previous day in the north and south of the Jordan valley, that had resulted in casualties, and in particular of an air attack on a Saudi Arabian convoy of six trucks near Al-Hasa on the Amman-Aqaba route, that had resulted in the killing of two and wounding of three Saudi

nationals and the destruction of two bridges. In a letter of the same date (S/8912), Israel stated that an Israel commando had blown up two Jordanian bridges because one of its industrial establishments, the Sodom Potash Works, had been shelled on the previous night. The letter complained of continuous attacks from Jordanian territory.

64. In letters dated 3 December (S/8916 and S/8917), both Jordan and Israel submitted further charges and counter-charges relating to cease-fire violations on that day. Jordan charged that Israel shelling of the villages of Kum, Kufor Asad and Samma had spread to cover the whole northern part of the Jordan valley and that an Israel air attack on Kufor Asad had resulted in loss of life and damage to property. Israel charged that artillery fire had been opened from Jordanian territory on the night of 2-3 December against nine Israel villages in the Beit Shean and Jordan valleys and stated that Israel had had to act in self-defence by returning the fire and employing aircraft.

65. In a letter dated 4 December (S/8918), Jordan stated that the situation had grown more serious as Israel aircraft had on 4 December attacked the positions of Iraqi troops stationed in the Mafraq area as well as Jordanian posts in the northern area, and that the air raids had extended to densely populated villages in the north. Israel replied on the same day (S/8919) that its aircraft had acted in self-defence against Iraqi military positions which had shelled Israel villages the night before.

66. On 18 December Jordan submitted (S/8935) a list of sixty-nine alleged attacks by Israel against centres of civilian population in its territory from 2 October to 15 December. Many of these, it was stated, had been carried out by Israel armed units, some of which had penetrated deep into Jordanian territory. On 3 December, it was charged, more than thirty elderly men, women and children had been killed in the village of Kufor Asad alone as a result of indiscriminate Israel bombing and shelling, and forty houses had been destroyed. On 15 December Israel forces had shelled centres of civilians in Ghor Al Safi, with resulting casualties and destruction of houses. On 30 December Jordan charged (S/8951) that on the previous

day Israel had again launched a four-hour artillery attack on Jordanian territory, from which casualties had resulted.

67. In a letter dated 12 February (S/9006), Jordan complained that on the previous day Israel armed forces had shelled the villages of Safi and Fotah, south of the Dead Sea, and that on the same day Israel aircraft had bombed Ghor Al Safi, using napalm bombs and killing six soldiers and wounding ten.

68. In a letter dated 4 March, Jordan further submitted to the Security Council (S/9039) a list of seventy-six Israel attacks against its territory from 11 December to 14 February and charged that Israel jet fighters and helicopters had continued to bomb and strafe Jordanian villages, using missiles and napalm bombs. Israel rejected the Jordanian charge in a letter dated 10 March (S/9065) and stated that in the past two months numerous attacks had been launched from the Jordanian territory by regular and irregular forces and that Israel forces had had to take action in self-defence.

69. Further charges were made by Jordan on 16 and 17 March (S/9083 and Corr.1, S/9085) of air raids by Israel jets on 15, 16 and 17 March on a number of Jordanian villages and civilian centres deep in Jordan territory, resulting in civilian casualties and damage to property. On 17 March Israel replied (S/9089) that the persistent armed attacks against Israel by regular and irregular forces from Jordan had necessitated actions on 15, 16 and 17 March from Israel in self-defence against terror organization camps and bases situated in Jordan territory but outside the centres of population.

(d) *Requests for a meeting and consideration by the Council at its 1466th to 1473rd meetings (27 March to 1 April 1969)*

70. By a letter dated 26 March (S/9113), Jordan complained of an attack that day by Israel jet fighters on Jordanian villages and certain centres in the area of Salt, as a result of which seventeen civilians were killed and twenty-five were wounded. The attack had also caused heavy damage to property and to the main roads linking the villages of the city of Salt. In its letter, Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider

that grave and serious violation of the cease-fire and to take more effective measures to check Israel's acts of aggression. Later, on 31 March, Jordan transmitted (S/9121) to the Council a series of photographs showing civilian casualties and trucks carrying vegetables and fruit damaged as a result of the Israel attack on 26 March.

71. By a letter dated 27 March (S/9114), Israel also requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider grave and continual violations by Jordan of the cease-fire, including armed attacks, armed infiltration and acts of murder and violence by terrorist groups operating from Jordan territory with official support, and also firing across the cease-fire lines by Jordanian forces, including shelling of Israel villages.

72. At the 1466th meeting of the Council, on 27 March 1969, the President, before the adoption of the agenda, stated that the meeting had been convened at the request of the representative of Jordan, whose letter appeared as item 2 on the provisional agenda. However, a few minutes before the meeting, a communication from the representative of Israel had also been received which could be inscribed as item 3 on the provisional agenda.

73. The representative of the United States suggested that in view of the Council's practice since 1967 to inscribe the various communications relating to the various aspects of the Middle East situation under the over-all heading "The situation in the Middle East", the two communications before the Council could be noted under the same heading.

74. The President pointed out that the practice of the Security Council had varied in that respect; for example, on the last such occasion on 29 December 1968 the two items had been dealt with separately. He had therefore suggested that the communication from Israel be noted as item 3 on the provisional agenda.

75. The representative of Algeria stated that as regards the suggestion of combining the two items, he considered that by so doing the Council would be putting on an equal footing the legitimate complaint of Jordan against an act of aggression and Israel's counter-complaint.

76. After some further procedural discussion in which the President and the representatives of Algeria, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States participated, the Council agreed to a suggestion of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the agenda of the Council should consist of the following three items:

"1. Adoption of the agenda

"2. The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 26 March 1969 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9113)

"3. The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 27 March 1969 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9114)."

77. The President stated that it was understood that in their statements speakers could refer to any aspect of the items on the agenda so far as was relevant to the meaningful examination of the problem.

Decision: *The agenda, as amended, was adopted.*

78. The representatives of Jordan and Israel and, subsequently, of Saudi Arabia were invited to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

79. The representative of Jordan stated that his Government would have brought Israel's continuous acts of aggression to the attention of the Security Council much earlier but for its desire to create conditions conducive to the success of efforts to find a peaceful solution. Its shellings of Jordanian villages in the north had become a daily practice that was often escalated by Israel jet fighters carrying out raids deep into Jordanian territory. In previous documents (S/8911, S/8916, S/8935, S/9039, S/9083, S/9085), Jordan had reported to the Council Israel attacks on its territory since the beginning of December. Many of these attacks against civilian targets resulted in severe loss of life and damage to property. They had lately been intensified. The occasion of the current discussion in the Council was Israel's air raid by four jet fighters on rest homes and winter resorts in Ein Hazar, frequently visited by civilian Jordanian citizens

and where travellers between the East Bank and West Bank stopped for refreshments before crossing the Jordan River. The raid had killed taxi drivers and many of their passengers, besides destroying several taxis and trucks and six houses in the area. A report in *The New York Times* had stated that there had been no military installation in the immediate area and that no anti-aircraft fire had been directed against the Israel planes. It appeared that the severe international condemnation of Israel following its raid on Beirut Airport (see section 3, below) had prompted its leaders to think of a new policy under which it could continue its aggression without, however, drawing world public attention to those acts. Israel had found that new policy in the so-called active self-defence. Under that new policy of aggression, Israel would send a few of its jet fighter bombers deep inside Jordanian territory to hit civilian targets in the shortest possible time, ending their indiscriminate bombing by dropping time-bombs that exploded when civilians gathered to carry away their dead. The new Israel attacks had covered almost all populated areas on the East Bank of Jordan, in the north and in the south. In spite of that policy of aggression, Jordan had wished to avoid submitting a new complaint to the Security Council in order not to prejudice the peace efforts of the four permanent members of the Security Council. Jordan had all along supported all efforts towards finding a peaceful solution of the situation in the Middle East and in that respect had co-operated with all representatives of the Secretary-General. Israel, on the other hand, had done everything to frustrate those efforts. That being the case, it was the duty of the Security Council, particularly of its four permanent members, to take measures so that Israel's acts of aggression were discontinued and all its attempts towards frustrating a peaceful solution were checked. It was clear that if the Security Council failed to take effective measures it would have to face more conflicts in the area, because unless adequate measures under Chapter VII were taken, more and more acts of aggression from Israel would follow.

80. The representative of Israel stated that in spite of the Security Council cease-fire re-

solution calling for an end to "all military actions in the area", Arab military aggression had continued unabated. In the absence of effective United Nations action Israel had no choice but to defend itself, as it had done on 26 March when it took action to disable terrorist bases in Jordanian territory. Since 20 January there had been a marked upsurge in terror warfare against Israel. More than 200 sabotage raids and firing attacks across the cease-fire line had been recorded. The majority of those terror acts had been carried out by El Fatah. During February 1969 alone, those attacks had resulted in eight Israelis being killed and sixty-one being wounded. One United Nations observer had also been injured in the explosion in a super-market in Jerusalem. Jordan's role in warfare by terror against the people of Israel was a major one, since Jordanian territory served as the main base for attacks against Israel. The main terrorist organizations had their headquarters in Jordan, and their camps, which were located close to the camps of the Jordanian army, were administered and policed by the Jordanian authorities. An agreement had been reached regulating relations between Jordan and the commando organizations, which implicated Jordan in the activities of the commandos to such an extent that its responsibility for violations of the cease-fire could not be denied. The Jordanian papers themselves had reported details about co-ordination between the Jordanian army and the terror organizations. In accordance with its policy of attacking terrorist bases, Israel's action of 26 March had been directed against an El Fatah base at Ein Hazar about three kilometres south of the town of Salt which, he said, was an isolated site quite far from the settlements of the civil population. In Ein Hazar there was a road-block manned by the terrorist squads at which travellers from the West Bank were stopped for control, questioning and instruction. There were also canteens and recreational facilities. Those were the so-called cafés, and in them the persons whom the representative of Jordan had referred to as civilians. Alongside, many vehicles belonging to terrorist organizations were always parked. It was against these centres of terror that Israel had taken action on 26 March. When an end was put to

that terror warfare and the Arab States scrupulously maintained the cease-fire to which they had pledged themselves, there would no longer be need for Israel's defence actions. Until then, Israel's right to self-defence remained inalienable and could not be questioned by labelling it reprisal, a concept which had no application to the current Middle East situation.

81. The representative of Israel went on to state that official communiqués concerning the operations of the terror organizations published by Arab States as well as documents which had come into the possession of Israel had given sufficient proof of the direct responsibility of the different Arab Governments for the activity of the terrorists operating from territories under their control since 1955. The terror warfare was generally begun and ended according to the decisions taken by the Arab Governments. This same policy had been followed by the Arab Governments since June 1967, and a decision to this effect had been taken at the Khartoum Conference of the Heads of Arab States in September 1967. Pursuing this policy, Jordan, Egypt and Syria had set up training camps for terror units in which instruction was given by officers of the regular armies of those countries. Training bases also existed in Algeria, and recruitment centres were established in various capitals of the Arab States. The most gruesome aspect of their activity was that it was directed against civilians. Arab terror warfare was a criminal policy, had continually violated the cease-fire and had undermined the peace-making efforts. The Arab Governments must realize that sabotage and killing had not weakened Israel during the last twenty years and was not going to weaken its determination to attain a just and lasting peace.

82. At the 1467th meeting of the Council on 27 March, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Council had been called once again to consider Israel's latest act of aggression against Jordanian villages, rest homes and other civilian objectives in the Salt area. That act had been taken in clear violation of the cease-fire and the relevant Security Council resolutions. It was this aggressive policy of Israel which had stood in the way of achieving a peaceful settlement of the Middle

East situation. The attack of 26 March was the latest in the chain of Israel attempts to continue taking Arab territories by force and strengthening its position there. Quite naturally, there was a resistance and liberation movement against Israel's occupation and appropriation of Arab territories. As the movement grew, Israel had begun launching new military actions which could not be distinguished from naked aggression and could in no way be described as "self-defence". Israel must, however, realize that acts of aggression could not go unpunished and that the struggle of peoples against the aggressors was not only legitimate on the basis of international law but also invincible, deserving support and sympathy on the part of all peace-loving countries. Israel was trying to give the impression to the world, particularly through the statements of its Foreign Minister, that the incidents of cease-fire violations were minor incidents and that, generally speaking, calm and quiet prevailed in the area. In other words, Israel wanted a free hand to assimilate the Arab territories conquered by it. The latest Israel aggression was committed precisely at the time when efforts were being made to find ways and means to settle the Middle East problem on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. It indicated that Israel wanted to undermine the international efforts towards restoring peace in the Middle East and that its professed declaration of peaceful intent had no basis. In the face of such a challenge, the Security Council could not but condemn Israel's new act of aggression, demand that it observe the Council's previous resolutions concerning the cease-fire and cease any activities to subvert efforts towards finding a peaceful settlement.

83. The representative of Nepal stated that it was dismaying to note that the new tensions in the Middle East had occurred at a time when some positive signs of progress had been noticed. His delegation was encouraged by the return to the area of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, by the projected mission of King Hussein of Jordan and by the preparations for the Big Four talks. All those hopeful signs would no doubt receive a setback from the recent pre-

meditated act of violence which was wholly inconsistent with the requirements of self-defence. His delegation deplored all acts of violence and all violations of the cease-fire and expressed its sympathy to the victims. The solution to the Middle East problem did not lie in finding a new formula but in implementing the one contained in the unanimously adopted Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. Nepal believed that a lasting peace in the Middle East was possible only through a settlement, negotiated either bilaterally or within the framework of the United Nations, which should include the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories, termination of all claims of belligerency, respect for the sovereignty and integrity of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

84. The representative of the United States stated that his Government deeply deplored the loss of civilian life in the reported Israel air attack and would make clear once again its firm opposition to attacks of that kind, which formed a flagrant violation of the cease-fire. It would once again urge Israel to avoid such indiscriminate actions involving violations of the Security Council resolutions concerning the cease-fire. However, his Government was well aware that that attack must be seen in the total context of the continuing absence of peace in the Middle East. There had been other equally serious incidents. Thus, while condemning the current Israel air attack, the Security Council could not refrain from condemning the other grave violations from the other side. There were various incidents for which the Arab *fedayeen* had proclaimed their responsibility. The United States equally deplored those actions, and the Arab Governments could not completely escape responsibility for them. In such a pattern of violence it was therefore all the more necessary that all Governments concerned should scrupulously observe the cease-fire. While considering the current situation concerning cease-fire violations, the Council should not, however, lose sight of some of the hopeful developments. The Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, was in the area and was holding consultations with

the Governments concerned. In addition, some of the permanent members of the Security Council were also having talks on ways and means whereby Ambassador Jarring's efforts could best be assisted. To continue with those encouraging developments, it was urgently required that the parties, besides co-operating with Ambassador Jarring, should make every effort to see that all violations of the cease-fire were prevented.

85. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that in spite of numerous condemnations of Israel, incidents involving violations of the cease-fire had continued and he feared that their continuance might lead to a world-wide conflict. One of the main reasons for those incidents and unrest in the Middle East was that an act of injustice had been done to the people of Palestine when they were denied the right of self-determination in contravention of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Charter. That was the crux of the problem in the Middle East. A people living in their own homeland had been driven away and denied the right of self-determination by another group of people coming from outside, mostly from eastern Europe, with the help of their supporters in the United Kingdom and the United States. It was wrong to say that the Jewish peoples from all parts of the world had a claim over Palestine simply because a Jewish tribe had lived there some 2,000 years ago. The fact was that Zionism was using Judaism for its political and economic ends to exploit the Middle East. The Palestine question, therefore, was not a dispute between the Arab Governments and Israel. It was a struggle of the Palestinian people to regain their lost homeland. The trouble in the Middle East would not be solved until a solution satisfactory to them was found. In all their efforts, the major Powers must keep that factor in mind, because a miscalculation in that respect could result in a great catastrophe involving the whole world.

86. The representative of Israel stated that he would like to submit to the Council additional information which would throw further light on the nature of terrorist bases at Ein Hazar. In the course of Israel action on the previous day, at least fifteen members of a terrorist organization, including two of its

commanders, were injured and were hospitalized in the Salt hospital. One of the terrorists belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and captured by an Israel patrol on 27 February 1969, had told his interrogators that he had spent some time in one of the houses in Ein Hazar and that there were thirty other saboteurs there who were dressed in uniforms of the terror organization and were armed with rifles. These places could not be described as mere rest houses or cafés. In accordance with the tenets of international law, which were fundamental and did not depend on the policies of individual Governments, Jordan, having given assistance and encouragement to terror organizations, could not be absolved of responsibility for continued aggression against Israel. As early as 1948, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at a meeting of the Security Council, had asked that each party should be held responsible for actions of individuals or groups on its territory to ensure that their actions did not violate the truce. Israel maintained that the assistance and encouragement given by Arab Governments to terrorist organizations fell within the terms under which the Soviet representative's statement would hold the Arab Governments responsible for their action. The Soviet Union could help in the search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East by denouncing the actions of the terrorists and, in accordance with its earlier stand, by holding the States from whose territory those acts were committed responsible for them.

87. The representative of Jordan said that the representative of Israel had expressed doubts with regard to his description of the places bombed by Israeli aircraft as "rest homes" and "cafés". However, reporters for *The New Times* and the CBS had stated clearly that the raid by Israel jets had killed a number of taxi drivers and their passengers and that there were no signs of commandos in that area. Those were eye-witness accounts and could not be denied. The Government of Jordan had already invited representatives of the Red Cross and of all members with embassies accredited to Jordan to ascertain for themselves the true facts relating to Israel's air attack on Salt.

88. The representative of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics stated that after the representative of Israel's statement it was clearer than ever that Israel's air attack and Israel's position in the Security Council were intended to disrupt the efforts that were being made to find a peaceful solution of the situation in the Middle East. Furthermore, there was never any formula either in international law or in the commentaries of the most authoritative jurists prohibiting the population of occupied territories from resisting the invader. No principle of international law could justify the aggressive acts and terror perpetrated by Israel in the Arab territories occupied by it.

89. At the 1468th meeting, held on 28 March, the representative of Algeria stated that the Israel attack on Ein Hazar was only one of the violent manifestations of the explosive situation prevailing in the Middle East. It was part of a carefully prepared strategy which was intended to destroy the economic resources of the Arab countries and to compel them to accept an imposed solution. Having been put in the midst of the Arab world by the colonialists and inspired by their ideology, Israel was using their tactics to carry out its expansionist ambitions. For twenty years Israel had unjustly deprived a people of their right to self-determination and national existence. Currently, that people was resolutely claiming recognition and resisting oppression and occupation. In order to undermine that struggle, Israel was carrying out repeated attacks against Arab countries neighbouring Palestine under its co-called policy of self-defence. Faced with such an undisguised act of aggression, the Security Council must condemn Israel and must envisage the necessary measures in accordance with the Charter.

90. The representative of Finland, after referring to the charges and countercharges concerning the attack on Ein Hazar, stated that the Security Council could not accept as valid any arguments put forward to justify unilateral military actions that constituted a breach of the cease-fire. Nor could it consider the current incident or the many others the Security Council had dealt with previously in isolation, as they must be seen as part of the unbroken cycle of violence that was undermining the cease-fire arrangements. The fighting had continued

intermittently along the cease-fire lines and inside the countries involved as well, adding to the tragic losses suffered by the civilian populations. The Council must insist, therefore, on strict observance of the cease-fire by the parties, which should refrain from any action which was likely to increase tension in the area. The cease-fire was, however, a temporary arrangement and only a first step towards making peace. It was necessary, therefore, to take the next step and to remove from the area the state of insecurity which gave rise to acts of violence. The Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 had set out the principles on which a just and lasting peace could be established. The Secretary-General's Special Representative was continuing his efforts to promote agreement on the basis of that resolution. At the same time the four permanent members of the Security Council were also moving towards joint talks, which should be welcomed by the international community. In its current discussion the Council should not proceed in such a manner as to make the forthcoming negotiations more difficult. The overriding interest of the Security Council was to promote unity among its members, and particularly among the four major Powers, in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

91. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that for almost two years the Council had had brought to its notice an appalling list of violent acts committed in the Middle East, resulting in the killing of innocent persons and causing widespread destruction of property. His delegation condemned all acts of violence and breaches of the cease-fire. The Security Council would, however, be tinkering with the problem if it were to concentrate on individual incidents, as the time had come when action to settle the fundamental problem could no longer be delayed. In view of the dangers involved, the outside world could not afford to stand by and treat the Middle East situation as a local quarrel. The parties had had long enough time to try and resolve it on their own. It was proper that there should be new initiatives for peace involving, in particular, the four permanent members of the Council. It was encouraging to learn that the four-Power talks were expected to begin

soon, and the Council must condemn any action which damaged the prospects of their success. Therefore, while appreciating the concern and feelings of Jordan with regard to the victims of the recent attack on its territory, the United Kingdom delegation would wish it also to reflect on the need for unanimity in the Council in order to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East.

92. The representative of France stated that the recent Israel attack on Ein Hazar, resulting in the death of innocent persons, which was not an isolated bombing, had brought destruction to a country which already had suffered cruelly. Israel's declaration that its repeated aerial attacks were aimed at commando bases and were of the nature of "preventive attacks" could not justify operations which constituted a new escalation of military action about which the Security Council should be duly concerned. On several occasions the French Government had stated that it condemned all violations of the cease-fire and demanded its strict observance. The French Government also believed that the aerial bombings, instead of crushing the terrorist acts as Israel had claimed, tended to increase the animosity among the populations which suffered from those attacks and strengthened the reaction of which the *fedayeen* were a manifestation. By widening the gap between Arabs and Israelis, those attacks delayed, if not dispelled, the possibility of a settlement which Israel itself sought. He then recalled that in May and June 1967 the French Government had done everything within its power to have the States concerned avoid the outbreak of an armed conflict, but to its regret those efforts had not been successful. In the months that followed, France again tried to limit the consequences of that conflict and have conditions for pacification prevail. It was for that reason that the French delegation had continued to stress that as long as there was no settlement and occupation lasted, incidents were likely to multiply. It therefore asked for rapid implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. In that respect the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, had not so far produced the expected results. On several occasions

he had been told that the best means of reaching a settlement was through direct talks between the parties. However, in the current circumstances it appeared that direct talks were not feasible and such a procedure was not realistic. Faced with that situation, the French Government had suggested that the four permanent members of the Security Council should unite their efforts to seek ways and means for the implementation of the 22 November resolution.

93. The representative of Pakistan stated that even if Israel's air attack on rest homes and winter resorts in Ein Hazar had been an isolated incident, it would have, by itself, called for condemnation by the Security Council. But the abundant evidence before the Council, as shown by Israel attacks reported to the Council since the previous December, made it clear that it was part of a systematic pattern of acts by Israel which, exploiting its air superiority in the region, had been inflicting heavy destruction on the neighbouring States. During the Council's discussions of previous military actions, Israel had pleaded the right of reprisal. The Council had, however, rejected that plea because it considered that the acceptance of the theory advanced by Israel would destroy the rule of law embodied in the Charter. In its resolutions 248 (1968), 256 (1968) and 262 (1968), the Security Council had condemned Israel's military attacks, and in its resolution 248 (1968) it had explicitly stated that it would have to consider further and more effective steps if actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire continued. It was obvious that a much more forceful stand by the Security Council was called for in a case where even a pretext to so-called retaliation could not be advanced. The significant feature of the recent Israel attack was that its target was a place having no military installations and where no anti-aircraft fire had been directed against the planes. The recent proclamation by the Israel Government of the doctrine of "active defence" showed that the occurrence was not fortuitous. This doctrine was nothing but the assertion of an unlimited right to attack the territories of Arab States for having given refuge to the uprooted people of Palestine. Israel's military action was not likely to prevent the

increase in strength and activities of the resistance movement, which was the inevitable result of and response to occupation. It was likely, however, to hamper efforts towards finding an agreement. The current attack had come precisely at the time when some hope had been aroused by the efforts of the four permanent members of the Security Council to promote a just solution. The Security Council should condemn the attack of 26 March as a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions and issue a final warning to Israel that any repetition of such attacks would result in the adoption of necessary measures under the Charter.

94. The representative of Israel stated that the validity of the views of Member States were dependent on their relationship to the fundamental concepts of international law, the United Nations Charter, equity and justice. Thus, the political views of certain Governments could not affect the basic right of self-defence. Nor could the methods of self-defence used by Israel be prescribed [*sic*] by the aggressor States or their supporters. Israel had every right to defend itself against open and relentless Arab warfare. If a cease-fire implied reciprocal and scrupulous observance by both sides, Israel could not but insist on such observance on the part of the Arab Governments. Similarly, Israel could not be denied the right to live in peace and security. Israel believed that the only way to attain a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict was to ensure the faithful observance of the cease-fire and promote agreement by the parties on a just and lasting peace.

95. The representative of Jordan stated that the representative of Israel had asserted that the views of the members of the Council could not affect the basic right of self-defence, but the conception of self-defence that the representative of Israel had in mind was not the one defined by the jurisprudence of the United Nations but was one of his own definition. The statements by Israel and its attacks on the Security Council should not, however, divert the attention of the Council from the dictates of the Charter and its own previous decisions. The Council had on a number of occasions condemned Israel's acts of aggression, and it was time

for it to take effective measures to put an end to Israel's continued and arrogant defiance.

96. At the 1469th meeting of the Council, on the same day, the representative of Spain stated that Israel's attack against civilian centres in Jordan, besides constituting a violation of the Council's cease-fire resolutions, also threatened peace and security not only in the Middle East but in the world at large. That situation had resulted directly from the aggression of 5 June 1967, the subsequent occupation of the territory and the non-compliance with resolution 242 (1967). Without prejudice to the fact that that resolution must be completely implemented, it was obvious that the United Nations Charter did not allow for the occupation of territory by force. The Spanish delegation believed that the violent acts about which Israel had complained could be avoided if it were to withdraw immediately from the territory occupied by it. After Israel's withdrawal, the cause for resistance would disappear. If there were as many *fedayeen* camps and bases as the representative of Israel had described, one would have to conclude that those were not terrorists but an entire people who had been expelled from their territory and who had revolted against the injustice done to them. However, the most recent Israel military action had been taken at a time when no act of violence had been committed from the other side and also when the four major Powers were endeavouring to find a solution. Quite apart from the general problem of the Middle East, the United Nations could not allow one of its Member States repeatedly to take the law into its own hands, commit aggression and occupy territories in violation of all basic United Nations principles, and must take the most appropriate measures to arrest such a situation and prevent a Member State from continuing its defiance of the Council's resolutions.

97. The representative of Senegal stated that his delegation deplored Israel's military action against civilian populations in the area of the town of Salt at the very time when active consultations were taking place with a view to finding a solution of the Middle East situation. Senegal would urge strict observance of cease-fire so that efforts towards a settlement might meet with success.

98. The representative of Colombia stated that the recent attack by Israel formed part of a tactic of reprisals which was contrary to the principles of the Charter and an act with which no State could associate itself. At the same time, his delegation condemned all violations of the cease-fire and terrorist acts irrespective of their source. In view of the recent violent occurrences in the region, it was all the more necessary that every effort should be made to create an atmosphere conducive to the peaceful solution of the conflict in the Middle East. The principles embodied in resolution 242 (1967) were still valid and their full implementation was the only sure guarantee for restoration of peace in the area. In that respect the efforts of Ambassador Jarring had so far proved fruitless. The four permanent members of the Security Council, with their influence in the region, might be able to obtain the active co-operation of Israel and the Arab States necessary for the implementation of that resolution. Colombia still considered as valid the formula for the Middle East peace that the Latin American Group had first submitted at the emergency session of the General Assembly in June 1967 and which later had formed the basis of resolution 242 (1967). It provided for an over-all solution, taking into account the tragic plight of the Palestinian refugees, the withdrawal of the Israel forces from the Arab territories, the recognition of Israel and the ending of the state of belligerency. The Colombian delegation believed that, without neglecting isolated cases of violence, it was necessary to deal with the situation as a whole. It also urged the parties to break the vicious circle of reprisals which was blocking the road to peace.

99. The representative of Zambia stated that while his delegation deplored violence of any kind and regretted the loss of life and property that might have occurred in Israel as a result of the activities of the guerrillas, there did not appear to have been any incident at that time to spur Israel to request a meeting of the Council. Jordan, on the other hand, had been the victim of a premeditated act of aggression executed by the regular forces of Israel. His delegation deplored that attack and urged Israel to refrain from acts that might hamper the efforts of the four major Powers towards peace. It also

associated itself with those who believed that the territory of a Member State was inviolable and might not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, and that such territorial acquisition obtained by force could not be recognized.

100. The President, speaking as the representative of Hungary, stated that Israel, by its attack on Jordan on 26 March, had once again violated the sovereignty of that country and the Council's cease-fire resolutions. Israel had maintained that its military action had been defensive in character and was aimed at the maintenance of Israel's security. However, those assertions were not corroborated by Israel's actions. Israel, having occupied militarily large sections of Arab territories, could not demand submission by the people of those territories. The cease-fire ordered by the Security Council could not be used to consolidate Israel's occupation. Its main purpose was to stop further territorial incursions by Israel. The attacks by Israel's armed forces violated not only the laws of peace but also the laws of war, for belligerents were not entitled to attack civilian targets and use against them weapons of mass destruction and chemical weapons like napalm. It was not the security of Israel but that of its Arab neighbours that was threatened by Israel's occupation of their territory. The deteriorating situation in the Middle East was a matter of great concern to the United Nations, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, who, because of that concern, had agreed to hold talks with a view to contributing to the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). Hungary would support every initiative that might lead to a political settlement by a full implementation of that resolution.

101. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that the main cause of war in Palestine was the uprooting of its indigenous people by the Zionist movement which was alien to the land of Palestine. Until three years ago, the people of Palestine had hoped that countries contiguous with Israel would be able to find a solution to their problem, but those States had failed. The Palestinian people then decided to continue the fight themselves, and even their children

were imbued with that spirit. Some of the Palestinian young men were returning to join that fight. It was, therefore, imperative that during the consideration of the question relating to Palestine, the people of Palestine must also be consulted. The core of the situation lay in the realization of the right of self-determination for the people of Palestine. What was needed, therefore, was a new orientation to the problem, not only through the four big Powers but also through a change of heart on the part of the leaders of Israel. As a result of that change of policy, a new Palestine could emerge in which the Arabs and the Israelis could live side by side in a binational state.

102. The representative of the United States stated that in its statements before the Council each side had accused the other of a long series of premeditated acts of violence and had justified its own acts as necessary measures of self-defence. For its part, the United States could not accept as valid any of those acts of violence and believed that the Council should conclude its deliberations by condemning the immediate act of violence submitted to it as well as all other acts which had violated the cease-fire. Such a decision by the Council would preserve a spirit of impartiality which would be most conducive to the success of its efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement.

103. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that up until then the Security Council had made a distinction between the aggressor and its victim. It was important to keep that distinction in mind and to consider that the new act of aggression had been committed at a time when many had thought that new initiatives were possible for a peaceful settlement of the problem of the Middle East.

104. At the 1470th meeting of the Council, on 29 March, the representative of Jordan stated that his Government regretted the tendency on the part of some of the members of the Council to find some justification for Israel's act of aggression against civilian targets and to preoccupy themselves with side issues injected into the debate by Israel with the intention of perpetuating current cease-fire arrangements which of course were temporary in nature. In order to make

the four-Power talks fruitful, the Council must check Israel attacks. Any hesitation on the part of the Council in taking effective measures would only result in further deterioration of the situation and would only encourage Israel to continue its aggression.

105. The representative of Paraguay stated that his delegation regretted the loss of life resulting from violations of cease-fire, and also the material damage, particularly since that damage had been inflicted on a developing country like Jordan. It meant greater sacrifices for a people which had been handicapped already by its under-development and by the consequences of a recent war. Paraguay could not condone the violent incidents involving serious violations of the cease-fire; at the same time, it could not accept the theory of the exercise of reprisals whereby a State could arrogate to itself the right to carry out military operations of the kind being considered by the Council. It further regretted that those incidents had taken place at a time when the four permanent members of the Security Council were establishing contacts to intensify the efforts for a just and stable peace on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). It was for that reason that his delegation would urge the parties to comply strictly with the cease-fire resolutions and to help in creating an atmosphere for the success of the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, and also those of the four permanent members of the Security Council.

106. The representative of China stated that while Israel had not denied its attack on Salt, it had claimed that the targets of its attacks were not civilians but centres of armed elements hostile to it. Whatever might be the case, his delegation considered the air raid across national boundaries to be a clear violation of the cease-fire and one to be condemned by the Council. Israel's action could not be characterized as a measure of self-defence, as recognized under Article 51, but rather a punitive action which showed that Israel believed in the effectiveness of armed actions rather than in pursuing conciliatory policies. The Chinese delegation was, however, aware of the fact that acts of violence had become a daily routine, particularly in the

Suez Canal area, and considered that all forms of violence were to be deplored. It would urge the parties to give every assistance to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, in his search for peace in the Middle East.

107. The representative of Israel stated that the Arab States, while continuing their warfare against his country, wished at the same time that it should not take any action in self-defence. A resolution by the Council which would ignore Israel's right of self-defence would be one-sided and inequitable and would only increase tension in the area. The Council already had adopted numerous resolutions of that nature, and they had in no way contributed to a solution of the Middle East problem. Only understanding between the parties themselves could bring about such a solution.

108. The representative of Jordan stated that Israel would wish the Security Council to take its decisions in accordance with Israel's wishes. However, the Council had already adopted numerous resolutions unanimously condemning Israel's aggression. What was needed was that Israel should withdraw its armed forces from the occupied territories. As long as Israel's occupation continued, there would be resistance, which was a natural act on the part of the people who were oppressed.

109. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the tragedies in Palestine were caused by the incursion of alien Zionists who had occupied the land. The current Israel action was aimed at dividing the great Powers on the eve of their discussions aimed at finding some solution. Israel had flouted all the United Nations resolutions, and it was incumbent upon the big Powers to see that these resolutions were obeyed. There could never be peace in the Middle East with an exclusive and aggressive Zionist society.

110. At the 1471st meeting of the Council, on the same day, the President announced that as a result of consultations among members of the Council, a draft resolution had been worked out. However, the sponsors, out of respect for the day of national mourning in the United States (for General Dwight D. Eisenhower, former President of the United States, on 31 March

1969), had decided to introduce it at the Council's next meeting.

111. At the 1472nd meeting, on 1 April, the representative of Pakistan introduced the following draft resolution (S/9120) which was co-sponsored by Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1466,

"Having heard the statements made before the Council,

"Reaffirming resolution 236 (1967) calling for respect for the cease-fire and resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968), condemning the air attacks by Israel on the Jordanian territory in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions,

"Observing that numerous premeditated violations of the cease-fire have occurred,

"Viewing with deep concern that the recent air attacks on Jordanian villages and other populated areas were of a pre-planned nature, in violation of resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968),

"Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation which endangers peace and security in the area,

"1. Deplores the loss of civilian life and damage to property;

"2. Condemns the recent premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions and warns once again that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would have to meet to consider further more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such attacks."

112. The representative of Pakistan stated that the draft resolution represented a compromise resulting from prolonged consultations among members of the Council, including the permanent members. His own delegation's view, with which many other members of the Council had agreed, was that the Council, taking into consideration Israel's latest act of aggression, should have followed the logic of its previous resolu-

tions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968) and have taken more effective measures. However, in the interest of agreement and mindful of the necessity of preventing a division among the permanent members of the Council on the eve of the projected four-Power talks, the sponsors had not insisted on their original text. The sponsors, however, could not, as some permanent members had desired in the name of what they considered to be a balance, give equal emphasis to premeditated attacks launched by a Government and sporadic violent acts by a resistance movement directed against foreign military occupation.

113. The representative of Zambia stated that while an air attack on civilian targets was certainly deplorable, the Council should look to the future and try to ensure that further violence was not committed against either side. His delegation would wish the Council to take steps to have the rights of the indigenous people of Palestine restored to them, to see that the State of Israel was allowed to exist in peace and that the boundaries of the States in the region should be the same as they existed before 5 June 1967. Unless those goals were attained there could not be peace in the Middle East. Because of its belief that territorial aggrandizement was not conducive to peace and its concern for the welfare and restitution of the rights of the Palestine refugees, Zambia could not but condemn the recent Israel air attack on Jordan, and it hoped that the adoption of the three-Power joint draft resolution (S/9120) would bring about the restraint which was so necessary for efforts towards finding a peaceful solution of the Middle East situation.

114. The representative of the United States, in explanation of his delegation's vote, stated that the three-Power joint draft resolution had concentrated in its operative part exclusively on one kind of violence, ignoring the one which had provoked it. The draft resolution had thus become unbalanced and was unlikely to move the parties towards a peaceful solution. Had its sponsors been willing to add another operative paragraph condemning or deploring all violations of the cease-fire, his delegation would have been able to support it. The United States abstention, however, should not be interpreted

as condoning the kind of violence which the three-Power draft resolution condemned any more than it could condone any other violations of the Council's cease-fire resolutions.

115. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation would have wished to express its strong disapproval of indiscriminate air bombing by voting for a strong condemnatory resolution. However, every action should be judged by its contribution towards forwarding the cause of peace. Consequently, his delegation had considered it necessary that the Council should maintain its unanimity, which was of vital importance at that juncture, and also keep in mind the over-all situation, in the context of which the Council considered individual incidents. In order to avoid a split in the Council, it would have been desirable for the draft to have deplored all violations of the cease-fire. Failing such an addition to the three-Power draft resolution, his delegation would not be in a position to support it.

116. The representative of Jordan recalled that in December 1968 the Security Council had warned that if Israel attacks were repeated, it would consider applying more effective measures to give effect to its decisions. Jordan had expected that this time the Council would, in fact, adopt more effective measures to prevent a repetition of such attacks by applying Chapter VII of the Charter, but in a spirit of compromise it had not insisted on this. It welcomed the initiative leading to the discussions of the Big Four on the Middle East, but their success would depend on their determination to uphold the basic principles of justice in their search for a settlement. The first objective should be the complete elimination of armed aggression; and Jordan doubted if the draft resolution would lead to that result, since Israel opposed any efforts for peace either by the Security Council or by the four Powers.

117. The representative of Israel stated that as long as Jordan continued to glamourize murder by the terrorists and initiated, organized and supported terror warfare against Israel, it must be considered responsible for a continual violation of international law and a crime against humanity. He reiterated that Ein Hazar had been an encampment of the terror organizations.

The one-sided draft resolution, by its perversion of the nature of Israel's defence action, its misrepresentation of that action's targets, its disregard of continuing Arab aggression and its distortion of the contents of previous Security Council resolutions, was contrary to truth and equity.

118. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the main conclusions to be drawn from the Council's current consideration was its unanimous condemnation of Israel's policy of aggression against its neighbours, since no member of the Council had spoken out in justification of Israel's policy. Certain members of the Council had, however, attempted to put together questions which were basically different and also to put the aggressor and its victim on the same level. It was also clear that Israel had no serious desire to participate in efforts towards finding a peaceful solution. In fact, its aggression had meant to undermine those efforts. That was the only possible explanation for its latest act of aggression. Some members of the Council had expressed their misgivings with regard to the adoption of the Asian-African draft resolution by stating that it might create division. His delegation did not share those misgivings and felt that the draft resolution should serve as a further warning to those who were attempting to undermine the efforts for a peaceful solution in implementation of Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. He emphasized that the item before the Security Council was in effect the problem of the struggle for national liberation of the Arab peoples, who were fighting against foreign rule and foreign occupation, and were waging a struggle of liberation against foreign aggressors who had seized their territories, and enslaved — though only temporarily — their population. Israel had, in fact, proved to be the instrument used against the Arab world by those endeavouring to arrest the natural process of revolutions for national liberation in the Middle East. But that attempt would be of no avail. He also referred to reports of the deliberate destruction for "preventive" purposes of homes belonging to Arabs in the territory occupied by Israel, and drew attention in that connexion to General Assembly resolution

2443 (XXIII) in which Israel was called upon to desist from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population in areas occupied by it and which provided for the establishment of a Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, composed of three Member States.

119. At the 1473rd meeting of the Council on the same day, the representative of Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors, introduced a revised text (S/9120/Rev.1) of the three-Power draft resolution. In the revised text the third preambular paragraph read: "Recalling resolution 236 (1967)" and a new operative paragraph 1 was inserted which read: "Reaffirms resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968)". The former operative paragraphs 1 and 2 were accordingly renumbered as paragraphs 2 and 3.

120. The representative of Paraguay stated that his delegation had supported the Council's earlier resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968), but as the revised text of the three-Power draft resolution (S/9120/Rev.1) had omitted certain parts of those resolutions in which reference had been made to all acts of violation of the cease-fire, his delegation would abstain on the three-Power draft resolution.

121. The representative of France stated that his delegation had wished that the draft resolution before the Council would have commanded unanimous support, particularly of the four permanent members of the Council. The efforts in that respect, in which his delegation had participated, had not succeeded. In the absence of an agreed text, his delegation would vote in favour of the three-Power revised draft resolution (S/9120/Rev.1).

122. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that the Security Council, in its two earlier resolutions, 248 (1968) and 256 (1968), had condemned Israel's military actions. Those resolutions had been adopted unanimously. The Arab delegations failed to understand the reason for the reluctance to support the new text of the three-Power draft resolution. The United States representative had stated that his delegation would be able to vote for the draft if the guerrilla warfare were taken into consideration in

the text. That question of equation was a new usage in the United Nations. However, the destiny of a people could not be weighed in the scales. Justice had to be done to the people of Palestine, and an equation between an aggressor and its victim could not be established.

123. The representative of Colombia stated that his delegation regretted that the efforts to have a generally agreed text of the draft resolution had not succeeded and that its sponsors were not prepared to include a paragraph deploring all other violations of the cease-fire. To his delegation that was indeed a vital point since it believed that the Council was duty-bound to condemn all violations, regardless of their point of origin.

124. The representative of Finland stated that the revised text of the three-Power draft resolution (S/9120/Rev.1) had met to a great extent some of the suggestions made by his delegation to the sponsors of that draft. By reaffirming resolution 248 (1968) in the first operative paragraph, the Council would deplore by implication all incidents violating the cease-fire, as had been done in the past resolutions unanimously adopted by the Council. His delegation regretted that the revised text had not met with the approval of all members of the Council, since that could not but weaken the impact of Council pronouncements on the course of events in the area. That was all the more regrettable in view of the projected four-Power talks.

125. The representative of Hungary stated that, in view of the continued defiance by Israel of the Council's previous decisions, the Council currently should have taken effective measures against further defiance by Israel. However, some members of the Council were still reluctant to adopt those measures, and it was for that reason that the text of the revised draft resolution, although it no doubt condemned the Israel air attack, did not include measures which were necessary.

Decision: At the 1473rd meeting of the Council on 1 April 1969, the three-Power draft resolution (S/9120/Rev.1) was put to the vote and was adopted by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (Colombia, Paraguay, United Kingdom and United States) as resolution 256 (1969).

126. Following the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom expressed his regret that unanimity had not been reached when the Council had been so close to agreement. Because of the omission of any statement deploring all violations of the cease-fire, the United Kingdom had reluctantly abstained in the vote.

127. The representative of Israel complained that the resolution was one-sided, inequitable and ignored basic established facts and was therefore not a contribution to the advance of peace in the area. Arab terror warfare must be condemned with full force. Israel's policy would remain based on: readiness to conduct negotiations with each of the neighbouring States for the purpose of concluding peace treaties; co-operation with Ambassador Jarring, within the framework of the 22 November 1967 resolution; observance of the cease-fire on the basis of reciprocity; and self-defence against armed attacks.

128. The representative of Jordan expressed gratitude to the Council members for condemning in clear terms the most recent premeditated attack by Israel on Jordan villages and populated areas and for rejecting the Israel allegations and counter-complaint which were intended to confuse the issue. Jordan hoped this would be the last warning given to Israel. The way to peace was for Israel to abide by its old commitments to the Security Council, but its behaviour had been one of war, in which it had received some accommodation from its friends. Members of the United Nations had undertaken to abide by the will of the majority.

(e) Communications to the Council between 1 April and 15 July 1969

129. In a letter dated 8 April (S/9137), Israel complained to the Security Council that on that day a Katyucha rocket attack had been launched against the city of Elath, resulting in the wounding of thirteen Israeli civilians, and that in self-defence Israel had taken air action to stop the attack which had originated from the area of the city of Aqaba.

130. On the same day Jordan charged (S/9138) that Israel aircraft had raided the city of Aqaba with rockets and bombs and that the raid had resulted in the death of eight civilians

and the wounding of several others. Many buildings, including a Catholic church, a girls' high school and the police headquarters were also damaged.

131. In a letter dated 20 April (S/9166 and Corr.1), Israel complained to the Security Council of a series of cease-fire violations by the armed forces of Jordan on 19 and 20 April, including firing attacks on Israel positions in the Golan Heights and on the Jordan and Beit Shean valleys, as well as the interception of saboteur units. Fire had been returned to silence the source of the attacks.

132. In letters dated 21 and 22 April (S/9167, S/9170, S/9173), Jordan called to the attention of the Council intensive Israel attacks against civilian targets in Jordan on 19, 20 and 21 April, including shelling and bombing of villages throughout the northern area and the suburbs of Irbid, causing casualties among civilians and heavy damage to property.

133. In a letter dated 28 April (S/9180), Israel stated that because of the attacks launched on 19 April by regular and irregular forces from Jordan, with the participation of Iraqi artillery and United Arab Republic military bases in Jordan, Israel had been forced in self-defence to take measures against saboteur centres, Jordanian and Iraqi military positions and two United Arab Republic operated radar stations in Jordan.

134. In a letter dated 1 May (S/9187), Jordan complained that on 29 April Israel aircraft had bombed and strafed the areas of Tel Shubeil and Wadi Yabis causing the death of four civilians, and that Israel forces had also shelled the area of Shuna Shamaliya.

135. In a letter dated 16 May (S/9211), Jordan charged that on 14 May Israel aircraft had bombed and strafed the Irbid district, causing the death of six civilians, and that on 9 May an Israel unit had crossed the Jordan River, dynamited five houses and mined the area of Wadi Yabis, causing three civilian casualties. The letter also listed eighty-six cease-fire violations by Israel in the period from 17 February to 9 May. In a further letter of 16 May (S/9212), Jordan charged that Israel forces had been using the farm of an Arab orphanage

in the Jericho area to shell Jordanian positions on the other side of the Jordan River and that Jordan forces had had to return fire in self-defence. In its reply, dated 21 May (S/9217), Israel rejected these charges, stating that they were a pretext for Jordanian shelling of civilian targets in the Jericho area and that Israel had no military positions in the area.

136. In letters dated 22 and 23 May (S/9218 and S/9219), Jordan charged that on 21 May two Israel companies supported by fighters and helicopters had attacked the villages of Safi and Feifa and that on 22 May four Israel jet aircraft had also shelled and strafed the area of Dair Alla in the north. As a result civilians had been killed and wounded, and houses, schools and other buildings destroyed.

137. In a letter dated 24 May (S/9221), Israel charged that on 24 May fire had been opened from Jordan territory on the Ethiopian monastery south of the Allenby Bridge, and that on 23 May an Israel village in the Beit Shean Valley had been shelled from Jordan and an Israel patrol in the same area had come under Jordanian fire. After stating that between 11 and 17 May there had been fifty-seven attacks from Jordan against Israel, the letter added that on the night of 17 May irregular units from Jordan had attacked Israel positions in the central Jordan Valley. It also charged that on 19 May Jordanian forces had attacked Israel patrols between the Dead Sea and Allenby Bridge, and on the same night the potash plant near Sodom had been attacked by Katuycha rocket from Jordan.

138. In a letter dated 28 May (S/9228), Israel charged that the orphanage of the Arab Development Society, its school and farm near Jericho had again been shelled from Jordan. Israel charged that those attacks were part of a series of pre-planned assaults from Jordan on civilian centres, including Arab inhabited localities, as shown by the shelling of the city of Jericho on the night of 27/28 May and again on the night of 28 May.

139. In a letter dated 19 June (S/9271), Jordan charged that on the previous day Israel jets had conducted attacks for seven hours against numerous sites in Jordan, using bombs, strafing,

firing rockets and dropping napalm, and that twice on the same date Israel forces had shelled Jordanian positions. In the course of those attacks, it added, nine soldiers had been killed and twenty-three wounded.

140. In a letter dated 23 June (S/9274), Israel charged that the campaign of aggression waged against it by Jordanian regular and irregular forces, as well as by Iraqi troops stationed on Jordanian territory, had been dangerously intensified, as was illustrated by a sharp rise in the number of artillery attacks initiated by regular Jordanian and Iraqi forces independently of operations by terror organizations. The letter stated that during 1969 there had been 600 acts of aggression committed from Jordanian territory, including attacks by artillery, mortars, tanks, rockets and anti-tank and recoilless guns, as well as incidents of mining and attempts to cross the cease-fire line, adding that most of them were directed against civilian targets.

141. In a letter dated 23 June (S/9275), Jordan charged that on the previous day waves of Israel jets had raided several areas on the East Bank of Jordan and added that those indiscriminate raids had resulted in the death of one civilian and the injury of seventeen persons, six of them soldiers.

142. In a further letter of 23 June (S/9277), Israel charged that Jordan was responsible for a breach of the cease-fire in Jerusalem on 20 June, in which three bombs had been exploded in a narrow street leading to the Western (Wailing) Wall, injuring three Arab and one Israel inhabitants. As proof of Jordan's responsibility, the letter stated that on 21 June the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, with headquarters in Amman, had published a communiqué admitting responsibility for the attack and that it had been disseminated by Jordan's official media of information.

143. In a letter dated 26 June (S/9285), Jordan complained of several attacks by Israel on the previous day, during which, it stated, the Israel army opened fire on Jordanian positions using machine-guns and tank artillery, and Israel jets had strafed the same area, overflown Amman, and bombed and strafed several other areas in the northern part of the

Jordan Valley with rockets and machine-guns. The letter added that as a result of those attacks eleven Jordanian soldiers were dead and six others seriously wounded.

2. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(a) *Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General from 16 July to 4 September 1968 and request for a meeting*

144. In a letter dated 16 July (S/8681), Israel stated, in reply to a complaint by the United Arab Republic on 10 July (S/8677 and Corr.1) of Israel shelling of the city of Suez on 8 July, that the Israel forces had acted in self-defence, with considerable restraint, and that the United Arab Republic forces had initiated the fire.

145. In a letter dated 28 August (S/8788), Israel stated that on 26 August two Israel jeeps had been ambushed while on patrol along the Suez Canal. As a result of the explosion of mines laid on the patrol route and the subsequent firing on the jeeps, two Israeli soldiers had been killed and a third, probably wounded, had been kidnapped by the Egyptian soldiers. In a further letter dated 2 September (S/8794), Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the "deliberate and planned military attack by the United Arab Republic against Israel forces on 26 August 1968, in flagrant violation of the cease-fire". It added that the seriousness of that attack had been aggravated by the negative reply of the United Arab Republic to representations made by Israel through General Odd Bull for the return of the kidnapped soldier.

146. Supplemental information concerning the incident of 26 August was received from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), General Odd Bull, and made available to the Council by the Secretary-General in two reports. The first, dated 29 August (S/7930/Add.74 and Corr.1), stated that United Nations military observers had reported hearing explosions and observing firing from the west side of the Canal towards the east. Israel on 27 August had complained that on 26 August a patrol car had been ambushed and mined by United Arab Republic

forces which had crossed the Canal. An inquiry conducted by United Nations military observers on 27 August had found that an Israel Defence Force patrol had been mined and the physical evidence had indicated that it had been ambushed. Israel had requested the immediate return of the kidnapped soldier, but the United Arab Republic authorities stated that no United Arab Republic forces had taken part in any action on the Israel side of the Suez Canal sector and they had no knowledge of any missing Israel soldier. The second report, dated 4 September (S/7930/Add.76), stated that during the inquiry on 27 August, the observers had asked to see the bodies of the two Israel soldiers reported to have been killed during the incident but had been told that the bodies had been removed from the area for burial that day. The observers could not therefore verify that two Israel soldiers had been killed. However, blood stains and three damaged steel helmets had been seen by the observers at the scene of the incident, and photographs of them had been taken.

(b) *Consideration at the 1446th and 1447th meetings (4 and 5 September 1968)*

147. At the 1446th meeting, on 4 September, the agenda was adopted without objection. The representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic were invited at their request to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the question. The President drew attention to the information circulated by the Secretary-General in documents S/7930/Add.74 and Corr.1 and Add.76.

148. The representative of Israel stated that his Government had decided to bring before the Security Council the incident of 26 August 1968 because the United Arab Republic had denied to General Bull any knowledge of the matter. The facts, however, are quite clear. In violation of the cease-fire and in breach of the arrangements prohibiting military activities in the Canal, a well-planned military attack had been carried out against Israel by Egyptian forces operating from the west bank. That was the first time that Egyptian units had crossed the Canal and attacked the Israel forces stationed along its east bank, and that development was fraught with the gravest dangers

for the maintenance of the cease-fire. No attempts to disclaim responsibility or to confuse the problem by introducing irrelevant allegations could alter the basic fact that Egypt could have prevented that attack as it had been able to do so until then. As Israel had informed General Bull, it might be inferred from the nature of the operation that it was not meant to be an isolated incident but the initiation of a new policy of military aggression in the area. In bringing this matter before the Security Council, Israel expected that the Council would take steps to arrest further deterioration of the situation, to condemn the military attack carried out in violation of the cease-fire and to secure the return of the captured Israel soldier.

149. The representative of the United Arab Republic stated that his Government had ordered an inquiry as soon as news of the alleged incident had reached it. The findings of that inquiry, which had also been conveyed officially to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, had shown that no United Arab Republic forces had taken part in any action in the territories east of the Suez Canal. At the same time, the United Arab Republic had assured the Chief of Staff of its continued observance of the cease-fire in conformity with the Security Council resolutions. As regards the missing soldier, his Government had had no knowledge of the matter. The Israel charges concerning involvement of the United Arab Republic armed forces in the incident had not been substantiated by the United Nations observers in the area, as shown in the information furnished by General Bull (S/7930/Add.74). It should also be recalled that there had been a lapse of time separating the alleged event from the request addressed to General Bull to undertake the inquiry. The statement of the Israel second lieutenant at that inquiry did not bear close scrutiny, since, if he had been there, he would surely have reacted to save his kidnapped colleague. Moreover, the bodies of the two soldiers had not been examined in time by the United Nations observers. It was clear that in submitting its charges about the alleged incident to the Security Council, Israel was indulging, as previously, in its diversionary tactics. Indeed, any violations in the Suez Canal sector had always been committed by Israel. Since its

act of aggression in June 1967, it had consistently followed a brutal and aggressive policy in that area, causing heavy losses in civilian life and massive destruction of civilian buildings. The attempts of Israel to hold every Arab Government responsible for acts of patriotism on the part of the oppressed population in the occupied territories could not convince anybody. The Government of the United Arab Republic had steadfastly supported all liberation movements in Africa and Asia. It was therefore ironic that that Government was now being asked by Israel to negate its policy of supporting freedom fighters and help Israel in suppressing a genuine and rightful liberation movement.

150. The representative of Israel said that the Council was discussing a simple though extremely grave matter which required a simple response. In accordance with its obligations under the cease-fire, Egypt was responsible for prevention of any incursions or attacks from its side against Israel forces or civilians and for observance of the arrangements prohibiting movements of personnel and of military activity in the Canal. His Government would like to know whether Egypt was ready to take the necessary measures to prevent attacks of that nature in the future and whether it was prepared to free the Israel soldier abducted in the course of the attack that occurred on 26 August. Israel was defending itself against attacks from military positions established inside the cities along the west bank of the Canal.

151. At the 1447th meeting of the Council, on 5 September, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government, which had always condemned violence and reprisal, considered Israel's decision to bring the matter to the Security Council as the right course. In the case at hand, the Council had the advantage of having reports on which it could rely because of its confidence in General Bull and his observers. The Council could accept their findings that the Israel patrol had been mined and that physical evidence had indicated that the patrol had been ambushed. It should deplore and condemn any such acts of violence. At the same time, it was unfortunate that no report of the incident had been made to

the United Nations authorities until the morning after the event. Had an immediate report been made, the evidence before the Council would have been fuller and more valuable. On the other hand, the contention of the United Arab Republic that it had neither knowledge nor responsibility in the matter could not be accepted, as it was the positive responsibility of the United Arab Republic to maintain the cease-fire. However, the assurance given to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO that the United Arab Republic would continue to give its unqualified support to the cease-fire and to the agreed practical arrangements to give effect to it on the Canal was most valuable and welcome. The Council had been called to deal with one event, the attack on the Israel patrol, and for the time being it could concentrate on and reach a conclusion in a simple and clear resolution. Nevertheless, every time that the Council met to discuss the situation in the Middle East, it was essential to recall certain wider considerations. The Council had agreed unanimously on the principles of a final settlement which had been accepted by the parties concerned. It therefore followed that, above all, it was necessary to concentrate, through the Secretary-General's Special Representative, on the substance of the principles and purposes to which all had subscribed and on a new urgent effort to prepare practical proposals to implement the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.

152. The representative of Denmark stated that his delegation deplored all violations of the cease-fire, which made progress towards peace more difficult. It was incumbent upon all parties to ensure that the climate of calm should continue in order to further the aims of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). General Bull had presented a report according to which United Nations observers had found that an Israel patrol had been mined and that physical evidence indicated that the patrol had been ambushed. Denmark welcomed the fact that Israel had chosen to bring before the Council the incident of 26 August, and it hoped that the debate in the Council would help towards putting an end to the vicious circle of attack and counter-attack. The Danish Government was convinced that all efforts must henceforth

be concentrated on facilitating the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring and, in that respect, the representative of Denmark referred to a communiqué issued on 4 September 1968 at the Nordic Foreign Ministers' meeting in Stockholm which had appealed to all parties to the Middle East dispute to ensure that Ambassador Jarring's mission led to results conducive to peace.

153. The representative of the United States said that, taking into account the three elements of the matter before the Council, i.e., the allegations of the Israel Government, the substantial circumstantial support for those allegations provided by the investigation of the United Nations military observers and the limited denial by the Government of the United Arab Republic, the Council would be entirely justified in accepting Israel's statement, substantially confirmed by the Chief of Staff, while at the same time taking account of the limited denial of the United Arab Republic. The evidence clearly pointed to a wholly unprovoked attack by a substantial number of armed men with the acquiescence of the Government of the United Arab Republic. Every Government was responsible for the control of its own population, and that responsibility was not limited to the actions of its regular armed forces. The United States Government therefore strongly deplored the incident and felt that the Government of the United Arab Republic was to be held strictly accountable for observing the requirements of the cease-fire, which it had asserted it continued to support. Moreover, it was incumbent on the Council to express its position clearly in an appropriate resolution. The Council had repeatedly and properly taken a strong line against acts of military reprisal, and it should therefore equally condemn acts of terror and violence, as otherwise it would leave no alternative to a policy of reprisal. Finally, the parties to the dispute should avail themselves of the instrumentality represented by Ambassador Jarring, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to start a dialogue which might ultimately lead to a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem.

154. The representative of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Council was meeting to consider a complaint by a country which itself had committed armed aggression against the United Arab Republic and was occupying a considerable portion of its territory. Before submitting its complaint, Israel first should have indicated its intention to abide by the previous decisions of the Security Council, in particular its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, including the withdrawal of its troops from the occupied Arab territories. Naturally, the question arose as to why Israel had had recourse to the Security Council for such a minor incident, which allegedly had taken place on 26 August 1968 on the territory of the United Arab Republic currently occupied by Israel troops. Moreover, it was quite clear that the complaint was unfounded, as evidenced also by information furnished by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, which had not once mentioned the United Arab Republic as a country against which claims could be made in connexion with the incident reported by Israel. Serious doubts about the reliability and plausibility of the Israel assertions had been cast by the supplementary report, which had clearly shown that Israel had refused to provide the United Nations observers with the opportunity to see the corpses of the two Israel soldiers allegedly killed during the incident. However, even if the incident was not a deliberate fabrication but had actually taken place as a result of action by the Arab freedom fighters, the United Arab Republic could not be held responsible for incidents in Israel-occupied territory. The Soviet Union could not agree with the United States view that the Arab States were responsible for events in the territory under Israel occupation. Resentment against the actions of the occupying forces would inevitably lead to an intensification of the Arab population's struggle for liberation against the aggressor. Israel's aggressive policy was fraught with the most serious dangers for its own people. While the Arab States had accepted the resolution of 22 November 1967 and were ready to work for a political settlement, Israel had refused to do the same and was putting forward unrealistic demands in an effort to cover up its aggressive and expansionist policies. Israel was in practice paralysing the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-

General, the main purpose of which was to promote the implementation of the 22 November resolution.

155. The representative of the United States, exercising his right of reply, declared that he had not stated that the United Arab Republic or any other Arab State should be held responsible for events which had taken place on territory that was currently occupied by Israel. Rather, he had suggested that it seemed only elementary that every Government should be held responsible for events which resulted from the actions of its citizens and which were mounted from its territory. He reiterated that according to the statement of the Government of Israel and the evidence that was adduced by the United Nations observers, though it did not fully corroborate Israel's statement in every detail, it was clear that the United Arab Republic had some responsibility for the attack reported to the Council.

156. The representative of Israel stated that the United Arab Republic had taken a highly cynical attitude towards serious discussion in the Security Council of the need to avert the deterioration of the cease-fire. The relations between Israel and the Arab States were regulated by the cease-fire established by the Security Council. Although the cease-fire was not Israel's choice, Israel was prepared at any time to conclude peace with Egypt and to establish secure and recognized boundaries. However, as long as Egypt refused to abandon the Khartoum decision and rejected peace with Israel, the cease-fire was the only basis for relations between the two countries. Israel had turned to the Council for the purpose of finding in it support for strengthening the fabric of the cease-fire.

157. The President, in adjourning the meeting, declared that the next meeting would be held after members of the Council had had an opportunity to hold consultations among themselves on the matter on the Council's agenda.

(c) *Communications to the Council on 8 September 1968 and requests for a meeting*

158. In a letter dated 8 September (S/8805), Israel charged that the United Arab Republic armed forces had violated the cease-fire on that

date in the Suez Canal sector and, in the light of that violation, requested an immediate resumption of the meetings of the Security Council adjourned on 5 September. In a letter of the same date (S/8806), the United Arab Republic charged that Israel had shelled the cities of Port Tawfiq, Suez, Ismailia and Kantara and, in view of the gravity of the situation, requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

(d) *Consideration at the 1448th, 1449th, 1451st and 1452nd meetings (8 to 18 September 1968)*

159. At the 1448th meeting of the Council, on 8 September 1968, the President stated that he had convened the meeting in response to requests for an urgent meeting received by him that day from the representatives of Israel (S/8805) and the United Arab Republic (S/8806).

160. The representatives of Algeria and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considered that the agenda should contain only the letter from the United Arab Republic (S/8806), as this referred to a new question. The President replied that he had been guided by the rules of procedure, which provided that any item whose consideration had not been completed at a meeting of the Council should, unless it was decided otherwise, be included in the agenda of the next meeting. The agenda as proposed by the President, containing the letters from Israel of 2 and 8 September (S/8794 and S/8805), as well as the letter of 8 September from the United Arab Republic (S/8806), was adopted with out further discussion, and the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic were invited, pursuant to their requests, to participate without vote in the discussion.

161. The Secretary-General stated that in three brief cable messages, in the course of that afternoon, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had informed him of the heavy and prolonged exchange of fire that day across the Suez Canal. The third of those messages stated that exchange of fire in the Canal area had ceased. In view of the fact that no messages about further firing had been received, it was safe to conclude that the cease-fire arranged by the United Nations observers had been holding since it became effective at 1650 hours GMT on 8 September. The Secretary-General also read out the text

of a report just then received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, which gave details of the exchange of fire observed by the United Nations military observers at different posts along the Canal, the weapons used and the attempts made at securing cease-fire. The report also contained accounts of damage to UNTSO installations and the wounding of a United Nations military observer. (The report was subsequently issued as document S/7930/Add.78)

162. The representative of Israel stated that the fact that the Egyptian forces had on 8 September opened fire a few minutes after the detonation of a mine and that very soon thereafter the Egyptian artillery had begun an attack along the entire front from Kantara to Port Tawfiq clearly indicated that the 8 September attack was a premeditated and large-scale one in flagrant violation of the cease-fire. He recalled that in his statement to the Council on 4 September he had expressed his Government's concern that the Egyptian attack of 26 August might be a prelude to a renewed campaign of violence along the cease-fire line. That concern had been strengthened by the repeated planting of anti-vehicle mines in the same place, within sight of Egyptian army positions distant only 200 to 300 metres. From these developments it was obvious that the United Arab Republic was trying to undermine the cease-fire and create a situation of grave danger in the area. It was incumbent upon the Security Council that it should take steps to halt Egypt's acts of aggression and help maintain the cease-fire.

163. The representative of the United Arab Republic, after recalling his statement to the Council on 4 September when he had observed that in the past Israel had preferred to use force rather than bring its case to the Security Council, stated that Israel had returned to its normal routine of first using force and then submitting its complaint to the Security Council. On 8 September, Israel had opened fire in the area of Port Tawfiq and had continued it by extending the shelling to the cities of Ismailia and Kantara. There were grounds for believing that missiles had been used by Israel. The United Arab Republic forces were obliged to return the fire in self-defence and to ensure the safety of

its civilian population, whose casualty toll had amounted to 332 killed and 767 injured.

164. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that it would have been more appropriate for Israel to have informed the United Nations observers when a mine had been discovered. The explosion of that mine had started off the crossfiring by both sides on 8 September. If the Israel forces had acted appropriately, the incident and its distressing consequences, for which Israel must bear the responsibility, could have been avoided.

165. The representative of the United Kingdom proposed that in view of the urgency of the matter and the gravity of the situation, the Council might recess for a brief period in order to hold consultations on what immediate action it could take.

166. The representative of the United States, supporting the United Kingdom proposal, formally moved, under rule 33 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, that the Council adjourn for a brief period for purposes of consultation.

167. The United States motion was approved without vote.

168. When the Council resumed its meeting the same night, the President of the Council stated that after extensive consultations he was authorized to make the following declaration :

"The Security Council, having met urgently to consider the item on its agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1448/Rev.1, having heard the reports of General Odd Bull presented by the Secretary-General and having heard the statements of the representatives of Israel and of the United Arab Republic, deeply regrets the loss of life, and requires the parties strictly to observe the cease-fire called for by the Security Council's resolutions."

169. At the 1449th meeting of the Council, on 10 September, the President of the Council drew its attention to the further supplemental information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.79). The Chief of Staff stated that he had not been informed on 8 September of a mine to be exploded by the Israel forces, but that in a report received at

the UNTSO headquarters on 9 September, the Israel Liaison Officer had reported the discovery of three anti-vehicle mines on 5 September and one anti-vehicle mine on 8 September, which was exploded some two hours later, as it could not be safely removed.

170. The representative of Israel stated that a double standard was being employed by some members of the Council towards Israel. While approving Israel's recourse to the Council, they were at the same time seeking to thwart a just decision by the Council on Israel's complaint. Israel had presented complaints of genuine attacks against it by the Egyptian forces on 26 August and 8 September, whereas the United Arab Republic had merely given traditional and qualified denials, which had been invariably disproved by facts. A careful analysis of the reports submitted by General Bull would confirm the Egyptian responsibility. The initiation of the attack and its immediate extension along a wide front with the co-ordinated use of artillery, mortars, tanks and machine-guns left no doubt about the premeditated and well-prepared character of the operation.

171. The representative of Ethiopia stated that the interminable recurrences of cease-fire violations were jeopardizing the delicate peace mission in progress and if not checked could result in large-scale warfare. The Council should, however, be prepared to look beyond those incidents and focus its attention on the important questions of the maintenance of the cease-fire in all sectors and the peace-making efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative. In the spirit of its unanimous resolution 242 (1967), the Council should appeal to the parties to exercise the utmost restraint, to observe scrupulously the cease-fire resolutions and to co-operate with the United Nations representative in the area. It was necessary to create a favourable climate for the success of the peace-making mission of Ambassador Jarring, Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

172. The representative of Brazil said that the Council should not ignore the report of the inquiry by UNTSO, which had stated in clear terms that, from physical evidence observed, an Israel patrol had been mined and ambushed. However, the Council could not go on

indefinitely limiting itself merely to fact-finding exercises on complaints submitted to it, or even to a routine allotment of blame, while the vital questions affecting the situation there, such as the arms race between the parties, remained untackled. If both parties were to show an equal degree of adherence to resolution 242 (1967) and co-operate unreservedly with the Secretary-General's Special Representative, an equitable solution of the Middle East situation could be found.

173. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that his delegation had requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council on 8 September in order to have prompt and effective action by the Council against Israel's act of aggression. The report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had clearly indicated that Israel had initiated firing on 8 September. Israel's action was not only a flagrant violation of the cease-fire but indicated its ominous designs for the future in the area. The latest Israel aggression had resulted in considerable loss of human life and damage to installations and property on the west bank of the Suez Canal and should be severely condemned by the Council. His Government regretted that the United States, in its enthusiastic support for Israel, should uphold the notion that the Governments of the Arab States were responsible for the actions of the Arab population living under Israel occupation. The representative of the United Arab Republic referred to the Israel statement of 5 September that the cease-fire was the only basis for relations between the two countries. That was a distortion of facts, since the cease-fire was never envisaged as a framework for governing future relations. In fact, in resolution 234 (1967) the Council had called, as a first step, for all measures for an immediate cease-fire and the cessation of military activities in the area. Hence, the cease-fire was only a preliminary step towards cessation of hostilities. Further steps should have been taken for the prompt liquidation of all traces and consequences of aggression, particularly of the military occupation. The United Arab Republic had repeatedly declared its acceptance and readiness to implement fully resolution 242 (1967) which had been unanimously adopted by the Council on 22 November 1967.

Israel, however, continued to evade a direct acceptance of its implementation. Israel's deliberate policy of omitting all references to the Armistice Agreements was a grave matter which deserved the Council's attention. Those Agreements were still valid and must be adhered to meticulously. The United Nations considered those Agreements still valid and applicable, as was clear from the Secretary-General's reference to them in his introduction to his annual report to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly (A/ 6701/Add.1, paragraph 43).

174. The representative of Hungary stated that the reports of the United Nations military observers (S/7930/Add.74 and Add.76) had not confirmed the Israel accusation that the United Arab Republic forces had violated the cease-fire. In fact, the United Arab Republic, in spite of the long occupation of its territories, the misappropriation of its natural resources, the systematic destruction of its cities and industries and the blocking of the Suez Canal, had rigorously adhered to the cease-fire and had steadfastly worked in favour of a political solution of the Middle East crisis based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. His delegation deplored attempts which were being made in the name of even-handedness to have the Council adopt a stand totally unrelated to the facts of the issue before it. The fact of the matter was that there was an abnormal situation prevailing in the Middle East. The Security Council had adopted a unanimous resolution laying down the basis for a political solution and stipulating the withdrawal of Israel forces from occupied Arab territories, which had not yet been accepted, let alone implemented by Israel.

175. The representative of Algeria said that Israel's real objective in resorting to the Council with a baseless complaint was to create a façade of peaceful intentions before the world, while hiding its real designs for future aggression. However, as long as the Arab territories remained occupied by enemy forces, the duty of the inhabitants was to fight by all the means available to them, and that resistance had to be pursued on all fronts. The tolerance shown by the Council to Israel's continual occupation of the Arab

territories had encouraged that country to continue its aggressive policy towards the Arab States. The Council, therefore, ought to condemn Israel in order to emphasize its disapproval of the use of force, particularly against civilian installations.

176. The representative of France regretted that Israel's commendable decision to appeal to the Security Council on 2 September, instead of resorting to unilateral retaliation, had been marred by the deplorable incident of 8 September when both sides had exchanged heavy machine-gun and artillery fire. The proximity of important localities on the west bank of the Canal made its consequences even graver. Those recent developments pointed to the urgent need for restoration of peace in the Middle East. His delegation continued to believe that only a political solution could end the incidents, the repetition of which had raised the possibility of a new conflagration in that region. The resolution of 22 November 1967 still remained the only basis for a settlement that members of the Council were seeking, and all clauses of that resolution must be implemented without reservation.

177. The President, speaking as the representative of Canada, said that the incidents of 26 August and 8 September 1968 had given rise to grave concern not only because of the increase of tension in the area but because they had involved grievous loss of life and damage to property on both sides. The Security Council must ask the parties concerned to observe the cease-fire most scrupulously until the goal of a peaceful and accepted settlement was reached. The goal of a peaceful and accepted settlement was the only way out of the vicious circle of violence.

178. The representative of Israel agreed with the representative of the United Arab Republic that the basis for relations between Israel and the Arab countries should be more than the cease-fire, which was only a first step. But as long as the United Arab Republic adhered to the Khartoum decision of "no peace, no negotiations, no recognition of Israel", it was wilfully preventing progress towards a lasting peace.

179. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the representative of the United Arab Republic called upon the representative of Israel to clarify in precise terms the position of the Government of Israel regarding acceptance and implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November.

180. The representative of Israel, in reply to the representative of the USSR, said that his Government's position with regard to the resolution of 22 November had been made very clear at the Security Council meeting on 1 May and could be found in the record of that meeting.

181. At the 1451st meeting of the Council, on 11 September, the President drew the Council's attention to supplemental information (S/7930/Add.80) received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO relating to incidents in the Suez Canal sector on the previous day. The Chief of Staff reported an Israel complaint of a mining incident in which one soldier had been wounded. An explosion had been seen and heard on the east side of the Canal by United Nations observation posts and an inquiry was being conducted. Later, he reported a further Israel complaint that an Israel soldier had been wounded by fire by a United Arab Republic sniper. An observation post had reported a single rifle shot fired by the United Arab Republic across the Canal.

182. The representative of Pakistan said that the Council did not have an agreed version even of the basic facts of the incident of 26 August, but that the evidence for the incident of 8 September was comparatively fuller and clearer. According to General Bull's report, the fire was initiated by Israel forces after certain explosions had been observed on both sides of the Canal. Sustained firing from both sides seemed to have followed until the cease-fire was arranged. The two issues involved in the situation should not be confused, namely, incidents pertaining to cease-fire violations and incidents arising from the natural consequences of foreign occupation. It was well known that foreign occupation gave rise to resistance. His Government believed that restoration of peace and stability in the area depended on the implementation of the Council's resolution 242 (1967) and on a successful completion of the mission of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring.

183. The representative of Senegal said that the information available to the Council did not make it possible to establish the degree of responsibility for the incidents on each side. In those circumstances, the United Arab Republic could in no way be held responsible for incidents which had occurred in areas it no longer controlled and were under military occupation by Israel. His Government believed that forthright co-operation with Ambassador Jarring on the basis of strict implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 was the only way that could lead to the establishment of a just and lasting peace.

184. The representative of the United States said that it was encouraging to note that the two Governments concerned had indicated their intention to continue to adhere scrupulously to the cease-fire. To implement these statements of intent fully and without qualification was now clearly their responsibility. The Council must insist not only that both States adhere to the cease-fire but, to that end, that they should issue strict orders to their local commanders against violations or unilateral action that could endanger the cease-fire. At the same time, the States concerned should, as a matter of urgency, give full co-operation at all levels to UNTSO. Cease-fire should not, however, be confused with peace. The resolution of 22 November had provided a set of principles on which a just peace could be erected. Yet Ambassador Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in spite of his skillful and tireless efforts, had not been able to translate those principles into perceptible progress towards peace. Under those circumstances, the Council must examine what more needed to be done.

185. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the event of 8 September was a new act of provocation by Israel armed forces. It presented a new threat to peace in the Near East and was a gross violation of decisions of the Security Council concerning the cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities in that part of the world. The meaning of the events which had occurred on 8 September in the Suez Canal area went far beyond simple violation of the cease-fire. The recent sequence of military and political events showed

that the Security Council was faced with a pre-meditated aggressive policy intended to inflame the situation in the Near East through acts of provocation by Israel against the United Arab Republic. Israel's responsibility in that respect had been fully confirmed by the report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. The Security Council should note that the aggressor, who had invaded the territory of the United Arab Republic, blocked the Suez Canal and stopped international navigation on that highly important waterway of world significance, was intentionally and deliberately going so far as to aggravate the situation in the area still further. In those conditions the United Arab Republic, whose vitally important centres and densely populated areas were in immediate danger and within range of artillery fire and other means of attack by the aggressor, could not help taking legitimate defensive measures to repel possible new acts of provocation by Israel armed forces. It was the duty of the Council to put an end to Israel's acts of aggression and secure a political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of full implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, which provided as a first principle of settlement that Israel forces must withdraw from all territories occupied in the summer of 1967.

186. The President drew the attention of the members of the Council to further supplemental information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.81), which contained a summary of an inquiry into an explosion on the east bank of the Canal on 10 September. United Nations military observers had seen a damaged half-track, a crater at the scene of the incident and four anti-tank mines in the track and various bootmarks on the embankment. In a further report dated 11 September (S/7930/Add.82) the Chief of Staff reported further firing incidents, two initiated by United Arab Republic forces and one from the south-east.

187. At the 1452nd meeting of the Council on 18 September, the President drew the attention of the members of the Council to further supplemental information submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. The first of these reports, dated 13 September (S/7930/Add.83),

gave information received from the United Arab Republic authorities concerning casualties and material damage on the west side of the Canal, as well as damage to UNTSO installations and property resulting from the firing on 8 September. Information had not yet been received from the Israel authorities concerning casualties and material damage on the east side of the Canal resulting from that firing. A further communication of 17 September (S/7930/Add.86) gave the texts of letters addressed to the Israel and United Arab Republic authorities protesting the damage to UNTSO installations and property in that incident (the replies from the two Governments were included in supplemental information dated 25 September (S/7930/Add.89)). Firing incidents were also reported on 13 September, when observation posts reported firing initiated by United Arab Republic forces across the Canal and at Israel jet aircraft (S/7930/Add.84 and Add.87).

188. The President then read out the text of the following draft resolution which, he said, had been the result of intensive consultations among members of the Council:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling the declaration of the President of the Security Council of 9 September 1968, as made at the 1448th meeting of the Council,

"Gravely concerned with the deteriorating situation in the Middle East,

"Convinced that all Members of the United Nations should co-operate towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East,

"1. Insists that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council in its resolutions must be rigorously respected;

"2. Reaffirms its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, and urges all the parties to extend their fullest co-operation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the speedy fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to him under that resolution."

Decision: *At the 1452nd meeting of the Council, on 18 September 1968, the draft resolution was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (Algeria), as resolution 258 (1968).*

189. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the obvious and primary duty of the Council was to bring the discussion of the current matter to an early end and open the way to progress towards settlement by concentrating on the immediate aim of restoring and maintaining the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector. For that reason his delegation had no hesitation in supporting the resolution that the Council had just adopted. It was a matter of satisfaction that the Council had received assurances from both sides to respect the cease-fire. The maintenance of cease-fire, in which the United Nations military observers had played a commendable part, was a necessary step if the way were to be clear to go forward without delay to transform declared principles and purposes into the realities of a peaceful settlement.

190. The representative of the United Arab Republic stated that it had become clear that the policies carried out by Israel had two main objectives: the first was to inflame the already tense situation in the area by embarking on a series of pre-planned attacks which, coupled with the continued occupation of Arab territories, could only aggravate the situation further; the second was a tactical campaign with the avowed aim of confusing the issues and distorting the facts. Under those circumstances, it was incumbent on the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities and request forthwith compliance by Israel with resolution 242 (1967). The resolution adopted on 15 September by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity requesting the withdrawal of foreign troops from Arab territories occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967 showed that the world community was becoming apprehensive about the continued occupation.

191. The representative of Paraguay stated that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution because it believed that any appeal to ensure compliance with the cease-fire and to prevent further acts of violence would create a more favourable atmosphere for the productive exchange of ideas which might lead to an end of the conflict. His delegation could not but condemn the incident brought to the attention of the Council by the representative

of Israel in his letter of 2 September, which had formed the basis of the Council's deliberations.

192. The representative of Denmark said that his delegation had already emphasized that the cease-fire should be strictly maintained by all concerned, not only in order to avoid loss of lives, human suffering and material damages but because any violation of the cease-fire had an adverse effect upon the efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the problems of the Middle East. His delegation understood operative paragraph 1 to mean that the parties in the Suez Canal Sector should strengthen their co-operation with General Bull and his observers; and it whole-heartedly welcomed the reaffirmation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the call on the parties to extend their fullest co-operation to Ambassador Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

193. The representative of Pakistan said that his delegation had voted in favour of the resolution although it reflected only a part of the action which his delegation would have liked the Council to take. It was in the full, effective and speedy implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 that the best hope of bringing a durable peace to the Middle East lay. Each time that the Council failed to insist on a speedy implementation of that resolution, it only prolonged the agony of the Arab inhabitants of occupied territories. Respect for the observance of the cease-fire, however important, was not an end in itself. In fact, peace-keeping and peace-making were inseparably linked. It was the conspicuous absence of a rational juxtaposition of these two essential elements from the cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 that had led to the existing situation.

194. The representative of Algeria said that his delegation had abstained from voting on the draft resolution because of its conviction that no real solution to the tragedy of the Middle East could be found so long as the Council refrained from tackling the root of the evil and contented itself only with provisional solutions. The real source of tension in the Middle East was Israel's expansionist policy and not the incidents which were only a manifestation of that policy. The time had come for the Council

to demand an immediate end to Israel occupation of the Arab territories and to seek the restoration to the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights.

195. The representative of Brazil said that his delegation had voted for the resolution although it would have preferred a more detailed analysis of the complaints submitted to the Council by the parties, a more stringent requirement for respect of the cease-fire and a strengthening of UNTSO under General Odd Bull. However, his delegation hoped that the positive aspects of the resolution would support the task entrusted to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. He stated that his delegation considered that the third preambular paragraph of the resolution adopted entailed, *inter alia*, an implicit appeal to the major Powers to strive towards a mutual understanding on the all-important question of the supply of armaments and implements of war to the parties of the conflict and that it should serve as basis for further action by the Council on this particular question.

196. The representative of the United States stated that his delegation had considered it essential that the Council must insist, as it did in the resolution just adopted, upon rigorous observance of the cease-fire. The need to arrest a further deterioration in the Middle East through rigorous respect for the cease-fire had become all the more critical and urgent in view of Ambassador Jarring's return to New York and the continuation of his peace-making efforts. The Council could well expect the parties concerned to extend their fullest co-operation to Ambassador Jarring.

197. The President, speaking as the representative of Canada, said that the goal of the Council and of the states concerned in the area was surely to further the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Progress towards that goal through the mission entrusted to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, was impeded by outbreaks of violence which also increased tension in the area. The cease-fire resolutions adopted by the Council required the prevention by the parties of any and all violations of the cease-fire. It was also incumbent upon the parties to extend the fullest co-operation to the Chief

Staff of UNTSO, under whose guidance the United Nations military observers were working with dedication. The reaffirmation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) should be regarded as a renewal by the Security Council of its support for the provisions and principles so carefully outlined in that resolution.

198. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the resolution just adopted by the Council basically met the requirements of the moment. However, there had been an attempt to present the situation as if it were not Israel but the United Arab Republic that bore the primary responsibility for the incidents that had, in fact, been provoked by Israel. It was the duty of the Security Council not only to emphasize the need for strict compliance with the cease-fire decisions but also to place particular stress on the need for the earliest possible implementation of its resolution of 22 November 1967. The most significant aspect of the decision just adopted by the Security Council was that the Council had called for speedy implementation of that resolution. He pointed out that implementation of that resolution, which called for the immediate withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Arab territories occupied as a result of the June 1967 aggression, was the only way of reducing tension and bringing about the necessary conditions for a political settlement in the Middle East. He said that the earliest possible liquidation of the consequences of the Israel aggression against the Arab States, through the immediate implementation of the Security Council's resolution 242 (1967), was called for by the overwhelming majority of countries of the world. The responsibility for the lack of progress in the implementation of that resolution rested not only with Israel but with those countries which were supporting Israel. If they too were prepared to help bring about a political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, such a settlement could become a real fact. The Soviet Union was prepared to do everything possible to that end.

199. The representative of Israel said that his delegation had come to the Council on 2 September with a simple and modest request: to

condemn the military attacks on Israel, to call on the United Arab Republic to prevent their recurrence and to ascertain the fate of the abducted Israel soldier. He regretted that the resolution just adopted did not reflect the gravity of the United Arab Republic's attacks and their consequences, in spite of the clear facts of the situation. He declared that Israel would continue to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring and at the same time, it would continue to fulfil its obligations towards its citizens and the territories under its control.

(c) Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General between 18 September and 1 November and requests for a meeting

200. In a letter dated 23 September (S/8830), Israel charged that on 22 September an Egyptian unit had crossed the Canal and attacked an Israel force south of the Bitter Lake, hitting a military truck and wounding two soldiers. The Secretary-General submitted supplemental information, dated 24 and 25 September (S/7930/Add.88 and Add.91), from the Chief of Staff, reporting that the observation posts closest to the alleged scene of the incident had heard explosions and that during the subsequent inquiry United Nations military observers had seen mines and other ammunition, a damaged truck and footprints to and from the scene of the incident and the Canal bank.

201. In a letter dated 25 September (S/8831), Israel stated that an Israel half-track had been blown up by an anti-vehicle mine on that day on a track about one kilometre east of the Canal in the Little Bitter Lake area. In supplemental information dated 26 September (S/7930/Add.92), the Chief of Staff reported that, in an inquiry conducted on that day, United Nations military observers had seen the damaged half-track, newly cut barbed wire and footprints to and from the bank of the Bitter Lake.

202. In supplemental information dated 25 September, 1 October and 29 November (S/7930/Add.90 and Corr.1 and 2), the Secretary-General furnished up-to-date information concerning the renaming and relocation of the observation posts established by UNTSO for its cease-fire observation in the Suez Canal sector.

203. In supplemental information dated 23 October (S/7930/Add.94), the Chief of Staff reported that on that day planes had been observed crossing the Canal in both directions and that an aerial battle between three Israel and three United Arab Republic planes had been observed over Ismailia.

204. In a letter dated 26 October (S/8868), Israel complained that on that day United Arab Republic forces had opened artillery fire across the entire length of the Canal on Israel positions on the east bank, and added that a cease-fire had been arranged following two unsuccessful attempts in which cease-fire proposals by United Nations military observers had been observed by Israel but not by the United Arab Republic. In a further letter of the same date (S/8869), Israel complained of two attempts by United Arab Republic forces to cross the Canal, one south of Little Bitter Lake and one in the vicinity of Port Tawfiq. Fire had been exchanged. In a letter of 29 October (S/8875), Israel called attention to the report that the Algerian forces stationed in the Suez Canal zone had participated in the attacks against Israel on 26 October and said that this information was particularly grave because Algeria had ignored the cease-fire resolution and was, on its own admission, pursuing an active role against Israel. On 30 October, Israel charged (S/8877) that the attack of 26 October, which had resulted in fifteen Israel soldiers killed and thirty-four wounded, was the climax of a series of premeditated attacks by the United Arab Republic forces in pursuance of announced United Arab Republic policy of so-called preventive military operations.

205. In a letter dated 26 October (S/8870), the United Arab Republic charged that on that date Israel forces in the Suez Canal area had launched a rocket attack against the city of Tawfiq, resulting in the loss of lives and damage to property. Fire had been returned.

206. A summary of the exchange of fire on 26 October was contained in a report from the Chief of Staff issued on 27 October (S/7930/Add.95 and Corr.1). The Chief of Staff also reported further incidents on 27 October, including ground explosions and over-flying by jet aircraft. In a subsequent report issued on 1 November (S/7930/Add.99), the Chief of Staff stated that on 27

October the United Arab Republic authorities had shown United Nations military observers a weapon at Port Tawfiq which they alleged was one of the missiles fired by Israel on 26 October. The weapon was described as being made of heavy metal, cylindrical and containing high explosive.

207. In further supplemental information issued on 28, 30 and 31 October and 1 November (S/7930/Add.96-98 and Add.100), the Chief of Staff reported on investigations made following Israel complaints of mines laid by United Arab Republic forces along the east bank of the Canal. Investigating United Nations military observers had observed, *inter alia*, damaged vehicles, craters, anti-tank mines and footprints leading to the east bank of the Canal.

208. In a letter dated 1 November (S/8878), the United Arab Republic charged that on the night of 31 October Israel aircraft had penetrated deep into the Nag Hamadi area inside the United Arab Republic bombing civilian targets, among them the Nag Hamadi Bridge, and killing one civilian and wounding two others. It requested an urgent meeting of the Council.

209. On the same day Israel also requested (S/8879) an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the recent acts of aggression by the United Arab Republic against Israel which already had been brought to the Council's attention in previous communications (S/8868, S/8869, S/8875, S/8877) and in the relevant reports by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO.

(f) *Consideration by the Council at the 1456th and 1457th meetings (1 and 4 November 1968)*

210. At its 1456th meeting, on 1 November, the Security Council included in its agenda the complaints submitted by the United Arab Republic and Israel. The representatives of the United Arab Republic and Israel, and later the representative of Saudi Arabia, were invited, pursuant to their requests, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

211. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the latest act of aggression against it by Israel was ominous not only because of its premeditated nature but because it had been openly admitted by responsible Israel leaders. The selection of civilian installations

for bombing showed that Israel aimed at paralysing the economy of the United Arab Republic. While carrying out those and other destructive acts, Israel was, at the same time, conducting a propaganda campaign about its peaceful intentions and constructive approaches. However, Israel had so far refused to declare its acceptance of, and willingness to implement, the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, and that fact spoke more eloquently about its real intentions. In those circumstances, the Security Council, which had already condemned Israel in its resolutions 248 (1968) of 24 March and 256 (1968) of 16 August 1968, must discharge its authority by invoking the required enforcement measures as envisaged in the Charter.

212. The representative of Israel said that although the Security Council, as far back as 1948 and more recently on 22 November 1967, had called upon the parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to conclude a permanent peace settlement, the United Arab Republic had continued in its policy of belligerency, in pursuance of the Khartoum decision of not recognizing and not making peace with Israel. It had now initiated a new policy of so-called preventive defence, under which it had begun a series of aggressive acts against his country. That policy had been started at a time when Ambassador Jarring was doing his best to promote an agreement between the parties for the establishment of a just and lasting peace. As a result, Israel was left with no choice but to act unilaterally in self-defence. Thus, the blowing up of the power station and the two bridges in upper Egypt, carefully avoiding populated areas and Egyptian troops, was meant to persuade the United Arab Republic to stop its flagrant violations of the cease-fire agreement.

213. The representative of the United States said that the latest violations of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector again showed that the parties, instead of complying with the Council's decisions, were engaged in their so-called policies of preventive defence and reprisal or retaliation. While the cease-fire was not in itself a substitute for peace, its scrupulous observance would strengthen the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to transform it into a just and lasting peace, in accordance

with the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.

214. The representative of Algeria stated that the penetration so far west of the Suez Canal by the Israel commandos implied a grave threat to the safety of the Aswan Dam itself. He reiterated that the real problem of the Middle East was that of Palestine and of the occupied territories, and he urged the Council to tackle immediately the political problem created by the presence of Israel in the Middle East rather than concentrate upon the observance of a precarious cease-fire.

215. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the occupation of Arab lands by Israel was a constant source of tension and the main reason for new military incidents. The latest premeditated act of provocation by Israel against the United Arab Republic could not be justified, and it was the duty of the Council to condemn Israel and to demand its compliance with the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.

216. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the only way to break the vicious circle of violence in the Middle East was to make an urgent advance towards a political settlement. Since there was already an agreement on the purposes and principles on which a settlement in the area should be based, the Council must give every support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in his talks with the Foreign Ministers of the parties concerned towards finding an agreed formula for the implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. It must also be remembered that while violence not only hampered progress towards a political settlement, its worst sufferers were mainly innocent people. The Council should not forget the civilian populations living in danger and in fear, and the more than 300,000 refugees in the hills of eastern Jordan who had homes to which they could return immediately. That should provide an added impetus for making progress towards a political settlement.

217. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that, as he had said before, the real problem in the Middle East was the expulsion of the indigenous people of Palestine and the settling there of eastern European Jews, who sought

to create a religious State under the banner of Zionism. More than 100 million Arabs, though they felt no hatred for the Jews as such, were nevertheless united in pressing for the rights of the Palestine refugees to their homeland and would not be intimidated by the announced intention of the United States Government to sell Phantom jets to Israel. The only solution to the problem was for the Zionists to relinquish the dream of gathering the Jews of the whole world into Palestine and to look forward instead to an era of brotherhood with the Arabs. The Security Council, instead of adopting resolutions which remained ineffective, should look towards a new approach and urge upon the Zionists to re-examine their presence in the Middle East.

218. At the Council's 1457th meeting, on 4 November, the representative of France stated that in view of the increasingly large-scale incidence of violence it would not be enough to protest against violations of the cease-fire or to increase the means of detecting its observance. Rather, it was necessary to remove the evil by its root by securing the full implementation of the Council's unanimous resolution of 22 November 1967. It was a matter of great regret to his delegation that the application of that resolution had not been accepted in equal fashion by both parties to the dispute, but he hoped that Israel would make an effort, comparable to that recently shown by the United Arab Republic, to facilitate the work of Ambassador Jarring, Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

219. The representative of the United Arab Republic stated that the arrogant admission by Israel of having deliberately bombed civilian targets in the United Arab Republic on the pretext of bringing home the necessity of the maintenance of the cease-fire was not only defiance of the Security Council but an ultimatum to the whole world. The protective defence measures undertaken by his country, on the other hand, were aimed at protecting the lives of citizens in the Suez Canal cities. The Israel forces stationed on the east side of the Suez Canal were systematically shelling civilian targets across the Canal. An unexploded Israel missile had been shown to the United Nations military observers at Port Tawfiq on 27 October 1968. Israel's lip service to the cease-fire resolution

was but a subterfuge designed to obstruct the implementation of the resolution of 22 November 1967. Moreover, the cease-fire injunctions were only a first, though essential, step that was to be followed by the withdrawal of Israel forces from the occupied territories and the establishment of a just and peaceful settlement. On that basis the United Arab Republic, unlike Israel, had accepted and adhered to the Council's resolutions of 6 June and 22 November 1967.

220. The representative of Brazil stated that the recent acts of aggression and retaliation by the parties to the dispute signified a lack of will to compose differences and forgo violence. The authority and prestige of the Security Council had been challenged repeatedly, and therefore the current debate called for more than merely another stereotyped resolution. It was necessary to achieve implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 while the unanimity with which it had been adopted, particularly among the big Powers, still lasted. His delegation would again urge upon the major Powers the halting of the arms race in the Middle East and regretted that they had not exerted serious efforts to arrest it. The co-operation of the major Powers in that respect, as well as in securing an agreed implementation of the Council's resolution, was most essential.

221. The representative of Hungary stated that Israel, contrary to the principles of the Charter and to the Council's resolution 248 (1968), claimed the right of military reprisals whenever it felt or said that it had been wronged. Unfortunately, the Council had been prevented from taking effective measures by those members who had protected Israel from the application of Chapter VII of the Charter. Attempts were being made by Israel and its protectors to place Israel and the Arab victims of its aggression on an equal footing, with the objective of enabling Israel to maintain its occupation over the Arab territories. To use the cease-fire for such a purpose ran counter to the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Whatever military activities had occurred in the Middle East since June 1967 had taken place on Arab territory; Israel could not therefore claim to be defending itself. By its latest act, Israel had

extended its aggression to targets deep in the territory of the United Arab Republic. Perhaps Israel's real aim was to sabotage the peace mission of Ambassador Jarring. If the Council wished to give support to that mission, it could not but condemn Israel's latest act of aggression.

222. The representative of Canada said that the recent series of incidents in the Suez Canal sector and inside the United Arab Republic had shown once again the precarious nature of the cease-fire. While the cease-fire was not meant to be a permanent solution, it was, nevertheless, important, because it provided for the abandonment of violence for the pursuit of peace. Its value clearly depended on strict observance, and neither party was entitled to interpret its arrangements to its own advantage. All violations of cease-fire must therefore be condemned, and each party bore full responsibility for the maintenance of cease-fire. The repeated acts of violence further obstructed the achievement of a peaceful and accepted settlement and only resulted in frustration and further acts of hostility. In that respect, Canada endorsed the warning of the representative of Brazil regarding the dangers of an unlimited escalating arms race in the Middle East and hoped that efforts would be directed towards finding a solution of that problem. It must, however, be remembered that the parties themselves carried the main responsibility in the search for a peaceful settlement. The Secretary-General's Special Representative could assist them in that respect, but he needed their fullest co-operation.

223. The representative of Ethiopia said that the events of the last few weeks in the Middle East had dampened the hopes of the international community for peace-building in that troubled region at a time when such hopes had been enhanced by the provisions of the Council's resolution 258 (1968) and by the presence in New York of the two Foreign Ministers concerned and the Secretary-General's Special Representative. The Council should insist that no violation of the cease-fire and no military retaliation should be allowed to occur; otherwise a continued cycle of violence and counter-violence might lead inevitably to further escalation of the conflict. A basis for a solution of the problem had

already been provided in the Council's resolution 242 (1967).

224. The representative of Israel stated that he regretted to inform the Council of another cease-fire violation. On 3 November two United Arab Republic aircraft had violated the cease-fire line in the Suez Canal sector, but they had been intercepted and had been driven back by Israel fighter aircraft. That violation plus the incident of 26 October pointed to the fact that the United Arab Republic was intensifying its aggressive policy and making it more difficult to make any advance towards peace in the area. Moreover, the United Arab Republic had not given any indication of willingness to conclude an agreement with Israel for a just and lasting peace, which was the central provision of the resolution of 22 November 1967.

225. The representative of Algeria reiterated that the substance of the problem in the Middle East was the recognition of the right of the people of Palestine to self-determination and their right to nationhood. Regarding the cease-fire, he said that, according to the experience of Algeria itself and of Viet-Nam, a cease-fire invariably emerged from a political settlement, and not vice versa, adding that if Algeria had fought alongside the United Arab Republic, it was because of a natural solidarity with fighters for national liberty within the context of Arab and African fellowship.

226. The representative of Saudi Arabia, referring to the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, said that Israel was not really interested in peace, because it was linking withdrawal from occupied Arab territory with a demand for bilateral peace talks, knowing quite well that no Arab country could talk about a bilateral treaty with Israel. The people of Palestine had as much right of survival as any other people, and the right to regain their homeland could not be denied to them.

227. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the efforts towards achieving a settlement in the Middle East had reached a critical stage and that if the Council were to fail in 1968 to give effect to its unanimous agreement reached in 1967, then 1969 would be the year of retribution, when hate, fear, hopelessness and the horror

of another war might become a terrible certainty. Noting that the Foreign Ministers of the parties concerned were currently engaged in discussions, he suggested that the Council at that stage might adjourn.

228. Following a procedural discussion, the President announced that the Council would adjourn until 7 November; the Council, however, did not resume consideration of the above complaints on its agenda.

(g) *Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General on the observance of the cease-fire from 4 November 1968 to 15 July 1969*

229. During this period, although the Council did not meet to consider complaints relating to breaches of the cease-fire, there were numerous communications from Israel and the United Arab Republic, each accusing the other of violations of the cease-fire. In addition, frequent, at times daily, breaches of the cease-fire were reported by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and brought to the attention of the Council by the Secretary-General in the series "Supplemental Information" (S/7930/Addenda). These incidents comprised firing over the Canal, ranging from single rifle shots to large-scale heavy artillery, mortar, tank and rocket fire, over-flights, aerial attack and the laying of mines in commando operations across the Canal. The Chief of Staff included in his reports summaries of inquiries conducted by United Nations military observers into individual incidents. The number and intensity of the incidents led the Secretary-General, in special reports in April (S/9171) and again in July (S/9316) to draw the Council's attention to the critical situation prevailing in the area and in a report of 2 May (S/9188), to express his concern at the threat to the observation of the cease-fire and the dangers to United Nations military observers and installations.

230. Below is a month-by-month indication of communications received from the parties and reports from the Chief of Staff:

231. During the month of November 1968, the Secretary-General circulated to the Security Council supplemental information from the Chief of Staff issued on 4, 27 and 29 November (S/7930/Add.101, Add.103 and Add.104) re-

lating to an overflight, a mining incident and firing across the Canal.

232. During December the Council received a letter from Israel dated 16 December (S/8934) relating to incidents reported by observers in S/7930/Add.104 and Add. 106 and supplementary information from the Chief of Staff issued on 11 December (S/7930/Add. 106) relating to firing of single shots across the Canal by United Arab Republic forces.

233. During the month of January, 1969, the Council received a letter from Israel dated 15 January (S/8978) in which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel quoted from a reported statement by the President of the United Arab Republic in support of the "Palestinian resistance forces" and maintained that this statement, which must be regarded as official United Arab Republic policy, had disturbing implications for the maintenance of the cease-fire and the establishment of a just and lasting peace as called for by the Council's resolutions. In addition, supplemental information from the Chief of Staff issued on 2 and 26 January (S/7930/Add.109 and Add.111) related to firing on an Israel patrol and the presence of and firing on Israel motor gun boats on the Canal.

234. In February, the Council received three letters from Israel dated 5, 12 and 13 February (S/8994, S/9004 and S/9009), charging the United Arab Republic with waging terror warfare against Israel, repeated sniping attacks against Israel forces on the east bank of the Canal and the laying of mines at various points on the east bank. It also received a letter from the United Arab Republic dated 13 February (S/9008), in which the Minister for Foreign Affairs charged that Israel had refused to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and that its expansionist plans had been confirmed by statements of its leaders. Thirteen documents containing supplemental information from the Chief of Staff were issued on 5, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28 February (S/7930/Add.112, Add.114-117, Add. 119-120, Add.122-127) relating to numerous firing incidents with small arms, automatic weapons and machine guns, as well as inquiries into mining incidents.

235. During March, the Council received seven letters from Israel dated 8, 9, 11, 13, 18 and 24 March (S/9057, S/9059, S/9062, S/9078, S/9093, S/9106 and S/9109), charging the United Arab Republic with large-scale attacks on those dates along a wide front, sometimes extending throughout the whole Canal sector. Algerian forces, it was charged, had participated in the attacks on 8 and 9 March (S/9076). On 13 March Israel replied (S/9077) to the United Arab Republic letter of 13 February (S/9008), rejecting its charges and stating that, on the contrary, it was the United Arab Republic which had a negative position on resolution 242 (1967), as had been revealed in statements by President Nasser as well as in the artillery, sniping and mining attacks recently carried out along the Suez Canal sector. The Council also received seven letters from the United Arab Republic dated 9, 11, 13, 18 and 24 March (S/9060, S/9061, S/9071, S/9072, S/9080, S/9092, S/9108), charging Israel with large-scale attacks on those dates and the shelling of cities and civilian installations on the west bank.

236. Seventeen documents were circulated by the Secretary-General containing supplemental information from the Chief of Staff issued on 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 24 and 26 March (S/7930/Add.128, Add.130-145) relating to firing incidents, overflights and, in particular, the large-scale incidents of 8, 9, 11, 13, 18 and 24 March.

237. Documents issued during the month of April included a letter from Israel dated 1 April (S/9124), charging that speeches by President Nasser on 27 and 30 March showed the policy of aggression being pursued by the United Arab Republic in disregard of the Charter and the Security Council resolutions, as well as a letter from the United Arab Republic dated 3 April (S/9130), rejecting those charges and stating that the cause of the deteriorating situation in the area was the refusal of Israel to implement United Nations resolutions.

238. The Council also received letters from Israel dated 4, 8, 9, 10, 14 and 21 April (S/9134, S/9140, S/9144, S/9147, S/9156 and S/9172), charging the United Arab Republic with large-scale artillery attacks, sniping, overflights and commando attacks across the Canal on 19 and

21 April.

239. During the same period, the Council received ten letters from the United Arab Republic, dated 4, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 21 and 25 April (S/9132, S/9143, S/9148, S/9152, S/9155, S/9157, S/9159, S/9165, S/9168, S/9178), charging Israel with large-scale artillery and tank-fire attacks, in particular, against cities and civilian installations on the west bank of the Canal, with overflights and with responsibility for the grave situation in the Suez Canal sector because of its expansionist policies and its refusal to implement the resolutions of the Security Council. The Council also received a cable dated 30 April (S/9186) from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, charging an Israel air attack on 29 April on civilian installations in the Naga Hammadi and Idfou areas, hundreds of miles away from the military front.

240. Also during April, the Secretary-General circulated thirty-three documents containing supplemental information from the Chief of Staff issued on 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29 and 30 April (S/7930/Add.147 and Corr.1, Add.148-151, Add.153-164, Add.165 and Corr.1 and Add.166-180), relating to continuous firing incidents, including the major incidents complained of by the parties, and reporting damage to United Nations installations.

241. On 21 April, the Secretary-General submitted a special report (S/9171) on the critical situation in the Suez Canal sector. The Secretary-General said that he felt it necessary to employ the unusual means of a special report from the Secretary-General to the Security Council to call most urgently to the attention of its members the prevailing situation in the Suez Canal sector which, in his view, was grave. After referring to the information submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, the Secretary-General stated that it was clear that observance of the Security Council cease-fire resolutions had been degenerating steadily, particularly since 8 April 1969, and that there had been daily major breaches of the cease-fire for twelve successive days. In numerous instances, the exchange of fire had taken place along most of the length of the Canal. The weapons employed

ranged from small arms to heavy mortars, rockets, tank fire and heavy artillery. The United Nations military observers, who were operating under great danger and difficulty, had exerted every effort to bring a quick end to the firing, but in each instance, not later than the following day, firing had erupted again. In those circumstances, the Secretary-General stated, the only conclusion that could be drawn was that the Security Council cease-fire had become almost totally ineffective in the Suez Canal sector and that a virtual state of active war existed there.

242. Referring to this report, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in a letter dated 8 May (S/9196), expressed satisfaction that the Secretary-General had brought that matter to the attention of the Security Council at an opportune moment. The deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, it was stated, which aroused grave concern, was caused by Israel's policy of frustrating the efforts towards a peaceful settlement as provided in the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. That same policy was evident in Israel's attitude towards the Four-Power consultations which could be an effective means of reaching a settlement on the basis of the Council's resolution. If the situation in the area was to be returned to normal, it was necessary that the Security Council resolution on the cease-fire be strictly observed.

243. In a reply dated 15 May (S/9209), Israel rejected the USSR charges as without foundation and stated that the responsibility of the United Arab Republic for the aggravation of this situation in the sector had been clearly shown in General Bull's reports.

244. On 2 May 1969, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report (S/9188), in which he stated that he was increasingly concerned about certain recent developments which threatened the effectiveness of the observation of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector. Those developments exposed United Nations military observers and other United Nations personnel to grave danger and caused heavy damage to United Nations installations, vehicles and equipment. In his report, the Secretary-General included texts of identical letters he had sent to the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic on 21 April, the

replies of Israel, dated 23 April, and those of the United Arab Republic, dated 25 and 29 April, as well as the texts of further letters he had addressed to the parties on 1 May.

245. In his letters to the parties on 21 April, the Secretary-General had expressed his anxiety for the safety of the United Nations military observers and supporting Field Service personnel stationed in the Suez Canal sector and referred in this connexion to some of the damage caused to United Nations installations and vehicles in the twenty firing incidents between 8 March and 20 April. Referring to complaints by the Chief of Staff that United Nations installations and facilities, though clearly marked, had been repeatedly fired on by both sides and that United Nations observation posts on both sides of the Canal had been encroached on by military positions of the parties, he requested that instructions be issued urgently to the military forces of the parties to avoid actions which restricted the observation operation and endangered the lives of the United Nations personnel. He also requested that the construction of new shelters for United Nations personnel be completed as a matter of urgency.

246. Both of the parties in their replies gave assurances of their co-operation with General Bull and stated that they were taking the necessary steps, as requested by him, to expedite the construction of shelters for United Nations military observers. Each side blamed the other for the danger to United Nations personnel and damage to United Nations installations.

247. The Secretary-General, in his report, pointed out that since he had addressed his initial letter to the parties, daily exchanges of fire had taken place, encroachment on United Nations observation posts had continued and some of them had been hit. An observer had been wounded when his vehicle struck a mine, and the relief of observers had been delayed owing to continued firing. He endorsed proposals by the Chief of Staff that safe perimeters should be established around United Nations installations and that UNTSO should be provided with a United Nations craft to be used for the relief of United Nations personnel when relief by road was not possible.

248. In a letter dated 17 May (S/9213), referring to this report, Finland expressed appreciation of the Secretary-General's efforts to provide adequate protection to the United Nations military observers, took note of the statements by Israel and the United Arab Republic in response to the Secretary-General's appeal and expressed the hope that the arrangements initiated by the Secretary-General would ensure the effectiveness of UNTSO, which was an indispensable means for maintaining the cease-fire.

249. On 13 May the United Arab Republic informed the Secretary-General (S/9207) of the progress of the steps that had been taken by the United Arab Republic to eliminate the exposure of the observers to Israel fire and to ensure their safety.

250. On 27 June, Israel charged (S/9286) that the United Arab Republic authorities were continuing to obstruct Israel's efforts to assure the safety of United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector by firing on United Nations personnel, installations and vehicles, as evidenced by General Bull's reports, as well as on sites where shelters were under construction by United Nations and Israeli personnel, despite promises not to disrupt that work.

251. Also during May, two letters were received from Israel, dated 7 and 19 May (S/9194 and Corr.1 and S/9124), rejecting the charges contained in communications from the United Arab Republic of 25 and 30 April (S/9178 and S/9186) and of 13 and 15 May (S/9206 and S/9210), and stating that the United Arab Republic was responsible for maintaining tension in the area and initiating breaches of the cease-fire, while Israel had acted only in self-defence.

252. Three letters were received from the United Arab Republic, dated 1, 12 and 15 May (S/9189, S/9206 and S/9210), charging Israel with firing across the Canal, with attempts to cross the Canal and with systematic destruction of civil and economic installations in the area.

253. Every day during May, the Secretary-General received supplemental information from the Chief Staff [*sic*], which was issued on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 May

(S/7930/ Add. 181-194, Add.195 and Corr.1, Add.197-209, Add.211, Add.213, Add.215-216), relating to daily incidents of firing across the Canal with weapons ranging from rifles through light and heavy machine-guns and artillery to mortar, tank and rocket fire, aerial activity and anti-aircraft fire, and incidents of firing on United Nations personnel and damage to their installations, as well as proposals for their relocation.

254. During the month of June, Israel addressed two letters to the Council, on 3 and 24 June (S/9254 and S/9278), containing charges that units of the armed forces of Kuwait stationed in the United Arab Republic were collaborating in armed attacks against Israel and that the Kuwaiti Government was assisting Arab terror warfare. On 16 June, Kuwait replied (S/9256) to those charges, asserting that its co-operation with the United Arab Republic was in full accord with Article 51 of the Charter and that its support for the Palestinian resistance movement stemmed from support of the legitimate right of the Palestine people to self-determination.

255. On 25 June, Israel complained (S/9283) that United Arab Republic forces had crossed the Canal and attacked an Israel position on 22/23 June, leaving behind the bodies of five Egyptian soldiers. Despite arrangements which had been made for the return of their bodies by United Nations and Red Cross representatives, their removal was prevented by Egyptian mortar fire.

256. During June also, the Secretary-General continued to circulate, on a daily basis, supplemental information from the Chief of Staff, issued on 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 30 June (S/7930/Add. 217-224, Add.226-242, and Add.244-249), relating to firing incidents in the sector involving small arms, artillery, machine-gun, mortar, tank and rocket fire, and incidents of firing on United Nations personnel and installations with damage to the latter, as well as relocation of some installations and efforts under way to relocate certain others.

257. On 11 July, the United Arab Republic transmitted (S/9325) a communication from a representative of the International Committee

of the Red Cross concerning difficulties encountered in retrieving the bodies of United Arab Republic soldiers killed on 23 June and charged that Israel authorities had left their bodies to deteriorate in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention.

258. Between 1 and 15 July 1969, the date of closure of this report, the Secretary-General circulated to the Security Council sixteen documents containing supplemental information provided by the Chief of Staff, issued on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15 July (S/7930/Add.250-257, Add.259-264, Add.265 and Corr.1 and Add.266), relating to daily firing incidents in the Suez Canal sector, in which it was reported that weapons used had included rifles, machine-guns, artillery, mortars, tanks and rockets; aerial activity had included flights by light aircraft and Mirage aircraft, provoking anti-aircraft fire; one incident, on 10 July, when twelve rubber boats, containing from six to eight men, had crossed from the west bank towards the east bank and had returned approximately one hour later, following which two United Arab Republic flags were observed on the east bank the next morning. On several occasions the reports included information concerning incidents of firing by rifles and machine-guns, and once by mortars, at United Nations personnel and installations, with occasional damage being reported.

259. In a special report dated 5 July (S/9316) the Secretary-General, after recalling his special report of 21 April (S/9171), stated that although there had been some reduction in violence in the Suez Canal sector during the last two weeks of May and the first week of June, the observance of the cease-fire had again deteriorated in the second week of June, with exchanges of heavy-weapons fire initiated almost daily, especially from the west side of the Canal, as reported to the Security Council in the supplemental information reports of the S/7930 series, which had covered firing on eighty-six consecutive days as of 5 July. The fact that many of those activities had been announced by the parties themselves implied a tacit recognition by them that the cease-fire, to all practical intents and purposes, had ceased to be respected in the Suez Canal sector. The Secretary-General, re-

ferring also to his report of 2 May (S/9188), in which he had expressed his concern about the danger to which United Nations military observers and installations had been exposed, stated that that risk had increased in the past two weeks. The military observers, although carrying out their duties with a devotion worthy of the highest praise, were doing so under conditions of continuous danger. Messages had been sent by UNTSO to the authorities of the United Arab Republic and, on occasion as necessary, to Israel concerning incidents of firing on United Nations personnel and United Nations observation posts and equipment, but without any noticeable effect. In the month of June alone, there had been twenty-one reported incidents of firing by United Arab Republic forces and five by Israel forces on United Nations personnel or installations. After recalling that the observers were unarmed men doing their best under extraordinary stress and strain to fulfil the task assigned to them by the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that they could not be expected to serve as what amounted to defenceless targets in a shooting gallery. If they continued to be fired upon, the Secretary-General added, he would have to advise the Council on the future course of action, including even the possibility of withdrawal of the observers.

260. The Secretary-General said that the conclusion was inescapable that throughout the Suez Canal sector open warfare had been resumed. Experience showed that it was virtually impossible to ensure effective observance of a cease-fire for a prolonged and indefinite period in a situation where two hostile forces constantly confronted each other across a narrow no man's land, with one party in military occupation of territory belonging to the other and with no early prospect of the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967.

261. After referring to the worsening situation also in the Israel-Jordan sector, the Secretary-General stated that the level of violence in the Middle East since 1967 had never been higher than it was at the time of his report. He was bringing that situation to the attention of the Security Council fully aware that as Secretary-General he had been unable to improve it, and

because if it continued, the situation could soon render vain efforts towards a peaceful settlement and could even be the overture to more general intensive hostilities in the Middle East.

262. The Secretary-General then appealed to all parties in the Middle East to end immediately all offensive military actions, particularly those taking place daily in the Suez Canal sector, and return to observance of the Security Council cease-fire in order to avoid frustrating current efforts to restore peace in the Middle East. He also appealed to the members of the Security Council and to all Members of the United Nations to exert all influence and to take all measures which might be helpful in making the cease-fire effective and the peace efforts successful in the vital interest of the whole world.

263. In a letter dated 10 July (S/9321), the United Arab Republic stated that the full responsibility for the deterioration in the situation, to which attention had been called in the Secretary-General's report, lay with Israel. The Security Council had called for a cease-fire as a first step, and in a second resolution had called upon Israel to withdraw its forces from the occupied territories and had provided for a peaceful settlement. By refusing to accept and implement this resolution and other United Nations resolutions, Israel was obstructing the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement and was therefore responsible for the prevailing state of tension in the area. For its part, the United Arab Republic had exerted all efforts for the success of Ambassador Jarring's mission, had accepted the Security Council's resolution 242 (1967) and had co-operated with the United Nations Command to ensure the safety of the observers in the Suez Canal sector.

264. In a letter dated 11 July (S/9322), Israel stated that it had accepted the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions in June 1967 and had at all times been prepared to adhere to them scrupulously on a reciprocal basis. However, if armed attacks were made across the cease-fire lines from the territory of Arab States, whether by regular or irregular forces, Israel had to take appropriate self-defence measures. It was clear that the responsibility lay with the Arab States; the United Arab Republic was openly proclaiming a policy of

initiating fire and of raiding across the Suez Canal, and the activities of terrorist groups were openly supported by Arab Governments and armies. There were almost daily cases of firing by United Arab Republic troops at United Nations observers and installations. There was full agreement and co-operation between the Israel military authorities and the United Nations cease-fire machinery for the protection of United Nations personnel on the Israel side; Israel forces were under strict orders to avoid any harm to United Nations observers or installations, and where posts on the Egyptian side might have been hit by shell fragments, that had been an unavoidable result of return fire at Egyptian positions.

3. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON

(a) *Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General on the observance of the cease-fire between 16 July and 26 December 1968 and requests for a meeting*

265. In a letter dated 28 October (S/8872), Lebanon complained that on the night of 26/27 October, Israel forces had shelled the Lebanese village of Almajdyiah, and, in a letter dated 29 October (S/8874), further complained that on 28 October, Israel forces had shelled two border positions.

266. With regard to the first of these complaints, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported in supplemental information issued on 28 October (S/7930/Add.96) that in an inquiry into the incident, United Nations military observers had found blood-stains, craters, holes in the roofs of houses and dead livestock. In a subsequent report issued on 31 October (S/7930/Add.98), the Chief of Staff summarized the results of three inquiries into a further Lebanese complaint that on 28/29 October mortar fire had been directed towards the areas of Nabi el Oueida, Houle and Blida; observers had seen craters and mortar tailfins with markings in Hebrew.

267. In its reply of 6 November (S/8891), Israel stated that the cease-fire had been first violated from the Lebanese side and that Israel had had to take appropriate defensive measures.

268. In a letter dated 29 December (S/8945), Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the

Security Council to consider an act of aggression committed by the Israel Air Force against Lebanon by the attack on the Civilian International Airport of Beirut on 28 December 1968, for which, the letter added, the Israel authorities had admitted their responsibility.

269. In a letter of the same date (S/8946), Israel also requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the constant violation by Lebanon of the United Nations Charter and the Council's cease-fire resolutions by assisting and abetting acts of warfare, violence and terror by irregular forces and organizations operating from Lebanon against Israel, particularly against Israel civil aviation.

(b) *Consideration at the 1460th to 1462nd meetings (29 to 31 December 1968)*

270. At the 1460th meeting, held on 29 December, the Security Council adopted, without objection, an agenda which listed the letter of 29 December from Lebanon (S/8945) under the general heading of "The situation in the Middle East", followed by the letter of 29 December from Israel (S/8946), again under the same general heading.

271. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that while his delegation had not formally objected to the adoption of the agenda, it reserved its right to come back to that matter, as the second item on the agenda had no direct relationship to the situation in the Middle East, inasmuch as the events had taken place in Athens.

272. The representative of Canada stated that his delegation would wish to have the assurance from the President that, in adopting the agenda, members of the Council had done so without prejudice to the positions they or the parties concerned might take on the substance.

273. The President said that it was his understanding that in their statements members of the Council could refer to any part of the agenda as it stood.

274. The representatives of Lebanon and Israel and, subsequently, of Saudi Arabia, were invited, at their request, to participate without vote in the discussion.

275. The President drew the attention of members of the Council to information relating

to the question received from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO and contained in documents S/7930/Add.107 and Add.108.

276. The first report, issued on 29 December (S/7930/Add.107), stated that on that morning the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission had received a complaint from the Lebanese delegation that on the previous evening Israel heliborne troops had destroyed thirteen civilian aircraft at the Beirut International Airport. An immediate inquiry had been requested and was being conducted. The report added that in discussion with the Chief Operations Officer of UNTSO, the Assistant Israel Liaison Officer had stated that fourteen aircraft had been destroyed or damaged. The second report (S/7930/Add.108), containing the summary of inquiry, stated that eleven witnesses had been interrogated, who provided an account of the attack at the Beirut International Airport, the physical damage caused and injury to one of the personnel at the airport. The United Nations military observers had seen thirteen destroyed aircraft, damage to the main terminal building, explosive charges and a grenade with Hebrew markings.

277. The representative of Lebanon said that his country and people, which had always been ardent supporters of the principles and purposes of the Charter, had become the latest victim of Israel's aggression on 28 December 1968. The defenceless Civilian International Airport of Beirut had become a target of Israel's aggressive designs. Units of the Israel Air Force had staged a surprise and treacherous attack on its installations and on civilian aircraft which had been in the hangars and on the ground of the airport. The airplanes destroyed in that attack constituted the main portion of Lebanon's civilian aircraft fleet. Hangars, repair shops and fuel depots were also hit and destroyed. The buildings of the air terminal also suffered extensive damage. The aggressive act committed against Lebanon was a flagrant violation of the principles and objectives of the Charter. The Security Council should go beyond the usual condemnatory resolutions and take effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Lebanese Government would, at a later stage, after having fully assessed the damage

suffered, request the Council to take the necessary measures against Israel in order to compensate Lebanon fully for such damages.

278. The representative of Israel stated that on 26 December an Israel civil airliner, en route to New York on a regular, scheduled commercial flight, had been attacked by bombs and machine-guns at the Athens International Airport. The assailants had come from Beirut. They had opened fire indiscriminately with sub-machine-guns against the passengers and the crew, killing one passenger.

279. Speaking on a point of order, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the representative of Israel was involving the Security Council in the consideration of events which had taken place in Athens and related to the sovereignty and competence of the Greek Government. In dealing with that matter, the Greek Government had not appealed to the Security Council. The question before the Council related to a completely different matter arising out of Israel's aggression against a peaceful country, Lebanon.

280. The representative of Israel, resuming his statement, stated that it was in Beirut that the major Arab terrorist organizations had established their head-quarters and had set up their international networks; by permitting them to do so, the Lebanese Government had assumed responsibility for their activities. Lebanon had, however, undertaken obligations towards Israel under the Security Council cease-fire resolution, and any attack against an Israel civil aircraft, wherever it might be, was as much a violation of the cease-fire as any attack on Israel territory and entitled the Israel Government to exercise its right of self-defence. Two attacks on Israel aircraft within the last year by the same commando group based in Beirut showed that the objective was to disrupt Israel civil aviation. On 28 December a commando unit of the Israel defence forces had landed at Beirut airport and had struck at a number of aircraft belonging to Arab airlines parked in the airport. There was no loss of life. The action was taken to uphold Israel's basic right to free navigation in international skies. The complaint had to be seen in the broader context of the continuation by the Arab States of active warfare

against Israel through irregular forces, armed, trained and financed by them. The activities of the terrorist organizations seriously undermined the patient efforts of Ambassador Jarring towards a settlement. Israel hoped that the Security Council would clearly indicate that it could no longer tolerate the continuation of warfare under the guise of terrorist activities and would demand from the Arab States, including Lebanon, full adherence to their obligations under the Charter and the cease-fire.

281. The representative of the United States said that the Council was meeting to deal with a most regrettable Israel action which his Government strongly condemned. It shared the concern of Israel over the increasing interference with the right of unimpeded air travel between States, but felt the Israel action of 28 December was unjustified. It saw no justification for retaliation of any kind against Lebanon. Lebanon was a country which clearly had been doing its best to live in peace with all other States in the area. Furthermore, such a military attack upon an international airport was an unacceptable form of international behaviour. In magnitude it was entirely disproportionate to the act which had preceded it. It was disproportionate in two ways: first, in the degree of destruction involved; secondly, in a more fundamental way, in the difference between the acts of two individual terrorists and those of a sizable military force operating openly and directly under Government orders. The attack on the Civilian International Airport of Beirut had introduced new dangers into the already alarming situation in the Middle East. The Security Council and every Member of the United Nations owed it to itself to help break the pattern of violence in the Middle East. For its part the United States was prepared to support prompt action by the Security Council to condemn the latest Israel action.

282. The representative of the United Kingdom emphasized the profound concern of his Government at the action of the Israel Government in sending forces to commit dangerous and deplorable acts of violence at the Beirut International Airport. The Council must necessarily look at events not in a vacuum but against the background of past violence in the context of the

situation in the Middle East. The Council could not ignore the dangers to peaceful international air travel posed by such acts as the hijacking of aircraft and the machine-gunning at Athens airport. However, the scale and intensity of the Israel action stood out exceptionally, even against that sombre background, involving as it did the traditionally peace-loving Lebanon. The events of 28 December were also a setback to efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East situation.

283. The representative of France expressed serious concern over the Israel raid and especially regretted that the Israel attack was directed against a country which had always shown respect for the principles of the Charter. On many previous occasions the French delegation had stated that the very idea of reprisals was unacceptable. From that point of view the raid of 28 December was inadmissible and therefore deserved condemnation. A satisfactory settlement could result only from putting into effect the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. Joint action by Member States, and especially those with particular responsibility, was now indispensable and urgent.

284. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Israel military action against Lebanon represented a very serious violation of the Security Council cease-fire decision. The new aggressive act by Israel could not be justified in any way and could be regarded only as the expression of a pre-planned decision to create further complications in order to undermine the United Nations efforts, in particular those of Ambassador Jarring, to achieve a political settlement. In spite of the fact that Israel's responsibility for the attack on the Beirut Airport was clearly established, certain representatives, and particularly the representative of the United States, had attempted to put the aggressor and its victim on the same level. Counting on the moral and political support of certain circles in the West, the Israel extremists were broadening their aggression and threatening international peace. The Security Council must first of all condemn in the most decisive manner the criminal military adventure of Israel directed against Lebanon and take appropriate measures under chapter

VII of the Charter, in order to force Israel to respect the Security Council and the General Assembly decisions and the Charter of the United Nations.

285. The representative of India said that from all information available to the Council it was clear beyond any doubt that the Israel military action against the International Airport at Beirut was unprovoked, unnecessary and a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. It was the duty of the Council to condemn it and to take suitable measures under the relevant provisions of the Charter to prevent the repetition of such acts. At the same time the Council should demand of Israel the payment of compensation to Lebanon for the damage caused in the action. The incidents in occupied Arab territories of individual acts against Israel property had been cited as justification for the recent recrudescence of tensions. While his delegation deplored all violent incidents leading to loss of life and property, it could not, however, accept that those incidents could justify in any way the massive attacks launched by Israel on Arab civilian property. That action was a serious set-back to the achievement of a political settlement.

286. The representative of Hungary stated that while the complaint of Lebanon clearly belonged within the competence of the Security Council, Israel's letter was meant to be a pretext to justify its aggressive policy. By its attacks against civilian installations, Israel aimed at terrorizing the civilian population and undermining the economy of the Arab States. All States should exert their influence to have the Government of Israel discontinue the series of deliberate destructive acts committed against its neighbours and compensate the victims for the losses suffered. The Hungarian delegation was strongly convinced that it was time to take resolute action against Israel and it would, therefore, co-operate with other members of the Security Council in considering the application of the measures as envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter.

287. The representative of Algeria stated that his delegation had accepted the agenda to facilitate consideration of the Lebanese complaint. It considered that the Israel complaint did not

fall within the purview of the Council. Israel's act of aggression had been carefully premeditated and undertaken in defiance of the international community. That behaviour stemmed from the encouragement and assistance which Israel was receiving from certain major Powers as shown by the recent decision of the United States to supply Israel with modern fighter planes, which, in the light of the events in Beirut, had sinister implications in the eyes of Arab countries and world public opinion. Peace in the area would become a reality only when solutions were found which took into account the vital interests of the Palestinian people. In view of the latest act of aggression by Israel, his delegation believed that the Security Council must unequivocally condemn it and must see to it that, in addition to necessary compensation, effective measures were taken under Chapter VII of the Charter to put an end to the policy of systematic aggression pursued by Israel.

288. The representative of Senegal said that the raid on the Beirut Airport by Israel troops, which had been interpreted as an act of reprisal, had caused concern in the world and had contributed to increased tension in the area. Such acts made the prospect for peace even more remote. They damaged the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to find a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Senegal condemned all acts of reprisal, including the recent attack against Lebanon. In view of the increase in acts of violence, the Security Council must agree to achieve the implementation of its resolution of 22 November 1967.

289. The representative of Brazil stated that the unjustifiable and premeditated attack by Israel against the Civilian Airport of Lebanon had clearly shown how close the situation was to open warfare. The authority and prestige of the Security Council had been challenged. His delegation wished to reiterate its conviction that such violent acts as that under consideration by the Council should not be ignored. It was imperative that the Security Council should act promptly by discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Brazil would be prepared to join in any effort to uphold the authority of the Council under the Charter.

290. At the 1461st meeting on 30 December, the representative of Lebanon stated that the Armistice Agreements and the Council's ceasefire decisions had always been scrupulously respected by his country. From the point of view of international law, a State could not be held responsible for acts committed by inhabitants of the State acting outside its territory on their own initiative. In that respect, the attitude of Israel itself could be cited when Argentina had submitted its complaint to the Security Council concerning the Eichmann case. Moreover, the persons responsible for the Athens airport incident were Palestinians, who had come to Beirut only two days before the Athens operation. After having committed a premeditated act of aggression, Israel had sought to justify it by submitting a contrived complaint of its own against Lebanon, a complaint which it had not filed at the time the incident occurred. Lebanon, however, could not be held responsible for acts of Palestinians whose intentions were not known to it and who, being refugees as a result of Israel action, held strong feelings for their cause. The representative concluded by quoting the diplomatic note which had been sent by the President of the Republic of Lebanon to certain States.

291. The representative of Denmark said that his Government deplored all violent incidents arising out of the conflict in the Middle East and condemned the Israel attack on the Beirut International Airport, which was particularly deplorable, as it extended the area of conflict to Lebanon, a country which had stood for moderation. Israel should instead have brought promptly to the United Nations the act of terror committed against its aircraft at Athens on 26 December. He expressed the hope that the parties would come to realize that the best promise for peace in the area lay through co-operation with Ambassador Jarring.

292. The representative of Canada said that the Israel attack was unprecedented and out of proportion to any provocation offered. It seriously risked bringing about a rise in tension and further violent incidents in the Middle East. That kind of reprisal must be regarded with deep concern by all countries upholding the rights of persons to use civil air carriers to move

safely from one place to another. He appealed to the parties concerned to make a renewed and determined effort to break out of the vicious cycle of violence and work for a settlement on the basis of the provisions and principles of resolution 242 (1967).

293. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government strongly condemned the attack on the Beirut Airport, just as it deplored all violations of existing cease-fire arrangements. It regarded the attack in Beirut as particularly reprehensible. The Security Council could not accept or condone acquisition of territory by conquest. Any suggestion that Israel must be subject to continuous violence and intimidation was equally unacceptable. The Council had thus declared the twin principles of withdrawal and security. It had also declared other purposes, among which was included a just settlement of the refugee problem and the freedom of passage through international waterways to all shipping without exception. Those principles and purposes had been repeatedly endorsed, particularly by the four permanent members of the Security Council. Unfortunately, because of mistrust and bitterness between the two sides, those approved principles and purposes had not yet been implemented. It was therefore necessary that, instead of violence, which created further mistrust and fear, the two sides should declare, without any reservation, their readiness to implement the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, permit the new refugees to return to their homes without delay and begin negotiations through the Secretary-General's Special Representative.

294. The representative of China said that the Council had been told that the military action taken by Israel was in the nature of a retaliation provoked by an attack on an Israel aircraft in Athens on 26 December and the previous hijacking of another Israel airliner. It seemed to his delegation that the massive, destructive foray into a centre of international transportation could not be justified under the circumstances. To deal an unwarranted blow to a country which had hitherto shown itself to be moderate and restrained in its attitude towards Israel must cause universal concern. No Government,

even under extreme provocation, should take the law into its own hands. His delegation was prepared to support prompt, effective and just action by the Council for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the Middle East.

295. The representative of Pakistan said that in the current situation, resulting from Israel's latest act of aggression at the Civilian International Airport of Beirut, there seemed to exist no doubt among the members of the Council that the Council's authority should be reasserted and that it should act promptly and speedily. It had been established during the debate, first, that the Israel attack called for condemnation by the Security Council in the most unmistakable terms; secondly, that the occurrence of a certain act at the Athens airport on 26 December not only was irrelevant to the current debate but was outside the purview of the Security Council; thirdly, that the Security Council was confronted with the worsening of the crisis in the Middle East as a result of the repetition of the acts of belligerency and the inclusion in the area of conflict of the defenceless State of Lebanon. Considering these factors, the Council, if it were to reassert its authority, must put responsibility on Israel to make reparation for the damages which it had caused to Lebanon. Every act and every declaration of policy by Israel aggravated the indignation felt by the Arab Governments and peoples at the continued occupation of their territories. The chances of a peaceful settlement could not be promoted unless that indignation was assuaged. For the Council to arrest the trend towards another war, it was essential that a balance be introduced into the situation by the imposition of some element of restraint on Israel's reckless course. The Pakistan delegation was also convinced that there was a need for the permanent members of the Security Council to concert their efforts for peace in the Middle East. It was their concerted action alone which could bring about the conditions necessary for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). What was further required was a re-examination of the policies pursued so far in order to show an awareness of the sense of outrage suffered by the Arab peoples over the historic injustice inflicted upon them.

296. The representative of Paraguay said that his delegation had never hesitated to condemn premeditated military activities carried out in the territory of another sovereign State. Although attempts had been made to justify them by using the term "reprisals", the unprecedented attack carried out by the elements of the Israel Air Force against the Civilian International Airport of Beirut was most reprehensible. The situation in the Middle East being very grave and tense, it was necessary that individual and collective efforts be carried out in an effort to establish in the entire area a just and lasting peace. His delegation could support efforts towards a unanimous resolution reflecting the universal concern and anxiety in order to avoid a repetition of incidents similar to that before the Council.

297. The representative of Israel stated that the attackers of the El-Al aircraft in Athens had testified that they were Lebanese and had lived in the city of Tripoli. Both were members of the Palestine Liberation Front, which was the first to announce the execution of the Athens attack. The encouragement and the complicity of the Lebanese Government was no doubt accountable for the rapid expansion of that Front's activities. The attention of the Lebanese Government had been drawn on numerous occasions to the activities of the terror organizations within its borders. That Government, however, had not only continued to condone those activities but had publicly identified itself with them. Israel was determined to defend itself against attack, whether by regular or irregular forces; peace could not be attained if warfare continued while the Arab States disclaimed responsibility for it.

298. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the latest Israel armed provocations against the United Arab Republic, Jordan and now Lebanon, represented a new stage in Israel's aggressive policy directed against the neighbouring Arab States. The fact that the Government of Israel had officially declared that it had conducted a raid against the Beirut Airport simply proved that Israel's practice of reprisal and military provocation had now been raised to the level of the official policy of the Government of Israel. Modern inter-

national law ruled out the policy of military reprisals by States. Even before the Charter of the United Nations was adopted, international law recognized that it was absolutely inadmissible to carry out reprisals as a response to actions taken by individuals. The question of putting a stop to Israel's aggression depended very much on the position of the United States. It might contribute greatly to achieving a political settlement in the Middle East if the United States, eschewing lip-service and verbal condemnation, would use the possibilities that it had at its disposal, jointly with the Security Council and with other States, to bring the necessary pressure to bear on Israel. The United Kingdom could also take measures that would have a definite impact on the Government of Israel. For its part, the Soviet Union considered that the Council was now required to condemn Israel and, as indicated in resolution 248 (1968), to adopt in regard to Israel "the further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter".

299. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that the Charter was quite explicit about measures to be taken against aggression. Chapter VII of the Charter spoke of sanctions. One would like to know if the United States would be willing to apply sanctions if Israel would not offer reparations and an apology to Lebanon. He then recalled that he had already warned the Council that the question of Palestine was no longer one between the Arab States and Israel but, indeed, between the Palestinian people and those who had robbed them of their homeland.

300. The representative of Israel, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, charged that it was the Soviet Union which by its unreserved support of Arab intransigence and belligerency and its encouragement to Arab terror warfare against Israel had made the attainment of peace in the Middle East more difficult.

301. At the 1462nd meeting of the Council on 31 December, the President stated that after intensive consultations, the members of the Council had been able to reach agreement on the text of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1462,

"Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (document S/8945),

"Having noted the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization contained in documents S/7930/Add.107 and 108,

"Having heard the statements of the representative of Lebanon and of the representative of Israel concerning the grave attack committed against the civil International Airport of Beirut,

"Observing that the military action by the armed forces of Israel against the civil International Airport of Beirut was premeditated and of a large-scale and carefully planned nature,

"Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from this violation of the Security Council resolutions,

"And deeply concerned about the need to assure free uninterrupted international civil air traffic,

"1. Condemns Israel for its premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions;

"2. Considers that such premeditated acts of violence endanger the maintenance of the peace;

"3. Issues a solemn warning to Israel that if such acts were to be repeated, the Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to its decisions;

"4. Considers that Lebanon is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it suffered, responsibility for which has been acknowledged by Israel."

Decision: At the 1462nd meeting on 31 December 1968 the draft resolution was adopted unanimously as resolution 262 (1968).

302. The representative of Canada said that in supporting the resolution his delegation wished to emphasize that the Israel attack had taken place against a background of growing violence throughout the area. Neither that incident nor other incidents could be taken out of context, because otherwise they would be inexplicable. The incidents at the Athens and Beirut airports must be understood as expressions of extreme feelings of frustration and anger provoked by a state of mutual hostility. There would be no

peace unless both sides felt free to develop their national life free from violence.

303. The representative of Brazil said that his delegation was gratified that the Council had adopted a clear indication of a firm purpose to deal with threats to peace in the Middle East. Brazil did not condone such violent acts as that at Athens airport, but no responsibility, direct or indirect, of the Lebanese Government had been established in that connexion. To bring permanent peace to the area, the Council should strive towards a definite political settlement on the basis of its resolution 242 (1967) and should do its utmost to check the arms escalation which was daily building up there.

304. The representative of Denmark stated that his Government, which deplored any and all violent incidents, would have preferred the Council to deal more directly with the act of terror committed against the Israel civil aircraft in Athens on 26 December. However, the last preambular paragraph of the resolution adopted by the Council should leave no doubt that the Council insisted that all undue interference with international civil air traffic be henceforth discontinued.

305. The representative of France said that the Israel attack against the Beirut International Airport was an obvious violation of the Council's resolutions, which was all the more serious as it had not been provoked by Lebanese action. While the events at the Athens airport were regrettable, the direct responsibility of the Lebanese Government had not been established. Israel's premeditated aggression struck a blow against a country which had always shown respect for the principles of the Charter and extended *de facto* warfare to a region that had up to then been spared. The resolution just adopted was the logical result of debates in which his delegation had been happy to note the emergence of certain common views on the necessity of concerted action by permanent members of the Security Council towards the achievement of a settlement of the Middle East conflict.

306. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Council must deplore all acts of violence and all violations of the cease-fire wherever they occurred, and, in particular, must be concerned at the new trend of threats to the

safety of international civil air traffic. The pattern of violence emerged from the fundamental, unsolved problems of the Middle East. The Charter laid on all Members the duty to bring about by peaceful means the settlement of dangerous situations.

307. The representative of Hungary stated that the resolution adopted by the Council did not fully meet the requirements of the dangerous situation. Some members of the Council, while condemning Israel, were not prepared to take the logical step of applying sanctions as envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter. It was hoped that those members who considered the current resolution as adequate would use their influence with Israel to secure its compliance.

308. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation had already pointed out that Israel's attempt to describe its attack at Beirut as a "response" was futile. From the point of view of modern international law, reprisals as a means of self-defence against illegal action taken by another State would be admissible only if conducted within a very limited scope and without the use of armed force. Moreover, no evidence had been given of Lebanon's responsibility for the attack against the Israel airplane at the Athens airport. That attack had been carried out by citizens of a third State on the territory of yet another State, and under international law a State could be held responsible only for acts of its own citizens or armed forces. In violation of international law, the United Nations Charter and the Armistice Agreement, Israel had invaded Lebanese air space. After stating that the new act of aggression by Israel had aroused indignation everywhere, he read out a communication from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic on that subject. In the circumstances a much more clear-cut decision by the Council was needed, making provisions for measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. The resolution adopted by the Council might produce some useful results only if all members of the Council, particularly its permanent members, took all necessary measures to prevent a repetition of Israel's aggressive acts. Unfortunately, certain members of the Security Council, including certain permanent members, while condemning

Israel's aggression in statements, had failed to demonstrate their will to proceed from words to deeds.

309. The representative of Algeria said that in a message to the Secretary-General, the Foreign Minister of his country, after condemning Israel's aggression, had stated that it gave additional proof of Israel's despair at the increasing success of the Palestinian patriots in their legitimate struggle to regain their homeland. No State could be held responsible for their acts. He added that Israel, in violation of all international tenets, had attacked Lebanon, and the Council would have been well within its competence to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter. The resolution adopted by the Council, although falling short of that requirement, had been supported by his delegation because it condemned Israel unequivocally, stressed the rights of Lebanon to compensation and issued a warning to Israel.

310. The representative of the United States said that his delegation wished to disassociate itself from the sweeping denunciations of Israel's alleged policies and acts, having nothing to do with the episodes properly before the Council. The Council was not being asked to pronounce its judgement on all issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The resolution did not entirely suit his delegation. Despite differences over language or substance, however, it supported the resolution and endorsed its condemnation of the action against the Beirut Airport in accordance with his Government's initial response to the operation. His Government believed that the United Nations should be in the forefront of an effort to perfect new rules of international law that would give to the civilian airports of the world a special status, providing for appropriate examination of every situation in which that status was disregarded. He stated that it had been alleged that his Government, in supporting the resolution, had exhibited inconsistency. It should be noted that the policies of his Government were governed by principles on which friends sometimes disagreed. The United States Government was ready at any time to discuss measures to limit the flow of arms into the Middle East.

311. The representative of Senegal stated that his delegation's support was based upon its firm

conviction that force should not be used to resolve international disputes. It also believed that Israel's attack against the Beirut Airport would only extend the zone of conflict.

312. The representative of Paraguay said that his delegation had voted in favour of the resolution, hoping that it would impress upon the parties the need of scrupulous respect for the cease-fire, thus facilitating the creation of an atmosphere for the success of the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jarring. Moreover, the last preambular paragraph of the resolution reflected the deep concern of the Council regarding the need to ensure free and uninterrupted international civil air traffic.

313. The representative of Israel said that by ignoring the fundamental principles of the United Nations, equality of all Member States, the resolution adopted by the Council was contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter and was, therefore, not applicable. The resolution reflected the moral, political and juridical bankruptcy of the Security Council in respect of the Middle East situation. It was not the Security Council resolution but the attitude and actions of the Governments in the area that would determine the destiny of that area. Israel's action in Beirut, taken in defence of its rights, should make the Arab Governments understand the depth of Israel's determination to ensure its right to peace and security. When the Arab States realized that determination, there would be peace in the Middle East.

314. The representative of Saudi Arabia congratulated the Council on reaching in such a short time unanimous agreement on a resolution condemning the Israel attack on Beirut Airport. However, Israel had been condemned in the Council many times without any effect. The right of the Palestinian people to survive and to return to their homeland should not be forgotten; it was they who would resolve the question, and they would be supported by every Arab.

315. The representative of Lebanon stated that the Council had hesitated to order the application of Chapter VII of the Charter, which was a logical step to take in the light of its discussions. Israel, which had deliberately attacked the Beirut Airport, aware that it was violating international

law, the Armistice Agreements and the cease-fire decision, was not likely to heed the Council's warning. Lebanon, however, hoped that the Council, in the future, would respond to Israel's acts of aggression by sanctions; otherwise paragraph 3 of the resolution would be futile.

316. The President, at the conclusion of the debate, stated that by virtue of their great power and the responsibility given to them under the Charter, the permanent members of the Council had a special role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security and, therefore, periodic meetings of the four permanent members, as suggested at the beginning of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly by the Secretary-General, and as recently called for by France, would enhance the effectiveness of the Organization in that respect. The Middle East, he added, could perhaps be the first of the problems on which such consultations could be conducted profitably, since in that particular case all four permanent members had supported the Council's resolution 242 (1967).

(c) *Communications to the Council from 1 January to 15 July 1969*

317. In supplemental information issued on 4 January 1969 (S/7930/Add.110), the Acting Chief of Staff transmitted a report of an inquiry into a Lebanese complaint that during the night of 2-3 January, mortar and artillery shells had been fired on two occasions from Israel territory against four Arab villages in Lebanon. United Nations military observers had interviewed three witnesses and had seen physical evidence of mortar impacts and two broken telephone wires but had found no evidence of artillery shelling or casualties.

318. In a letter dated 22 February (S/9023), Lebanon complained that on the previous day Israel military planes had violated Lebanese air space on twelve occasions, sometimes in groups of two or four. Lebanese anti-aircraft artillery and Air Force units had taken action against the intruders. The Lebanese representative stated that the action should be viewed in the light of Israel's repeated threats against Lebanon, its efforts to implicate Lebanon in the incidents at the Zurich and Athens airports and other unjustified and unprovoked acts which revealed Israel's

aggressive designs against Lebanon. In supplemental information issued on 24 February (S/7930/Add.121), the Chief of Staff reported complaints from the Lebanese authorities of overflights by two Mirage-type jet aircraft on 21 February. Aircraft had been seen by a United Nations military observer.

4. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General on the observance of the cease-fire from 16 July 1968 to 15 July 1969

319. In supplemental information issued on 3 and 4 September 1968 (S/7930/Add.75 and Add.77), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported on two firing incidents which took place on 30 August and 2 September in which fire had been initiated by Israel. A Syrian complaint regarding the incident of 2 September, which stated that two Syrian soldiers had been killed and one wounded, had at first requested an inquiry, but later that request was cancelled. In a letter dated 5 September (S/8804), Israel, referring to these incidents, stated that the Syrians had approached the Israel cease-fire line across the no man's land and had been fired on, and that other recent incursions in the area for mine-laying and sabotage purposes had shown the need for vigilance on the part of the Israel forces. The refusal of the Syrian authorities to allow United Nations military observers access to the place of the incident showed Syrian responsibility for violation of the cease-fire.

320. Further firing incidents were reported on 13 and 14 September (S/7930/Add.84-85 and Add.87), in which fire was initiated from the Israel side and returned by Syria.

321. In supplemental information issued on 9 October (S/7930/Add. 93), the Chief of Staff reported on two further firing incidents on 5 October. The first report concerned a Syrian complaint that Israel military positions had opened fire across the Israel cease-fire position, killing one woman. In the inquiry by United Nations military observers into the incident, observers reported hearing one shot, and Syrian witnesses stated that the woman had been picking grapes in an area considered by the local villagers to be east of the Syrian cease-fire position. In the second incident, Syria had complained that two

Syrian soldiers forming part of a routine patrol had been shot when they lost their way and ran into an Israel ambush. Israel had complained that three Syrian soldiers had penetrated into Israel-held territory in the Golan Heights and opened fire at an Israel patrol; as a result of the exchange of fire two Syrian soldiers had been killed. United Nations military observers reported having heard several explosions and heavy machine-gun fire and seen flares illuminating the area. The bodies of the two soldiers were returned to Syria through arrangements made by Red Cross representatives.

322. A further exchange of fire was reported on 30 October (S/7930/Add.97).

323. In supplemental information issued on 25 November (S/7930/Add.102), the Chief of Staff reported on an inquiry into a Syrian complaint that one Syrian civilian had been killed and two had disappeared while looking for livestock on 19 November. Syrian witnesses stated that they had seen and heard firing from Israel forces and had seen Israel soldiers in the area between the forward defended localities and that fifteen Israel soldiers had been observed running after a civilian. The body shown the inquiry team had been identified as that of one of the three men who had been searching for livestock between the forward defended localities. Machine-gun and rifle cartridges with Hebrew markings had been found at the alleged scene of the incident in the area between the forward defended localities.

324. In supplemental information issued on 8 February (S/7930/Add.113), the Chief of Staff reported that on 7 February an Israel light aircraft had been seen crossing the Israel forward defended localities and ack-ack rounds and heavy machine-gun fire had been heard. On the same day the Israel authorities had stated that an Israel vehicle had struck a land mine south of the village of Rafid and that one Israel soldier had been killed and another wounded. Observers had seen an Israel half-track and other vehicles proceeding south, and an hour later had heard a loud explosion and seen the Israel half-track seriously damaged.

325. In supplemental information issued on 14 February (S/7930/Add.118), the Chief of Staff reported that United Nations military observers

had observed unidentified aircraft crossing the Syrian and Israel forward defended localities and heard firing from both Israel and Syrian positions. Both Israel and Syria had charged that jet aircraft belonging to the other side had violated its air space and that following an air engagement Israel had claimed and Syria had admitted the loss of one of its aircraft. In an inquiry a damaged MIG 21 aircraft had been observed east of the Syrian forward defended locality.

326. In supplemental information issued on 24 February (S/7930/Add.122), the Chief of Staff reported several over-flights, many of the planes having been identified as Israel Mirage aircraft. Syrian anti-aircraft guns had opened fire on some of those planes. Explosions and machine-gun fire had been observed west of the Israel forward defended locality on the previous evening. Syria had complained that jet fighters and bombers had attacked civilian installations in the Hamah and Maisaloun areas and civilian cars on the main Damascus-Beirut road and that twenty civilians had been wounded as a result of that aggression. The Chief of Staff indicated that the bombing of Hamah and Maisaloun had been confirmed. In further supplemental information issued on 27 February (S/7930/Add.126), the Chief of Staff reported that in an inquiry conducted on 25 February at the request of Syria into the Israel air attack, observers had seen destroyed and damaged houses, factories and other buildings, as well as thirty-one persons who had allegedly been injured in the air attack on Hamah, all having the type of injuries that could be sustained by aerial bombing.

327. In relation to the same incident, Syria, in a letter dated 25 February (S/9028), charged that on the previous day a number of Israel bombers escorted by fighters had launched air attacks on civilian targets in the suburb and district of Damascus. Fifteen people had been killed, forty wounded and a number of houses, factories, a summer youth camp, a customs police station and other civilian installations had been destroyed. Private vehicles, including the car of the Ambassador of the People's Republic of Hungary in Syria, had been attacked on the road, and two Syrian and three Israel aircraft

had been shot down in the engagement. That act of aggression had been preceded by statements of Israel leaders proclaiming a policy aimed at the annexation of Arab lands, in particular the Golan Heights. Israel, in a reply dated 28 February (S/9033), stated that it had taken air action on 24 February in self-defence to disable two El Fatah bases at Hamah and Maisaloun on the road between Damascus and Beirut, which were the central bases of that terrorist organization. The Government of Syria had for years, it charged, openly sponsored, organized and encouraged terror warfare against Israel.

328. In a letter dated 4 March (S/9041), Syria denied that the targets of Israel attack of 24 February were El Fatah bases and cited the report of the Chief of Staff (S/7930/Add.126) to show that the targets of that planned attack had been civilian installations. In a reply dated 12 March (S/9075), Israel reiterated its charge that the air action of 24 February had been directed against El Fatah bases, citing in support of its contention reports in the Arab Press attributed to El Fatah spokesmen to the effect that Hamah and Maisaloun served as bases for that organization. In a further letter dated 25 March (S/9110), Syria listed the names of civilian victims killed and seriously injured in that attack, including women and children.

329. Hungary and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics also sent communications with regard to the incident of 24 February. In a letter dated 11 March (S/9070), the representative of Hungary transmitted the text of a *note verbale* sent to the Government of Israel, protesting the air attack in which the life of the Ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic had been endangered and his car demolished as a grave violation of international law and reserving Hungary's right to claim full compensation. In a letter of the same date (S/9073), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted a TASS statement dated 28 February protesting that and other acts of provocation committed by Israel against the Arab countries which Israel sought to justify as reprisals. The struggle of peoples against invaders and occupiers was justified from the point of view of international law. Israel's acts of aggression showed that Israel was pursuing an aggressive policy with the aim of aggravating the situation

in the Middle East and creating conditions which would preclude the possibility of establishing a lasting peace in the region in conformity with the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.

330. On 18 March Israel replied (S/9091) that, with regard to the TASS statement, its most sinister aspect was the blanket approval it expressed for the Arab terror warfare waged against Israel. The attempts to make that warfare legitimate was open encouragement to the Arab States to continue to violate the cease-fire and further undermine the prospects for peace.

331. In another letter dated 18 March (S/9094), Israel drew attention to the reported entry and stationing of Iraqi armed forces in Syria, stating that their presence would further aggravate the situation in the area, as there was no assurance that they would observe the cease-fire. Israel requested the Secretary-General to obtain from Iraq an assurance that the Iraqi forces would respect the cease-fire.

332. In a letter dated 25 March (S/9111), Syria stated that in view of Israel's policy of aggression, in particular after June 1967, it was only natural that the Arab countries should co-ordinate their defence and it was for that reason that they had formed an Arab common defence pact.

333. In a letter dated 1 April (S/9125), Iraq, commenting on Israel's letter of 18 March (S/9094), stated that the entry of Iraqi armed forces into Syria had taken place at the specific request of the Syrian Government and under the Joint Defence Agreement between Iraq and Syria. Iraqi troops, it was stated, had been stationed at a considerable distance from the cease-fire line in Syrian territory, and their presence in Syria was in accordance with the right of self-defence recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and by international law.

334. In two communications dated 10 April (S/9145 and S/9146), Israel noted that the Government of Iraq had refused to accept the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council in June 1967 and continued to proclaim a policy of waging war against Israel. Accordingly, Israel considered that Governments which permitted the maintenance of the Iraqi expeditionary forces

on their territory should bear full responsibility for the consequent aggravation of the situation. Israel further stressed the urgency of efforts by the Secretary-General to obtain assurances that Iraq accepted the cease-fire resolutions and that its forces would respect the cease-fire. The positions of Iraq and Israel in this matter were reiterated in letters from the representative of Iraq on 24 April and 5 May (S/9175 and Corr.1, S/9192) and from the representative of Israel on 29 April and 12 May (S/9181, S/9201).

335. In a letter dated 4 April (S/9131), Syria charged Israel occupation forces with the destruction of Syrian villages and the demolition of houses (see section B, below) and said that on 28 March Israel soldiers had taken up positions at Briqa village in the buffer zone and on 30 March had fired on shepherds in the buffer zone, wounding and capturing one. In a letter of 8 April (S/9139), Syria charged that Israel had erected a new advanced observation point in the buffer zone, and in a further letter of the same date (S/9141), charged that on 5 April six Syrian shepherds had been captured and murdered by Israel soldiers in the area of Briqa village. In a letter dated 15 April (S/9158), Israel rejected the Syrian charges contained in the three above-mentioned letters and stated that Syria had no right or grounds for complaint over defence measures taken by Israel on its side of the cease-fire line, particularly when they were essential in face of repeated Syrian attempts to violate the cease-fire by its regular forces and by marauders and saboteurs (see also section B, below).

336. During the period from early April until 15 July, the Secretary-General continued to circulate supplemental information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO containing data reported by United Nations military observers on breaches of the cease-fire in the Israel-Syria sector. Supplemental information reporting on firing incidents or exchanges, in which machine-gun, mortar, heavy weapon, tank and ack-ack fire, as well as mine explosions, were heard, were issued on 9 and 28 April, 14, 27 and 28 May, 7 and 24 June and 9 July (S/7930/Add.152, Add.178, Add.196, Add.210, Add.212, Add.225, Add.243 and Add.259). On 6 June (S/7930/Add.222), the Secretary-General circulated a revised list, submitted by the Chief of Staff, of the

locations of the observation posts situated along the limits of both the Syrian and Israel forward defended localities. Also reported during this period were two incidents of aerial engagements in which the military observers had observed the firing of air-to-air missiles and the probable downing of aircraft. The first incident was reported in supplemental information issued on 29 May (S/7930/Add.214), and second on 9 July (S/7930/Add.258). The observers reported in the latter incident having seen four Israel Mirage aircraft flying west to east over the area between the limits of the forward defended localities, two Mirage aircraft engaging three MIG 21 aircraft, and two unidentified aircraft falling in the area. Shortly thereafter, observers had again seen four Mirage aircraft crossing the area, two aircraft engaged in high air battle, five air-to-air missiles fired and an object falling which could have been an aircraft. In a letter dated 10 July (S/9320 and Corr.1), Syria complained that three Syrian planes had been downed and a Syrian pilot killed, while intercepting attacking Israel planes, four of which had been downed. The letter charged that the latest attack had been premeditated and executed as part of a new aggressive military strategy adopted by the Israel General Staff.

B. QUESTION CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS IN ISRAEL-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND RELATED MATTERS

337. During the period covered by this report, the Security Council received a number of communications concerning the treatment of civilian populations in territories under Israel occupation. Communications from the Arab States complained about Israel's policies in these territories, alleging the arrest, detention, torture, dispossession and expulsion of Arab civilians from their homes, the destruction of Arab villages and houses and the establishment of Israel settlements in the occupied areas. Israel rejected the charges of the Arab States and made countercharges regarding the treatment of Jews in certain Arab States (see section D, below). The Secretary-General submitted a report on his efforts to send a representative to the Middle East to enable him to meet his reporting obligations under Security Council resolution 237 (1967) concerning humanitarian questions. His report was discussed by the Council at two meetings in September 1968.

(a) *Communications to the Council from 16 July to 18 September 1968*

338. By a letter of 18 July (S/8685), Jordan drew attention to a map circulated at the twenty-seventh World Zionist Congress held in Jerusalem in June depicting the location of some thirty-five new Jewish settlements. The majority of those para-military fortified settlements, it was stated, were to be established in occupied Arab territory. In reply, Israel, in a letter of 28 July (S/8696), stated that of the "thirty-five new Jewish settlements" referred to only fourteen were in areas that had come under Israel control since the cease-fire of June 1967, and nearly all of them had been in existence for some time. In previous communications Israel had explained that the activities of the "Nahal outposts" were designed to assist in ensuring the security of the area and in maintaining the cease-fire. In a letter of 2 August (S/8717), Jordan rejected the Israel explanation and stated that land had been illegally expropriated, villages had been razed to the ground and thousands of Arabs had been expelled to accommodate new Israel settlers.

339. In a letter dated 24 July (S/8690), Jordan drew attention to the deteriorating conditions of more than 400,000 refugees and displaced persons forced to flee from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the East Bank of Jordan. Jordan charged that owing to Israel intransigence in implementing Security Council and General Assembly resolutions only a small proportion of the displaced persons had been allowed to return. In a further letter dated 25 July (S/8691), Jordan charged that Israel intended to deport another 50,000 Palestinian refugees from the Gaza Strip to the East Bank and charged Israel with systematically persecuting the Arabs in the occupied territories in order to further its policy of colonization. In a letter dated 26 July (S/8693), Sudan also protested the planned mass expulsion. Jordan, in a letter dated 29 July (S/8698), protested the carrying out by Israel of that act of mass expulsion in defiance of the Security Council's resolutions; Israel's expulsion of the refugees with the support of its armed forces had resulted in a firing incident at the King Hussein Bridge (see section A, above). In a letter dated 30 July (S/8700), Israel rejected the charges that any pressure had been exerted on Palestinian

refugees to leave the Gaza Strip; nor, it was added, were they being prevented from leaving. In a further letter dated 1 August (S/8711), Israel stated, in reply to the Jordanian letter of 24 July, that it was Jordan that had failed to effect the return of 3,000 refugees a day to the West Bank, following a humanitarian agreement signed by the two countries on 6 August 1967. In reply, Jordan stated in a letter of 2 August (S/8717) that Israel's distortions could not justify the obstacles that it had placed in the way of the return of the refugees. In a letter of 5 August (S/8722), Jordan transmitted a copy of a protest against deportation sent by the Mukhtars of Jabalia Camp to the Director of UNRWA in the Gaza Strip to show Israel's premeditated plan for the expulsion and deportation of the refugees.

340. In a letter dated 25 July (S/8689), Syria charged that the Israel invading forces were systematically continuing their ruthless colonization of Arab-occupied territories, as evidenced by Israel statements and press reports, and their inhuman treatment of the Arab civilian population. These allegations were rejected by Israel in a letter of 1 August (S/8708), which also charged continued oppression of Syrian Jews and continued rejection by Syria of all United Nations efforts towards peace in the Middle East. In a letter of 9 August (S/8742), Syria stated that Israel had ignored the issues raised in Syria's previous letter and maintained its charges. In a letter of 16 August (S/8749), Syria quoted further reports and statements in support of its charges that Israel was integrating occupied Syrian territory in the Golan Heights into Israel.

341. By a letter dated 29 August (S/8789), Jordan transmitted a copy of a letter of 25 July from the inhabitants of Emmaus, Yalo and Beit Nuba, charging that following their forced evacuation from their houses and property in the six-day war, their villages had been destroyed, and they had been rendered destitute.

342. By a letter dated 18 September (S/8820), Jordan transmitted protests sent by Arab leaders and inhabitants of the occupied territories to Israel officials and international bodies against the measures taken by the Israel authorities in the occupied territories. In addition to protests relating to Jerusalem, there were included protests concerning the mistreatment of innocent Arab

ladies in Israel prisons, a letter from Arab lawyers and a declaration by trade union leaders concerning the expulsion of refugees in Jabalia Camp in the Gaza Strip and a request for the end of Israel occupation by the mayors and dignitaries of the West Bank.

(b) *Report of the Secretary-General of 31 July 1968 and requests for a meeting*

343. On 31 July 1968, the Secretary-General, pursuant to Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V), submitted a report (S/8699) setting forth the communications between the Secretary-General and the parties from May to July 1968 relating to his proposal to send a representative to the Middle East, in particular for the purpose of meeting his reporting obligations under Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) concerning humanitarian questions. In letters of 2 and 20 May, the Permanent Representative of Syria had emphasized his Government's understanding that the humanitarian resolutions under which the proposed special representative would be appointed referred exclusively to the civilian population in the Arab areas occupied by Israel and to the Arab refugees from those areas and did not apply to Jewish communities in Arab countries, and that the mission of the representative would be confined to reporting under those resolutions. In conversations on 23 May and in written communications of 12 and 26 June and 8 July 1968, the Permanent Representative of Israel had stated his Government's view that the mission of the representative should include the situation of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries, including those in Iraq and Lebanon. Israel maintained that the relevant resolutions related to the conditions of the civilian population throughout the Middle East area of conflict and not only in Israel-held territories. It was clear that Iraq was one of the States directly concerned because of its participation in the war; although Lebanon did not fully participate in the fighting, anxiety was felt about the Jewish community there, and there was no logical reason why Lebanon should be excluded from the scope of the mission.

344. The Secretary-General, orally on 23 May and in written communications of 18 and 27 June

and 15 July, stated that the proposed extension of the terms of reference to cover the treatment of the Jewish communities in Iraq and Lebanon was unacceptable and regretted that the question had been raised, particularly at such a late stage. The second humanitarian mission would have the same terms of reference and general scope as the first (Gussing) mission, and the suggested extension had not been raised at that time. The Secretary-General expressed his deep concern for the situation of the Jewish communities in the Arab States and said that he had been dealing directly with the question of the treatment of the Jewish community in Iraq through that country's Permanent Representative and would continue to do so. He added that there was no indication that a problem existed concerning the treatment of the Jewish community in Lebanon. The Secretary-General then pointed out that it was only by a broad humanitarian interpretation that it had been possible in the case of the Gussing mission to stretch the terms of the resolutions to include "humanitarian inquiries" concerning Jewish persons in Syria and in the United Arab Republic as ancillary to the investigation of the condition and treatment of inhabitants in occupied territories. The Security Council resolution could not, by legal interpretation, be regarded as applying to the Jewish communities in Iraq and Lebanon. Attached to the Secretary-General's letter of 15 July was a brief legal analysis concerning the application and scope of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. The Secretary-General stated that he regretfully had to conclude that the points raised by Israel were to be taken as conditions which had to be met, if the proposed mission was to be able to proceed and have the necessary access to the areas it was concerned with [*sic*].

345. The Secretary-General communicated the position of Israel to Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic. The replies from the representatives of Syria and Jordan on 23 July and the United Arab Republic on 25 July confirmed that their Governments would welcome the Secretary-General's Special Representative, whose terms of reference, they stated, had been clearly indicated in Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V). The obstacles and arbitrary demands of Israel

to the proposed second mission were aimed, it was stated, at perpetuating the tragedy of the Arab inhabitants expelled by the Israel occupation authorities and at continuing the inhuman treatment of the civilian population under Israel rule in occupied Arab territories. The representatives of the Arab States hoped that the Secretary-General would see that the two resolutions were effectively and fully implemented.

346. On 29 July a reply was transmitted from the Foreign Minister of Israel, in which he stated, *inter alia*, that Israel was not imposing "conditions" but was asking only that the mission should have an equal opportunity to investigate the situation of Jewish communities in Arab countries since the recent conflict. Israel believed that that was clearly within the scope of the relevant resolutions, which had made plain that United Nations humanitarian concern extended to civilians in the whole Middle East area. It was the unwillingness of the Arab Governments to co-operate in that respect which was delaying the mission. The Foreign Minister requested that the Secretary-General communicate the substance of his Government's position also to Iraq and Lebanon, since those countries were also directly involved in the conflict and inquiry needed to be made into the situation of their Jewish communities.

347. The Secretary-General concluded his report by stating that there was currently no basis on which the mission could proceed, since it required the co-operation of the parties concerned and the necessary assured access. The difficulties arose from an attempt to broaden the scope and terms of reference of the new mission beyond those applying to the Gussing mission, which went as far as the relevant resolutions would permit. There was no question of discrimination; approaches had been made to the Governments concerned, including the Government of Iraq, regarding the treatment of Jewish communities, and there appeared to be no problem regarding the Jewish community in Lebanon. The Secretary-General held that on the legal level, the resolution could not be stretched to cover those two countries and stated that he had not approached them regarding the question of the acceptance of the mission. He pointed out that resolution 237 (1967) had referred to "the area of conflict" not the territory of States parties

to the conflict and that the records of the discussions preceding the adoption of the resolution also showed that it had been motivated by concern for the inhabitants of the occupied areas where military operations had taken place. The proposed mission would be concerned exclusively with humanitarian matters. The Secretary-General considered it unfortunate that considerations involving the well-being of a great many people should not be regarded as being of sufficient urgency to override the obstacles that the projected mission was facing.

348. By a letter dated 17 September (S/8819), the representative of Pakistan and Senegal requested the President of the Security Council to call an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the Secretary-General's report (S/8699).

(c) *Consideration by the Council at its 1453rd and 1454th meetings (20 and 27 September 1968)*

349. At the 1453rd meeting on 20 September 1968, the Security Council placed the letter from Pakistan and Senegal on its agenda. The representatives of Jordan, Israel and the United Arab Republic and, subsequently, of Syria were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

350. At the same meeting, the representative of Senegal introduced a draft resolution (S/8825, and Rev.1) co-sponsored by Pakistan and Senegal, which, in its operative part, would have had the Security Council: (1) deplore the refusal of Israel to receive a Special Representative of the Secretary-General; (2) request the Secretary-General urgently to dispatch a Special Representative to the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel, following the hostilities of 5 June 1967, and to report on the implementation of resolution 237 (1967); and (3) request the Government of Israel to receive the Special Representative, to co-operate with him and to facilitate his work. The representative of Senegal stated that the Israel Government, by introducing into the question elements which were entirely alien, in fact as well as in law, to the humanitarian procedure which the Secretary-General wished to follow, had hindered the implementation of resolution 237 (1967) which related solely to the civilian populations in the area where hostilities had taken place and were subsequently occupied by Israel and

which had nothing whatsoever to do with the status of minorities in foreign countries. He hoped that the Government of Israel would co-operate with the Secretary-General's Representative and that the draft resolution would be adopted unanimously.

351. The representative of Pakistan said that the Secretary-General's report showed clearly that Israel had raised certain issues entirely irrelevant to resolution 237 (1967) in order to becloud the fact that the Council had addressed a clear call to Israel to ensure the welfare and fundamental rights of inhabitants under its military occupation since June 1967. His delegation entirely agreed with the interpretation that the projected mission was limited only to "areas where military operations have taken place". It was the clear duty of the Council to ensure that, pending final settlement of the political issues, the people who had been left under Israel military occupation were not denied their fundamental rights. The attempt to bury that humanitarian question by raising irrelevant issues must be resisted by the Council.

352. The representative of Jordan said that the issue before the Security Council was whether or not Israel should be permitted to defy the Council's injunction calling for the security, welfare and safety of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories. Israel was resisting an impartial investigation because that would uncover its criminal acts and lawless behaviour. He charged that the Israelis had (1) denied the right of the inhabitants of the occupied areas to protection, safety, welfare and security; (2) unlawfully interfered in the religious rights of the inhabitants; (3) forced prisoners of war to take part in services of military production, which would be used in war operations against their country; (4) arbitrarily arrested many innocent individuals without trial and tortured many others; (5) expelled thousands of Palestinians and many of their leaders from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and from the West Bank of Jordan to the East Bank; (6) ignored the laws of the occupied territories, changed the status of officials and judges, and promulgated Israel laws in direct violation of international law and practice; (7) destroyed Arab houses and confiscated Arab property; (8) settled Jewish groups on Arab land in occupied

territories; (9) imposed harsh and discriminatory economic measures on the inhabitants of the occupied territories; and (10) committed acts leading to systematic destruction of the essential foundations of the life of the Palestine people. Should Israel deny these charges, he said, that would reinforce the fact that the only way to find out the truth was by on-the-spot investigation. In support of his charges, the representative of Jordan referred, *inter alia*, to previous communications he had addressed to the Council concerning the destruction and looting of Arab property, desecration of the Holy Places, attacks on Arab inhabitants, intimidation and torture of arrested persons, expulsions of Arab leaders and groups of inhabitants, destruction of Arab villages after the cease-fire resolutions and the demolition of Arab houses and establishment of Israel settlements (S/8750, S/8820, S/8290, S/8311, S/8445, S/8373, S/8691, S/8698, S/8722, S/8634, S/8666, S/8667, S/8609, S/8685).

353. The representative of Israel stated that the complaint before the Security Council was but a reflection of continued Arab hostility and intransigence and an expression of Arab refusal to advance towards a just and lasting peace. Far from contributing to the promotion of understanding, it heightened tension and did not assist the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It was regrettable that the Arab Governments were delaying the process by which the current situation of cease-fire lines and military administration could be replaced through agreement and peace by recognized boundaries and normal government. Israel had conveyed its willingness to the Secretary-General to co-operate with a second representative on a fact-finding mission within the context of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V). If the mission was unable to undertake its work it was only because the Arab countries had insisted that the mission be based on anti-Jewish discrimination.

354. The representative of Israel then said that he was authorized to state that any person present at the Security Council table who wished to come to Israel would be welcome and his visit to the territories under Israel control would be facilitated so that he could form his own impressions. What Israel could not accept was deliberate disregard

for the fate of Jews who were in distress. The meeting for the first time since 1948 between Arabs and Israelis showed that peaceful co-existence between the two peoples was possible, since both wanted peace; the normalcy of the situation had been commented upon by neutral observers. The real humanitarian problem in the Middle East concerned the people of Jewish faith in Arab countries. The representative of Israel charged that in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, Jews had been subjected to discrimination, oppression and inhuman treatment.

355. The representative of Algeria, on a point of order, stated that by raising the question of the situation of people of Jewish faith in various Arab countries, the representative of Israel was departing from the agenda and interfering directly in the domestic affairs of sovereign States.

356. The President explained that the item in the agenda was the situation in the Middle East, under which the Council was considering the letter from the representatives of Pakistan and Senegal (S/8819). That, in turn, referred to the report of the Secretary-General (S/8699), which contained the views of Governments, including Israel. Those views had ranged over the issues which had been referred to by speakers in the debate.

357. The representative of Senegal, supported by the representatives of Algeria and Pakistan, called attention to the terms of the letter from Senegal and Pakistan.

358. Following informal consultations, a revised version of the draft resolution of Pakistan and Senegal (S/8825/Rev. 2) was before the Council at its 1454th meeting on 27 September 1968. It read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Concerned with the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June 1967,

"Recalling its resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

"Noting the report by the Secretary-General, contained in document S/8699, and appreciating his efforts in this connexion,

"Deploing the delay in the implementation of resolution 237 (1967) because of the conditions

still being set by Israel for receiving a Special Representative of the Secretary-General,

"1. *Requests* the Secretary-General urgently to dispatch a Special Representative to the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June 1967, and to report on the implementation of resolution 237 (1967);

"2. *Requests* the Government of Israel to receive the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to co-operate within [*sic*] him and to facilitate his work;

"3. *Recommends* that the Secretary-General be afforded all co-operation in his efforts to bring about the implementation of the present resolution and resolution 237 (1967)."

359. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed concern that humanitarian action, in accordance with the clear purposes of the Council unanimously expressed after the June hostilities, had been so long delayed. At the same time, the Council must not lay itself open to charges of discrimination. The General Assembly and the Council, in adopting the humanitarian resolutions, had been concerned about civilians in the area of conflict. The Secretary-General had explained that by a broad humanitarian interpretation it was possible to stretch the terms of the resolution to include humanitarian inquiries concerning Jewish persons in Syria and the United Arab Republic as ancillary to the investigation of the condition of the inhabitants of the occupied territories; he had also explained why it was not possible to extend the inquiries to Lebanon and Iraq. While it might be possible to contend that the Secretary-General had gone beyond the strict interpretation of the resolutions, he had done so for humanitarian reasons which should be respected; no charge of discrimination could be made against him. What was needed was effective action without delay through a unanimous decision to assist those who had been suffering too long. He appealed on humanitarian grounds that every support should be given to the Secretary-General and his representative in the discharge of that humanitarian mission.

360. The representative of France stated that his delegation supported the Secretary-General's

idea of sending a new representative to the area to enable him to report in accordance with the resolutions of the Council and the Assembly and regretted that certain obstacles had made it impossible to send such a representative. The Secretary-General had stated that the second mission would have the same scope as the first mission and that had caused no particular difficulties. France, for obvious humanitarian motives in line with its traditions, had been gratified at the broad interpretation placed by the Secretary-General on the resolutions concerning the area of activity of the Gussing mission. However, the areas at which the resolutions were aimed were the territories occupied by Israel. France had always urged a speedy end to that occupation, but as long as it continued the Security Council must be informed with regard to the conditions prevailing there.

361. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the continued illegal occupation of the Arab lands and the mistreatment of their inhabitants was a constant violation of the international principles, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949, regarding behaviour of States in time of war and protection of civilians. Among the most flagrant crimes were the inhumane practice of indiscriminately demolishing houses as a means of suppressing the legitimate aspirations of the civilian inhabitants; the appropriation of lands owned individually or collectively by Arabs, especially in Jerusalem; intimidation, coercion and massive deportation aimed at changing the ethnic and demographic structure of the occupied Arab territories. That established policy of repression explained why Israel was adamant in its refusal to co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and had put obstacles in the way of the implementation of resolution 237 (1967). Israel's violation of human rights had been recognized by the Teheran Conference on Human Rights. The resolution of that Conference had made it imperative for the Secretary-General not to delay the dispatch of his Special Representative.

362. The representative of Syria stated that resolutions 237 (1967) and 2252 (ES-V) had been completely disregarded by Israel, which had committed and was still committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in the occupied Arab territories, as could be seen from various United

Nations documents and in writings of Israel, American and other Western writers. While the humanitarian aspect of the problem was the one which should guide the Council's deliberations, it should not override legal considerations, as the Secretary-General had made clear. The members of the Jewish community in Syria were Syrian citizens with full, equal rights and duties; those who were concerned about ethnic or religious minorities in Arab countries could seek assurances from the International Red Cross Committee, whose representative had paid tribute to Syrian efforts to protect its Jewish citizens. Swelling the number of refugees, which were increasing daily, the occupied areas of Syria had been almost completely emptied of their inhabitants, and over forty villages there had been levelled by Israel bulldozers; as the Commissioner-General of UNRWA had pointed out, the standard of living which UNRWA had been able to provide to the refugees was inadequate.

363. Referring to his delegation's previous communications to the Council, the representative of Syria charged that the Israel occupying authorities had committed violations of human rights and of the Geneva Conventions, including intimidation and expulsion of indigenous inhabitants, burning of crops, seizure of innocent individuals, looting and bulldozing of villages. There were now thirty-eight new Israel settlements in the occupied Arab territories, nine of which were on Syrian soil. Jewish sources had stated that the Golan Heights would be converted into a summer resort area, and plans had been made for grazing massive herds of cattle there. The resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Human Rights and the Teheran Conference relating to the treatment of the Arab civilian population in the Israel-occupied territories should remind the Council of the gravity and dimensions of the human problem involved.

364. The representative of Israel said that the Arab delegations and their supporters had tried by devious arguments to dismiss the problem of oppression of Jews in the Arab States in the wake of the June 1967 hostilities; it was not the first time that they had proposed in the Council that justice and law be one-sided. He cited reports relating to the situation of Jews in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The situation had been considered grave

enough for the Secretary-General's first Representative on humanitarian matters to concern himself with it, and the situation of Jews in Iraq woeful enough for the Secretary-General to take it up repeatedly with the Government of Iraq. Yet the Arab delegations and the sponsors of the draft resolution before the Council would have it ignored. The Arab Governments by continuing to wage war against Israel were responsible for the situation and Israel was therefore compelled to put its security in the forefront of its considerations. Israel had no objection to a second United Nations humanitarian mission examining the situation in areas under Israel control, provided the Arab Governments took the same position regarding the situation of Jews in their territories since June 1967. Resolution 237 (1967) was addressed to the Governments concerned, not to one Government, and its preamble and paragraph 2 made it plain that international concern extended over the Middle East region as a whole, not only the territories under Israel occupation.

365. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Council was dealing with one more manifestation of Israel's aggressive policy in violation of the Charter and Council's decisions. The question of the situation of the Arab population in territories occupied by Israel and of the dispatch to the Middle East of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for humanitarian purposes was an inalienable part of the problem of the speedy liquidation of the consequences of Israel aggression against the Arab States. Israel had not heeded the warning contained in resolution 237 (1967) but had continued to commit acts of lawlessness in the occupied Arab territories and had established there a régime of arbitrary oppression, expropriating Arab lands, expelling the Arab inhabitants, and destroying Arab villages. Because it feared exposure, it was therefore hindering the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. What was happening in the occupied Arab territories emphasized the need for the speediest possible liquidation of the consequences of Israel aggression, the earliest possible withdrawal of Israel troops from Arab territories and a political settlement in the Middle East through the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. For refusing to comply with the

Security Council's resolution of 14 June 1967, and for refusing to allow the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to enter the territories concerned in spite of all the Secretary-General's efforts, Israel should be decisively condemned by the Security Council which should also reaffirm resolution 237 and demand its immediate implementation.

366. The representative of Algeria said that Israel had set conditions which it knew in advance were unacceptable for the fulfilment of the humanitarian mission in order to avoid having to account for the conditions of life of the displaced populations following its expansionist policies. There was only a slight chance that Israel would eliminate the obstacles it had imposed, because its unavowed aim in posing as the champion of minorities all over the world was to provoke dissension within States and create an atmosphere of suspicion towards their minorities. It was seeking to provoke or increase a current of emigrants who would be forced out out of fear and hatred and thus allow Israel to increase its population and colonize the newly conquered territories. Instead of admitting its responsibilities for the non-implementation of resolution 237 (1967), Israel had preferred to cast blame on the Arab countries. The humanitarian mission must be maintained as precisely interpreted by the Council and the Secretary-General.

367. The representative of Ethiopia said that in sponsoring resolution 237 (1967) his delegation's primary purpose had been to ensure the safety and welfare of peoples who had been directly affected by the military conflict of June 1967 and, more particularly, those inhabiting the territories which had come under Israel military control during and subsequent to the conflict. In requesting the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the resolution it had taken special care not to specify any rigid course of action which would make it difficult for him to carry out his mandate; it commended his efforts and hoped that they would continue. His delegation could not accept the Israel interpretation of resolution 237 (1967) or the conditions that emanated from it. That did not mean that Ethiopia was unconcerned about the necessity of universal respect for religious freedom; it condemned all religious persecution and discrimination on grounds of race, religion,

colour or creed. The course of action proposed in the draft resolution was fair and just, and his delegation would support it.

368. The representative of India said that the language of paragraph 1 of resolution 237 (1967) made it quite clear that the scope of the inquiry was limited to the occupied areas. The task of the Special Representative was simple and unambiguous: to gather full information on the basis of which the Secretary-General could report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution. In the light of the Secretary-General's report, it must be concluded that the purposes and principles of the resolution had not yet been fulfilled. India was deeply concerned about the plight of the Arab civilians under foreign occupation and urged Israel to co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

369. The representative of Hungary said that the discussion had shown that the representative of Israel was attempting to widen the scope of the debate to include issues outside the framework of the subject-matter. The Security Council should not tolerate those attempts. The representatives of Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Syria and Algeria had produced a large number of facts in favour of the urgency of a visit of the Special Representative to occupied Arab territories. The term "areas where military operations have taken place" in resolution 237 (1967) clearly referred to the areas of the Arab States illegally occupied by Israel. By frequent reference to the Jewish people, the representative of Israel was trying to confuse the issue. Israel was responsible for implementing resolution 237 (1967) and the resolution which the Council might adopt regarding the humanitarian conditions of those Arab citizens, no matter what their religious beliefs. The draft resolution was very modest in form and careful in wording and should be adopted unanimously.

370. Statements in exercise of the right of reply were made by the representatives of Syria, Israel and the USSR referring to conditions of Jews, Christians and Kurds in Syria and Jews in the USSR and of Arabs in the occupied areas in Syria and the Gaza strip.

371. Following a brief procedural discussion in which the representative of the United Kingdom, on a point of order, suggested that the vote on the

draft resolution be postponed and the representatives of Pakistan and the USSR opposed such postponement, the President put the draft resolution to the vote.

Decision: At the 1454th meeting on 27 September 1968, the revised draft resolution of Pakistan and Senegal (S/8825/Rev. 2) was adopted by 12 votes in favour, none against and 3 abstentions (Canada, Denmark, United States of America) as resolution 259 (1968).

372. Following the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General stated that the Special Representative could be on his way with minimum delay, once there was assurance that he would have the access and co-operation indispensable to the fulfilment of his mission.

373. The representative of Brazil said that in voting for the draft resolution, his delegation had had the same humanitarian concern without political motivation which had inspired it to co-sponsor resolution 237 (1967). The new resolution should not be construed as being directed against any State or any of the parties involved in the Middle East dispute; it was a measure to help the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring about the implementation of resolution 237 (1967).

374. The representative of China said that in voting for the draft resolution, his delegation understood that it was a follow-up of resolution 237 (1967) for the purpose of enabling the Secretary-General again to dispatch a Special Representative on a humanitarian mission and would in no way detract from the earlier resolution or prejudice the discretion of the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring about its implementation.

375. The representative of Denmark stated that his delegation had abstained in the voting on the draft resolution, as it was not convinced about the adequacy of the approach in that resolution to the problems involved. It had felt strongly that the United Nations, in pursuance of resolutions 237 (1967) and 2252 (ES-V), should take an active interest in the safety, welfare and security of the civil populations affected by the hostilities of 1967. It was clear that the Secretary-General had done everything in his power to follow the implementation of the two resolutions, and it was highly regrettable that obstacles should have been raised to the sending out of a second humanitarian mission. It was the duty of those concerned to co-

operate with the Secretary-General, especially in a case like the present one where, in a truly humanitarian spirit, he had shown considerable flexibility and given to the resolutions in question what the Secretary-General himself had called a broad humanitarian interpretation. There could be no doubt that those concerned, and not least the Government of Israel, should have been more forthcoming. His delegation believed that the Council should have expressed its full support of the Secretary-General's efforts, including the dispatch of another Special Representative with the scope and terms of reference set forth in the Secretary-General's report, and should have called on those concerned to co-operate fully and unconditionally with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative.

376. The representative of Paraguay said that his delegation had voted for the resolution for humanitarian reasons and because it adhered to the fundamental principle that all resolutions of the Security Council must be scrupulously observed. It regretted the omission in the resolution of the provision of the first and second preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 2 of resolution 237 (1967). It felt that the Governments concerned must scrupulously observe the provisions of that resolution.

377. The representative of the United States stated that his Government continued to support an approach to the issue on the basis of resolution 237 (1967). It would have been pleased to vote for a draft resolution which clearly provided for the dispatch of a United Nations representative on the same basis as before. It regretted that the sponsors had not found acceptable an informal proposal presented during the consultations by which the Secretary-General would have been asked urgently to pursue his efforts, including the dispatch of a Special Representative, with a view to implementing resolution 237 (1967), and would have requested that the Secretary-General be given all necessary assistance and be permitted to carry out his task without conditions being imposed. His delegation could have supported such a text. Moreover, it appeared that the sponsors wished to disassociate the Security Council from the fate of Jewish minorities in the area of conflict; this was unacceptable to his delegation. A text which appeared to narrow the terms of

reference of the Special Representative or was ambiguous on that point was not designed to achieve practical results; the United States could not therefore support it. The United States was deeply concerned about the plight of those who were suffering as a result of the hostilities and considered that the United Nations should pursue its humanitarian role. It considered that it was on the basis of resolution 237 (1967), as interpreted by the Secretary-General, which had produced practical results the previous year, that further progress was most likely to be made, and it hoped that despite the divisive elements introduced by the adoption of the resolution a common ground might yet be found that would permit the United Nations to manifest its legitimate and real concern for the people of the Middle East.

378. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had felt that the resolution was in a form unlikely to facilitate the implementation of resolution 237 (1967) and therefore had put forward alternative proposals, which it regretted had been rejected. On the other hand, it strongly supported the purpose of resolution 237 (1967), the dispatch of the Secretary-General's Representative to the Middle East and the implementation of the humanitarian resolution without conditions. Therefore, although it did not accept certain sections of the resolution, it supported, in particular, the last operative paragraph and had voted in favour of the resolution.

379. The President, speaking as the representative of Canada, said that Canada shared the deep and general concern about the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants in the area of conflict in the Middle East and supported the efforts of the Secretary-General to send another Special Representative on humanitarian questions to the Middle East. It would have accepted the suggestion in the Secretary-General's report that the second mission should have the same scope and terms of reference as the first and that the broadest possible humanitarian interpretation should be given to the terms of reference. Unfortunately, the resolution took a restrictive view of the mission and was therefore unlikely to achieve its primary purpose, the dispatch of another Special Representative. Since it was concerned that Security Council resolutions should be so drafted as to be carried out, Canada had been obliged to

abstain.

380. The representative of Senegal said that the sponsors of the resolution had taken into account the Secretary-General's report in trying to find a way out of the deadlock in the Council. It hoped that after the adoption of the current resolution, resolution 237 (1967) would be applied effectively and rapidly. The sponsors asked only that a representative of the Secretary-General should go and find out what was happening to the inhabitants of the Arab territories occupied by Israel. Clearly, the Representative could find in the resolution just adopted by the Council no legal basis permitting him to go to sovereign States which no longer administered zones currently occupied by Israel. If Israel did not wish to admit a representative, it had only to withdraw from the occupied territories. The sponsors hoped that no further obstacles would be placed in the way of an important inquiry concerning the safety, welfare and security of inhabitants of the Arab territories militarily occupied by Israel.

381. The representative of Pakistan stated that Pakistan's position that the Council had adopted resolution 237 (1967) out of concern for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of Arab territories under the temporary military occupation of Israel remained unchanged; that was the basis for the current resolution which it had co-sponsored. The amendments accepted to the original draft did not, in his delegation's opinion, change the basic concept of that resolution.

382. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the Council had indicated clearly to Israel that the responsibility for co-operating with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General lay with the Israel authorities and that no conditions would be accepted with regard to the fulfilment of the Representative's mission. The Representative should be sent to the occupied areas immediately, and all facilities necessary for his mission should be accorded to him. He regretted that the delegations of the United States, Denmark and Canada had abstained from voting for a merely humane resolution.

383. The representative of Syria associated his delegation with the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic.

(d) Report of the Secretary-General of 14 October 1968

384. On 14 October, the Secretary-General, in pursuance of paragraph 1 of resolution 259 (1968), submitted a report (S/8851) containing the texts of letters exchanged by him with the representatives of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic. On 28 September, the Secretary-General had addressed a letter to the representative of Israel, seeking assurance that the Israel Government would receive, co-operate with and facilitate the work of the Special Representative to be designated by him. On the same day, he had also written to the representatives of the three Arab States to obtain the co-operation of their Governments for the Special Representative.

385. In their replies, the representatives of Jordan and the United Arab Republic had given assurances of their Governments' fullest co-operation with the Special Representative. The representative of Syria, after stating his Government's understanding that under resolutions 237 (1967) and 259 (1968) the Special Representative had no mandate over Syrian citizens of Jewish faith, had also assured him that the Special Representative would be afforded all co-operation in his efforts. The representative of Israel reiterated his Government's stand that the task of the Special Representative should, in accordance with its interpretation of resolution 237 (1967), include the question of treatment of both Arab and Jewish persons in the States which were directly concerned because of their participation in the war. He added that as soon as the Secretary-General had received assurances from the Arab Governments that had participated in the June war that the Special Representative would have the access and co-operation indispensable to the fulfilment of his mission concerning the Jewish minorities in those countries, Israel would be ready to discuss the arrangements for the mission.

386. In his reply to the representative of Israel, the Secretary-General pointed out that his request for co-operation was made under resolution 259 (1968) which in its paragraph 1 referred exclusively to "Arab territories under military occupation by Israel", and in its paragraph 2 made a request of Israel which envisaged implementation without conditions. The Secretary-General concluded that since Israel's reply did not afford him a basis on which to dispatch the Special Repre-

sentative, he had no alternative but to report to the Security Council accordingly.

387. In conclusion, the Secretary-General stated that as would be seen from the correspondence, he had not been able to give effect to the decision of the Security Council.

(e) Further communications received between 27 September 1968 and 15 July 1969

388. In this period many communications were received relating to the conditions of the inhabitants of the territories occupied by Israel following the hostilities of June 1967.

389. In a number of letters Syria made specific charges of the demolition of Syrian villages in occupied territory or of houses in Syrian villages. Israel in reply stated either that it was a question of demolition of damaged and abandoned houses or that the Israel actions were necessary for security reasons.

390. In a letter dated 15 October (S/8857), Syria charged that on 18 September Israel had started demolishing the occupied Syrian village of Souraman and on 10 October the village of Ahmediye. In a letter dated 21 October (S/8863), Israel replied that Syria had magnified out of proportion the demolition of some abandoned and damaged houses which constituted a risk as they were in danger of collapse. Syria confirmed its charges in a letter of 7 November (S/8893) and, in a letter dated 21 November (S/8904), stated that the demolition of Souraman was continuing.

391. In a letter of 4 March (S/9042), Syria charged that on 26 February the Israel occupation forces had set fire to the village of Khisfine. On 4 April it charged (S/9131) further demolition of houses on 26 March and at Aboukhbit on 31 March; on 8 April it charged (S/9139) the demolition of houses at Kuneitra on 31 March; on 11 April it charged (S/9150) the demolition of houses on 6, 7 and 8 April at the villages of Zbizetun, Tel Esseqi, Errazaniye and Khan El-Joukhadar. In reply to those charges, Israel asserted in a letter dated 15 April (S/9158) that Syria had no grounds for complaint over defence measures taken by Israel on its side of the cease-fire line in the face of Syrian violations by its regular forces and by marauders and saboteurs. In a letter dated 17 April (S/9164), Syria, in turn, protested that so-called defence measures could not justify the

razing of villages, demolition of houses and mass execution of shepherds, and called attention to Israel's refusal to accept the dispatch of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in accordance with the Council's resolution 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968. In a further letter dated 25 April (S/9177), Israel declared that since Syria's policy had remained one of war with Israel, Syria had no basis for advising Israel on how to defend itself. In a letter dated 9 May (S/9199), Syria charged further demolition of houses by Israel authorities on 27 and 28 April at the village of Aache.

392. In letters of 12 December 1968 (S/8928) and 16 January 1969 (S/8971), Syria drew attention to reports by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency concerning Israel plans for establishing Israel settlements on the Golan Heights.

393. Charges of the violation of human rights and the Geneva Conventions in occupied Arab territories were also made in communications from various Syrian organizations transmitted by letters dated 28 October and 5 November (S/8873 and S/8887). In a letter of 30 October (S/8876), Israel rejected Syrian charges and accused Syria of oppressing Jews and other minorities. Syria, in rejecting the Israel charges in a letter of 6 November (S/8892), quoted a letter from Israel intellectuals regarding violation of human rights in the occupied territories.

394. In a number of communications throughout the period, Jordan, in addition to protests relating to Jerusalem and the treatment of its population (see section C, below), complained of oppressive measures against Jordanian citizens in the occupied areas, in particular, of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, ill-treatment in prisons, unjustified expulsion and demolition of houses. A number of these charges were rejected by Israel as false or distorted.

395. In a letter dated 9 December (S/8923), Jordan charged Israel with taking oppressive measures against Jordanian citizens in the occupied areas, in particular, with arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, and, in letters of 12 December (S/8929, S/8930), transmitted resolutions adopted by the Arab Regional Conference on Human Rights held in Beirut on 4 December 1968, condemning the Israel attack on the civilian population of Irbid on 3 December and the arbitrary

imprisonment of Jordan citizens under Israel occupation.

396. By a letter dated 13 December (S/8932), Jordan transmitted a memorandum signed by mayors, members of the professions and members of women's organizations on the West Bank, protesting the treatment of the inhabitants by the occupation authorities, including house demolition, property confiscation and unjustified arrests and expulsions.

397. By a letter dated 7 January 1969 (S/8961), Jordan transmitted a statement by a Jordanian citizen, the President of the Union of Palestine Arab Students in Lebanon, alleging his ill-treatment and that of other Arabs in Israel prisons. His charges were rejected as false by Israel in a letter dated 13 January (S/8965).

398. In a letter dated 30 January (S/8988), Jordan drew attention to the condition of the refugees in eastern Jordan, following floods and snowstorms, and urged that steps be taken for their speedy return to their homes.

399. On 10 February, Jordan transmitted (S/9001) a list of protests submitted to the Israel occupying forces by religious leaders and institutions against Israel measures in the occupied areas, in particular in Jerusalem.

400. In a letter dated 21 March (S/9102), Jordan charged Israel with arbitrary measures against the Arab population in the occupied areas, especially Jerusalem, including arbitrary detention, attacks on schools and students and demolition of houses. In a letter of reply dated 31 March (S/9122), Israel stated that Jordan had distorted necessary security measures taken by Israel against those who had committed acts of murder and terror or had abetted them.

401. In a letter of 17 April (S/9162), Jordan charged Israel with the arbitrary arrest and expulsion of Arab personalities from the West Bank as a means of pressure on the population. In a letter dated 22 April (S/9174), Israel replied that in the two cases cited, the individuals had been arrested on the basis of information that they were engaged in terrorist activities and that they had been well treated and had left the country at their own request.

402. In a letter dated 8 May (S/9197), Jordan charged further violations of human rights in the

West Bank and in Gaza, particularly with regard to women suspected of resistance to foreign occupation, and transmitted protests from relatives of those detained and from the Red Cross Societies of Jordan and Lebanon. Israel, in a letter of 14 May (S/9208), rejected those charges as false and distorted and said that they were designed to divert attention from Jordan's responsibility for the continuation of acts of terror and aggression carried out by and from Jordan. Jordan reaffirmed its charges in a letter dated 26 May (S/9225) and quoted reports from Israel papers of arbitrary detentions and the demolition of houses. Israel rejected the Jordanian contentions and reaffirmed its position in a letter of 2 June (S/9230 and Corr. 1).

403. In a cable dated 3 February (S/8991), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic charged the Israel authorities with inhuman treatment of the civilian population in the Gaza Strip. Israel rejected these charges in a letter dated 5 February (S/8994), stating that the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza limited their actions to the minimum required to prevent outbreaks of violence, which, it stated, the Egyptian Government was fostering.

404. In a communication transmitted on 21 February (S/9029), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Southern Yemen protested against the armed attack by Israel on the civilian inhabitants of Khan Younis on 13 February 1969.

405. In a letter transmitted on 13 February (S/9011), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq charged Israel with atrocities against the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories.

C. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN AND AROUND JERUSALEM AND ITS HOLY PLACES

(a) *Communications and reports received between 15 July 1968 and 2 July 1969 and requests for a meeting*

406. During the period covered in the current report, a number of communications were addressed to the Security Council concerning Jerusalem and its Holy Places, which had been discussed by the Council in April and May 1968 prior to the adoption on 21 May of resolution 252 (1968).

407. In a letter dated 19 August 1969 (S/8750), Jordan complained of incidents of lawlessness

against Arab inhabitants in occupied Jerusalem, charging that on the preceding day hundreds of Israel youths had attacked Arab residents in Arab Jerusalem, injuring scores of innocent civilians, looting Arab stores and destroying property, during which time the Israel police apparently had not intervened. The letter linked the incidents with other charges of mistreatment of Arab inhabitants in the occupied territories (see section B, above). In a reply dated 21 August (S/8756), Israel charged that the incidents in question had arisen with three premeditated and planned terror attacks carried out by terror organizations operating from Jordan, which, the letter stated, were supported and even participated in by the Government of Jordan (see section A, above). Moreover, the Jerusalem authorities had condemned the outburst and had arrested a number of the young men implicated.

408. By a letter dated 11 October (S/8847), Syria transmitted to the Secretary-General a message from some of the religious leaders in Syria condemning the desecration of the Holy Places by the Israel occupying forces. By a letter dated 22 October (S/8864), Kuwait forwarded a group of forty photographs, together with accompanying explanatory notes, which related to alleged desecration by Israel authorities of Moslem and Christian Holy Places in and around Jerusalem and the destruction of Arab homes in the city. In a letter dated 6 November (S/8890), Jordan also brought to the attention of the Secretary-General charges of continuous Israel acts of demolition and change of character of historical and religious buildings in Jerusalem and transmitted a letter from the Mayor of Jerusalem containing an account of Israel's measures in that respect.

409. By a letter dated 5 February 1969 (S/8995), Jordan transmitted a cable which it stated had been addressed to the President of the Security Council on 1 February by Mr. Rouhi El-Khatib, the Mayor of Jerusalem, urging action to end the liquidation of the 70,000 Arabs of Jerusalem and the repressive measures being promulgated by Israel to change the character of the Holy City. In a further communication dated 10 February (S/9001), Jordan transmitted a list of protests submitted to the Israel authorities by religious leaders and institutions against the measures taken

by the Israel Government and concerning the conduct of some Israel citizens in Jerusalem.

410. In a letter dated 8 February (S/8998), Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council "to consider the continued Israeli defiance of Security Council resolution 252 (1968)" which, among other things, called upon Israel "to desist from taking any action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem". Jordan stated that despite that clear warning, Israel had enacted, against Arab opposition, legislation designed to destroy the character of the city and incorporate the Arab life and institutions into Israel life. The legislation was to take effect on 25 February and would create a situation which threatened not only the economic life of the Christians and Moslems of Jerusalem but international peace and security, warranting, therefore, consideration of that situation by the Security Council.

411. By another letter dated 8 February (S/8999), Jordan transmitted the text of a memorandum addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel by a group of Arab lawyers in Israel-occupied territory, in which they had protested against Israel legislation aimed at completing the process of Israel's annexation of Jerusalem and its environs.

412. In a note dated 10 February (S/9000), the President of the Security Council stated that since the Government of Israel had decided to postpone until 23 May 1969 the putting into effect of the legislative provisions which formed the subject-matter of Jordan's complaint, the meeting of the Security Council, which had been fixed for 11 February, had been postponed.

413. In a letter dated 13 February (S/9010) to the Secretary-General, Jordan stated that the postponement allowed for an extension of the time-limit during which efforts could be made for the repeal of the legislation and thus avoid confronting the world with a *fait accompli*. Jordan also requested the Secretary-General to furnish the Security Council with a progress report on the implementation of resolution 252 (1968).

414. In a report dated 11 April (S/9149), submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, the Secretary-General stated that since the termination of the mission of his Personal Representative in Jerusalem in Sep-

tember 1967, he had had no means of obtaining first-hand information upon which he could base a report. On 13 February 1969, the Secretary-General had sent a note to Israel in which he recalled that under resolution 252 (1968) the Security Council had considered that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tended to change the legal status of Jerusalem were invalid and could not change that status; had urgently called upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tended to change the status of Jerusalem; and had requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution. The Secretary-General had stated that he must, in the main, look to the Government of Israel for the information necessary in the discharge of his responsibilities and had therefore requested the Government of Israel to provide him with such information. In reply on 25 March, the representative of Israel had informed the Secretary-General that the position of his Government continued to be the same as set forth in the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel of 10 July 1967 (S/8052) and in the statements which had been made on that subject by the representatives of Israel in the General Assembly and the Security Council.

415. The Secretary-General then stated that the only other source of information of an official nature pertinent to the implementation of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) was the Israel Official Gazette, published originally in Hebrew. According to that source, the Israel Parliament had adopted on 14 August 1968 the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law", which was relevant to the situation in Jerusalem. Regarding the implementation of that law, the Secretary-General recalled that the President of the Security Council had indicated, in his note of 10 February 1969, that Israel had decided to postpone until 23 May 1969 the putting into effect of that law. The report of the Secretary-General contained as annex I an unofficial translation of the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law, 5728, 1968", and as annex II an unofficial translation of the "Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law, 5728, 1968" and explanatory notes.

416. In a letter dated 23 June (S/9277), Israel complained of an incident which it stated was carried out from Jordan on 20 June against the civilian population of Jerusalem, when three bombs were exploded in a narrow street which serves as a passage for worshippers on their way to the Western (Wailing) Wall, injuring three Arab and one Israel inhabitants.

417. By a letter dated 26 June 1969 (S/9284), Jordan complained of Israel's further violations of its resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 concerning Jerusalem. Jordan stated that instead of complying with the Security Council's directives, the Israel Government, in utter disregard of the will of the inhabitants of Jerusalem, had enacted Administrative Regulation Law 1968 and had, on 27 April 1969, enacted further provisions and new regulations. Although an urgent meeting of the Council on this matter, called in February 1969, had been deferred, Israel had continued to take measures contrary to the Council's resolution 252 (1968) and the United Nations Charter and was further implementing its plans for the establishment of Israel settlements in the city. Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider Israel's continued defiance of resolution 252 (1968) on Jerusalem.

418. By letters dated 30 June and 2 July (S/9289 and S/9303), Jordan transmitted photographs which, it stated, showed Israel bulldozing of Arab houses and Muslim shrines in Jerusalem adjacent to the Western Wall of the Aqsa Mosque and the construction of Israel settlements on confiscated Arab land in eastern Jerusalem.

(b) *Consideration by the Council at the 1482nd to 1485th meetings (30 June to 3 July 1969)*

419. At the 1482nd meeting on 30 June, the Security Council included in its agenda Jordan's letter of 26 June 1969 (S/9284), and the President invited the representatives of Jordan, Israel and the United Arab Republic, pursuant to their requests, to participate in the debate without the right to vote. Subsequently, the representatives of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Morocco, Iraq, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Yemen, Tunisia and Kuwait also requested, and were similarly invited, to participate in the discussion.

420. The representative of Jordan stated that

the urgent meeting had been called to consider a situation threatening not only the political and economic life of Jordanian citizens in Jerusalem but international peace and security. By failing to respond to the request of the Security Council, Israel had continued to violate the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly calling on it not to take any action tending to alter the status of Jerusalem. Israel laws were designed to create a greater Jerusalem to be part of a greater Israel and tended to subordinate all previous Arab life to those laws and gradually liquidate the whole Arab character of the city. With eviction on political grounds a daily occurrence in occupied Jordan, the Israelis were able to confiscate Jordanian property under the law, although Jewish ownership in the whole city of Jerusalem was not more than 26 per cent, the rest being legally Arab. Indicating that the new law contained provisions making it impossible for Arab business to maintain its independence and identity, he stated that there were more than 180 Arab companies and firms in Jerusalem, employing more than 4,000 people, which, under the law, could either be totally absorbed in the Israel economy or be automatically liquidated. Such laws violated the Council's resolutions, international law and the Geneva Convention and were therefore null and void and had no legal basis. If the Israel actions, intended to create a *fait accompli*, remained unchecked, it would be impossible to create the necessary preconditions for peace. If no action was taken immediately, the Security Council would face more conflict in the area, and if something was not done soon, the city of peace might very well become a city of real conflict. The representative of Jordan asked the Security Council to deplore the failure of Israel to show any regard for Security Council resolution 252 (1968); to call once more upon Israel to rescind all measures which had resulted or might result in changing the status of the city of Jerusalem, and, in future, refrain from all actions likely to have such an effect; to warn Israel that unless the illegal acts of legislation were rescinded the Council would reconvene to take action, including the application of Article 41 of the Charter; to appeal to Member States to refrain from sending arms and military equipment to Israel until it complied with the Council's requests; to reaffirm Security Council resolution 252 (1968)

of 21 May 1968 and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967 on Jerusalem and declare the new Israel legislation dated 23 August 1968 and the subsequent decrees and legislation null and void; and to call upon the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council on the implementation of its resolution.

421. The representative of Israel stated that Jordan had come before the Security Council to plead the cause of its 1948 invasion and that Jordan and other Arab States were openly pursuing warfare against Israel. The Jordanian regular army and the Iraqi forces stationed in Jordan were actively involved in terrorist operations. To seize the Security Council in these circumstances with technicalities of registration and commercial enterprises was the height of frivolity, and the intensification of Jordanian and Egyptian armed attacks had been widely condemned as prejudicing the search for peace in the Middle East. The Jordanian complaint was a manoeuvre to divert attention from the fact that the Arab Governments had hardened even further their refusal to conclude peace with Israel. Regarding the regulations which were the subject of the complaint, he said that what mattered to Jordan was less what Israel did than the fact that Israel did it. In reply to Jordanian complaints concerning Israel measures in the area of the Wailing Wall, he stated that Jordan had, in 1948, razed thirty-four of the thirty-five houses of worship, as well as schools and homes, in the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem. Moreover, captured saboteurs had admitted that they had been dispatched to attack worshippers at the Wailing Wall on 20 June. The people of Israel and the world at large would follow with interest the views expressed by the members of the Security Council on such outrageous assaults on peaceful worshippers at a Holy Place in the city of Jerusalem.

422. Describing the life in Jerusalem under a united rule, the representative of Israel stated that the thousands of foreign visitors visiting Jerusalem would attest to the fact that the city was basically content. An incident did sometimes occur, and some of Jerusalem's inhabitants might not be happy but a large number of Christian and some Moslem leaders had expressed satisfaction at the situation regarding their Holy Places. He then charged

that Jordan was not motivated by Jerusalem's welfare but by continued belligerence against Israel. Jordan's attitude disregarded the basic precepts of international law and morality and was in violation of the rights of the city's population, which consisted of more than 200,000 Jews, 60,000 Arabs and 5,000 others. It was evident that the great majority of the city's population categorically rejected any Jordanian claims to intervene in its life.

423. The representative of Jordan, exercising the right of reply, stated that the figures established by the Anglo-American Commission on Palestine showed that Jerusalem had had a majority of Arabs, not Israelis, as the representative of Israel had stated. Regarding the unity of the city, he stated that the Council had objected to annexation by force, which amounted to aggression, not unity. He concluded by stating that the issue was Israel's defiance of the Council's own resolution. Violations had continued and more acts of aggression had been committed; and Jordan had come to the Council for an effective remedy.

424. The representative of Saudi Arabia asked if the Council was paralysed on the question and whether it was going to pass more resolutions which would not be implemented. After referring to the history of Jerusalem, he stated that Jerusalem was sacred to three great religious faiths and the Zionists should not make it their capital. He warned that the situation was serious and that the lethal weapons of today might tomorrow wipe out Jews and Gentiles alike.

425. At the 1483rd meeting, on 1 July, the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that the Israel measures of annexation were meant to achieve the consolidation of Israel's occupation and that the will of the international community in that respect had been demonstrated in the General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions, which had all invalidated the Israel measures, reaffirmed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and called upon Israel to rescind those measures and desist forthwith from changing the status of the Holy City. Israel was under obligation to carry out those decisions, but Israel's reaction to these resolutions had been negative and Israel had persisted in its destruction of Arab homes and properties. The

time had come for the Council to move from the stage of passing resolutions of condemnation and injunctions to the stage of measures and actions to enforce its decisions. His delegation would fully support the measures suggested by the representative of Jordan.

426. The representative of the United Kingdom reaffirmed the position of his Government, as stated in the General Assembly by his Foreign Secretary on 21 June 1967, that under Article 2 of the Charter, war should not lead to territorial aggrandizement. Regarding Jerusalem, he reiterated his support of the position that no unilateral action should or could change the status of that city. It was essential for the Council to require that nothing should be done by unilateral action to prejudice the future of Jerusalem, which must be kept open and decided upon as part of a final settlement ensuring a permanent peace. Although no one disputed the vital concern in the matter of the countries of the Middle East, the Council and the whole world had a legitimate interest in peace in the area, and the Council was not to be told that its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security was diminished or deferred. He said in conclusion that Jerusalem was the heart of the whole problem and that a just and complete settlement should not be ruled out in advance or rendered impossible by any act designed to prejudice the future status of the city.

427. The representative of France stated that Jerusalem had already been the subject of many debates and resolutions by the Security Council and the General Assembly, including resolution 252 (1968), and that since 1967 a number of measures adopted in the occupied territories, and particularly in Jerusalem, had given rise to Jordan's protests to the Council and the General Assembly. The new complaint of Jordan appeared to be the continuation of previous ones and stemmed from Israel's non-compliance with the provisions of resolution 252 (1968). Recalling that France had voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions 2252 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, he pointed out that since that time France had opposed anything that might further increase the hostilities among the parties concerned in the Middle East. There could be no doubt that all legislative or other measures adopted by Israel

that might facilitate the process of integration of part of Jerusalem were in contradiction to those resolutions and that some of them were contrary to the rules of international law regarding armed occupation and to the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Israel authorities had often given assurances that they would take steps to assure free access by all to places of worship. However, the problem was not only administrative and social but political, religious and legal in nature. It was his delegation's hope that Israel would consent to put an end, without delay, to the contested measures and safeguard the character of a city, the future status of which could in no way be prejudiced.

428. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Council was forced again to consider the question in view of the illegal attempts by Israel to annex the Arab part of Jerusalem. The General Assembly had firmly opposed the annexationist designs of Israel and termed Israel's action illegal. In its resolution 252 (1968), the Security Council had confirmed the resolutions of the General Assembly, but the actions of Israel in Jerusalem testified to the fact that the Government of Israel was ignoring those resolutions. Israel occupation forces were carrying out in Jerusalem a programme of measures aimed at changing the Arab nature of the Old City, expelling Arab inhabitants, destroying Arab houses and imposing Israel settlements in the Arab section. The overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations and world public opinion had condemned and rejected Israel's annexationist plans in Jerusalem. Israel therefore should ponder the dangerous consequences for the State of Israel itself in pursuing such a policy. The Security Council, in discharging its duties under the Charter, must take the necessary measures to see that its decisions were carried out. The Council must demand of Israel that it cease immediately all attempts at "Israelizing" Arab Jerusalem, which it was occupying, and implement resolution 242 calling for a political settlement in the Middle East and the withdrawal of Israel forces from all occupied Arab territories.

429. The representative of Algeria stated that by promptly and almost unanimously adopting the resolutions of the General Assembly and the

Security Council regarding Jerusalem, the international community had shown the occupiers the importance it attached to the fate of the Holy City. But Israel, defying the hundreds of millions of human beings for whom Jerusalem was the symbol of faith, had begun on 8 June 1967 to take preliminary measures to absorb the Old City, in flagrant violation of all the resolutions of the United Nations and despite the opposition of the population of Jerusalem. In three successive aggressions Israel's objective had been more land and fewer Palestinians. The Security Council must examine Israel's refusal to implement its previous decisions on this question. It was his delegation's opinion that the Council should take up its responsibilities in accordance with the Charter and tackle the causes of the crisis that has shaken the Middle East for twenty-one years.

430. The representative of the United States stated that the discussion thus far had made amply clear that the status of Jerusalem was not an isolated problem but an integral part of the whole complex of issues in the current conflict. The Council had recognized that fact in resolution 242 (1967), which treated the entire Middle East situation as a package. That resolution remained the basis for the approach to a just and lasting peace in the area. Because Jerusalem was one of the holiest cities in the world, the United States had always considered that the city enjoyed a unique international standing. In the opinion of his delegation, none of the deep concerns over Jerusalem which moved all parties to the Arab-Israel dispute were served by what was now taking place there, whether it was actions by those now in authority or by individuals considering themselves aggrieved. The United States considered that the part of Jerusalem that came under Israel control in the June war was occupied territory, subject to the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power. Under the Geneva Convention and international law the occupier must maintain the occupied area as intact and unaltered as possible, any changes being necessitated by immediate needs of the occupation. The actions of Israel in occupied Jerusalem gave rise to understandable concerns that the eventual disposition of East Jerusalem might be prejudiced and that the private rights and activities of the population were

already being affected and altered. His Government did not accept those measures as affecting the ultimate status of Jerusalem. After recalling his government's efforts to bring peace to the Middle East, he suggested that the Council should request the parties concerned to desist from any action in Jerusalem or elsewhere that might prejudice a final comprehensive settlement and a just and lasting peace. Any proposal should be subjected to the test of whether it would help or hinder the peaceful settlement process.

431. Exercising his right of reply, the representative of Israel, referring to the talks between the four Powers, stated that Israel's Prime Minister had said that Israel did not accept in principle that those Powers should arrogate to themselves the right to decide the destiny of other States without the participation of those concerned. From the political and practical stand-point, she had said, Israel could only react negatively to the Big Four talks, being fully aware that one of the Powers was hostile and the outspoken representative of the Arabs. He stated that the United Arab Republic and Algeria had refused to accept United Nations resolutions, including the call in the 22 November 1967 resolution for a peaceful settlement, and he asked whether anyone could seriously consider that Israel should listen to advice from those sources. Quoting figures from various periods, he reiterated that Jerusalem had had a Jewish majority for many years. Any Arabs relocated in Jerusalem had been fully compensated. Violence, harassment and pressure would not weaken Israel's determination to work for its goal of real peace and security for Jerusalem, for Israel as a whole and for its neighbours.

432. The representative of Syria referred to a statement by the representative of the Catholic Women's Guild concerning the difficulties encountered by Arab workers in Jerusalem in finding work. He also stated that in 1947 the British Mandatory Powers had submitted to the United Nations a document showing that Jewish ownership in the Jerusalem subdistrict was 2 per cent and that of the Arabs 80 per cent.

433. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that Jerusalem, in the seventh century, had been inhabited by a conglomeration of peoples, neither Arabs nor Jews, who later had embraced Islam and Arabism. Regarding the attitude of Israel

about living standards in Jerusalem he said that it reminded him of the "white man's burden" used as an argument in the colonization of Africa and Asia. A just peace had to meet the aspirations of the Palestinian people. The Arabs did not want compensation; they wanted their homes which their people had occupied for centuries. It was the indigenous people who held title to Jerusalem and to all of Palestine.

434. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the representative of Israel had distorted the facts and that there was no indication that Israel intended to comply with the resolutions of the Council, but that it meant to continue its policy of expansion and annexation.

435. At the 1484th meeting, on 2 July, the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that Israel's defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions regarding Jerusalem had gone so far that it had informed the Secretary-General that its annexation of Jerusalem was irreversible and not negotiable. Regarding Israel's policies, he stated that in Israel's view, peace would amount to the surrender of the Arab peoples to its will and their acquiescence in its territorial ambitions.

436. The representative of Morocco stated that the decisions and resolutions by the United Nations on the question of Jerusalem had been violated, and although it was a question of Arab territory, interest in the city and its Holy Places was worldwide. In spite of United Nations resolutions, Israel had transferred the main part of its governmental machinery to Jerusalem and held military parades there, Jordan had submitted its complaint in order to denounce that series of violations that were contrary to clear-cut decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Noting that the representative of Israel had read a statement by the Israel Prime Minister contending that the Great Powers had nothing to say about the matter, he stated that that had not always been Israel's policy. Israel had been glad to have their support at various times, but now it feared that they would interfere with its designs. But the great Powers had special responsibilities under the Charter, and he hoped that their talks would be successful.

437. The representative of Zambia deplored the fact that Israel was, according to *The New York Times*, moving its national police headquar-

ters from Tel Aviv to East Jerusalem, which had been part of Jordan until 1967. His delegation had been grieved to find that Israel continued to defy with impunity the decisions of the Council. Regarding the laws promulgated by Israel, he said that they were intended to confuse even more an already confused situation. Restating his Government's stand on the whole Middle East question, he said that political reality must persuade everyone to accept the independence and sovereignty of the State of Israel, but it was also clear that territorial aggrandizement could not be recognized. It was time that both sides listened and paid attention to world appeals for peace, and the Council had a duty to call on Israel not to proceed with its measures.

438. The representative of Nepal stated that his delegation considered all actions taken by Israel which tended to change the status of the city of Jerusalem as invalid. The occupying authorities, he added, had taken further measures in a clear bid to change the status of Jerusalem in defiance of the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. His delegation expected all parties, particularly those directly interested in the question, to show restraint, moderation and respect for the decisions of the United Nations. That appeal was not an equation between those who pursued a policy of annexation and those who suffered from it.

439. The representative of Hungary stated that the problems regarding Jerusalem constituted an integral part of the Middle East issue facing the Council. Israel had created an additional and more difficult problem by fundamentally and juridically changing the status of a part of the occupied territory. The measures complained of, which the representative of Israel had qualified as mere technicalities, were violations of the Charter and United Nations resolutions. The location of the national police headquarters in the occupied city constituted an act of grave provocation and not a mere technicality. It was difficult to understand how a Government which based its claim to Jerusalem on religious grounds could fail to take into account the sentiments of others motivated by the same consideration. The Middle East situation, he concluded, remained explosive, and the Security Council should not tolerate any further violation of its decisions.

440. The representative of Finland said that the General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem were based on legal and political considerations and proceeded from the basis that the Government of Israel could claim no sovereignty over Jerusalem and that measures by Israel could not be accepted as altering the status of the city. The Finnish Government had concurred in that view in voting in favour of the afore-mentioned General Assembly resolutions. He referred to the fact that the situation in Jerusalem was intensifying tensions in the Middle East at a time when the overall situation in the area was deteriorating. The Secretary-General had some time ago called to the urgent attention of the members of the Security Council the critical situation in the Suez Canal sector and the danger of a break-down in the cease-fire arrangements there. The tension and violence continued unabated along the cease-fire lines and beyond them in other areas as well. All acts in defiance of the pertinent cease-fire resolutions made the task of promoting a peaceful settlement on the basis of the resolution adopted on 22 November 1967 more difficult. The Four Power talks still offered the best hope that would ensure progress toward a peaceful and accepted settlement. The Council should, therefore, do everything possible to promote the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

441. The representative of China stated that there was a consensus that the Holy City should be kept out of international rivalry and strife. The question of Jerusalem could not be viewed in isolation from the Middle East problem as a whole. The Council's resolution on Jerusalem remained binding on the Council as well as on the parties concerned. No matter what Israel had done in Jerusalem since 1967, it had not been acceptable to the Arab population and was inconsistent with the terms of Security Council resolution 252 (1968). The Council should reaffirm the principles laid down in resolution 252 (1968) and urgently call upon Israel to comply with the requirements of that resolution.

442. The representative of Malaysia stated that perhaps it was not too late to remind Israel that the status of the Holy City was not purely a matter between Israel and Jordan and that any changes in its status would have profound repercussions

also on Christians and Muslims all over the world. Recalling the resolution regarding Jerusalem adopted by the International Islamic Conference in April 1969, which condemned Israel for having usurped the Arab territories and, in particular, the Holy City, he stated that if Israel continued to defy the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly regarding Jerusalem, it would have to contend not only with its Arab neighbours and the Muslim world but with the political and moral force of the United Nations.

443. The representative of Lebanon said that both the General Assembly and the Security Council in 1967 and 1968 had adopted several resolutions on the question of Jerusalem, for which Israel had shown only disrespect. His delegation was gratified that the representatives of the Four Powers had all reaffirmed the positions of their Governments with regard to Israel's illegal and invalid decision to annex the old Arab city of Jerusalem, as that decision prejudiced the final settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. If Israel wished peace, it must desist from acts that undermined peaceful development, and its presence in the Old City was not conducive to peace. In these circumstances the Security Council had a special responsibility to prevent the development of such a perpetual conflict by taking measures under the Charter to bolster its resolution 252 (1968).

444. The representative of Iraq said that the complaint before the Council constituted an appeal by all humanity, not one by Jordan or the Arab States. By taking more coercive measures in the occupied territory, and in Jerusalem in particular, Israel was showing contempt for world public opinion. In his view the Council should act immediately and put an end to Israel's defiance.

445. The representative of Indonesia stated that Jerusalem was a Holy Place to 100 million Indonesian Muslims. The tension in the Middle East was threatening the precarious balance of power in that area. The actions of Israel were a clear violation of its obligations under international law as an occupying Power. His delegation believed that only by a firm stand could any further aggravation of the situation be averted.

446. The representative of Spain stated that the military occupation of Jerusalem by Israel was not justified in any way and was contrary to a number of United Nations resolutions, despite which Israel continued to take measures designed to change the legal status of the city and to consolidate an illegal *de facto* situation. The Security Council must urgently demand respect for the United Nations resolutions, condemn the policy of *faits accomplis* and reiterate that the use of force could not justify any territorial annexation. Patience must have a limit in the light of non-compliance with resolutions and the flouting of the rights of many Member States.

447. The representative of Colombia stated that his delegation's position on the problems of the Middle East had not changed since first set forth in June 1967. On the specific question of Jerusalem which was before the Council, he entirely endorsed resolution 252 (1968) and considered that any action or step which violated that resolution was illegal and arbitrary. Therefore, his delegation could not endorse or countenance any alteration of the legal status of Jerusalem by unilateral initiative, regardless of its origin.

448. The representative of Paraguay stated that since the position of his delegation was based entirely on questions of principle, it was unchangeable and immutable. He recalled the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its second, third and fourth sessions regarding the establishment of Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum* and stated that in his delegation's view, despite the *de facto* situation, those provisions were still fully and legally valid unless they were modified by the General Assembly. He also recalled the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V), and of Security Council resolution 252 (1968), and stated that in the light of those decisions, the new legislative and administrative measures and other actions taken by Israel which tended to change the legal status of Jerusalem had no legal validity and were not binding. Moreover, those actions taken by Israel in Jerusalem affected other aspects of the general problem of the area and had a negative effect on the efforts being made both by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative and by four Permanent Members of the Security Council.

449. The representative of Syria stated that Israel's violation of the Council resolution on Jerusalem was only part of Israel's pattern of behaviour. Israel had disregarded all resolutions relating to Jerusalem, had taken the law into its own hands and was depriving the Arabs in Jerusalem and the other occupied territories of basic human rights.

450. The representative of Israel stated that Arab intransigence and hostility toward Israel had been made clear in the statements of the United Arab Republic, Algeria and Syria. Replying to Arab assertions, he stated that Jerusalem had been united and integral for centuries and had been divided for only nineteen years after an invasion. He went on to say that for the first time all universal religions were accorded recognition and respect, and Israel would make certain that all inhabitants of Jerusalem, Jew and Arab, would have their rights respected.

451. At the 1485th meeting of the Council on 3 July, the representative of Afghanistan said that he held the same views as expressed by previous speakers that the status of Jerusalem should not be changed, that Israel should withdraw its forces from all the occupied territories and that Israel's actions in East Jerusalem were detrimental to the common interests. The United Nations had an obligation to take action in the matter, which was of interest to the small countries which made up the majority of the United Nations membership. In an insecure world no small country could allow the concept of acquisition of territory by military force to be accepted. He appealed to the members of the Council to intensify their efforts to bring about peace in the Middle East.

452. The representative of Saudi Arabia reiterated his previous position and stated that the United Nations should implement its decisions rather than pass resolutions which seemed to be a futile exercise. The big Powers, he added, should act before it was too late.

453. The representative of Tunisia said that by its action in Jerusalem, Israel was violating international law and the resolutions of the United Nations. He hoped that the Council would show the proper determination to see that its resolutions were implemented. Israel had said it would not give up Jerusalem. The Council should face that challenge.

454. The representative of Sudan said that he was appealing to the Council members to see that their decision on Jerusalem was not made void by the daily acts of Israel to perpetuate its domination. The Palestinians would never forget the injustice done to them. They were scattered in refugee camps, but they were fighting back; and the leaders of Israel must fear the relentless force of the Palestinians' desire to return to their homeland. There was no doubt that Israel's actions in Jerusalem were in violation of the Security Council resolution on the issue. Referring to statements by Israel leaders about annexing Jerusalem, half of the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, and stating that Israel had refused all peace overtures, he said that the Council must find a way to ensure implementation of its resolutions. The peace effort would otherwise fail.

455. The representative of Jordan observed that the Council was now in possession of photographs showing the construction of Israel settlements (S/9289 and S/9303) and the bulldozing of Arab shrines. The Israelis presented the conflict as one between Israel and the Arab States, ignoring the Palestinian people. Stressing the colonial character of Israel policies, he recalled that according to one historian, the Zionist Jews from East Europe had inflicted in Palestine the same moral wrong as had been committed in South Africa and Rhodesia. He said that nobody liked any form of foreign domination. People liked freedom, even with poverty.

456. The representative of Yemen said that his country had hoped the Council would take the required measures to protect Jerusalem's special character. Israel had deprived the Palestine people of their homeland. It had persisted with its measures in Jerusalem, despite the United Nations resolutions on the subject. The Council should make sure that the Zionist State did not defy the whole world.

457. The representative of Pakistan pointed out that this was the third time in two years that the United Nations had been concerned with the question of Jerusalem. Israel had shown total defiance of the Council's resolutions and had refused to rescind measures changing the legal status of the city. Recalling the statements of the representatives of the big Powers and statements by representatives of a wide range of countries

condemning Israel's actions as offensive to the universal religious interest and as transgressing the rules which govern military occupation under international law, he stated that any Council decision should be based on the principle of the non-admissibility of territorial gains by conquest. He added that no one would be deluded by Israel's talk of "reunification" of Jerusalem. Referring to Article 24 (1) of the Charter, which conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, he said the four permanent members of the Council had to safeguard the interest of all Members of the United Nations in the City of Jerusalem. The representative of Pakistan then introduced a draft resolution (S/9311) sponsored by Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia. The text of the draft resolution read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution 252 of 21 May 1968 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967 respectively concerning measures and actions by Israel affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,

"Having heard the statements of the parties concerned on the question,

"Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has taken further measures tending to change the status of the City of Jerusalem,

"Reaffirming the established principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

"1. Reaffirms its resolution 252 (1968);

"2. Deplores the failure of Israel to show any regard for the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions mentioned above;

"3. Censures in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of the City of Jerusalem;

"4. Confirms that all legislative and administrative measures and actions by Israel which purport to alter the status of Jerusalem including expropriation of land and properties thereon are invalid and cannot change that status;

"5. Urgently calls once more upon Israel to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it which

may tend to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, and in future to refrain from all actions likely to have such an effect;

"6. *Requests* Israel to inform the Security Council without any further delay of its intentions with regard to the implementation of the provisions of this resolution;

"7. *Determines* that, in the event of a negative response or no response from Israel, the Security Council shall reconvene without delay to consider what further action should be taken in this matter;

"8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution."

458. The President, speaking as the representative of Senegal, stated that the problem of Jerusalem was a religious, juridical and political one and could not be solved by administrative measures. Although requested by the Council not to take any measures to change the status of Jerusalem, Israel had acted in dilatory fashion and did not seem to be willing to comply therewith. All Members should abide by the United Nations decisions.

459. In putting the draft resolution to the vote, the President stated that a separate vote had been requested on operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution.

Decision: At the 1485th meeting on 3 July 1969, paragraph 5 of the three-Power draft resolution was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (United States).

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted unanimously, as resolution 267 (1969).

460. After the vote, the representative of the USSR stated that he had voted for the draft resolution because, basically, it reflected world indignation at Israel's actions and its refusal to abide by the Council's resolutions. There was a special significance to the new resolution because it had been adopted unanimously. If Israel disregarded it, the Council must meet again to consider further action.

461. The representative of the United States said that he had voted for the resolution because it was consistent with his Government's position on Jerusalem. His delegation abstained on paragraph 5 because the language in it was inconsistent

with the language of the previous paragraph, which stated that the measures referred to could not change the status of Jerusalem. Moreover, the United States did not consider the provision practical. In voting for the resolution, his delegation was not committing itself to any specific course of action in any future consideration of the matter by the Council. The United States continued to believe that Jerusalem could not be dealt with on a piecemeal basis. It rededicated itself to a determined effort for agreement on a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in the context of which Jerusalem should not again become a bone of contention among religions and nations.

462. The representative of Israel stated that his delegation had already called the attention of the Council to the Arab States' repudiation of the United Nations Charter in relation to Israel, among other things their rejection of the Security Council's peace and cease-fire resolutions. He questioned the value of a resolution adopted at the instigation of those States. Resolutions of the kind just adopted by the Council could not affect Jerusalem's life.

463. The representative of Jordan stated that Israel was engaged in disqualifying various States after having disqualified the Council in connexion with its decision on the Beirut raid. But the Council should ponder what to do about Israel's defiance. There was no alternative to the Council thinking seriously of invoking Article 41 of the Charter providing for sanctions. States should also stop shipping weapons to Israel. After thanking all the delegations which stood for justice, he noted that the Council had voted unanimously and said that now, more than ever, Israel stood alone.

(c) *Communications and reports received between 30 June and 15 July 1969*

464. On 30 June the Secretary-General issued an addendum (S/9149/Add. 1 and Corr. 1) to his report of 11 April on the implementation of resolution 252 (1968), in which he brought to the attention of the Security Council further information concerning legislation adopted by Israel. The legislation consisted of certain emergency regulations entitled "Regulation of Legal and Administrative Matters — Further Provisions", which took the form of additional provisions of the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation)

Law" contained in his initial report (S/9149). The addendum contained as annex A an unofficial translation of a Law and Administration Ordinance, and as annexes B and C two sets of regulations which postponed for six months certain of the provisions of the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law".

465. By a letter dated 3 July (S/9312), the representative of Turkey transmitted the text of a statement made by his Minister of Foreign Affairs in connexion with the Security Council's discussion. The statement recalled the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly in connexion with the status of Jerusalem and noted that Israel had continued to take measures inconsistent with them. Turkey hoped and believed that the Security Council would re-examine the current situation in detail and take all the measures it might deem necessary for its amelioration.

**D. OTHER MATTERS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN CONNEXION WITH
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

*(a) Communications concerning an attack on an Israel
civil aircraft at Zurich airport*

466. On 18 February 1969, a spokesman of the Secretary-General stated that the Secretary-General had heard with dismay and deep concern of the attack on an El-Al airliner at Zurich airport on that day. The Secretary-General believed that that attack, as well as the one at the Beirut airport two months previously, was a matter of urgent concern to all Governments and peoples. The Secretary-General also hoped that that act would not be followed by an attack of retaliation but by constructive international action to prevent acts of violence against international civil aviation in the future.

467. In communications dated 19, 20 and 25 February (S/9016, S/9017, S/9018, S/9020, S/9025), the United States, United Kingdom, Finland, France and Italy condemned the attack and expressed concern at the threat which such attacks posed for the safety of international civil aviation. They appealed to the parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exercise the utmost restraint so as to avoid the chain of action and reprisal and not jeopardize the efforts in search for peace in the area.

468. In a letter dated 20 February (S/9021), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel protested to the Secretary-General against an armed assault on the crew and passengers of the El-Al aircraft at Zurich on 18 February, two months after a similar attack on another Israel aircraft at Athens airport. He believed that those actions were the work of organized groups of saboteurs operating with the support and co-operation of Arab Governments which were Member States of the United Nations and of the International Civil Aviation Agency. After noting that the Security Council resolution of 31 December 1968 had not said a word against the attack on an El-Al aircraft at the Athens airport, the Foreign Minister expressed the view that the latest attack had taken place "in the atmosphere of international indulgence thus created". After referring to the above statement of the spokesman of the Secretary-General, he expressed interest in what constructive international action the Secretary-General had in mind to prevent those actions against international civil aviation.

469. In a reply dated 26 February (S/9030), to the Foreign Minister of Israel the Secretary-General stated that he had been in touch with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association regarding the Zurich incident. He had also consulted certain Members of the United Nations with a view of finding means to prevent those acts. He believed that improved methods of international police co-operation and regulation of a national as well as international character might contribute towards the prevention of those acts of terrorism and violence. However, he considered that the only sure way of bringing an end to terrorist acts would be some substantial movement towards a peaceful settlement of the major issues underlying the Middle East conflict on the basis of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. An essential first step towards that end would be a declared readiness by the parties to implement that resolution.

470. In a reply dated 5 March (S/9048), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel stated his country was vitally interested in the promotion of improved methods for international police co-operation and regulation of a national and international character and would actively associate

itself with the meeting of the Council of the ICAO. However, it would be wrong to ignore the responsibility of Member States, since the attacks at the Zurich and Athens airports and the hijacking of an Israel airliner to Algiers had not been acts of individuals, but of terrorist organizations supported and encouraged by Arab States in violation of their international responsibilities. He suggested that constructive international action to safeguard civil aviation might include an undertaking by all States to prevent and condemn actions on their soil designed to endanger civil aviation, and he regretted that the Secretary-General had not conveyed his Government's request to certain Arab Governments to condemn those attacks and dissociate themselves from them and take required steps against the organizations which had carried out those attacks. His Government would continue to co-operate with Special Representative of the Secretary-General to promote an agreement for the implementation of the resolution of 22 November 1967.

471. In a letter dated 10 March (S/9064), the Secretary-General quoted the exchange of communications between himself and the Permanent Representative of Israel on 19 and 20 February in which the Secretary-General had indicated that it would not be helpful if his good offices were used to transmit questions or messages of a political nature from one Government to another unless the parties concerned had previously agreed to that procedure. He had, therefore, been unable to carry out Israel's request to transmit two questions to certain Arab Governments, but he had suggested that the Government of Israel might bring those questions to the attention of those concerned through a communication to the Security Council. The Secretary-General added that he continued to believe that a declaration by the parties of their readiness to implement the 22 November resolution would constitute a helpful first step towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

(b) *Communications concerning archaeological excavations in occupied territory*

472. In a letter dated 23 May 1969 (S/9220), Syria charged that Israel was continuing its excavations in the occupied territory of Syria and was misappropriating Syrian cultural property. These

excavations were being undertaken in the areas of Banias and Fiq, where Roman temples had been found, and in the area of Jibbin, where an archaeological hill had been destroyed as a result of the opening of a road. After declaring that very important archaeological pieces had been removed from their places of origin, Syria stated that those illegal acts constituted a violation of articles 4 and 5 of the 1954 Hague Convention as well as of article VI, paragraph 32, of the recommendations adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1956. Syria referred to its previous complaint on 7 July 1967 (S/8040), which Israel had, on 14 July 1967 (S/8058), declared unfounded, stating that a representative of UNESCO, who was then expected in Israel, would be invited to visit the site referred to by Syria. Syria requested a report on the question of excavations and theft of its cultural property.

473. In a letter dated 29 May (S/9229 and Rev. 1), Israel, in reply, stated that no Israel scientist had carried out any excavations in any of the sites mentioned by Syria or in any other parts of the Golan Heights. The historical altar from the town of Banias had been removed temporarily and restored to its original site after arrangements for its safety had been completed. In a letter dated 6 February 1968 to the Director-General of UNESCO, the Commissioner-General, appointed under The Hague Convention of May 1954, had already dismissed such Syrian charges. The report of the Director-General to the seventy-eighth session of the Executive Board of UNESCO had stated that the Commissioner-General in Jerusalem had informed him that "investigations had been carried out where the information supplied had been sufficient to make inquiries possible, and that the complaints in question had proved groundless".

474. In a letter dated 10 June (S/9246), Syria pointing out that Israel had admitted having removed the historical altar for its safety and that it had been restored later, stated that those justifications had also been used by the Nazi occupiers in Europe. The report of the Director-General of UNESCO quoted by Israel related only to complaints made in 1967 and 1968. Moreover, the High Commissioner had stated that his investigations were based upon cases "where the information supplied had been sufficient to make inquiries

possible". In the same report, the High Commissioner had informed the Director-General of UNESCO that "atmospheric conditions" had made the Golan Heights inaccessible and that he had been unable to visit the site of excavations. Israel, in citing the report of the Director-General of UNESCO, had only meant to mislead the international community. Syria's six complaints, contained in its letter of 23 May 1969, remained unanswered, and only when a report of the Director-General of UNESCO on the matter was submitted in 1969, with specific reference to Syria's 1969 complaints, could it be cited in answer to Syria's letter. In a further letter dated 1 July (S/9299), Syria stated that its accusations stood and that it was awaiting the report on them by the Director-General of UNESCO.

(c) *Communications concerning the treatment of Jewish communities in Arab States*

475. In a letter dated 30 September 1968 (S/8837), Iraq protested against the interference in its internal affairs represented by the discussion by Israel in the Security Council regarding the treatment of Jews in Iraq and denied the Israel allegations (see section B, above). In a letter of 9 October (S/8844), Israel reaffirmed its position that the situation of the Iraqi Jews should be the subject of a fact-finding mission by a representative of the Secretary-General, as provided in resolution 237 (1967); and in a further letter of 11 October (S/8848), Israel drew attention to a cable from the association of Jews from Egypt, Iraq and Syria, expressing concern at the conditions of Jews in those countries.

476. In a letter dated 27 January 1969 (S/8982), the Foreign Minister of Israel protested the execution by Iraq on that day of nine Iraqi Jews, who, it was stated, had been wrongfully accused of spying for Israel. In a letter of 29 January (S/8987), the representative of the United States drew attention to the statement of the United States Secretary of State expressing concern on humanitarian grounds at the public execution of fourteen persons convicted of espionage in Iraq. In a statement transmitted on 31 January (S/8989), Iraq stated that those executed had been tried in accordance with the law and found guilty of espionage; those not found guilty, including Jews, had been acquitted. It accused Israel of distorting the facts

to create a propaganda smokescreen. By a letter of 6 February (S/8997), Israel transmitted twenty-seven statements from various countries relating to the executions in Iraq.

477. In a further letter dated 26 February (S/9031), Israel protested against the executions on 20 February in Iraq of eight persons for espionage for Israel and charged continued inhuman measures against the Jewish community in Iraq. These charges were rejected by Iraq in a letter dated 11 March (S/9068). In a letter of 19 March (S/9095), Israel, and in a letter of 27 March (S/9118 and Corr.1) Iraq, reaffirmed their charges.

E. REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE PROGRESS OF THE EFFORTS OF HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST

478. On 29 July 1968, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a fourth report (S/8309/Add.3) on the progress of the efforts of his Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, covering his activities after 29 March 1968. It stated that during that period Ambassador Jarring had held discussions with the Governments of Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Israel and Lebanon. In addition to reporting to the Secretary-General regularly on those meetings, Ambassador Jarring also had met him at Teheran on 22 April 1968, and it was then agreed that he would return to New York for further consultations. He stayed in New York between 15 May and 21 June, during which period he held consultations with the Secretary-General and the permanent representatives of the parties concerned.

479. During the period between 21 June, when he left for Europe, and 22 July, when he returned to New York, Ambassador Jarring had met with officials of some of the parties in various cities of Europe. In the light of his discussions, he had arrived at the conclusion, which was endorsed by the Secretary-General, that it would be advisable for him to extend further his contacts with the parties, and for that purpose he would return to the Middle East.

480. On 3 December 1968, the Secretary-General submitted the fifth report (S/8309/Add.4) on the mission of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, covering his activities after 29 July.

481. In accordance with his intention as recorded in the previous report, Ambassador Jarring arrived in Nicosia on 15 August for a further round of discussions with Governments concerned. On 23 September, he arrived at United Nations Headquarters, where the Foreign Ministers of the parties had gathered for the twenty-third session of the General Assembly. Ambassador Jarring first met with them informally, and later formally, and concluded his discussions with them by receiving written communications from the Foreign Ministers of Israel and the United Arab Republic.

482. On 26 November, Ambassador Jarring wrote to the Secretary-General, stating that, as agreed with him, he was leaving New York on 27 November for a further round of talks with the parties and that he intended to invite them to a new round of discussions in the middle of January 1969. In his reply dated 27 November, the Secretary-General, after concurring with Ambassador Jarring's programme, expressed to him his gratification on Ambassador Jarring's willingness to continue his efforts with the parties towards a peaceful settlement. The Secretary-General once again put on record his appreciation of the wisdom, tact and patience shown by Ambassador Jarring in the task entrusted to him.

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Report of the Economic and Social Council (Excerpt).¹

August 3, 1969 - August 8, 1969

247. The Council was informed that the Commission on Human Rights had adopted two resolutions relating to the Middle East. In resolution 6 (XXV) (E/4621, chap. XVIII), the Commission, noting that the Security Council had once again expressed its concern for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel, and had deplored the delay in the implementation of Security Council resolution 237 (1967), and noting also resolution I adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights on 7 May 1968,²

on respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories, and General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, reaffirmed the inalienable right of all the inhabitants who had left since the outbreak of hostilities to return; called upon the Government of Israel to implement immediately the United Nations resolutions to that effect; deplored Israel's continued violations of human rights in the occupied territories; called upon the Government of Israel to put an immediate end to such acts; expressed its deep concern on Israel's refusal to abide by the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; and called once again upon the Government of Israel to respect fully and apply that Convention. The Commission had set up a special Working Group of Experts composed of the members of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of Experts established under Commission resolutions 2 (XXIII) and 2 (XXIV), with the following mandate: (a) to investigate the allegations concerning Israel's violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War in the territories occupied by Israel as a result of hostilities in the Middle East; (b) to receive communications, to hear witnesses and use such modalities of procedure as it might deem necessary; and (c) to report, with its conclusions and recommendations, to the Commission at its twenty-sixth session.

248. In resolution 7 (XXV), entitled "Question of human rights arising out of hostilities in the Middle East", the Commission had made a fervent appeal to all Governments, their peoples and world public opinion to spare no efforts to ensure peaceful settlement of the conflict affecting the Middle East through respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and through implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, and meanwhile to ensure in that region respect for the fundamental rights of all human beings, which would greatly contribute towards the creation of conditions for the restoration of peace.

¹ U.N. doc. A/7603.

² See *Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E. 68. XIV. 2), chap. III.

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Report of the UNRWA Commissioner-General Michelmores, Covering the Period July 1, 1968 - June 30, 1969.¹ (Excerpt)

Letter of transmittal

Letter from the Chairman of the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

INTRODUCTION

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II. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY UNESCO EXECUTIVE BOARD

III. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

15 September 1969

Sir,

I have the honour to submit my annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for the period 1 July 1968 to 30 June 1969, in compliance with the request contained in paragraph 21 of resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 and paragraph 8 of resolution 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958.

The report is presented in three main parts.

The introduction seeks to emphasize the fact of the Agency's dangerously low financial resources and the implications for the refugees and displaced persons if additional funds are not forthcoming, in the first instance to reduce the expected deficit in 1969 and, secondly, for the continuation of the Agency's programmes at their present level in 1970. The introduction also describes briefly the continuing sad plight of the refugees, particularly those who were displaced following the hostilities of June 1967 and the continuing and increasing operational problems for the Agency.

Chapter I gives an account of the Agency's activities during the twelve months ending 30 June 1969 and includes a section on the legal aspects of UNRWA's work.

Chapter II presents the Agency's budget for the calendar year 1970 for consideration by the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session, and the revised budget for 1969.

Statistical tables relating to various aspects of the Agency's work are included in annex I to the report. Resolutions adopted following discussions of UNRWA's education and health activities by the UNESCO Executive Board and the World Health Assembly, respectively, are reproduced as annexes II and III.

The Advisory Commission of UNRWA has considered this report and its views are set forth in a letter dated 20 August 1969 from its Chairman, of which I attach a copy. Although in

¹ U.N. doc. A/7614, 15/9/1969.

drafting the report I have had the benefit of the advice of the members of the Commission, it should not be assumed that the Government represented on the Commission necessarily subscribe to all the views I have expressed.

Since a major part of UNRWA's operations during the past year have been conducted in areas under the control of the Government of Israel, I also considered it appropriate to show the report, in draft, to its representatives and have taken their views and comments into account in preparing the final text.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Laurence MICHELMORE
Commissioner-General

The President of the General Assembly
United Nations
New York

LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

20 August 1969

Dear Dr. Michelmores,

At its meeting on 19 August 1969, the members of the Advisory Commission of UNRWA stated their views on the content of the annual report which you propose to submit to the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

While individual members of the Commission have reserved the position of their respective Governments on a number of matters discussed in the report, as in previous years, the Commission as a whole believes that your report accurately describes the Agency's activities during the period 1 July 1968 to 30 June 1969.

The Commission is well aware of the formidable problems for the Agency that arose following the hostilities of 1967 and continued in 1968 and 1969, and which have hampered the Agency's operations. In addition, the depletion of the Agency's funds and the shortage of income endanger the future of the Agency and jeopardize the essential services now being provided, any lessening of which would mean increased hardship for the refugees.

The Commission commends the Agency's staff for the manner in which they have carried out their tasks in exceptionally difficult circumstances and hopes that, at its twenty-fourth session, the General Assembly will arrive at a solution of the Agency's financial problems which will enable it to carry out the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly at the twenty-third session, without any reduction in services to the refugees.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) Dr. Subhi AMR
Chairman
Advisory Commission

Dr. Laurence Michelmores
Commissioner-General
United Nations Relief and Works Agency
Beirut

INTRODUCTION

1. At its twenty-third session, the General Assembly renewed the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for a further three years until 30 June 1972. An account of the Agency's activities during the last year of the previous mandate is contained in chapter I of the present report.¹ The Agency's programmes

¹ Information concerning the origin of the Agency and its mission and work will be found in the following annual reports and other United Nations documents:
A. Final report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (28 December 1949) (A/AC 25/6, parts I and II).
B. Report of the Secretary-General on Assistance to Palestine Refugees: *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee Annexes*, vol. II, (A/1060), p. 14.
C. Proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees. Documents submitted by the Secretary-General to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly (A/4121).
D. Report by the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237 (1967) (A/6787).
E. Reports of the Director (Commissioner-General) of UNRWA and special reports of the Director and Advisory Commission to the General Assembly:
(i) *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 19* (A/1451/Rev. 1);
(ii) *Ibid.*, *Sixth Session, Supplements Nos. 16 and 16A* (A/1905 and Add. 1);
(iii) *Ibid.*, *Seventh Session, Supplements Nos. 13 and 13A* (A/2171 and Add. 1);
(iv) *Ibid.*, *Eighth Session, Supplements Nos. 12 and 12A* (A/2470 and Add. 1);

of relief, education and health continued on the same lines as in the past: the main problems during the year were related to the continuing consequences of the 1967 hostilities, including military occupation and the continued deferment of hope of return to their homes for all but a small fraction of those who had to move in 1967; the persistence of sporadic hostilities and a general heightening of tension in the area; and a deteriorating financial position which cast doubt on the viability of the Agency's future operations.

(v) *Ibid.*, Ninth Session, Supplements Nos. 17 and 17A (A/2717 and Add. 1);

(vi) *Ibid.*, Tenth Session, Supplements Nos. 15 and 15A (A/2978 and Add. 1);

(vii) *Ibid.*, Eleventh Session, Supplements Nos. 14 and 14A (A/3212 and Add. 1);

(viii) *Ibid.*, Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/3686 and A/3735);

(ix) *Ibid.*, Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/3931 and A/3948);

(x) *Ibid.*, Fourteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/4213);

(xi) *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/4478);

(xii) *Ibid.*, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/4861);

(xiii) *Ibid.*, Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/5214);

(xiv) *Ibid.*, Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/5513);

(xv) *Ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/5813);

(xvi) *Ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/6013);

(xvii) *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/6313);

(xviii) *Ibid.*, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/6713);

(xix) A/6723 and Add. 1. For the printed text, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967*, documents S/8001 and Add. 1;

(xx) A/6787 and Corr. 1;

(xxi) A/7070;

(xxii) *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/7213).

F. Pertinent General Assembly resolutions:

194 (III) of 11 December 1948; 212 (III) of 19 November 1948; 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949; 393 (V) of 2 December 1950; 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952; 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952; 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953; 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954; 916 (X) of 3 December 1955; 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957; 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957; 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958; 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959; 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961; 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961; 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962; 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963; 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965; 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965; 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966; 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967; 2341 (XXII) of 19 December 1967; 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968.

G. Pertinent Security Council resolutions:

237 (14 June 1967); 242 (22 November 1967).

2. It should be noted that UNRWA is not responsible for the maintenance of law and order in refugee camps. In Lebanon, Syria and east Jordan, the Arab host Governments undertake police and other security functions in regard to camps and refugees generally as part of their normal responsibilities towards the population within their borders. As regards the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, the Government of Israel has been called upon in Security Council resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 to "ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place" and these inhabitants include the refugees who remain in Gaza and the West Bank.

3. In Lebanon, despite an unusually stormy winter, the refugee population were not exposed to emergency conditions, but they were indirectly affected by the repercussions of military and political events such as the Israeli raid on the Beirut Airport on 28 December 1968 and the prolonged Government crisis that followed *pro-fedayeen* demonstrations in April. These events inevitably depressed the economy, especially the tourist industry, and reduced opportunities for employment. They also gave prominence to the political aspects of the refugee problem and, while they were no direct concern of UNRWA, they formed part of the environment in which the Agency's work took place.

4. In Syria, despite severe winter storms, the emergency camps accommodating the refugees and other displaced persons¹ from south-western Syria withstood the winter well, thanks to the measures of "winterization" that had been taken. The refugees in Syria were also affected by the general tension in the Middle East.

Little employment was available for those who had been displaced and they were, throughout the year, almost entirely dependent on the relief provided by UNRWA. No registered refugees were among those who were allowed to return to their homes in occupied territory under the arrangement negotiated by the International Committee

¹ Throughout this report, the term "refugees", "displaced refugees" or "newly displaced refugees" refers to those persons who were registered with UNRWA prior to the June 1967 hostilities; the term "displaced persons" or "other displaced persons" refers to those who were displaced after the outbreak of the June 1967 hostilities, but who were not registered with UNRWA.

of the Red Cross, and the second anniversary of their flight passed without any brighter prospect of return. In last year's report, it was stated that plans for reopening the UNRWA Training Centre at Homs, which had been occupied by Syrian displaced persons after the hostilities of 1967, were being discussed with the Syrian Government.¹ No further progress has been made in the negotiations with the Government, and the Centre is still occupied by the displaced Syrians.

5. In east Jordan, shelling, air raids and other hostilities added to the strains of exile and emergency conditions. In the emergency camps, the number of persons had increased to 91,000 by the end of June 1969 as a result of movement into the camp by more refugees or displaced persons who had at first found shelter with friends or relatives or had preferred to fend for themselves as best they could, but who were now forced by dwindling resources or winter weather to seek accommodation in the camps. Work continued on improving facilities by the construction of better drainage and, notably, temporary shelters of timber-frame and asbestos sheeting or galvanized iron or aluminium. The improvements that can be made, of course, are limited by uncertainty about the future, by lack of funds and by the environment — the emergency camps are situated on barren hillsides or plains offering no amenity and little natural protection from heat and dust storms in the summer months and cold, rain, mud, wind, and snow storms in the winter. Supplementary feeding, including the provision of a daily hot meal for children up to the age of fifteen years, was maintained in the emergency camps (as in those in Syria) despite the Agency's worsening financial position.

6. A shelter programme, which has made it possible to provide 9,600 family units to date, is being financed by special contributions from various sources (see paragraph 58 in chapter I below). In addition shelters and other facilities for 800 families were constructed in Talbiyeh Camp by the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society. The understandable reluctance of the vast majority of the refugees to accept a type of accommodation that might appear to make their return

to their homes less urgent deferred the start of construction until shortly before the onset of winter. The shelters ready and occupied during the winter months withstood storms well and represented a great improvement over tents; by the end of June the figure was 9,700, with 700 still under construction, but there were still about 5,000 families left in tents in these camps. The Commissioner-General hopes that special contributions may be forthcoming for the construction of shelters for them before the winter of 1969-1970. Good progress was also made, thanks to donations by voluntary agencies, notably the Pontifical Mission for Palestine and Diakonische Werke, in the replacement of tents by prefabricated buildings for school classrooms, clinics and other facilities.

7. On the West Bank also the effects of persistent hostilities were felt and to them were added those of resistance to the military occupation. As the period of occupation lengthened and the prospect of a settlement seemed to recede, demonstrations, strikes and bomb explosions became more frequent and led to counter-measures by the Israeli military authorities, such as detention, deportation and, in cases of alleged complicity in violence, the blowing up of houses. This action and reaction dislocated the work of schools and training centres and imposed extra strains on the Agency's staff. Two members of the Agency's Arab staff, a headmistress and a doctor, were deported; four were convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment by military courts; eight were detained for varying periods and then released; and seven are still under detention, but not yet convicted or sentenced (two have been charged and are awaiting trial, while the remainder are either undergoing investigation or are being held on administrative detention).

8. In the Gaza Strip, disturbances and dislocation were on a greater scale than before. During the first months of 1969, strikes and incidents of violence were an almost continuous feature of life there, and the Agency could not escape some of the consequences such as the arrest, detention and imprisonment of staff for alleged illegal activities outside of their official duties. During the period from 1 July 1968 to 30 June 1969, fifty-four staff members were arrested, of whom forty were detained for varying periods without

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/7213), para. 6.*

trial and then released, eight were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and six were still under detention as at 30 June 1969. Of those arrested prior to 1 July 1968, and still under detention as at that date, two were subsequently released without trial (including one who was detained for fifteen months), one was acquitted and released and seven were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. There were also a number of instances of intrusion into Agency premises by demonstrators and security forces. It says much for the staff of the Agency that the normal work of relief, health and welfare was continued without serious disruption and that the educational services never suffered complete breakdown.

9. As time went on, the troubled situation in the Middle East affected operations more profoundly. Even in the most favourable circumstances, the Agency's task is not an easy one, and the normal difficulties have been aggravated by the tensions, frustrations, suspicions and mounting violence in which it has been carried on during the past year. The questioning and detention of staff interfered with work and raised delicate questions of policy and practice for the Agency. The withdrawal of certain school textbooks from the occupied territories until they had been reviewed by the Commission of Outside Experts appointed by UNESCO¹ obliged the Agency to compile, reproduce and distribute enormous quantities of teaching notes. In March, the Government of Israel informed the Agency that for reasons of public security, the supply route for the West Bank and Gaza across the Lebanon/Israel border, the opening of which they had agreed to after the hostilities of June 1967, could no longer be used; the alternative was to take the longer and more expensive route through Syria and east Jordan and across the Jordan River for supplies that could not conveniently be imported through Ashdod and Haifa. There were also restrictions imposed by various Governments on the movement of individual Agency staff members, on movement of staff across the Lebanon/Israel border and, generally, on movement in and out of the occupied territories. These restrictions complicated and added to the cost of the Agency's operations. Further, as the higher-cost Israeli

economy continued gradually to influence the prices of goods and services on the West Bank and in Gaza, the Agency's costs there rose directly through purchases and indirectly through the effect on staff salaries of the higher cost of living.

10. The General Assembly, at its twenty-third session, again emphasized the need for the speedy return of displaced refugees and other displaced persons and called upon the Government of Israel "to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities".² In 1967, from information supplied by the International Committee of the Red Cross, 14,058 persons returned to their homes on the West Bank under the scheme in force in July and August of that year. The outstanding permits granted under these arrangements were revalidated late in 1968 and 2,500 new permits were issued against permits not taken up. In the meantime, some of the inhabitants of the West Bank were able to return under a "family reunion" scheme. (The International Committee of the Red Cross has no figures for 1968 and 1969 for return to the West Bank, because the arrangements were handled by the Government of Israel through municipal authorities on the West Bank.) The International Committee of the Red Cross has also informed the Commissioner-General that, under the "family reunion" scheme for Gaza, 158 persons returned in 1967, 2,032 in 1968 and 330 in the first three months of 1969, making a total of 2,520; and that 449 displaced Syrians returned to the Golan Heights in 1969, with permits outstanding for a further 263. None of those who returned to the Golan Heights were registered refugees and the figures for the West Bank and Gaza do not distinguish between refugees and other displaced persons.

11. There has thus been only a limited return of refugees or other displaced persons to their former places of residence. Uncertainty about the future, which has hung over the heads of the refugees for twenty-one years, continues; and they continue to express their disappointment and disillusionment over the delay in the realization of the hopes to return to their places of residence before June 1967, hopes for repatriation to their

¹ See para. 105 below.

² General Assembly resolution 2452 A (XXIII), para. 1.

original homes or compensation for those choosing not to return,¹ and hopes for "a just settlement of the refugee problem" as part of the just and lasting peace envisaged by Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967.

In the meantime, they are confronted constantly with the physical dangers and tensions resulting from hostilities across the cease-fire lines, eruptions of violence in the occupied areas, and retaliatory raids on the ground and in the air. They feel the frustrations and fears of measures taken for security reasons, such as curfews, interrogations, detentions and demolition of buildings, and this has inevitably had a detrimental effect on the morale of these unfortunate people.

12. The consequence for the Agency of only limited return has been the continuing need to provide services for more than 200,000 displaced refugees and other persons in Syria and east Jordan. In the United Arab Republic, the Agency has made a contribution to the relief of displaced refugees cared for by the Government. The Commissioner-General regrets that he must again direct the attention of the General Assembly to the painful anomaly that on the West Bank well-equipped camps are only partly occupied and, in some cases, particularly at Jericho, are almost empty, while their former inhabitants live in barely tolerable conditions in the emergency camps or whatever other accommodation they have been able to find in east Jordan. What means of livelihood these people had before the hostilities and whatever opportunities they had for their economic and social rehabilitation in the communities in which they had lived for almost twenty years have been lost through the events of the past two years. As was noted in the Commissioner-General's report for the year ending 30 June 1967,² the progress achieved in this respect

prior to the June 1967 hostilities was not inconsiderable.

13. There has been almost no migration from Gaza and the West Bank to east Jordan since the Jordanian Government, in July 1968, prohibited the entry of persons intending to remain in east Jordan. It has thus been possible for UNRWA to make good progress in restoring order in Agency registration records, which had been thrown into confusion by the large-scale movement of refugees during and after the 1967 hostilities. The special identification procedures at distribution centres referred to in last year's report were maintained in Gaza, the West Bank and east Jordan. In Gaza and the West Bank, deletions from the rolls have made it possible to add children not previously included on the ration rolls. In Lebanon, the Government's authorization to make field investigations was withdrawn for several months, but has now been restored and verification of eligibility is continuing. In Syria, the Agency is still unable to conduct field investigations and must rely for amendment of its records on information on deaths and prolonged absences as provided in government refugee records. In all areas, children over the age of one year who are technically eligible for rations, but for whom none is available, now total 308,038. Of these, 14,947 children of displaced registered refugees in east Jordan and Syria are at present receiving rations from UNRWA on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, and 41,532 children in east Jordan receive rations paid for by the Jordanian Government.

14. Economically, the bulk of the refugee population has continued to suffer reverses, although seasonal occupations and other casual employment have benefited small numbers. Generally the economic situation remains depressed and has increased the need of refugees for assistance from the Agency. For the majority, this assistance is essential to survival.

15. It is noteworthy that there have been no major epidemics among the refugees, including those in the emergency camps in east Jordan and in crowded conditions with primitive sanitation.

16. Although there were many disruptions and attendance fluctuated during the year in the Agency's schools, particularly in the occupied areas,

¹ The General Assembly, in its resolution 194 (II), adopted on 11 December 1948, resolved "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for losses of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible...". This paragraph (11) has been referred to in many subsequent resolutions, most recent of which is General Assembly resolution 2452 B (XXIII), para. 4. For other relevant resolutions, see footnote 1-f above.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/6713)*, paras. 53-57.

there was no abatement of the devotion to education the refugee community has always shown and enrolment increased with the increase in the population of school age. Attendance at teacher and vocational and technical training centres also fluctuated during the year owing to incidents such as strikes and demonstrations. Some of the time lost was made up by extra classes and extension of the school year. In spite of the present uncertainties, all the indications are that the great majority of the young people earnestly wish to complete their training and acquire skills that will enable them to find employment and help their families.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER UNITED NATIONS ORGANS AND WITH SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

17. The Agency again enjoyed fruitful co-operation with other United Nations organs and agencies in improving the conditions of the refugee population. The Agency's education programme is jointly conducted with UNESCO, whose guidance and help have been invaluable in grappling with the many problems that have arisen, especially those arising from the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The continued technical direction of the Agency's health programme by WHO is also deeply appreciated. In addition, WHO is undertaking a study of the health conditions among the displaced persons in the area, the results of which will be of assistance to UNRWA. A number of the Agency's vocational and technical instructors have received fellowships at the ILO's International Centre for Advanced Training and Vocational Training in Turin, Italy, and the ILO has indicated its interest in assisting UNRWA in other areas yet to be determined. The Commissioner-General welcomed the announcement in June by the World Food Programme (WFP) of its intention to make available further supplies of food commodities to the Government of Jordan, which will provide for 140,000 displaced persons other than Palestine refugees for a period of four months. (It should be noted that UNRWA projects are not eligible for assistance under UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and similar United Nations agency programmes of aid.)

18. The Agency's accounts for 1968 have been audited by the United Nations Board of Auditors

whose report will be reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee. In addition, and in response to a proposal made in the Fifth Committee during the twenty-third session, the Agency will submit a report on its administration, budget and financial procedures to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

ASSISTANCE FROM VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND OTHER NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

19. In recording his gratitude to the many voluntary agencies and other organizations and individuals who have provided assistance for the refugees and displaced persons during the past year, the Commissioner-General wishes to make special mention of contributions that made it possible to carry out programmes which might otherwise have had to lapse for lack of funds. The projects financed by these contributions, together with the names of the donors, are noted in the appropriate sections throughout this report, among them the American organization, Near East Emergency Donations, Inc. (NEED); the Swedish Save the Children Federation (Radda Barnen); the British OXFAM; AUSTCARE (Australia); the Pontifical Mission for Palestine; MISEREOR and Diakonische Werke (Federal Republic of Germany); Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO); the Near East Council of Churches and many others. All contributions made direct to UNRWA from non-governmental sources are shown in table 21 of annex I. The Commissioner-General also wishes to pay tribute to the continued generous assistance and untiring efforts on behalf of the refugees by the voluntary agencies, both international and local, based in the area of the Agency's operation (see table 18 of annex I).

FINANCE

20. The deteriorating financial position of the Agency has overshadowed all other administrative and operational considerations. There has now been a deficit in every year of operation since 1963, except for 1967, when the obvious needs in the aftermath of the hostilities brought forth special contributions. These special contributions

were exhausted in the following year and 1968 again closed with a deficit. The cumulative total of the deficits since 1963 is \$7 million. The current year (1969) is expected to end with a deficit of between \$3.3 and \$3.8 million, depending on various factors, such as the impact of the rising cost of living on staff costs and any shortfalls in expected contributions. A deficit of the order of \$3.5 million is forecast for 1970 if services are maintained at their present level.

21. The accumulated surplus or "working capital," a legacy from the early years when funds were donated for large-scale resettlement and development projects, amounted to over \$20 million at the end of 1962. On 31 December 1968, it had fallen to \$13.7 million and, at the end of 1969 it will be about \$10 million. Of this amount, some \$7 million to \$8 million will be tied up in supplies in the "pipeline" or otherwise immobilized and the cash element will correspond to less than the cost of two months' operations. This margin is, of course, inadequate for safe operation. Unless services are reduced or more funds are made available in one way or another, the Agency is certain to run out of cash in the course of 1970. If payment of governmental contributions lags behind expenditure, it may happen in the first half of the year that the Agency will find itself unable to pay salaries and meet other commitments.

22. The reasons for the Agency's recurring deficits are clear. While UNRWA purchases goods and services in the world market and cannot escape the impact of rising prices, in most cases contributions have not increased correspondingly. At the same time, the refugee population, like all populations in the comparable socio-economic category, has been rapidly increasing. The effect of ration costs has not been proportionate because of the imposition of "ceilings" for the distribution of basic rations, but the demand for services, specially education, has greatly increased. In 1969-1970, for instance, there will be 50,000 more children than in 1966 receiving elementary and preparatory education in UNRWA / UNESCO schools. The annual increase in the school population is now of the order of 14,000 and the recurrent costs of education will be about \$1 million more in 1970 than in 1969.

23. The agency has also faced heavier expenditure as a result of the 1967 hostilities. Special

contributions have paid for infrastructure and buildings in the emergency camps in east Jordan and Syria, but some duplication of services has been necessary and also some expansion. For example, the hot meal programme was extended to children in the age group of seven to fifteen years because of the conditions in these camps. More recently, the rising cost of living in the area, due to both external and internal causes, and its repercussions on staff costs, have been a source of concern to the Agency. The policy in regard to remuneration of local staff has been to take as guidelines the salaries paid by the local governments to staff employed on similar duties, such as teachers and health workers. When these governments increase their salaries, it is difficult for the Agency not to follow suit, since to some extent it competes in the same market. Thus, many UNRWA teachers leave the Agency's service every year for employment with governments in the Arab world, and, while the training they have received in the Agency's teacher-training centres and schools is a valuable form of technical assistance to the region, there are limits to the extent to which the Agency can suffer the loss of qualified and experienced personnel and still maintain standards in its own school system. Moreover, as a United Nations agency, UNRWA is bound to treat its employees equitably and cannot allow its rates of remuneration to lag far behind those paid by governments or other organizations save at the risk of a lowering of morale and consequently of efficiency. Some increase in staff remuneration is therefore required despite the critical budgetary situation.

24. In the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly last year, the Secretary-General made a strong appeal for an increase in contributions, and the Commissioner-General warned of the measures that would be necessary if income were not adequately increased. Both the Security-General and the Commissioner-General have since approached a number of Governments with a particular interest in the Agency's task; some increase in contributions has resulted, but, as stated in paragraph 20 above, a very large deficit remains. The Commissioner-General, faced with the decision whether to reduce services forthwith, consulted the Advisory Commission of UNRWA in April. All the Arab host

Governments strongly opposed any reduction, which they said would inflict severe hardship on the refugees and would be harmful to public security. The other members of the Advisory Commission expressed the hope that reductions could be avoided, but could offer no other solution to the financial problem except further efforts to raise more funds. The Government of Israel was also given an opportunity to comment, but reserved its views pending clarification of UNRWA's financial position in the light of developments. In view of the advice he had received, especially the strong representations made to him by the Arab host Governments, and on his own judgement of the situation at a time when sustained efforts were being made to reach a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, the Commissioner-General decided to defer reduction of services until the General Assembly had been given a further opportunity to consider alternative solutions. At the end of June 1969, he submitted a statement on the Agency's financial position to the Secretary-General, who communicated the statement by a letter of 24 July to all States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies (A/7577). In doing so, the Secretary-General impressed upon them the necessity for adequately supporting UNRWA and expressed the hope that, at its next regular session, the General Assembly would take urgent and effective action on the future financing of the Agency.

25. In a report to the Advisory Commission in April 1969, the Commissioner-General gave a list of reductions in services which might have to be made if the deficit were not covered by contributions. In relief services, these reductions included the elimination from the basic ration content of soap, pulses, sugar and rice; a 25 per cent cut in supplementary feeding; the elimination of the winter ration of kerosene; and the elimination of provision for relief assistance to displaced persons from Gaza in the United Arab Republic. As the basic ration provides only 1,500 calories per person per day and is less than an adequate diet, the removal of pulses, sugar and rice would have serious nutritional effects. The elimination of soap would be unfortunate from a health point of view, given the conditions in which refugees live, especially in the emergency camps.

26. It would be unrealistic to look for any substantial saving by means of reducing the number of basic rations distributed. The present ration ceiling is a little less than 850,000 and excludes about 293,000 children, who receive services only. Rectification of the ration rolls is proceeding as a continuous process, and good progress has been made during the year in reconciling the rolls for Gaza, West Bank and east Jordan. Much of this rectification has consisted, however, of the deletion of persons dead or absent and their replacement by children entitled to rations but not previously in receipt of them. Investigation for income has also continued during the year wherever possible, but opportunities for employment have diminished rather than increased as a result of the unsettled political and economic conditions in the area.

27. The beneficiaries of supplementary feeding are children and other vulnerable groups; the kerosene ration is intended for heating; and as for relief assistance to displaced persons from Gaza in the United Arab Republic, they would either go without or the Government which has already heavy relief commitments would be asked to assume the burden.

28. The cuts in UNRWA's own health services could not be made without risk to refugee health, since these services constitute little (if any) more than a bare minimum. It must also be borne in mind that the growth in the child population has increased the demand on the services. Sickness on an epidemic scale has been avoided because of effective public health measures, including environmental sanitation and programmes of inoculation and vaccination carried out through UNRWA's clinics. It would be dangerous to jeopardize this protection, especially if there were to be simultaneous cuts in the ration content.

29. Education is now overtaking relief as the largest item in the Agency's budget, absorbing about 43 per cent of expenditure. It is also the most constructive part of the Agency's work, contributing both to individual rehabilitation and to the general development of the area. The refugees themselves attach the greatest importance to education for their children as a means of achieving independence and dignity, and Arab host and contributing Governments have constantly

expressed the hope that UNRWA's education work would be continued and strengthened.

30. Some education expenditure is financed by contributions made for a specific purpose that would not be available for other purposes, for example, grants from Government funds for development aid. When these grants are made for capital projects, the Agency seeks to obtain at the same time an assurance of support over a period for consequential recurrent expenditure. Such assurances are not always possible but are sometimes forthcoming; for instance, the Federal Republic of Germany, which is financing the capital cost of the expansion of the Wadi Seer Vocational Training Centre (east Jordan), has agreed to provide funds for five years for the recurrent cost of the expansion. The UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education, which is pioneering new methods of in-service training for teachers, is financed currently by contributions from the Swedish Government (through the Swedish International Development Authority), the Swiss Government (Swiss Technical Co-operation) and, through the provision of staff, UNESCO. Standards in UNRWA schools are far from lavish; classes often exceed fifty in size and would be reduced on educational grounds if funds could be found to pay for more teachers.

31. There is little scope for economies in the educational programme or for reductions in educational services directly provided by UNRWA without dismantling part of the system, for example, eliminating the preparatory cycle, that is the last three years of the nine-year course of study. The possible reductions listed by the Commissioner-General related therefore to university scholarships and to subsidies to public and private education authorities for the maintenance of refugee pupils in their schools. The elimination of these subsidies would either throw a burden on the Governments concerned, which already face mounting expenditure on education, or leave upwards of 60,000 refugee children without education. Reductions in educational expenditure therefore offer no easy solution to the problem.

32. In the search for economies, attention is likely to be directed to "administrative" costs. As UNRWA is an operational agency, providing services directly, it is difficult to isolate costs

that can be labelled "administrative". It is relevant that, of the Agency's locally recruited staff of 21,901, 56.3 per cent are employed in education services and 18.4 per cent in health services. The international staff now number only 110, having been reduced from 183 in 1963, and, in the opinion of the Commissioner-General, they represent the minimum necessary to ensure the international character of the Agency and provide the direction, control and supervision for which the Commissioner-General is responsible to the General Assembly. The budgetary procedures of the Agency are designed to subject costs to searching scrutiny at periodic hearings and there has been regular pruning of staff manning-tables. Substantial economies commensurate with the Agency's financial problem cannot be obtained from an attack on "administrative" costs.

33. The Agency is thus faced with the threat that its cash reserve will be exhausted — perhaps early in 1970 — unless more income is forthcoming or expenditure can be reduced. Successive appeals, in and out of the General Assembly, have failed to produce the required increase in income. Reductions in expenditure of the volume required cannot be made without further hardship for the refugees and political repercussions, and would have to be carried out against the opposition of the refugees themselves and of the Arab host Governments. It would seem that the Agency's budgetary position cannot be stabilized without a major decision on the method of future financing or on the scope of the services the Agency is to provide for the refugees. A decision of this kind can no longer be delayed, for the Agency can hardly go forward into 1970 in such uncertainty.

34. It is worth mentioning here that, in 1969 and 1970, part of the Agency's income is expected to be in the form of flour in excess of its normal requirements. As part of its regular basic ration issue, UNRWA distributes annually 112,000 tons of flour to the refugees (the other food components being pulses, rice, sugar and oil). The bulk of the Agency's requirements of flour is normally provided by the United States Government as part of its regular contribution. In the past few years, additional flour has been donated by the Government of Canada as part of its regular contribution and as special contributions. Whatever

balance was required was purchased by the Agency on the open market. Several other countries have now donated flour as part of their contribution and, should the same level of flour contributions be continued in 1970, the Agency will have a surplus of this commodity. Means which would not worsen the Agency's financial position must therefore be found of utilizing or disposing of the flour, for example, the substitution of additional flour for one or more of the other components of the ration issue, or its sale or exchange for other commodities. If one of these courses is possible, the full value of the excess flour will not be realized and the deficit will be increased accordingly.

35. In view of the precarious state of the Agency's reserves, it is also relevant here to refer to the Agency's claim against the Governments of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan jointly in respect of excess rail charges (see paragraph 158 in chapter I below). The amount involved is over \$1.5 million and, if paid would make a substantial contribution to strengthening the reserve. The Agency has therefore renewed with urgency its request for a meeting with representatives of the Governments to settle the claim.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

36. This introduction has sought to convey an impression of the major preoccupations of the Agency during the year ending 30 June 1969. Despite uncertainties and apprehensions, UNRWA has consolidated its work and has tried, so far as it lies within its power, to safeguard the welfare of the refugees and the future of their children by its health and education programmes.

37. It is obvious that for so long as the problem of the refugees remains unsettled, the need for the services provided by UNWRA must continue. As has been explained above, these services cannot be substantially reduced without bringing further hardship to many hundreds of thousands of persons already on the verge of destitution, adding to their feelings of desperation and setting in train widespread repercussion in the area that would exacerbate the inflamed and dangerous situation in the Middle East. Furthermore, if education and training were to be curtailed, the horizon of the refugees would be even more limited and a valuable form of technical

assistance to the Arab world would be lost. Nevertheless, despite these compelling reasons for the Agency to be provided with the financial resources essential to its ability to continue operations and plan for the future, there is at the time of writing no assurance that 1970 will not witness a major crisis in the Agency's affairs. This introduction can therefore only end with an appeal to the General Assembly to set the Agency's finances on a firmer foundation and assure it of funds adequate to its task.

CHAPTER I

REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE AGENCY FROM 1 JULY 1968 TO 30 JUNE 1969

38. The following section of the report describes UNRWA's main activities during the year ending 30 June 1969. Supplemental information on the estimated expenditure for each activity in the calendar year 1969 and the actual expenditure in 1968 is given in chapter II below, which presents the Agency's budget for the year 1970.

A. RELIEF SERVICES

39. The large-scale movement of refugees from the West Bank and Gaza to east Jordan which took place during the previous year did not continue in the year under review. New arrivals virtually ceased in July 1968 when the Jordan Government stopped admitting newcomers from Gaza. Arrivals from the West Bank had already almost ceased. Thus the east Jordan refugee population has been comparatively stable during the reporting year and it was possible to plan the needs of the newly displaced refugees for shelter and other services on this basis. The special identification procedures at distribution centres, referred to in last year's report,¹ were maintained in Gaza, the West Bank and east Jordan throughout the year in a continuing effort to ensure that rations were issued to eligible refugees only.

40. The establishment of the new record centre in Amman was completed during the year by the transfer from Jerusalem and Gaza of thousands of family files and records for east Jordan refugees as well as those of refugees

¹ *Ibid.*, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/7213), para. 43).

displaced from the West Bank and Gaza. Progress has also been made in establishing records in respect of refugees residing in the new camps in east Jordan and it is anticipated that these will be completed during the next few months. Despite concentrated efforts in Gaza, the West Bank and east Jordan, the task of correcting the Agency's records, after the identification of refugees who became displaced to new locations, is still incomplete. The need to concentrate on this important project has inevitably delayed the normal recording of changes in family composition, and statistics for east Jordan therefore do not yet fully correspond to the actual situation, although they more closely reflect the changes that have occurred since the 1967 hostilities than was true in 1968. In particular, a large number of births remain to be recorded. The following statistics should therefore be read with these deficiencies in mind.

41. The number of refugees registered with the Agency on 30 June 1969 was 1,395,074 compared with 1,364,294 on 30 June 1968, an increase of 2.2 per cent. However, the number of UNRWA rations issued in June 1969 was 840,353, including issues being made on an emergency basis, compared with 862,988 in June 1968, a decrease of 2.6 per cent. The new ceilings which have been fixed will stabilize the number of rations at about the same figure as before June 1967 and so allow several thousand eligible children to be added to the rolls. The number of refugees registered with the Agency, but not receiving rations, was 554,721 in June 1969 compared with 501,000 in June 1968. It will be noted that only some 60.2 per cent of registered refugees received rations in June 1969. Tables 1 to 3 of annex I give statistics of registered refugees, the categories of services to which they are entitled, and changes in the composition and entitlement of refugee families as recorded by the Agency.

42. As well as its normal programme of distribution of rations to registered refugees, the Agency, as requested by the Jordan Government in 1967 and subject to reimbursement by the Government of most of the additional costs, has continued to distribute rations to all Government-registered displaced persons in east Jordan. In the month of June 1969, 242,483 rations were issued to such persons.

ELIGIBILITY AND REGISTRATION

43. In east Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank, the Agency's main effort was directed to restoring order in registration records, which had been thrown into confusion by the mass movements of population which followed the 1967 hostilities. Correlation of records of rations distributed in these three areas revealed many discrepancies, such as duplicate issues of rations and failures by whole families to collect rations, and these had to be investigated with the families concerned. To facilitate and speed up correction of the records, the refugees in Gaza and the West Bank were invited to declare the names of any previously unreported dead, absentees and other ineligible persons recorded on the registration cards and to nominate eligible children to receive any rations which became available as a result. The co-operation received from the refugees was most encouraging, and from the rations saved as a result of these voluntary declarations and other corrective action, the Agency has been able, since July 1967, to issue 22,151 rations on the West Bank and 13,403 rations in Gaza to children registered with the Agency, but previously not in receipt of rations.

44. In Lebanon, governmental authorities withdrew authorization to make field investigations for a period of several months. However, as of 15 January 1969, the normal investigative programme resumed, with resulting new additions to the rolls and reinstatement of rations approximately balancing the number of deletions. The Agency plans in future months to continue its programme of verification of eligibility, and to redistribute the rations of families who have become self-supporting to the children of needy refugees for whom no rations are available within the ceiling established for Lebanon.

45. There has been no progress in rectification in Syria, and Government opposition to field investigations has been maintained. Agency records continue to be amended in respect of deaths and prolonged absences on the basis of Government refugee records, and ration entitlements are adjusted accordingly. The ration ceiling has remained approximately static, at just above 100,000.

46. In all areas of the Agency's operations, the names of 72,433 persons, including 61,877 ration recipients, were removed from the rolls during the twelve months ending 30 June 1969 (compared with 55,327, of whom 47,390 were ration recipients in the twelve months ending 30 June 1968). In place of those refugees who have been removed from the ration rolls, 23,463 rations were issued during the year to children on the waiting list whose families were found to be suffering extreme hardship. For other rations issued, see table 2 of annex I.

47. All children (11,938) of displaced refugees residing in the emergency camps in east Jordan have been issued with rations by the Agency as a continuing temporary measure, and the children of those displaced refugees living outside camps have been issued with rations donated by the Jordan Government. Similarly, in Syria, 3,009 children of displaced refugees have been issued with rations by the Agency.

48. The financial position of the Agency made it necessary to continue its restrictions on the number of ration recipients, and the number of children over the age of one year for whom no rations are available continues to grow. By June 1969, these children totalled 308,038, of whom 162,691 were in east Jordan, 64,594 on the West Bank, 11,063 in Lebanon, 33,344 in Syria and 36,346 in the Gaza Strip, although, as stated above, 11,938 of these children in east Jordan and 3,009 in Syria are being issued with rations by the Agency as an emergency measure and a further 41,532 are being issued with rations donated by the Jordanian Government.

BASIC RATIONS

49. The content of the basic food rations, which provided approximately 1,500 calories per day in summer and 1,600 in winter, remained unchanged during the period covered by this report. Details of the rations and of the other supplies distributed to the refugees are contained in table 4 of annex I. During the year, the Agency imported some 112,200 tons of flour and some 24,800 tons of other food-stuffs for distribution to the refugees. The cost of those supplies, together with the cost of distribution, accounted for approximately one third of the Agency's budget.

SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING

50. Since the UNRWA basic ration content is dietetically inadequate, lacking as it does all fresh food items and all protein of animal origin, the supplementary feeding programme has been established to protect and promote the health of the vulnerable groups among the refugee population, notably infants, children in the pre-school age group, pregnant women, nursing mothers, and tuberculous patients under domiciliary treatment.

51. A daily issue of a mixture of liquid whole and skim milk is available for infants aged six to twelve months, as well as for those under six months who cannot be breast-fed. A portion of liquid skim milk is made available on twenty-six days per month to children aged one to six years, as well as to expectant and nursing mothers from the beginning of the fifth month of pregnancy until the end of the twelfth month after delivery and to certain sick refugees upon medical recommendation. During the scholastic year, there is an issue of milk in the Agency's elementary schools on twenty-two days per month. During the 1968 school holidays, the same beneficiaries were entitled to an issue on twenty-six days per month through the milk distribution centres. A monthly issue of 500 grammes of cornflour/soya/milk mixture (CSM) is made available to all children in the age group six to ten years. The Agency's milk and CSM distribution programmes are made possible through the special annual contribution of skim milk powder and cornflour/soya/milk mixture from the Government of the United States of America. During the period under review, the Agency received donations of 1,442 metric tons of skim milk powder and 1,944 metric tons of CSM.

52. A nutritionally balanced hot meal is provided at Agency supplementary feeding centres on six days per week, on an "open" basis to all children up to the age of six years, on medical selection to children between six and fifteen years and to a small number of sick adults. Over and above the varied standard menus, a special bland high-protein menu is provided for infants and young children suffering from gastroenteritis and malnutrition. Vitamin A and D capsules are issued to children one to six years

of age attending supplementary feeding centres and to elementary school children at the time of school milk distribution. On medical certification, extra dry rations are issued to expectant and nursing mothers from the beginning of the fifth month of pregnancy to the end of the twelfth month after delivery. On medical certification also, tuberculous out-patients receive a monthly supplement equivalent to the UNRWA monthly basic rations.

53. In addition to the foregoing supplementary feeding, the emergency feeding programme introduced after the June 1967 hostilities was maintained throughout the period of this report. While those benefiting under this special programme were mainly the newly displaced refugees, whether living in or out of the emergency camps in east Jordan and in Syria, assistance was also provided to some other categories on the West Bank and in Gaza. In broad outline, the emergency feeding programme consisted of (a) extension of the daily hot meal and milk distribution to include all displaced refugee children up to the age of fifteen years; (b) distribution of a monthly protein supplement consisting of one twelve-ounce tin of meat and 500 grammes of cornflour/soya/milk mixture to all displaced registered refugees in Syria, to the same categories living in the tented camps in east Jordan; and to all pregnant and nursing women and tuberculous out-patients in Gaza and on the West Bank, and to those in this category living outside the tented camps in east Jordan; (c) a non-protein supplement, which included flour, rice and fats, to all displaced refugees living in the tented camps and hardship cases living outside those camps in Syria. Daily hot meals were provided for about 8,000 displaced persons not registered with UNRWA, but living in the emergency camps in east Jordan. (After 1 January 1969, the Jordanian Government resumed responsibility for the supplies for these meals). On the West Bank some registered refugees identified as hardship cases were also given daily hot meals. The whole / skim milk mixture was made available for the age group four to six months among the displaced registered refugee population in east Jordan and in Syria. A monthly issue of one kilogramme of dry skim milk was provided to all displaced refugees living outside the tented camps

in east Jordan until 30 June 1969, when the supplies specially donated for this distribution were exhausted.

54. In addition to gifts in kind, in the form of milk, canned meat and other items, received from various donors, a most generous monetary contribution by OXFAM helped to make possible the continuation of this emergency programme. OXFAM also met the construction costs of the supplementary feeding sub-centre built at Rafah Camp in the Gaza Strip.

55. Tables 5 and 6 of annex I give, in summary, the numbers of various categories of refugees who were benefiting from the milk and supplementary feeding programmes.

CAMPS, SHELTER AND CONSTRUCTION

56. The registered population of the fifty-three¹ established UNRWA camps increased slightly, from 433,031 in June 1968 to 434,952 in June 1969. The number of persons actually residing in these camps is estimated at approximately 490,000 (see table 7 of annex I). In the ten new emergency camps (six in east Jordan and four in Syria), the population increased over the year from approximately 86,000 to 100,000. Thus, the total camp population was some 590,000.

57. In east Jordan, about 75,000 refugees who had abandoned the camps in the east Jordan Valley in February and March 1968 as a result of the hostilities which took place at that time, were immediately accommodated in tents in six new camps established with hastily provided sanitation and water supply facilities, drainage and access roads, in the hill country north and south of Amman. Five of these camps were operated by UNRWA, and the sixth, at Zizia, south of Amman, by the Red Lion and Sun Society of Iran, which undertook to construct accommodation at Zizia of a more solid character; upon completion in the autumn of 1968, this camp (since renamed Talbiyeh) was turned over to UNRWA to administer.

¹ This figure is reduced by one camp over the number shown in previous reports owing to the fact that Karameh Camp in the east Jordan Valley was abandoned during the hostilities in February 1968. All usable, movable property belonging to the Agency was withdrawn and the Agency relinquished responsibility for the Camp during the summer of 1968.

58. By agreement between UNRWA and the Jordanian Government in August 1968 and with the use of funds specially donated for the purpose by Governments and non-governmental organizations, a major construction programme was initiated in the autumn of 1968 to replace tented accommodation with more solid temporary shelter. By June 1969, some 7,300 families in three east Jordan camps were occupying UNRWA-built temporary shelters (4,800 provided by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and 2,500 by NEED), and 800 families in the Talbiyeh (Zizia) Camp had been given concrete shelters by the Red Lion and Sun Society of Iran; the Near East Council of Churches has provided shelters for an additional 1,600 families at a fifth camp; the Standing Conference of British Organizations for Aid to Refugees has donated another 700 shelters, which are now being erected in the sixth camp; and a further donation, which will allow 400 shelters to be erected, has been promised by the Italian Government.

59. The total population of the six emergency camps in east Jordan increased during the year to about 91,000. Of these, accommodation will have been provided for some 60,000 in temporary shelters at a cost of approximately \$2 million. However, about 30,000 refugees and other displaced persons continue to live in tents and further special contributions are being sought to finance additional shelter construction. In the emergency camps in east Jordan, substantial contributions in cash or kind are making it possible to construct a variety of prefabricated and mobile buildings to serve as schools, clinics, kitchens, dining halls, youth centres, children's play centres, bath houses and slaughter houses, and also to build roads, pathways, latrines, septic tanks and surface and storm water drainage. Construction of these projects and other buildings is under way with the aim of accommodating all central camp services and schools in buildings in place of tents before the coming winter and the 1969-1970 school year. Contributions to UNRWA of prefabricated buildings from Diakonische Werke (Federal Republic of Germany) are being used for some of these purposes, while the Norwegian Refugee Council has donated mobile clinics and the Pontifical Mission for Palestine has provided

school buildings in three of the camps.

60. In the four emergency camps in Syria, the total population increased from 7,746 to 9,041 during the year. Although the refugees have remained in tents, further concrete platforms, bath houses, paths and drainage were provided in these camps.

61. In the Lebanon camps, 180 shelters were erected and a protective sea wall was strengthened; in the Gaza camps some road work was carried out as well as the repair of damaged shelters.

62. In addition to the camp improvement, noted above, the Agency was able to proceed with more permanent construction of schoolrooms and training centres and a limited programme of buildings for health facilities. The funds for this construction were provided from several sources, mainly from the private American organization, NEED, the Swedish Save the Children Federation, AUSTCARE (Australia), and the Governments of Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Agency's technical services were expanded so that the necessary design and engineering work could be carried out at Headquarters, and the supervisory work in the respective Field Offices. The work undertaken was adversely affected by disturbances and the prevailing unsettled conditions in the various countries. The major part of the new construction is being carried out in east Jordan, where an entirely new technical office had to be established as the former staff remained in Jerusalem after the June 1967 hostilities. Particulars of schoolroom and training centre construction are given in paragraphs 95 and 128, respectively, and of the health facilities in paragraph 70 below.

SPECIAL HARDSHIP ASSISTANCE

Clothing

63. The voluntary agencies continued, through their contributors abroad, to make generous donations of used clothing available to UNRWA to meet the needs of the refugees, which have increased considerably since 1967, particularly in east Jordan. During the year, about 1,300 tons of used clothing were received by UNRWA and distributed to registered refugees in need in east Jordan and on the West Bank, in Lebanon, Syria

and Gaza. The Agency itself spent over \$30,000 on inland transportation costs and on ocean freight for some of the clothing received from abroad.

64. While the following agencies generously maintained and indeed increased their regular contributions to meet the needs of the many thousands of registered refugees and other displaced persons, other special donations were received from various organizations in the United States of America, Canada and Europe which were of great assistance in meeting emergency clothing needs.

American Friends Service Committee
 Canadian Lutheran World Relief
 Canadian Red Cross Society
 Caritas-Verband (Federal Republic of Germany)
 Catholic Relief Services (United States)
 Church of Scotland
 Church World Service (United States)
 Lutheran World Relief, Inc.
 Mennonite Central Committee (United States)
 OXFAM (United Kingdom)
 Unitarian Service Committee of Canada
 United Church of Canada
 Väst kustens Efterkrigshjälp (Sweden)
 Women's Royal Voluntary Service (United Kingdom)

Case-work programme

65. Because of the increased need among the refugee population, the Agency augmented its programme of aid to those members of the community who, because of chronic illness, old age, widowhood or unforeseen emergencies required special assistance. In all, 20,917 persons were assisted with small cash grants and others were helped with special issues of clothing, blankets and kerosene, but, because of budgetary limitations, the Agency was unable to assist many more thousands of refugees who had become destitute as a result of the hostilities. The Agency also distributed to refugees and displaced persons in east Jordan 120,000 blankets by the Jordan Government and by voluntary agencies in Jordan, including Lutheran World Relief Inc., Mennonite Central Committee, Near East Council of Churches, Catholic Relief Services, and CARE. In addition, case-workers advised many thousands of refugees on their personal problems

and placed thirteen destitute aged people in homes and 102 orphans in institutions.

B. HEALTH SERVICES

66. The June 1967 hostilities and the subsequent outbreaks of armed conflict in the east Jordan Valley in February 1968 called for emergency measures to meet the immediate requirements of the displaced refugees, and the aftermath of these tragic events is still clearly in evidence in the continued existence of the emergency camps in east Jordan and in Syria. Nevertheless, with the passage of time, the emergency medical facilities and services and basic sanitation in these camps are being progressively improved. These improvements include the provision of better, even if temporary, accommodation for the health centres and for the health staff resident in the camps; the establishment and operation of a number of rehydration/nutrition centres for the treatment of infants and young children suffering from gastro-enteritis and/or undernourishment; the provision of a more extensive water distribution system; improved surface drainage; the construction of septic-tank latrines, bath houses and slaughter houses; and the provision of emergency kitchens and dining halls for the preparation and distribution of the daily hot meal and liquid milk issues. Such improvements have been achieved in large measure through the co-operation of the Government health authorities and valuable assistance from various voluntary societies either operating in the area or providing aid from abroad. These contributions have been received in the form of medical personnel, supplies, equipment, ambulances, and prefabricated or other types of buildings to provide accommodation for services or staff. At the present time, therefore, it can be stated that the level of health services in the emergency camps is approximately of the same standard as that provided by the Agency under its normal health programme. In the Gaza Field, the Agency's health services were maintained at a satisfactory level despite serious shortage of staff. The situation though still very pressing has, however, been eased somewhat by the recruitment of doctors and nurses both locally and from abroad. In addition, the services of a pediatrician have been donated by the Belgian Government. Some vacancies still exist and active steps continue

to be taken to secure the services of additional staff in order to fill all vacant posts.

67. It is to be noted that, under its resolution WHA. 21.38 of 23 May 1968, the twenty-first World Health Assembly has requested the Director-General of WHO to study the health conditions among displaced persons in the area (the Near East) and to report to the twenty-second World Health Assembly. (Resolutions concerning UNRWA adopted at the twenty-second session are appended as annex III). The Agency provided the Director-General of WHO such information in respect of the displaced UNRWA registered refugee population as requested for the purpose of enabling him to complete this report.

68. The Agency's total health programme is carried out with the help of WHO. By agreement, WHO provides advisory and consultative health services as required on the planning of this programme, which is directed by a WHO staff member on loan to UNRWA as Director of Health. In addition, WHO provides the services of four other senior staff members, mostly on a non-reimbursable basis.

69. Within the stringent budgetary restrictions imposed by UNRWA's limited financial resources, the Agency has continued to maintain a comprehensive health programme under which a full range of preventive and curative health services as well as basic sanitation services are provided. These have been designed to approximate as closely as possible the level of services by the Governments in the area for their own citizens of similar economic status. Such modest improvements as were achieved during the period of review were in general made possible through the receipt of donations made for specific purposes. Thus, it was possible to replace a number of old and unsatisfactory health centre buildings with entirely new structures. Much assistance has been received from the Governments, universities, charitable organizations, business firms and individuals in such forms as the provision of personnel, free hospital beds, x-ray and laboratory facilities, services in maternal and child health centres, medical supplies, vaccines, layettes, equipment, supplementary food items, as well as help in mass vaccination campaigns. Funds have also been provided for the training of refugee

students, particularly in basic nursing education and in midwifery.

CURATIVE AND PREVENTIVE MEDICAL SERVICES

Clinics, hospitals and laboratories

70. Curative and preventive medical services continued to be provided directly by UNRWA at eighty-nine points and at a further twenty-one points operated by the governments or voluntary societies and subsidized by the Agency. The curative services comprise medical consultations, laboratory examinations, injections, dressings, eye treatments, dispensing of medicines and dental services, as well as referrals, where indicated, to specialists, hospitals and medical rehabilitation centres. It was possible to establish in each of the Agency's five fields (Lebanon, Syria, East Bank, West Bank, Gaza) a special clinic for the treatment and better medical control of patients suffering from diabetes. Table 9 of annex I provides a statistical summary of health centre attendance. Construction was completed of two new health centre buildings at Rafah Camp in the Gaza Strip and at Jalazone Camp on the West Bank with funds donated by the Norwegian Refugee Council and OXFAM, respectively. Similar donations received from the Swiss CARITAS and the European Refugee Campaign will permit the building of health centres at Amari Camp on the West Bank and at Irbid Camp in east Jordan. Plans for these buildings are already at an advanced stage of preparation, as are also those for a new rehydration/nutrition centre and the replacement of an existing infant health centre building at Jabal Hussein Camp in Amman, the cost of which is being borne by American Middle East Rehabilitation, Inc. (AMER). A prefabricated building donated by War on Want has been constructed in east Jordan for use as the Field Central Pharmacy, thus eliminating the makeshift arrangements which have had to be made for handling the Agency's medical supplies in that area since the 1967 hostilities. Before that time, the central pharmacy in Jerusalem served the whole of Jordan.

71. The number of hospital beds available for refugees during the period of review was 1,827, of which the majority were in Agency-subsidized

government, university or private institutions. Hospital services, free of charge, were however provided in the Government mental hospitals in east Jordan, the West Bank and Syria, in CARITAS Children's Hospital at Bethlehem, St. John's Ophthalmic Hospital in Jerusalem, and in Israel in the Haddassa Hospital and the Government Hospital at Tel Hashomer. In the occupied areas, the Government of Israel continued to provide hospital and out-patient facilities for medical treatment under arrangements similar to those made with the Governments of Jordan and the United Arab Republic prior to the occupation. The Agency continued to maintain its cottage hospital (thirty-six beds) at Qalqilya on the West Bank, nine camp maternity wards (sixty-nine beds) located mostly in the Gaza Strip, and a fifteen-bed pediatric ward in the UNRWA-Swedish Health Centre at Gaza. (Part of the operational cost of this Centre is being provided by the Swedish Save the Children Federation.) In addition, UNRWA and the public health authorities in Gaza operated jointly the 250-bed tuberculosis hospital at Bureij. Through a donation from the Finnish Refugee Council, extensive improvement of both patient and staff accommodation as well as of certain other facilities in this hospital are being effected.

72. About two-thirds of all hospital beds available are set aside for the treatment of patients suffering from acute conditions of a medical, surgical or gynaecological nature, the remaining one-third being occupied by sufferers from chronic conditions, principally tuberculosis and mental diseases. Statistical details in respect of the number of beds available are shown in table 10 of annex I.

73. The Agency maintains a central laboratory in the Gaza Strip. It continues to operate four small clinical laboratories (two in the Gaza Strip and two in Lebanon) and, in addition, during the period of report, it has established a further seven clinical laboratories attached to the larger health centres in the different Fields. All other laboratory services, whether of a clinical or public health nature, are obtained from government, university or private laboratories, usually on a subsidy or cost-for-service basis, but in certain instances free of charge.

Control of communicable diseases

74. Although adverse living conditions among the refugees and residents displaced by the conflict of June 1967 and its aftermath increased the danger of the transmission of communicable diseases, still there were no major outbreaks among the registered refugee population as a whole or among other displaced persons in emergency camps administered by UNRWA. However, in east Jordan, the rates for such conditions as acute conjunctivitis, trachoma, dysentery, infectious hepatitis, pertussis, measles and poliomyelitis tended to be higher in the emergency camp population than the rates among the registered refugee population as a whole. For the emergency camp population in Syria, such differences in rates were hardly noticeable. A survey on the prevalence of tuberculosis in one of the tented camps of east Jordan, conducted by the Ministry of Health of Jordan, late in 1968, led the director of the survey to the conclusion that the prevalence rate of pulmonary tuberculosis in the sample population was over 2 per cent. There was a significant increase in the number of reported cases of tuberculosis in east Jordan in 1968-1969, as compared with displaced refugees. For the other Fields of operation, there was a very substantial decrease. For most of the other communicable diseases, the favourable downward trend continued. Infectious hepatitis was an exception, in that it showed a substantial increase in all Fields. Measles showed its usual incidence for the Fields as a whole attended by its usual severe morbidity and significant mortality in infants and young children. There was a continued freedom from the occurrence among the refugees of any of the six quarantinable diseases (cholera, plague, relapsing fever (epid.), smallpox, typhus (epid.) and yellow fever). Although influenza in the early months of 1969 showed a greater than usual seasonal increase and definitely epidemic in some areas, the disease was in general mild or moderate. No studies were made to establish the strain and variant. However, immunization of groups at special risk was carried out with donated vaccine containing the Hong Kong variant.

75. The Agency's Health Department maintained its general control over communicable diseases through its programmes of environmental sanitation, prompt medical care of cases of any

type on their occurrence, and health education. The more specific measures included close surveillance of disease trends through weekly incidence reporting; epidemiologic investigation of any untoward incidence or outbreak followed by specific action to limit transmission; and regular immunization of the population against selected diseases. Health authorities in all areas co-operated closely with the Agency's Field Health Departments by making hospital beds available for acute infectious diseases; collaborating in control of disease outbreaks; providing diagnostic and consultative service in tuberculosis control; donating various vaccines and participating in some Fields in the immunization programme for refugees; and, in the case of Gaza, collaborating in the combined malaria control programme for the refugees and residents. In its immunization programme, the Health Department revised and standardized the schedules for all Fields, introduced the use of lyophilized typhoid-para-typhoid vaccine, pressed for more extensive use of lyophilized smallpox vaccine, and sought to have attenuated measles vaccine available through donor sources. Various special studies were carried out by different Field Health Departments, as for example, an epidemiological study in Lebanon of all cases of tuberculosis discovered in 1966 and 1967; evaluation of malaria control during 1968 in Gaza; evaluation of the standard serological tests of the UNRWA laboratory in Gaza in a WHO-sponsored study; circumscribed epidemiological studies of infectious hepatitis in Lebanon, enteric fever in Syria and helminthic diseases and schistosomiasis in Gaza.

76. Table 11 of annex I lists the numbers of cases of selected communicable diseases reported by the Fields for the year 1968-1969.

Maternal and child health

77. At the end of the reporting period, the Agency was providing maternal care and infant health care at seventy-six of the Agency's health centres, and subsidizing a voluntary society for similar services at one more centre. Maternal care was being provided at three further centres and infant care at one. Full maternal and child health service was re-established at Ein Sultan Camp and was established for the first time at the Jerusalem City health centre, both on the

West Bank. The infant health service was re-established at Bethlehem Town Clinic. In east Jordan, maternal and child health services in five of the emergency camps were gradually redeveloped for displaced refugees, as well as for other displaced persons sheltered therein. Medical and nursing teams of three voluntary agencies, that is, the Norwegian and Commonwealth Save the Children Funds and the Lutheran World Federation, continued to provide comprehensive services in three of the camps. UNRWA staff took over responsibility for maternal and child health services from the Jordan Red Crescent for one more of these centres and began operations in the remaining centre.

78. The maternal services comprised ante-natal care from about the fifth month; attendance at delivery, mostly by supervised traditional midwives (*dayahs*) in the home, but also in maternity centres, especially in Gaza, and in subsidized hospitals for selected cases; and post-partum care. In the infant health service, regular supervision is provided through the second year of life and for selected cases in the third year. Mothers are educated systematically in nutrition and child care; immunization is provided against tuberculosis, whooping cough, diphtheria, tetanus, poliomyelitis, smallpox and typhoid-para-typhoid fevers; medical consultation and treatment, specialist consultation and hospitalization are provided as necessary. (In the Gaza Field, infants and young children were protected against measles by means of attenuated vaccine made available in limited quantities to the Agency.) Special attention is directed to the nutritional problems through close surveillance of underweight children, promotion of their use of the supplementary feeding programme and reference of the more serious cases of malnutrition or gastroenteritis to the rehydration/nutrition centres. Eighteen of the latter centres, with accommodation for 212 infants, were in operation, of which three were established and operated in emergency camps by the above-mentioned voluntary agency teams and the others by UNRWA staff.

79. In its concern to safeguard the nutritional state of mothers and children, the Agency had arranged early in 1968 with WHO for an appraisal by a team of nutritionists and maternal and child health experts of the nutritional status of

infants and children, as well as of the supplementary feeding programme. After field studies in April and May 1968, with particular reference to populations in the emergency camps in east Jordan and Syria, the team submitted a detailed report with recommendations and this had been receiving the careful attention of the Health Department. Field Departments in Lebanon, Syria and on the West Bank continued their annual studies on infant mortality and, as from January 1969, all Fields are undertaking systematic studies of this type. Towards the end of 1968, the Syrian and east Jordan Fields carried out special studies on infant mortality in selected emergency camp populations.

80. Progress was made in respect of the plans to develop a health supervisory service for pre-school children between two and six years of age. Early in 1969, all Fields (with the exception of Gaza, owing to shortage of staff) initiated pilot programmes, each in a number of selected centres, to extend regular health care now provided for children in the first two years of life to cover children in their third year of life.

81. School health services continued to be provided for all children in the Agency's elementary and preparatory schools, comprising basically the routine examination of school entrants and re-examination of pupils on special indication; treatment and the correction of defects; referral of the under-nourished for supplementary feeding; immunization; school environmental sanitation; and health education. The service is provided through the Agency's camp health units and special school health teams, the latter assigned on the basis of one per Field, except for east Jordan, where a second team was established especially for the service in emergency camps. The new system of quarterly assessment and reporting on this service is resulting in an improvement in the quality and effectiveness of the service, as well as in the health statistical information gained.

82. Statistical information on maternal and infant care and on school health services is shown in table 12 of annex I.

Health education

83. The Health Department continued to place strong emphasis on educating the mothers

in health centres, children in schools, special groups in social welfare centres and the general camp communities on the basic elements of health, prevention of disease and on individual and community responsibility in the protection of health. The theme chosen for the general programme for the calendar year 1969 was "Health and its promotion — disease and its prevention". Each month, a special subject of the theme was presented through direct communication by health personnel with the public in the situations mentioned above. Some twenty-two health education workers were responsible for organizing and supporting the programme through health unit staff, school health committees, camp officials and camp committees. Aside from this general programme, the Fields developed special programmes to accord with their particular needs. For example, much emphasis was placed on systematic courses of instruction in child care for mothers in the maternal and child health clinics. In Gaza, the special course on "Motherhood and child care" for the senior classes in girls' preparatory schools was running successfully for the third year, with some 2,300 students participating.

84. In all aspects of the health education programme, most valued assistance was provided by the visual aids produced by the Audio-Visual Division. On the occasion of World Health Day (1969), a poster was produced to embody the theme "Health, labour and productivity" and to commemorate also the fiftieth anniversary of the ILO. This, along with resource material from WHO, was widely used in all Fields by health personnel to mark the occasion.

85. The Health Department sought an expert appraisal of its health education programme from WHO and to this end the services of the regional adviser in health education of WHO's Eastern Mediterranean Region were made available in April 1968. In his report, issued in June 1968, this expert commended the organization, efficiency and technical quality of the programme and made useful recommendations which the Department has been implementing within its available means.

Nursing services

86. The nursing services play a most important part in the preventive and curative health programmes, since the nursing staff have considerable

responsibility for the following activities: maternal and child health clinics, layette distribution, supervision of infant feeding, home visiting, certification of expectant and nursing mothers for supplementary ration distribution purposes, school health, health education, individual and mass immunization, tuberculosis and venereal diseases control, care of the sick in clinics, hospitals and rehydration/nutrition centres, and midwifery services in the home, in camp maternity centres and in hospitals. Despite difficult working conditions, particularly in the emergency camps, and in spite of staff shortages in the Gaza Strip, the nursing services were maintained at an effective level. Due credit must be accorded to the nursing staff in the various clinics and hospitals subsidized by the Agency for their contribution to the medical care programme for the refugees. At the end of the period under review, the Agency was employing 172 graduate nurses and midwives, 291 auxiliary nurses and fifty-nine traditional midwives (*dayahs*).

Nutrition

87. General surveillance of the health and nutrition of the refugees is maintained through the Agency's preventive and curative services. Of particular importance in this respect are the regular periodic returns on the number and proportion of underweight infants under two years of age, as well as the quarterly reports of the school health officers.

88. The aim of the supplementary feeding and milk distribution programme is to protect the most vulnerable groups of the population (infants, pre-school and school children, pregnant and nursing women and selected medical cases). Details of this programme, which is administered and operated by the Agency's Health Department, are given in paragraphs 50-55 above. Included is a description both of the normal programme in operation in all five Fields and of the emergency feeding programme, which provides additional assistance to the newly displaced refugees in east Jordan and Syria as well as to certain hardship cases elsewhere.

Environmental sanitation

89. The environmental sanitation programme, which is concerned mainly with the provision of potable water supplies, safe and sanitary means

of disposal of sewage, garbage and other wastes, surface water drainage and control of insect and rodent vectors of disease, was maintained in camps administered by the Agency. In the emergency camps for refugees and displaced persons in east Jordan and Syria, the services and facilities had to be provided necessarily on an *ad hoc* basis. Considerable improvements, however, have taken place in environmental conditions in these camps, particularly in the provision of water facilities, drainage and waste disposal. Emergencies due to winter storms had to be met, and flea infestation had to be coped with. Depending on local circumstances, the various methods employed for refuse disposal consisted of composting, incineration, dumping or sanitary filling. Mechanization of refuse collection was progressing satisfactorily in Gaza and it was being introduced in east Jordan and Lebanon. The sanitation labour force in camps was maintained at a ratio of 1.7 labourers for 1,000 of camp population, with the exception that in the emergency camps the ratio of 2.5 which was being applied until April 1969 is due for reduction progressively to 2.0.

Medical education and training

90. In the field of health sciences, 458 refugee students are holders of Agency university scholarships (see paragraph 136 below). Of these, 370 are studying medicine, twenty-six dentistry, sixty pharmaceutical chemistry and two veterinary medicine. There are, in addition, seventy students receiving training in basic nursing, eight students in a maternal and child health course for auxiliary nurses, forty-six training as assistant pharmacists, nine as public health inspectors, six as x-ray technicians, fourteen as laboratory technicians and six as physiotherapists. During the period of review, 113 students completed successfully their course of education and training and passed their final qualifying examination: thirty-one in medicine; two in dentistry; eleven in pharmaceutical chemistry; one in sanitary sciences; eleven in basic nursing; twelve in midwifery; nineteen as assistant pharmacists; eleven as public health inspectors and fifteen as laboratory technicians.

C. EDUCATION AND TRAINING SERVICES

91. The 1967-1968 school year ended on a peaceful note, and examinations were held

normally, with results on the whole better than had been expected. The new school year started on time, with unusually high enrolments in Gaza, the West Bank and east Jordan, mainly in the first elementary classes. In all, a total of 143,891 children were enrolled in UNRWA/UNESCO schools in these three areas in 1968-1969, compared with 125,933 in the previous school year, and 136,759 in 1966-1967.

92. Despite a good beginning, however, the 1968-1969 school year has been marred by widespread disturbances to the school programme; demonstrations, strikes by students, teachers' strikes, curfews and, in the occupied territories (Gaza and West Bank), the closing of certain schools and the detention of some staff and pupils on security grounds by order of the military authorities. In Gaza and parts of the West Bank, these disturbed conditions began in October 1968, shortly after the schools and training centres reopened, and continued in one area or another throughout the year, reaching a peak in February 1969. The Agency's training centres in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon were affected in varying degrees, though for different reasons. In the occupied territories, the protests were mainly directed against the occupation authorities, whereas in Lebanon they were the result of differences between the Agency's teaching staff and the Agency. Teachers in Lebanon, Syria and east Jordan took strike action in support of their claims on a number of occasions.

93. Since 1950, the educational services for the Palestine refugee community have been carried out in collaboration with UNESCO. By agreement between the two organizations UNESCO is responsible for the technical aspects of the education programme, while its administration is the responsibility of UNRWA, which also bears the main financial burden. The services of the Director of Education and a number of education specialists are made available by UNESCO.

94. A number of conferences on educational topics were held during the school year, the most important being the UNRWA/UNESCO meeting with representatives of the Arab host countries in Beirut from 5 to 8 March 1969, at which Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the United Arab Republic were represented, as well as the League

of Arab States, UNESCO and UNRWA. Previous meetings had been held in 1965 and 1966. A third was called for May-June 1967, but was postponed at the last moment because of the political situation at that time. The 1969 meeting was called at the request of the Arab host countries and has led to the formulation of a series of recommendations which they addressed jointly to UNESCO and to UNRWA. These are under consideration in the light of their general feasibility and the Agency's financial situation. Other meetings involving the Agency's Department of Education were held in February (Institute of Education Field Representatives), in March (Vocational Training Conference) and in April (Teacher Training Conference).

95. Funds provided by the Government of Denmark, NEED (United States), the Swedish Save the Children Federation, and AUSTCARE (Australia), have enabled the Agency to press ahead with its school construction programme. Over a three-year period this programme will accommodate the natural increase, prevent triple-shifting and gradually reduce double-shifting, and replace unsatisfactory schoolrooms. In east Jordan, 596 schoolrooms and nineteen science laboratories are required for which funds are available. In Syria, a total of 489 schoolrooms and twenty-four science laboratories are required, but funds are available for only 131 schoolrooms and five science laboratories. In Lebanon, 262 schoolrooms and ten science laboratories are required, while funds are available for only 128 schoolrooms and six laboratories. Approximately 64 per cent of the foregoing items for which funds are available is under construction. In the occupied territories, pending developments on the return of the refugees, plans for large-scale school construction were held in abeyance during the school year, but one school of five rooms was completed and twenty science laboratories are under construction on the West Bank. In Gaza, a school of twelve rooms, which was totally destroyed during the 1967 fighting, was reconstructed. In summary, the programme comprises a total of 1,364 schoolrooms and seventy-two science laboratories, for which funds are available for only 872 schoolrooms and fifty science laboratories.

96. Another major contributor to the Agency's education programme for many years has been the

Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), whose donations have provided for university and vocational training scholarships, science equipment and other education needs.

Staff regulations

97. On 1 July 1968, the Agency, after about three years' preparatory study, introduced a major change in its staffing structure and salary scale, under which the Teaching Service, with its 6,000 teachers, was distinguished from the General Service for the rest of its locally employed (area) staff. This measure came into effect throughout the Agency's area of operations, except for the Syria Field, where its introduction was delayed at the request of the Syrian Government in response to representations by teachers.

98. The conditions governing entry into the new service are laid down in an *Occupation Classification Manual*, which defines the academic and professional qualifications and, where applicable, the prior teaching experience required for the different categories of posts in the Service. Considerable emphasis is placed in the new *Manual* on the acquisition of the particular combinations of qualifications required for particular posts, and on the new, long salary scales (twenty-eight incremental steps as compared with the standard thirteen in the General Service scales), which form part of the *Manual* to provide the incentive and the reward for possession of these qualifications. To safeguard the rights of existing staff members at the change-over date, the Agency gave formal assurances that no teacher would suffer any loss in salary, either immediately or at any future date, by reclassification and transfer to the new scales. Teachers were also formally assured that, under the new classification, they remained, as UNRWA area staff members, employees of the United Nations subject, like all other UNRWA employees, to the Agency's staff rules and regulations and with exactly the same status in that respect as before.

99. Despite these assurances, there was widespread misunderstanding and resistance on the part of the teachers to the new classification and related salary scales. This led to exhaustive discussions between representatives of the teachers and senior officials of the Agency, both in the different Field Offices and at Agency Head-

quarters, particularly during the first quarter of 1969. In the course of these discussions, explanations and assurances were given on a considerable number of points raised by the teachers, some relating to the new *Manual*, others of a pedagogical rather than a personnel nature. On quite a number of points, it proved possible for the Agency to go some way to meet the teachers' requests, but on others the Agency found itself unable to act as requested, usually because of lack of the necessary funds.

100. In mid-April, after discussions with the Arab Governments, through their representatives on the Advisory Commission of UNRWA, the Agency proposed that the teachers be given an option to choose between the old and new conditions of service, and agreed to regard the latter as in suspense (except for salary payments) pending a decision on the former. Subsequently, at the request of the Government of Jordan, the Agency agreed to "cancel" the new *Manual* and this decision necessarily affected the other Fields as well. The implication of this decision are under examination and further consultation with Governments and staff will take place.

101. Although comparisons are difficult, particularly with regard to social security provisions and fringe benefits, the Agency considers that its salary scales and service conditions are generally in line with those in force in government civil services in the area.

GENERAL EDUCATION

102. In spite of the difficulties referred to in last year's annual report, many of which still remain, the Agency continued its education programme for an increased refugee school population. During the year under review, it operated 466 elementary and preparatory schools, 275 of which were built by the Agency, 161 in rented premises, twenty-three in tented schools and prefabricated buildings in the established camps and seven in premises shared with government schools, providing education for a total of 200,922 refugee children. An additional 41,137 registered refugee children were enrolled in government and private schools in the elementary and preparatory cycles, covering the first nine years of general education, making a grand total of 242,059. In 1968-1969, the Agency employed

a total of 5,790 teachers in its elementary and preparatory school system.

103. Attendance of refugee students at secondary government and private schools totalled 21,343. The agency does not operate schools in the secondary cycle of general education, but offers a measure of assistance by way of grants, allowances or subsidies to eligible refugee students enrolled in non-Agency schools. This subsidy covers only a small part of the actual cost of the education provided, the main burden being borne by the Governments concerned. In the course of the Education Conference referred to in paragraph 94 above, the Arab Government spokesmen urged the Agency to assume fuller responsibility by providing secondary education for refugee students, with curricula and standards equivalent to the education provided in the Arab host countries.

104. Details of the numbers and distribution of refugee children receiving education are given in tables 13-16 of annex I.

105. In paragraphs 17-19 of last year's report, an account was given of the difficulties which had arisen regarding the textbooks in use in UNRWA/UNESCO schools. The Department of Education continued during the 1968-1969 school year to produce teaching notes as substitute for the banned textbooks in the occupied territories (214,000 copies for Gaza and 76,000 for the West Bank) and, *faute de mieux*, to use school texts declared obsolete in Syria and east Jordan in place of certain new issues which had been referred to UNESCO for examination by the Commission of Outside Experts set up by the Director-General of UNESCO in virtue of the Executive Board resolution 7.4 of 20 June 1968. The setting up of this Commission was agreed to by the Governments of Lebanon, Jordan, the United Arab Republic and Israel, but was rejected by the Government of Syria as being an encroachment on its national sovereignty. The commission held meetings in Paris between November 1968 and February 1969, during which it examined and reported on 127 titles. Its findings, as approved by the Director-General, were communicated by him to UNRWA and to the Governments concerned in a series of letters which were subsequently presented, together with replies received, as a progress report to the

UNESCO Executive Board in the course of its eighty-second session in May 1969. In the debate which took place on this item, the representatives of Jordan and Syria, which countries are not at present members of the Executive Board, were heard by permission of the Board. Resolutions presented by both Israel and the Arab States were subsequently withdrawn in favour of a compromise resolution presented by the Latin American delegates. This was unanimously approved by the Board, with one member State (Pakistan) abstaining on the resolution as a whole, and another (Israel) abstaining on one paragraph. The agreed resolution (see annex II) took note of the work of the Commission of Outside Experts; invited the Director-General to continue his consultation with the Government of Syria; called upon the Governments of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic to transmit to the Director-General their observations on the findings of the Commission and to pursue consultations with him in order to reach an agreement on the textbooks issue; authorized the Director-General to lift the ban before the beginning of the school year 1969-1970 on those textbooks which he will have approved; and called upon the Government of Israel to permit without any restriction the import and use of the textbooks approved by the Director-General for UNRWA/UNESCO schools in the occupied territories. (It was on this paragraph that the Government of Israel abstained). Consultations continue between UNRWA and UNESCO on the ways and means of implementing this resolution in the new school year. UNESCO, of course, is also in regular communication with the parties concerned in the various Executive Board resolutions, and keeps the issue under constant review, being fully aware of its great importance to the UNRWA/UNESCO school system.

Lebanon

106. A "sit-down" strike which lasted from 10 February to 5 March 1969, was declared by the UNRWA/UNESCO teachers primarily against the new *Occupation Classification Manual*. There were also serious interruptions in the proper running of the Agency's schools in Lebanon Field because of political disturbances in April. Two schools in south Lebanon were occupied for a time by refugees who, owing to

severe winter storms, lost their shelter during the latter part of January 1969.

107. After serious consideration and study, it was decided that promotion to the preparatory cycle in UNRWA/UNESCO schools in Lebanon should be made conditional upon the passing of a special end-of-elementary cycle examination instituted by the Agency, to enable successful pupils to be promoted to the preparatory cycle instead of relying solely on the "Certificat" public examination. Of the fifty-eight elementary and preparatory schools run by the Agency in Lebanon, twenty-two operated on a double-shift system involving 222 class sections. In UNRWA/UNESCO schools, the total enrolment in the elementary and preparatory cycle was 28,472 as compared with 26,480 last year, that is, an increase of 1,992 pupils.

Syria

108. The difficulties which faced the Agency, as a result of the loss of its seventeen schools, in accommodating the refugee children evacuated from the Quneitra area have been temporarily overcome. The number of UNRWA/UNESCO schools now operating in Syria is eighty-five with a total enrolment of 28,559 as compared with 27,178 last year.

109. Legislation was introduced by the Syrian Government in 1968-1969 cancelling the competitive public examination for the end of the elementary cycle. The Ministry of Education increased admission opportunities of students into Government secondary schools; all students who obtain the preparatory school certificate can now enrol in either secondary academic or secondary technical schools. It was not possible to make progress in the proposal to introduce French as a second foreign language in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools in Syria and it has been kept in abeyance.

East Jordan

110. In spite of the increasingly unsettled conditions in east Jordan and the additional hardships resulting from unusually severe winter conditions and from military activities, the education programme was maintained without undue interruption. The number of schools operating, the majority on double-shift, was 134

with 64,296 pupils enrolled, as compared with 54,636 pupils last year, out of which 12,607 were in twenty-two tented schools and prefabricated buildings.

West Bank

111. As a result of strikes and other disturbances, and related security counter-measures, including on occasion the closure of some schools, the education programme suffered a great deal. During certain periods, the daily attendance in this Field, particularly in the Nablus-Ramallah areas, fluctuated greatly, but improved during the latter part of the school year. The total enrolment was 25,993 pupils in eighty-eight schools as compared with 23,544 pupils in ninety schools last year.

Gaza

112. Attendance at schools varied considerably throughout the year; work was frequently interrupted and the morale of teachers and pupils alike was affected by incidents of one sort or another, leading to demonstrations, curfews, the closure of schools, military incidents, etc. The total enrolment in the UNRWA/UNESCO school system was 53,602 pupils in 101 schools as compared with 47,753 pupils in 103 schools last year. The non-recognition of the Gaza end-of-secondary cycle examinations by the Arab host countries remains a barrier preventing the Gaza refugees from continuing their studies. Efforts are being made by UNESCO and UNRWA to resolve this problem and a favourable outcome is now expected.

YOUTH ACTIVITIES PROGRAMME

113. This programme was established to train volunteer leaders in youth activities and to encourage and guide young refugee men to become responsible members of their community. The Agency now operates thirty-four youth activities centres, including six in the new temporary camps in east Jordan, in full co-operation with the World Alliance of YMCAs.

114. Although training in sports and cultural and recreational activities continues, greater emphasis is now laid on public service and active participation in community projects in

camps; useful skills, such as fire-fighting, first-aid, gardening and tree-planting are taught, and the young men explore the many ways in which they can serve their communities: by promoting safety campaigns in the camps; by assisting UNRWA health educators and sanitation workers; and by participating in social surveys in the new temporary camps.

115. The youth programme is now accepted by the refugees as a vital force in camp life not only as it affects the youth, but because of its contribution to the camp community. It has developed a sense of individual responsibility in many of the participants and fostered the concept of working together for the community good.

PRE-SCHOOL PLAY CENTRES

116. In addition to providing pre-school-age refugee children with rudimentary training in a cheerful atmosphere, the children receive at these centres routine medical supervision and are given a hot meal and milk before they return home. This programme must be financed by special contributions and it is encouraging to report that, with the assistance of voluntary agencies, play centres have been opened in the new temporary camps; twenty-seven centres are now in operation compared with eighteen before the hostilities.

TEACHER TRAINING

117. The Agency's programme of teacher training falls into two distinct categories, the pre-service training of post-secondary school level students at UNRWA/UNESCO residential training centres, and the in-service training of Agency teaching staff undertaken by the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education, which operates Agency-wide from its headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon.

Pre-service

118. The Agency's five teacher training centres, two in Ramallah (West Bank), two temporary centres in Amman (east Jordan) and one at Sibling (Lebanon), resumed operation in the fall of 1968. In the period under review, these centres concentrated on two-year courses to prepare

teachers mainly for the elementary schools. In addition, the Ramallah Men's Teacher Training Centre organized on an experimental basis a third year of training for a group of graduates of the two-year course, for specialization in the teaching of Arabic in the preparatory cycle. These centres have had a very disturbed academic year, with the sole exception of the temporary training centre for women in Amman, which managed to carry on in an admirably normal fashion.

119. A satisfactory site on the outskirts of Amman has been obtained for a new training centre which will be constructed with funds provided by the American private organization, NEED, and which will absorb the two temporary teacher training centres in Amman, as well as providing vocational training for 150 girls. The new centre will have an enrolment capacity of 700 (400 women and 300 men). It is hoped to have it ready for operation by October 1970.

120. The total number of refugee trainees enrolled in the UNRWA pre-service teacher training centres in 1968-1969 was 1,186, compared with 1,219 in 1967-1968 and 1,121 in 1966-1967. This number is not expected to increase significantly in 1969-1970, but should do so in the following year, when the new Amman centre begins to operate.

In-service

121. The UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education had, by the end of the school year 1967-1968, completed three of its basic two-year courses for the in-service training of the professionally unqualified teachers employed in UNRWA/UNESCO schools. Out of a total initial intake of 2,300 teachers enrolled in these three courses between 1964 and 1966, 1,428 (about 62 per cent) successfully completed all the requirements of their training programme, and have been recognized by the Agency as professionally certificated class teachers (elementary cycle school teachers). Most of the remaining 872 teachers (about 38 per cent) who failed in one or more of the requirements of certification are being given further opportunity to make up for their deficiencies.

122. In addition, 941 elementary school teachers are still undergoing in-service training

with the Institute, having begun their training in 1966, 1967 or 1968. Of these, 444 will complete their training in August 1969, 374 in August 1970 and 123 in August 1971. The total number of elementary school teachers who have so far been involved in this programme of on-the-job professional training is, therefore, 3,241. This represents about 80 per cent of the total number of UNRWA elementary teachers in October 1968, compared with the figure of about 10 per cent of trained teachers available in October 1964, when the Institute started its operation. This indicates that the Institute is winning the battle in the elementary cycle of education. This first phase of the operation, that is, improving qualifications of elementary school teachers, is expected to run down during the forthcoming two school years, but not to be eliminated completely.

123. At the beginning of the 1967-1968 school year, the Institute started the second phase of its operations by organizing, on an experimental basis, a two-year subject course for the in-service training of 193 teachers of mathematics at the preparatory level. At the beginning of 1968-1969 and as a result of the successful start of the first experiment, the Institute expanded this second phase by organizing the following new courses for preparatory level teachers: a one-year professional course for university graduates (1962); a two-year subject course for teachers certificated for the elementary cycle, but teaching science at the preparatory level (112); a three-year combined professional and subject training course for preparatory-level teachers without university degrees (119); a two-year professional course for teachers of home economics (43); and another two-year subject course for teachers certificated for the elementary cycle, but teaching mathematics at the preparatory level (35). The total number of preparatory school teachers so far involved in this more specialized type of training is 664, and represents about 39 per cent of the total number of preparatory school teachers. The

major part of this phase of the Institute's work is expected to be completed by the end of school year 1971-1972. The total number of elementary teachers actually undergoing training in 1968-1969 is 1,580, which is the normal full training capacity of the Institute.

124. The Institute is also gradually moving into a third phase of activities, which aims at the improvement of the quality of education through activities other than in-service teacher training, e.g., by assisting in the improvement of classroom teaching through the introduction and adaptation of more effective teaching methods and techniques, including the use of closed circuit television, and by the further training of certificated teachers.

125. From its inception in 1964, the Institute has been considered by UNESCO as a pilot project with wider aims than those strictly related to the Agency's educational system. Proposals have been made for making its techniques available to other systems of education, and preliminary talks have started with one of the Governments in the area. The cost of the operation of the Institute is currently being borne by the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland, and by UNESCO, whose contribution consists of providing the services of a number of experts and certain items of equipment.

VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION

126. This form of education continues to be made available to Palestine refugees in seven Agency-operated residential training centres. Six of the centres are for young men, and two of these are combined teacher/vocational and technical training centres. The total number of vocational and technical training places available for young men in the Agency's centres in 1968-1969 was 2,098. The seventh training unit is a combined teacher and vocational training centre for girls.

127. The names and locations of the Agency's centres are as follows:

<i>Centre</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>No. of Training Places Vocational and Technical</i>
Kalandia Vocational Training Centre	West Bank	376
Wadi Seer Vocational Training Centre	East Jordan	360
Gaza Vocational Training Centre	Gaza	484
Damascus Vocational Training Centre	Syria	400
Siblin Vocational Training Centre	Lebanon	396
Siblin Technical and Teacher Training Institute	Lebanon	82
Ramallah Women's Training Centre	West Bank	310
Total :		2,408

Details of the training places available by centre and course of study are given in table 17 of annex I. It may be noted that a total of thirty-eight different courses are offered. Training in the medical and para-medical fields is reported in paragraph 90.

128. Expansion plans now being implemented or under study will raise the number of UNRWA vocational and technical training centres from seven to eight and will increase the total capacity from 2,403 to 3,100 places (2,610 for men and 490 for girls). The expansion is being accomplished by:

(a) Establishing near Amman a combined vocational and teacher training centre. This centre, financed by NEED, will provide 150 vocational training places for girls (plus 250 teacher training places for girls and 300 teacher training places for men, that is, a total capacity of 700), and will supplement the courses offered at the Ramallah Women's Training Centre, which is not available to refugees living in east Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in the present circumstances;

(b) Increasing the capacity of the Wadi Seer Vocational Training Centre, Amman, from 360 to approximately 800 training places, capital costs (and recurrent costs related to the expansion for a period of five years, including existing recurrent costs) being financed by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany;

(c) Increasing the capacity of Gaza Vocational Training Centre from 484 to 556 training places. This is the second phase of an expansion programme that was begun in 1967¹ and is being financed as to capital cost by NEED (the Govern-

ment of Israel has made a special contribution towards the operating cost of this expansion);

(d) Increasing the capacity of the vocational training section of the Ramallah Women's Training Centre from 310 to 340. The total capacity of the Centre, including the teacher training section, will then be 640. This expansion is being financed by NEED.

129. During the period under review, training in the centres situated in the occupied territories and in those situated in Lebanon and east Jordan has been seriously affected by strikes.

130. As noted in the previous report, since 1967, the employment prospects of graduates from the Agency's vocational training centres in the occupied areas have declined. This continues to give much cause for concern. The Agency is considering means of strengthening its Placement Services in the occupied areas and is seeking new outlets for these young men and women.

131. Through the good offices of the Federal Republic of Germany 100 graduates of UNRWA vocational training centres, including thirty-seven from the occupied territories, were given the opportunity in 1968-1969 of gaining further trade experience by working in modern industrial concerns. The Agency is making arrangements with the Federal Republic of Germany for another 150 refugee trainees, who are scheduled to complete their courses in August 1969, to benefit from this training-in-industry scheme.

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/7213), para. 123.*

ADULT TRAINING COURSES

132. The Agency continued to provide training through its handicraft courses to those refugees who lack the academic qualifications for admission to vocational training centres. Forty-five young men attended one-year carpentry courses on the West Bank and were thus enabled to acquire a skill and improve their prospects of employment. One thousand eight hundred and fifty-four girls completed six-months' training in thirty-six sewing courses, three of which were established and operated by voluntary organizations in the new temporary camps in east Jordan. This year 728 young women participated in afternoon programmes of women's activities in fourteen centres. Through a variety of cultural, social and recreational activities, this training aims at raising the standard of living of the women and girls by their own initiative. It includes literacy classes, remodelling of second-hand clothing, the teaching of embroidery, needlework, knitting, first aid, child care, recreational activities and household skills. The products of the handicraft and embroidery classes are sold on a co-operative basis and the profits used to help meet the running costs of the programme. In addition, cooking courses instructed the refugee women in how to make the best use of the rations issued by UNRWA. Most of these activities are financed by special donations.

TRAINING OF THE HANDICAPPED

133. The UNRWA programme for the rehabilitation of physically disabled refugees includes the blind, the deaf and the crippled. During the summer of 1968, a team of experts from the United Arab Republic visited Jordan, Syria and Lebanon to interview and examine fifty-five

crippled children out of whom thirty-nine were selected as suitable for education and training in the Vocational Rehabilitation Foundation (for the physically disabled) Institutes in Alexandria and Cairo. Of these, seventeen were admitted for training during 1968-1969 and it is expected that the balance will be admitted during the next scholastic year.

134. During the period under review, 288 disabled boys and girls were placed in institutes. This figure includes fifty trainees placed free of charge in various institutes in the Middle East and sixty-three blind children and adults attending the Pontifical Mission Centre for the Blind, Gaza. In addition, there are thirty-five blind workers at the three Home Service Sections of the Centre in Gaza.

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

135. UNRWA awarded a record total of 1,255 scholarships for Palestine refugees for university study during the academic year 1968-1969. Of these scholarships, 600 were provided from funds made available as a special donation by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. UNRWA university scholarships are awarded only for one year at a time, but are renewable from year to year for the duration of the course of study undertaken by the individual student provided he satisfactorily passes the end-of-year examination held by his faculty. Of the 1,255 scholarships awarded this year, 533 were continuing and 722 were new scholarships; the latter figure is considerably in excess of the 276 new awards made in 1967-1968.

136. The distribution of university scholarships is shown in the following table:

UNIVERSITY SCHOLARSHIP HOLDERS BY COURSE OF STUDY AND COUNTRY
OF STUDY DURING THE ACADEMIC YEAR 1968-1969

<i>Course of study</i>	<i>United Arab Republic</i>			<i>East Jordan</i>	<i>West Bank</i>	<i>Iraq</i>	<i>Turkey</i>	<i>Libya</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>Lebanon</i>	<i>Syria</i>							
Medicine	273	14	78	—	—	4	1	—	370
Pharmacy	34	4	20	—	—	2	—	—	60
Dentistry	9	—	14	—	—	3	—	—	26
Veterinary	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Engineering	146	30	48	—	—	25	4	2	255
Agriculture	26	1	3	—	—	1	—	—	31
Arts	68	28	50	34	29	1	—	—	210
Science ^a	43	25	35	46	25	8	—	—	182
Education	47	4	11	—	—	—	—	—	62
Commerce and Economics	14	7	4	32	—	—	—	—	57
All courses	662	113	263	112	54	44	5	2	1,255

^a Includes students who may later enter the medical or engineering schools of their university.

137. Several Governments have also granted scholarships directly to Palestine refugee students. These include, in addition to the Arab host countries, Iraq, Turkey, Algeria, Libya, the Sudan and Pakistan. The Agency, with the assistance of UNESCO, continues to contact other countries which are in a position to offer scholarships to foreign students in the hope that they will make some of their scholarships available to Palestine refugees.

D. COMMON SERVICES AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

138. The number of staff employed by the Agency at 30 June 1969, as compared with the figures for the preceding year, are given in table 23 of annex I. They show an increase of 1,046 locally recruited personnel and ten internationally recruited staff during the year covered by this report, most of the increase resulting from the filling of manning-table posts which had become vacant or had become necessary as a consequence of the June 1967 hostilities. These figures, of course, take no account of vacant posts. The local-staff manning-table comprised 13,088 posts at 30 June 1969 and 12,946 posts at 30 June 1968, an increase of only 142 posts, almost entirely for

teachers for the increased numbers of children in the Agency's schools. The corresponding figures for the International manning-table were 124 posts at 30 June 1969, of which fourteen were then vacant, and 114 posts at 30 June 1968, of which fourteen were also vacant. The net increase was ten posts, distributed as follows: two in the Technical Division, two in Relief Services, one in the New York Liaison Office, one in the Environmental Sanitation Division and four in Education Services.

139. The Agency's 13,000 locally recruited employees, comprising the General Service and the Teaching Service of the Area Staff, and the Manual Workers, are represented by five Field Area Staff Associations, that of Jordan being provisionally represented by east Jordan and West Bank committees. The problem which has arisen because of the establishment in July 1968 of the Teaching Service is described in paragraphs 97-101 above. Apart from this special problem, staff representations have been mainly concerned with the cost of living in the various Fields and requests for improvements in the health and education services available to Agency employees. For several years, the Agency's salary policy for locally recruited staff has been to use government

levels of remuneration in each Field for comparable groups of employees as a guide within the limits set by the availability of funds. In line with this policy, the salaries of Manual Workers employed in east Jordan and on the West Bank are being increased with effect from 1 April 1969, at an estimated additional annual cost of \$ 116,000. Other, and possibly more extensive, increases in government salary levels have been recommended, but not yet implemented, in Lebanon, and similar increases may occur elsewhere in the area of operations during 1969, with consequent effect upon the Agency's staff costs. For further references to this subject, see paragraph 179 below.

140. In Lebanon, as a result of problems that arose concerning the employment of staff, discussions were held with the Government, and the Agency hopes shortly to reach agreement on procedures for consultation with the Government on staff matters, where appropriate, without prejudice to the Agency's position as a United Nations organization. In Syria, difficulties referred to in previous reports have not yet been completely resolved and there have been long delays in the filling of vacancies in the Agency's staff, except on a temporary basis.

141. The Agency also continues to experience difficulty in moving its Arab staff in and out of the occupied territories on duty. In recent years and in the interest of economy, the Agency has substantially reduced its international staff and has placed correspondingly more reliance upon senior locally recruited staff for the technical supervision or field programmes. Difficulties and delays in movement in and out of the occupied territories, even though due to security considerations, are therefore very prejudicial to the proper performance of the Agency's work. Additional comment on this subject is given in paragraph 147 below.

142. Up to early March 1969, there were no serious difficulties about sending Agency supplies and equipment by road from Beirut to Gaza and the West Bank via Ras El Nakoura. A freight service operated three times per week and met normal needs. Since early March, however, the border at Ras El Nakoura has been closed to freight transport by the Israeli authorities for security reasons, and the Agency has been obliged to make arrangements to use the more expensive

and time-consuming route to the West Bank and Gaza via Syria to the Allenby Bridge over the river Jordan.

E. LEGAL MATTERS

General legal activities and problems

143. Apart from claims, which are dealt with later in this section, the main problems affecting the legal side of the Agency's work remain as before. They relate to the upholding of the Agency's authority over the appointment of its staff to the protection of the Agency's premises and staff, and to securing the freedom of movement of its staff. All these requirements devolve from the basic necessity of ensuring the ability of the Agency, as an international organization operating under the Charter of the United Nations, to perform adequately the functions conferred by the mandate of the General Assembly. The year under review has, in some respects, not been an easy one in this regard.

144. Article V of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946 confers on the Agency's officials immunity from legal process in respect of words spoken or written, and acts performed by them in their official capacity, but this immunity is not universally recognized in practice within the Agency's sphere of operations. Locally recruited staff employed by the Agency within Syria, whether Syrian or Palestinian, do not enjoy the full measure of privileges and immunities conferred on the Agency's officials by article V of the Convention, and the difficulty mentioned in last year's report remains.¹ It will be recalled that, pursuant to a decree of 1 August 1967, Syria excluded locally recruited staff from the privileges and immunities of the Convention with the exception of the exemption from taxation on salaries. Following negotiations, the Agency, on 15 May 1968, submitted a memorandum to the Government in this regard. At the request of the Syrian Government, a translation into Arabic of the memorandum of 15 May 1968 was sent to the Government at the end of last year. The Agency regrets to report, however, that in January two senior area staff members of the Agency were kept under arrest for twenty-four hours, and then

¹ *Ibid.*, annex II, para. 2.

reported that they had been interrogated in relation to their official duties. A note verbale on these two cases was sent to the Government of Syria on 6 February 1969, but no reply was received.

145. The problem, mentioned in last year's report,¹ concerning the detention of staff for substantial periods, without trial, in the territories occupied by Israel after the hostilities of June 1967, continues to some extent. As before, these cases do not relate to detention on account of "official acts" performed by members of the staff in the way of duty, but to charges of illegal activity. Nevertheless, the fact of the detention remains, with the result that the member of the staff is deprived of his liberty and the Agency is deprived of his services. One member of the staff was detained in Gaza for a period of fifteen months before he was released, without any charge having been brought against him, and many representations were made to the authorities concerning him. On the West Bank, one member of the staff was detained before trial for twelve months; another has been detained without trial for seven months; and others have been detained for periods of over four months. Some staff members are detained under the practice of "administrative detention", that is, by administrative decision without trial by any court.

146. In one instance, the Agency has been compelled to protest by a note verbale against the expulsion of one of its staff, the head teacher of one of the Agency's schools in Nablus, who was expelled from the West Bank to east Jordan. The reason given to the Agency was that the head teacher had been expelled for security reasons not connected with her official duty. The Agency has, as a result, been deprived of the services of the head teacher at the school in Nablus since 25 November 1968. The Agency's protest was based on article 49 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, as well as on Articles 100 and 105 of the United Nations Charter. No formal reply to this note verbale has been received. A further case of deportation to east Jordan, of one of the Agency's medical officers, occurred in June 1969. The matters

complained of do not relate to the officers' official duties.

147. The problems confronting the Agency in its effort to ensure the freedom of movement of its staff within the area of its operations, for the purpose of the performance of official duty, has been mentioned in the preceding section of this chapter (paragraph 141). States Members of the United Nations, by accession to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, have accepted an obligation to facilitate the travel within their territories of officials engaged on the business of the Agency. It is essential that those members of the Agency's staff, both its international staff and its locally recruited staff, whatever their nationality, who have duties which extend to more than one territory within the area of the Agency's operations, or have duties of supervision or control over the whole area of the Agency's operations, should be able to move freely from one territory to another. The Agency must also, to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of time and money, try to secure travel by the quickest and cheapest route, and this applies in particular to the occupied territories.

148. Considerable obstacles have been encountered by the Agency during the current year in regard to this matter. There is difficulty with some Governments in obtaining the necessary permits for entry to or exit from their territories, and, in the case of one Government (Syria), this difficulty has extended to visas for international officers of the Agency. A note verbale was delivered on 10 October 1968 in the case of one member of the staff prevented from travel to headquarters on Agency business, though provided with a United Nations *laissez-passer* under article VII of the Convention of 1946. No reply having been received, a further note was sent on 6 February 1969. Difficulties have also been encountered over the obtaining of visas or entry and exit permits without undue delay, and these are still restricted in some cases to one journey, or a short period. On 19 February 1969, a note verbale was sent to the Syrian Government on the matter of the stamp duty and "popular action contribution" collected since July 1968 by the Government on applications by the Agency for travel permits. No reply to that note having been received, a further note was sent on 21 May 1969.

¹ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

149. In regard to the Agency's premises, the Agency has, on various occasions, been called on to protest to the authorities against incursions into its premises in the occupied territories. On 24 May 1969, a note verbale was delivered to the Government of Israel protesting against military intrusions into two of the Agency's educational establishments, in particular, the Vocational Training Centre in Gaza and the Preparatory Boys' School at Khan Yunis. To this note, the Government of Israel has replied that it regards this protest as unwarranted, and is obliged to reject it for reasons which were stated at a meeting between Israel and UNRWA officials.

150. In regard to other matters, various amendments of the staff rules relating to both international and area staff have been made and a substantially revised directive on contracting activities has been issued.

Claims against Governments

151. Further progress has been made in presenting and prosecuting pecuniary claims by the Agency against Governments, especially in the matter of claims arising out of the hostilities of June 1967. Some progress has also been made towards settlement of certain claims; but no progress has been made in relation to other outstanding claims.

LEBANON

152. Following the decision of the Council of Ministers of 22 May 1968 to "approve in principle" the Agency's claims,¹ most of the taxes in respect of which the Agency claimed exemption, in particular municipal taxes and stamp duties on insurance policies, which constituted a heavy financial burden on the Agency, are no longer collected. The Ministry of Finance in December 1968 set up a Commission of Experts in Taxation for the purpose of verifying the particulars of the Agency's claim, which, at the end of 1968, amounted to LL. 594,135. At the request of the Commission, a detailed financial statement was submitted by the Agency on 1 March 1969, and certain further particulars have been requested. There is every hope that this claim will soon be settled.

153. Certain taxes, however, in particular a landing charge on goods discharged in Lebanese ports, continue to be collected, although the Agency's exemption was expressly recognized by decision of the Council of Ministers. But the Agency expects to resolve this problem with the Government in the near future.

SYRIA

154. As was reported last year,² the majority of the items in the Agency's total claim of LS. 272,577 against the Syrian Government were rejected by that Government. The issues of principle which appear to be involved in the rejection of the claims were stated in the report. A note verbale was sent to the Syrian Government on 6 September 1968 setting out these issues, and enclosing, for consideration by the Government, a comprehensive aide-mémoire (in French) concerning the interpretation of section 7 (a) of the Convention on the Immunities and Privileges of the United Nations, and a note (also in French) on "prescription" in international law. The Agency renewed its proposal for joint discussions. At the same time, in response to the request by the Syrian Government previously made, the Agency nominated two representatives for the purpose of exploring in detail, with the Customs Administration, the Agency's particular claim for the refund of duties on fuel and petroleum products. In November 1968, the Agency was requested to provide a translation into Arabic or English of the aide-mémoire referred to above and, accordingly, a translation into English was sent to the Syrian Government in February 1969. In March 1969, the Agency was asked for a translation into Arabic of the aide-mémoire. This translation has been made and was sent to the Syrian Government on 4 July 1969.

155. This claim is a continuing claim in regard to certain items, namely portorage fees and taxes on electricity bills.

JORDAN

156. A proposal has been made to the Government of Jordan for an over-all settlement of the Agency's claims against that Government mentioned in last year's report,³ and of claims made,

¹ *Ibid.*, para. 14.

² *Ibid.*, paras. 16-18.

³ *Ibid.*, para. 19.

on the other hand, by the Government against the Agency, which would result in a payment being made by the Agency to the Government of \$ 3,371.70.

157. Regarding the claims against the Agency under contracts to carry out "winterization" programmes in the Jordan Valley, arbitration proceedings have now taken place between the Agency and one of the contractors. The arbitrator found that the contract was frustrated by factors outside the control of the Agency, but he has nevertheless awarded the contractor JD. 1,500 as compensation in respect of certain expenses incurred. This amount will in due course be claimed from the Jordan Government.

The claim against Lebanon, Syria and Jordan jointly in respect of excess rail charges

158. No progress has been made towards settlement of this claim of about \$ 1.5 million for excess costs paid by the Agency for the transport of supplies from Beirut to Jordan by rail, as mentioned in last year's report.¹ By note verbale of 15 March 1967 to all three Governments, the Agency had proposed a joint meeting, but, apart from an expression of willingness to meet by the Lebanese government (conditional on the willingness of the other two Governments to meet), no reply has been received to these notes. Letters dated 10 June 1969 have now been sent by the Commissioner-General to the Foreign Ministers of Syria and Jordan asking again for agreement to a meeting, or for any alternative proposals they may have for a settlement of this matter.

Claims arising out of the hostilities of June 1967

159. Immediately after the June 1967 hostilities, the Agency made an effort to assess, as quickly and accurately as possible, the damage it had suffered. A survey team visited the areas, and made a full investigation and report, which was completed by 31 August 1968. As a result of this work, and of further information obtained by the legal staff, the Agency has formulated the following claims:

(a) *Against the Government of Israel*

(i) By note verbale of 31 December 1968, for \$ US 708,610.43 in respect of damage to and

loss of Agency property. Further claims will be made in respect of damage or losses suffered by Agency staff which the Agency has obligations to meet, and for losses arising out of military incidents since the hostilities. The last category will include losses suffered in the shelling or raids by Israeli forces on Karameh and other camps in the Jordan Valley at the end of 1967 and in early 1968.

(ii) By two notes verbales, both dated 23 January 1969, in respect of "battle damage" to the Agency's Jerusalem Field Office (amounting to \$ US 83,286.64) and at nine of the Agency's schools in the Gaza Strip (amounting to \$ US 12,498.38). This damage was suffered in the course of fighting within or near these installations, and the Agency has claimed one half of these amounts from the Government of Israel.

(b) *Against the Jordan Government*

By note verbale dated 23 January 1969, for one half of the amount of the "battle damage" suffered at the Jerusalem Field Office, as indicated above.

(c) *Against the United Arab Republic Government*

By note verbale dated 23 January 1969, for one half of the amount of the "battle damage" to the Agency's schools in the Gaza Strip, as indicated above.

160. Following upon an exchange of notes with the Government of Israel, it is hoped that negotiations with the Government on the Agency's claims against it will soon begin.

161. In respect of losses or damage suffered in various military incidents in the occupied territories, the Agency has submitted claims through the liaison Officers to the Military Governors of the respective areas. Some small claims have been settled by the military authorities. The others (the majority) will be summarized and resubmitted to the Government of Israel through the Foreign Ministry in the near future.

162. The Agency continues to pursue its claim both against the Bank of Alexandria and the Government of Israel in respect of the amount of £E 40,401.854 held by the Gaza Branch of the Bank of Alexandria, to the account of the Agency, at the time of the hostilities of June 1967.²

¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 22-24.

² *Ibid.*, para. 26.

A note verbale dated 22 August 1968 was received by the Agency from the Government of the United Arab Republic in response to its note, and a further note was sent by the Agency on 5 April 1969.

F. FINANCIAL OPERATIONS

163. The financial accounts of UNRWA are published separately, together with the related report of the Board of Auditors. This section, therefore, presents in summary form the Agency's actual financial operations in 1968 and its estimated financial operations in 1969. (UNRWA's fiscal period is the calendar year, whereas the present report covers the period 1 July 1968 to 30 June 1969.)¹

164. Increase in Agency activity — and expenditure which in 1967 could properly be considered part of the Agency's "emergency" programme related to the June 1967 hostilities had by 1968 become essentially part of the Agency's "normal" programme. Moreover, in 1968 the Agency had to meet further increases in the refugees' needs for assistance, arising from population growth, economic stress and movement of families. At the same time, unit costs of staff, supplies and services employed or purchased by the Agency increased appreciably, particularly in the occupied areas. As a consequence, the Agency's total expenditure and commitments in 1968 reached nearly \$ 44 million, compared with \$ 40.6 million in 1967 and only \$ 37.5 million in 1966.

165. Although the response of Governments and of non-governmental organizations to the Agency's request for special contributions to meet the increased needs arising from the June 1967 hostilities was indeed generous (some \$ 10 million of special contributions being received altogether in 1967 and 1968), it was not sufficient to cover the increase in the Agency's expenditure over the two years. As a consequence, the Agency — which had an excess of \$ 2.5 million income over expenditure in 1967 — suffered a deficit of income of \$ 2.9 million in 1968.

166. The following summary table reflects the Agency's financial operations in 1968:

	<i>Millions of US dollars</i>
Income received in 1968:	
Pledges by Governments	37.6
Other contributions	2.6
Other income	0.9
Total income	41.1
Expenditure and commitments in 1968:	
Relief services	20.9
Health services	5.6
Education services	17.5
Total expenditure and commitments	44.0
Net surplus (deficit)	(2.9)
Add working capital at 1 January 1968 (after adjustment of prior year's accounts)	16.6
Working capital at 31 December 1968	13.7

167. Perhaps the most significant point of the foregoing summary is that the Agency again — for the fifth time in six years — incurred a massive deficit on its programme, amounting to \$ 2.9 million, which reduced working capital to only \$ 13.7 million, composed largely of pledges and accounts receivable and supplies in the Agency's "pipeline".

168. Unliquidated commitments carried forward from 1968 (or prior years) to 1969 totalled approximately \$ 2.6 million, compared with only \$ 0.9 million of such commitments which had been carried forward from 1967 to 1968. During 1968, savings on liquidation of commitments from prior years totalled some \$ 0.2 million (the savings were credited to working capital).

169. At the end of 1968, unpaid pledges from Governments totalled \$ 9.6 million, compared with only \$ 7.6 million unpaid at the end of 1967, reflecting a measurable slow-down in the rate of payment of contributions in 1968 by certain Governments. Inventories of supplies and advances to suppliers at \$ 7.7 million were slightly lower than at the close of 1967 (\$ 8.2 million). Accounts receivable, however, had increased from \$ 1.7 million at the close of 1967 to \$ 4.5 million at the close of 1968.

170. As a consequence of the deficit in 1968

¹ Figures for income, expenditure and working capital and details of income from all sources since the establishment of UNRWA are shown in tables 19 and 20 of annex I. Table 21 lists contributions from non-governmental sources for the year 1968 and the first six months of 1969. Chapter II provides more detailed information with respect to the Agency's financial operations for 1968 and 1969.

and of the very large increase in non-cash assets previously mentioned, the Agency's free cash position, that is, cash in excess of current liabilities, deteriorated markedly in 1968, falling from \$ 6.2 million at the close of 1967 to only \$ 1.2 million at the close of 1968. Fortunately a number of unpaid pledges were paid early in 1969; otherwise the Agency would have faced serious difficulties in meeting payrolls and suppliers' invoices in the early part of 1969.

171. The foregoing figures do not include those related to the receipt and expenditure of funds made available by NEED (Near East Emergency Donations, Inc.) mentioned elsewhere in this report. For technical and legal reasons, these funds are not regarded as part of the Agency's funds. Up to 31 December 1968, the Agency had received a total of \$ 4.7 million of NEED funds (including interest) and by that date had expended or committed \$ 2.8 million, largely for the provision of emergency shelter and sanitary arrangements for refugees and other displaced persons in east Jordan and for the displaced refugees in Syria. The unexpended balance of funds available was largely earmarked for provision of improved and expanded educational facilities for the refugees.

172. The financial prospects for the Agency in 1969 are even more alarming than ever before, as the following summary table clearly shows.

	<i>Millions of US dollars</i>
Estimated income in 1969:	
Pledges by Governments	38.3
Other contributions	2.0
Other income	0.7
Total income	41.0
Estimated expenditure and commitments in 1969:	
Relief services	19.7
Health services	5.6
Education services	19.0
Total expenditure and commitments:	44.3
Estimated surplus (deficit)	(3.3)
Add working capital at 1 January 1969	13.7
Estimated working capital at 31 December 1969	10.4

173. As the preceding table shows, the Agency expects to incur a further deficit of some \$ 3.3 million in 1969. However, even this estimate is subject to a number of assumptions, the more important of which are that (a) unit costs will not increase further, (b) the Agency will not be called upon to provide assistance to additional numbers of persons, (c) some \$ 12 million of expected pledges by Governments will be forthcoming and (d) that contributions from non-governmental sources will continue at the same high rate as in 1968. While the latter two of these seem reasonably safe assumptions, the first may well prove to be seriously wrong, particularly in respect of staff salaries effected by cost of living increases. As for assumption (b), this depends very largely upon the amount of assistance received by the governments in the area for their programmes of assistance to displaced persons not registered with UNRWA.

174. The problem posed by the expected deficit of \$ 3.3 million in 1969 is discussed in the introduction to this report (see paragraphs 20-35). What is at stake is the ability of the Agency to continue its existing programme.

175. As noted in paragraph 171 above for 1968, the preceding figures for 1969 do not include the expected receipt and expenditure of NEED funds. However, these funds will enable the Agency to undertake expenditure on capital projects, particularly the provision of additional and replacement school facilities and training centres. As at 30 June 1969, the Agency had received a total of \$ 6.3 million in NEED funds (including interest) and had expended or committed \$ 4.4 million.

CHAPTER II

BUDGET FOR 1970

AND

REVISED BUDGET FOR 1969

A. INTRODUCTION

176. This part of the report presents both the budget estimates for 1970 and the adjusted budget estimates for 1969. The budget estimates for 1969 were originally presented to the General Assembly in the report for 1967-1968, but have subsequently had to be adjusted — virtually all

of the increases were necessary to provide for the use of special contributions received during the year for items not included in the original estimates.

177. The budget estimates for 1970 amount to \$42,978,000 compared with adjusted budget estimates of \$44,264,000 for 1969 and actual expenditure of \$43,987,000 in 1968. These totals include costs of buildings, equipment and other items of a non-recurring nature, financed largely by special contributions earmarked for these purposes. The non-recurrent costs are limited to \$683,000 for 1970, compared with the adjusted budget of \$2,231,000 for 1969 and \$3,422,000 actual expenditure in 1968. Continuing recurrent costs, on the other hand, total \$42,295,000 for 1970, an increase over the adjusted budget estimate of \$42,033,000 for 1969 and actual expenditure of \$40,565,000 in 1968.

178. Recurrent costs in each of these three years have been or are expected to be higher than in earlier years, in part as a result of the mid-year hostilities in 1967. Another important factor has been the constantly increasing cost of education. The principle increases in recurrent costs in 1969 over 1968 are attributable to general education (\$0.6 million) and vocational and professional training (\$0.4 million, largely covered by special contributions). For 1970, a further increase is expected in general education (\$0.7 million) and in vocational and professional training (\$0.2 million, for which special contributions are expected). Fortunately, in 1970 there should be an offsetting decrease of \$0.7 million in relief costs due to an expected reduction in the prices of contributed flour and oil.

179. The progressive rise in living costs throughout the Agency's area of operations, notably in Gaza, east Jordan and on the West Bank, has necessitated certain revisions in staff salaries, especially in the manual worker categories. It seems probable that increases for other categories of staff will also have to be made, particularly in West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon, but no provision for them has yet been included in either the proposed budget for 1970 or the revised estimates for 1969. Unit prices for supplies and commodities as well as hospital bed rates and construction costs also continue to rise and are reflected to some extent in the estimates for 1969 and 1970.

180. As noted above, education costs have risen considerably. For the 1968-1969 scholastic year, an unprecedented intake of pupils included many thousands who in 1967-1968 had been withheld from school by their parents following the hostilities of June 1967. This increase will be further supplemented by the normal increases in school years 1969-1970 and 1970-1971. Furthermore, in both east Jordan and Syria, where schools have had to be operated in tents in the emergency camps, the average class occupancies are lower than they are in Agency-built classrooms where average enrolment is almost fifty pupils per classroom. Again, where displaced refugees are concentrated in urban areas, the Agency has been obliged to lease such school premises as could be found, usually providing smaller than normal classrooms. This has led to the need for more teachers, increasing the Agency's education costs accordingly. This situation will improve somewhat during 1969-1970 when standard-sized classrooms, being constructed with special funds contributed for the purpose, will replace a number of tents and rented premises.

181. Although costs of health services in 1969 are expected to be somewhat higher than in 1968, particularly recurrent costs, no material further increase is anticipated in 1970, subject to possible increases in staff costs, mentioned above. In the operation of the emergency camps, health service costs are higher than in the older well-established camps, especially for environmental sanitation (as well as for educational services, as mentioned in paragraph 178 above).

182. In relief services, a slight increase in recurrent costs in 1969 over 1968 is expected to be followed by a material decrease in 1970 due to the expected lower prices of flour and oil mentioned in paragraph 178 above. The total cost of relief services in 1970 will be further reduced by the absence of capital improvements (principally for shelter) unless special contributions are received as in 1968 and 1969.

183. Cases of special individual hardship continue to be of great concern to the Agency, which is unable to make more than a token gesture in recognition of the real problem. For essential clothing, for example, the Agency is entirely dependent on, and greatly indebted to, the many voluntary societies who not only share

the burden of providing used clothing, but also assist in its allocation and distribution to needy cases, as far as their own limited resources permit.

184. Some real measure of success has been achieved in rectification of the ration rolls as a result of the Agency's persistent and continuous efforts. Nevertheless, the numbers of refugees technically entitled to receive UNRWA relief assistance, but so far excluded because of ration ceilings, constantly exceed those deleted.

185. Common costs (supply and transport and other internal services, general administration and liaison), after rising sharply in 1968, have tended to be more nearly stable in 1969 and are expected to continue so in 1970. The practical necessity to operate through a Field Office in Jerusalem as well as one in Amman has inevitably added to the Agency's financial burden, despite every endeavour to limit these costs, and has temporarily offset the Agency's continuous efforts to reduce common costs. The new Field Office

in Amman was initially established in hastily acquired offices in several quarters distant from each other, none being large enough to accommodate all of the departments of the Field Office in one place. In the past year, alternative premises have been found in Amman which will accommodate all of the departments operating as the Field Office headquarters and which facilitate the Agency's work in east Jordan.

B. BUDGET ESTIMATES GENERAL

186. The following tables present in summary the budget estimates for 1970 together with comparative data of the adjusted budget for 1969 and of actual expenditure in 1968, table A presenting the total estimates and tables B and C the estimates of recurrent and non-recurrent costs, respectively. The estimates for 1970 are briefly described in the paragraphs following the tables.

TABLE A
TOTAL COSTS
(In thousands of US dollars)

	<i>1970 budget estimates</i>	<i>1969 adjusted budget estimates</i>	<i>1968 actual expenditure</i>
<i>Part I, Relief services</i>			
Basic rations	12,234	12,908	12,814
Supplementary feeding	2,072	2,162	2,257
Shelter	265	443	1,710
Special hardship assistance	553	563	639
Share of common costs from Part IV	3,538	3,586	3,496
Total, Part I	18,662	19,662	20,916
<i>Part II, Health services</i>			
Medical services	3,345	3,367	3,497
Environmental sanitation	1,105	1,108	1,026
Share of common costs from Part IV	1,105	1,116	1,100
Total, Part II	5,555	5,591	5,623
<i>Part III, Education services</i>			
General education	12,392	12,108	11,774
Vocational and professional training	3,664	4,171	2,975
Share of common costs from Part IV	2,705	2,732	2,699
Total, Part III	18,761	19,011	17,448
<i>Part IV, Common costs</i>			
Supply and transport	3,607	3,671	3,521
Other internal services	2,382	2,397	2,435
General administration and liaison	1,359	1,366	1,339
Total, Part IV	7,348	7,434	7,295
Costs allocated to operations	(7,348)	(7,434)	(7,295)
Grand total	42,978	44,264	43,987

TABLE B
RECURRENT COSTS
(In thousands of US dollars)

	<i>1970 budget estimates</i>	<i>1969 adjusted budget estimates</i>	<i>1968 actual expenditure</i>
<i>Part I, Relief services</i>			
Basic Rations	12,229	12,896	12,807
Supplementary feeding	2,060	2,064	1,993
Shelter	260	274	281
Special hardship assistance	551	555	565
Share of common costs from Part IV	3,403	3,410	3,359
Total, Part I	18,503	19,199	19,005
<i>Part II, Health services</i>			
Medical services	3,314	3,305	3,265
Environmental sanitation	1,082	1,079	994
Share of common costs from Part IV	1,074	1,076	1,058
Total, Part II	5,470	5,460	5,317
<i>Part III, Education services</i>			
General education	12,268	11,528	10,881
Vocational and professional training	3,411	3,196	2,771
Share of common costs from Part IV	2,643	2,650	2,591
Total, Part III	18,322	17,374	16,243
<i>Part IV, Common costs</i>			
Supply and transport	3,400	3,403	3,379
Other internal services	2,361	2,369	2,297
General administration and liaison	1,359	1,364	1,332
Total, Part IV	7,120	7,136	7,008
Costs allocated to operations	(7,120)	(7,136)	(7,008)
Grand total	42,295	42,033	40,565

TABLE C
NON-RECURRENT COSTS
(In thousands of US dollars)

	<i>1970 budget estimates</i>	<i>1969 adjusted budget estimates</i>	<i>1968 actual expenditures</i>
<i>Part I, Relief services</i>			
Basic rations	5	12	7
Supplementary feeding	12	98	264
Shelter	5	169	1,429
Special hardship assistance	2	8	74
Share of common costs from Part IV	135	176	137
Total, Part I	159	463	1,911
<i>Part II, Health services</i>			
Medical services	31	62	232
Environmental sanitation	23	29	32
Share of common costs from Part IV	31	40	42
Total, Part II	85	131	306
<i>Part III, Education services</i>			
General education	124	580	893
Vocational and professional training	253	975	204
Share of common costs from Part IV	62	82	108
Total, Part III	439	1,637	1,205
<i>Part IV, Common costs</i>			
Supply and transport	207	268	142
Other internal services	21	28	138
General administration and liaison	—	2	7
Total, Part IV	228	298	287
Costs allocated to operations	(228)	(298)	(287)
Grand total	683	2,231	3,422

RELIEF SERVICES

BASIC RATIONS

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1970 budget estimate	12,234,000	12,229,000	5,000
1969 adjusted budget estimate	12,908,000	12,896,000	12,000
1968 actual expenditure	12,814,000	12,807,000	7,000

187. The components of the actual ration issues have been briefly described in paragraph 49 above and in table 4 of annex I. The costs included under this heading cover both the purchase and the distribution of all basic food items and soap. Costs of warehousing and of transportation within the UNRWA area, however, are recorded and treated under "supply and transport services" in paragraphs 215 and 216 below.

188. The present estimates provide for ration issues to beneficiaries throughout 1970 at the

same level as in 1969, inclusive of approved provision for frontier villagers, but at an estimated cost significantly lower than either of the two preceding years, because of expected lower prices of flour and oil, which are largely provided as part of the United States contribution.

189. Many of the premises where distribution is carried out are old and unsuitable; nevertheless no proposals are included for replacements, however desirable, owing to the serious financial situation.

SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1970 budget estimate	2,072,000	2,060,000	12,000
1969 adjusted budget estimate	2,162,000	2,064,000	98,000
1968 actual expenditure	2,257,000	1,993,000	264,000

190. This programme has particularly increased in cost since the hostilities of mid-1967 and is carried out as described in paragraphs 50-55 above and in annex I, tables 5 and 6. In this activity also, as for basic rations (see paragraph 187 above), warehousing and transportation within the UNRWA area are charged to "supply and transport services".

191. The nutritional value of the supplemental hot meals which are served remains the same and the authorized numbers of beneficiaries are proposed to be continued at the same level as in the second half of 1969. Other supplemental

items of diet, including milk, cornflour/soya/milk mixture and tinned meat have been continued for particularly vulnerable categories of refugees. For imported commodities, the same observations apply as for "basic rations", but a separate and difficult problem is the progressive upward trend in the prices of fresh food items for hot meals.

192. Although the premises used are, in many cases, old and unsuitable, some seriously dilapidated, no provision has been included this year for any replacement construction.

SHELTER

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1970 budget estimate	265,000	260,000	5,000
1969 adjusted budget estimate	443,000	274,000	169,000
1968 actual expenditure	1,710,000	281,000	1,429,000

193. This programme is described in paragraphs 56-61 above and in table 7 of annex I. Estimates include the rental value of camp sites (most of which are made available as contributions by Governments), the cost of administrative control of existing shelters and a very limited amount for maintenance including upkeep of roads and paths within camps.

194. For 1970, no provision has been made for shelter construction in established camps, not even to take care of social cases or cases of special hardship. Nor has any provision been included for further new road construction

within camps.

195. Fortunately, the provision of tents required in the emergency camps, and more recently their replacement to a large extent by prefabricated shelters, has been possible with funds specially contributed for these purposes. In the emergency camps in Syria, and in some of the six emergency camps in east Jordan, the heavy cost of maintaining and replacing tented shelters may pose a winter problem in the event of storms, but no provision has been made for replacement.

SPECIAL HARDSHIP ASSISTANCE

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1970 budget estimate	553,000	551,000	2,000
1969 adjusted budget estimate	563,000	555,000	8,000
1968 actual expenditure	639,000	565,000	74,000

196. This heading covers the provision of additional relief assistance to refugee families who suffer from special hardship; this is limited to welfare casework, the distribution of donated used clothing, donated layettes, blankets and winter fuel. The programme is described in paragraphs 63-65 above.

197. Prior to the mid-year hostilities in 1967, the Agency had been able progressively to reduce the quantities of donated used clothing imported

for the refugees and in certain circumstances was exempted from freight charges on such shipments from the United States. During the past two years, however, clothing needs have become significantly greater and the quantities have been augmented accordingly. On the other hand, in 1970 (for the winter of 1970-1971), general issues of blankets will be replaced by issues only to established cases of special hardship.

HEALTH SERVICES

MEDICAL SERVICES

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1970 budget estimate	3,345,000	3,314,000	31,000
1969 adjusted budget estimate	3,367,000	3,305,000	62,000
1968 actual expenditure	3,497,000	3,265,000	232,000

198. For preventive and curative medical services, the programmes are described in paragraphs 66-88 above and in tables 9 to 12 of annex I.

199. No improvements of any kind are proposed in the present minimal standards of care nor is any provision made for replacement of unsuitable premises. Increases are expected in the rising unit costs of supplies, in the increasing numbers of refugees to be served (largely owing to loss of income) and in higher bed rate charges

for hospital services.

200. In the maternal and child care health programmes, inclusive of rehydration/nutrition treatment for infant cases of gastro-enteritis or malnutrition, no provision is included for any extension of current activities, however desirable.

201. A minimal provision has been included for essential replacement of worn out ambulance vehicles which are beyond the stage of economical repair.

ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1970 budget estimate	1,105,000	1,082,000	23,000
1969 adjusted budget estimate	1,108,000	1,079,000	29,000
1968 actual expenditure	1,026,000	994,000	32,000

202. The programme is described in paragraph 89 above. The progressive reduction in costs resulting from more proficient techniques and from the gradual replacement of public by private latrines (the latter significantly reducing maintenance costs) has been largely offset by increases in unit cost of supplies (especially of effective insecticides where resistance to cheaper treatments has developed) and by the higher ratio of sanitation labourers required in the emergency camps and by the wage increases for these manual workers.

203. Further construction works are required in camps, especially in the emergency camps, for more permanent drainage and disposal of storm water, for further conversion of pit latrines to septic tank types, for additional and more efficient incinerators and for the extension of existing water supply systems (all of which would result in long-term economies). However, the budget for 1970 is limited to essential maintenance and repair of the existing facilities and unavoidable replacement of corroded water pipes, worn out pumps and other essential equipment.

EDUCATION SERVICES

GENERAL EDUCATION

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1970 budget estimate	12,392,000	12,268,000	124,000
1969 adjusted budget estimate	12,108,000	11,528,000	580,000
1968 actual expenditure	11,774,000	10,881,000	893,000

204. For a description of the Agency's general education programme, see paragraphs 102-112 above and tables 13 to 16 of annex I. Several minor activities conducted outside the UNRWA/UNESCO schools are also included under this heading: youth activities (paragraphs 113-115), women's activities (paragraph 132) and pre-school play-centres (paragraph 116).

205. Although the two latter activities are considered as Agency programmes, they are normally funded from special contributions.

206. Of all the services provided for refugees, general education is perhaps the most valued. It is on education that individual families pin their hopes for the future; this is more and more noticeable in the tendency for boys to remain in school throughout the preparatory cycle and then to press for admission to secondary schools, and for girls to attend school in ever larger numbers and to continue longer than formerly.

207. In general, standards of accommodation and equipment are maintained at a modest level, but they are usually not lower than those of local government schools except in respect of average classroom occupancy, where Agency practice is dictated by the lack of funds. Except for minimum essential replacement of equipment, provision has been made for capital improvements only to the extent of presently foreseeable special funds available for the purpose. If additional special contributions are received, as in 1968 and 1969, the budget will be increased accordingly.

208. The UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education (see paragraphs 121-125) continues to operate effectively, efficiently and successfully, and its in-service training programmes to raise the academic and professional qualifications of teachers already in the Agency's schools. In 1970, this particular activity is expected to cost \$ 384,000, part or all of which, it is hoped, will be covered by special contributions.

VOCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL TRAINING

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1970 budget estimate	3,664,000	3,411,000	253,000
1969 adjusted budget estimate	4,171,000	3,196,000	975,000
1968 actual expenditure	2,975,000	2,771,000	204,000

209. Details of these programmes are given in paragraphs 118-120 and 126-134 above. They include teacher training and vocational and technical courses conducted in the Agency's residential training centres as well as similar training subsidized by the Agency in centres operated by

Governments and other organizations.

210. Also included is the cost, in 1970, of \$ 539,000 for scholarships to be awarded at universities in the Agency's area (described in paragraphs 135-137 above) for candidates selected on the dual basis of academic qualifications

and economic need. Approximately one third of this programme represents an increase over years prior to 1968 and is made possible by a special contribution.

211. This heading also includes other minor categories of training, such as adult craft training in woodwork and sewing, the training of physically handicapped children and some additional assistance to graduates from Agency centres in obtaining on-the-job training in their respective trades in factories abroad (which is usually limited to defraying travel costs).

212. The steep rise in estimated expenditure in 1969 is almost entirely due to capital expenditure for expansion at the Wadi Seer Vocational Training Centre (\$ 786,000 contributed by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany) and to additional operational costs there (\$ 112,000 similarly contributed — along with existing operational costs) and elsewhere, especially at the Gaza Vocational Training Centre and at the

Ramallah Women's Training Centre (at both of which the capital costs of expansion were funded by NEED).

213. Operational costs in 1970 will be significantly higher than in either of the two preceding years, because capacity, as it becomes available by construction, will be taken up by approximately 175 additional trainees in the 1969-1970 academic year and approximately 500 additional trainees in 1970-1971. It should be noted, however, that although the over-all costs of operations are higher, the individual unit costs per graduating trainee reflect a significant decrease. Part of the increase will be covered by special contributions.

214. For capital costs in 1970, only \$ 17,000 is provided for essential replacement and updating of equipment at training centres already established, the remainder of the provision being related to the expansion of Wadi Seer Vocational Centre.

COMMON COSTS

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT SERVICES

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1970 budget estimate	3,607,000	3,400,000	207,000
1969 revised budget estimate	3,671,000	3,403,000	268,000
1968 actual expenditure	3,521,000	3,379,000	142,000

215. Under this budget heading are all costs of procurement, control and warehousing of supplies and equipment, and the operation of freight and passenger transport within the UNRWA area of operations for all activities. Although the cost level appears to have stabilized, there is little possibility of reducing costs in the present circumstances.

216. Replacement of old vehicles has been a serious problem for several years, but austerity has necessitated severe restrictions. Although \$ 260,000 will be expended during 1969 for this purpose and there is compelling need for at least a similar provision in 1970, the budget has been limited to \$ 200,000 with minor provision for replacement or repair of equipment.

OTHER INTERNAL SERVICES

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1970 budget estimate	2,382,000	2,361,000	21,000
1969 adjusted budget estimate	2,397,000	2,369,000	28,000
1968 actual expenditure	2,435,000	2,297,000	138,000

217. These services include the registration of refugees and the determination of their eligibility for Agency benefits; internal administrative services; translation, legal, financial, technical (engineering) and data processing services and the protection of the Agency's installations.

218. Between 1963 and 1967, an intensive sustained effort by the Agency had resulted in a substantial reduction in the cost of these internal

services. The dislocations caused by the hostilities of 1967 have, unfortunately, given rise to increased costs largely offsetting the reductions previously achieved. However, the cost level appears now to have largely stabilized again, and the Agency will again pursue its efforts aimed at reducing these costs as far as is consistent with efficient and adequate control of operations. Major reductions cannot, however, be anticipated.

GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1970 budget estimate	1,359,000	1,359,000	—
1969 adjusted budget estimate	1,366,000	1,364,000	2,000
1968 actual expenditure	1,339,000	1,332,000	7,000

219. All general administration requirements for the Agency's headquarters and for the five Field Office headquarters are included in this budget estimate, as well as all subordinate area and camp offices, together with maintenance of liaison offices in New York, Geneva and Cairo and the Agency's public information service.

220. Paragraph 218 on "other internal services" applies equally to general administration, and the conclusion offered therein is also equally applicable.

ALLOCATION OF COMMON COSTS

221. The summary tables in paragraph 186

above reflect the allocation of common costs to the three main categories of Agency services — relief, health and education. Such an allocation contains an element of judgement; the percentages allocated were based on a detailed study of the Agency's operations in each Field Office. They are believed to be an accurate assessment.

C. FINANCING THE BUDGET — 1969 AND 1970

222. The problems of financing the proposed budget for 1970 and the adjusted budget for 1969 may be summarized as follows (in thousands of US dollars):

	<i>1969</i>	<i>1970</i>
Budget	<u>44,264</u>	<u>42,978</u>
Estimated funds available from:		
Non-Government contributions	2,000	1,500
Miscellaneous income	<u>700</u>	<u>600</u>
	<u>2,700</u>	<u>2,100</u>
Balance to be covered by contributions from Governments	41,564	40,878

223. The estimated reduction in non-Government contributions in 1970 is related to special one-time contributions for purposes covered by the 1969 budget, but not in the 1970 budget. It is, of course, by no means certain that the very high level of ordinary non-Government contributions estimated for both 1969 and 1970 will be forthcoming. Since the hostilities of 1967, this source of funds has been much higher than before the hostilities, but it may be over-optimistic to assume their continuation at this high level.

224. Miscellaneous income will be appreciably less in 1970 than in 1969, because the rate of

payment of amounts due to the Agency from the liquidation of the Development Bank of Jordan Ltd. will be less in 1970.

225. Any shortfall in contributions by Governments below the figures shown above will have to be financed from the Agency's working capital, which at 1 January 1969 stood at only \$ 13.7 million, with over half this amount invested in the Agency's "pipeline" of supplies on hand, in transit or on order against advances to suppliers. The consequences of further drawing down of working capital are discussed in the introduction to this report.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I. — TABLES

STATISTICS CONCERNING REGISTERED POPULATION

TABLE 1

TOTAL REGISTERED POPULATION ACCORDING TO CATEGORY OF REGISTRATION 1950-1969^a

Year ended	"R" Category				"S" Cat.		"N" Cat.		Grand Total ^e 4+5+6+7
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
	Full-ratio recipients	Half-ratio recipients ^b	Babies and children registered for services ^c	Total 1+2+3	Other members receiving no rations ^d	Members of families receiving education and medical services ^d	Members of families receiving no rations or services ^d		
June 1950	<i>f</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>f</i>	960,021	—	—	—	960,021	
June 1951	826,459	51,034	2,174	879,667	—	—	24,455	904,122	
June 1952	805,593	58,733	18,347	882,673	—	—	32,738	915,411	
June 1953	772,166	64,817	34,765	871,748	—	—	45,013	916,761	
June 1954	820,486	17,340	49,232	887,058	—	—	54,793	941,851	
June 1955	828,531	17,228	60,227	905,986	—	—	63,403	969,389	
June 1956	830,266	16,987	75,026	922,279	—	—	74,059	996,338	
June 1957	830,611	16,733	86,212	933,556	18,203	4,462	62,980	1,019,201	
June 1958	836,781	16,577	110,600	963,958	19,776	5,901	63,713	1,053,348	
June 1959	843,739	16,350	130,092	990,181	21,548	6,977	68,922	1,087,628	
June 1960	849,634	16,202	150,170	1,016,006	22,639	8,792	73,452	1,120,889	
June 1961	854,268	15,998	169,730	1,039,996	23,947	9,515	77,566	1,151,024	
June 1962	862,083	15,805	176,772	1,054,660	20,004	9,027	91,069	1,174,760	
June 1963	866,369	15,705	197,914	1,079,988	21,195	10,420	98,567	1,210,170	
June 1964	863,284	15,617	226,494	1,105,395	23,369	13,168	104,653	1,246,585	
June 1965	859,048	15,546	251,131	1,125,725	29,387	18,589	107,122	1,280,823	
June 1966	845,730	15,392	284,025	1,145,147	39,485	24,367	108,750	1,317,749	
June 1967	845,790	15,328	312,649	1,173,767	39,997	25,331	106,991	1,346,086	
June 1968	824,366	14,704	316,166	1,155,236	60,219	26,900	121,939	1,364,294	
June 1969	806,366	13,466	326,185	1,146,017	73,738	27,315	148,004	1,395,074	

Notes to Table 1

a The above statistics are based on the Agency's registration records, which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to factors such as unreported deaths and undetected false registration.

b Before 1954, half rations were issued to babies and bedouins, as well as to frontier villagers in Jordan. Since then, babies have been eligible for full rations after their first anniversary if the ration ceiling permits. Bedouins are eligible to receive full rations. Half rations are issued only to frontier villagers on the West Bank. Three thousand three hundred and eighty-seven frontier villagers displaced to east Jordan after the hostilities of June 1967 are issued with full rations, on an emergency basis.

c Includes babies below one year of age and children who, because of ration ceilings, are not issued rations. (These children without rations number 162,691 in east Jordan, 64,594 in the West Bank, 36,346 in Gaza, 33,344 in Syria and 11,063 in Lebanon). No births have been registered in respect of registered displaced refugees in east Jordan since the hostilities of June 1967.

d Columns 5, 6 and 7 show the number of persons whose registration for assistance by the Agency has been reduced or cancelled according to their family income as known to the Agency and the income scale in force in their country of residence.

The members of "R" families receiving no rations (column 5) shown for 1957 to 1969 correspond to a level of income insufficient to cancel the whole family's entitlement to rations. The increase in 1969 includes refugees who were absent from West Bank and Gaza after the hostilities of June 1967, many of whom are now being issued with rations in east Jordan on a temporary basis, pending documentation of their transfer. Up to 1956, such persons were reported together with families of the "N" Category (column 7). In 1966, a new sub-category of registration was introduced for persons registered for rations, but whose entitlement has been temporarily suspended (e.g., by reason of their employment by the Agency or acceptance in institutions). At the end of June 1969, persons registered in this sub-category numbered 13,886.

The "S" Category of registration (column 6) was created in January 1965 in place of the previous "E" and "M" Categories and is being extended to all areas in accordance with appropriate income scales.

"N" Category (column 7) includes refugees whose income is such as to disqualify them for normal services, or who have received assistance to enable them to become self-supporting.

In general, it must be pointed out that the distribution of refugees by category of registration gives only a partial picture of the number of self-supporting refugees owing to the limitations faced by the Agency in determining their actual income or degree of need.

e The total population as at 30 June 1952 included 19,616 refugees receiving relief in Israel who were UNRWA'S responsibility to that date.

f Details not available.

g Does not include:

- a 18,302 displaced registered refugees and children of displaced refugees who are receiving rations on an emergency basis and as a temporary nature and whose category of registration has not therefore been changed.
- b 1,540 displaced persons who are not registered with UNRWA who are receiving rations on an emergency basis and as a temporary nature.
- c 3,000 persons displaced from Gaza who are being provided with relief assistance in the United Arab Republic.

TABLE 2

RECAPITULATION OF CHANGES IN COMPOSITION AND/OR ENTITLEMENT
OF FAMILIES REGISTERED FOR RATIONS^a

<i>Nature of changes</i>	<i>1 July 50 to</i>	YEAR ENDED					<i>Total 1950-1969</i>
	<i>30 June 64</i>	<i>30 June 65</i>	<i>30 June 66</i>	<i>30 June 67</i>	<i>30 June 68</i>	<i>30 June 69</i>	
<i>Increases</i>	b				c	c	
Births	473,113	43,857	43,945	40,506	26,803	38,659	666,883
New registration	45,519	258	283	74	75	1	46,210
Loss of self-support ^d	68,085	6,136	7,340	7,117	5,621	5,460	99,759
Returned from absence	14,038	773	1,168	1,679	3,872	17,757	39,287
Miscellaneous ^e	30,416	1,135	212	529	995	1,001	34,288
Total	631,171	52,159	52,948	49,905	37,366	62,878	886,427
<i>Decreases</i>	b						
Deaths	96,067	9,953	7,155	6,233	7,158	8,806	134,472
False registration and duplication	55,980	1,422	204	166	565	597	58,934
Self-support ^d	160,180	13,514	23,401	10,190	8,850	12,794	228,929
Absence	40,430	6,894	2,077	3,296	34,068 ^f	48,035 ^f	134,800
Miscellaneous ^e	133,613	747	770	1,669	4,686	2,211	143,696
Total	486,270	31,630	33,607	21,554	55,327	72,443	700,831
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	
Population at 30 June	1,105,395	1,125,725	1,145,147	1,173,767	1,155,236	1,146,017	

^a This table recapitulates changes over nineteen years affecting the total number of ration recipients, their babies and children registered for services (column 4 of table 1). Births, new registrations, deaths, false registrations and duplications result in additions to or deletions from the registration records. Self support and absence reflect transfers to or from the lower categories of registration (shown in columns 5, 6 and 7 of table 1).

Transfers within or between areas, as well as issue of rations (when available) to children registered for services are not shown in this table.

^b Includes changes effected during the 1950-1951 census operations.

^c No births and virtually no other changes have been documented in respect of registered displaced refugees in east Jordan since the hostilities of June 1967.

^d Covers income, employment with the Agency, assistance towards self-support etc., or the cessation thereof.

^e Miscellaneous changes include up to June 1953, a number of additions to or deletions from the registration records, as well as certain changes in category of registration. The deletion of refugees in Israel from the Agency's records is also reported mainly under this heading (40,930 persons over the period July 1950 June 1953).

^f This figure includes refugees who were absent from West Bank and Gaza after the hostilities of June 1967, many of whom are now in east Jordan.

TABLE 3

RECAPITULATION OF CHANGES IN COMPOSITION OF TOTAL REGISTERED POPULATION^a

<i>Nature of changes</i>	<i>1 July 50 to</i>	<i>YEAR ENDED</i>					<i>Total</i>
	<i>30 June 64</i>	<i>30 June 65</i>	<i>30 June 66</i>	<i>30 June 67</i>	<i>30 June 68^c</i>	<i>30 June 69^c</i>	<i>1959-1969</i>
<i>Additions</i>							
Births	478,514	46,059	46,212	42,971	29,286	41,555	684,597
New registration	45,519	258	283	74	75	1	46,210
Miscellaneous ^b	6,299	154	68	92	458	392	7,463
Total	530,332	46,471	46,563	43,137	29,819	41,948	738,270
<i>Deletions</i>							
Deaths	98,679	9,621	7,866	6,963	7,855	9,866	140,850
False and duplicate registration	57,443	2,524	1,633	8,041	3,623	805	74,069
Miscellaneous ^b	89,165						89,165
Total	245,287	12,145	9,499	15,004	11,478	10,671	304,084
<i>Total registered population at 30 June</i>							
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	
	1,246,585	1,280,823	1,317,749	1,346,086	1,364,294	1,395,074	

^a This table recapitulates changes affecting the total number of registered population (column 8 of table 1) over nineteen years.

Transfers within or between areas are not shown herein.

In comparing the figures in this table with those in table 2, it should be borne in mind that deletions from the ration rolls do not necessarily entail deletions from the total registered population. Persons ceasing to draw because of absence or self-support continue to be registered within the total population. On the other hand, some deaths and false and duplicate registrations are reported among persons registered but not receiving rations, and this accounts for the minor differences under these headings in the two tables. In the earlier years of the Agency's history the distinction between ration recipients and registered population was incompletely recorded.

^b Nature of changes reported under "miscellaneous" was not specified during the census operation. Figures reflect those amendments which resulted in addition or deletion in the total registered population, and removal of refugees in Israel from UNRWA registration records, and correction of deletions previously made by error which were included in the figures of new registration in the reports of previous years.

^c No births and virtually no other changes have been documented in respect of registered displaced refugees in east Jordan since the hostilities of June 1967.

RELIEF SERVICES

TABLE 4

BASIC RATIONS AND OTHER SUPPLIES DISTRIBUTED BY UNRWA

1. *Basic dry rations*

A monthly ration for one person consists of :

- 10,000 grammes of flour
- 600 grammes of pulses
- 600 grammes of sugar
- 500 grammes of rice
- 375 grammes of oils and fats

This ration provides about 1,500 calories per day per person.

In winter, the monthly ration is increased by:

- 300 grammes of pulses
- 400 grammes of flour

It then provides about 1,600 calories per day per person.

2. *Other supplies distributed*

1 piece of soap (150 grammes) per month to each ration beneficiary.

1 $\frac{1}{2}$ litres of kerosene were allocated to ration beneficiaries and to babies and children registered for services, in camps in east Jordan, West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria during five winter months. In Gaza, 1 litre was allocated to these beneficiaries, whether or not they lived in camps, during five winter months.

TABLE 5

NORMAL SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING PROGRAMME

Number of issuing centres and beneficiaries

1 July 1968 - 30 June 1969

A. Cooked meal programme

Field	Number of feeding centres	Beneficiaries		
		Daily average for the period		
		0-2 years	2-15 years and special cases	0-15 years
East Jordan	13	421	1,990	2,411
West Bank	30	574)	9,145)	
	5 ^a	163)	293)	10,175
Gaza	24	1,805	17,149	18,954
Lebanon	18	342	3,987	4,329
Syria	18	281	4,437	4,718
	108	3,586	37,001	40,587

B. Milk programme

Field	Number of milk centres	In milk centres	Daily number of beneficiaries Average for the period		
			Schools	Orphanages, medical prescriptions	Total
East Jordan	14	4,162	20,151	166	24,479
West Bank	34 ^b	3,939	10,675	111	14,725
Gaza	24	21,765	21,744	54	43,563
Lebanon	21	15,123	6,507	362	21,992
Syria	18	13,343	12,904	146	26,393
	111	58,332	71,981	839	131,152

C. Dry ration issue

Field	Beneficiaries				
	Monthly average for the period				
	Pregnant women	Nursing mothers	TB out-patients	CSM ^c	Total
East Jordan	976	3,009	170	31,015	35,170
West Bank	1,048	3,593	441	23,125	28,207
Gaza	3,395	7,893	505	34,115	45,908
Lebanon	919	2,652	146	19,586	23,303
Syria	772	1,885	98	19,399	22,154
	7,110	19,032	1,360	127,240	154,742

^a Centres operated by voluntary societies.^b Including three centres operated by voluntary societies.^c Corn soya mixture.

TABLE 6

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING PROGRAMME

A. *Cooked meal programme*

<i>Categories by field</i>		<i>Number of beneficiaries Daily average</i>
East Jordan	— displaced refugees	12,794
	1-15 years	
	— non-refugee displaced persons	
	1-15 years	7,693
West Bank	— displaced refugees and hardship cases	
	6-15 years	3,385
Syria	— displaced refugees	
	1-15 years	5,251
		<u>29,123</u>

B. *Milk programme*

<i>Categories by field</i>		
East Jordan	— displaced refugees	
	1-15 years	2,641
	— non-refugee displaced persons	
	1-15 years	1,886
Syria	— displaced refugees	
	1-15 years	6,831
		<u>11,358</u>

C. *Other emergency supplements*I. *Protein supplement^a*

(Consists of a twelve-ounce tin of meat and 500 grams CSM per month.)

<i>Field</i>	<i>Number of beneficiaries Monthly average</i>
East Jordan	34,096
West Bank	5,061
Gaza	11,974
Lebanon	—
Syria	16,214
	<u>67,345</u>

II. *Non-protein supplement^b*

(Consists of 600 grams of flour, 500 grams of rice, and 500 grams of fat per month.)

<i>Field</i>	
East Jordan	—
West Bank	—
Gaza	—
Lebanon	—
Syria	15,368
	<u>15,368</u>

^a Authorized for issue to all displaced refugees in Syria, to those living in tented camps in east Jordan and to pregnant and nursing mothers and tuberculosis outpatients in West Bank and Gaza.

^b Authorized for issue to displaced refugees living in emergency camps in Syria and to identified hardship cases among the same category living outside these camps. This was done with a view to having the Agency's ration conform as closely as possible in food value to that issued by the Syrian Government to the Syrian displaced persons.

TABLE 7

POPULATION OF ESTABLISHED CAMPS, BY COUNTRY, AS AT 30 JUNE 1969

<i>Area</i>	<i>Number of camps</i>	<i>Number of persons officially registered in camps^{a, b}</i>	<i>Number of persons actually living in camps^c</i>
East Jordan	4	70,539	107,789
West Bank	20	67,315	73,903
Gaza	8	191,551	195,446
Lebanon	15	81,031	86,459
Syria	6	24,516	27,151
Total	53	434,952	490,748

^a This table does not include displaced persons and registered refugees in the emergency camps (see table 8 below).

^b Persons officially registered in these camps are refugees eligible for UNRWA assistance who are shown in UNRWA records as living in camps, irrespective of their category of registration (R, S, N), although some may have moved to villages, towns or cities in other parts of the country and their removal has yet to be reported to the Agency. The figures do not include refugees in camps who are not given shelter by UNRWA but benefit from sanitation services only.

^c Persons actually living in these camps are mostly UNRWA registered refugees although some are persons displaced in 1967 and 1968 who are neither registered with UNRWA nor eligible for UNRWA assistance. Also included are so-called refugee "squatters" who live in or on the fringes of the camps, although never officially admitted to or registered in the camps.

TABLE 8

POPULATION OF EMERGENCY CAMPS BY COUNTRY, AS AT 30 JUNE 1969

<i>Area</i>	<i>Number of camps</i>	<i>Number of persons actually living in camps^a</i>
East Jordan	6	90,900
Syria	4	9,041
Total	10	99,941

^a Persons actually living in these camps comprise approximately 60 per cent UNRWA registered refugees and 40 per cent other persons, all of whom became displaced in 1967 and 1968.

N.B. Total population of persons living in established and emergency camps is 590,689.

HEALTH SERVICES

TABLE 9

OUT-PATIENT MEDICAL AND DENTAL CARE

Number of patient-visits according to service rendered, UNRWA and UNRWA-subsidized clinics,
1 July 1968 - 30 June 1969

<i>Type of service</i>	<i>Number of visits (first and re-visits combined)</i>					
	<i>East Jordan</i>	<i>West Bank</i>	<i>Gaza</i>	<i>Lebanon</i>	<i>Syria</i>	<i>All fields</i>
Medical consultation	466,050	271,856	548,912	431,244	440,344	2,158,406
Injection	389,465	218,752	595,742	259,530	229,398	1,692,887
Dressing and/or skin treatment	294,383	216,940	390,357	237,918	107,487	1,247,085
Eye treatment	207,273	184,710	421,004	121,797	35,853	970,637
Dental treatment	12,513	13,959	24,758	20,623	8,301	80,154
All types	1,369,684	906,217	1,980,773	1,071,112	821,383	6,149,169

TABLE 10

IN-PATIENT MEDICAL CARE

A. Hospitals providing services to Palestine refugees, as at 30 June 1969

<i>Administering body</i>	<i>Number of institutions</i>
Government and local authorities	30
Voluntary societies or private	38
UNRWA	1
	<hr/> 69

(There are, in addition, a tuberculosis hospital in Gaza, operated jointly by UNRWA and the Public Health Authority, and nine UNRWA-operated maternity centres — one in Syria, two in West Bank and six in Gaza.)

B. Hospital beds by type of service and by field

<i>Type of service</i>	<i>East Jordan</i>	<i>West Bank</i>	<i>Number of beds available</i>		<i>Syria</i>	<i>All fields</i>
			<i>Gaza</i>	<i>Lebanon</i>		
General medical and surgical	221	232	348	155	80	1,036
Tuberculosis	21	25	150	32	20	248
Maternity	25	44	87	9	7	172
Paediatrics	40	62	60	22	—	184
Mental care	47	75	—	56	2	180
All services	354	438	645	274	109	1,820

C. Rehydration/nutrition centres

	<i>East Jordan</i>	<i>West Bank</i>	<i>Gaza</i>	<i>Lebanon</i>	<i>Syria</i>	<i>All fields</i>
Number of centres	5	1	6	3	3	18
Number of cots	47	20	98	30	21	216

TABLE 11
INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED AMONG PALESTINE REFUGEE POPULATION
(1 July 1968 - 30 June 1969)

<i>Reportable diseases</i>	<i>East Jordan</i>	<i>West Bank</i>	<i>Number of cases</i>		<i>Syria</i>	<i>All fields</i>
			<i>Gaza</i>	<i>Lebanon</i>		
Cholera	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plague	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yellow fever	0	0	0	0	0	0
Smallpox	0	0	0	0	0	0
Typhus (louse-borne)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ankylostomiasis	0	0	131	0	0	131
Bilharziasis	0	0	17	0	0	17
Brucellosis	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chicken-pox	1,203	1,036	1,258	1,080	556	5,133
Conjunctivitis	10,206	6,657	6,449	2,200	6,577	32,089
Diphtheria	1	2	0	0	1	4
Dysentery	1,406	615	1,017	517	169	3,724
Enteric group fevers	0	0	45	8	155	208
Gonorrhoea	1	1	4	4	9	19
Infectious hepatitis	80	72	406	79	172	809
Leishmaniasis cutaneous	0	3	0	0	4	7
Malaria	0	0	1	1	0	2
Measles	1,185	1,062	1,002	2,466	445	6,160
Meningitis (cerebrospinal)	6	0	1	2	3	12
Mumps	1,631	1,080	916	2,254	1,212	7,093
Pertussis	292	185	4	110	32	623
Poliomyelitis	11	1	26	35	12	85
Rabies	0	0	0	0	0	0
Relapsing fever (endemic)	1	0	1	0	0	2
Scarlet fever	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syphilis	0	0	42	28	12	82
Tetanus	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tetanus neonatorum	0	0	13	4	0	17
Trachoma	209	139	345	62	425	1,180
Tuberculosis (pulmonary)	81	11	87	99	22	300
Typhus (endemic)	0	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE 12
MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH
1 July 1968 - 30 June 1969

	<i>East Jordan</i>	<i>West Bank</i>	<i>Gaza</i>	<i>Lebanon</i>	<i>Syria</i>	<i>Total</i>
A. Ante-natal services						
Number of ante-natal clinics	10	24	9	18	19	80
Pregnant women newly registered	6,072	3,835	10,455	3,921	2,968	27,251
Average monthly attendance	1,425	1,182	3,685	1,174	873	8,339
Serological tests	2,216	2,030	3,307	1,294	970	9,817
Tests positive	0	0	35	28	11	74
Home visits	1,066	15	71	938	634	2,724
B. Infant health care						
Number of infant health clinics	10	21	9	18	19	77
Number of infants 0-1 year registered, monthly average	5,840	2,825	9,603	4,341	2,779	25,388
Number attended, monthly average	4,018	2,439	8,378	3,407	2,177	20,419
Number of infants 1-2 years registered bi-monthly average	4,819	2,541	9,372	4,226	2,901	23,859
Number attended, bi-monthly average	3,651	2,092	4,992	2,834	2,451	16,020
Smallpox vaccinations	4,542	2,519	7,658	3,996	2,765	21,480
TAB immunizations (full)	3,387	2,307	13	3,241	2,596	11,544
DPT immunizations (full)	5,989	2,954	17,108	4,337	3,201	33,589
Home visits	9,369	10,738	10,741	18,877	12,132	61,857
C. School health services						
Number of school health teams	2	1	1 ^a	1	1	6
School entrants examined	9,884	993	3,686	2,301	756	17,620
Other pupils examined	1,513	6,703	0	568	17,724	26,508
Follow-up examinations	1,463	665	0	1,070	16,728	19,926
Teachers and attendants examined	1,814	4,130	0	1,637	8,844	16,425
School inspections	106	342	725	121	442	1,736
TAB boosters	65,080	10,854	33,240	5,172	13,064	127,410
Diphtheria or diphtheria tetanus boosters	13,246	2,834	7,779	1,026	3,662	28,547
DPT immunizations (full)	0	317	0	0	0	317
Smallpox revaccinations	0	10	0	0	239	249
BCG vaccinations	0	2,893	5,954	8,528	0	17,375

^a School Medical Officer not available.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING SERVICES

General Education

TABLE 13

UNRWA-UNESCO SCHOOLS

Number of elementary and preparatory pupils, 1951-1969

Country	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
<i>Jordan</i>																			
Elementary	16,345	15,882	30,118	39,188	42,144	43,649	42,431	41,600	39,519	38,223	38,309	41,000	45,531	50,220	55,713	60,802	65,849	45,593	53,357
Preparatory	—	—	87	790	1,612	2,862	4,274	5,357	6,714	6,898	7,437	8,384	8,492	8,868	9,623	11,113	12,838	9,043	10,939
Secondary	—	—	—	22	82	200	334	495	578	612	598	875	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	16,345	15,882	30,205	40,000	43,838	46,711	47,039	47,452	46,811	45,733	46,344	50,259	54,023	59,088	65,336	71,915	78,687	54,636 ^a	64,296 ^a
<i>West Bank</i>																			
Elementary	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Preparatory	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Gaza</i>																			
Elementary	19,543	22,551	25,702	31,107	34,016	35,087	34,876	35,163	34,806	36,633	36,591	37,885	38,470	38,905	41,164	40,757	41,362	35,395	38,351
Preparatory	61	164	675	1,781	3,339	4,937	6,410	7,495	8,244	8,481	9,841	10,641	12,797	13,627	15,032	15,644	16,710	12,358	15,251
Total	19,604	22,715	26,377	32,888	37,355	40,024	41,286	42,658	43,050	45,114	46,432	48,526	51,267	52,532	56,196	56,401	58,072	47,753	53,602
<i>Lebanon</i>																			
Elementary	4,564	6,291	9,332	11,695	12,567	12,983	13,155	13,936	14,881	15,422	16,292	17,124	17,411	18,041	19,836	19,547	20,744	21,312	22,426
Preparatory	—	—	86	384	620	948	1,003	996	1,325	1,668	2,159	2,676	2,680	3,491	3,710	3,648	3,451	5,168	6,046
Total	4,564	6,291	9,418	12,079	13,187	13,931	14,158	14,932	16,206	17,090	18,451	19,800	20,091	21,532	23,546	23,195	24,195	26,480	28,472
<i>Syria</i>																			
Elementary	2,599	2,895	5,410	8,758	9,700	10,288	11,042	11,332	12,256	13,354	13,685	14,430	15,618	16,463	17,631	18,720	19,564	20,197	21,088
Preparatory	—	—	166	864	671	936	1,180	1,562	1,916	2,592	3,589	4,122	4,459	4,946	5,284	5,740	6,449	6,981	7,471
Total	2,599	2,895	5,576	9,622	10,371	11,224	12,222	12,894	14,172	15,946	17,274	18,552	20,077	21,409	22,915	24,460	26,013	27,178	28,559
<i>Grand total</i>																			
Elementary	43,051	47,619	70,562	90,748	98,427	102,007	101,504	102,031	101,462	103,632	104,877	110,439	117,030	123,629	134,344	139,826	147,519	141,454	155,633
Preparatory	61	164	1,014	3,819	6,242	9,683	12,867	15,410	18,199	19,639	23,026	25,623	28,428	30,932	33,649	36,145	39,448	38,137	45,289
Secondary	—	—	—	22	82	200	334	495	578	612	598	875	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	43,112	47,783	71,576	94,589	104,751	111,890	114,705	117,936	120,239	123,883	128,501	137,137	145,458	154,561	167,993	175,971	186,967	179,591	200,922

^a East Jordan only.

TABLE 14
NUMBER OF REFUGEE PUPILS ATTENDING GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS,
AS OF 31 MAY 1969

Country	Elementary		Preparatory		Secondary		All levels	
	Government schools	Private schools	Government schools	Private schools	Government schools	Private schools	Government schools	Private schools
East Jordan	8,423	919	2,965	411	3,124	388	14,612	1,718
West Bank	4,681 ^a	1,411	5,409 ^a	707	4,710 ^a	530	14,800	2,648
Gaza	—	—	—	—	8,038	—	8,038	—
Lebanon	880	5,105	210	1,847	102	1,347	1,192	8,299
Syria	6,321	145	1,401	202	2,126	978	9,848	1,325
Total	20,405	7,580	9,985	3,167	18,100	3,243	48,490	13,990
								62,480

^a Figures not yet verified for eligibility.

TABLE 15

UNRWA-UNESCO SCHOOLS SHOWING NUMBER OF PUPILS BY GRADES AS OF 31 MAY 1969

Elementary

<i>Country</i>	<i>I</i>		<i>II</i>		<i>III</i>		<i>IV</i>		<i>V</i>		<i>VI</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>
East Jordan	6,148	5,671	4,976	4,481	4,747	4,255	4,450	3,737	4,438	3,581	3,984	2,889	28,743	26,614
West Bank	1,902	2,110	1,729	1,858	1,660	1,738	1,521	1,605	1,582	1,659	1,611	1,436	10,005	10,406
Gaza	4,484	4,064	3,110	2,815	3,227	2,749	3,057	2,738	3,218	3,020	3,179	2,690	20,275	18,076
Lebanon	2,350	2,172	2,311	2,036	2,152	2,014	1,619	1,397	1,805	1,417	1,752	1,401	11,989	10,437
Syria	2,217	2,032	2,000	1,698	1,943	1,614	1,777	1,389	1,895	1,524	1,805	1,194	11,637	9,451
Total	17,101	16,049	14,126	12,888	13,729	12,370	12,424	10,866	12,938	11,201	12,331	9,610	82,649	72,984
Grand total	33,150		27,014		26,099		23,290		24,139		21,941		155,633	

Preparatory

<i>Country</i>	<i>I</i>		<i>II</i>		<i>III</i>		<i>IV</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>
East Jordan	2,984	2,008	2,434	1,460	1,259	794	—	—	6,677	4,262
West Bank	1,383	1,096	1,036	763	718	586	—	—	3,137	2,445
Gaza	3,217	2,705	2,253	2,415	2,383	2,278	—	—	7,853	7,998
Lebanon	1,517	863	1,250	770	497	265	599	285	3,863	2,183
Syria	1,567	1,227	1,346	872	1,602	857	—	—	4,515	2,956
Total	10,668	7,899	8,319	6,280	6,459	4,780	599	285	26,045	19,244
Grand total	18,567		14,599		11,239		884		45,289	

TABLE 16
DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEE PUPILS RECEIVING EDUCATION AS OF 31 MAY 1969

Country	Number of UNRWA- UNESCO schools	Number of pupils in elementary classes at UNRWA-UNESCO schools			Number of pupils in preparatory classes at UNRWA-UNESCO schools			Number of refugee pupils in government and private schools		Total number of refugee pupils receiving education
		Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Govt. schools	Private schools	
East Jordan	134	28,743	24,614	53,357	6,677	4,262	10,939	14,612	1,718	80,626
West Bank	88	10,005	10,406	20,411	3,137	2,445	5,582	14,800	2,648	43,441
Gaza	101	20,275	18,076	38,351	7,853	7,398	15,251	8,038	—	61,640
Lebanon	58	11,989	10,437	22,426	3,863	2,183	6,046	1,192	8,299	37,963
Syria	85	11,637	9,451	21,088	4,515	2,956	7,471	9,848	1,325	39,732
Total	466	82,649	72,984	155,633	26,045	19,244	45,289	48,490	13,990	263,402

UNRWA-UNESCO VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION ENROLMENT, 1968-1969 SCHOOL YEAR

[illegible]

TABLE 17 (continued)

UNRWA-UNESCO VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION ENROLMENT, 1968-1969 SCHOOL YEAR

	East Jordan		West Bank		Lebanon		Syria		Gaza	
	Vocational Training Centre Wadi Seer	Vocational Training Centre Kalandia	Women's Training Centre Ramallah	Vocational Training Centre Siblin	Technical and Teacher Training Institute Siblin	Vocational Training Centre Damascus	Vocational Training Centre Gaza	Grand total		
<i>Trades and professions</i>										
<i>D. Technicians</i>										
Land surveyor ^a	—	25	—	—	—	—	—	25		
Quantity surveyor	—	25	—	—	—	—	—	25		
Construction technician	—	26	—	—	—	23	—	49		
Architectural draughtsman	—	26	—	—	—	20	—	46		
Foreman instructor ^a	—	—	—	—	17	—	—	17		
Engineering draughtsman	22	—	—	—	—	—	—	22		
<i>E. Commercial</i>										
Business and office practice (men)	47	93	—	98	—	—	—	238		
Secretaries (women)	—	—	84	—	—	—	—	84		
<i>F. Para-medical</i>										
Assistant pharmacist	—	—	—	—	—	45	—	45		
Laboratory technician ^a	—	—	—	—	—	13	—	13		
Public health inspector	—	—	—	—	11	—	—	11		
<i>G. Vocational courses for girls</i>										
(other than commercial)										
Home and institutional management	—	—	35	—	—	—	—	35		
Infant leader	—	—	44	—	—	—	—	44		
Dressmaking	—	—	64	—	—	—	—	64		
Clothing production	—	—	32	—	—	—	—	32		
Hairdressing	—	—	35	—	—	—	—	35		
Total	329	382	294	356	54	368	510	2,293		
GRAND TOTAL 1,999 Men 294 Women										

^a Courses of one year's duration.

OTHER ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

TABLE 18

VOLUNTARY AGENCIES HAVING OPERATIONAL PROGRAMMES FOR DIRECT ASSISTANCE
TO UNRWA-REGISTERED REFUGEES, 1968-1969

American Friends Service Committee

Baptists Mission (United States)

CARITAS

Catholic Relief Services

Commonwealth Save the Children Fund

Co-operative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)

Lutheran World Federation

Mennonite Central Committee

Near East Council of Churches — World Council of Churches

Pontifical Mission for Palestine

Women's Auxiliary of UNRWA

World Alliance of YMCAs

Young Men's Christian Association

Young Women's Christian Association

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENDITURE AND WORKING CAPITAL

TABLE 19

1 May 1950 - 31 December 1969^a
(In US dollars)

	Income		Total income	Expenditure	Adjustments to working capital ^b increases (decreases)	Balance of working capital (operating reserve)
	Pledges from Governments	Other income				
1 May 1950 to 30 June 1951	39,477,281	1,346,325	40,823,606	33,598,972 ^c	—	7,224,634
1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952	67,686,495	1,018,785	68,705,280	28,573,058	215,792	47,572,648
1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953	26,867,673	440,419	27,308,092	26,778,934	518,220	48,620,026
1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954	22,684,330	575,024	23,259,354	29,192,012	(157,264)	42,530,104
1 July 1954 to 30 June 1955	23,673,500	594,161	24,267,661	29,222,705	(114,217)	37,460,843
1 July 1955 to 30 June 1956	23,385,026	571,866	23,956,892	32,198,550	(164,814)	29,054,371
1 July 1956 to 30 June 1957	42,378,773	1,072,872	43,451,645	52,464,139	198,575	20,240,452
1 January to 31 December 1958	32,555,876	1,104,793	33,660,669	32,777,564	36,519	21,160,076
1 January to 31 December 1959	32,625,400	1,405,205	34,030,605	35,015,817	110,688	20,285,552
1 January to 31 December 1960	33,828,887	2,629,135	36,458,022	34,674,460	150,084	22,219,198
1 January to 31 December 1961	34,386,052	2,306,293	36,692,345	39,051,521	194,943	20,054,965
1 January to 31 December 1962	34,308,775	1,346,239	35,655,014	35,688,844	615,154	20,636,289
1 January to 31 December 1963	34,444,063	1,251,994	35,696,057	36,207,078	448,589	20,573,857
1 January to 31 December 1964	33,963,601	1,198,130	35,161,731	37,192,861	(922,665)	17,620,062
1 January to 31 December 1965	34,000,353	1,134,525	35,134,878	37,618,472	155,708	15,292,176
1 January to 31 December 1966	34,969,322	1,358,729	36,328,051	37,498,420	152,209	14,274,016
1 January to 31 December 1967	40,335,873	2,733,256	43,069,129	40,540,693	(115,529)	16,686,923
1 January to 31 December 1968	37,561,310	3,546,861	41,108,171	43,987,105	(156,048)	13,651,941
1 January to 31 December 1969 (estimated)	38,287,902	2,700,000	40,987,902	44,264,000	—	10,375,843
	667,420,492	28,334,612	695,755,104	686,545,205	1,165,944	

a/ The figures in this table are based on the Agency's audited accounts through 1968, modified to reflect, for each period, the income and expenditure (including commitments) applicable to the budget for that period, regardless of when the income was actually received or the expenditure actually incurred. This basis of reporting was first adopted in the Commissioner-General's report for 1961-1962 and a few minor changes have since had to be made in the figures contained in that report (see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/5214)*).

b/ These adjustments represent principally the liquidation in subsequent years of liabilities and commitments at less than amounts originally charged to expenditure account. Also included are adjustments arising from revaluation of inventory, recovery of assets previously charged to expenditure, and price variations on supplies not chargeable to a particular budget heading. These adjustments are shown separately because of the difficulty in identifying the specific prior year to which the adjustments pertain. The adjustments made in the period 1 January to 31 December 1964 and 1 January to 31 December 1967 also include transfers of \$1,761,792 and \$460,854 respectively to bring up the provisions for deferred staff costs to the level required by the Agency's revised social security arrangements. The adjustments made in the period 1 January to 31 December 1968 include a transfer to the Agency's reserve for unliquidated commitments of \$431,664 reflecting a commitment in 1968 for capital construction of a receipt of funds included in the income of the preceding financial year.

c/ Includes \$2,646,909 deficit of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees paid by UNRWA.

TABLE 20

DETAILED STATEMENT OF INCOME TO UNRWA, 1 MAY 1950 - 31 DECEMBER 1969^a
(in US dollars)

Contributor	For the period							Total income
	1 May 1950 to		Twelve months to					
	31 December 1964	31 December 1965	31 December 1966	31 December 1967	31 December 1968	31 December 1969 ^b		
	I. Pledges by Governments							
Abu Dhabi	—	—	—	20,927	40,000	40,000	100,927	
Argentina	—	—	—	—	2,000	2,000	4,000	
Australia	2,978,303	201,600	201,600	201,600	201,600	358,000	4,142,703	
Austria	21,950	10,000	10,000	29,350	10,000	15,000	96,300	
Bahrain	23,867	—	—	—	—	—	23,867	
Belgium	368,000	30,000	30,000	35,000	35,000	74,771	572,771	
Bolivia	5,000	—	—	—	—	—	5,000	
Brazil	25,000	—	—	—	—	—	25,000	
Burma	9,546	—	—	—	—	—	9,546	
Cambodia	7,141	—	—	—	—	—	7,141	
Canada	16,357,614	1,111,111	1,111,111	2,463,768	1,709,445	1,111,111	23,864,160	
Central African Republic	398	—	—	—	—	1,800	2,198	
Ceylon	4,400	1,000	1,000	3,000	800	800	11,000	
Chile	—	—	—	—	1,000	1,000	2,000	
China	3,279	—	10,000	20,000	30,000	30,000	93,279	
Congo (Democratic Republic of)	—	—	—	20,000	—	20,000	40,000	
Cuba	5,000	—	—	—	—	—	5,000	
Cyprus	1,402	280	280	560	240	240	3,002	
Denmark	671,630	114,733	209,348	496,986	691,333	566,000	2,750,030	
Dominican Republic	6,000	—	—	—	—	—	6,000	
El Salvador	500	—	—	—	—	—	500	
Ethiopia	35,500	—	—	—	—	—	35,500	
Federal Republic of Germany	2,632,076	503,145	500,000	752,800	2,149,263	1,710,000	8,247,284	
Finland	33,000	10,000	10,000	65,000	60,000	60,000	238,000	
France	12,008,682	213,238	229,778	1,258,137	1,128,457	1,093,000	15,931,292	

TABLE 20 (continued)

For the period

1 May 1950
to

Twelve months to

Contributor	31 December 1964	31 December 1965	31 December 1966	31 December 1967	31 December 1968	31 December 1969 ^b	Total income
I. Pledges by Governments (continued)							
Gambia	30	—	—	—	—	—	30
Gaza authorities	721,569	155,302	167,437	155,547	107,152	93,737	1,400,744
Ghana	18,000	3,000	3,000	6,000	3,000	3,000	36,000
Greece	245,017	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	320,017
Haiti	6,000	—	—	—	—	—	6,000
Honduras	2,500	—	—	—	—	—	2,500
Holy See	19,965	1,000	2,500	28,500	12,500	12,500	76,965
Iceland	—	—	—	12,000	—	—	12,000
India	311,526	21,008	13,333	13,333	13,333	13,333	385,866
Indonesia	240,000	—	—	—	—	—	240,000
Iran	49,153	6,000	—	12,695	7,120	6,000	80,968
Iraq	2,000	—	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	402,000
Ireland	83,876	25,000	25,000	65,000	40,000	50,000	288,876
Israel	256,547	—	—	683,911	591,629	905,073	2,437,160
Italy	661,326	160,000	160,000	240,100	160,870	160,000	1,542,296
Jamaica	—	560	560	3,000	—	3,250	7,370
Japan	132,500	30,000	30,000	140,000	40,000	50,000	422,500
Jordan	1,441,922	105,320	173,819	163,737	146,477	163,899	2,195,174
Kuwait	822,860	220,000	220,000	220,000	220,000	220,000	1,922,860
Laos	4,687	—	—	—	—	—	4,687
Lebanon	612,710	33,495	37,231	51,839	43,253	49,988	828,516
Liberia	26,500	—	—	3,000	—	5,500	35,000
Libya	44,000	20,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	464,000
Luxembourg	31,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	46,000
Malawi	—	140	140	—	—	—	280
Malaysia	26,238	1,500	1,500	11,500	1,500	1,500	43,738
Malta	—	—	—	5,000	—	—	5,000
Mexico	115,691	—	—	—	20,000	—	135,691
Monaco	6,053	204	204	204	204	204	7,073

Morocco	119,326	19,763	20,000	25,000	25,000	40,000	249,089
Netherlands	766,782	166,228	140,625	115,518	110,193	110,193	1,409,539
New Zealand	2,016,000	140,000	140,000	84,000	67,200	67,200	2,514,400
Niger	—	—	510	510	2,500	2,500	6,020
Nigeria	10,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	35,000
Norway	648,569	70,000	77,000	293,497	91,000	111,810	1,291,876
Pakistan	541,506	20,964	31,446	20,964	20,969	20,968	656,817
Philippines	12,500	1,250	1,250	1,250	1,250	1,250	18,750
Qatar	62,728	—	10,000	10,000	10,000	12,000	104,728
Republic of Korea	6,500	—	—	—	—	—	6,500
Republic of Viet-Nam	21,000	—	—	3,000	—	3,000	27,000
Rhodesia and Nyasaland	39,200	—	—	—	—	—	39,200
Saudi Arabia	1,618,413	297,778	594,778 ^e	297,778	297,778	297,778	3,404,303
Singapore	—	—	—	1,000	1,000	1,000	3,000
Spain	50,000	—	—	166,481	—	706,071	922,552
Sudan	153,940	—	—	—	—	—	153,940
Sweden	1,671,205	447,445	2,354,641	2,200,773	2,222,369	2,200,000	11,096,433
Switzerland	720,374	268,612	297,791	254,630	196,760	845,454	2,583,621
Syria	1,255,256	88,965	91,480	93,726	88,770	87,972	1,706,169
Thailand	4,125	—	—	6,800	—	—	10,925
Trinidad and Tobago	—	—	—	1,000	1,500	2,000	4,500
Tunisia	14,000	4,000	5,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	35,000
Turkey	59,759	8,000	8,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	105,759
United Arab Republic	4,850,607	246,712	255,960	120,452	1,845	—	5,475,576
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	85,124,004	5,400,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	4,500,000	4,500,000	109,524,004
United States of America	340,668,069	23,800,000	22,550,000	24,200,000	22,200,000	22,200,000	455,618,069
Uruguay	5,000	—	—	—	—	—	5,000
Yugoslavia	508,700	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	608,700
Sundry Governments through World Refugee Year Stamp Plan	238,211	—	—	—	—	—	238,211

TOTAL GOVERNMENT

482,265,732 34,000,353 34,969,322 40,335,873^a 37,561,310^d 38,287,902 667,420,492

PLEDGES

TABLE 20 (continued)

Contributor	For the period						
	1 May 1950 to		Twelve months to				Total income
	31 December 1964	31 December 1965	31 December 1966	31 December 1967	31 December 1968	31 December 1969	
II. Contributions from others							
UNESCO	1,997,121	279,294	332,215	343,221	349,376	345,000	3,646,227
WHO	546,753	51,303	51,402	60,878	65,185	65,000	840,521
Sundry donors	5,695,953	485,453	438,770	1,944,709	2,256,992	1,590,000	12,411,877
TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS							
FROM OTHERS	8,239,827	816,050	822,387	2,348,808 ^d	2,671,553 ^a	2,000,000	16,898,625
III. Miscellaneous income and exchange adjustments							
	8,621,414	318,475	536,342	384,448	875,308	700,000	11,435,987
TOTAL INCOME	499,126,973	35,134,878	36,328,051	43,069,129	41,108,171	40,987,902	695,755,104

a/ The figures in this table through 1968 are based upon the Agency's audited financial statements, modified to show for each year the government pledges applicable to that year, regardless of when payment was actually made.

b/ The figures for 1969 are estimated.

c/ Includes a late contribution of \$ 297,000 for 1964.

d/ Includes special contributions for the emergency situation arising from the hostilities of June 1967 as follows:
 from Governments \$ 5,841,465 (in 1967) and \$ 1,327,836 (in 1968);
 from others \$ 1,309,928 (in 1967) and \$ 1,454,136 (in 1968).

TABLE 21
STATEMENT OF INCOME FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
1 JANUARY 1968 TO 30 JUNE 1969
(in US dollars)

<i>Name of contributor</i>	<i>Year 1968</i>	<i>First six months of 1969</i>
<i>Australia</i>		
Australians Care for Refugees	111,555	—
J. Kitchen and Sons PTY Ltd.	1,096	—
United Nations Association of Australia	69	—
United Nations Association of Australia — Victorian Division	502	—
<i>Austria</i>		
Caritas	—	1,925
<i>Belgium</i>		
Caritas Catholica	320	—
Comité belge pour les réfugiés	70,000	—
L'Association culturelle belge-libanaise	—	343
Manta S.A. Belgium	3,480	—
<i>Canada</i>		
Arab Refugee Emergency Appeal, Windsor	122	124
Baird, Dr. R.P.	460	462
Canadian Red Cross Youth Members of Quebec	—	463
Canadian Save the Children Fund	4,653	—
Finnemore, Mrs. C.	91	—
OXFAM	1,516	—
Personnel of the Canadian Forces Medical Centre	185	—
Point Grey Secondary School, Vancouver	170	—
United Church of Canada	6,406	—
Unitarian Service Committee of Canada	3,472	4,356
Sundry donors	44	22
<i>Denmark</i>		
Danish Refugee Council	4,670	—
<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>		
Bayerische Vereinsbank	1,000	—
Caritas	3,080	—
Daimler-Benz Company, Stuttgart	1,000	—
Deutsche Bank, AG	1,000	—
Diakonisches Werk	621,305	25,653
Flüchtlingsaktion 66	62,975	—
Kraukenhagen, Gerndt	—	75
MISEREOR	116,736	10,004
Near East Representatives of German Banks	750	—
Spehl, Helmut	248	149
Sundry donors	43	3

TABLE 21 (continued)

<i>Name of contributor</i>	<i>Year 1968</i>	<i>First six months of 1969</i>
<i>Finland</i>		
Finnish Refugee Council	13,800	—
Sipila, Mrs. Helvi	1,000	—
<i>France</i>		
Association de Solidarité Franco-Arabe	795	—
Bouges, Miss Bernadette	—	122
El Mallawany, I.	464	46
French Red Cross	15,959	—
Guy, Edmond	93	—
Sundry donors	240	—
<i>Gaza</i>		
Abu Abdallah family	71	31
Abu Ayyad family	26	12
Abu Ayyad and Awada families	51	22
Abu Khusa family	23	10
Abu Middain family	1,406	620
Abu Omar family and Khalil Khalil	26	12
Abu Salim family	345	152
Abu Salah Nasr	20	9
Abu Sha'b family	311	137
Abu Uriban family	66	29
Abu Uriban and Abu Middain families	34	15
Awada family	1,103	486
Awada and Abu Middain families	226	100
Daghma family	78	34
El Mussaddar family	198	87
Gaza Municipality	39	17
Mussaddar and Qur'an families	263	116
Saleh Ali Barbakh	32	14
Tarazi family	81	36
Waqf Department	4,637	2,046
<i>Iceland</i>		
Women's Club of Neschurch (Reykjavik)	100	100
<i>Iran</i>		
Sundry donors	—	12
<i>Ireland</i>		
Sundry donors	—	24
<i>Italy</i>		
Immacolata, Mrs. Salviaki	480	—
<i>Jamaica</i>		
United Nations Association of Jamaica	136	—

TABLE 21 (continued)

<i>Name of contributor</i>	<i>Year 1968</i>	<i>First six months of 1969</i>
<i>Jordan</i>		
Municipal Council, Qalqilia	616	308
Tibawi, Dr. A.L.	—	120
The Jordan Red Crescent	281	—
Voluntary Agencies Joint Venture		
American Friends Service Committee	1,039	—
Friends Service Council (London)	1,245	—
Lutheran World Federation	15,557	—
Menonite Central Committee	15,557	—
World Council of Churches/Near East Council of Churches	15,557	—
Anonymous	704	—
Sundry donors	53	—
<i>Lebanon</i>		
American Mission	1,019	496
Foreign airlines	160	—
Greek Orthodox Community	641	312
Hortaman, John F.	—	50
Heirs of Saaddine Shatila	1,282	624
Kassab, Miss Norma	64	—
Merck, Sharp, Dohme and Grosst	101	—
Middle East education consultant	—	28
Mneimneh and Bohsaly	1,442	702
Rowland, Victor	—	70
Singer Company	450	—
Syrian Lebanese Mission	1,923	936
Anonymous	1,234	493
<i>Luxembourg</i>		
Biermann, P.	500	—
Anonymous	2,000	—
<i>Malaysia</i>		
Masged Negara	—	412
<i>Monaco</i>		
Girl Guides of Monaco	500	—
<i>Netherlands</i>		
Aid to Palestine Refugees Foundation	3,000	—
Philips Company	77	—
Weve, Dr. H.J.M. Stitching Foundation	—	300
Sundry donors	18	—
<i>New Zealand</i>		
Council of Organizations for Relief Services Overseas Inc. (CORSO)	19,553	—
United Nations Association of New Zealand, South Canterbury Branch	130	400
Sundry donors	11	—

TABLE 21 (continued)

<i>Name of contributor</i>	<i>Year 1968</i>	<i>First six months of 1969</i>
<i>Norway</i>		
Korksnes, Arthur	141	—
Norwegian Red Cross	129	—
Norwegian Refugee Council	71,417	503
Save the Children Fund (Redd Barna)	420	700
<i>Portugal</i>		
Gulbenkian Foundation	10,000	20,000
<i>Sweden</i>		
Broden, Miss Eva	58	—
Eriksson, Bengt	500	—
Graduation Class Statens Sjukskjoterskaskela	105	—
Johnson, Erland	240	—
Swedish Committee for Palestine Refugees	128	43
Swedish Organization for Individual Relief	393	—
Swedish Save the Children Federation	47,187	132,348
Sundry donors	10	53
<i>Switzerland</i>		
Desaules, R.	—	46
Hoffmann La Roche	2,000	1,125
Krbec, Miss Eva Marie	185	93
Swiss Association for International Civil Service	602	—
Swiss Pastors	278	167
Anonymous	46	—
Sundry donors	7	2
<i>Syria</i>		
Syrian local authorities	2,019	2,024
<i>United Arab Republic</i>		
Sundry donors	—	46
<i>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</i>		
Androssan Churches' Group, Scotland	—	335
Beydoun, Dr. Riad R.	64	—
Collegiate School for Girls, Blackpool	499	—
Cornmarket Press Ltd.	587	—
Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding	—	500
Golcher, W.E.	72	—
Iraq Petroleum Co., Ltd.	18,864	—
OXFAM	555,337	149,556
Petts Wood Methodist Church	432	—
Rogers, Miss M.	432	432

TABLE 21 (continued)

<i>Name of contributor</i>	<i>Year 1968</i>	<i>First six months of 1969</i>
<i>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (continued)</i>		
Standing Conference of British Organizations for Aid to Refugees, including:		
Astor Bursary Fund	912	—
Middle East Relief Fund	1,864	—
Help the Aged	}	142,134
Catholic Women's League		
Friends Service Council		
War on Want		
United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland		
OXFAM	—	
United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	543	24
War on Want	15,284	—
Anonymous	1,200	—
Sundry donors	106	67
<i>United States of America</i>		
Abdallah Salih	100	—
American Friends of a Turkish Palestine	50	—
American Friends of the Middle East Inc.	500	—
American Middle East Rehabilitation Inc. (AMER)	15,844	23,800
American Friends Committee	340	2,143
American Women's Club of Lebanon	481	—
Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO)	148,310	—
Arab Club, Monterey	169	—
Cafarelli, John	75	—
Chesler, Mark A.	50	—
Co-operative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)	18,608	—
Dutton, Miss Patricia A.	15	—
Elwert, Miss Margout M.	50	—
First Congregational Church of San Francisco	—	500
First Parish in Lincoln	467	—
Friends Service Council	1,204	—
Garth, William le Roy Estate	283	—
German-American Society of Chicago	50	—
Graduate Students for Refugee Relief	1,400	—
Greater Seattle Committee to Aid Arab Refugees	100	—
Guidance Associates of Pleasantville	50	—
Hess, Mrs. Gertrude C.	50	50
Hurlimann-Mader, Mrs. Marianne	—	1,000
Isfahani, Manouchehr Safa	100	—
Manasse, Mrs. Anne Marie	130	—
Mennonite Central Committee	13,234	—
Miami University, Oxford, Ohio	500	—
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, Ltd.	180	—
Mukwonago Union High School	274	—

TABLE 21 (continued)

<i>Name of contributor</i>	<i>Year 1968</i>	<i>First six months of 1969</i>
<i>United States of America (continued)</i>		
NAJDA — American Women for the Middle East	500	—
National Cash Register Company	—	6,000
Ottinger Foundation	1,000	—
Pal-Aid International of Chicago	6,034	13
Piercy, G. through ANERA	—	500
Post, Miss Elizabeth M.	100	—
Righter, Thomas	—	190
R.J. Reynolds Food, Inc.	1,936	—
Scarsdale-Hartsdale Chapter of the United Nations Association of the U.S.A., Inc.	100	125
Schwitters, A.M.	—	100
Selby, Poorpete S.S.A.	51	—
Shindy, Dr. Wajeeh	100	—
Stephen College, Columbia, Missouri	750	—
The Holy Land Centre, Inc.	2,204	—
Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.	450	800
United Nations Council of Greenwich, Connecticut	300	—
United States Committee for Refugees, Inc.	300	—
U.S. Omen	231	250
United States Peoples Fund for the United Nations Inc.	—	612
Anonymous	50	150
Sundry donors	740	148
<i>International Organizations</i>		
Caritas International	1,051	—
Caritas Jordan	3,390	—
Catholic Relief Services	5,662	—
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions	3,000	—
International Centre for Advanced Technical Vocational Training (ILO), Turin	12,859	—
International Federation of Business and Professional Women		
XIth Congress	1,030	—
Central Committee	5,537	2,024
Australia	1,008	—
Canada	6,027	3,588
Denmark	—	24
Japan	200	—
New Zealand	499	499
Norway	—	492
Sweden	199	319
Switzerland	502	—
United Kingdom	1,498	1,072
United States of America	500	—

TABLE 21 (continued)

<i>Name of contributor</i>	<i>Year 1968</i>	<i>First six months of 1969</i>
<i>International Organizations (continued)</i>		
Lutheran World Federation	24,659	5,609
Swiss and German Caritas	—	19,676
United Nations New York	4,048	—
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	349,376	181,308
Women's Auxiliary of UNRWA	3,173	4,525
World Council of Churches/Near East Council of Churches	74,639	92
World Health Organization (WHO)	65,185	40,704
Zonta International	14,000	14,220
Anonymous	—	462
Sundry donors	225	22
	2,671,553	814,334

TABLE 22
DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS TO REFUGEES^{a, b} FOR THE YEAR ENDED 30 JUNE 1969
(in US dollars)

<i>Governments</i>	<i>Education services</i>	<i>Social welfare services</i>	<i>Medical services</i>	<i>Housing</i>	<i>Security services</i>	<i>Miscellaneous services</i>	<i>Administrative costs</i>	<i>Totals</i>
Israel	1,057,714	80,000	1,072,857	—	314,283	—	334,285	2,859,139
Jordan	1,283,380	270,200	335,955	370,785	1,103,738	—	87,052	3,451,110
Lebanon	43,750	9,375	14,063	550,000	135,937	13,844	79,906	846,875
Syria	857,764	200,841	80,530	1,160,478	36,057	111,965	293,270	2,740,905
United Arab Republic	2,439,964	495,075	27,600	—	—	37,975	132,308	3,132,922

a/ In addition to the foregoing contributions direct to the refugees, all Governments listed also made contributions to UNRWA for the latter's budget. These contributions are reported in the Agency's own accounts and are set out in tables 19 and 20.

b/ All data shown are based upon information provided by the Governments concerned, and are expressed in dollars computed by applying the Agency's accounting rates of exchange, which are based on official or free market rates as appropriate.

UNRWA PERSONNEL

TABLE 23

STAFF EMPLOYED BY UNRWA AT 30 JUNE 1968 AND AT 30 JUNE 1969 a,b

	<i>Locally recruited staff</i> ^c	<i>UNRWA</i>	<i>International staff</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>Grand total</i>
			<i>Seconded and loaned from other United Nations organs</i>				
			<i>Non-</i>				
			<i>Reimbursable</i>	<i>Reimbursable</i>			
31 December 1967 ^b	11,750	70	5	22	97	11,847	
30 June 1968	11,855	72	5	23	100	11,955	
30 June 1969	12,901	77	7	26	110	13,011	

a/ In previous reports, the figures shown in this table were based on the calendar year. To make this table more in keeping with the period covered by the report, the basis has been shifted from 31 December to 30 June. At the same time, the figures as of 31 December 1967 have been shown as well, as a transitional measure.

b/ All figures now include staff recruited on temporary or short-term appointments against manning-table posts. In previous reports, such staff were omitted, and the figures for 31 December 1967 accordingly have been adjusted from those which appeared in the previous report.

c/ Virtually all locally recruited staff are Palestine refugees.

PART II

The Palestine Problem before the General Assembly General Debate in the General Assembly Selected Speeches

222

Address by the Brazilian Foreign Minister de Magalhaes Pinto, before the General Assembly.¹ (Excerpt)

September 18, 1969

Formerly, the argument went that the United Nations, while in a position to play a part in solving conflicts between small nations, could not interfere effectively in conflicts involving any of the major Powers. Now the theory seems to have been polished up so as to extend it to conflicts between small countries as well since, it would seem, such conflicts always involve the interests of the major Powers. Actually, it is an extremely dangerous delusion to attempt to draw a sharp dividing line between "big conflicts" and "small conflicts". In a world continually drawn between the opposing forces of poliocentrism and bipolarization, the so-called small conflicts tend to insert themselves into the context of larger and more complex ones affecting the whole international community. The Brazilian delegation called the attention of the Security Council to this point when we emphasized some time ago in that forum that the problem of the Middle East, difficult enough to settle on its own terms, could become downright impossible to solve if allowed to move in the direction it is even now taking, of becoming one more chapter in the long history of confrontation between the great Powers.

223

Address by the U.S. President Nixon before the General Assembly.² (Excerpts)

September 18, 1969

Already, as you know, we have had extensive consultations with the Soviet Union as well as with others about the Middle East, where events of the past few days point up anew the urgency of a stable peace.

The United States continues to believe that the United Nations cease-fire resolutions define the minimal conditions that must prevail on the ground if settlement is to be achieved in the Middle East. We believe the Security Council resolution of November 1967 charts the way to that settlement. A peace, to be lasting, must leave no seeds of a future war. It must rest on a settlement which both sides have a vested interest in maintaining.

We seek a settlement based on respect for the sovereign right of each nation in the area to exist within secure and recognized boundaries. We are convinced that peace cannot be achieved on the basis of substantial alterations in the map of the Middle East. We are equally convinced that peace cannot be achieved on the basis of anything less than a binding, irrevocable commitment by the parties to live together in peace.

Failing a settlement, an agreement on the limitation of the shipment of arms to the Middle East might help to stabilize the situation. We have indicated to the Soviet Union, without result, our willingness to enter such discussions.

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1755 (prov.), p. 7.

² U.N. doc. A/PV. 1755 (prov.), p. 23.

224

**Address by the Japanese Foreign Minister
Aichi before the General Assembly.¹****(Excerpts)****September 19, 1969**

Active consultations and discussions are now in progress inside and outside the United Nations with respect to the Middle East questions; but in spite of these consultations, to our deep regret, armed conflicts persist in the troubled area. Japan sincerely hopes that solution of this very difficult question will be brought about through the further efforts of all the interested parties and particularly of the major Powers in line with the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

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225

**Address by the U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister
Gromyko before the General Assembly.²****(Excerpts)****September 19, 1969**

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It is impossible to qualify otherwise than as a direct challenge to the United Nations and to all peoples Israel's obstruction of any steps towards a political settlement in the Middle East. What are the Israeli leaders waiting for, what are they hoping to get in setting out to annex the territories of the Arab States, seized two years ago, in staging continuous new military provocations against those States and acting contrary to the well-known Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 which has been recognized by all States, except Israel, as a realistic basis for a settlement?

The representatives of Israel often issue statements, some of them at the United Nations, to the effect that they would like to see a lasting peace in the Middle East and an end to the conflict with the Arab States. Why then does Israel refuse to meet the major and indispensable condition for peace in the area — and that is to

withdraw its troops from occupied Arab territories that have never belonged to Israel? References to the effect that Israel is seeking recognition of its right to independent national existence are groundless. The decision of the Security Council — and this is a commonly known fact — does stipulate, along with the demand for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories, the recognition and guarantee of that right for all the States in the Middle East, including Israel. And there is no vagueness or ambiguity about that.

There is every indication that the leaders in Tel Aviv want to move towards further complications in the Middle East, not peace. This results in a situation fraught with the danger of a new flare-up. The danger involved in this development is self-evident. How things go depends in no small measure on all of us: will Israel and certain quarters in other countries that support it heed the interests of international security or is recklessness, not reason, to prevail in the Middle East?

A political settlement in the Middle East that is fair to all the States in the area must be reached, and this is in the interests of all countries and peoples. The Soviet Union, together with many States, resolutely advocates such a settlement. It pursues that line also within the framework of the international effort that has been made in recent months to give effect to the resolution of the Security Council, including the consultations between representatives of the four Powers, permanent members of the Council. We have submitted specific proposals for consideration by the participants in the exchange of views.

The United States side has referred to the question of limiting arms supplies to the Middle East as a measure designed to stabilize the situation. As the Soviet Government has already stated to the Government of the United States, a discussion of that question cannot serve any useful purpose as long as the Israeli troops occupy the territories of Arab countries.

The attainment of a political settlement in the Middle East would, obviously, considerably promote the strengthening of peace, and it would be in line with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

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¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1756 (prov.), p. 12.² U.N. doc. A/PV. 1756 (prov.), pp. 43-46.

226

**Address by the Swedish Foreign Minister
Nilsson before the General Assembly.¹****(Excerpts)****September 19, 1969**

It is deeply regrettable that it has not yet been possible to carry out the decision on the crisis in the Middle East, which the Security Council took in its resolution of 22 November 1967. The peoples in the area continue to live in a condition of political tension, military actions and counter-actions, entailing the risk of serious repercussions also outside the area. This is possibly the risk which has made the four great Powers conduct negotiations on a method to carry out the decision of the Security Council and in this way to facilitate the task of the special representative of the Secretary-General. The day the four great Powers will reach agreement on such a method, the parties must take it fully into account. The efforts of the four Powers deserve our support.

227

**Address by the British Foreign Minister
Stewart before the General Assembly.²****(Excerpts)****September 19, 1969**

I turn now to another and even more urgent problem, that of the Middle East. Since we all discussed it a year ago, there has been much diplomatic activity and unhappily little progress. And meanwhile there has been continuing violence. The cease-fire has in fact broken down. There have been many acts of violence in which hundreds of lives have been lost and thousands of lives have been disrupted and distorted. All this violence makes future settlement even more difficult to obtain. Yet a comprehensive political settlement is essential.

Let me say something about the method, the form and the content of a settlement. As to

method, we had hoped that the patient work of Mr. Jarring would succeed. Certainly through no fault of his, it has not brought success. So when early in this year it was proposed that the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom should meet, we gladly accepted that proposal. Since then, there have been discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Now the view of my Government is that we should not be dogmatic as to the method of settlement. Consultations of four Powers or of two Powers, the work, in co-operation with them of Mr. Jarring, may all be helpful — and if at any stage with the help of Mr. Jarring the parties to the dispute could get into discussion, so much the better. In our view nobody ought to say, "We rule out any particular method", and nobody ought to say, "We insist on one method and one method alone". If at any time one method proves impossible, we must all be prepared to try others.

Next, as to the form of the settlement: This must place inescapable obligations on all the parties to live at peace with each other and to respect each other's frontiers, and to these obligations all parties must be manifestly and irrevocably committed.

Third, the content of a settlement: here again, we must remember the importance of respecting Security Council resolutions. The content of the settlement must put into effect all the provisions of the important resolution passed in November 1967 — withdrawal, just and lasting peace, and indeed everything in that resolution. The problem has been to fashion from that resolution a workable package, or programme or list of parallel actions to be performed by the parties — use whatever term you please — which would ensure that all the provisions of the resolution would be carried out. Now surely respect for the resolution means this: That when anyone, any nation, is attempting to frame such a package he must say to himself, "I will not reject any particular proposal merely because I think it would be distasteful to any party to the dispute to whom I may be favourably disposed. I will rather ask myself about any proposal these questions: 'Is it fair, is it workable, will it be durable, is it in conformity with the Security Council resolution?' " This is the spirit in which anyone who attempts to play any part in

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1757 (prov.), pp. 4-5.

² U.N. doc. A/PV. 1759 (prov.), pp. 37-40.

solving the problem must urgently approach his task. And the parties concerned must realize that this is so; they must not expect any nation whether in four-Power or two-Power talks, or any other forum, to act merely as an advocate. They must act more constructively than that.

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228

Address by the French Foreign Minister Schuman before the General Assembly.¹
(Excerpts)

September 24, 1969

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However, it is in the Middle East especially that the establishment of a just and lasting peace, taking account of the legitimate interests of all the parties, would appear beyond our reach if we were not determined to overcome sadness and apprehension. France's policy there, as elsewhere, finds its inspiration in the principles that my predecessors have already evoked from this rostrum: the right of peoples to self-determination; respect for international law; the equilibrium of forces and the maintenance or restoration of peace. The strict application of these principles constitutes the only means of ending the growing deterioration of the situation which prevails in that region.

Nearly two years have elapsed since the adoption of the resolution of 22 November 1967, which is our law. My Government, drawing the lesson from events which have shown that only concerted international action would allow the formulation and implementation of a satisfactory solution, proposed last January that the four permanent members of the Security Council — taking into account their special responsibilities — should meet in order to study the means of facilitating the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and should examine at the same time the measures necessary to avoid a worsening of the situation. As that proposal was accepted by our three partners, it became possible to examine in detail the different

aspects of the conflict and the possibilities for settlement consistent with the spirit of the Charter and the resolutions adopted by the United Nations.

I thank the Secretary-General for having allowed, through a successful and recent initiative, the four to resume their task, which must now be pursued unrelentingly. To thwart or to contest it would be to assume the heavy responsibility of impeding the application of the only method that can lead to a general, equitable and lasting settlement in the respect of "the inalienable right to existence as independent and sovereign States" of all the States of the Middle East, according to the very words of our joint communiqué of last Saturday, 20 September. Need I add that this settlement will have to include measures of an international nature making it possible to ensure the preservation and the protection of all the holy places as well as free access to them by all? Mankind is awaiting this necessary symbol of the start of a new era of reconciliation and co-operation.

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229

Address by the Argentinian Foreign Minister Martin before the General Assembly.²
(Excerpts)

September 25, 1969

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Argentina continues to follow with deep concern the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East where present tensions can at any moment unleash a war of greater and more irreparable consequences. This disquieting process, with the successive crises, affects the authority of the United Nations and particularly that of the Security Council.

We are not unaware of the complexity of the problem: we know what sequels of the past and passions of the present weigh upon the populations concerned and their leaders. We are, however, convinced that nothing can be gained unless the facts are faced; we are absolutely convinced

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1763 (prov.), pp. 31-32.

² U.N. doc. A/PV. 1765 (prov.), p. 17.

that only a true act of political determination can open prospects of peace for the Middle East, and this act must be strict compliance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. Argentina, then a member of the Security Council, laboured hard and hopefully, first to achieve a cease-fire and then in the drafting of a resolution that might make feasible an elimination of the real and profound causes that had led to the conflict.

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Address by the Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel before the General Assembly.¹
(Excerpts)

September 25, 1969

The second area of political progress in which our Organization can and should better itself involves the Security Council and the role therein of the very great Powers. The example which I shall choose to illustrate my point in this regard is the dangerous continuing crisis in the Middle East.

I prefer to say nothing about all the acute and disappointing aspects of that conflict; too many incidents, already serious in themselves, are made dangerous because of the spirit they reveal and the obstacles they accumulate along the road to any political settlement.

For us, the only hope for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East lies in global negotiation, with the Security Council occupying a central position. Only this can bring the belligerents forward to peace.

In this connexion, the resolution of 22 November 1967 was indeed a remarkable and exceptional event, for in it the Security Council succeeded, unanimously, in laying down the general conditions for an equitable political solution. However, since that time nearly two years have passed, but the Security Council has not been able to work out a programme under which one of the belligerents, having taken a first step toward the

restoration of peace, would have the assurance that the other party would, in its turn, take a similar step, so that thus, stage by stage, all the goals set by the resolution of 1967 might be attained.

To this end, the four-Power negotiations suggested by France, and, more recently, the conversations between the United States and the Soviet Union, constitute, in our view, the only approach by which the Security Council will be able finally to propose to the belligerents the lines of a fair settlement.

The Security Council not only is in duty bound to prevent the spread of conflicts; it also bears the responsibility for eliminating their causes. Action by the permanent members in this regard is, in our opinion, the counterpart of the specific powers entrusted to them by our peoples.

At San Francisco we recognized their power, but we also asked them to put that power at the service of peace. If, therefore, we in the United Nations have agreed to unequal treatment as regards States, it was not for the purpose of dividing the world into spheres of influence, much less to enable certain States to practice a policy of hegemony with respect to territories beyond their borders.

What we all wanted and what we are banking on in the Middle East crisis and elsewhere is our hope that the very large States will propose to the non-permanent members of the Security Council and to the States parties to the crisis concrete terms for fundamental agreements that will restore peace to the areas devastated by war and political strife. This, we know, is something they can do; and furthermore, in our view, there is no other possibility, no alternative.

This is not to deny the specific responsibility of the belligerent States or of other Members of the United Nations. I wish merely to stress the fact that the responsibilities conferred on the Security Council by the membership as a whole of our Organization have their natural counterpart in the obligation to support the Council's action.

What we expect from the very great countries are those assertions of initiative, imagination, perseverance and authority without which we should become here a sort of Tower of Babel. Today, at the time when the three great States

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1765 (prov.), pp. 43-45.

have undertaken essential action, I wish to state that if that action fails, a fatal blow will be dealt to the United Nations, but that if it succeeds, the Middle East will not be alone in benefitting from it. Acting in the only possible direction, the direction indicated by the Charter of San Francisco, we shall be strengthening our Organization to a considerable degree.

I should not be frank if I did not say how disappointed I was to notice how seldom the statements of President Nixon and Mr. Gromyko coincided.

231

Address by the Congolese Foreign Minister Adoula before the General Assembly.¹
(Excerpts)

September 29, 1969

With respect to the Middle East, the Democratic Republic of the Congo endorses the considerations stated by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report. Indeed, in that part of the world the resurgence of violence and the increase in tension further remove any prospects of peace.

We encourage negotiations among the Four great Powers interested in the conflict in the Middle East to the extent that those negotiations might lead to a solution resulting in lasting peace between the belligerents. We nevertheless ask those great Powers to be honest with themselves and to stop encouraging the parties to the conflict through the supply of arms and ammunition.

The delegation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo firmly believes that an objective application of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 would inevitably lead to the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East.

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1770 (prov.), p. 27.

232

Address by the Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu before the General Assembly.²
(Excerpts)

October 2, 1969

In another area of the world, in the Middle East, a hotbed of conflict still persists, with grave implications for the peace of the entire world. Military incidents and the material destruction and loss of human life which they entail inflict great harm on the people in that region and can only serve the interests of the imperialist circles, which seek to stir up disputes and to heighten tension in order to maintain and consolidate their domination.³

The entire experience of international affairs in modern times confirms that any attempt to settle disputes by means of the policy of force cannot lead to viable solutions. It is only political means, in a spirit of justice and respect for the legitimate rights and interests of all the parties concerned, that can bring about a lasting settlement. In order to create a climate which may help to promote such solutions it is necessary to avoid any action that might increase tension and add to the gravity of the situation, making even more difficult the solution of problems in the Middle East.

Romania has consistently opposed military operations in the Middle East and it stubbornly believes in the need for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with the legitimate interests and rights of all the peoples living in that region. My country has consistently favoured a solution of the Middle East conflict in the spirit of the Security Council resolution of November 1967, which provides a reasonable basis for the settlement of the situation in that area. In line with that resolution, we believe it is necessary that Israel withdraw its forces without delay from the occupied territories and that it renounce any territorial claims. At the same time, we believe that the integrity of the frontiers and the security of all States in that part of the world

² U.N. doc. A/PV. 1775 (prov.), pp. 36-37.

³ Mr. Mojsov (Yugoslavia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

should be ensured and that the problem of the Palestinian refugees should be settled with due consideration for their legitimate interests and rights.

We would express our conviction that all the members of the international community are able to make a contribution towards a peaceful solution for the Middle East in the spirit of the principles and goals enshrined in the Charter. We believe that it is absolutely necessary to take into account the nefarious influence of the time factor on the opportunities that exist for settling conflicts and that courage and responsibility should be demonstrated in approaching existing problems and stepping up the efforts of all States, great and small, with the aim of establishing a just and lasting peace in that area.

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**Address by the Indian Foreign Minister
Dinesh Singh before the General Assembly.¹
(Excerpts)**

October 2, 1969

In West Asia, Israel continues to be in adverse possession of large areas of territory it over-ran by forces in June 1967. The human problem of large numbers of Arab refugees is an element in that tangled situation to which we must not and cannot close our eyes.

Almost two years ago, on 22 November 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967). The Security Council and its Permanent Members have a special responsibility to ensure the faithful implementation of the 22 November resolution.

The first thing should have been to get the aggression vacated so that the aggressor would not retain the fruit of aggression and use it as a bargaining counter. However, we are given to understand that, in the interest of mutual accommodation, a wider solution of the West Asian problem is being attempted. Even as such, there is no movement forward towards a peaceful solution, and the hostilities continue to flare up

from time to time, with even more dangerous^s consequences.

There is further an unfortunate attempt by some interested parties to give religious overtones to a problem which is essentially political. This could only play into the hands of those who wish to confuse the issues in West Asia and fan religious emotions, making the quest for an objective political settlement even more difficult.

My Government has welcomed the initiative of the Permanent Members of the Security Council to engage in negotiations amongst themselves on this question. We have no desire to prejudge or to prejudice the outcome of those efforts, especially as those efforts continue to be made, albeit at a leisurely pace. We feel, however, that the responsibility cannot be of the Permanent Members of the Security Council alone. All States Members of United Nations have a collective responsibility in all such matters.

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**Address by the Italian Foreign Minister
Moro before the General Assembly.²
(Excerpts)**

October 8, 1969

I am speaking firstly of the crises in the Middle East, a region which Italy, because of its geographical position, views with particular interest and concern. In that region we have been witnessing for over two years a steady intensification, in gravity and frequency, of incidents which unfortunately are increasingly taking on the aspect of open warfare.

We feel that this is the time and the place to make a fervent appeal to the parties to refrain from the use of violence and to all countries in the United Nations to act, willingly and effectively, according to their responsibilities and influence, to bring about a peaceful settlement. It is unthinkable, in our view, that a solution could be achieved by means of force; it can only come through a political initiative. We can, therefore, guarantee our support for the efforts that are being made by the permanent members of the Security Council

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1775 (prov.), p. 61.

² U.N. doc. A/PV. 1783 (prov.), pp. 19-22.

on the basis of the resolution of 22 November 1967 to clarify its dispositions and win the consensus of the parties and thus break the present deadlock. We could not conceive of any solution imposed from above upon sovereign countries which are understandably jealous of their independence. We feel that we should embark, without being discouraged by the complexity of the problems and difficulties involved, on a patient search for new formulas and means of contact that would enable the parties to arrive at substantial agreements.

To this end, the exploratory talks that are being conducted within the United Nations, the work that is being done by four permanent members of the Security Council, and the activities of Ambassador Jarring, could prove most valuable because it should be possible, through these channels, to remove the obstacles which are still preventing in the entire area a final settlement based on just, definite and secure boundaries recognized by all. It is generally agreed, we believe, that all States have the right to live in peace, with integrity and independence assured, including the State of Israel, which is a Member of the United Nations and maintains relations with a large number of other countries. The acknowledgement of this enhances the right to autonomy, independence and development of the States in the area of conflict.

The tragic events of the past few years, which have caused death, sorrow and waste of valuable efforts, lead us to make an impressive assessment of the points on which there is substantial agreement and to concentrate our attention on those disagreements which can and must be overcome. The just settlement which could thus be envisaged would make it possible to restore peace and remove the conditions and consequences resulting from the war and from a state of insecurity and uncertainty that has lasted for many years. In particular we cannot be insensitive to the unhappy plight of the many Palestine refugees who must be given back their faith in life and in international justice. The prolonged closure of the Suez Canal has to some extent altered the geography of the world and has made maritime communications between countries, which previously seemed relatively near, more time-consuming and costly. This is one further reason why an equitable and

enduring political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is so desirable.

For our part, we are ready to support any initiative taken in the United Nations to secure peace in the Middle Eastern region and to contribute to it, if we are requested to do so. But we should also like the other Powers to appreciate how necessary it is to halt the rising flow of arms in the area as a first step, pending a final plea in all conscience, as Italy has as a matter of consistent policy refrained from sending military supplies to any country involved in the conflict.

I should therefore like to express the wish and the hope that the Mediterranean area which, throughout the world's history has provided a basic channel of communication and a point of encounter for three continents and great civilizations, may become an area of peace, solidarity and progress and fulfil its special function for the benefit of mankind.

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Address by the Senegal Foreign Minister Gaye before the General Assembly.¹ (Excerpts)

October 8, 1969

I purposely left to the end a consideration of two complex situations which relate to mandates formerly exercised by the League of Nations. I refer to the situation in Namibia and — curiously — to the situation in the Middle East. Indeed, was not the latter situation virtually created immediately after the mandate over Palestine was cancelled? Is it not a result of the confrontation between Israel and the Arab States provoked by the partition of Palestine?

Of course, that analysis is facilitated by hindsight. But we must note that the course of events would have been different without the occupation of Arab Palestine. We must also note that the choice offered to the Palestinians between indemnification and repatriation, and the creation of UNRWA have never really reassured anyone.

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1784, (prov.), pp. 66-67.

However, twenty years after the vote on the resolution which gave birth to Israel, a resolution of the Security Council, of November 1967, has defined the bases for a settlement which could put an end to the Israel-Arab crisis. Those bases provide a framework which we must always recall: respect for the sovereignty of States and their territorial integrity; rejection, without any appeal, of annexation by force of the territory of one State by another; consequent withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the occupied Arab territories; a just solution of the Palestine problem; freedom of navigation on international waterways in the region.

The Arab States have bowed to the authority of the Security Council of the United Nations and we must ask Israel to respect international law. There is no other way to guarantee to all a just and durable peace.

The recent events in Jerusalem and the criminal arson of which we are all aware have brutally reminded the world that to safeguard and protect the Holy Places depends on respect for the status which thirteen centuries of history has conferred on the Holy City of Jerusalem.

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PART III

The Palestine Problem before the Special Political Committee

236

Statements by the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and by the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs.¹

December 2, 1969

Mr. Micheltore (Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East): The representative of Jordan yesterday, and in an earlier intervention, asked for additional information on several points.

One request, made on an earlier occasion, concerned the deportation, detention, arrest and conviction of UNRWA staff in the West Bank and Gaza. Information on this subject for the period 1 July 1968 to 30 June 1969 was provided in the Report (A/7614), paragraphs 7 and 8. The representative of Jordan asked for comparable information for the period subsequent to 30 June 1969. My latest information is that since that date, in the West Bank, three staff members (a teacher and two headteachers) were newly deported; five staff members were arrested and detained, making twelve under detention at present. In Gaza, twenty-five staff members were arrested and detained, seventeen of whom were subsequently released, one (an Egyptian nurse) having been convicted, sentenced, and later pardoned. This leaves twelve Gaza staff members still under detention.

The cases of deportation have all been taken up with the authorities of the Government of Israel and a reply is awaited. The Secretary-General's staff has been informed, and the office of the Legal Counsel is being consulted about what further steps should be taken and at what time.

With regard to arrests, the UNRWA field director takes up each case with the military government authorities as soon as the arrest is known, to ascertain the grounds for the arrest and to determine whether the alleged offense has any relation to the performance of official duties and consequently whether any question arises in connexion with the Convention on Privileges and Immunities. This question was raised in connexion with the Egyptian nurse in Gaza, by the UNRWA director in Gaza, and by the Agency's legal consultant in the proceedings of the Military Court. The office of the Legal Counsel in New York has been provided with all available information in this case and I understand that the Legal Counsel's consultations have not yet been concluded.

In other cases of arrests which do not appear to raise questions under the Convention of Privileges and Immunities, the Agency has the concern of a good employer for its staff, and is interested in having cases brought to trial quickly so that staff members may return to their duties. The UNRWA field directors personally also endeavour to visit staff members in Prison.

The Agency must also inquire whether there is evidence of actions by a staff member that would affect his employment by a United Nations agency. This, of course, applies in the case of arrests not only in the occupied areas, but in all of the areas in which the Agency operates. The only criteria to be applied here are those set forth in the staff regulations and rules.

The representative of Jordan also asked whether shelters in UNRWA camps or other Agency property had been destroyed or damaged. Some property, including shelters was destroyed or damaged during and immediately after the hostilities in 1967, and some subsequently. The Agency has reported this to the General Assembly in a special report distributed on 4 July 1967 (A/6723 Add.1, paragraph 3), and in its Report to the twenty-second session submitted on 15

¹ U.N. doc. A/SPC/135. These statements were made at the 680th meeting of the Special Political Committee in reply to the points raised by the Jordanian Permanent Delegate and contained in the Annual Report of the UNRWA Commissioner-General.

September 1967 (A/6713), especially paragraphs 28 and 29, in which the loss of property, equipment and supplies through destruction and looting was estimated at \$800,000. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Mr. Gussing) also included some comments on this matter which are mentioned in the Secretary-General's Report (A/6797), especially paragraphs 123 and following. The Agency referred to this also in its *Report for 1967-68* (A/7213) paragraph 15, and in the *Report for 1968-69* (A/7614) paragraphs 159 to 161. This latest report indicates the Agency's revised estimates of damage to and loss of Agency property at the time of the hostilities for which claims have been submitted to the Government of Israel (\$708,610) and for "battle damages" to the Agency's Jerusalem office (\$83,287) and nine of the Agency's schools in Gaza (amounting to \$12,498) for which claims have been submitted to the Governments of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic.

I believe that the Agency has not previously reported the number of shelters demolished. In Gaza, there were 228 shelters demolished during the June 1967 hostilities. In the period immediately following the hostilities 167 shelters were destroyed. Later in 1967 99 shelters or rooms in barrack type structures were demolished. From 1 January 1968 to mid-November 1969 an additional 46 shelters or barrack rooms were demolished. During the last half of November there have been further demolitions in Gaza on which my information is still incomplete, but they included one shelter in Beach camp said by the Israeli authorities to have contained 16 mines which could not be moved because they were booby-trapped. This explosion on 15 November also damaged three Agency schools in the vicinity. On 24 November six shelters in three different camps were demolished; on 25 November some barrack rooms (the exact number not yet reported) were blown up with possible damage to adjacent shelter; and on 27 November 15 rooms and three kitchens were destroyed with extensive damage to roof tiles in adjacent shelters. Protests were made by the UNRWA director in Gaza, to the Military authorities. In the West Bank, one shelter was destroyed in 1967, and 12 others since 1 January 1968.

The representative of Jordan asked about

casualties to UNRWA staff including a head teacher. I have been informed that a head teacher was accidentally killed on 25 November by a shot after a grenade incident in circumstances not connected with Agency service. Further details are expected but have not yet been received. Some other UNRWA employees have suffered injuries in the course of the past year, but I am unable to give the number at present.

The representative of Jordan referred to incidents in Rafah Camp in Gaza in June 1967. The Agency reported to the General Assembly on 4 July 1967 (A/6723 Add.1) that some shelter had been demolished after the fighting mainly at Jabaliya and Rafah, as reprisals for mining incidents; that burial arrangements were not satisfactory and could pose a health hazard; and that these and other matters had been taken up with the authorities. On 6 July 1967, Mr. Gussing was appointed as the Secretary-General's special representative, and UNRWA transmitted to him all information which had become available to it relating to his mission, including reports, whether or not corroborated, of incidents such as that mentioned by the representative of Jordan. The Agency informed the General Assembly, in its Report submitted on 15 September (A/6713) paragraph 26 that this had been done and that it was not therefore reporting on questions which fell within Mr. Gussing's assignment.

Although the Agency and its staff are deeply concerned with all matters affecting the welfare of the refugees, the Agency's mandate is limited to providing services for the refugees. It does not have the authority nor the staff to investigate other matters, and it should be noted that the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission have never proposed that UNRWA be directed to inquire into the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of occupied areas, but have always contemplated other arrangements for this purpose.

UNRWA, of course, is concerned with any matter affecting the discharge of its own mandate, and the conduct of its work in accordance with United Nations principles. The Agency, with the collaboration of the officials of the United Nations Secretariat, attempts to resolve problems

which arise and does not seek to publicize them while efforts for solutions are in progress. The Agency, in its annual reports, informs the General Assembly of difficulties which persist, and these reports become public.

Mr. Bunche (Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs): I refer to the question raised by the representative of Jordan at the 679th meeting of this Committee on Monday, 1 December, relating to the United Nations guides and the Guide Service and the question of Palestine refugees and the UNRWA pictorial exhibit.

I have made an inquiry from the Office of Public Information, which is responsible for the Guide Service, and I am happy to be able to assure the representative of Jordan that United Nations guides have not been advised or instructed to avoid references to Palestine refugees in the conduct of their tours. I can also assure him that there is no reason for any United Nations guide to avoid taking the tours to the UNRWA pictorial exhibit on Palestine refugees, because this exhibit continues to be a regular part of the United Nations tours.

The guides are instructed to be extremely careful and concise in their remarks in the course of their tours, particularly as they relate to questions raised by those taking the tours on important matters of a political and controversial nature before the United Nations. They are instructed to confine themselves to facts as set forth in official documents. They are conducting tours; they are not expected to give political briefings on questions before the United Nations. They are, in the nature of the case, under the limitations of time — the tours are one hour in duration — and it is not possible for them to put emphasis on any particular problem, no matter how much interest in that problem may be manifested by one or more in the particular group they are conducting.

When members of the touring group show an interest or a desire for additional information, the guides have been instructed to refer them to the public information counter of the Public Inquiries Unit of the Visitors Service, where the relevant documents are available for them to see.

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Letter from the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to the Chairman of the Special Political Committee.¹

December 10, 1969

As the Special Committee was closing its consideration of agenda item 36, one of the representatives called attention to the fact that whereas I had said that there had been one case of deportation of an UNRWA staff member from Gaza, my *Report* for the year ending 30 June 1968 stated that forty-eight teachers had been deported from Gaza (A/7213, paragraph 105). These forty-eight cases of deportation had been reported to have taken place within a few days of the hostilities of June 1967. Since then, one case of the deportation of an UNRWA staff member has been reported, and the total number of deportation of UNRWA employees, including those which took place soon after the hostilities, is forty-nine.

May I also take this opportunity to provide a more precise figure on the total number of staff members in Gaza and the West Bank who have been arrested or detained at one time or another since the hostilities of June 1967. As I informed the Committee, the figure for Gaza is 128. I can now give the figure for the West Bank, which is 49, making a total of 177 for both areas.

(Signed) Laurence MICHELMORE
Commissioner-General

¹ U.N. doc. A/SPC/136.

PART IV

The Palestine Problem before the Security Council

A. Letters from the Representatives of Arab States, Israel and other countries to the Secretary-General and President of the Security Council.

I. IRAQ

238

Letter from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq to the President of the Security Council on the Iraqi Government's Execution of Iraqi Nationals Charged with Espionage against Iraq.¹

January 31, 1969

I have the honour to refer to Security Council document S/8987, containing the letter addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America, dated 29 January 1969, and to attach herewith the text of a statement issued by this Mission this afternoon.

I respectfully request that this letter together with the attached statement be circulated as a Security Council document.

Accept, Sir, etc.

(Signed) Adnan RAOUF

Deputy Permanent Representative
of Iraq to the United Nations

PRESS RELEASE

31 January 1969

A great many comments have been made during the last few days in connexion with the execution in Iraq of a number of Iraqi citizens who have been tried and found guilty of committing acts of sabotage and of espionage in favour of Israel. The comments and expressions of various sentiments — some of them made in good faith — were immediately exploited by the Israeli propaganda machine to blow the issue out of pro-

portion and to launch a vicious campaign of defamation against Iraq. It is, therefore, quite appropriate to state a few facts in order to clarify the issue and dissipate the clouds of malicious propaganda that have been raised about it.

Recently the Government of Iraq brought to trial a number of Iraqi citizens charged with conspiracy to commit acts of sabotage against some military and civil installations inside Iraq, and of espionage in favour of Israel. After an exhaustive trial, during which the defendants availed themselves of legal counsel and were adequately defended, sentences were passed by the court. Those found guilty were sentenced to death, the penalty for high treason, and were subsequently executed last Monday. They were three Moslems, two Christians and nine Jews. Those whose guilt was not proved were immediately acquitted, including seven Jews.

There was no question that the matter was entirely an internal affair of Iraq and the competence of the Iraqi Government to try Iraqi nationals in accordance with the laws of the land was never questioned by any party.

The trial was conducted in camera because its proceedings involved information regarding military bases and installations, troops stationing and other military matters. However, those parts of the trial which did not touch upon military secrets were broadcast several times on Baghdad radio.

Israel and all Zionist organizations immediately seized the opportunity to embark on a vicious campaign to malign Iraq by unduly dwelling on the fact that there were nine Jews among those executed, conveniently forgetting those of other religions, and entirely omitting any reference to those who were acquitted, Jews or otherwise. The utterances of Israeli leaders on this occasion of

¹U.N. doc. S/8989.

course were part and parcel of Israel's pretensions to identify itself with all the Jews of the world, and the arrogation to itself of the entirely rejected assumption to represent all Jews regardless of their nationality.

But apart from this fact there were other motives behind the uproar created by Israel which helped to inflame passions in most of the world where Zionist organizations are vociferous and influential. It would take a little scrutiny and some knowledge of Israel's history to realize that the smoke screen created by Israel around this issue is actually meant to veil Israel's designs for the area, and cover up its brutal acts against the Arab inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories. As recently as two weeks ago Israeli forces opened fire against a demonstration of Arab women in Rafah, killing one woman and wounding many others. Again, it is an open secret that whenever Israel plans to commit a new act of aggression against an Arab country, it usually paves the way with a concentrated propaganda campaign against that country. The incident of the attack on Beirut International Airport is still fresh in our minds.

International quarters which are duly concerned about the prospects of peace in the Middle East will be well advised if they attempted to dispel the Israeli propaganda smoke screen and endeavoured to discern Israel's real motives. Several instances in Israel's history would be sufficient to show where the real danger to peace in the area looms.

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Letter from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq to the President of the Security Council on the Iraqi Government's Execution of Iraqi Citizens.¹

March 11, 1969

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to document S/9031, circulating the letter addressed to Your Excellency on 26 February 1969, by the Permanent Representative of Israel.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9068.

Apart from the malicious continuation of the defamation campaign against Iraq, initiated by Israel and taken up by the Zionist organizations, the only purpose of the letter referred to above is a repetition of the insidious attempt by Israel to claim the dubious right to represent all the Jews in the world. This arrogation is entirely rejected and it is doubtful that any Member State of the Organization would concede Israel its assumptions. However, having started to defend the Iraqis of the Jewish faith who were found guilty of espionage for Israel, the Permanent Representative of Israel soon found himself in the unenviable position of defending other non-Jewish Israeli spies. His claim that the charges against those spies were "false and unfounded" is entirely refuted by the trials records. Nor is this new disavowal by Israel supported by previous cases of espionage and sabotage such as the Lavon Affair or the case of "Their Man in Damascus" Eli Cohen. It is well remembered and recorded how Israel initially disclaimed any responsibility or connexion in those instances only to boast of them at a later stage.

The letter is a thread-bare attempt, which has become only too monotonous recently, to divert world public opinion from the brutal treatment of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories by the Israeli authorities, and from the various acts of aggression committed by Israel against the Arab countries. It is not without significance that the Israeli letter came only two days after the beastly attack by the Israeli Air Force against the two Syrian towns of El-Hammah and Maisaloun — subject of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Syria on 25 February 1969, and 4 March 1969 (S/9028) and (S/9041).

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Letter from the Acting Permanent Representative of Iraq to the President of the Security Council on the Iraqi Government's Execution of Iraqi Citizens.²

March 27, 1969

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to document S/9095, containing

² U.N. doc. S/9118.

the letter addressed to you on 19 March 1969, by the Permanent Representative of Israel.

Apart from repeating the usual Israeli presumptions, the letter does not amount to more than an exercise in rhetoric. However, gross falsifications with which the letter is so abundantly imbued make it imperative to set the record straight again.

1. The very first statement in the letter to the effect that "wherever violations of human rights take place, the conscience of all decent people will be aroused", immediately rules Israel out as qualified to take any stand on human rights. Nor does it appear that Israel is moved by the reaction of decent people all over the world to the various violations of the basic human rights in the Arab territories occupied by Israel. With Israel's record since its inception, and particularly since its aggression in June 1967, any reference by it to "moral duty" and "international responsibility" should be taken with extreme caution if not with down-right suspicion.

2. Unabashedly, the letter of the Israeli representative again repeats the by now worn-out allegation that the Iraqis who were found guilty, by a court of law, of espionage for Israel, were "defenceless individuals". No individuals in the recent history of the Middle East earned the adjective of "defenceless" more than the people of Deir Yassin and Kafr Qasm for whose massacres pre- and post-natal Israel is solely responsible. This is apart from those displaced by Israel's recent acts of aggression or those detained and imprisoned or those whose houses were dynamited by the Israeli authorities in the occupied territories, without the benefit of a trial.

3. In the customary exercise of semantics the letter of the Israeli representative refers to the Iraqis (or at least those of them who in Israel's view are defenceless) as people who happen to "live" in the country. It may be useful to assure the Israeli representative that all loyal Iraqis have better and more valid rights to their country than any Zionist could claim to Palestine. The only people who happen to "live" in a country are those who usurped it from its rightful inhabitants.

4. Again the letter of the Permanent Representative of Israel reiterates various false charges with regard to the trial and conviction of persons found guilty of espionage for Israel, in spite of the

fact that his charges have been time and again rejected and entirely refuted. He may find his repetitions helpful in order that he may eventually be convinced of them, but I have no remedy for this.

5. It is also customary when Zionists assume the self-awarded role of representing other Jews, to refer time and again *ad nauseam*, to the alleged "previous persecutions in Iraq". And although the circumstances in which Iraqi Jews were given the option to relinquish freely their nationality some eighteen years ago were amply covered in previous documents, (*vide*, this Mission's letters of 3 and 27 June 1968, documents S/8610 and S/8657, respectively), the Israeli representative always finds it fit to call the granting of that choice to Iraqi Jews "persecution". He even alleges that the majority of those Iraqi Jews who freely chose to renounce their Iraqi nationality have found "refuge" and haven in Eretz Yisrael.

If the Israel representative is still in doubt of the true nature of the Jewish "flight" from Iraq, he may be referred then to Mr. Ovadin Sehayek, address presently unknown, or any of his eight brothers and sisters, for an informative treatise on objective and methods of the Halutz Movement in Iraq. Or better still, he may be referred to Mr. Yisrael Galili, the present Israeli Minister of Information, who is reputed to be quite an authority on the subject. But giving the Israeli representative the benefit of the doubt and assuming that he is really unaware of the enormity of the lies he keeps repeating, then we may be doing him a service by referring him to what was published in the Israeli weekly *Haolam Haze*h on 20 and 27 April 1969. In the latter issue the first paragraph of an article by Shalom Cohen under the title, "This Can only Happen in Israel", reads as follows:

"This could happen only in Israel. Last week *Haolam Haze*h published the scoop of the year... It was the story of the explosions that were thrown some 15 years ago into the synagogues and other Jewish centres of Baghdad with a view to spurring the Jews of Iraq onto a hasty *Aliya* to Israel. These things were known to but a few people who guarded them as a terrible secret; they have been made public now for the first time officially and responsibly."

One would have thought that the Zionists were going to maintain a discreet silence regarding this episode which in reality constitutes another infamous chapter of the history of Zionism. This chapter has no parallel in infamy, perhaps, except in the Zionist practice immediately after World War II to use condemned ships to transport European Jews in order that these ships may scuttle *en route* to Palestine, and thus, arouse world sympathy for the helpless Jews "fleeing from persecution" only to drown within sight of the promised land.

Now it may come as a shocking revelation to the Israeli representative to know that the individuals who threw those bombs were not Iraqi non-Jews "persecuting" the Iraqi Jews, but rather Zionist Jews working on behalf and at the behest of Israel and the Zionist organizations. It may be quite a surprising discovery, if the Israeli representative is really seeking the truth, for him to find that the Jews who left Iraq early in the fifties were not actually fleeing the "persecution" of non-Jews but rather the pressure, cajolment and terror of other Jews. He may then become aware of the irony of the following quotation from his letter "Jews regard themselves as duty bound to help fellow Jews, particularly when other nations and peoples have failed or have been unable to come to their rescue." Then the question would arise: who would help the Jews when they become the wittingly or unwittingly victims of Zionist machination?

6. The Permanent Representative of Israel concludes his letter by repeating the big lie in respect of the "conditions of the Arab inhabitants in the territories under Israel's administration". He boasts of alleged freedom of movement, freedom of thought and expression, etc., etc.

Notwithstanding the fact that these boastful claims have no relation to reality, they are ominously reminiscent of the justifications the white colonialists in Southern Rhodesia and other colonial territories invoke in order to maintain their dominance and illegal usurpation and the denial to the African and indigenous peoples their basic human rights. These boasts, with which Israel is actually borrowing a page from the annals of nineteenth century colonialism, are tantamount to a demand that the Arabs, now or who may potentially come under Israeli rule, should rejoice

and forgo their rights to a country, homeland and other basic human rights in view of the material benefits Israeli occupation would bring them. Are we then to expect that in the second half of the twentieth century and in the era of the United Nations to welcome the advent of "Zionist burden" to replace that of the white man. The United Nations ought to take note.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Adnan RAOUF
Acting Permanent Representative
of Iraq to the United Nations

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General on Israel's Violation of the Cease-fire Resolutions.¹

April 24, 1969

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to the letter of 10 April 1969 addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Israel (A/7539, S/9146).

In that letter the Israeli representative attempts to make the cease-fire resolutions the central point of the situation prevailing in the area. He conveniently forgets that the Security Council adopted those resolutions as a result of the war of aggression waged by Israel against the Arab countries in June 1967. He also ignores that the underlying factor of the cease-fire régime is the continuation and perpetuation of the Israeli occupation of the territories of three Arab States Members of the United Nations.

The occasional sanctity given to the cease-fire resolutions is all the more hypocritical when it comes from the representative who on various occasions arrogantly admitted in the Security Council and in official documents the deliberate and calculated breaches of those resolutions by Israel. It has been on record that since the adoption of these very same cease-fire resolutions, the

¹ U.N. doc. S/9175. Also issued under the symbol A/7545.

Security Council has either deplored or condemned Israel no less than five times for breaches of the resolutions.

It is, therefore, obvious that the desperate invocation of the cease-fire resolutions is nothing more than a worn out attempt to divert attention from the facts of its continuous occupation of Arab territories in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the rules of international law. It has been established beyond any doubt that Israel is not only perpetuating its occupation, but is, in fact, using the occupied territories as spring-boards for its various acts of aggression against the inhabitants of, and civilian targets in, the rest of neighbouring Arab countries and as staging points for future expansion.

World public opinion must not be misled; the crux of the matter is the Israeli aggression and plans for expansion, rather than certain temporary arrangements which would not exist had they not been the direct outcome of the Israeli aggression.

I have the honour to request Your Excellency to have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Adnan RAOUF
Acting Permanent Representative
of Iraq to the United Nations

CORRIGENDUM I

Second paragraph

The last sentence should read as follows:

"He also ignores that the underlying factor for the failure of the cease-fire régime is the continuation and perpetuation of the Israeli occupation of the territories of three Arab States Members of the United Nations."

2. JORDAN

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General Containing a Statement by As'ad Abdel-Rahman on the Treatment of Arab Prisoners in Israeli Prisons in the Occupied Territories.²

January 8, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention a statement prepared by a Jordanian national, Mr. As'ad Abdel Rahman, President of the Union of Palestine Arab Students in Lebanon, describing his treatment and that of other Arab prisoners in Israeli jails in the occupied territories.

I have the honour to request that this letter together with its enclosure be circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Statement by As'ad Abdel-Rahman, President of the Union of Palestine Arab Students in Lebanon, on his imprisonment in Israeli occupied territory (21/12/67 to 29/9/68) and the treatment of Arabs in prisons under the Occupation to the Club of the Alumni Association of the American University.

Beirut, November 21, 1968

Any discussion of the treatment of the inhabitants of the occupied territories in Palestine is bound to be affected by emotion, by preconceived ideas and by the temptation to distort facts for propaganda purposes. My awareness of this has prompted me to confine my remarks today to two

¹ U.N. doc. S/9175/corr.1. Also issued under the symbol A/7545/corr.1.

² U.N. doc. S/8961. Also issued under the symbol A/7500.

sets of data: (a) what actually happened to me when I was arrested by the Israeli authorities and during my period of imprisonment, and (b) what I gathered directly during my imprisonment by way of observation, conversation and verification concerning the experience of other Arab inmates of Israeli prisons. I shall include in this second category of data only the information that I believe to be strictly true. I am, therefore, here to report facts to you. My purpose is information not propaganda.

1. *What happened to me*

On the morning of 21 December 1967 just after 9 o'clock I was knocking at the door of a house in the Old City of Arab Jerusalem situated near the Syriac Convent to meet a colleague of mine Mr. Taysir Kuba'a the Vice-President of the General Federation of Palestine Arab Students. No sooner had I started knocking at the door than I found myself before two men of the Special Branch of the Israeli Jerusalem Police who pointed their pistols at my face and the face of another friend who had come with me to show me the house. Within seconds we found our hands handcuffed while the policemen proceeded to empty our pockets of all their contents.

I started to protest and to ask for an explanation for such behaviour when one of the two policemen who had arrested us (Sergeant Rosenthal Joseph) ordered me not to utter another word. One of the Israelis then left us for about ten minutes and returned with six other Israelis. One of the six new arrivals immediately slapped my face and asked why we had come to the house, and whether we expected other visitors. I said that I had come to call on a friend and protested at our treatment. Thereupon, and after two of the Israelis were left behind in the house, my companion and I were each handcuffed to a policeman and we were led to a military vehicle parked some 200 yards away near Jaffa Gate. The car drove us to the prison in the Russian Compound in central Jerusalem. The time was about 9.30 a.m.

My companion and I were led to separate rooms in the basement of the prison where our interrogation started immediately. In my interrogation room I faced Commander Shimon Sapir who asked me two questions after which he

asked me to take my clothes off. Every time I took an article off, he would order me to take off another, until I suspected the worst, and refused to continue my striptease. As soon as I had stopped, Sapir and four other men immediately rushed at me raining blows with their fists and the edges of their outstretched hands in expert Karate fashion. The blows were aimed at my head and every part of my body. I shouted in protest and demanded to know the reason for such treatment. Their attacks persisted without interruption for a period I cannot calculate until I began to feel the loss of consciousness. Before I passed out I remember trying to show them a deep scar in my belly, the result of an operation, in the hope of putting them off, but their blows continued to be directed systematically, it seemed, at my head and neck.

My next recollection is of water being splashed over me after which I revived somewhat. As I came to, Sapir told me that my friend Taysir Kuba'a had been arrested. He showed me his identity card and told me that there was no point in further denial.

The interrogation then started all over again. A question would be put to you but before you could answer the blows would fall again; another question would follow, then more blows, and so on. This time, however, the blows did not come from fists and hands only; a short thick knotted stick was also used. This was aimed at the head and every part of the body. This interrogation continued until about 2 p.m. after which I was taken to my cell.

My cell was a dark, damp, icy cold corridor leading to Blanket Store Room No. 4. I found there another inmate, one Ali Al 'Awadah from Gaza. I spent the night in this cell.

The following day I was taken to cell No. 1 in the Muscovite Prison where we were five in all. I was left alone during the whole of the second day, perhaps to build up suspense. On the third day we had a heated argument with our warden Jacob, because he ordered us to stand to attention every time he appeared, saying: "An Arab must stand to attention whenever an Israeli enters the room."

As a result of this argument I was taken to a stinking underground cell to which no light penetrated. The cell was divided into two by iron

bars across the middle. On the *other* side of the bars there was a tin full of faeces. In my cell, *this* side of the bars, there was no place to relieve oneself. One urinated through the bars into the tin, but for other purposes one looked for scraps of newspapers on which one relieved oneself and then deposited them through bars in the tin.

On the following day I was summoned for more interrogation. I was confronted by a certain Tolensky who, we were led to believe, was the deputy chief of Intelligence and a Major Joseph (these were probably fictitious names). My interrogators mentioned certain allegations against me, chiefly that I was one of the *fedayeen*. They threatened me with torture if I denied these allegations. I repeated what I had said on the first day, namely: I was the President of the Union of Palestine Students for Lebanon and the President of the Confederation of Arab Students in Lebanon. I had come to the Western Bank to visit my family who live in Nablus on the occasion of the Bairam Feast and to bid them farewell before I left for the United States, where I intended to continue my graduate work for a doctorate. I also intended to seize the opportunity of my presence in the Western Bank to study the possibility of organizing passive resistance among students in the face of the forcible change in the school curricula imposed by the Israeli authorities on Arab schools in occupied territories. I intended to collaborate with my colleague Taysir Kuba'a in drawing up a report on the subject which we intended to submit to the Executive Committee of our Students' Federation.

On the following day a bedouin from Gaza was put in my cell. He could hardly stand up. His whole body was lacerated and covered with blood. His urinary system was almost completely damaged. One did what one could to help him out of his difficulties. He said he had been an inmate of a torture camp run by the Israeli Army and reported gruesome details of the happenings in the camp.

On Friday, 29 December 1967, two members of the Israeli Military Police appeared. At their sight my bedouin companion shouted a warning that they were members of the staff of the torture camp. They asked for me and for another prisoner named Khalil Buhais whom I had not met before. Our hands were handcuffed and shackles put on

our legs. We were then led blindfolded to a lorry. We climbed to the back of the lorry where we were chained to a ring in the floor. In this manner we travelled to Sarafand — a forty-minute drive. The strain on our wrists was considerable and the manner in which we were tossed about produced nausea.

As soon as we arrived at our destination and got off the lorry we were met with slaps and blows accompanied with jeers and a continuous flow of curses from a group of soldiers. Our escort led us across ditches and trenches filled with stinking water into which we stumbled because, being blindfolded, we could not see our way. Our clumsy attempts to climb out of the trenches were met with more jeers, laughter, curses, and blows. Suddenly there was firing, very close to us, and for a while I thought I had had it. It turned out, however, that they intended only to play with us.

After this I was taken to a cell of unbelievable stench. The cell was eighty cms. long and sixty cms. wide. This was to be home for the next days. There was no blanket or cover of any kind, no bed, no mattress, no water to wash, no place to relieve nature except a bucket already brimful with faeces and urine. I was still handcuffed, my legs shackled, my eyes blindfolded (except at meal-times). It was impossible to lie down, to rest or sleep. I often found that my hands had slipped into the bucket.

Throughout the night the place echoed with the sounds of torture and interrogation. They always chose the night: your neighbours led away from the cell on the right, or the cell on the left; their screams piercing the night; yourself expecting your turn, at any moment.

On the fourth day only, my turn came. Tolensky with two others called for me. On the way to the interrogation room the soldier who was dragging me stopped in front of a tree and violently knocked my head against the trunk, then he threw me down a flight of stairs.

What happened at the interrogation? A new development: the gradual transformation of any interrogation into a political investigation. There were no beatings but constant threats. I could in fact hear the cries of the tortured and I was constantly reminded that if I wanted to avoid their fate I had to speak up quickly. This was not Jerusalem, they said.

The interrogators seemed surprised at my explicit political stand and my analysis of the Israeli entity as an imperialistic, expansionist and racist phenomenon, an analysis which I supported by quoting from documents and sources available in the Central Zionist Archives Office and the Hebrew University Library in Jerusalem.

After this interrogation session I was transferred to a cell larger than the one I was in where I stayed for six days.

The following day and for every subsequent day my interrogation continued. They would start at 9.30 a.m. and continue until 11 p.m. at the earliest. There were no breaks for meals. Food was brought to the interrogation room. I was subjected to political, intellectual and psychological probings by army and intelligence officers. They worked in teams of three to eight persons in endless relays, averaging twenty different persons a day. My political convictions, of course, remained the same, and I could see the expressions of puzzlement in their eyes. One effect of this seemed to be that the army officers who came to cross-examine me and listen to my views about the nature of Israel and Zionism became increasingly more senior in rank. Of course this did not mean that I inspected a guard of honour on my way to or from the interrogation room. There were the same blows and attacks to the accompaniment of an unending background of the filthiest insults and curses from my escorts and the soldiers on the way.

On the thirteenth day I was taken to wash my face for the first time since my arrival at Sarafand. I was also allowed for the first time in eighteen days to have a shave, after which I was asked to sign a paper testifying to the good treatment I had received. I signed.

I was then tied through my handcuffs back to back to another person and both of us were dumped into a lorry. As we were lying in the back of the lorry, a woman soldier (I could tell this from her voice) sprayed eau de cologne on my head and face and all over my clothes. The lorry took us to Jerusalem where I found myself in my last cell there again.

I stayed in this cell for a month during which my interrogation continued. During this period my health deteriorated and I began to feel the effects of undernourishment in addition to my

other troubles. To give you an idea about food in Jerusalem this was our daily menu:

Breakfast: (1) One small cube of salty margarine per person.
8 a.m.

(2) $\frac{3}{4}$ tablespoonful of jam for all the cell irrespective of the number of persons in it.

(3) $\frac{1}{4}$ loaf of bread, per person, the loaf itself being about one foot long.

(4) One small-sized glass of very weak, tepid tea.

Lunch: (1) 2 tablespoonfuls of rice, tepid and 12 noon soggy, with one hot dog served cold per person.

(2) $\frac{1}{4}$ of a loaf of bread per person. Every other day a plate of cold, thin, vegetable soup.

Dinner: (1) One hard-boiled egg per person.
3.30-

4 p.m. (2) $\frac{1}{4}$ loaf of bread per person. Sometimes a small cube of margarine.

In the last third of January I was transferred with other comrades to the Central Ramleh Prison where we stayed for six days after which we were transferred to another section of the prison commanded by an officer named Copani.

I stayed two months in Ramleh Prison. Food and sleeping conditions were not too bad, i.e. we had beds and a lavatory but were twenty to twenty-five persons in a room ten by four metres. After continuous contacts with the Red Cross we won the right to listen to one news broadcast a day (Radio Israel, 7.30 a.m. in Arabic) in addition to receiving some Arabic books, the most recent of which had been published in 1945. It was while I was in Ramleh Prison that I was taken, together with a friend named Ahmad Khalifeh, on two occasions (once towards the end of February, the other time in early March) to the torture camp in Sarafand, wrapped in canvas bundles, where we met General Gazit (an assistant to the Chief of Staff) and another apparently important but mysterious civilian person who listened to our views about the nature of Israel and Zionism. Gazit behaved with all the arrogance of the conqueror and the

civilian mentioned the books I had written in Arabic on Zionism.

On 4 January 1968 together with other comrades I was transferred to Ramallah Prison. We had quite a reception party of beatings and insults. We were hit with the hands, with sticks, with pistol-ends and rifle butts. Three of us, Taysir Kuba'a, another friend and myself were put together in a cell two metres long and one metre wide. We were beaten daily but intermittently for four days and remained eighteen days in all in this cell. We were then isolated from the other prisoners in a special section. I stayed in this section for three months during which I was brought to trial. There were no more beatings, only the occasional spitting. I was tried before a military court composed of one judge and an officer. I was charged with infiltration, membership of an illegal organization, and forging an identity card. I was not allowed the services of a team of French lawyers who arrived in Ramallah to defend several of us. But we were allowed to obtain defense counsels from the territory occupied before 5 June. We had five lawyers, three of them Arab and two Jewish. They were all competent, honest and brave. I thank them all. My line of defense was to deny the competence of the court to try me. I based my case on the principles of international law, the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions, the Security Council resolutions. In fact we introduced the whole Palestine question into the court from the moral, legal, national and humanitarian points of view. The first presiding judge was infuriated by this line of defense. He altogether lost his temper and publicly attacked the Jewish lawyers for repeating my arguments. He also constantly attacked me. This first judge was replaced by another more disciplined judge. With some exceptions, the trial was public and the procedure outwardly democratic. The lawyers, it was obvious, were under great duress. I was finally convicted of ordinary infiltration for social purposes and for forging my identity card. My sentence was one year of imprisonment.

Very gradually my treatment began to improve. On 18 July 1968 I was transferred to an ordinary cell with other prisoners where I remained until my deportation to the Eastern Bank on 29 September 1968.

2. *What happened to the others*

Let me preface the second part of my statement with three observations:

(1) What I am about to describe does not always happen in its entirety, nor at the same level of intensity.

(2) It does not necessarily happen to all those who are arrested.

(3) The torture methods of the Israelis follow *two axes*: the psychological and the physical. These two axes often intersect to produce a compound effect, so that it is not always possible to draw a clear line of distinction between the one and the other. Nevertheless for the purposes of clear presentation I shall deal with the two methods separately.

A. *Psychological torture and the war of nerves*

The moment one is arrested one is subjected to two influences simultaneously: inducements and threats. The threats take many forms. You are threatened with beating or torture, with the arrest of those dearest to you (your father, mother, sister, brother), with the blowing up of your home, with the rape of your nearest women relatives, with imprisonment in cells containing Israeli thieves and murderers; if you are a woman, with imprisonment in cells containing Israeli prostitutes.

The cells you are sometimes thrown into and the condition in which you are thrown into them (blindfolded, handcuffed, shackled) have already been described. But there are variations here too. The cells often are powerfully lit day and night without interruption. They are sometimes fitted with mouthpieces which continuously broadcast sounds and words deliberately calculated to break your nerve (e.g. the sound of weeping or wailing, the appeal of a mother or a sister, etc.). Sometimes the cell is fitted with blowers which direct strong waves of cold and hot air alternately. Sometimes a snake might be thrown into your cell. The snake is not poisonous, but you don't know it and, remember, you are blindfolded. Sometimes enormous highly-trained dogs are introduced into your cell. They tear at your clothes and body and expertly snatch at the cloth blindfolding your eyes.

Sometimes you are led to an open grave and

told that the grave has been specially dug for you. Sometimes the leg of a corpse (probably artificial) is sticking out of the grave covered with dirt and you are told it is the body of this or that of your friends. Sometimes you are taken into the torture chamber to see your friends or strangers undergoing torture. Sometimes you are merely shown the torture implements (e.g. batteries with wires and clips attached to them; handcuffs dangling from the ceiling). Sometimes you are deliberately starved. Sometimes you are taken to a "party". At these parties beating is usually moderate but their basic ingredients are jeering and insults from groups of soldiers accompanied by shooting at close range between your legs or above your head. Sometimes when you are transferred from one place to another the information is volunteered that you are going to a torture camp. Always your identity is cancelled from the start and you become a mere number. Mine was 293. At least 60 per cent of those arrested on charges of helping the resistance receive some variations of this type of psychological treatment.

B. Physical torture

Within this general environment, which, as can be seen, lends itself to many combinations, physical torture, in the strict sense, is practised on you in one or more of the following styles.

It should be remembered, however, that this happens to only a minority of those arrested. The proportion varies. On the West Bank up to about 15 per cent receive this physical treatment. In the Gaza Strip the proportion is higher, reaching up to 25 per cent of those arrested.

As for the actual methods of physical torture I have been able to identify sixteen different methods. These are methods that I am completely intellectually convinced have actually been practised. I am not saying they are all practised against the same person. Nor am I saying they are all practised with the same frequency. What I am saying is that all have actually been practised. This conclusion is based on continuous research that I carried out with my prison inmates. It is based upon a close examination of evidence given me by these inmates, on a long rigorous process of checking and counter-checking of the evidence, and on my objective appraisal of the integrity of my informants. To do less than this, to invent horror stories for you for cheap propaganda effect

would be to insult the manhood and humanity of hundreds of my compatriots. In this connexion I would like to say that I am not mentioning names in public for obvious reasons. But I have the names of all the victims concerned as well as other relevant details. These names and details I am prepared to put at the disposal of specialized international agencies if I could get adequate guarantees that the victims would not be endangered.

As for the different methods of torture, these are:

(1) The prisoner is made to strip completely of all clothes. The body is whipped or beaten with sticks. No part of the body is spared. The beating and whipping continues until blood is drawn. Salt is thrown on the lacerations and the beating is resumed.

(2) The lighted cigarette ends are applied to various parts of the body.

(3) The prisoner is forced to sit naked on cactus leaves fixed on platforms.

(4) Enormous dogs are let loose on the prisoner who is usually handcuffed with hands behind the back. The dogs are trained to throw the prisoner on the ground. The prisoner is ordered by an interrogator, whip in hand, to get up on his feet as soon as he falls down and so on...

(5) The fingers of the hand are placed on the edge of an open door and the door is slammed on the fingers.

(6) Finger nails are pulled out with ordinary pincers.

(7) The prisoner is injected with pepper solutions.

(8) The prisoner is suspended from the ceiling from his wrists or ankles. The interrogator throws his weight on the prisoner or pulls him in downward motions.

(9) Electric shocks are passed through the ear lobes, the chest and the privy parts.

(10) The prisoner is injected with solutions which he is told induce almost instant insanity. He is shown what he is told is an antidote which he would be given if only he would confess in time.

(11) A large metal container is fitted over the head and neck and held firm to the body by extensions that are held in place by a waist-band.

The container is then hit with sticks and rods on the outside, at first slowly and in routine fashion and then with increasing tempo. The more battered the container is the more difficult it is to pull out.

(12) A certain chemical substance (possibly a nerve irritant) is put in the hand of the prisoner who is ordered to clench it. The substance gives the effect of an electric shock.

(13) Water hoses are applied to the mouth or anus and the water turned on.

(14) The motions of sodomy are enacted apparently by a man kept for the purpose.

(15) One of the prisoner's arms is firmly tied to the fixed bars of a window, the other to the handle of a door. The door is slowly opened in the other direction.

(16) Matchsticks are inserted into the urinary-genital tract. Sometimes they are lit. Or, alternatively, the fillings of dry ink pens are inserted in the tract.

These methods of physical torture are practised with great skill and artistry in order to avoid permanent damage. But the interrogators sometimes lose control of the situation and certain, perhaps unwanted results, follow, such as partial paralysis, the perforation of the stomach, the loss of an eye, or total nervous breakdown.

Thank you.

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General on the Plight of Jordanian Refugees due to Storms and Floods with an Emphasis on the Need for the Return of the Displaced Persons to their Homes.¹

January 30, 1969

My Government instructed me to inform Your Excellency that, as a result of wind, rain, floods and snowstorms which swept over the eastern part of Jordan, namely the area where the refugees have their temporary camps, the plight of those

innocent Jordanian citizens has acquired a new, greater dimension.

Hundreds of tents housing scores of thousands of refugees went down under the impact of the storms. Most of the tent camps are now in flooded areas and subject to unprecedented heavy rains and hurricanes.

With nothing to protect them against the ravages of nature, most of the 450,000 newly displaced persons are within walking distance of their homes and camps which remain empty in the Israeli-occupied territories. This appalling situation cries for the conscience of mankind. It defies human values. To keep silent about it would add to the refugees' miseries and lead to more tragedies.

On 14 June 1967, in resolution 237 (1967), the Security Council called upon Israel "to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities", and entrusted Your Excellency with the task of following the effective implementation of this resolution.

This was reaffirmed on 4 July 1967 in General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V).

It was also the subject of deliberations in the Special Political Committee during the twenty-third session of the General Assembly. The need for a speedy return of the displaced persons to their homes was emphasized.

Addressing the Committee Your Excellency stated:

"It cannot be questioned that the plight of many of the refugees could best be relieved immediately by their return to their homes and to the camps which they formerly occupied... I think it is necessary to state that if the camps on the West Bank could again serve their original purpose, and if the displaced persons could return to their former homes, a long step would have been taken towards reducing the hardships faced by a large number of the refugees and displaced persons in Jordan."

Lord Caradon, speaking for the United Kingdom, said: "Many of them [the displaced persons] have homes, stone houses, to go back to on the other side of the Jordan Valley. They could go back tomorrow."

¹ U.N. doc. S/8988. Also issued under the symbol A/7504.

Ambassador Wiggins also emphasized the need for a greatly expanded programme for the return to the lands west of the Jordan of the displaced persons of the 1967 war.

Resolution 2452 (XXIII) was adopted, which, *inter alia*, called upon "the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities".

None of the above resolutions was implemented by the Israeli authorities. This is but another act of defiance of United Nations authority and disregard for international will.

Since Your Excellency has been entrusted with following up the effective implementation of these Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and in view of the present situation, it is the earnest hope of my Government that appropriate steps will be taken to help the victims of continued Israeli occupation and facilitate their speedy return.

In the words of Lord Caradon to the Special Political Committee: "And, after all, when you come to think of it, it is not asking a lot that people shall be allowed to go home. Surely this is an elementary human right."

May I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council Containing a Cable from the Mayor of Jerusalem dated 1 February 1969 Addressed to the President of the Security Council.¹

February 6, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government I have the honour to request that the cable of the Mayor of Jerusalem dated 1 February 1969,

addressed to Your Excellency, be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.
Please accept, etc.,

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

TEXT OF CABLE SENT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 1 FEBRUARY 1969

In the name of humanity and justice I beseech Your Excellency and the United Nations and the Security Council to use your full weight and good offices in order to put an end to the sentences of liquidation being applied by Israel against the 70,000 Arabs of Jerusalem and also to stop the repressive measures being constantly and speedily promulgated by Israel to change the long established character of the Holy City in defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and international law.

Life sentences and long-term imprisonments and banishment orders imposed by Israeli military tribunals on Jerusalem Arabs monthly subject hundreds of them to terrorizing measures exposing them to torture and liquidation.

Israeli uninterrupted policy of annexing Jerusalem and forcible expropriation of Arab land and property including demolition and blowing up of such seized Arab property continues to expose thousands of Jerusalem Arabs to decimation and liquidation.

Israeli unabated threats to enforce the unjust law of 1968, and incidence of this law, due for promulgation against Jerusalem Arabs as from 23 February, will liquidate remaining Arabs of the City.

It has been subjecting them to incessant anxiety and terror throughout the last twenty months.

I appeal to you and to human conscience to put an end to this total liquidation of the Arabs of Jerusalem and to speedily execute General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

Rauhi KHATIB
Mayor of Jerusalem

¹ U.N. doc. S/8995.

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council.¹

February 8, 1969

I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the continued Israeli defiance of the Security Council resolution on Jerusalem No. 252 dated 21 May 1968.

Although the Security Council has in that resolution called upon Israel "to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem", the Israeli authorities have never relented in their disregard of this clear warning and of the Assembly resolutions on this subject.

The most recent Israeli measure was the enactment of legislation designed to destroy the character of the city and incorporate the Arab life and institutions into Israeli life. The Arabs of Jerusalem have strongly expressed their opposition to this arbitrary and oppressive law, but the Israeli authorities paid no attention to their request; they insisted that if by the deadline which they have fixed in the legislation, i.e., 23 February 1969, the law is not complied with the oppressive measures embodied therein will be invoked.

The situation threatens not only the economic life of Christians and Moslems of Jerusalem, but also international peace and security. It calls for immediate consideration by the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA

Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General with a Memorandum Sent by Arab Lawyers in Israel-Occupied Territory to Israel's Prime Minister, Rejecting the "Administrative Provisions Bill, 1968".²

February 10, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request that the attached memorandum sent by Arab lawyers in Israeli-occupied territory to the Prime Minister of Israel rejecting the so-called "Administrative Provisions Bill, 1968", be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and Security Council.

The request of the Arab lawyers was not heeded by the Israeli authorities. The bill was passed in the Israeli Parliament on 27 June 1968, and became the "Administrative Regulation Law, 1968", as published in the Israeli *Gazette* No. 542 of 23 August 1968. Its object is to complete the process of Israel's unilateral annexation of Jerusalem and its environs.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA

Ambassador
Permanent Representative

TO H.E. THE PRIME MINISTER OF
ISRAEL THROUGH THE MILITARY
GOVERNOR GENERAL
JERUSALEM

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE
PROVISIONS BILL, 1968

On 27 June 1967, the Israeli Parliament enacted an amendment to the Judicial and Administrative Provisions Law No. 11/67 which provided, *inter alia*, that Israeli administration and judgements apply to all Israeli territory. On 28 June 1967, the Minister of Interior promulgated an order entailing the extension of the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, whereby the Arab sector of Jerusalem as well as all its suburbs were ceded to Israel in contravention of the rules of international law, the provisions of the United Nations

¹ U.N. doc. S/8998.

² U.N. doc. S/8999. Also issued under the symbol A/7508.

Charter, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the recommendations of the General Assembly and the resolution of the Security Council passed after June 1967. The Israeli authorities further unlawfully closed down Arab courts in Jerusalem, confiscated Arab property, drove away Arab nationals from their homes and settled Israeli nationals in Arab habitations, thereby violating international law, decisions and practice.

A few days ago, it was brought to the attention of the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem that the Israeli Justice Minister had placed before the Parliament a draft law (Administrative Provision Bill, 1968). The said Bill confirms the previous territorial cession and has as its object the incorporation of the Arab population of Jerusalem as well as all its institutions into their Israeli counterparts, by imposing the same on Arab nationals of Jerusalem who are under military occupation, against their free will and in violation of the Geneva Conventions, United Nations Charter and United Nations resolutions relating to Jerusalem.

The Arab population of Jerusalem as well as members of the judiciary and the legal profession object to the enactment of the said law for the following reasons:

(a) Because the act of ceding Arab Jerusalem is unlawful, lacks support in international law and contravenes the provisions of the United Nations Charter which prohibit the use of force in international relations, the threat to employ force and the resort to conquest as a means of ceding territories.

(b) It is a fundamental rule of international law that the will of the people in an occupied region should be respected. It is recalled here that our people had previously proclaimed that Jerusalem is a part of Jordan and the Arab homeland. Naturally the cession of Arab Jerusalem to Israel was not accompanied by the consent of its Arab population, contrariwise, it was against their legal free choice.

(c) The Bill in question has no binding force inasmuch as it is based on an enactment which is null and void.

(d) The said Bill envisages the disintegration of the Arab population of Jerusalem by forcing the said population as well as all their professional

associations (lawyers, engineers, physicians, etc.) firms and institutions to amalgamate, against their free will, with their Israeli counterparts.

(e) Because the enactment of such a law entails a flagrant breach of General Assembly recommendations and Security Council resolutions invalidating Israeli measures taken in respect of Jerusalem, as well as crying encroachment upon the territory of a United Nations Member State.

In view of the above, members of the Bar and the Bench in the West Bank as well as the law graduates of Jerusalem request the following:

(1) The withdrawal of the above-mentioned Bill from the Israeli Parliament, and refraining from its enactment or the enactment of any similar legislation likely to molest the rights of the Arab population of Jerusalem.

(2) Reopening of Arab courts in Jerusalem to enable Arab members of the Bar and the Bench to exercise their functions under the legal system in force before the occupation. Also reopening all other Arab State departments which the Israeli authorities had closed down in violation of the Geneva Conventions and international legal provisions.

(3) Observation of international law and morality as well as United Nations resolutions in relation to the rights and privileges of the Arab population in the occupied territories.

Jerusalem, 15 August 1968.

(Signed)

Husni Jayyousi, *Attorney-General*, West Bank.

Istawri Da'doush, *Judge of Law Settlement Court*, West Bank.

Walid Toukan, *Judge*.

Said Abu Swai, *Judge*.

Rashed Jayyousi, *President of Court of First Instance*, Nablus.

Kazem Abu Ghazaleh, *Judge*.

Zuhair Murad, *District Attorney*, Jerusalem.

Jeries Khouri; Falah Al-Madi; Hussain Al-Jaghoub; Mustafa Audi; Abdulrahman Hammad; Zuhdi Al-Hashwi; Hafiz Tahboub; Joudeh Shahan; Jamil Habibi; Abdulmuhsin Abu Maizar; Yousif Takrouri; Isam Anani; Abdullah Abu Ied; Hashim Khalil Isa; Zahi Marmash; Hisham Shahin; Adnan Bakri Al-Khairi; Walid Asali;

Shaith Khairi; Sharif Ali; Tariq Faidi; Said Al-Housaini; Mohammed Ayyubi; Isa Al-Hawa; Zakariya Abdin; Basim Al-Ghadban; Bahij Tamimi; Mitry Abu Aita; Zidan Al-Jilani; Mahmoud Shaikh Yasin; Taisir Nabulsi; *Lawyers*.

247

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General with a List of Protests Submitted to the Israeli Authorities by Religious Leaders and Institutions against the Measures of the Israeli Government and the Behaviour of Israeli Citizens in the Holy City of Jerusalem.¹

February 11, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention a list of protests submitted to the Israeli occupying forces by religious men and institutions against the measures taken by the Israeli Government and the behaviour of its Israeli citizens especially

in the Holy City of Jerusalem.

None of the listed protests were answered or even acknowledged by the Israeli authorities and no Israeli action was taken to rescind such measures and discontinue such behaviour.

On 27 November 1968, a meeting of religious leaders to look into ways and means of conveying their protests, to be held in Jerusalem, was outlawed by the Israeli occupying forces and was never allowed to materialize.

I need not emphasize that such Israeli measures whether in Jerusalem or elsewhere in the occupied territories, are null and void. They are in direct violation of United Nations resolutions and international law and against the will of the people.

I have the honour to request that this letter and attachments be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA

Ambassador
Permanent Representative

No.	Date	Israeli recipient	Sender	The protest
1.	24/7/67	Military Governor	Islamic High Commission	Protest against the desecration of Moslem holy places and sites.
2.	12/8/67	Military Governor	Director of Waqf (Moslem Endowment) Jerusalem	Protest against the desecration of Haram Al-Sharif (Al Aqsa Mosque).
3.	14/8/67	Military Governor	" "	Protest against the desecration of Moslem holy places and sites.
4.	17/8/67	Military Governor	" "	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Moslem holy quarters.
5.	17/8/67	Military Governor	" "	Protest against the usurpation of the school of Al Aqsa Mosque.
6.	26/8/67	Military Governor	" "	Protest against the occupation of Zawiyah Fakhriyah (a Moslem religious corner).
7.	2/9/67	Military Governor	President of Waqf Council	Cable of protest against confiscation of key to one of Al Aqsa Mosque doors.
8.	5/9/67	Prime Minister	" "	Cable of protest against the desecration of Al Aqsa Mosque.
9.	25/9/67	Prime Minister	" "	A request to re-open an Al Aqsa door closed by the Israeli authorities.
10.	1/10/67	Prime Minister	" "	Protest against the excavating and destroying of Waqf properties.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9001. Also issued under the symbol A/7509.

<i>No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Israeli recipient</i>	<i>Sender</i>	<i>The protest</i>
11.	15/10/67	Prime Minister	President of Waqf Council	Protest against the excavations taking place in Waqf territories.
12.	15/10/67	Prime Minister	" "	Protest against the trespassing on the sanctity of Al Aqsa Mosque.
13.	15/10/67	Military Governor	" "	Protest against the attacks taking place on the Moslem cemetery and on the Rachel Tomb Mosque in Bethlehem.
14.	10/10/67	Military Governor	Bethlehem Qadi	Protest against the desecration of Qoubat Rachel Mosque.
15.	10/10/67	Military Governor	" "	Protest against the attacks on the Moslem cemetery in Bethlehem and on the Rachel Tomb Cemetery.
16.	24/10/67	Military Governor	President of Waqf Council	Protest against preventing Moslems from praying in Qoubat Rachel Mosque.
17.	29/10/67	Prime Minister	" "	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in the quarters of Al Aqsa Mosque.
18.	21/11/67	Prime Minister	Mufti of Jerusalem	Protest against the trespassing on the sanctity of Al Aqsa Mosque.
19.	30/11/67	Prime Minister	President of Waqf Council	Protest against the attempt to destroy the Zawiyah Fakhriyah (religious corner).
20.	30/11/67	Defence Minister	" "	Protest against the desecration of Al-Haram Al-Sharif Alibrahimi (Abraham Mosque in Al-Khalil, Hebron).
21.	11/1/68	Military Governor	President of Waqf Council	Protest against the desecration of Prophet Samuel Mosque.
22.	13/1/68	Military Governor	Al-Khalil (Hebron) Qadi	Desecration of the sanctity of Abraham Mosque.
23.	25/1/68	Military Governor	President of Waqf Council	Desecration of Abraham Mosque.
24.	21/2/68	Prime Minister	" "	Protest against excavations and destruction of Moslem Waqf property.
25.	21/4/68	Prime Minister	" "	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Al Aqsa Mosque.
26.	25/4/68	Defence Minister	" "	Protest against the desecration of Waqf Property.
27.	12/5/68	Defence Minister	Director of Waqf Council	Protest against the demolition of Moslem Waqf.
28.	28/5/68	Military Governor	Moslem High Commission	Protest against the expropriation of Moslem holy places and Waqf property.
29.	12/6/68	Prime Minister	Custodian of Magharbah Waqf	Protest of expropriation of the beneficiary Waqf's real estate.
30.	12/6/68	Prime Minister	Director of Jerusalem Waqf	Protest against the expropriation of beneficiary Waqf's real estate.
31.	13/6/68	Prime Minister	" "	Protest against the expropriation of Waqf property.
32.	15/6/68	Military Governor	Moslem High Commission	Protest against the demolition and expropriation of Moslem Waqf.

<i>No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Israeli recipient</i>	<i>Sender</i>	<i>The protest</i>
33.	11/7/68	Prime Minister	President of the Moslem High Commission.	Protest against the excavations taking place in Moslem Waqf lands.
34.	23/9/68	Defence Minister	Notables of Al-Khalil (Hebron)	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Abraham Mosque.
35.	26/9/68	Defence Minister	Moslem leaders	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Abraham Mosque.
36.	28/9/68	Prime Minister	President of Waqf Council	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Abraham Mosque.
37.	28/9/68	Military Governor	Notables of Hebron	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Abraham Mosque.
38.	13/10/68	Defence Minister	Notables of Hebron	Protest against the demolition of steps leading to Abraham Mosque.
39.	14/10/68	Military Governor	Moslem High Commission	Protest against the excavations in Waqf territory.
40.	16/10/68	Defence Minister	President of Waqf Council	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Al Aqsa Mosque.

248

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General on Israel's Violation of the Armistice Agreement and the Cease-fire Resolution.¹

February 13, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention a grave Israeli violation of the Armistice Agreement and the cease-fire resolution.

Yesterday, 11 February, at 11.10 hours local time, the Israeli armed forces shelled the villages of Safi and Fefah south of the Dead Sea using mortar and field artillery for thirty minutes.

At 12.30 of that same day eight Israeli jet fighters and a helicopter raided Ghor Al-Safi and bombed the area for ninety minutes using napalm bombs.

As a result, six Jordanian soldiers were killed and ten others wounded, and property was heavily damaged.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General

Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

249

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General on Israel's Violations of Security Council Resolution 252 of 21 May, 1968, on Jerusalem.²

February 13, 1969

On 8 February 1969 my Government requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the grave Israeli continued violations of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968.

Your Excellency will recall that Security Council resolution 252 (1968) called upon Israel "to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem".

¹ U.N. doc. S/9006. Also issued under the symbol A/7510.

² U.N. doc. S/9010. Also issued under the symbol A/7512.

Instead of complying with the above directives, the Israeli authorities proceeded to enact a new legislation, i.e. Administrative Regulation Law 1968, to complete their hold on the Holy City and its people.

Your Excellency will also recall that consideration of our complaint was deferred in view of an Israeli decree extending the deadline for the coming into force of the above-mentioned law from 23 February to 23 May 1969.

Far from solving the problem, this postponement resulted only in some alleviation of the immediacy of the Jordanian complaint. This measure allowed for a little extension of the time-limit during which efforts could be exerted for the repeal of the above legislation and the dissuasion of the Israeli authorities from their determination to confront the world with the annexation of Jerusalem as a fait accompli.

My Government feels that Your Excellency would greatly facilitate the task of the Council if, by virtue of the authority vested in you, and in pursuance of Security Council resolution 252 (1968), you would call on the Israeli authorities to comply with the Security Council resolution and to rescind without delay all legislations that violate it.

In view of the urgent character of this matter, the Jordanian Government would be grateful if Your Excellency would take the necessary steps to furnish the Security Council with a report on the implementation of resolution 252 (1968) of the Security Council as soon as possible.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and General Assembly.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

250

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council on Israel's Aggression against the Capital of Jordan and its Suburbs.¹

March 17, 1969

Further to my letter of yesterday 16 March (S/9083) and upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention further Israeli attacks for the third consecutive day.

Today 17 March 1969, at 08:10 hours local time, two Israeli jet fighters bombed and strafed the Addasiyah area near the capital Amman. Again, rockets, napalm and machine-guns were used.

At 09:10 hours local time, two other Israeli jet fighters raided the areas of Manshiyah and Shunah Al-Shamaliyah in the North. The Israelis bombed and strafed these areas intermittently until 09:30, using rockets and machine-guns.

As a result, one civilian was seriously wounded, two cars destroyed and the crops badly damaged.

The new Israeli policy of aggression aimed at the capital of Jordan and its suburbs is intended to intimidate the people and undermine efforts for peace in the area and thus further complicate an already deteriorating situation.

May I request this letter to be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

¹ U.N. doc. S/9085.

251

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council on Israel's Aggression against Jordanian Citizens in the West Bank.¹

March 21, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention serious and arbitrary Israeli measures against the Arab population under Israeli occupation and in particular those living in Arab Jerusalem.

In the first week of this month hundreds of innocent Jordanian citizens were detained arbitrarily and tortured; religious and secular leaders were arrested and imprisoned; schools were attacked and students brutally beaten; several houses were completely demolished.

In the cities and towns of Jerusalem, Nablus, Al-Khalil (Hebron), Gaza, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Beir Zeit, mass arrests were carried out. Information received today shows that a new wave of arrests has included larger groups of Arab women and teen-age girl students from Nablus, Gaza and Jerusalem.

Mrs. Isam Abdul Hadi, President of the Palestine Women's Union, was also arrested and imprisoned. More than 250 persons including elderly women were imprisoned and tortured.

In an unprecedented move the Israeli authorities arrested the Anglican Reverend, Elia Khouri, in Ramallah, and closed and sealed the Anglican Church there. People of all walks of life protested against this. Women in Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Beit Sahur took refuge in their churches and protested against such measures. Hunger strikes have taken place in churches and mosques in many other parts of the occupied territories.

Christian and Moslem leaders, some of whom were expelled from Jerusalem, sent a cable to Your Excellency on this question. The text of this cable is attached herewith (see annex I).

Dr. Nabih Muammer, the Director of the Makasid Philanthropic Hospital, situated on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem, and the only

surgeon of the hospital, whose services are indispensable, was also arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned.

Physicians in a meeting held in Makasid Hospital on 9 March 1969 issued a declaration condemning these and other Israeli measures. The text of their declaration and protest is also attached to my letter (see annex II).

On 2 March 1969, two high school girls were attacked by Israeli soldiers and the girls and teachers were savagely beaten. In Ramallah Secondary School, a teacher lost consciousness and many girls were brutally beaten and injured. The scene in Bethlehem Secondary School was not different. While holding a sit-in peaceful strike in their school, the girls were suddenly attacked by Israeli soldiers and savagely beaten. The Secretary of the Municipal Council of Bethlehem together with sixteen students were also beaten and imprisoned. The Mayor of Bethlehem protested vehemently to the Military Governor of this area.

Moreover, the destruction of Arab houses continues. In the first two weeks of this month, several houses were destroyed; six in Jerusalem, four in Gaza, four in Ramallah, three in Al-Khalil (Hebron), two in Nablus and one in Beir Zeit.

Teddy Kollek, whom the Israelis have illegally declared as the Mayor of Arab Jerusalem, expressed his satisfaction that the houses in "his" city were bulldozed rather than dynamited!

In Arab Jerusalem, Israel continues to put into effect further measures to consolidate its illegal annexation of the city. The citizens have expressed their rejection of such measures. Their latest protest and rejection were addressed to Your Excellency, the original copy of which (in Arabic) and its translation are attached (see annex III).

Expulsion of Jordanian citizens, especially young men, continues to be a corner-stone of the Israeli policy towards the occupied Arab territories. On 4 March 1969, after one year of torture and imprisonment, seven young Palestinians were expelled. These were Hamdan Hamad, Ibrahim Hamad, and Suleiman Safadi of Rafah, Ibrahim Abu Ismael and Yasser Suleiman of Khan Yunis, Mohammad Barakat of Gaza and Gabir Abu Farah of Jabalia refugee camp, Gaza.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9102. Also issued under the symbol A/7531.

Your Excellency will recall that, in accordance with Security Council resolution 259 (1968), you have submitted a report (document S/8851 dated 14 October 1968) informing the Council of Israel's refusal to abide by its resolution, and therefore as Your Excellency reported, you "have not been able to give effect to the decision of the Security Council". This report has not been discussed by the Council yet.

The above Israeli measures increase daily in intensity and cruelty. This fact makes the consideration of your report an urgent necessity. More so since Israel, instead of complying with Security Council resolution 237 (1967), "to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants", is tightening her grip on them.

No attitude of indifference, Mr. Secretary-General, should be allowed to prevail in the face of such criminal Israeli actions. Nor should the Israeli policy of distortion and deceit be permitted to conceal the truth about the Israeli occupation, which continues to pose a most serious challenge to the United Nations authority.

I have the honour to request that this letter and its annexes, together with the original text in Arabic and the signatures that appear therein, be circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX I

Excellency,

We, Christian and Moslem religious heads in Jordan's capital, join voices of Moslem and Christian masses who stayed all today in Mosques and Churches in silent protest and solidarity against atrocities perpetrated by Israeli authorities in our territories under occupation. We appeal to human conscience to put an end to Palestinian tragedy and take effective measures for return of Arab refugees and expellees to their native land. We strongly condemn repressive measures and policy of intimidation and expulsion applied against Arab inhabitants and directed lately against innocent ladies and school girls. We demand full restoration of Arab rights and

return to us of our Holy Places and shrines within an inseparable national unity for our Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in both banks. May we request the Secretary-General to distribute this message to all United Nations delegations.

Respectfully,

Archbishop Deadoras,	Sheikh Abdallah Goshe
Archbishop Assaf,	Sheikh Abdelhamid Sayeh
Bishop Simman,	Sheikh Abdallah Galhily

His Excellency UThant
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, N.Y.

ANNEX II

Declaration of physicians against Israeli arbitrary and illegal measures in Jerusalem

We, Arab physicians in Jerusalem, met in the Jordanian Government Hospital of Jerusalem on 9 March 1969 to state our position and declare our opinion as a group who feel especial and humane responsibilities particularly under the present circumstances and dangerous events that haunt our country, and decided to have a sit-in strike for two days in the hospital to express what has befallen us to world public opinion and to reject all illegal steps and measures taken by the Israeli occupying authorities, which include:

1. Israel's illegal annexation of Jerusalem and what other steps followed to amalgamate the professional, economic and administrative activities against the wish and will of the people, not to mention its violations of international law and United Nations resolutions;

2. Confiscation of the newly built Jordanian Government Hospital in Jerusalem's Sheikh Jarrah Quarter and transform it to meet other purposes (Israeli police headquarters);

3. The Israeli Government's decision to close down the old hospital, the Blood Bank, Government Medical Laboratories, T.B. Sanitarium Centre and Department of Health and hence obliterate all Arab medical services;

4. Arbitrary imprisonment of some Arab physicians and expulsion of others which adversely affect medical treatment in the occupied territories;

5. Imprisonment of Dr. Nabih Muamer, the Director and only surgeon of the Makassid Philanthropic Hospital on the Mount of Olives. Dr. Muamer's services are indispensable under the circumstances.

We, as a group, feel very saddened that the occupying authorities go on with their arbitrary measures of detainment, imprisonment, intimidation and torture of thousands of citizens of all ages and groups, students (boys and girls), religious men, elderly men and women, unabated.

In our sit-in strike we add our voices to others of our people who preceded us hoping that world public opinion and world institutions and people of free conscience wherever they are will stand by us and add their voices to ours. We are, after all, seeking truth, justice and peace.

9 March 1969

ANNEX III

We, the undersigned, representatives of different groups and sectors of Arab Jerusalem strongly condemn the arbitrary and inhuman measures being practised by the Israeli occupation authorities in violation of the United Nations principles, international agreements and both the Geneva and Hague Conventions.

Measures by the Israeli occupation authorities towards Jerusalem, such as the unilateral annexation of the Holy City and its suburbs and the illegal legislations which aimed at consolidating this annexation, the obliteration of the Arab character of the city, the replacement by Jewish settlers of expelled Arabs, and the confiscation of Arab land and property, are taken in utter disregard of the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions which called upon Israel to desist forthwith from taking any measure that tends to change the status of Jerusalem. All these measures demonstrate Israel's disregard for world public opinion and the principle of self-determination of the Arabs under occupation as well as her expansionist intentions and ambitions in this area.

We note with increasing concern that the latest Israeli legislation forces all professionals, companies, societies, hospitals and other Arab institutions to register as Israeli bodies. This is only

one attempt to liquidate the Arab character of Jerusalem, transform it into a Jewish city as part of Israeli expansionist plans and therefore increase the tension in the area.

We request Your Excellency and appeal to world conscience and freedom-loving people in all corners of the world to stand by us in our just cause and fight to protect our entity against the Israeli policy of liquidation. We further request you to help stop the Israeli plans of aggression and expansion which is a prerequisite for a just peace in the area.

(Signed by a number of Jerusalem dignitaries, professionals, leaders of women's organizations, societies and trade unions.)

His Excellency the Secretary-General
United Nations

252

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council.¹

March 26, 1969

Further to my letters of 16 and 17 March (documents S/9083 and S/9085) concerning active Israeli aggression on centres of civilians in Jordan I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that today, 26 March 1969, Israeli jet fighters brutally attacked Jordanian villages and civilian centres in the area of Es Salt.

At 14.30 hours local time, Israeli jets attacked rest houses and winter resorts in Ein Hazar one kilometre from Es Salt City. These resorts are frequently visited by civilian citizens. The main roads connecting the villages around Es Salt and the city itself were also raided, bombed and strafed. Heavy bombs and rockets were used.

As a result of these Israeli attacks and from information received from my Government so far, 17 civilians were killed and 25 wounded, three of them seriously. Among those killed was an entire

¹ U.N. doc. S/9113.

family from the Kuloob tribe, two students walking on their way back from school and a 12-year-old boy.

Many of the casualties were elderly women and children. Six houses and a number of trucks were destroyed. The attacks caused serious and heavy damage to the main roads linking the villages to the city of Es Salt. One of the Israeli rockets left a 10-metre-deep pit. Some have not exploded.

In my letter to Your Excellency dated 16 March (document S/9083) I reminded the Council that "if the Israeli use of napalm and other destructive weapons, in brutal defiance of the United Nations cease-fire resolution, is allowed to go unchecked, the Israelis will continue to embark upon more violations and acts of aggression". Today, the Israelis executed another grave attack causing heavy loss of life and damage to property.

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider these continuous and grave Israeli violations and to adopt more adequate and effective measures to check Israeli acts of aggression and restore international peace and security.

May I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA

Ambassador
Permanent Representative

253

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council on Israel's Military Action against the Jordanian Town of Aqaba.¹

April 8, 1969

Upon instruction from my Government I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention a very grave Israeli attack against the Jordanian city of Aqaba.

Today, 8 April 1969 at 0530 hours local time, two Israeli Mirage jet fighters raided the city of Aqaba using both rockets and bombs.

The results of this treacherous attack were as follows:

1. Eight Jordanian civilians were killed: three men, one woman, two boys and two girls.

2. The Reverend George Demon, Head of the Catholic church, and his mother, Jean Philic, both Belgian citizens, were seriously wounded.

3. Nine civilians were wounded, two of them seriously.

4. The Catholic church and a house were severely damaged. Twelve other houses, the girls' high school, and the police headquarters were also badly damaged.

I will keep Your Excellency informed of any further details.

Your Excellency may recall that the Security Council in its resolution 262 (1968) issued "a solemn warning to Israel that if such acts were to be repeated, the Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to its decisions".

Only on 1 April 1969 the Security Council, in its resolution 265 (1969), condemned "the recent premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions". It also warned, "once again that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would have to meet to consider more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such attacks".

The continued Israeli violations of the cease-fire resolutions and the Armistice Agreement make it incumbent on the Security Council to take more effective measures in order to check Israeli acts of aggression against civilians and their spiritual and educational institutions such as churches and schools, and restore international peace and security.

May I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA

Ambassador
Permanent Representative

¹ U.N. doc. S/9138.

254

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General on Israeli Treatment of Prominent Arabs in the Occupied Territories.¹

April 17, 1969

Further to my letter of 21 March 1969 (A/7531, S/9102) in which I informed Your Excellency of the Israeli arbitrary measures in the occupied Arab territories, including the arrest of the Reverend Elia Khoury, Pastor of the Anglican Church in Ramallah, and Dr. Nabih Muammer, the Director and only surgeon of the Makasid Philanthropic hospital in Jerusalem.

Yesterday, 16 April, after a period of more than a month and a half of imprisonment and torture, both the Reverend Khoury and Dr. Muammer were expelled by the Israeli authorities to the East Bank of the Jordan.

This arbitrary measure is part of the Israeli policy to expel Arab personalities from the West Bank. The list includes doctors, clergymen, lawyers, mayors, teachers and professionals from all walks of life.

This measure is part of a policy to vacate the West Bank of its leaders and professionals as a means of pressure on the population in the whole of the occupied territories, in complete defiance of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) calling upon Israel "to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place".

May I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and General Assembly.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA

Ambassador
Permanent Representative

255

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council on Israel's Attacks on Civilian Targets in Jordan.²

April 21, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention grave and intensive Israeli attacks against civilian targets in Jordan.

On 19 April at 1700 hours local time, Israeli forces opened fire on the villages of Aqraba, Kufer Asad and Soum, using medium machine-guns, 106 mm guns and heavy artillery situated in the occupied Syrian heights.

At 1940 hours local time, Israeli forces opened their machine-gun fire on Adasiyyah area.

Yesterday, 20 April, at 0655 hours local time, Israeli forces opened fire from medium machine-guns, tanks, and heavy mortar on the villages of Adasiyyah, Baqourah and Tel-El-Arbacen.

At 0915 hours local time, the area of Tel-El-Arbacen was subjected to shelling from field artillery.

At 1140 hours local time, Israeli forces in the occupied Syrian heights extended their attack and shelled the areas of Kufer Asad and Saham.

At the same time, two Israeli jets bombed the village of Az-Zemal.

The Israeli shelling continued until 1220 hours local time, injuring a soldier and destroying three civilian cars.

Today, 21 April, at 0540 hours local time, Israeli forces embarked on a heavy shelling of the whole northern area using tanks, mortars and heavy artillery together with aerial bombardment.

Civilians and their villages, as well as irrigation projects, were the subjects of these Israeli shelling and bombing. I will keep Your Excellency informed of further details since the Israeli forces went on with their attack to the despatch of the above information.

I have the honour to request that this letter be

¹ U.N. doc. S/9162. Also issued under the symbol A/7542.

² U.N. doc. S/9167.

circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

256

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General Transmitting a List of Israeli Attacks on Jordan in Violation of the Cease-fire Resolutions, 17 February-9 May, 1969.¹

May 16, 1969

Further to my letter of 4 March 1969 (A/7520, S/9039) and upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention a further series of Israeli attacks against Jordan in direct violation of the cease-fire resolution and the Armistice Agreement.

The Israeli armed forces continue to attack Jordanian farms, villages and towns using destructive weapons such as napalm bombs. Their attacks are premeditated and indiscriminate. They are usually admitted by Israeli officials and military men who think of their raids in terms of "lessons".

Only the day before yesterday, 14 May, and at 18.30 hours local time two Israeli fighter-bombers bombed and strafed the area of Tabaqat Fahl in Irbid district using rockets and machine-guns for ten minutes. As a result six civilians were killed, three of whom were women, and another wounded. One house was destroyed.

On 9 May an Israeli army unit crossed the Jordan River to Wadi Yabis and dynamited five houses. Upon its return the patrol mined the area. As a result three civilians were killed when their car hit one of these mines.

These types of Israeli attacks are part of a pattern which the Israelis have been following and which is obvious from the attached list of more than eighty incidents.

I have the honour to request that this letter

together with the list be circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

1. On 17 February 1969, at 08.40 hours local time, two Israeli "Mystère" jets attacked the area south of Sheikh Hussein bridge for fifteen minutes using napalm. As a result crops were burnt and destroyed.

2. On 19 February, at 04.55 hours, Israeli forces opened fire on Jordanian positions near Abu Es-Sous in the north using machine-guns and mortar artillery. Fire was returned and exchanged until 05.20.

3. On 23 February, at 13.45 hours, four Israeli half-tracks crossed the Armistice Line in the Gharandal area in Wadi Araba. Jordanian forces exchanged fire. Seven Israeli jet fighters rocketed and strafed the area intermittently for one hour and twenty minutes. As a result two soldiers were wounded and the police station building damaged. A number of the Israeli attackers were hit and three of their half-tracks damaged.

4. On 24 February, at 21.30 hours, Israeli forces opened fire on the areas of Adasiyyah and Baqurah using machine-guns and mortar artillery. Fire was returned and exchanged for twenty minutes.

5. On 25 February, at 08.15 hours, two Israeli "Mystère" jets rocketed and strafed the villages of Nushan and Um-Tutah for half an hour. The raid was resumed at 09.05 hours, using napalm bombs. As a result crops were destroyed.

6. On 25 February, at 17.05 hours, the villages of Safi and Feifah were shelled. At the same time four Israeli jet fighters rocketed and strafed Safi. Israeli shelling and bombardment continued until 17.55 hours.

7. On 26 February, at 10.25 hours, Israeli military aircraft violated Jordanian air space over the Irbid district but were forced to return.

8. On 27 February, at 12.30 hours, Israeli forces opened fire on Jordanian positions near

¹ U.N. doc. S/9211. Also issued under the symbol A/7555.

Khalid bridge using machine-guns and artillery. Fire was returned and exchanged.

9. On 28 February, at 01.05 hours, Israelis opened fire on the Adasiyyah area. Fire was returned and exchanged until 01.25 hours.

10. On 28 February, at 10.45 hours, two Israeli jets bombed the area north of Karama using rockets. The same area was shelled. Shelling was returned and exchanged until 11.50 hours.

11. On 1 March, at 07.50 hours, two Israeli jets bombed and strafed the area south of Sheikh Hussein bridge using rockets. This continued intermittently until 08.35 hours. Property was damaged.

12. On the same day, at 20.00 hours, the Israelis opened fire on the village of Baqura. Fire was returned.

13. On 2 March, at 13.10 hours, the Israelis shelled Karama. Shelling was returned and exchanged until 13.50 hours.

14. On 5 March, at 17.15 hours, Israeli forces opened fire on the area of Um-Sudra north of Damiya bridge using machine-guns and artillery. At 18.00 hours shelling was extended to the area of Qarn. Shelling was returned and exchanged until 18.50 hours.

15. On 6 March, at 20.10 hours the Israeli opened fire on the area of Rajm Al-Maqrah in Wadi Araba. Fire was returned and exchanged until 20.45 hours.

16. On 7 March, at 16.05 hours, Israeli forces opened fire on the area south-west of Kuriemah using tank artillery. Fire was returned and exchanged until 16.30 hours.

17. On 8 March, at 21.35 hours, Israeli forces opened fire on Jordanian positions near Kattaf.

18. On 9 March, at 07.05 hours, two Israeli "Mystère" jets raided the village of Nushan using rockets and napalm for five minutes.

19. On the same day, at 14.40 hours, Israeli forces opened their machine-gun fire and artillery on the village of Um Es-Sous. Fire was returned and exchanged.

20. Again on the same day, at 21.20 hours, Israelis opened their machine-gun fire and mortar artillery on the villages of Baqurah and Shuna Shamaliyyah. Fire was returned and exchanged until 22.15 hours.

21. Still on the same day, at 23.40 hours, Israelis shelled Jordanian positions near King Hussein bridge. Shelling returned and exchanged.

22. On 13 March, at 20.40 hours, the village of Baqurah was shelled. Fire was returned.

23. On 15 March, at 06.35 hours, four Israeli jet fighters bombed and strafed the villages of Shuma Sharmaliyyah, Waqqas and Zamaliyyah (see S/9083 and Corr.1). As a result two farmers were killed, nine wounded, five of them seriously. Seven civilian cars and a tractor were destroyed or damaged.

24. On 16 March, at 06.30 hours, Israeli jet fighters raided civilian centres in the areas of Amman, the capital, Jerrash and Shubak using rockets, machine-guns and napalm. In Shubak the raid continued until 06.40 hours, in Amman and Jerrash until 07.40 hours. In the Jerrash area two civilians were killed and four others wounded. Two soldiers were wounded, one seriously. Four vehicles were destroyed. In Shubak one civilian was killed and another wounded. In Amman one civilian car was damaged.

25. On 17 March, at 08.10 hours, two Israeli jet fighters raided Adasiyyah area using rockets, machine-guns and napalm. At 09.10 hours, two other jets raided Manshiyyah and Shuma Shamaliyyah using rockets and machine-guns. The raids were intermittent and were ceased at 09.30 hours. As a result one civilian was wounded, two cars damaged and crops burnt.

26. On 19 March, at 09.25 hours, Israeli forces opened their machine-gun fire on Jordanian positions near the village of Nushan. Fire was returned and exchanged for twenty-five minutes.

27. On the same day, at 11.05 hours, four Israeli jets bombed and strafed the Al-Safin area south of Manshiyya. Rockets, machine-guns and napalm were used. One vehicle was damaged.

28. On 20 March, at 12.45 hours, the Israelis shelled the area of Deir Abu Said. Shelling returned and continued until 13.15 hours.

29. On 21 March, at 14.15 hours, Israeli forces opened their 105 mm artillery fire on Jordanian positions near Mindassa and Um Nakhlah. At 15.55 hours two "Mystère" jets bombed the same areas as well as positions east of King Hussein bridge. As a result one Israeli

"Mystère" was shot down and the pilot killed and two Israeli half-tracks were destroyed.

30. On 22 March, at 22.00 hours, the Israelis shelled the villages of Shumah and Mashru using mortar. Shelling was returned. The Israelis extended their shelling to Kufor Asad village. Shelling was ceased at 22.40 hours.

31. On 24 March, at 09.00 hours, the Israelis opened their machine-gun fire on Jordanian positions near Sheikh Hussein bridge. Fire returned and exchanged intermittently until 10.10 hours.

32. On the same day, at 16.30 hours, the Israelis opened fire on Jordanian positions near Um-Nakhlah. Fire was returned and exchanged until 16.45 hours.

33. On 27 March, at 14.30 hours, Israeli jet fighters attacked Ein-Hizeir near Es-Salt (see S/9113, S/9121). As a result eighteen civilians were killed and twenty-five wounded, ten of them seriously. Six trucks and a taxi were damaged or destroyed. Six houses damaged.

34. On 30 March, at 06.20 hours, two Israeli "Mystère" jets raided the area of Tel Abu Al-Niaj using napalm bombs. Bombing was ceased at 06.45 hours.

35. On the same day, at 07.05, the Israelis opened fire on Adasiyya and Baqura using machine-guns and tank artillery. Fire was returned and exchanged until 08.05 hours.

36. Still on the same day, at 22.00 hours, the Israelis opened their machine-gun fire and mortar artillery on Jordanian positions in the northern part of the Jordan valley. Fire was returned and exchanged until 22.15 hours.

37. On 2 April, at 13.25 hours, Israeli forces opened fire on Jordanian positions in Manshiyya area. Fire was returned and exchanged until 13.55 hours.

38. On 3 April, at 15.10 hours, the Israelis opened fire on Jordanian positions near Al-Makheiba. Fire was returned and exchanged for five minutes.

39. On the same day, at 19.20 hours, Israelis opened their artillery fire using 81 mm mortar and 4.2'' on Qarn and Abu Es-Sous. Fire was returned and intermittently exchanged until 20.30 hours.

40. On 6 April, at 06.25 hours, Israeli forces

opened fire on the villages of Adasiyyah and Tel El-Arbein using mortar and tank artillery and machine-gun fire. Fire was returned.

41. On 7 April, at 06.40 hours, the Israelis shelled the area of Sheikh Hussein bridge. Shelling was returned and intermittently exchanged until 07.35 hours.

42. On 8 April, at 05.30 hours, Israeli fighter bombers attacked the Jordanian port of Aqaba (see S/9138). As a result eight civilians were killed and nine wounded. A church, a school and twelve other houses were destroyed.

43. On 9 April, at 11.45 hours, Israeli forces opened fire on the area south of Sheikh Hussein bridge using mortar and 106 mm artillery. Fire was returned and exchanged until 12.20 hours.

44. On the same day, at 18.15 hours, Israeli forces opened fire on Jordanian positions near Mindassa using machine-gun and mortar artillery. Fire was returned in self-defence.

45. On 10 April, at 07.45 hours, the Israelis opened fire on the village of Baqura using machine-guns and tank artillery. Fire was returned.

46. On 11 April, at 20.00 hours, Israeli forces shelled the Kureimeh area. Shelling was returned and intermittently exchanged until 20.25 hours.

47. On 12 April, at 05.45 hours, Israelis opened their machine-gun fire and tank artillery on Jordanian positions near Manshiyya. Fire was returned.

48. On the same day, at 21.05 hours, the Israelis opened their fire on the village of Abu Es-Sous. Fire was returned.

49. On 13 April, at 10.10 hours, Israelis opened fire on Jordanian positions near Abu Sudra. Fire was returned.

50. On the same day, at 12.10 hours, the Israelis opened their machine-guns on Jordanian positions near Damya bridge. Fire was returned and exchanged until 13.10 hours.

51. Still on the same day, at 12.55 hours, two Israeli jets bombed and strafed the Karameh area. This was followed by shelling of the same area. Fire was returned and exchanged until 13.45 hours.

52. Again on the same day, at 14.00 hours, Israeli forces opened their machine-gun fire

and tank artillery on Jordanian positions near Um Al Shurat bridge and Jiniedya. Fire was returned and intermittently exchanged until 15.15 hours.

53. On 15 April, at 06.50 hours, Israeli forces opened fire on Jordanian positions near Adassiya using machine-guns and tank artillery. Fire returned and exchanged until 07.25 hours. Israeli fire and shelling was resumed at 08.35 hours and exchanged until 10.35 hours. Two Jordanian soldiers were wounded.

54. On the same day, at 10.05 hours, the Israelis opened fire on Manshiyya area. Fire was returned.

55. At 20.10 hours, the Israelis opened their machine-gun fire and mortar artillery on Jordanian positions near Um Es-Sous. Fire was returned and exchanged until 21.40 hours. One Jordanian officer was killed.

56. On 16 April, at 06.25 hours, the Israelis opened fire on Jordanian positions near Prince Abdullah bridge using machine-guns, tank and mortar artillery. Fire returned and exchanged until 09.10 hours.

57. At 07.10 hours, two Israeli jet fighters raided Nu Khan and Um Tutah using napalm bomb and rockets.

58. On the same day, at 13.00 hours, Israeli forces opened fire on Jordanian positions near Damya bridge. Fire was returned and exchanged until 13.15 hours.

59. On 16 April, at 18.10 hours, the Israelis opened their machine-gun fire and tank artillery on Jordanian positions near King Hussein bridge. Fire was returned. At 19.45 hours, the Israelis deployed heavy artillery. Shelling was returned and exchanged until 20.20 hours.

60. On 17 April, at 05.30 hours, the Israelis opened their machine-gun fire and tank and mortar artillery on Kattaf and Um-Tutah. Fire was returned and exchanged until 18.15 hours.

61. On 18 April, at 07.40 hours, the area of Tel El-Arbacin was the target of Israeli machine-gun and mortar artillery. Fire was returned and exchanged for ten minutes.

62. On 19 April, at 17.00 hours, the Israelis used the Syrian Heights to shell the villages of Aqraba, Sum and Kufr Asad. Shelling returned and exchanged until 19.30 hours. At 19.40 hours,

the Israelis opened their machine-gun fire on Jordanian positions near Adasiyyah.

63. On 20 April, at 06.55 hours, the Israelis opened fire on Adassiyah, Baqura and Tel-El-Arbacin using machine-guns, mortar and tank artillery. Fire was returned and exchanged until until 08.00 hours.

64. At 09.15 hours, the areas of Tel As-Sukar and Tel Al-Arbacin were shelled. Israeli shelling was extended at 11.40 hours to Kufr Asad, Sum, Semal. Later, Israeli aircraft bombed these areas using rockets. Fire returned.

65. On 21 April, at 05.40 hours, Israeli forces opened their machine-gun fire and artillery on Jordanian positions near Waqqas. Fire was returned. At 06.15 hours, Israeli jets bombed the same area by rockets and napalm for ten minutes.

66. At 06.40 hours, the areas of Deir Abu Said, Manshiyya and Shuna Sharmaliyyah were shelled. Shelling was returned. At 07.00 hours, the Israelis extended their shelling to the villages of Bariha, Sum, Mukhasha, Sama and Jaffien using field artillery. Shelling was returned. Simultaneously Israeli jets bombed and strafed these areas. As a result one soldier was killed and ten others wounded.

67. On 22 April, at 06.00 hours, Israeli planes attacked Jordanian villages in the north and in the south (see S/9173). As a result five civilians and five soldiers were killed and ten civilians and twenty soldiers wounded.

68. On 24 and 25 April, Mindassa was the subject of Israeli attacks. Machine-gun fire and artillery were used.

69. On 26 April, at 19.00 hours, Mindassa was attacked again. Fire was returned and exchanged until 19.20 hours.

70. On 27 April, at 06.05 hours, the Israelis opened their machine-gun fire on Jordanian farmers in the Adassiya area. Two of them were wounded.

71. On the same day, Israelis opened their mortar artillery fire on Jordanian positions near Mindassa. Fire was returned.

72. On 28 April, at 06.30 hours, the village of Baqura was the target of Israeli shelling. Fire was returned and exchanged until 07.00 hours.

73. On 28 April, at 13.05 hours, the areas of Baqura and Manshiyya were the targets of Israeli shelling. Fire was returned. The East Ghor Irrigation Canal was the subject of heavy Israeli shelling. As a result parts of the canal were damaged.

74. On 29 April, at 06.30 hours, Israeli forces shelled Zamaliya and Tel Al-Arbacin. At the same time four Israeli planes bombed and strafed the areas of Tel Sukar and Kattaf. Fire was returned.

75. At 10.00 hours, two Israeli planes bombed and strafed the area of Tel Sukar and Wadi Yabis. As a result one farmer was wounded and two trucks damaged.

76. Also on 29 April, at 16.45 hours, four Israeli fighter-bombers attacked the areas of Tel Sharhabeil and Wadi Yabis for ten minutes using rockets and machine-guns. As a result four civilians were killed and twelve houses destroyed (see S/9187).

77. At 22.00 hours, the Israelis opened their tank and mortar artillery fire on Jordanian positions near Shuma Sharmaliyyah. Shelling was returned and exchanged until 22.30 hours.

78. On 30 April, at 23.00 hours, Israeli forces on the Syrian Heights shelled the city of Irbid. Shelling was returned. As a result four civilians were wounded and four houses damaged.

79. On 1 May, at 13.45 hours, Israeli forces opened fire on Jordanian positions near Um Es-Sous using mortar artillery. Fire was returned and exchanged until 14.25 hours. One soldier was wounded.

80. On 2 May, at 05.40 hours, Israelis opened fire on Um Qais. Fire was returned and exchanged for five minutes.

81. On 3 May, at 21.00 hours, Israelis opened fire on Um Al-Shurat. Fire was returned and exchanged until 21.16 hours.

82. On 4 May, at 07.15 hours, Israelis opened their machine-gun and artillery fire on Manshiyya. Fire was returned and exchanged for ten minutes.

83. On the same day, at 12.50 hours, the Israelis heavily shelled the Meghtas area. Shelling was returned and intermittently exchanged until 14.50 hours.

84. Still on the same day, at 15.00 hours, four Israeli aircraft bombed and strafed the area of Shammath near Maan. As a result one civilian was wounded.

85. Again on the same day, at 16.45 hours, the Israelis opened their fire and shelled the area of Um Qais. Fire was returned and exchanged until 18.50 hours. As a result twelve houses, one truck and one bus were damaged.

86. In the evening of 9 May, an Israeli army unit crossed towards Wadi Yabis and dynamited five houses. Upon its return the patrol mined the area. As a result three civilians were killed and their car destroyed.

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council on Israel's Attack on the Jordanian Villages of Feifa and Safi.¹

May 22, 1969

Upon instruction from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention a premeditated Israeli attack against the Jordanian villages of Feifa and Safi, three miles inside Jordan territory, in violation of the cease-fire resolution and the Armistice Agreement.

Yesterday, 21 May 1969, at 09:00 hours local time, two Israeli companies, one consisting of tanks and the other of armored infantry, supported by jet fighters and helicopters crossed the Armistice Demarcation line south of the Dead Sea and attacked the villages of Safi and Feifa.

As a result of this wanton Israeli attack and according to information received so far casualties and damage to property in the village of Feifa were as follows:

1. Fatimah Awad Salamah, a nine year old girl was killed.

2. Five persons are lost: Suwalih Salih (60 years old), Aaizad Abu Hindah (40), Khameis Salim (18), Aawaid Udah (18), all farmers, and a child Musa Hussein (10).

¹ U.N. doc. S/9218.

3. Twenty houses, a school, a post office building and a grocery were destroyed.

4. Five bedouin tents and their contents were burnt.

5. A tractor, license No. 19383 belonging to Said Musa Al Habashinah, was looted.

In the village of Safi two soldiers were wounded and five houses destroyed.

It is clear that the Israeli attack was against civilians and their property and was publicly admitted by the Israeli authorities as substantiated by *The New York Times* of today.

I will keep Your Excellency informed of any further information.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council on Israel's Attacks on the East Bank of Jordan and Ghor El-Safi.¹

June 23, 1969

Further to my letter of 19 June 1969 (S/9271) and upon instruction from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention further Israeli acts of aggression against Jordan.

Yesterday, 22 June 1969, waves of Israeli jets raided several areas in the East Bank of Jordan.

At 10:50 hours local time two Israeli jets bombed and strafed the area of Ghor El-Safi, using rockets and machine-guns. As a result two soldiers were wounded.

At 11:30 an Israeli jet fighter intermittently attacked the village of Al-Aynah using rockets

and machine-guns. The raid continued for one hour. As a result one civilian was killed and four others wounded.

At 15:50 two Israeli jet fighters attacked a civilian car on the desert road near El-Hasa. Two civilians were wounded.

At 16:55 and until 17:20 two Israeli jets attacked Ein Al-Bayda near the town of Tafila. As a result five civilians were wounded and two civilian cars damaged.

At 14:30 Israeli jets attacked the area of Beir Mathkhour in Wadi Arabah. Two soldiers were wounded and two vehicles destroyed.

At 17:50 and until 18:55 six Israeli jet fighters attacked Zamalya area in the northern part of the Jordan valley. Two soldiers were wounded and two houses destroyed.

The above Israeli premeditated and indiscriminate raids, carried out by the Israeli Air Force, have resulted in the death of one civilian and the injury of seventeen, six of whom are soldiers.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

259

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council.²

June 26, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention further and intensified Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, concerning Jerusalem.

In this resolution, the Council considered that "all legislative and administrative measures and

¹ U.N. doc. S/9275.

² U.N. doc. S/9284.

actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status" and urgently called upon Israel "to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem".

In utter disregard to the will of the inhabitants of Jerusalem and instead of complying with the above directives the Israeli Government proceeded to enact a new legislation, i.e., Administrative Regulation Law 1968 (S/9149) which was to be put into force on 23 February and later extended to 23 May 1969. On 27 April 1969, further provisions and new regulations were exacted. Your Excellency will recall that on 8 February 1969, my Government requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council on this matter. This was deferred. But Israel continued to violate basic human rights in the Holy City and to take measures contrary to the provisions of resolution 252 (1968) and the United Nations Charter.

Jordan has already referred to the arbitrary arrests, detention, torture and demolition of houses and deportation (S/9001) and (S/9102) and (S/9197) committed by the Israeli authorities. On 9 June 1969, nine Jordanian citizens, four of them from Jerusalem, were expelled to the East Bank of Jordan. Only yesterday, 25 June, the Israeli authorities evicted more than eighty-eight persons, some of them forcibly, from the old city of Jerusalem. One of the buildings in the area evacuated belonging to Waqf, a Muslim religious and charitable institution, contained a mosque, a religious court and a school.

While Arab quarters, houses and public buildings have been demolished or emptied and inhabitants deported or evicted, the Israeli Government has been carrying its plans for the establishment of Israeli settlements in the city and re-peopling of its inhabitants.

These above Israeli illegal actions and planned measures and many others make a Security Council meeting imperative. Therefore, upon instructions from my Government, I request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the continued Israeli defiance of its resolution 252 (1968) on Jerusalem.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General Containing Mr. E. C. Hodgkin's Article Entitled "Grim Reports of Repression in Israel-Occupied Land", Published in The Times of 28 October, 1969.¹

November 10, 1969

With reference to Security Council resolution 237 (1967), calling upon the Government of Israel "to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities", and upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith an article by Mr. E.C. Hodgkin, entitled "Grim reports of repression in Israel-occupied land", published in *The Times* of 28 October 1969. It further shows the intensifications of Israeli measures of collective punishment against innocent civilians and their means of livelihood.

May I kindly request Your Excellency to arrange for the circulation of this letter and its enclosure as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

¹ U.N. doc. S/9501. Also issued under the symbol A/7758.

GRIM REPORTS OF REPRESSION IN ISRAEL-OCCUPIED LANDS

By E.C. HODGKIN

The author, who is Foreign Editor of *The Times*, has just returned from Israeli-occupied Jordan where he revisited places and people he has known for more than thirty years. In this article he records his verdict on the Israel occupation, which he describes as "profoundly depressing". Among the places he saw was the village of Halhul, between Bethlehem and Hebron, which is now reported to have been completely demolished by the Israel army, one of whose lieutenants had been killed in a bomb incident.

The Arabs on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip have now lived under Israel military occupation for nearly two and a half years. It is not to be expected that such an occupation will be popular; but what surprised me was the intensity with which the Israelis are hated everywhere by all sections of the population.

The mood is perhaps similar to that in occupied France at the beginning of 1942. The invaders' hopes of acceptance, and the invaded people's hope of a quick rescue, have vanished. Repression is severe, and acts of resistance are multiplying. Each adds fuel to the other. As yet the stage of massive reprisals and collective punishments has not been reached. But eventually, if things go on as they are now, it will come.

It has been suggested that Israel's occupation of Arab lands is somehow different — the occupiers more benign, or the occupied more resigned. This is not so. The Israelis are at least as determined as are the Russians in Czechoslovakia to crush all opposition and are in a better position than the Russians to do this. Measures currently being used include:

Deportation. About ninety Palestinians, as far as I could calculate, have so far been pushed over the border into Jordan. Most are people who were prominent in West Bank life — the former mayor of Jerusalem and the present mayor of Ramallah, for example; judges, lawyers, doctors, teachers, and so on.

Destruction of houses. On the latest pre-Halhul tally, 7,140 Arab houses have been blown up.

This includes entire villages which have been destroyed "for security reasons" but in the majority of cases the houses were blown up because somebody suspected of connexion with guerrilla activity was living in them. What particularly angers Arabs is that destruction often takes place as soon as a suspect is carried off. There is no waiting for him to be charged, let alone convicted. Nor does it matter if he is not the owner of the house. Innocent or guilty, tenant or visitor or owner, the explosives go in. Requisition of buildings is a lesser irritant, though the conversion of the brand-new hospital in east Jerusalem to police headquarters is a constant affront.

"LIGHT" SENTENCE

Imprisonment. Suspects are frequently held for months at a time without trial, without their whereabouts being known, and without lawyers or relatives being able to visit or contact them. Eventually they come before an Israel military court and have the services of an Israeli advocate. Sentences are very harsh indeed. The day before I visited Nablus, for example, it was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* that four members of a "terrorist cell" had been sentenced there — two, aged seventeen and twenty-one, to life imprisonment; one, aged eighteen, to thirty years, and one, aged sixteen, to twenty-five years. What the newspaper did not report was that in passing sentence on the sixteen-year-old the president of the court apparently remarked that, in view of the boy's youth and the fact that he had pleaded guilty, a light sentence would be imposed. It was not clear whether this was meant seriously or as a joke. Sentences of this order are reported almost daily.

Torture. A common belief in the occupied areas — held by all resident there, not only by the Arabs — is that anyone suspected of belonging to a guerrilla organization or of helping one in any way is tortured as a matter of routine, and there is a great body of evidence to support this belief. The methods reported to be used follow the pattern familiar from Algeria, Hungary, Viet-Nam and elsewhere, including electrical treatment as well as every form of beating. Torture is said to be carried out in the interrogation centres at the Russian Compound in Jerusalem, Sarafand camp, and Ashkelon gaol.

Curfews. These are a weapon of authority in every difficult situation. They can, however, be applied as precautionary measures or as punishments, and the Israelis prefer to use them as punishments. The example of Beit Sahur, just outside Bethlehem, is fresh in everyone's memory. This is a community of settled tribesmen, each family living in a small box-like stone house. It was near this straggling village that rockets were installed, two of which fell in Jerusalem last August. The Israelis claimed, no doubt with reason, that some of the villagers must have known what was going on. So a total curfew was imposed. For a week nobody was allowed to leave their house or to open a window. As the latrines are outside the houses, and as it is very hot in Palestine in August, the result was not pleasant. Outside, the livestock of the villagers died or was requisitioned. A modified curfew persisted for some weeks longer.

Passes and permits. Permits are needed for travel to or from Jordan and for residents in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip to visit Jerusalem which, with its surrounding villages, has been annexed by Israel. Already more than half the Arab population of Palestine is dispersed in the outside world; the separation of families is now greater than ever before and their reunion, temporary or permanent much more difficult.

Naturally, the Israelis say that everything is the fault of the guerrillas — the fedayin. If they would only stop their raiding and bomb throwing there would be no need for repression. Perhaps not. But it seems ingenuous to expect the Palestinian Arabs not to react to an alien military occupation as other people everywhere else react. Indeed, they have a stronger reason not to lie still because they fear that occupation is only the preliminary to annexation.

I must confess that when going around on the West Bank I found it difficult to avoid the conclusion that this is Israel's aim. Israelis see the Jordan River as historically and strategically a natural frontier. So the new settlements go up on the West Bank, the new buildings rise like mushrooms in and around Jerusalem, the new military roads and communications are constructed. These are evidence of a people determined to stay where they are.

The only inconvenience is the presence of

rather a lot of Arabs — 650,000 on the West Bank and another 450,000 in the Gaza Strip. As it would be much simpler if these were not there, every effort is being made to persuade them to go. The most important ones to be got rid of are those with education and authority. This covers most of the deportees (who, it must be assumed, will be followed by their families), and others who find life intolerable either because they have little work and therefore little money, or simply because there is a limit to their endurance of the day-to-day pressures of occupation.

All sections of the population worry particularly about their children. What is going to happen to the Arab schools? All schools have been threatened with closure if their pupils strike or demonstrate against the occupation authorities. Two schools in Nablus and one in Jenin (run by the United Nations) were in fact shut down during my visit. Moreover, all Government schools in the annexed Jerusalem area have been compelled to change from Jordanian to Israeli textbooks and examinations, so that the children start learning to read with such sentences as "I am an Israeli citizen". The prospect of their children having to follow an alien system of education — or having no education at all — is enough to make even the most patriotic think about throwing in their hand and leaving.

Simpler methods are used to speed the departure of simpler people. During the Beit Sahur curfew, for example, the villagers were repeatedly told that if they wanted to join King Husain in Jordan, military transport was available to take them to the border. Various bribes have been offered to make families emigrate. There is no need to evacuate the whole million; trimmed to half or even three-quarters of its size, and judiciously split up by new roads, garrisons, and settlements, the Arab population would be of little trouble.

A catalogue of repression like this is inevitably depressing, and it is more depressing than ever when related to a State so idealist — where its own people are concerned — as Israel. Many people simply believe that "it can't happen there". This may account partly for the double standard with which the West is often charged by the Arabs. If there are demonstrations in Prague against the Russian occupiers, they say, you applaud; if there are reports of torture in Greece

you insist on investigations; if bombs go off in Athens you say this is only to be expected, and cheer; if South Africa keeps "suspected terrorists" in gaol for months without trial you protest. But similar things can happen all the time in occupied Palestine, and the world remains indifferent.

USE OF FORCE

This is a main reason for the growth and persistence of the fedayin. The assumption that Palestine Arabs now make — and most other Arabs make it too — is that whatever other countries, and particularly Britain and the United States, may say about the need for a withdrawal by Israel they are not going to use any real pressure to secure it. So pressure must come from the Arabs themselves, and particularly from those most concerned — and hitherto least consulted — the Arabs of Palestine.

There seems to be virtual unanimity in the occupied territories that the only help is self-help, and that this means force. But there are many different ideas about what the political aim should be. Some feel that the occupation has such an appalling impact that it is worth paying almost any price to end it. Others say that a bargain which sent the Israelis back to their pre-1967 borders would solve nothing. The rump of Palestine would be as vulnerable as ever and all title to the other conquered territories would have to be given up. There is, however, widespread support for the idea of a handover of the occupied territories to the United Nations for a transitional period.

This may offer the only hope — if not of peace, at least of avoiding intensified suffering on both sides. Otherwise there is going to be a long drawn-out war.

All occupations are bad. Power slips more and more into the hands of extremists — the big stick on one side and the big bomb on the other. That is what is happening in what is left of Palestine. On the whole the Arabs there used to be probably the most adaptable, intelligent, and moderate of their race, anxious only to live and prosper in the land which has so long been their home. It is a tragedy that they are now being persecuted into a new diaspora by the armies and people of Israel.

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General Requesting the Circulation of the "Letters to the Editor", Published in "The Times" in Reply to E. C. Hodgkin's Article, to the Members of the General Assembly and the Security Council.¹

November 21, 1969

Further to my letter of 10 November 1969 (A/7758, S/9501), and with reference to the letter addressed to Your Excellency by the Permanent Representative of Israel (A/7766, S/9506) concerning the intensification of Israeli repressive measures as depicted by an article which appeared in the London *Times*, and upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request that the attached "Letters to the Editor" published in that newspaper, written by authoritative personalities, like the former Deputy Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA

Ambassador
Permanent Representative

A. Arabs under Israel: Reports of oppression

From Dr. M. MACHOVER

[30 October 1969]

Sir,

As an Israeli citizen now staying in London, may I express my sense of relief on reading the long overdue factual reports from the Israeli-occupied West Bank. To Mr. Brogan's account of the razing of Halhul (report, 27 October) and Mr. Hodgkin's general report of Israeli repressions in the West Bank (special article, 28 October) may I add the following comments.

Reports I get from Israel indicate that the situation in the Gaza Strip is even worse than in the West Bank. In Israel itself, those who come

¹ U.N. doc. S/9507. Also issued under the symbol A/7783.

out openly and consistently in protest against the occupation are being subjected to ever-mounting measures of repression by the authorities. For example, earlier this month five young Israelis (three Jews and two Arabs), members of the "Matzpen" group, have been arrested in Nazareth and Jerusalem for voicing their opposition to the official policy. Hundreds of other Israeli citizens are already imprisoned under administrative regulations without trial or charges.

One can only regret that, until now, most foreign correspondents in Israel failed to inform their readers of such facts.

Sincerely,

M. MACHOVER.

Chelsea College,
Manresa Road, S.W. 3,
28 October.

B. Homeless families

From Mrs. C.K. BAMPTON

[30 October 1969]

Sir,

Patrick Brogan reports in your today's issue from Halhul (West Bank of Jordan) that that village has been blown up by the Israel army in retaliation after one Israeli officer was killed there. He says sixty or seventy families have been rendered homeless and that means women and children, with winter coming on. Moreover, no time was given them to even save their food, clothes and furniture.

Surely everyone, including many Jews in this country, must feel this is an excessive punishment for the life of one man belonging to the army of occupation.

It would be unreasonable not to expect Arabs to fight back with any means at their disposal to regain their country, just as we would do if our land was taken over by a victorious army.

Jews have found homes in countries all over the world: should they not be the ones to press for justice for the Arabs of the Holy Land?

I am, Sir, yours, etc.,

N.M. BAMPTON
The Croft House,
Blairlogie, Stirling,
28 October.

C. Systematic policy

From Mr. DENNIS WALTERS,
Conservative M.P. for Westbury

[30 October 1969]

Sir,

Your Foreign Editor has performed a very valuable service by restoring credence in the integrity and objectivity of your reporting from within Israel and Israeli-occupied territory. It was a necessary, if depressing, experience to read the truth after a year in which the news from Israel had been sent by an Israeli citizen.

In July 1967, after an extensive visit to the East Bank of Jordan and a look at the occupied West Bank, Ian Gilmour and I wrote an article in *The Times* in which we described the repressive Israeli behaviour. We had seen some of the bulldozed houses, watched the refugees being harried and bullied as they crossed the River Jordan, and spoken to many objective witnesses, who had recounted innumerable acts of violence, brutality and torture. For two years this systematic policy of repression has continued, and it is time that it stopped; time that Israel was no longer allowed to get away with conduct which would be regarded as intolerable if perpetrated by any other State in the free world.

An Israeli candidate in the Jerusalem local elections recently told me that visiting foreign Parliamentarians were looked upon as the most gullible of people by the Israeli authorities. Today's letter by Gordon Oakes confirms this assessment. He even questions the accuracy of the blowing-up of houses and refers naively to slum clearance. He only has to look at the photograph on the front page of *The Times* of Monday, 27 October, and read the accompanying report. It has been happening all the time.

Your faithfully,

Dennis WALTERS

House of Commons,
29 October.

D. Similar reports

From Mr. J.M. JEFFERSON

[30 October 1969]

Sir,

To those who have been abused for bringing

back from their Middle East travels similar facts and reports of Israeli occupation to those of your Foreign Editor today, his "turnover article" is very encouraging. It may also encourage a wider audience to believe that, though the Arabs may be their own worst enemies, those who sympathize with the Palestinian Arab predicament are not as foolish, nor as unprincipled nor as ignorant of the facts as the great volume of counter-propaganda suggests.

This raises the question of whether the Israeli political establishment, and the Zionist movement in general, are not victims of their own propaganda and, by refusing to acknowledge the facts and the hatred which results, thus sow the seeds of their own destruction.

Yours faithfully,

J.M. JEFFERSON

la Ridgeway,

Wimbledon Common, S.W. 19,

28 October.

E. Reports in Britain

From Mr. MICHAEL WALL

[31 October 1969]

Sir,

Earlier this year I made two visits to East Jerusalem and the West Bank of Jordan. Your Foreign Editor's report on Israeli behaviour in these occupied territories exactly confirms what I heard and saw myself.

It has been worrying that so few of the facts now reported by Mr. Hodgkin have appeared in the British Press. It has been alarming that the correspondents of some newspapers — and I regret *The Times* must be included — have written that the Israelis have been firm, but humane in their treatment of the Arab population and that the occupation is being tolerated with goodwill when, from my own knowledge, the truth is entirely different.

It can be argued that the Israelis have no alternative to suppressing all overt opposition and deterring any popular support for the Palestinian resistance movements by harsh and even brutal action.

But it is indefensible that the facts should not be published.

Yours faithfully,

Michael WALL

41 Lamont Road, S.W. 10,

29 October.

F. Amnesty report

From Mr. MARTIN ENNALS

[31 October 1969]

Sir,

Mr. Edy Kaufman writes (28 October) "The last report of Amnesty International said that Israel prison conditions are quite in order, without there being any proof of torture."

In fact, the Amnesty International report has not yet been published as discussions are still continuing with the Israeli Government about a follow-up inquiry, and with the United Nations about submitting our report to their committee of experts.

We have said that "there is no evidence of ill-treatment within the prisons administered by the Israeli Prison Commissioner where the prisoners are sent after interrogation or trial". This clearly omits reference to ill-treatment of prisoners during interrogation. At no stage have we said that there was no proof of torture.

We would, of course, welcome any evidence which Mr. Hodgkin can give us.

Yours faithfully,

Martin ENNALS

Secretary General

Amnesty International,

Turnagain Lane

Farringdon Street, E.C. 4,

29 October.

G. Accumulated evidence

From Mr. DAVID HOLDEN

[31 October 1969]

Sir,

Inevitably, some of your correspondents are outraged by Mr. Hodgkin's account of Israel's

occupation of the West Bank of Palestine. Naturally, they think him gullible, fanciful or malicious. May I say, however, that his report confirms precisely my own impressions derived from a similar visit to the West Bank as much as two years ago and published in *The Sunday Times* in November 1967?

Like Mr. Hodgkin, I reported as fact stories of the demolition of houses, expulsions, etc., which I had either witnessed or been able to check to my satisfaction. Like him, I qualified my statements in matters where doubt still seemed possible. Like him, I was abused.

Yet, in two years, as far as I know, no one has been able to show that my facts were wrong, and in most of the apparently doubtful matters, evidence has steadily accumulated to show that my qualifications were needless. I have not had to retract a word. When all the current fuss has died away, I dare say Mr. Hodgkin will find himself equally vindicated.

Yours Faithfully,

David HOLDEN

London, W.C. 1,

30 October.

H. *Ultimate victims*

From Mr. CECIL HOURANI

[1 November 1969]

Sir,

This has been a black week for the Israeli and Zionist public relations machine in England. On Monday, 27 October, *The Times* published on its front page the report from Patrick Brogan (whom no one has hitherto accused of being pro-Arab) describing the destruction of an entire Arab village by the Israeli army in retaliation for the killing of an Israeli officer. Scenes from the destroyed village were shown on television the same evening. On Monday also an editorial in *The Times* traced with clarity the connexion between the Lebanese crisis and the fact that "there over the frontier sits Israel, waiting to exploit to the full all the quarrels and confusions of her Arab neighbours".

On Tuesday, Mr. Hodgkin published in the centre page of *The Times* the most candid and

revealing article on Israel's record as an occupier yet to be printed in the British Press. On the same day, Mr. Patrick Brogan let another black cat out of the bag in the columns of *The Times* when he wrote that "By the phrase 'secure and recognized boundaries' in the United Nations resolution of 1967, Mrs. Meir, General Allon and Mr. Dayan now mean extensive annexations and permanent Israel military control of the West Bank": in other words, they have no intention of withdrawing from occupied territories either before or after the negotiations which they are demanding from the Arabs.

But perhaps the biggest setback to the Zionist machine were the letters of protest from Mr. Kaufman and Mr. Gordon Oakes published this morning, which used the words "one-sided" and "slandorous" to describe Mr. Hodgkin's article. Do the Zionists and their friends have a monopoly on truth? Must the British Press publish only their version of things? Should news coming from Israel only filter through the net of the Israeli correspondents whom most of the major British newspapers and news media maintain in that territory?

But we should never forget — and this advice I address to the Israeli and Zionist publicists in particular — that public relations is not policy. The ultimate victims of public relations campaigns which are not based on truth or on valid policies are the people whose cause they are meant to promote. Illusions about the real nature of their occupation or the real feelings of the Arabs will not help the Israelis: their best friends are those who tell them the truth. Congratulations to *The Times* for all the cats it is letting out of bags!

Cecil HOURANI

London, N.W. 3,

29 October.

I. *In detention*

From Mr. CHRISTOPHER WALKER

[1 November 1969]

Sir,

Since your correspondents Messrs. Kaufman and Oakes (29 October) want evidence of Israeli torture, perhaps I could furnish them with some?

I should, however, make one observation first: evidence of torture is notoriously difficult to gather and to corroborate. This was recognized at Nuremberg: of the evidence that convicted the nazi war criminals, over 90 per cent came from the victims.

I was in Israel and the occupied territories in May. I spoke with the close relatives (brother, father and cousin) of three men who had been maltreated in the Israeli detention centre in Ashkelon. The men were guerrilla fighters who had been captured last October near Ramallah. Their leader's name was el-Qassim. The conviction came on 28 April of this year: after it, they were initially sent to Ramle gaol. Their relatives saw them there once and said they were in good health. Then they were moved to Ashkelon, because in Ramle they behaved in a defiant manner, emphasizing that they were Palestinians and refusing to recognize the legality of the Israeli judgement, or of Israel itself.

Their relatives first saw them in Ashkelon on 9 May, and noted that an appalling change had come over them; the shaven head of one was swollen and badly bruised; another could hardly speak, but pointed "in a vague manner" to his head; another seemed to have difficulty in hearing. The personalities of all seemed utterly changed — broken, as one put it to me.

With such a terrible and sudden physical and mental change, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion of torture — torture, moreover, after trial and conviction.

Their relatives were not lying to me; the distress and suffering on their faces was almost more eloquent than their own words.

Yours, etc.,

Christopher WALKER

9 Margaretta Terrace, S.W. 3,
30 October.

From Miss SAIDA ANWAR NUSSEIBEH

[1 November 1969]

Sir,

As a Palestinian woman who has suffered and witnessed Israeli occupation in Jerusalem, I would like to congratulate Mr. Hodgkin (28

October) on his fair reporting of the situation in occupied Palestine.

I took part in the first women's demonstration in Jerusalem in April 1968 protesting against the military parade which the Israelis were holding there, flouting the United Nations resolution. Our objective was to deliver a protest signed by all the women of Jerusalem to the military governor.

On our way, the Israeli forces attacked us with sticks, batons, kicking us with their boots and hitting us with anything they had to hand. I was personally punched in the stomach with an amplifier. We were then arrested, told we were no better than "prostitutes" and I was taken separately to an underground cell and interrogated for three hours in a shift system.

There was subsequently another demonstration by more women to obtain our release, and they were similarly treated.

Those of us who were wounded at 9.30 that morning, some seriously, were offered first aid at 3 p.m. that afternoon. We were treated as criminals, finger-printed, numbered and our photographs taken for future use against us.

Later I was summoned for trial, but I had already left Jerusalem.

Yours truly,

Saida NUSSEIBEH

65 Chesterfield Gardens, W. 1,
30 October.

J. Harsh pattern

From Mr. JOHN REDDAWAY

[3 November 1969]

Sir,

At the time of the 1967 war in the Middle East, I was serving as Deputy Commissioner-General of UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees] and continued in this post throughout the following twelve months. During this period, my work took me every two or three weeks to Gaza and the West Bank, where I would spend some days at a time travelling through those areas and visiting refugee camps, schools and training

centres, as well as the villages and towns where refugees were living outside the camps. On each occasion, I spent many hours in conversation with refugees, UNRWA staff, local mayors and *mukhtars* and Israeli officials. On the West Bank, I was usually accompanied by an Israeli military liaison officer for whose humanity and objectivity I acquired considerable respect.

I believe I thus had as good an opportunity as any visiting observer could well have had to learn at first hand and over an extended period what was going on in the occupied areas and to judge the truth of the conflicting reports about the character of Israel's military occupation. On this basis, I find Mr. Hodgkin's report sober and accurate. In general, it confirms and corresponds to my own observation.

The harsh pattern of the occupation was set in the days and weeks immediately following the hostilities. At a time when magnanimity in victory might have changed the whole political climate in the Middle East, that option was effectively removed from Israel's grasp by the actions of military commanders who, faced with the daunting and dehumanizing task of preserving security in occupied territory, set their Government down the easy descent to cruel repression.

It was in Rafah, at the southern edge of the Gaza strip, where the poorest of the poor among the refugees live, that I first witnessed towards the end of June 1967, the extremes to which the occupying forces were prepared to go in their efforts to subjugate the Arab population. A whole section of the refugee camp, containing the wretched homes of 144 families, had been systematically razed to the ground. In an adjacent area, the walls and roofs of about sixty dwellings had been partially destroyed, apparently by explosives and fire.

The refugees told me that this had been done in reprisal for the throwing of a grenade against an Israeli military vehicle. They said that the occupants of the first area had been moved out before their homes were destroyed, but that those in the second area were still in their beds in the early hours of the morning when grenades were tossed on to the roofs and into the yards of their houses. Many of the buildings collapsed and about forty people — men, women and children — were said to have died in the attack. I was shown one

large and several smaller graves among the rubble and in the pathways of the camp.

Some weeks later, UNRWA secured permission on public health grounds to exhume and rebury the dead. This was done under the supervision of senior UNRWA staff in Gaza. Twenty-three bodies were found in the graves.

Yours faithfully,

John REDDAWAY

19 Woodsyre,
Sydenham Hill, S.E. 26,
31 October.

K. *Common knowledge*

From Professor JOHN CARSWELL

[4 November 1969]

Sir,

May I congratulate Mr. Hodgkin, and you, Sir, for at last publishing the facts about what is going on from day to day in Israeli-occupied territory? These facts are common knowledge throughout the Middle East, but frankly I had begun to despair of ever seeing them reported objectively in the Western Press. Every attempt to make this sort of information more widely known seems to get squashed at once as Arab propaganda. Dare one hope that, for once, it may be allowed that the Arabs *do* have a case?

Yours faithfully,

John CARSWELL

3E Carlisle Place, S.W. 1,
29 October.

From Mr. TOM LITTLE

[4 November 1969]

Sir,

I agree with your leader on Saturday ("To Be Fair To Both") that it is wrong to suppose that the Israelis are a special people able to avoid the abuses common to occupying Powers when confronted by resistance from indigenous inhabitants. I would add that the reports of a good journalist are evidence in themselves; and as I know Mr. Hodgkin (article, 28 October) to be a

calm journalist of experience and integrity, I do not think his words can lightly be set aside merely by repeating that there is no evidence.

Unfortunately, there is a great deal. A very substantial dossier was prepared in 1968 by the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut. It is available to anyone who wants to see it and records carefully the statements of Arab men and women who have suffered torture, imprisonment without trial, destruction of their homes and expulsion from their country, and which lists people who have been killed since the June war. I suppose some people would consider this dossier to be inadmissible because it is Arab evidence, although I do not know who can better stand witness than the surviving victims.

But there is corroboration from Israelis, who are like other peoples also in that among them are those who abhor violence and the abuse of power. The murder of forty-seven Arabs, men, women and children, by Israeli frontier guards at Kafr Qsim on 25 October 1956, only became fully known as a result of Israeli newspaper pressure for the trial of the eleven guards responsible. They were found guilty, but their sentences were whittled down by judicial process, partial pardons and amnesties and the principal accused, who had been found guilty of killing forty-three Arabs in an hour was, on his release in 1960, given the post of Officer Responsible for Arab Affairs in Ramla.

So far as I know, there has not been any report yet of the trial of those who killed fifteen Arabs in almost identical circumstances at Khazaa, near Khan Yunis, on 29 December 1967. The Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* reported, on 12 October 1967, that two Arabs had been killed by an Israeli sergeant and it has never been suggested that they were or had any connexion with the *fedayeen*. And so on.

There is ample evidence from Israeli and other non-Arab sources that demolitions take place on a greater scale than required to punish the associates of Al-Fatah. Mr. Moshe Dayan hardly disguised the fact. On 21 June 1967, when the fighting was finished, he justified the policy in the Knesset on the ground that Arab civilians had taken part in the war, and, in an interview with the Tel Aviv newspaper *Davar* on 8 September 1968, he said the policy was intended "as a warning to all Arab

families" that they must not help Al-Fatah. In other words, it is a large-scale deterrent in Jerusalem, it is large-scale Israeli "resettlement". There is always a reason.

As you said: "There are no nations in the world whose actions are wholly good. There is certainly no Government which is fit to be trusted without the continuous scrutiny of careful and honest reporting."

Yours truly,

Tom LITTLE

Manor Cottage,
Whitchurch-on-Thames,
Pangbourne,
Reading,
Berkshire,
2 November.

L. United Nations resolution

From Mr. STANLEY NEWENS, Labour
M.P. for Epping, and Mr. SYDNEY
BIDWELL, Labour M.P. for Southall

[6 November 1969]

Sir,

Your Foreign Editor's account of conditions in Israeli-occupied territories can leave little doubt that there is no hope of peace in the Middle East as long as the occupation continues.

The case for the Israeli occupation rested originally on the threat posed by the Arab countries to the security and continued existence of the State of Israel. The Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, which was sponsored by the British Government, provides for "acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force".

The effective *quid pro quo* for this is the "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict".

The United Arab Republic and Jordan both accept the resolution. Israel has also declared its acceptance, but contradicts this by refusing to renounce all territorial claims. Her case is that the

resolution is the basis for negotiations and she is prepared to have any item on the agenda if negotiations take place. The United Arab Republic and Jordan, however, are not prepared to agree to negotiations which are in any case not mentioned by the United Nations resolution.

If no way is found out of this impasse, there can be little doubt that Arab resistance will grow until a situation similar to that of Algeria under the French or South Yemen under the British is created. On the basis of the principle of national self-determination, there is no justification for continued Israeli occupation.

In the face of the increased strength of the forces of the right in the recent Israeli elections, the case for increased pressure on the Israeli Government in favour of genuine acceptance of the United Nations resolution is greater than ever.

Yours, etc.,

Stan NEWENS
Sydney BIDWELL
House of Commons.

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General Containing an Article Entitled "Eye-witness in Gaza", Published in the Sunday Times of 23 November 1969.¹

November 25, 1969

Further to my letter of 21 November 1969 (A/7783, S/9507), and upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request that the attached article, entitled "Eye-witness in Gaza", published in the *Sunday Times* of 23 November 1969, be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

EYE-WITNESS IN GAZA

On 28 October, *The Times* published an article by its foreign editor, E.C. Hodgkin, which was headlined: "Grim reports of repression from Israel-occupied lands". It described how Arabs in the territories which Israel conquered in 1967 were "being persecuted into a new diaspora by the armies and people of Israel". The article caused an international furore. Many instances of repression reported in it have been strenuously denied by the Israeli authorities.

The editorial operations of the *Sunday Times* are quite independent of those of *The Times*. And it so happens that more than a week before *The Times*'s article appeared, the *Sunday Times* had been entirely separately approached by an Israeli citizen with a disturbing account of conditions in one of the Israel-administered territories — the Gaza Strip. The spirit in which he came to us is suggested by the sentence quoted above. It comes from a long and detailed statement which he gave us and to which he swore on oath.

The reporter who was chosen to check our informant's statement was David Leitch. He has been visiting Israel at intervals since 1963, and has a deep sympathy and affection for the country and its people. Now here is his report.

In Gaza this week, the market price for grenade throwers — men not machines — is five Israeli pounds, or 12s. 6d. At this cut-price wage, they function more days than not. Also more days than not, the Israeli troops pick them up, their unspent wages still stuffed in their shirt fronts. The grenade boys usually harm more of their compatriots than Israelis. They have established a strong claim to being the most inefficient — as well as the cheapest — hired guns of modern times.

Even so, their *maladroit* manoeuvres have achieved something, perhaps even their masters' aim. In this they have been abetted by Major-General Moshe Dayan. His policy of "collective punishment", or let us call it reprisal, for that is what he means, has driven the uncommitted among the Arabs in Israel — and they did once exist — into the arms of the 100 per cent all-or-nothing haters. Between them they have turned this place, which at best was an unlovely armpit of the Middle East, into a city as menacing and as terrified as Saigon after the Tet offensive.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9511. Also issued under the symbol A/7792.

Here, indifferent Israeli conscripts were shooting at heads moving in the windows in the street of Omar El-Mukhtar. Here, when there was a bang, groups of tiny uniformed school girls scurried past the town hall like so many terrorized black rabbits. Private houses were destroyed to encourage the others, and the biggest high school was closed to make an army camp. Effectively, this Arab town of more than 60,000 was under siege.

The terrorists, by means of their 12s. 6d. hired boys, have evidently achieved their aim — to alienate the population and their occupiers. There are consequently Israeli officers there who adduce all Gaza's ills to terrorism. They talk of "last summer" with a certain lyricism. They say next summer, once the Dayan plan has eliminated the terrorists, could be as happy.

But was last summer so good? One observer, and he was there before terrorism was making young soldiers trigger-happy, found conditions unacceptable even then. It is reasonable to ask whether what is happening now is a product of what was done then.

He is an observer worth listening to because, apart from anything else, he is an Israeli, by education and by temperament even a Zionist. This is what he found.

The first thing was hunger. During his period of reserve duty on the Gaza Strip, which he described later as "the most horrific three weeks of my life", he was approached by Arab children who were happy to work all day, he says, for leftovers from soldiers' plates, or even waste food, which the Israeli army dumps in plastic bags.

During his service, he visited two hospitals where parents, usually mothers, were according to the staff, in the habit of stealing food from the meals served up to their sick children.

This was one of his milder allegations, and one of the easiest to confirm. Several neutral health workers in the area said that they had often seen this happen. Indeed, as long as they were assured their names would not be cited, they said they had come to find it quite normal.

Moshe Dayan, Israel's famous Defence Minister, said himself last spring, in a recorded interview, that hunger conditions in some parts of the Gaza Strip were unacceptable and bad for Israeli prestige in the world. But there is no source,

apart from this unofficial one, for the method which occupying forces are reported to have used last summer against the occupied.

He saw and heard from fellow soldiers how the authorities treated Gaza Arabs, months before Israeli officials began to talk about "environmental or neighbourhood punishment".

The first approach involved arbitrary curfews of the kind recently used as a reprisal against terrorism in the village of Beit Sabor, near Bethlehem, among other places. The inhabitants are forbidden to leave their homes for almost the whole twenty-four hours; they can go out to get food and water for perhaps two hours a day. As Arab homes in Gaza are usually tiny, have no sanitation or running water, and are sometimes shared with livestock, this is a severe punishment.

This witness says that such curfews were imposed against small villages at random, even when there had been no acts of terrorism. When there were terrorist incidents in the area, he claims the reaction of his unit was "much tougher".

In the tougher cases, the same curfew rules applied, but only the women were kept indoors. The men were driven into the desert in trucks and sometimes beaten up on the way. When they arrived at an isolated spot, they were divided according to age into two groups. They were then forced to squat on their haunches in the sun under guard for several hours — he says for as long as eight hours at a time.

There were also harsher measures, which the witness says were common knowledge among soldiers serving on the Strip this summer, but which he never witnessed himself. He says that during a coffee party in his tent (the Israeli army is dry), half a dozen soldiers told him the best way to combat terrorism was to bind suspects tightly with electric wire on arms and legs, and leave them in the sun.

These were not young soldiers telling tall stories, he says, but mature reservists chatting unemotionally, without even much interest (which was the single thing that made the deepest impression on him). He also says they reported beating Arab men on the shins with the butts of automatic weapons, sometimes until their legs were broken.

How accurate are these accounts? And do the

events they describe result from official policy? The first question is desperately hard to answer. Many Arabs around Gaza have told me similar stories in the last weeks, but even President Nasser could not call them good witnesses. They were vague on details. They were carried away by their own rhetoric (even filtered through an interpreter) and evidently biased.

On the other hand, an Arab professional man — he is under such pressure that I cannot even say which profession — gave a similar account. And this was also largely confirmed in the course of a series of extremely guarded conversations with international workers in the area, most of whom are concerned, above all, to avoid offending the occupying authorities.

Moreover, they are frankly terrified that any statement of theirs will be used to prevent them from continuing all kinds of essential services.

All of these witnesses, some of whom have spoken at first hand, and others only through hearsay, must be treated with some reserve. But the Israeli soldier, I believe, is in a different category.

He is not only a Jew; he is a devoted one. He has served in the Israeli army during two wars. He is a highly educated man, and indeed one of some distinction in his profession. He knows people, Israelis like himself, who have told me very similar stories. Finally, this witness, who, it should be said, is unlike the majority of dissident sources in Tel Aviv in that he is anti-communist, has gone so far as to swear a detailed statement which is in the possession of the *Sunday Times*.

The evidence is by no means conclusive. It does, at the very least, establish a *prima facie* case for some kind of independent inquiry. And it is not the only evidence.

The next set of statements, which deal with Arabs under detention in Israel, fall into much the same category. They have been obtained from both Arab and Israeli lawyers and, *via* access to defendants' statements and court transcripts, I have selected four examples which are, in various ways, typical.

It would be possible, given time, to add about forty more. But the following are in themselves sufficient to warrant an inquiry. These examples all involve what amounts to torture.

For historical reasons which do not require emphasis, this is a subject which is highly sensitive in Israel. It is hard to believe that a Government, based on all kinds of humane ideals, is prepared to make these methods an instrument of policy. Are the allegations true or not? Again, it seems that only an independent group could decide. But, again, the evidence available is enough in itself to cause great concern.

The evidence of Lutfiel El Houari

The first statement comes from a woman and it should be said, a damned tough one. She is called Lutfiel El Houari, she is twenty-five, and she was arrested in August this year in Ramallah.

The charges against her were numerous: being a member of an unlawful organization and attempted murder were the most serious.

According to her prosecutors, and their case has not been contradicted with any conviction, on 5 June 1969 — the second anniversary of the outbreak of the Six-Day War — she and four girl friends dispatched a bottle of poisoned whisky to some Palestinian Arabs, whom they regarded as collaborators.

She confessed to most of the charges against her, but, on 4 November, before a military court in Ramallah, her lawyer claimed that her statements had been extracted through torture and fear. This is what she says happened:

She was taken to Beit Shemesh and interrogated for fifteen days. During this period, she was kept in solitary confinement, with both wrists and feet handcuffed. She says her interrogators threatened her with the same punishment that she received a year earlier while under administrative arrests.

Then, she says, she was put in the same cell as a group of Jewish prostitutes, mostly from the Yemen. They attacked her and were encouraged to do so by the guards. She claims that during her solitary confinement she was prevented from using the lavatory which was particularly painful for her as she was convalescing from an operation for appendicitis at the time of her arrest.

She also claims that police or soldiers (she is not sure which) threatened that her house would be blown up unless she confessed. Eventually she did, but the house was blown up anyway. Miss Houari has given many more details of her alleged

illtreatment to her lawyer, who has made an official protest, so far without response.

The evidence of Ichak Ali El Marari

Ichak Ali El Marari was arrested on 7 March 1969 in Jerusalem. After two months of interrogation, during which he claimed he had no access either to his wife or his lawyer, he was charged with being a member of an illegal organization. Interestingly, though he is still in prison, the charges against him were dropped on 6 June 1969.

He says, and I have seen his statement, that he had been so maltreated during the interrogation period, that the marks would have been visible in court.

His story, which is similar to that of many others, tells of being beaten on the hands with a strap and of being denied water and medical treatment until he had made a full confession.

In his statement, which his lawyer sent on 15 September this year — so far without reaction — to Israel's Attorney-General, the Minister of Defence, and the Minister responsible for police, he names a police chief inspector (he is called Marcus), who directed the interrogation.

On the same date, his lawyer, again to no effect, requested an independent medical examination and access to the prisoner's medical files. These are probably easily available because, after his interrogation, Mr. Marari was treated in the prison hospital at Ramleh.

He says his most serious injury was a head wound and he also complains of defects in vision as a result of his treatment during interrogation, and recurring headaches.

His case is particularly interesting because, unlike most detainees who allege torture, there seems to be no convincing evidence, or indeed evidence of any kind, that he was involved in terrorist activities.

He admits a connexion with a nationalist front organization, but says he was only concerned with aiding the families of people who had been arrested. He may, of course, be lying, but, unless there are statements suggesting the contrary, to which I have not had access, there appears to be no hard evidence against him. This does not mean under the system of administrative imprisonment which is now widely used, that there is anything

to prevent his remaining in prison for an indefinite period.

The evidence of Abdullah Yusuf Oduan

Similarities can be found in the story of Mr. Abdullah Yusuf Oduan. The allegations of torture methods are much the same, though he names three different interrogators.

Mr. Oduan is, I understand, a Communist Party member, though this is not an offence in Israel, which has two Communist parties with parliamentary representation. By a nice international irony, he has already served a long period in a Jordanian prison for being a communist.

He says the Israelis acquired his Jordanian files when they occupied the West Bank, and picked him up as a result. He also says that Israeli interrogators assured him they would do a much better — which in this context means more brutal — job than their counterparts in the Hashemite Kingdom. Through his lawyer, on 11 September of this year, he submitted various allegations of ill-treatment to the relevant authorities. By the middle of November, there had been no response.

The evidence of Abdel Rahim Gaber

A fully paid-up 100 per cent terrorist, Abdel Rahim Amin Gaber, made similar allegations. He is serving a life sentence for terrorist activities, including planting a bomb at a bus station in Tel Aviv in 1968. Presumably he knew the risk, and was prepared to pay the price.

He claims to have served a longer period of solitary confinement than most of the other prisoners whose files I have seen.

But, if one can believe the statements prisoners make, there is little distinction between the treatment of an avowed terrorist and a suspect. A lawyer, an Israeli, who handles many of these cases, says that experience suggests 80 per cent of the prisoners are tortured during interrogation if what they say is true.

But is it? Prisoners, Communist Party members, men who have been picked up off the street after a grenade has gone off, are clearly not the best witnesses of their own experiences. Unfortunately, given the present system, what they say cannot be verified or contradicted.

Almost all allegations cover the period immediately after arrest. The suspect has not yet graduated to the comparatively enviable status of prisoner — that is, someone detained inside an official Israel prison with certain rights.

I have heard complaints about prison standards but, compared with those levelled against police and military intelligence during the interrogation period after arrest, they are too trivial to be worth repeating.

The prevailing system makes it particularly hard to check. The legal code which covers Arabs in the occupied areas, and within Israel as it existed before the Six-Day War, is so superlatively illiberal that those on the receiving end have almost nothing on their side. Anyone can be arrested, restricted to a certain area and kept in prison for an indefinite period without any charge. The authorities can give them access to outsiders, or they cannot. It depends on how they feel.

The system is disgraceful. For the British, who feel moral indignation when brought face-to-face with an approach apparently so alien, the only reaction is outrage. It is, however, worth bearing in mind that the British themselves are responsible for the system.

It is based, very largely, on the fourteen chapters and 170 articles of the 1945 Emergency Defence Laws which the British introduced under their mandate to deal with Jewish terrorism. Stern though the provisions were, they failed. Passionately, though Israeli jurists condemned them at the time as a contradiction of the most fundamental principles of justice, they have, with certain amendments, been carefully preserved.

The best objective witnesses of what is going on inside Israel's detention centres are members of the International Committee of the Red Cross. For various reasons, they cannot say what they believe is true, one way or the other. If they confirm bad stories, they provide Arab propaganda. If they deny them, the Israelis will exploit their statements.

As Israel refused to accept that the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention apply to the occupied territories, Red Cross delegates have no access to the police stations or detention centres where prisoners are kept after arrest. Neither can they see prisoners in solitary confinement.

If their representatives decide torture charges are justified — their criteria are physical marks on a prisoner — they make a report. These reports are strictly secret. They are not published, because they would prejudice the job which Red Cross delegates, within strictly defined limits, are at present permitted to do.

Many observers believe that the Israelis, if they wish to demonstrate the strength of their case, should either give the Red Cross more facilities, or let some other unbiased group look for themselves.

263

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council on Israel's Premeditated Murder of Jordanian Citizens.¹

November 26, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention new acts of piracy and premeditated murder committed by Israel against innocent Jordanian citizens.

Two days ago, on the 24th of November, at 21.30 hours local time, an Israeli patrol crossed the Armistice Line in Ghor Fefah south of the Dead Sea. The patrol attacked six Jordanian shepherds, killed four of them and kidnapped a fifth, Salim Salman Attehi. The sixth shepherd escaped. The Israeli patrol also killed five camels.

This is the second time in a week period that Israelis commit such a criminal act. On the 17th of this month, Israeli soldiers with helicopters kidnapped three Jordanian civilians: Naif Ali Nahar, Suleiman Mousa Abu Qaoud and Nahar Nouri Abu Qaoud, all of the area South West of Maien.

The responsibility of Israel for such acts of piracy and murder against innocent Jordanian civilians is clear and more United Nations measures are needed to put an end to such Israeli acts of lawlessness.

I have the honour to request that this letter be

¹ U.N. doc. S/9512.

circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

264

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council on an Israeli Act of Piracy in the Gulf of Aqaba.

December 8, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention a very serious act of piracy committed by the Israeli authorities in the Gulf of Aqaba.

On Saturday, 6 December 1969, at 05.00 hours local time, two Israeli torpedo boats intercepted the Japanese ship *Shinkai-Maru* heading towards the Jordanian port of Aqaba. Later on, the Israeli boats shot at the ship in spite of Israel's knowledge of the identity of the ship and its commercial cargo. The Japanese ship, fortunately, was able to reach its destiny without damage.

In view of Israel's premeditated and brazen attack and in view of the identity of the Japanese ship and the nature of its cargo, my Government finds it imperative that the Security Council take strong measures against such Israeli acts of piracy.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

265

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council on Israeli Indiscriminate Attacks on Jordanian Citizens.²

December 9, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention further Israeli indiscriminate attacks against Jordanian citizens.

On 6 December 1969, at 09.00 hours local time, two Israeli jet fighters attacked the area of Al Rayhanat, south of Masharee in the northern part of the Jordan Valley using rockets.

As a result one girl, 14 years old, was killed and two civilians were wounded. Three houses were damaged.

Yesterday, 8 December 1969, at 22.30 hours local time, Israeli forces in the occupied Syrian Heights shelled the city of Irbid using heavy artillery of 130 mm guns.

As a result of this attack, one woman and a man were killed and 6 civilians, four of whom women were seriously injured. Three houses were badly damaged.

The responsibility of Israel for such indiscriminate attacks against Jordan's centres of civilians is clearly established.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

¹ U.N. doc. S/9543.

² U.N. doc. S/9546.

266

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council on Israel's Raid on the Villages of Kufr Asad, Sama and Izmal, in the District of the City of Irbid.¹

December 22, 1969

Further to my letter of 9 December 1969 (S/9546), concerning Israel's indiscriminate attacks against Jordanian centres of civilians, and upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention the following:

Yesterday, Sunday 21st, at 0710 hours local time, waves of Israeli fighter-bombers raided the villages of Kufr Asad, Sama and Izmal in the district of the city of Irbid over three hours using rockets, bombs and machine-guns. The raid went on until 10.45.

As a result, six soldiers were killed and nineteen others wounded. Five civilians, among them a seven year old boy, were seriously wounded. Seven houses in the village of Sama were destroyed.

Later on, at 2100 hours local time, the Israeli army in the occupied Syrian Heights shelled the city of Irbid using heavy artillery of 130 mm guns. The shelling went on for one hour.

As a result, ten civilians were wounded and a girl, four years old, was killed. Several houses and buildings were damaged.

The death toll of yesterday's Israeli wanton attack was seven, among them a four year old girl. Thirty-four soldiers and civilians, among them a seven year old boy, were injured.

The Israeli attacks against Jordanian civilians has become more often and seems to follow a premeditated official policy. This requires a more effective international action.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

3. LEBANON

267

Letter from the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i. of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council on an Israeli Attack on the Villages of Southern Lebanon.²

August 11, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following:

On Monday, 11 August 1969, at 1.30 p.m., units of the Israeli Air Force consisting of ten Vautour Bombers and six Mirage Jet planes raided civilian villages in southern Lebanon, near the border, for twenty-five minutes, using napalm bombs, rockets and machine guns.

Amongst the villages attacked were the following: Rachaya Al-Fakhar, Charchoubeh, Kafar Hanan, Khabbariyeh, Ain Kelly and Chabaa.

The attack resulted in seven casualties among the civilian Lebanese population, four of whom were killed and three seriously injured. Of those killed was a woman who suffered burns inflicted by napalm.

I wish to draw your attention to the seriousness of this attack in which napalm bombs were directed against civilian population.

This latest unprovoked attack demonstrates again Israel's aggressive intentions against Lebanon.

I wish to stress that Lebanon has always respected her International obligations and abided by the Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement.

On behalf of my Government, I wish to protest most emphatically against this Israeli aggression which is in flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement and in defiance of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

I respectfully request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Yahya MAHMASSANI
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9578.

² U.N. doc. S/9383.

268

Letter from the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i. of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council.¹

August 12, 1969

Pursuant to my letter dated 11 August 1969, in which I informed you of the premeditated and unprovoked aggression committed by Israel against civilian villages in Southern Lebanon, and in view of the gravity of the situation endangering the peace and security of Lebanon, I have the honour, upon instructions from my Government, to request Your Excellency to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Yahya MAHMASSANI
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

269

Letter from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council on an Israeli Attack on the Arkoub Area in Southern Lebanon.²

September 5, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following:

On Wednesday, 3 September 1969, at 11.52 a.m., units of the Israeli Air Force consisting of twelve Mystere and a number of Mirage jet planes raided the Arkoub area in southern Lebanon during twenty-five minutes using napalm bombs and machine-gun fire.

Amongst the villages attacked were the following: Rachaya Al-Fakhar, Al-Habarieh, El-Fardis and Kfarchouba.

At 1.00 p.m. six Israeli jet planes launched another attack on the same villages for fifteen minutes using napalm bombs. Two Lebanese civilians were seriously wounded as a result of this attack.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9385.

² U.N. doc. S/9429.

This new act of aggression by Israel comes only few days after the Security Council has unanimously condemned Israel for its premeditated air attack on 11 August on villages in southern Lebanon, and warned that such military acts cannot be tolerated and "that it would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts".

Israel has repeatedly and openly threatened Lebanon's territorial integrity particularly in the last two weeks. My delegation has in due course informed the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of these threats.

This latest act of aggression by Israel demonstrates again Israeli aggressive designs against Lebanon. It also constitutes a flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement and an open defiance of the principles of the United Nations Charter and the resolutions of the Security Council.

I respectfully request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Yahya MAHMASSANI
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

270

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council on the Landing of Israeli Troops in Southern Lebanon.³

September 5, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following:

At midnight of Thursday, 4 September 1969, two Israeli helicopters Super Frelon penetrated the air space of southern Lebanon and landed troops of the Israeli Armed Forces at the village of Halta in the region of Hasbaya. The raiders attacked civilian population and properties.

The attack resulted in one civilian Lebanese being killed and two wounded. Three houses were destroyed.

³ U.N. doc. S/9433.

At 2 p.m., Friday, 5 September 1969, units of the Israeli Air Force consisting of twenty jet planes attacked the villages of Al-Khourba, Al-Mary, Halta and Douhairajat situated in southern Lebanon. The attack lasted one hour. Napalm bombs were used. The Israeli planes were met by anti-aircraft artillery and one of them was directly hit and exploded on Lebanese territory south of the village of Teybeh.

These new acts of aggression committed by Israel demonstrate once more Israel's aggressive designs against Lebanon.

Israel has made no secret of these designs and has repeatedly threatened Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Israel's acts of aggression against Lebanon are in open defiance of the principles of international law, the United Nations Charter and the resolutions of the Security Council. They do constitute added flagrant violations of the Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949.

Israel's reliance on militaristic and aggressive power rather than on law and international morality is a consistent threat to the peace and security of Lebanon and the Middle East. She consequently assumes full responsibility for the extension of the area of fighting, the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and world peace and security.

I respectfully request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Edouard GHORRA

Ambassador
Permanent Representative

271

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council on the Penetration of Israeli Troops into Southern Lebanon.¹

October 6, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following:

¹ U.N. doc. S/9465.

On Friday, 3 October 1969, at 11:00 p.m. a detachment of the Israeli Armed Forces crossed the Lebanese border from the Syrian occupied territory east of the Hasbani river penetrating for two kilometres within Lebanese territory; it reached the farm villages of Al-Dhyrjat and Tal-Almary and blew up five houses therein.

Concurrently, an Israeli helicopter landed armed troops in the village of Aytaroun North East of Bent Jbeil, one kilometre and a half inside Lebanese territory. The troops attacked Aytaroun and fired indiscriminately at the innocent civilian population; three civilians were kidnapped and four others were wounded, among them, two women.

These two unprovoked attacks were committed by Israel in utter contempt of the principles of International Law. They constitute a flagrant violation of the Security Council resolutions, and the Lebanon-Israeli armistice agreement.

Reports emanating from Israel allege that these attacks were directed against the Fedayeen. My Government most emphatically denies the presence of any Fedayeen in the above-mentioned villages. It is already a matter of record that Israel resorts to such pretexts whenever it attacks Lebanon in order to justify its aggression.

I respectfully request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Edouard GHORRA

Ambassador
Permanent Representative

272

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council on the Israeli Shelling of Villages in Southern Lebanon.²

December 4, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following:

On Wednesday, 3 December 1969, at 9 a.m., Israeli artillery has shelled the two villages of

² U.N. doc. S/9530.

Chabaa and Kfar-Chouba situated in the district of Al-Arkoub in Southern Lebanon. Following the shelling, units of Israeli Air Forces landed troops on Lebanese territory. These troops committed acts of violence against the civilian population and destroyed several houses in the two aforementioned villages.

The Lebanese Government strongly protests against this unprovoked and premeditated attack by regular Israeli forces against Lebanon.

This attack constitutes a flagrant violation of the Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Agreement, of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity, of the principles of International Law and of the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Furthermore, the Israeli repeated acts of aggression against Lebanon demonstrate the deliberate Israeli intention of continuously widening the area of conflict in the Middle East thus endangering the peace and security not only of Lebanon but of the whole region.

I respectfully request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Edouard GHORRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

4. SYRIA

273

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the President of the Security Council on Israel's Attacks on Civilian Targets in the Suburbs of Damascus.¹

February 25, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the latest Israeli aggression, savagely committed against civilian populated targets in my country in utter violation of every norm of international law and justice and in complete disregard of the most elementary human rights.

On the early morning of 24 February 1969,

a number of Israeli bombers, escorted by Israeli fighters, launched air attacks on deliberately selected civilian targets situated in the suburb and district of the capital, Damascus. Rockets and bombs hit Al-Hameh, Zebdani and Maysaloun. In Al-Hameh a number of houses and a washing-machines' factory were destroyed, in Zebdani a youth summer camp devastated, and in Maysaloun a custom-police station demolished. Eight private cars on the Beirut-Damascus road were not spared, among which was that of His Excellency, the Ambassador of the People's Republic of Hungary in Syria. To add cruelty to their attack and increase the number of casualties, the Israeli aircrafts dropped time-bombs which actually exploded at subsequent intervals. The ensuing massacre engulfed with its cruelty exclusively civilian victims. So far fifteen persons are dead including a number of women, children and a nurse of Lebanese nationality. The wounded too, included women and children and attained so far, the number of forty.

In self-defence the Syrian Arab air force intercepted the invading aircrafts and downed three of them. Two Syrian aircrafts were lost in the operation.

This wanton aggression has closely followed a series of statements made by Israeli leaders, from Prime Minister downwards, making crystal clear their expansionist policy aiming at the annexation of Arab lands, especially The Golan Heights, to the land they already usurped.

"As for The Golan Heights, we will quite simply never give them up. The same goes for Jerusalem." This is what Eshkol had to say recently to a *Newsweek* editor.

Neither violation of international law, international justice and the United Nations resolutions, nor inconsistency with their own previous claims of non-expansionism constitute the slightest deterrent to the formulation of their policy of conquest by force and terror. Their latest series of aggressions, culminating in the air raid of the 24th of this month, unravels what is their understanding of international law, of human rights and illustrates what kind of barbarism the Arabs are facing.

It remains to the United Nations Organization and to the Security Council in particular to assume their responsibilities and to put an end to

¹ U.N. doc. S/9028.

the Israeli arrogant defiance of international law and threat to international peace and security.

I would be grateful to Your Excellency if this letter is issued as an official document of the Security Council and distributed amongst its distinguished members.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

274

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the President of the Security Council Confirming Israel's Attack on Civilian Targets in Syrian Territory.¹

March 4, 1969

Acting upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to confirm my letter of 25 February 1969 [S/9028], reporting the savage attack by Israel air forces on civilian targets in the early morning of 24 February.

In his reply of 28 February 1969 [S/9033], the Israel representative — with the arrogance which has become his basic characteristic — while acknowledging the attack, gave two justifications:

1. "The targets were the El-Fatah bases at El-Hamma and Maisaloun, on the road between Damascus and Beirut." To prove this a big lie, I have only to refer you to the report received from General Bull which appeared in document S/7930/Add.126 of 27 February 1969:

"(d) Physical evidence seen by the United Nations military observers:

"El-Hamma area:

"(i) Six civilian houses totally destroyed and a large number of houses damaged or partially destroyed.

"(ii) A washing machine factory totally destroyed.

"(iii) One school building partially damaged.

"(iv) A candy factory badly damaged. The military observers on 25 February were not

allowed to visit the candy factory and guards were around the building. The liaison officer accompanying the military observers stated that an unexploded bomb was still in the building and guards were a security force. The military observers were able to inspect the building on 26 February and stated that inside the building they observed stocks of sugar, a damaged drum of caramel, boiling pots, tinned food and some clothing.

"(v) Twenty-one bomb craters and one unexploded bomb.

"Maisaloun Control Post:

"(i) Three buildings completely destroyed.

"(ii) Four civilian cars and one police jeep severely damaged.

"(iii) A petroleum station, approximately 100 metres south of the Customs Control Post, slightly damaged.

"(iv) Ten dead sheep.

"(v) Four bomb craters.

"Mezze Hospital:

"(i) The United Nations military observers saw thirty-one persons who were allegedly injured in the air attack on Hammah and they consisted of 14 men, 5 women, 7 girls and 5 boys.

"(ii) The military observers described the wounds as being consistent with the type of injuries that would be sustained by aerial bombing.

"3. Other information:

"(a) Death certificates have been requested and will be forwarded with the written report."

This proves beyond any doubt that, contrary to the claim of Mr. Tekoah, the targets of the planned attack, as well as the forty wounded and fifteen dead, were all civilian. What Mr. Tekoah omitted to say is that this inhuman attack was in implementation of a new theory adopted by the Israel authorities, and confirmed in statements made according to the *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 26 February 1969, by Minister of Police Eliahu Sasson and General Haim Herzog, a government spokesman:

"The Knesset today endorsed the Sasson position, which was delivered on behalf of the Government. It was interpreted as meaning that

¹ U.N. doc. S/9041.

Israel considers itself free to hit back at terrorists, wherever they are, and not necessarily in reply to a specific terrorist act against Israel or its nationals."

The sole purpose of this new theory is to justify attack on Arab territories, wherever the neurotic leaders of Israel see fit to unleash them.

I wish to recall here that the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 95 (I) on 11 December 1946, affirming the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, in accordance with which similar attacks planned and perpetrated by the Israel authorities constitute (a) crimes against peace, (b) war crimes, (c) crimes against humanity. It is a tragic fact of history that Israel, since its establishment, has committed against the Arabs all these crimes and remains, so far, the pampered and delinquent child of the international community.

2. Mr. Tekoah stated "that Syria has rejected the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967". I need not stress the obvious *irrelevance* of that reference. It would have been more relevant for Mr. Tekoah, who shows so much attachment to Security Council resolution 242 (1967), to answer my letter of 12 December 1968 [S/8928], reporting that twenty-five Israel settlements and a population of about 12,000 are being established and settled in the occupied Syrian territory. Nor did he have anything to say about the statement of the late Mr. Eshkol, which appeared in *Newsweek* of 17 February 1969, stating, "As for the Golan heights, we will quite simply never give them up. The same goes for Jerusalem. Here there is no flexibility at all". For twenty months now, since the 5 June war of aggression against the Arabs, and under the pretence of accepting the Security Council resolution, Israel continues the occupation of Arab territories, its rejection of all humanitarian and other resolutions, and its violations of the Geneva Conventions. Yet Mr. Tekoah, as well as other Israel and Zionist speakers, continues to preach law and practise lawlessness. But, perhaps, the best answer to Mr. Tekoah on the acceptance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) was given by his Minister of Defence, Mr. Dayan, who, asked whether the Government of Israel had really agreed to implement that

resolution, replied: "If we had agreed, do you think there would have been so much international pressure to tell you so publicly?" (see *Le Monde*, No. 7430 of 3 December 1968).

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH

Permanent Representative of Syria
to the United Nations

275

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the Secretary-General on Israel's Attack on the Syrian Village Khisfine.¹

March 5, 1969

Acting upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to report to you the following:

On 26 February 1969, at about 0900 local time, the Israeli occupation forces set fire to the Syrian village Khisfine located approximately at 2265-2506 co-ordinates. This Israeli action constitutes a flagrant violation of part III, section III, article 53, of the Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons and properties in occupied territories.

It thus appears that there is no law which can make Israel respect recognized international obligations as shown by its continued flagrant violations of human rights. The senior Syrian Arab delegate to the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAL) submitted to the Chairman of ISMAC on 28 February 1969, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, a complaint about this new dreadful action by the Israeli army of occupation.

I would be grateful to Your Excellency if this letter is issued as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH

Ambassador
Permanent Representative

¹ U.N. doc. S/9042. Also issued under the symbol A/7522.

276

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the President of the Security Council Containing a List of Civilians Killed and Wounded as a Result of Israel's Military Action against the Suburbs of Damascus.¹

March 25, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government and following my two letters of 25 February and 4 March 1969,¹ concerning the premeditated criminal Israeli air attack the morning of 24 February last, against purely civilian targets, notably El-Hameh and Maisaloun, I have the honour to list below the names of the Syrian civilian victims killed and wounded, including children and women, as a result of that attack.

Children killed

<i>Name</i>	<i>Age</i>
Fouad Ahmad Saleh	4
Hayysam Mustafa Sardar	5
Ecitaf Mustafa Sardar (girl)	8
Fatimah Ahmad Jassoumah (girl)	11
Rajae Ahmad Saleh	1 1/2
Bassam Mustafa Sardar	14

Adults killed

<i>Name</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Occupation</i>
Mouhammad Adyb Almassry	28	Teacher
Hassan Mouhammad Souleyman	24	Worker
Aabdoh Ahmad Rahym	19	Worker
Nazyh Mouhammad Hawwary	25	Worker
Mouhammad Ibn Kamel Nahhass	27	Worker
Abdul Majyd Mouhammad Takryty	30	Worker
Dawood Ismail Qassem	22	Worker
Fawzy Ibn Aaly Abou Dhyqah (Lebanese nationality)	27	Worker
Yessra Ahmad Karym (female)	40	

Seriously injured

<i>Name</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Occupation</i>
Mouwaffaq Ben Mouhammad Ezzat Tarjouman	30	Worker
Houshy Ibn Aaly Qamar	28	Worker
Fawziah Bint Ismail Zakaria (female)	25	Worker
Bashar Ibn Mouhammad Zoulghina	7	
Dr. George Ghaybah and his young daughter who is on the critical list (Lebanese nationality)		Physician
Mouhammad Mehdy Ibn Houssny Alnahhass	33	Worker
Maemoun Mouhammad Sayrawan	25	Worker
Tayysyr Ibn Youssef Joumeeah	28	Worker
Ahmad Ibn Mouhammad Albou-Qaei	25	Worker
Ahmad Mouhammad Kawwarah	40	Worker
Moustafa Ibn Mohammad Sardar	60	Worker
Saiid Ibn Ahmad Saleh	42	Worker
Shafyq Mouhammad Aaly Hhijazy	27	Worker
Yassyn Mouheddine Barakat	45	Worker
Mouhammad Salyn Ibn Saiid Altabk	28	Worker
Eousamah Mouhammad Rashad Albaba	14	Student
Mouwaffaq Ibn Ahmad Saleh	7	Student
Wafae Bint Ahmad Qassem (girl)	10	Student
Ahmad Ibn Aaly Mouhayysen	24	Civil servant
Aaly Ibn Ahmad Salloum	31	Civil servant
Ghassan Ibn Salym Abou Khalifah	26	Civil servant
Mahmoud Ahmad Alzein	27	Civil servant
Khayriah Bint Ismail Kyky (female)	42	Civil servant
Salimah Bint Khaled Ghayyadh (female)	35	Civil servant

¹ U.N. doc. S/9110. Circulated as documents S/9028 and S/9041.

Aazyzah Bint Khaled		
Ghayyadh (female)	16	Civil servant
Ahmad Aabdul Mounceim		
Alrahym	44	Peasant
Faryzah Hamdan Altaqwa	45	Housewife
Soud Ahmad Aabdul		
Mounceim Alrahym		
(female)	15	Student
Nazek Ahmad Aabdul		
Mounceim Alrahym		
(female)	13	Student
Rihab Ahmad Aabdul		
Mounceim Alrahym		
(female)	12	Student
Basimah Ahmad Aabdul		
Mounceim Alrahym		
(female)	9	Student
Halah Ahmad Aabdul		
Mounceim Alrahym		
(female)	5	Student
Randah Aabdul Mounceim		
Alrahym		
(female)	3	
Mouhammad Khayr		
Aabdul Mounceim		
Alrahym	1 1/2	
Mouwaffaq Ibn		
Mahmoud Bakry		
Alkhatat	3	
Aavdyl Razzaq Salloum	16	Student
Basimah Mustafa Sardar		
(female)	12	Student

There could be no more revealing expression of Israeli bestiality than this inhuman attack on the civilian population. This savagery conforms with the paranoic Israeli "strategy", shamelessly and deceptively labelled "active self-defence", which is nothing less than active unlimited attack against innocent children, women and men as substantiated by General Odd Bull's report of 27 February 1969 (document S/7930/Add.126) and indeed as arrogantly recognized by the Israeli representative in his letter of 28 February when he stated: "On the morning of 24 February 1969, Israel took air action in self-defence to disable two el-Fatah bases in Syrian territory".

It is the duty of the civilized community to avoid double standards in judgement and to remind the Israeli leaders that, under contemporary international law, they are as accountable

for their war crimes and crimes against humanity and peace as their Nazi predecessors.

I would request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

277

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the President of the Security Council Expressing Syria's Views on the Presence of Iraqi Armed Forces in Syria.¹

March 26, 1969

Acting upon instructions from my Government, and with reference to the letter of the representative of Israel, (document S/9094, A/7528) of 19 March 1969, on what he termed "entry and stationing of Iraqi armed forces in Syria", which he qualified as aggravating the situation in the area, I have the honour to state the following.

1. Ever since its premeditated war of aggression against the Arab countries in June 1967, and its occupation of territories belonging to three Arab States, Israel flagrantly pursues a policy of oppression and eviction of Arab residents of the occupied territories, in violation of the United Nations Charter and of all international obligations. Furthermore, its regular armed forces continue their premeditated aggressive attacks against Arab countries, irrespective of whether the objectives are civilian or military.

2. Israeli leaders do not conceal their aggressive designs arrogantly stating their determination to maintain their occupation and annexation of Arab territories, while others among them still call for further occupation of Arab lands. Indeed to mention only the latest, Mrs. Golda Meir, in her first statement as the new Israeli Prime Minister, spoke of "such natural borders of Israel as the Golan Heights, captured from Syria, and Sharm el-Sheikh, the former Egyptian outpost." (*The New York Times*, 19 March 1969.) On 13

¹ U.N. doc. S/9111.

March, Major General David Elazar, Commander of the so-called "northern section" i.e. the Syrian-occupied Golan Heights, told a Keren Hayesod Jewish appeal meeting, "the future of the occupied Golan Heights would be determined by the presence of Jewish settlement rather than by presence of Israeli soldiers in the region," adding that "only the establishment of settlements would give the area a Jewish identity". (JTA, *Daily News Bulletin*, 14 March 1969.) To Menachim Begin, the present minister without portfolio, and leader of the Herut Party: "Both sides of the Jordan form a historical and a geographical unit."

3. The Arab Governments have submitted to His Excellency, the Secretary-General, U Thant, as well as to the President of the Security Council, letters containing Israeli official statements proving decisively that Israel intends to commit new aggressive acts against the Arab States.

The Arab States are exercising their legitimate right of self-defence against the Israeli imminent danger threatening the very existence of their peoples and their future. This right of self-defence is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and recognized by international law. Consequently, suffering as they are from a continued, ruthless occupation and the threat of further Israeli expansion, they are justified in co-ordinating their own defence, in accordance with the Arab common defence pact.

5. The Syrian Government holds Israel responsible for any aggressive act it may undertake against Syrian territory and considers itself duty-bound to warn against such imminent danger. This is more so since the world by now has become used to Israeli allegation, and falsifications on the international level, as a prelude for aggression against the Arabs.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council, and avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency etc.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

278

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the President of the Security Council on Further Israeli Attacks on Syrian Villages.¹

April 11, 1969.

Acting upon instructions from my Government, and further to my recent letters concerning the systematic razing of Syrian villages by the Israeli occupying authorities, I have the honour to report the following new Israeli acts of lawlessness.

On 6 April 1969, three Israeli bulldozers were observed demolishing the houses of the occupied Syrian village Abizetun at approximately map reference 2256/2486. On 7 April 1969, three Israeli bulldozers were observed demolishing the houses of the occupied Syrian village Tell Esseqi at approximately map reference 2281/2527. And also village Errazaniye at approximately map reference 2290/2540. On 8 April 1969, three Israeli bulldozers were observed demolishing the houses of the occupied Syrian village Khan El-Joukhadar at approximately map reference 2297/2593 west of Joukhadar village.

The complaint relating to these grave violations the Geneva Conventions (article 53, section III, part III) and of scores of United Nations resolutions was duly submitted by the Syrian delegation to the Chairman of ISMAC (Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission).

In view of the gravity of these wanton acts, I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and avail myself, etc.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

¹ U.N. doc. S/9150.

279

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the President of the Security Council Considering Israel's Attacks as Acts of Lawlessness.¹

April 18, 1969.

On instructions from my Government and referring to my last letter to you of 11 April 1969 (S/9150), I have the honour to state the following:

1. The reply of the Israeli representative of 15 April 1969 (S/9158) is nothing less than a confession of guilt and criminality. In it he stated that complaints contained in my letters of 4, 8 and 11 April about Israeli acts of lawlessness, were, "defence measures taken by Israel on its sides of the cease-fire line".

But, Sir, do defence measures justify the razing of villages, the demolition of houses and mass execution of shepherds in the most barbaric manner? We still maintain that these are war crimes and crimes against humanity, for which the perpetrators of these acts will most assuredly be called to account for one day in court. If Israel is not afraid to have these acts exposed to the world, why has it refused so far to accept the dispatch of a special representative of the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968? The definite answer to this question has been given in Secretary-General U Thant's reply to Mr. Tekoah, dated 7 October 1968, wherein he stated: "To my regret, I am obliged to conclude that your letter of 4 October does not afford me a basis on which to dispatch the Special Representative in accordance with the clear intention of Security Council resolution 259." (document S/8851 of 14 October 1968, page 5.) This third report of the Secretary-General on the humanitarian resolutions has not yet been discussed by the Security Council.

2. To prove the deliberate and continuous lying of the Israeli representative, I am attaching to my letter a map, as annex I, which was published for the first time in the official journal of the Israeli army, *Bemahanay*, in Hebrew, entitled, "Map of the settlement of the Golan Heights and the development of the Hill

that has fallen into our life". The signs which appear in the rectangle on the lower right corner of the map in Hebrew mean the following: a) Civil Center (City In The Area); b) Resort Place; c) Colony; d) A main street; e) A side street (for emergencies); f) Cities and natural forests, tourist places and resorts. Furthermore, the Information Division of the Israeli Foreign Ministry issued in 1968 a book entitled, *Facts about Israel*. In it the Golan Heights, as well as the occupied areas of the United Arab Republic and Jordan, appear as the map of Israel itself and bearing the same colour, thereby signifying that these occupied areas are integral parts of Israel itself.

3. The Israeli representative appears not to have read some of the most recent statements of his superiors, or has ignored them totally, or must have intended to insult the intelligence of readers. For on 6 April 1969, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Yigal Allon, formerly leader of the shock troops of the Haganah, called the *Palmach*, stated in Haifa: "Israel had no choice but to establish secure borders with settlements. If the borders are secure, they will, in the course of time, be agreed upon and recognized." On the same day Mr. Dayan stated in Tel Aviv: "We should create a new map for Israel", and went on to say: "We must take action to remain in the occupied areas despite the Big Four, the United Nations and hostile populations of these areas." Specifically, he proposed applying Israeli law in the occupied area on the West Bank of the Jordan, introducing Israeli currency, and encouraging economic integration with Israel. (*The New York Times*, Monday, 7 April, 1969.)

These statements, as well as the official maps of the Israeli army and the Israeli Foreign Ministry, bring decisive proof to our numerous letters, submitted to the President of the Security Council and/or the Secretary-General of the United Nations since the third war of aggression against the Arabs: namely, that Israel is identical with expansionism, always creating new faits accomplis. Should any doubt linger in the mind of anyone that the war of 5 June was premeditated, meticulously executed and computerized, suffice it to quote the Commander of the Israeli Air Force, Mordicai Hod, who led the *blitzkrieg* on the morning of 5 June 1967. He said: "Sixteen

¹ U.N. doc. S/9164.

years' planning had gone into those initial 80 minutes. We lived with the plan, we slept on the plan, we ate the plan. Constantly we perfected it." (*The Sunday Times*, London, 16 July 1967, page 7.)

4. In his routine manner of preaching law, the Israeli representative keeps referring to United Nations and Security Council resolutions. I am attaching as annex II to this letter an index of twenty-one resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council, one specialized agency and various United Nations committees, after the 5 June 1967 Israeli conquest, concerning Israel's utter disregard and violations of Arab human rights. In this context, it is imperative to recall General Assembly resolution 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, adopted by 100 votes in favour, 6 abstentions, with Israel only voting against it. This resolution, after reaffirming previous humanitarian resolutions maintaining the rights of the displaced Arab persons —

.....

"*Emphasizing*, consequently, the requirement for their speedy return,

"1. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to take *effective and immediate steps* for the return without delay of those inhabitants who fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities."

This resolution is categorical in calling upon Israel for its immediate and effective implementation. It is not linked to any mission or representative, or any other condition. The United Nations and the world at large are surely entitled and anxious — as we Arabs are — to know from the ruthless Israeli authorities what steps they have taken towards its implementation, now that four months have elapsed after its adoption by the General Assembly.

But the United Nations, Sir, and the world, continue to hear the weekly dazzling statements of Messrs. Allon, Dayan, Begin and their likes, in utter contempt of all United Nations resolutions and world opinion. Meanwhile the Arab people continue to be terrorized by the Zionist-Israeli clique, subjected to tyranny and untold suffering which, when known in all their terrifying horror, are bound to shake the living conscience of mankind.

I have the honour to request that this letter and its annexes be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative

Mt. Hermon

1:250,000







Kiryat Shemonah


"Map of the settlement
of the Golan Heights
and the development
of the Hill that has
fallen into our life"

Qunaytirah

Tiberias

Ayn
Gev

- a) Civil center 
- b) Resort place 
- c) Colony 
- d) a Main street 
- e) a Side street 
- f) Cities and natural forests, tourist places and resorts. 



ANNEX II

<i>Serial number</i>	<i>Resolution number</i>	<i>Date of adoption</i>	<i>Organ of the United Nations</i>	<i>Main provisions</i>
1	237 (1967)	14 June 1967	Security Council	(1) Calls upon Israel to facilitate the return of the new refugees; (2) Calls upon Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Occupied Areas.
2	2252 (ES-V)	4 July 1967	General Assembly	"Welcomes with great satisfaction" Security Council resolution 237 (1967) (No. 1. above)
3	2253 (ES-V)	4 July 1967	General Assembly	(1) Declares the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem "invalid"; (2) Calls upon Israel to "rescind all measures already taken" and "to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem".
4	2254 (ES-V)	14 July 1967	General Assembly	(1) "Reiterates" its resolution 2253 (ES-V) (No. 3 above); (2) "Deplores the failure of Israel to implement" it.
5	240 (1967)	25 October 1967	Security Council	"Reaffirms the necessity of the strict observance of the cease-fire."
6	2341 (XXII)	19 December 1967	General Assembly	PART A: On old refugees: Reaffirms past resolutions. PART B: On new refugees: Reaffirms resolution 2252 (ES-V) (No. 2, above).
7	6 (XXIV)	27 February 1968	Commission on Human Rights	Reaffirms Nos. 1 and 2, above.
8	Telegram	8 March 1968	Commission on Human Rights	Telegram to the Government of Israel by the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights upon the decision of the Commission at its 99th meeting "calling upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from indulging" in "acts of destroying homes of Arab civilian population" in occupied territories, and to "respect human rights and fundamental freedoms".
9	248 (1968)	24 March 1968	Security Council	"Condemns" Israel for the military raid on Al-Karamah.

ANNEX II (continued)

<i>Serial number</i>	<i>Resolution number</i>	<i>Date of adoption</i>	<i>Organ of the United Nations</i>	<i>Main provisions</i>
10	250 (1968)	27 April 1968	Security Council	"Calls upon Israel to refrain from holding the military parade in Jerusalem which is contemplated for 2 May 1968".
11	251 (1968))	2 May 1968	Security Council	"Deeply deplores" Israel's "disregard of the unanimous decision adopted by the Council" in No. 10, above.
12	III	7 May 1968	International Conference on Human Rights	(1) Reaffirms Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7, above; (2) "Requests the General Assembly to appoint a special committee to investigate violations of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel and to report thereon."
13	252 (1968)	21 May 1968	Security Council	"Deplores the failure of Israel to comply with" Nos. 3 and 4, above.
14	WHA 21.38	23 May 1968	Twenty-first World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization	"Calls upon Member States to do everything possible to facilitate the return of displaced persons in order to ameliorate their health conditions."
15	1336 (XLIV)	31 May 1968	Economic and Social Council	(1) "Recalls" No. 12, above; (2) "Endorses" No. 7, above.
16	256 (1968)	16 August 1968	Security Council	(1) "Reaffirms" No. 9, above; (2) "Condemns" Israel for its recent military attacks.
17	259 (1968)	28 September 1968	Security Council	(1) "Recalls" No. 1, above; (2) "Deplores the delay in the implementation" thereof; (3) "Requests the Secretary-General urgently to dispatch a special representative to the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel:" (4) "Requests the Government of Israel to receive the Special Representative of the Secretary-General."

ANNEX II (continued)

<i>Serial number</i>	<i>Resolution number</i>	<i>Date of adoption</i>	<i>Organ of the United Nations</i>	<i>Main provisions</i>
18	2443 (XXIII)	19 December 1968	General Assembly	<p>(1) Recalls Nos. 1, 2, 6(B), 7, 8, 12, 15 and 17 above.</p> <p>(2) "Decides to establish a Special Committee of three Member States to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories."</p>
19	2452 (XXIII)	19 December 1968	General Assembly	<p>PART A: On new refugees:</p> <p>(1) Recalls No. 1 above.</p> <p>(2) Reaffirms No. 2 above.</p> <p>(3) "Calls upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities."</p> <p>PART B: On old refugees: Reaffirms its twenty-one past resolutions.</p> <p>PART C: On humanitarian assistance to old and new refugees: "Reaffirms" its resolutions in Nos. 2 and 6 above.</p>
20	262 (1968)	31 December 1968	Security Council	"Condemns Israel for its premeditated military action" against the Civil International Airport of Beirut.
21	6 (XXV)	4 March 1969	Commission on Human Rights	<p>(1) Recalls Nos. 1, 2, 6 (B), 7, 8, 15 and 19 above.</p> <p>(2) Notes 7 and 17, above.</p> <p>(3) "Deplores Israel's continued violations of human rights in occupied territories, particularly the acts of destroying homes of Arab civilian population, deportation of inhabitants, and the resorting to violence against inhabitants expressing their resentment to occupation, and calls upon the Government of Israel to put an immediate end to such acts."</p>

ANNEX II (continued)

<i>Serial number</i>	<i>Resolution number</i>	<i>Date of adoption</i>	<i>Organ of the United Nations</i>	<i>Main provisions</i>
				(4) "Expresses its deep concern on Israel's refusal to abide by the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949" and "calls once again upon the Government of Israel to fully respect and apply that Convention."
22	265	1 April 1969	Security Council	"Condemns the recent premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions...."

280

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the Secretary-General on Israel's Excavations in the Occupied Territory of Syria.¹

May 23, 1969

Acting upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to state that the Israeli invading army and its authorities are still carrying on their work of excavation in the occupied territory of Syria, misappropriation, theft and vandalism of Syrian cultural property. Following are the details:

(1) Large-scale excavations are being carried out by a group from the Hebrew University under Mr. Benjamin Mazar in the occupied Golan Heights;

(2) Excavations were carried out in the city of Banias and led to the discovery of an old Roman temple;

(3) Excavations were carried out in the city of Fiq and led to the discovery of an old temple;

(4) Excavations were carried out in a cave situated on the road between Majdal Shams and Mount Hermon;

(5) An archaeological hill situated near the village of Jibbin was destroyed as a result of the opening of a road;

(6) Very important archaeological pieces were stolen from their places of origin in the Syrian occupied area and removed to the Israeli colonies. An instance in point is the carrying away of the very important historical altar from the city of Banias to the Israeli colony of Dan.

I wish to remind Your Excellency that in my letter to you dated 7 July 1967 (A/6750, S/8040) I had reported similar illegal acts. In his reply dated 14 July 1967 (A/6758, S/8058) the Israeli representative not only denied that such acts had taken place but also stated that:

"A representative of UNESCO, expected in Israel in the near future, will be invited to visit the site too."

Such illegal acts which continue unabatedly constitute flagrant violations of articles 4 and 5 of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, done at the Hague on 14 May 1954, to which Israel adhered, as well as the recommendations adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO held at New Delhi in December 1956, specifically article VI, paragraph 32.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9220. Also issued under the symbol A/7558.

Since ample proofs have established either the utter ignorance of or the deliberate disregard by the Israeli aggressive authorities of all international treaties and obligations, I am annexing to my letter the texts of the articles invoked.

I shall be grateful if my Government could obtain a report on these illegal Israeli acts of theft and vandalism of the cultural property of Syria.

I wish also to request, Excellency, that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH

Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX I

CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT. DONE AT THE HAGUE, ON 14 MAY 1954

Article 4

RESPECT FOR CULTURAL PROPERTY

1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of hostility directed against such property.

2. The obligations mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present article may be waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver.

3. The High Contracting Parties further undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property. They shall refrain from requisitioning movable cultural property situated in the territory of another High Contracting Party.

4. They shall refrain from any act directed by

way of reprisals against cultural property.

5. No High Contracting Party may evade the obligations incumbent upon it under the present article, in respect of another High Contracting Party, by reason of the fact that the latter has not applied the measures of safeguard referred to in article 3.

Article 5

OCCUPATION

1. Any High Contracting Party in occupation of the whole or part of the territory of another High Contracting Party shall as far as possible support the competent national authorities of the occupied country in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property.

2. Should it prove necessary to take measures to preserve cultural property situated in occupied territory and damaged by military operations, and should the competent national authorities be unable to take such measures, the Occupying Power shall, as far as possible, and in close cooperation with such authorities, take the most necessary measures of preservation.

3. Any High Contracting Party whose Government is considered their legitimate Government by members of a resistance movement, shall, if possible, draw their attention to the obligation to comply with those provisions of the Convention dealing with respect for cultural property.

ANNEX II

RECOMMENDATION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF UNESCO HELD AT NEW DELHI, IN DECEMBER 1956

VI. *Excavations in occupied territory*

32. In the event of armed conflict, any Member State occupying the territory of another State should refrain from carrying out archaeological excavations in the occupied territory. In the event of chance finds being made, particularly during military works, the occupying Power should take all possible measures to protect these finds, which should be handed over, on the termination of hostilities, to the competent authorities of the territory previously occupied, together with all documentation thereto.

281

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the Secretary-General Attributing to Israel Vandalism of Syrian Cultural Treasures.¹

June 10, 1969

On instructions from my Government and with reference to my letter of 23 May 1969 (A/7558, S/9220), I have the honour to state the following:

The Israeli representative, in his answer dated 29 May 1969 (A/7562, S/9229) to my letter, acknowledges that the historical altar (subject of complaint 6 of my letter) was, for its safety, actually removed from the town of Banias and later restored to its site. Such flimsy justifications were used by the nazi occupying authorities in Europe whenever they committed theft and vandalism of the cultural treasures.

Furthermore, the Israeli representative quoted from the report of the Director-General of UNESCO to its Executive Board dated 16 May 1968 (78 EX/5), thereafter referred to as the *Report*, the following paragraph concerning the Syrian complaint:

"By a letter dated 6 February 1968, the Commissioner-General in Jerusalem informed me that investigations had been carried out, *where the information supplied had been sufficient to make inquiries possible*, and that the complaint in question had proved groundless..." (my italics).

A careful reading of the *Report* referred to above, as well as of the paragraph quoted by Mr. Tekoah will reveal the following:

1. The six complaints contained in my letter to Your Excellency are complaints lodged in 1969, whereas the *Report* quoted by the Israeli representative refers to complaints formulated in 1967 and 1968. Indeed, the Israeli representative simply skipped two years; for the paragraph quoted above is prefaced by the following:

"The Syrian Government sent me a note on 6 December 1967 containing *four complaints*." (78 EX/5, p. 10).

2. A careful reading of the paragraph quoted above should note the underlined clause:

"where the information supplied had been sufficient to make inquiries possible..."

The question duly arises whether the information by Israel had been sufficient to give a decisive, adequate and final answer.

3. The answer to this question is to be found in the *Report* itself. Referring to Syria's complaints of 1967 and 1968, the Commissioner-General (C.G.) for cultural property in the still Arab-occupied territories, Mr. H.J. Reinink, reported the following:

"I had occasion to visit almost all the monuments which were causing concern, *with the exception of some excavations in Syria*. This was not because the Israeli authorities refused me the necessary transport to visit these excavations, *but atmospheric conditions made the Golan Heights inaccessible and the exact location of the sites was not well enough known*." (78 EX/5, p. 5).

I wish to assert that for at least nine months of the year atmospheric conditions in the Golan Heights do permit visits to the sites of the excavations carried out there by the invading Israelis as well as investigation of damages done to archaeological sites which have been specifically designated by our letters of complaint.

4. The *Report* states furthermore:

"On 13 April 1968, the Syrian Government sent me a note making six complaints about the manner in which the C.G.'s inspections in Jerusalem had been carried out on Syrian Arab territory occupied since 5 June 1967." (78 EX/5, p. 10).

These complaints were communicated to the C.G. in Jerusalem on 16 April 1968, requesting him to carry out the inspections and take the other action asked for by the Syrian Government:

"I sent this letter to the C.G. in Jerusalem on 16 April 1968, requesting him to carry out the inspections and take the other action asked for by the Syrian Government. *I await the results of these inspections and will transmit them to the Syrian Government*." (78 EX/5, p. 11) (my italics).

It clearly transpires from the above that the Israeli representative not only avoided answering my letter in a clear-cut manner, but deliberately attempted, in an abusive and despicable manner, to deceive the international community. Our complaints still stand. My letter of 23 May

¹ U.N. doc. S/9246. Also issued under the symbol A/7565.

specifies six complaints submitted in 1969, not in 1967. The Israeli occupying authorities are still accused of acts of vandalism, theft of cultural property, excavations in the occupied territories, all in utter disregard of articles 4 and 5 of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, to which Israel adhered, as well as the recommendations adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO held in New Delhi in December 1965, specifically article VI, paragraph 32. It is only when a report on this complaint by the Director-General of UNESCO is submitted in 1969 and with specific reference to our 1969 complaints, that such a report can be cited in answer to my letter of 23 May 1969.

In this context, I wish to point out that the same *Report* refers to complaints by Jordan formulated on 21 April 1968, including among other things the now *cause célèbre* of the theft of the *Crown of the Virgin in the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem*. It is to be noted that this theft was reported by a letter to Your Excellency from the distinguished Permanent Representative of Jordan on 10 August 1967 (A/6784, S/8117). In his reply to this letter dated 16 August 1967 (A/6786, S/8123), the Israeli representative did not even bother to refer to this theft. This ugly act of vandalism was again raised by the Honourable Rouhi El-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem, in the Security Council on 3 May 1968 in the following terms:

"The holy places, Christian and Moslem alike, were subjected to repeated desecration not familiar to us. An example was the infamous burglary of one of the largest and holiest of churches in the world, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The priceless diamond-studded crown of the statue of the Virgin, Our Lady of Sorrows, on Calvary was stolen." (S/PV. 1421, p. 36).

To this Mr. Tekoah replied in the same meeting, as follows:

"Mention was conveniently omitted of the fact that the crown was recovered from the *thieves and restored* to the church in a ceremony of reverence joined in by all." (S/PV. 1421, p. 76) (my italics).

Thus, while the theft of the Crown and its return to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was acknowledged by the Israeli representative on 3 May 1968, the *Report* referred to the Jordanian

complaint about this particular act of vandalism as follows:

"By a letter of 12 February 1968, the C.G. in Jerusalem informed me that the investigations had been made and the complaints in question were unfounded." (78 EX/5, p. 10).

One should not hesitate to draw the appropriate and adequate conclusions on the too apparent discrepancies shown above. The striking analogy between the removal of the Baniyas historical altar and the theft of the Crown of the Virgin and their return is too obvious to be emphasized.

I shall be grateful if this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

282

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the President of the Security Council on Israel's Air Raid on Syrian Territory.¹

August 1, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the latest wave of Israeli serious violations of the cease-fire, culminating in the Israeli aerial raid against Syrian units in the northern sector.

At 1400 hours local time, on Wednesday, 30 July 1969, six Israeli military aircraft bombarded the positions of these units, wounding eleven Syrian soldiers, two of whom are now in critical condition. This wanton attack followed a series of Israeli provocations and cease-fire violations begun on 19 June 1969. The Israeli fire opened across the Syrian cease-fire positions was since then frequent and was not answered. These provocations continued to 20, 23 and 30 June. The Israelis resumed the fire on 1 July and returned to firing again across the Syrian cease-fire positions on 2 and 8 July. Complaints by the Syrian authorities about these provocations were

¹ U.N. doc. S/9371.

duly lodged with the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, indicating the exact locations of these acts and their dates.

Together with these provocations, the Israeli occupying authorities thought fit to demolish more houses in occupied Syrian villages. Their bulldozers were busy demolishing the houses of Boutmiye on 20 June 1969. On 23 June, their bulldozers were demolishing houses in Rafid and then on 13 July bulldozers pursued the demolition of houses in two Syrian villages, the first situated at approximately Map Reference 2292-2518 and the second at approximately Map Reference 2290-2526. These criminal acts were duly reported to the Chairman of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission.

Thus, with gun fire and demolition of houses, the Israeli occupying authorities, in their determination to escalate their aggression further, are using now their aircraft bombers to accomplish this purpose, their spokesmen making this new aspect of deliberate policy abundantly clear. Indeed in our letter of 10 July 1969 (S/9320), this aggressive Israeli policy was fully documented from Israeli official spokesmen.

While drawing your attention to this grave situation, I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the Secretary-General on Israel's Systematic Demolition of Syrian Villages and the Colonization of Arab Land with Intensive Settlement.¹

October 1, 1969

Acting upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to stress once more the fact that, despite our repeated complaints and pleas to

Your Excellency, the Israeli occupying authorities are deliberately pursuing the systematic demolition of Syrian villages and the colonization of Arab lands with intensive settlement.

Between 18 September 1968 and 13 July 1969 the Israeli invaders burned down or otherwise demolished no less than seventeen new Syrian villages in the occupied Golan Heights. Names, locations and other relevant information concerning the destruction of these villages appear in annex I of this letter. Names and locations of Israeli settlements built on the ruins of the Syrian villages are listed in annex II.

Examination of the data provided in these annexes reveals anew the invaders' criminal determination to erase, in the most barbaric fashion, all traces of Arab life and property in the occupied territories.

Since the Israeli blitzkrieg of 5 June 1967, the military occupying authorities have been pursuing a three-fold objective:

1. Eviction of the 115,000 Syrian inhabitants of the Golan Heights (see paragraphs 39 and 41 of the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1966-30 June 1967²).

2. Burning out and demolition of Syrian towns and villages, in order to obliterate the Arab character of the occupied areas.

3. Colonization of the occupied territories new settlers imported from various parts, but predominantly from Europe and America, thus adhering to the pattern of Zionist expansion in Palestine throughout the last half-century.

It is noteworthy that Israeli activities in the Golan Heights are but a faithful implementation of the decisions of the Twenty-seventh World Zionist Congress of June 1968, whose basic theme was the call for a new *Aliya* to inhabit the newly occupied territories.

An article by the correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, published 23 September 1969 under the title "Israeli Border Life — Golan Cliffs Along Syrian Border Key to Territorial Desires", indicates, on the one hand, the insatiable

¹ U.N. doc. S/9459. Also issued under the symbol A/7689.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement, No. 13 (A/6713).*

Israeli appetite for expansion and, on the other, extortion of funds from citizens of foreign countries indulged in by the World Zionist Organization to finance the unlawful designs of Israel. Two relevant excerpts from this article are reproduced in annex III.

While bringing to Your Excellency's attention these Israeli acts perpetrated daily, with premeditation, against my country and its people, in flagrant violation of the Charter, the many United Nations resolutions, and all norms of international law and civilized behaviour, we strongly request Your Excellency, as well as the competent organs of the United Nations, to assume in full their responsibilities with respect to

ending Israeli occupation of Syrian territory. As long as Israel is able to flout the Charter of the United Nations and the decisions of its organs, and to continue to consolidate its conquest, the situation in the Middle East will not cease to deteriorate; peace and security in the area will be increasingly threatened.

I shall be grateful if this letter can be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Permanent Representative of Syria
to the United Nations

ANNEX I

List of Syrian villages demolished or burned out by the Israeli occupying authorities

<i>Name of village</i>	<i>Date of destruction</i>	<i>Location : co-ordinates</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Al-Adnanieh (Suraman)	18 Sept.- 18 Nov. 1968	2783-2286	Continued despite Syrian protests to UNTSO
Al-Hamidieh	10-30 Oct. 1968	285-229	
Khesfin	26 Feb. 1969	2506-2265	Burned down by Israeli authorities
Group of dwellings	26 March 1969	2814-2290	
Abou Kheit	31 March 1969	2484-2273	
Kuneitra suburbs	31 March 1969	2813-2279	
Khan El-Joukhadar	8 April 1969	2593-2297	
Al-Razzanieh	7 April 1969	2540-2290	
Tel Al-Saqi	7 April 1969	2527-2281	
Abi Zeitoun	6 April 1969	2486-2256	
Maqam Abi Daher	7 April 1969	2564-2292	
Cluster of dwellings	27 April 1969	2855-2261	
Al-Asha	27, 28 April 1969	2643-2320	Continued despite Syrian protests to UNTSO
Al-Batmieh	20 June 1969	2615-2328	
Al-Rafid (5 houses)	23 June 1969	2625-2347	
Ein Al-Hamra	7 July 1969	2884-2255	
Cluster of houses	13 July 1969	2518-2292	
Cluster of houses	13 July 1969	2520-2290	

ANNEX II

Ten Israeli settlements built on the sites of partially or totally demolished Syrian villages, or in other locations in occupied Syrian territory

<i>Name of settlement</i>	<i>Former name</i>	<i>Date of establishment</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Shenir	Banias	14 Aug. 1967	
Golan	Kuneitra	5 Nov. 1967	
Geishur	Tel el-Faras	10 Mar. 1968	
El-'Al	El-'Al	5 May 1968	Most buildings of Arab El-'Al were demolished
Ezz Ed-Dine	Mazra'et Ezz Ed-Dine	7 July 1968	Total destruction
Fiq	Fiq	8 Aug. 1968	Most buildings demolished
Yoab	Kafar Hareb	Nov. 1968	Most buildings demolished
Gibin	Jibin	28 Dec. 1968	Total destruction
Ein Zivan	Ein Ziwan	29 Dec. 1968	Total destruction
Shalom	Jabata Az-Zeit	5 May 1969	Total destruction

ANNEX III

Excerpts from an article published in the "Christian Science Monitor" on 23 September 1969, "Israeli Border Life — Golan Cliffs Along Syrian Border Key to Territorial Desires", by Staff Correspondent Trudy Rubin

"Agricultural sheds are visible off the road and tractors with grinning young men in shorts. These are the first settlers. Already twelve settlements, ten civilian-agricultural and two military-agricultural (*nahals*), dot the heights. Two more *nahals* are soon to rise on the Syrian borders.

"The process for civilian settlement, Dina tells us, is relatively easy. Once the Israeli Government makes the decision to allow it (it has been permitted so far only in the Golan Heights and in two cases on the West Bank), the Jewish National Fund clears the land and the Jewish Agency provides loans for buildings, agricultural equipment and initial needs.

"Within Israel proper both these semi-governmental agencies are funded by money from the United Jewish Appeal, which raises funds from Jewish communities around the world. However, the agency takes pains to stress that the money for

settlement in the territories comes from special funds earmarked for the occupied areas."

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the Secretary-General on Israel's Decision to Extend its Legal Jurisdiction to the Golan Heights.¹

October 28, 1969

Acting upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 30 September 1969 (A/7689, S/9459), I have the honour to draw your attention to the most recent step taken by the Israeli authorities of occupation, to extend the Israeli legal jurisdiction to the Golan Heights, a Syrian territory under active Israeli colonization, a step which constitutes an additional instrument in the context of the *faits accomplis* long advocated by General Dayan and now being implemented one after the other.

To appease world public opinion falsely, the Israeli Attorney General was directed to state summarily that the move did not constitute a

¹ U.N. doc. S/9489. Also issued under the symbol A/7730.

measure of annexation. But the same news media that reported his statement immediately gave details of the ceremonies which are going to take place in the inauguration of this move, details that are sufficient to remove any doubt about the Israeli sinister designs. This is in fact what the Jewish Telegraphic Agency stated in its *News Bulletin* of 17 October 1969:

"Inauguration of the Court at Kuneitra, the largest town in the Golan Heights, will mean the replacement of Syria's legal code by Israeli law. Opening ceremonies will be attended by Israel's Minister of Justice, Yakov Shapiro, and other ministers, Members of Parliament and Israeli dignitaries. It will be more than a routine event and observers here expect it to raise new outcries in the Arab world."

Immediately following this arbitrary Israeli decision, taken in utter disregard of all norms of civilized conduct and in defiance of all relevant United Nations resolutions, General Dayan, himself, placed such moves in their true Israeli perspective. He said:

"Our struggle continues for a greater, stronger and more Jewish Israel." (*Le Monde* (22 October 1969), p. 5).

Giving his thought some more precision, he said, as he was elaborating on his concept of "strategic security borders", as reported by the same number of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency's *News Bulletin*:

"Both the Syrian Golan Heights and Sharm El-Sheikh on the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula were needed to secure such borders."

As though Mrs. Golda Meir wanted to outbid her Defence Minister, she appeared on the 22nd of this month on the Israeli television to say:

"There is no halt in the process of setting up Israeli fortified villages beyond our former frontiers."

Giving more precision to her statement, she added that:

"eighteen villages of that kind had already been created, seven would be set up in the very near future and the construction of such villages would continue at the same pace".

Not completely satisfied with such a plan of his Prime Minister, General Dayan, celebrating

the establishment of the first Israeli Court in Kuneitra, expressed the wish that the Israeli Government "should create conditions for permanent settlement of Israelis in the area", and he added:

"The main thing is not the occupation but the creation of a permanent presence." (*Le Monde* (23 October 1969), p. 6).

Your Excellency, the General Assembly, the Security Council, Member States, indeed the world at large, should draw their own conclusions as to where this defiant Israeli conduct would lead. Indeed, they are invited to do so by the very Israeli spokesman, who, to the question of whether the Israeli recent moves would constitute an annexation, had this to say:

"You may draw your own conclusions." (*Le Monde* (16 October 1969), (Cable of A.F.P. from Kuneitra)).

I have the honour to request that this letter be distributed as a document of both the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

5. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

285

Telegram from the United Arab Republic Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General on Israel's Repressive Acts against Civilians in Gaza Sector.¹

February 4, 1969

I have the honour to draw your attention with grave concern and regret to the alarming news that has reached the Arab world and world public opinion concerning events in the Gaza Sector and the barbaric acts perpetrated there by the Israeli occupying forces against civilians, and in particular women and children.

News agencies have reported yesterday, 2

¹ U.N. doc. S/8991. Also issued under the symbol A/7505.

February 1969, that thousands of women and children have demonstrated in protest against the massacres and the repressive acts carried out by Israeli military occupation authorities in that sector, as well as the prison sentences pronounced by Israeli military courts on three girls for varying terms. Israeli occupying forces fired on demonstrators after tear gas bombs had failed to disperse them, thus resulting in the killing and wounding of more than a hundred school girls between the ages of fifteen and twenty, several of whom were transported to hospitals as a result of bullet wounds inflicted by occupying forces.

I feel compelled to point out here that the Gaza Sector and all its towns have in the past few weeks turned into a battlefield in which a considerable number of unarmed civilians were killed or wounded as a result of brutal acts of repression carried out by the Israeli military occupation authorities, acts that have reached lately an extent which could no longer be tolerated. Two weeks ago, when women and children carried out peaceful demonstrations in the town of Rafah to protest against the detention of the entire male population of the town, they were savagely confronted by Israeli occupation forces and many mercilessly fired upon, as a result of which women were killed or wounded.

Since that day we have been receiving with alarming concern additional news about more events concerning the inhuman treatment of the civilian population of the Gaza Sector, which constitute a flagrant violation of the most elementary human rights which are the basis on which the civilized world is founded. The repetition of those criminal acts should be considered as a further evidence of Israel's indifference to the laws of war as well as its repeated violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the treatment of civilians in occupied territories. Israel's acts carried out lately are nothing new; they clearly reflect her intention of pursuing her aggressive policy against the Palestinian people by bombing their villages, destroying their homes and confiscating their property. Even refugee camps have not been spared such shelling. Those inhuman and terrifying acts have led the Security Council as well as organs of the General Assembly to condemn Israel on several occasions. The latest of these condemnations was the one adopted

by the Security Council concerning Israel's flagrant and premeditated act of aggression on the Beirut civilian airport, an act which was also censured by world public opinion.

Any repressive and violent action Israel may resort to can never deprive the Palestinian people of their right to national existence and their homeland as it is an inherent right which no one can deny. The Palestinian people have a just cause and it is therefore natural for oppressed people to struggle in order to attain their legitimate rights. It is, hence, natural for them to choose the ways and means for achieving their objectives. Israel in following such a policy aims, in fact, at creating a tense situation that would justify her aggression, her illegal occupation of Arab territory and her acts of reprisal. Israel's policy has always been and continues to be founded on the threat and use of force. This undoubtedly diminishes the chances of peace in the area and reveals her true expansionist designs. This would explain her rejection of the peaceful settlement laid down by the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. The criminal acts taking place in the Gaza Strip today not only pose a threat to peace and security in that region but are also a direct challenge to United Nations humanitarian resolutions concerning the treatment of civilian populations in occupied territories, the latest of which was adopted by the General Assembly at its last session setting up a Special Committee of three Member States to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories.

In view of your well known concern over the protection of human rights, I urge you to take as soon as possible whatever action is deemed necessary to put an end to these barbaric acts and to intervene with the occupying authorities in order to stop all acts of oppression, terrorism and mass killing which are in direct contradiction of the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

I request that this telegram be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Mahmoud RIAD
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council on the Situation in the Suez Canal Sector.¹

March 9, 1969

On instructions from my Government and pursuant to my letter dated 9 March 1969, I have the honour to inform you of the gravity of the situation and its deterioration brought about by Israel's deliberate pursuance of its aggression in the Suez Canal sector.

(1) Today at 3.15 p.m. local time, the Israeli occupying forces suddenly opened fire on the cities of Kantara, Ismailia, Deversoir and Suez, using artillery, mortars and tanks. In self defense, our forces had to return the fire.

(2) The Israeli occupying forces extended with intensity their shelling from Kantara in the north to Suez in the south concentrating their artillery in depth on the petroleum installations in Suez. As a result, some oil reservoirs were set on fire.

(3) The Israeli attack was particularly marked by its concentration on the ships in the port of Suez and the oil reservoirs, and the use of propeller planes as artillery observation posts to assist in the location of these civilian targets.

These renewed attacks today, with intensity and concentration on civilian targets, demonstrate again what I have pointed out in my previous letter to you that,

"... It further indicates clearly that Israel continues to pursue its policy of undermining any efforts towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The planning of this latest Israeli aggression at the time when Ambassador Jarring is resuming his contacts in the area exposes Israel's determination to sabotage his mission."

Needless to say that this policy of continuous aggression will not daunt the Arab will to resist Israel's expansionist policy. It will only contribute to the aggravation of the situation thus increasing the dangers to international peace.

I have the honour to request that this letter

be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Mohamed Awad EL KONY
Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic to
the United Nations

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council on Israel's Attacks on Civilian Installations and Homes along the Suez Canal.²

March 11, 1969

I have the honour to bring to your attention the third consecutive attack by the Israeli armed forces in this latest series of aggressions against the Suez Canal sector.

At 1545 local time today, Israeli occupying forces opened fire on Port Tewfik, Suez, and Elshatt, using heavy artillery and tank guns. Our armed forces were forced to return fire and shot down an Israeli propeller plane which the Israeli forces have been lately using for purposes of artillery reconnaissance.

The military engagements extended later in the afternoon to Ismailia and Kantara in the north. Artillery and mortars were used by the Israeli forces.

The recurrence of such attacks indicates clearly that those attacks are of a premeditated nature aimed at the destruction of civilian installations and homes in the densely populated areas of the cities along the Suez Canal.

It is significant that Israeli forces, twice during the engagements, refused to abide with the cease-fire requests proposed by the Military Observers in the area, the second of which was made by General Odd Bull himself who was in the area during the exchange. Israeli shelling only stopped at 1935 local time (i.e.) twenty minutes after the initial time proposed by General Odd Bull which was set at 1915.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9061.

² U.N. doc. S/9072.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

I avail myself of this opportunity etc.

(Signed) M. EL KONY
Permanent Representative of
the United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council on an Israeli Attack on the Suez Canal Sector.¹

March 24, 1969

I have the honour to bring to your urgent attention another serious attack committed by the Israeli occupying forces against the Suez Canal Sector.

At 6.30 local time, an Israeli moving tank opened quick fire on our forces in the southern section of the Lakes area. The fire was not returned.

Again at 8.40 local time, the Israeli occupying forces opened fire heavily in the vicinity of Suez and Port Tewfik using artillery and tank, guns. This time our armed forces returned the fire in order to put an end to that latest Israeli act of aggression.

It is to be stressed in this connexion that the Israeli occupying forces, instead of complying with the request of the Military Observers for cease-fire which was arranged for 10.00 local time, persisted with their attack, intensified their heavy shelling and extended the area of engagements to the north, reaching Ismailia, Deversoir and Toson. At 11.00 local time the Israeli assault was still under way.

The Military Observers had no other alternative but to arrange for a second cease-fire which was effective at 12.15 local time.

I hardly need to elaborate at any length on the targets of this most recent Israeli onslaught for it is by now an open secret that one of the

cardinal points in the Israeli military strategy and a salient feature of the Israeli policy as a whole is to cause maximum damage to the civilian population, and to destroy as many civilian installations as can be reached in the area. Presently the Port of Suez seems to be their prime target as can be ascertained by the damage caused to a vessel flying the Panamanian flag moored in the harbour.

I would be grateful if this letter were circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Ambassador EL KONY
Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council on Israel's Attacks on Civilians in the Suez Canal Sector.²

April 4, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention another premeditated act of aggression by the Israeli occupying forces in the Suez Canal sector.

At 12.35 local time today, these forces opened fire from artillery and tanks against Suez, Port Tewfik, El-Shat and Deversoir. Our forces in the southern part of the Suez Canal were compelled to return the fire.

It is to be noted that in these premeditated attacks, the Israeli occupying forces were concentrating their shellings against the harbour of Suez.

At 12.15 local time, a cease-fire was arranged by the United Nations Military Observers.

As a result of this wanton attack, several civilians have lost their lives, besides the destruction of civilian installations and the damage to an oil tanker.

In my previous letters, I have underlined the main targets of these Israeli attacks against the

¹ U.N. doc. S/9108.

² U.N. doc. S/9132.

United Arab Republic perpetrated by the Israeli occupying forces; namely, to terrorize the civilian population and to paralyze the economic life in the area of the Suez Canal.

Today's aggression by the Israeli occupying forces bears out the criminal pattern of the policy of Israel.

I have the honour to request that this document be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, etc.

(Signed) Mohamed Awad EL KONY

Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council on Israel's Attacks on Civilian Centres.¹

April 18, 1969

I have the honour to bring to your attention two consecutive acts of aggression committed by the Israeli occupying forces on 16 and 17 April 1969.

On 16 April, at 10.35 local time, the Israeli forces opened fire on the civilian centres along the Suez Canal from the entrance of the Port of Suez to the Bitter Lakes, using mobile tanks and heavy artillery, as well as rockets. Israeli shelling of the civilian targets lasted for about two hours until the United Nations Military Observers succeeded in arranging a cease-fire for 12.30 local time.

On 17 April, the Israeli occupying forces again opened fire at 17.30 local time, along the Bitter Lakes up till Kantara North. Fifteen minutes later, at 17.45, the Israeli forces extended the line of fire south to Port Tewfik.

The United Nations Military Observers arranged a cease-fire at 19.00 local time.

I would like to underline, once more, that the Israeli shelling was concentrated on the civilian centres and economic installations in the area

causing the loss of civilian lives and heavy damage to civilian buildings and installations.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Mohamed Awad EL KONY

Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General Expressing the United Arab Republic's Readiness to Contribute to Reducing the Risks Facing the United Nations Military Observers.²

May 13, 1969

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 29 April 1969 (document S/9188) in which I reiterated our readiness to contribute to the maximum extent possible towards reducing the risks which the United Nations Military Observers are exposed to in the discharge of their duties under the dangerous conditions created by the continued Israeli aggression.

Upon further instructions from my Government, I wish to confirm that during the recent meetings between Lt. General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, and Ambassador Salah Gohar, Under-Secretary of State, Lt. General Bull was informed that the fortification of UNMO's shelters along the west bank of the Suez Canal is already under way. Lt. General Bull was, moreover, informed that we are ready to undertake the fortification in accordance with the specifications which would be submitted to us by him. Lt. General Bull has also been informed of other steps already taken to eliminate the exposure of UNMO to Israeli fire.

Suggestions put forward by Lt. General Bull have been discussed extensively with Ambassador Gohar. Ambassador Gohar has again reassured

¹ U.N. doc. S/9165.

² U.N. doc. S/9207.

General Bull of our readiness to respond positively to any suggestion for that purpose which would naturally be consistent with the effectiveness of our defences in the Suez Canal sector against Israeli aggression.

While reaffirming our readiness to do all in our power to ensure the safety of the UNMO and supporting field service personnel stationed at the Suez Canal sector, I need hardly reiterate that Israel, by its persistent aggression, by its avowed intentions and systematic attacks on cities and towns and destruction of economic installations, bears solely the responsibility for the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and the endangering of world peace.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Mohamed Awad EL KONY

Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

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Letter from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council Attributing to Israel Full Responsibility for the Deterioration of the Situation in the Middle East.¹

July 10, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to submit the following:

In his special report to the Security Council dated 5 July 1969 on the cease-fire in the Suez Canal Sector, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that the cease-fire demanded by the Security Council in June 1967 had ceased to be respected.

I should like to emphasize from the outset that the full responsibility for the deterioration of the situation in the area lies solely on Israel.

The Security Council, by adopting its resolution on the cease-fire on 9 June 1967, aimed at stopping the Israeli aggression against the Arab States as

a first step, to be followed by a second resolution ordering Israel to terminate its aggression and withdraw its forces from the Arab occupied territories. A resolution to that effect was adopted by the Security Council calling upon Israel to withdraw its forces from territories occupied by its armed forces. This resolution embodied also a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem. Israel, by refusing to accept and to implement the Security Council resolution, has in fact been obstructing the efforts to achieve the peaceful settlement of the conflict and consequently is fully responsible for the aggravation and the deterioration of the situation.

Israel has adopted an obstructive attitude against all of the efforts exerted to reach a peaceful settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242; efforts carried out by Ambassador Jarring, as well as those actually undertaken by the four Powers to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. In taking such an attitude, Israel is seeking to impose its own terms and realize its expansionist aims in utter disregard of the dangers that threaten peace in the area.

In the meantime, the United Arab Republic has always exerted all efforts in a positive and practical way for the success of Ambassador Jarring's mission. It has, moreover, supported all international efforts for achieving a peaceful and just settlement in the Middle East.

The United Arab Republic has accepted the Security Council resolution 242, it has declared its readiness to implement its provisions. Furthermore, and in contrast to Israel's policy, it has supported international efforts as long as they aim at the implementation of the Security Council resolution, being convinced that the continuation of the Israeli policy in the area will definitely lead to an explosive situation which would endanger peace in the area.

Israel, however, has persistently rejected the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is to be noted in this respect that Israel rejected the Security Council resolution on Jerusalem adopted unanimously on 3 July 1969 and that the campaign she launched against the Council itself is a clear attack against the United Nations Organization and its organs and an evidence of Israel's disregard of the will of the world community.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9321.

Israel's defiance of the 3 July 1969 Security Council resolution on Jerusalem is but a reflection of the latest declarations of its leaders revealing her expansionist aims and plans. The Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan declared, on 26 June 1969, before an Economic Conference in Jerusalem:

"Golan should no longer be included among such terms as new areas or occupied areas, and should be viewed as one of the districts of Israel. The Golan will never be returned to Syria."

He added: "Israel would hold onto Sharm El Sheikh and the approaches to Gulf of Eilat... Jerusalem will never be divided again... Israel is willing to return the West Bank of Jordan within the framework of the Allon Plan." (It should be noted that the Allon Plan is the one which aims at ensuring Israel's continued occupation of the Jordan West Bank.)

Regarding the safety of the United Nations cease-fire Observers in the Suez Canal Sector, the United Arab Republic has always co-operated with the United Nations Command to ensure their safety in the fulfilment of their mission. The United Arab Republic attitude in practice has always been in full accordance with its declared policy.

Thus Israel, by refusing to implement the United Nations resolutions, by adopting an aggressive policy of continued occupation of the Arab territories, by foiling all efforts and attempts to reach a peaceful settlement of the problem, and by her declared policy of annexing the Arab occupied territories, is solely responsible for the deterioration of the situation and the existence of the prevailing state of tension in the area.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Abdullah EL ERIAN
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General on the Imprisonment of Miss Fatma Abdel Fattah El-Niguely a Citizen of the United Arab Republic and a Member of the Staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, by the Israeli Occupying Forces in Gaza.¹

October 15, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your urgent attention the following:

The Israeli occupying forces in Gaza have subjected Miss Fatma Abdel Fattah El-Niguely, a citizen of the United Arab Republic and a member of the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to illegal arrest and arbitrary trial.

An Israeli military court imposed on her a sentence of imprisonment in flagrant disregard of the immunity from jurisdiction which she enjoys as an official of the United Nations in accordance with article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations and article V, section 18, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

The persecution and arbitrary and illegal measures committed by the Israeli authorities against Miss El-Niguely, whose only crime in the eyes of the Israeli occupying authorities is the humanitarian and noble aid she renders as a nurse to her fellow inhabitants of Gaza suffering under the ruthless Israeli oppression, are furthermore a violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

This latest violation by Israel of the norms of civilized conduct has extended the scope of Israeli violations to include the disregard for the status and immunities of the officials of the United Nations whose protection the United Nations has the duty to ensure.

The United Arab Republic Government would like to elicit your Excellency's assistance in

¹ U.N. doc. S/9474. Also issued under the symbol A/7711.

facilitating the prompt respect of the rights of Miss El-Niguely.

I have the honour to request the circulation of this letter as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Mohamed Hassan EL-ZAYYAT

Permanent Representative
of the United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General on the Official Declarations made by the United States Embassy in Tel Aviv Permitting U.S. Citizens to Become Citizens of Israel and Enlist in its Armed Forces, while Maintaining their American Nationality.¹

October 17, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following:

I have learned with great concern and astonishment of the official declarations made by the United States Embassy in Tel Aviv revealing that United States citizens could maintain their American nationality even if they become citizens of Israel and enlist in its armed forces. This means that American citizens can have double allegiance to Israel and the United States and that they can take part in military aggressive acts which Israel commits against the Arab countries.

The United States, which has continued giving its political, economic and military aid to Israel following its aggression against the Arab countries on 5 June 1967, commences today a new phase in its assistance to Israel through the joining of American citizens in Israeli armed forces. Consequently, the United States is contributing to the aggressive war which is being launched by

Israel against the Arab countries, a method which does not differ much from the method by which the United States began its war in Viet-Nam. This new development represents a phase which is fraught with great danger and which undermines the endeavours aiming at the realization of a peaceful settlement within the United Nations.

The United States, which pledged its support of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, is engaging at present in undermining that resolution and endangering peace through providing Israel with arms and planes and encouraging American citizens to take arms under the Israeli flag against the Arab peoples.

When Israel defies the Security Council resolution, refuses to withdraw from Arab territories and insists on the pursuance of expansionist plans and the annexation of these territories, it so acts consequent to the material and moral support it receives from the United States.

What makes the policy of the United States and its continuation of aiding Israeli aggression assume a more grave character is the fact that the United States is a permanent member of the Security Council, which has a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In pursuing such a policy, the United States violates the character of the United Nations and undermines the world Organization.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Mohamed Hassan EL-ZAYYAT

Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

¹ U.N. doc. S/9477. Also issued under the symbol A/7714.

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General on the United States Government's Permission for its Citizens to Enlist in Israel's Armed Forces.¹

October 20, 1969

In its letter to Your Excellency dated 17 October 1969 (A/7714-S/9477), the United Arab Republic Mission sought to bring to your attention and that of the Members of the United Nations a serious development in the Middle East. This was the permission by the Government of the United States of America to its citizens to enlist in the armed forces of Israel while that country continued to occupy Arab territories, aiming at their annexation, and was committing daily new acts of aggression against Arab towns and villages.

The United Arab Republic would have welcomed a reply showing that its "allegations" were indeed "unfounded". The United Arab Republic Mission regrets that, in the letter of the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to Your Excellency dated 20 October 1969, the United States Government, on the contrary, affirms that "the mere fact of military service in a foreign army... does not necessarily mean loss of American citizenship" and that "because of the automatic extension of Israeli nationality to Jews entering Israel... a class of dual American and Israel nationals has grown up", and that, "in the last few years... increasing numbers have received call-up notices and have been obliged to serve [in the Israeli armed forces]".

Upon instruction of my Government, I wish to record that the legal measures referred to in the letter of the Permanent Representative of the United States of America clearly open the door for American citizens to fight under the Israeli flag against countries not at war with the United States of America. Such a serious development, in the opinion of my Government, can lead only to further escalation and disturbing repercussions in our area.

I have the honour to request that this letter be

circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Mohamed Hassan EL-ZAYYAT
Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General on Israel's Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories.²

November 17, 1969

The Third Committee of the General Assembly has begun its deliberation on the question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of *apartheid* in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories.

The world community in several occasions has pronounced itself against the consistent pattern of violation practised by the Israeli authorities in the occupied Arab territories.

The world public opinion might recall the several resolutions adopted by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights, the International Conference on Human Rights and other United Nations organs which called upon Israel, *inter alia*, to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population, to apply the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities. They also expressed deep concern about the reported continuation of human rights violation by the Israeli authorities. In this connexion, we might

¹ U.N. doc. S/9480. Also issued under the symbol A/7718.

² U.N. doc. A/C.3/619. The letter contained two resolutions on education and cultural properties in the Arab occupied territories, adopted by the Executive Board of UNESCO at its 83rd session in Paris on October 25, 1969; it also contained excerpts from reports on Israel's violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, published in *The Times*, *The New York Times* and *Le Monde*.

refer to the latest action taken by an international body, namely, UNESCO.

At its eighty-third session held in Paris on 25 October 1969, the Executive Board of UNESCO adopted two resolutions on education and cultural properties in the Arab occupied territories.

The first resolution (83 ex/8) states in its operative part the following:

"1. *Regrets* the failure to import and put to use in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools in the occupied territories the textbooks approved by the Director-General;

"2. *Urgently calls upon* the Government of Israel to remove immediately any obstacles to the import and use of the textbooks approved by the Director-General in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools in the occupied territories so that the textbooks would be in practical use in the said schools as early as possible in the present scholastic year."

The second resolution (83 ex/3M) entitled the *Burning of the Aqsa Mosque* stated the following:

"1. *Profoundly distressed* by the extensive damage which an act of arson caused on 21 August 1969 to the sacred mosque of Aqsa in Jerusalem under Israeli military occupation,"

"2. *Condemns* the criminal burning of the Aqsa Mosque, as well as those who are responsible for it."

It was published lately in the international Press by eyewitnesses' reports about the inhuman practices and actions followed by the Israelis against the Arabs in the Arab-occupied territories.

The British newspaper, "*The Times*" of 28 October 1969 stated by E.C. Hodgkin, its Foreign Editor, the following:

"*Deportation* — about 90 Palestinians, as far as I could calculate have so far been pushed over the border into Jordan. Most are people who were prominent in West Bank life — the former mayor of Jerusalem and the present mayor of Ramallah. For example: judges, lawyers, doctors, teachers and so on."

"*Destruction of houses* — on the latest pre-Malhud tally 7,140 Arab houses have been blown up. This includes entire villages which have been destroyed for security reasons but in the majority of cases, the houses were blown up because

somebody suspected of connexion with guerrilla activity was living in them. What particularly angers Arabs is that destruction often takes place as soon as a suspect is carried off. There is no waiting for him to be charged, let alone convicted. Nor does it matter if he is not the owner of the house, innocent or guilty, tenant or visitor or owner, the explosives go in. Requisition of buildings is a lesser irritant, though the conversion of the brand new hospital in east Jerusalem to police headquarters is a constant affront.

"Imprisonment — suspects are frequently held for months at a time without trial, without their whereabouts being known, and without lawyers or relatives being able to visit or contact them.

"All sections of the population worry particularly about their children. What is going to happen to the Arab schools? All schools have been threatened with closure if their pupils strike or demonstrate against the occupation authorities. Two schools in Nablus and one in Jenius (run by the United Nations) were in fact shut down during my visit. Moreover, all government schools in the Jerusalem area have been compelled to change from Jordanian to Israeli textbooks and examinations, so that the children start learning to read with such sentences as: 'I am an Israeli citizen.' The prospect of their children, having to follow an alien system of education or having no education at all is enough to make even the most patriotic think about throwing in their land and leaving.

"All occupations are bad. Power slips more and more into the hands of the extremists — the big bomb on the other. That is what is happening in what is left of Palestine. On the whole, the Arabs there used to be probably the most adaptable, intelligent and moderate of their race, anxious only to live and prosper in the land which has so long been their home. It is a tragedy that they are now being persecuted into a new diaspora by the armies and people of Israel."

The New York Times of 5 November 1969 stated the following:

"The Israeli military government is imposing a new level of punishment on Arabs in the West Bank area and the Gaza strip to compel them to take a stand against the Arab guerrilla movement.

"It is seen by the Arabs as a form of collective punishment and only one of several forms. Another is the seizure of Arab property which has become frequent recently as group punishment.

"In Hebron this week, for example, the security authorities seized twenty-six Arab shops, thirteen on each side of a street where an Arab terrorist had thrown a grenade at a military vehicle earlier in the day. It was the first time this sort of punishment had been applied."

A senior official of the military government said: "You can call it collective punishment; we call it defensive measures."

The New York Times of 16 October 1969 stated:

"Israeli civil law is being extended to the Golan Heights, captured from Syria in the 1967 war, according to a decree published by the Israeli military authorities. A Magistrate's Court will be established Monday in El Quneitra, once the largest town in the area, but now virtually abandoned; Syrian law will then give way to Israeli law. The Attorney General, Meir Shamgar, went on the State radio tonight to deny that the move meant annexation of the area which Israeli officials have indicated they intend to keep. Although tens of thousands of Syrians and Druse villagers inhabited the area before the war, only 6,000 Druses remained after Israeli forces captured the Heights and advanced to El Quneitra. It is considered quite certain, however, that in addition to the Golan Heights, Israel intends to keep the Gaza Strip and the western edge or western half of the Sinai Peninsula reaching to Sharm El Sheik at the south."

The New York Times of 11 November 1969 stated the following:

"In a major review of Israel's defense situation, Mr. Dayan conceded for the first time that Arab guerrillas were forcing Israeli authorities to stiffen security measures. Asked if Israel was applying collective punishment in response to these activities, Mr. Dayan said he preferred to call it 'neighbourhood punishment'.

"Israeli authorities recently began demolishing homes of Arabs who had been uncooperative in investigations of terrorism or who had declined to come forward with information. Previously, demolition was limited to the homes of those actively engaged in terrorism."

The French newspaper, *Le Monde* on 23 October 1969 stated:

"Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel, said on Tuesday evening: 'The establishment of fortified villages beyond our former frontiers is proceeding without interruption.' She added that eighteen such villages had already been set up and that another seven would be added at the same rate in the very near future.

"General Dayan, who took part on Tuesday in the inauguration of the first Israel Court at Kuneitra, said he hoped the Israel Government had created the conditions for a permanent settlement of Israelis in the region. He added that what mattered was not occupation but the creation of a permanent presence.

"According to a report from military sources in Tel Aviv, out of 190 Arab houses blown up with dynamite by the Israel authorities on the West Bank of the Jordan in the last six months, ninety were blown up in the last two months."

I have the honour to request circulation of this letter as an official document of the General Assembly and its bringing to the attention of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of Experts established under Resolution 6 (XXV) of 4 March 1969 by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Mohamed Hassan EL-ZAYYAT
Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General on Israel's Use of the United States-Built Phantom Jet Aircraft in its Attacks on the United Arab Republic.¹

December 5, 1969

During our conversation of 2 December 1969, I conveyed to Your Excellency the grave concern of the Arab delegations to the United Nations on

¹ U.N. doc. S/9540. Also issued under the symbol A/7828.

the use of United States-built Phantom jet aircraft by the Israeli armed forces, in their attacks on towns and villages in the United Arab Republic, as recently reported by Lt. Gen. Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (S/7930/Add. 439), dated 29 November 1969. He reports:

"At 0900 four Israeli forces Phantom aircraft crossed Canal from east to west and attacked with bombs targets approximately 30 kilometres southwest of OP. Attack ceased at 0903. Between 0859 and 0904 ack-ack fire by UAR forces. At 0915 two Israeli Phantom aircraft crossed Canal from east to west and carried out attack with bombs on target in the same area. Attack ceased at 0916. Between 0914 and 0917 ack-ack fire by UAR forces."

The use of United States-built Phantom jet aircraft by the Israeli occupying forces bears out the warnings and the apprehensions repeatedly expressed by the Arab countries regarding the serious repercussions of providing such offensive war weapons to Israel. It has been manifested that such military aid cannot but sustain Israel in its attempts to consolidate its aggression and plan further expansion.

Such military aid assumes disturbing character when it comes from a permanent member of the Security Council, which has a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request the circulation of this letter as a Security Council and General Assembly document.

(Signed) Mohamed H. EL-ZAYYAT
Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

6. ISRAEL

298

Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel to the Secretary-General on the Iraqi Government's Execution of Nine Iraqi Citizens.¹

January 27, 1969

I regret to convey to you the shocking news that the Government of Iraq executed nine Iraqi Jews this morning by public hanging in a central square in Baghdad.

The charge that they were spying for Israel is without a shred of truth. The Iraq Government has perpetrated an act of barbarity which exceeds even what the world has come to expect from a country in which violence and murder have become almost commonplace. The appeals made through a number of channels were disregarded, including that of yourself as Secretary-General.

The statement made by Prime Minister Eshkol in the Knesset this afternoon expressed the grief and anger felt throughout Israel at this deed. I have asked our Acting Permanent Representative to give you a copy of that statement.

As you will be aware, the Israel Government and people have felt increasing anxiety at the persecution of Jews in certain Arab countries in the Middle East. The facts of the matter have on a number of occasions been placed before the appropriate organs of the United Nations. To our profound distress, it must be recorded that these bodies have failed to take the required action.

I can only express the earnest hope that everything possible will yet be done by the international community, and the United Nations in particular, to relieve the plight of these helpless Jewish minorities. They are being subjected to gross discrimination and oppression, to imprisonment and torture, and even, as in the case of Iraq, to brutal public murders that must arouse the greatest revulsion in the minds of all civilized men.

I would request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council and General Assembly document.

(Signed) Abba EBAN
Minister for Foreign Affairs

¹ U.N. doc. S/8982. Also issued under the symbol A/7503.

TEXT OF THE STATEMENT MADE
BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF
ISRAEL, MR. LEVI ESHKOL, IN
THE KNESSET ON 27 JANUARY 1969

What we have feared has come true. At dawn, the Iraqi authorities have hanged nine Jews. Let us pay homage to the memory of:

Ezra Naji Zilkha
Fuad Gabbai
Yaacov Gurji Namurdi
Daoud Yehezkeel Baruch Dalal
Daoud Ghali
Yehezkeel Salah Yehezkeel
Sabah Hayim
Naim Kadoor Halal
Charles Raphael Horesh

The blood of the innocent martyrs of Babylon cries out to us and to the world from Iraqi soil. "Oh Daughter of Babylon, that art to be destroyed, happy shall be He, that repays thee as thou served us." The Lord shall avenge their blood.

The first spontaneous reaction in the heart of every one of us to the murder trial of nine Jews in Iraq, is profound mourning and the redoubled determination to fulfil in Jewish history that thoroughgoing charge of Israel's redemption and ingathering of the exiles, to which our lives are consecrated.

Beyond any doubt, there is more than the merely humane aspect to this murder. Here is further evidence, if such evidence was needed, to the essence of the régimes in Arab countries and to the fate they have ordained for the Jewish people and for each of its individuals, if they could but do as they pleased. These régimes are incapable of solving the problems besetting their own nations and they try hard to disclaim responsibility, unburdening it on others. Thus they strive to blunt the sting of their nation's despair, redirecting it at helpless hostages whom they have imprisoned within their boundaries.

The similarity between these régimes and movements and those régimes and movements which threatened the entire world until they were defeated in the Second World War is manifest to one and all.

The criminal plot of the Baghdad hangings and that of the demands of what goes by the

name of "Liberation of Palestine" is part and parcel of the self-same design. Unless a halt is put to it from outside it will not cease on its own. Between the design of genocide and its perpetration there stands the State of Israel alone — Israel and its strength.

The world's élite must understand this reality. As in the days of May 1967, this is not a matter of demands and counter-demands, between which a compromise must be sought. The conflict is one between a furor of destruction and a nation defending itself from its would-be assassins.

The Baghdad hangings have illuminated the fate of the remnants of Babylonian Jewry with a nightmarish light. The land of Iraq has become one great prison for its Jewish remnant. Our brethren are prey to terror at the hands of villains.

Iraq has become a gallows to its Jewish citizens. For 2,500 years the Jews have helped to build up Babylon — Iraq — with all their hearts and souls. When Israel attained statehood we welcomed those driven out from there.

Now, the persecutions have culminated in the hanging of nine Jews, whilst Iraq's leaders promise that this is not the end. The sole and only crime of these nine martyrs consists in their Jewishness. We know full well, and I do declare that the Iraqi Government also knew, that all accusations levelled at these Jews were entirely baseless. It is not for nothing that their trial took place behind locked doors.

The oppression of Jews in the Arab countries has been going on incessantly for years — yet the world's conscience has not been stirred. Thus, we have come to this pass — the hangings in Baghdad.

As soon as we learnt of the death sentences, we appealed to everybody likely perhaps to take action in order to rescue these people in Iraq. Many, including States, personalities, religious leaders, as well as the United Nations Secretary-General, have appealed to the Baghdad rulers — to be fobbed off with mendacious denials and deliberate misleading. These lies were meant to cover up for the murderous death sentences already passed, in spite of statements to the contrary. Once the ground had thus been prepared the murder was carried out. I cannot help but

reach the sorry conclusion that the world and all its institutions have failed to muster the necessary determination in this matter — and in the matter of Jews in Arab lands in general. Last-minute appeals and making do with hypocritical replies will not relieve from the awesome responsibility and the turning of a blind eye to the fate of the Jews in Arab countries.

From this rostrum I demand that the entire world should act, each one to the best of his capacity, in order to avert further acts of murder, to save the families and to protect the Jewish remnant.

If there is a conscience in this world, let its voice be heard, now. Let us awaken to the immediate need to rescue the remnant of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries.

Our hearts mourn for the victims and our fraternal feelings go out to the bereaved families and communities.

We are firmly resolved to accomplish Israel's revival until its full redemption.

Our actions will aim at strengthening the State of Israel and at the salvation of Jewish communities in distress.

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council on the Iraqi Government's Execution of Iraqi Citizens Charged with Espionage.¹

February 26, 1969

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to my letter of 7 February 1969 (S/8997) concerning the executions in Iraq on 27 January 1969 of fourteen persons including nine Jews and to state as follows:

On 20 February 1969, within less than four weeks, the same atrocious crime was repeated in Baghdad, when eight persons (none of them were Jews) were executed and their bodies left hanging for a public spectacle in the "Liberation Square". Again the trial was conducted in secret, behind closed doors. The fact that a trial had

taken place was revealed only on 19 February through a broadcast on Radio Baghdad; several hours later there was another announcement that the condemned persons had already been executed.

The Government of Iraq continues in its public declarations to explain the new hangings by false and unfounded charges that the condemned persons were guilty of espionage for Israel; and it describes these judicial murders as part of the Iraqi or Arab struggle against Zionism or the State of Israel.

These excuses bring into sharp focus the atmosphere of terror and incitement which prevails in Baghdad in general, and which is directed by the Iraqi authorities specially against the remnants of the Jewish community whose security and very life are continuously menaced.

Many Jews are still detained in prison and are subject to torture on similar charges. Five of the Jews arrested are known to have been tortured to death recently in Iraqi prisons. There is every reason to believe that the Baghdad authorities, in line with their public statements after the hangings in January that "there will be more hangings in the squares of Baghdad", will, as soon as they consider the time more propitious and when the pressure of world public opinion may appear in their eyes to have diminished, again start placing Jews on "trial" and hanging them.

In this situation, there is no recourse for the Jews of Iraq except to be allowed to leave that country.

The continuation of these arrests, trials and executions, apart from their being brutal and barbaric violations of human rights, increase the tension in the Middle East and constitute a danger to peace in the region. The international community must not, by its toleration, suffer this situation to continue to exist.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

¹ U.N. doc. S/9031.

300

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council Stating that Israel's Action was Directed Against Fatah Bases in Syrian Territory.¹

February 28, 1969

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Syria on 25 February 1969 (S/9028).

In the last five weeks there has been a marked upsurge in Arab terror warfare against Israel. The majority of these terror attacks were carried out by a terror organization known as el-Fatah. Conspicuous during this period has been the increase in Arab acts of aggression along the Israel-Syrian cease-fire line.

On the morning of 24 February 1969, Israel took air action in self-defence to disable two el-Fatah bases in Syrian territory. The action lasted for thirty minutes. All Israeli planes returned safely.

The targets were the el-Fatah bases at el-Hamma and Maisaloun, on the road between Damascus and Beirut. These are the central bases of the terror organization. El-Hamma is the operational headquarters for Syria and Lebanon as well as a general logistic, administrative and supply centre. It is also an induction and instruction base of recruits; a reassignment centre for el-Fatah members who return from training in Egypt, Algeria and communist China. Here el-Fatah also maintains its prison and interrogation branch. The Maisaloun base is auxiliary to the base in el-Hamma and is used for initial training. It is from el-Hamma and Maisaloun that acts of terror and murder against Israeli citizens have been initiated and conducted. These facts have been widely reported in the international Press and confirmed by Arab information media.

The Government of Syria has for years openly sponsored, organized, supported and directed terror warfare against Israel.

On 17 December 1968 the former Foreign

Minister of Syria Ibrahim Makhus, reiterated this policy as follows:

"We are the first, who called for action by the Fedayeen, the pioneers of the popular war of liberation. We were the first to support their organization and to reinforce their activities."

The present Syrian Foreign Minister declared on 8 January 1969:

"There is no alternative to armed struggle."

Indeed, Syria has rejected the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, and has refused to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring toward the establishment of a just and lasting peace.

The warfare by terror, pursued against Israel is a flagrant violation by Syria of its international obligations and in particular of the cease-fire established by the Security Council. The Government of Syria bears full responsibility for it.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

301

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council on the United Arab Republic's Violation of the Cease-Fire.²

March 10, 1969

In continuation of my previous letter to you of today, 9 March 1969, I now have the honour, on instructions from my Government, to transmit to you the following further information regarding today's large-scale aggressive armed attack by the United Arab Republic forces against Israel forces in grave violation of the cease-fire.

At approximately 1510 hours local time, United Arab Republic forces opened fire on Israeli forces in the vicinity of Al-Shat north of Port Tawfik. Fire was returned for ten minutes.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9033.

² U.N. doc. S/9062.

Shortly thereafter, the United Arab Republic forces intensified their fire and employed artillery. Fire was returned.

At approximately 1530 hours the United Arab Republic forces commenced an artillery barrage along the Suez Canal from Kantara to Port Tawfiq. Fire was returned.

The UNMOs proposed a cease-fire for 1645 hours. This was accepted by Israel. The United Arab Republic forces, however, continued shelling, and the Israeli forces were consequently compelled to resume fire in self-defence.

The UNMOs then proposed a cease-fire for 1800 hours. Israel accepted and at 1800 hours fire ceased from the Israel side. However, from the Egyptian side, fire continued with a heavy artillery barrage concentrated on Kantara, Kilometer 10, and south of Lake Timsah.

At 1835 hours, the United Arab Republic forces ceased fire. Israel's casualties from this Egyptian attack included one killed and thirteen wounded — the killed was a pilot of a "Piper" aircraft which was shot down over the Israeli side of the Canal.

In connexion with the continued efforts of General Odd Bull to achieve a cease-fire after his earlier efforts had not obtained the adherence of the United Arab Republic, at 1727 hours local time (1527 hours GMT) the following message from General Bull addressed to the Minister of Defence was received by telephone:

"I am deeply concerned with the breach of the cease-fire in the Suez cease-fire sector and I appeal to the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic to observe the cease-fire and to suspend all military activities in the area.

"I suggest 1600 GMT as the hour of definite suspension of all military activity.

"I am informing the Secretary-General of the United Nations of this message."

The following reply was transmitted to General Odd Bull by telephone at 1935 local time:

"I have been instructed by the Minister of Defence to reply to your message of 1727 hours of today.

"It was the Egyptians who initiated artillery fire yesterday and today, as you no doubt know from the reports of your observers. We accepted the

cease-fire proposals and observed them as we have always done in the past. This afternoon we accepted your cease-fire proposal for 1645 hours local time and held our fire. But the Egyptians, ignoring your proposal, continued their shelling and we were obliged to resume our defensive fire. The artillery fire of the last two days followed a long series of breaches of the cease-fire by the Egyptians through violation of our air space, infiltrations, mining and sniping which have continued for the last two months.

"I would reconfirm our acceptance of the cease-fire proposal for 1600 GMT of which we informed your headquarters seven minutes before your message of 1727 local time was received. At 1600 GMT fire ceased from our side but continued from the Egyptian side.

"It seems that the appeal should be addressed solely to the United Arab Republic."

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Shafat ROSENNE
for Yosef TEKOAH

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

302

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the Secretary-General on the Stationing of Iraqi Armed Forces in Syria.¹
March 19, 1969

On instructions of my Government I have the honour to draw your attention to confirmed reports on the entry and stationing of Iraqi armed forces in Syria.

It will be recalled that Iraq actively participated in the hostilities of June 1967; has been evasive in respect of its acceptance of the cease-fire, as I had occasion to point out last in my letter of 18 November 1968 to the President of the Security Council (S/8902); is continuing to maintain an

¹ U.N. doc. S/9094. Also issued under the symbol A/7528.

expeditionary force on Jordanian territory in proximity to the cease-fire line, this force having taken part in aggressive breaches of the cease-fire against Israel and actively supported terror warfare against Israel.

The stationing of Iraqi forces in Syria aggravates the situation in the area, in particular in view of the absence of any assurance that these forces would observe the cease-fire.

My Government would accordingly appreciate it if Your Excellency would obtain from the Government of Iraq an affirmation that Iraq accepts the Security Council cease-fire resolutions and that all Iraqi forces will respect the cease-fire.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

303

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council on the Iraqi Government Execution of Iraqi Citizens.¹

March 19, 1969

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 11 March 1969 by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq (S/9068) as well as to my earlier letter to the President of the Security Council of 7 February 1969 (S/8997).

Wherever violations of human rights take place, the conscience of all decent people will be aroused, and the Governments which represent them will feel a moral duty, arising out of a sense of international responsibility and human solidarity, as well as out of principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, to give expression to their views. This is particularly the case when the victims are defenceless individuals or minority groups, who, through no fault of their

own, are made scapegoats by the rulers of the country they live in for narrow purposes of domestic or foreign politics. When the persecutors invoke the name of a foreign country to buttress their false charges, that country has every right to defend its name. Moreover, that the truth should be known is in the interest of the entire international community.

What the Government of Iraq is trying to do is to assure itself a free hand to pursue its barbaric treatment of the Jews in Iraq by resisting international scrutiny of its gross misdeeds. It is understandable, therefore, that the deep and natural concern which these persecutions arouse among the Jewish communities in the world, and notably in Israel, where the majority of Jews who fled from previous persecutions in Iraq have found refuge, should cause embarrassment to the Government of Iraq.

Discrimination and oppression of Jews in one country or another have always kindled feelings of profound anxiety among the Jewish communities throughout the world. Jews regard themselves as duty bound to help fellow Jews, particularly when other nations and peoples have failed or have been unable to come to their rescue, as was tragically demonstrated in recent decades in Europe and elsewhere. The State of Israel, as the Jewish State, follows and will continue to follow this noble and humane tradition.

This attitude has found understanding among nations that are concerned with the protection of human rights. These nations have also raised their voices in deploring the inhuman treatment of Jews by the authorities of Iraq.

The efforts of the Government of Iraq to shelter behind specious arguments and malicious legalisms cannot win for it any reprieve from objective world opinion.

The treatment of the Jews in Iraq by the Government of Iraq reflects that Government's attitude towards Israel. The Government of Israel cannot remain silent when political hostility towards itself becomes a pretext for cruelty against Jews simply as Jews.

As for the conditions of the Arab inhabitants in the territories under Israel's administration, when the citizens of Iraq, Jews or non-Jews, begin to enjoy, even only partially, freedom of

¹ U.N. doc. S/9095.

movement, freedom of thought and expression, and personal security as they are enjoyed by those Arab inhabitants, Iraq will have made great progress toward democracy and the respect for human rights required by the United Nations.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, etc.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAHI

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

304

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council on the United Arab Republic's Continued Violation of the Cease-Fire.¹

March 25, 1969

Further to my letter to you of today, 24 March 1969, I have the honour to inform you that United Arab Republic forces have continued their acts of aggression in the Suez canal sector.

The cease-fire arranged through the United Nations Military Observers for 1200 hours local time was repeatedly breached at 1223, 1225 and 1235 hours, when Egyptian artillery opened fire south of Lake Timsah. The Israeli forces refrained from replying.

The purpose behind these repeated aggressions has been openly explained in official Egyptian declarations as serving a calculated policy of the United Arab Republic designed to undermine the cease-fire. That this policy is being continued and that today's attack is another manifestation of it, finds confirmation in the editorial by Mr. Husnein Haikal, President Nasser's spokesman in *Al-Ahram* of 21 March 1969, wherein it is stated that the United Arab Republic is aiming to release itself from the cease-fire commitment.

Referring to the cease-fire as made necessary at the time as the consequence of the six-day war, Haikal wrote that the jettisoning of the disengagement between the forces of the sides was the best guarantee for the pursuit of the moral and

material mobilization necessary for the continuation of the war. He went on to explain that it was necessary to initiate incidents so as to turn the situation into an international crisis:

"The rejection of disengagement has been and still is the way to place world opinion in a state of continuous alarm and to impress upon its attention the seriousness of the Middle East crisis."

In light of this, there is hardly any need to emphasize that violation of the cease-fire is a planned and deliberate policy on the part of the United Arab Republic.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, etc.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAHI

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

305

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council.²

March 27, 1969

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letter of 17 March 1969 (S/9089), I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the following complaint:

Grave and continual violations by Jordan of the cease-fire, the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and of international law, including:

(a) Armed attacks, armed infiltration and acts of murder and violence by terrorist groups operating from Jordan territory with the official support, aid and encouragement of the Jordanian Government and armed forces;

(b) Firing across the cease-fire lines by Jordan-

¹ U.N. doc. S/9109.

² U.N. doc. S/9114.

ian forces, and in particular the wanton shelling of Israel villages.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, etc.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

306

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council on the Resumption of United Arab Republic Aggression in the Suez Canal Sector.¹

April 4, 1969

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to inform you that the United Arab Republic forces have today resumed their acts of aggression in the Suez Canal sector.

This morning at approximately 1030 hours local time United Arab Republic forces opened fire from the western bank of the Suez Canal on Israel forces on the eastern bank, north of Port Tawfiq in the Mitla Pass area and to the south of Bitter Lake. Shortly thereafter, fire was returned and the UNMOs proposed a cease-fire for 1200 hours, and at 1113 hours, Israel notified acceptance of this proposal.

At 1100 hours the United Arab Republic forces commenced new artillery attacks in the Port Tawfiq area. At 1110 hours these attacks were extended to Deversoir. Fire was returned. At 1150 hours Israel was informed that the United Arab Republic accepted the proposed cease-fire for 1200 hours.

Israel forces ceased-fire at 1200 hours. The United Arab Republic forces continued firing in the Port Tawfiq, Deversoir and Mitla Pass areas. Fire was not returned. The area was quiet by 1222 hours.

No casualties were suffered by the Israel forces.

In several earlier letters to the President of the

Security Council, and on the last occasion in my letter of 1 April 1969 (S/9124), I have drawn attention to the extremely bellicose and provocative statements made by various official spokesmen of the United Arab Republic, including President Nasser, which establish beyond any doubt the calculated determination of the United Arab Republic to undermine the cease-fire and to pursue aggressive and violent policies in the Suez Canal area. The latest of these utterances was made today, 4 April 1969, by the official spokesman of the Government of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Ziyat, who said that under the Egyptian policy of "effective defence", Egypt will not wait for Israel, but will open fire first.

The letter addressed to you on 3 April by the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic (S/9130), with all its verbiage and specious legalisms, confirms this reckless policy, which is in flagrant violation of all the obligations of the United Arab Republic under the Charter of the United Nations and the Security Council's resolutions.

I have the honour to request the circulation of this letter as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

307

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council Denying Syria's Right to Complain of Israel's Defence Measures.²

April 15, 1969

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to the letters addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Syria on 4 (S/9131), 8 (S/9139, S/9141) and 11 April 1969 (S/9150), and without discussing the question of the veracity of allegations contained in them, to state:

¹ U.N. doc. S/9134.

² U.N. doc. S/9158.

Syria has no right or grounds for complaint over defence measures taken by Israel on its side of the cease-fire line, particularly when these measures are essential in face of repeated Syrian attempts to violate the cease-fire by its regular forces and by marauders and saboteurs.

In his letters, the Permanent Representative of Syria tries to divert attention from its Government's persistent policy of aggression, which is expressed in its rejection of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, its opposition to any peace-making effort, and the waging of terror warfare against Israel in flagrant violation of the cease-fire.

I have the honour to request the circulation of this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, etc.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOA

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

308

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council on the Escalation of United Arab Republic Aggression in the Suez Canal Sector.¹

April 21, 1969

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to draw your attention to the systematic and continuous aggression which is being waged by the United Arab Republic in the Suez Canal sector and which was escalated in the last two nights when units of the Egyptian forces crossed the Canal in deliberate violation of the cease-fire and of undertakings given in relation thereto.

On the night of 19 April 1969, at approximately 2030 hours local time, a unit of about 15 Egyptian soldiers crossed the Canal opposite Ismailia and assaulted an Israeli position which they unsuccessfully attempted to blow up. The attackers were repelled in a short encounter, in which one Israeli soldier was slightly wounded and one vehicle damaged. In its rout the Egyptian unit abandoned

arms and explosive charges.

On 21 April 1969 at 0130 hours an Israeli patrol on the east bank of the Canal intercepted another Egyptian commando unit about 30 kms north of Kantara. In the ensuing exchange of fire, the raiders were forced back to the United Arab Republic positions on the west bank of the Canal. Three Israeli soldiers were slightly wounded and one vehicle was damaged and soon repaired.

Referring to the first of these incidents, Radio Cairo announced this morning, 21 April: "The front in the Suez Canal sector was a scene for a military operation of a new type — a unit of the Egyptian Special Forces crossed the Canal and assaulted an enemy post which was destroyed."

As for the second incursion, the same source reported today, quoting an official United Arab Republic military spokesman, that Egyptian Special Units crossed the Canal, engaged Israeli forces and "destroyed one of their tanks".

The above-mentioned attacks followed three weeks of incessant breaches of the cease-fire by the United Arab Republic forces on the west bank of the Canal, as reported by General Odd Bull. The motivation of these premeditated acts of aggression is well known. I have referred to it in previous letters.

I have the honour to request the circulation of this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOA

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

309

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the Secretary-General Denying Syrian Allegations about Israel's Excavations in the Occupied Territory of Syria.²

May 29, 1969

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 23 May 1969 by the Permanent Representative of Syria (A/7558, S/9220).

² U.N. doc. S/9229. Also issued under the symbol A/7562.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9172.

The Syrian contentions are utterly unfounded. Neither Professor Mazar nor any other Israeli scientist has carried out any excavations in any of the sites mentioned in the Syrian letter, nor in any other part of the area of the Golan Heights.

The historical altar from the town of Banias was temporarily removed in order to make adequate arrangements for its safety, and it was restored to its site immediately after the completion of these arrangements.

The Syrian allegations have already been dismissed by the Commissioner-General appointed under the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1 May 1954), in a letter addressed by him on 6 February 1968 to the Director-General of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The report of the Director-General to the seventy-eighth session of the Executive Board of UNESCO (78 EX/5 — 16 May 1968) states:

"... By a letter dated 6 February 1968, the Commissioner-General in Jerusalem informed me that investigations had been carried out, where the information supplied had been sufficient to make inquiries possible, and that the complaints in question had proved groundless..."

Since then, the Commissioner-General has twice visited the area in question and found no reason for any complaint whatever.

It will be recalled that similar Syrian charges were investigated by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Nils-Göran Gussing, and dismissed by him (see his report of 15 September 1968 (A/6797, S/8158), para. 34).

It is doubtful whether, in the light of Syria's continued policy of aggression against Israel and its repudiation of international obligations incumbent upon it, any credence at all is given to anti-Israeli charges invented by Syria from time to time in order to divert attention from its destructive attitude.

I have the honour to request the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Josef TEKOAH

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

310

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the Secretary-General Justifying Israel's Self-Defence Measures.¹

July 11, 1969

On instructions of my Government I have the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's Special Report contained in document S/9316 of 5 July 1969.

The Israel Government accepted Security Council cease-fire resolutions in June 1967 and has at all times been prepared to abide by them scrupulously on a reciprocal basis. There cannot be a one-sided cease-fire. If armed attacks are made across the cease-fire lines from the territory of Arab States, whether by regular or irregular forces, Israel must take appropriate self-defence measures. The moment these Arab attacks cease, quiet would instantly be restored along the cease-fire lines, and there would be no further cause for concern on this score. It is suggested that the efforts of the United Nations should be directed towards inducing the Arab Governments to respect their obligations under the cease-fire, until it is replaced by a just and lasting peace.

There can be no reasonable doubt as to where the responsibility lies. The United Arab Republic openly proclaims a policy of initiating fire and of raiding across the Suez Canal. The activities of terrorist groups with the open support of Arab Governments and armies — especially from Jordan — is also a matter of public record.

The Secretary-General's remark that the United Nations Military Observers "serve as what amounts to defenceless targets in a shooting gallery" is relevant only to the conduct of the United Arab Republic. There are almost daily cases of deliberate firing by United Arab Republic troops at United Nations Observers and installations, often by snipers at close range. The numerous messages on this matter to the United Arab Republic authorities have in effect been disregarded. There is full agreement and co-operation between the Israel military authorities and the United Nations cease-fire machinery on the measures required for the protection of United Nations personnel on the Israel side.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9322.

These measures — including the construction of shelters — have been partially carried out. Their completion has been delayed only by actual or threatened Egyptian fire, despite assurances to the contrary given to the United Nations.

The Israel forces are under strict orders to avoid any harm to the Observers or installations, and there is no case on record in which these orders have been disobeyed. In the few instances where United Nations posts may have been hit by shell fragments on the Egyptian side, this has been an accidental and unavoidable result of return fire at Egyptian positions.

I have the honour to request circulation of this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

311

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the Secretary-General on "Letters to the Editor" Published in "The Times" in Reply to E. C. Hodgkin's Article.¹

November 18, 1969

I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Jordan on 10 November 1969 (A/7758, S/9501) requesting circulation as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council of an article which appeared in the London *Times* and, on instructions of my Government, to request identical publication of a selection of "Letters to the editor" published in that newspaper subsequently in reaction to the distortions and defamatory statements contained in the said article.

I have the honour to request circulation of this letter and its enclosure as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

A. ARAB TESTIMONY

[29 October 1969]

From Mr. Gordon Oakes, Labour M.P. for Bolton, West

Sir, — As one who was actually visiting Israel (including the occupied territories) at the time of the rocket attack on Jerusalem last August, I read with incredulity the article by your Foreign Editor in today's *Times*. He makes a number of slanderous accusations against Israel but substantiates none of them. He states that ninety leading Arabs have been deported, but uses the ambiguous phrase "pushed over the border". Can we have their names, please?

He quotes a specific number of houses destroyed. Could he quote the source of this very exact piece of information, and could he verify whether houses under slum clearance schemes have not been included?

Worst of all, he alleges that prisoners are held without trial and tortured in prison. This is a terrible accusation against a civilized democratic country and the only corroboration which is offered is that "there is a great deal of evidence to support this belief".

Did the writer visit any prisons? What evidence? On the question of visas for "Jordanians to visit Jerusalem" I regard it as a mark of astonishing tolerance that a country at war allows the citizens of a hostile country to set foot in its boundaries at all!

When in Israel I visited Bethlehem, East Jerusalem and a number of other towns in occupied territories and spoke quite freely to any Arab I wished to. Not a single one of the accusations made by your Foreign Editor was made to me or even hinted at by any Arab I spoke to. Perhaps I should add that I am neither blind nor deaf and thirteen years as a defence lawyer has taught me to see beneath the surface of any situation.

I am amazed that such a slanderous and wholly uncorroborated article should come from the pen of so distinguished a writer and appear in Britain's leading newspaper. I think you owe it to the people of Israel either to substantiate every one of these accusations or offer an unconditional apology.

Yours sincerely,

Gordon OAKES,

House of Commons, 28 Oct.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9506. Also issued under the symbol A/7766.

B. CONCERN FOR REPUTATION

[1 November 1969]

From Mr. Louis Velleman

Sir, — I have done, a couple of weeks ago, just what your foreign editor Mr. Hodgkin did, I travelled, as a journalist, extensively through the Israel-occupied territory, especially the West Bank and Gaza. And though it is true, as everyone knows, that houses sometimes are destroyed and members of terrorist groups are sentenced, on a whole the Israelis are seen, by the Arab population, rather as weak than as strong occupiers.

I spoke to at least more than 100 Arabs, among them many Arab authorities. They all blame Israel for occupying a country that, they think, belongs to them. But all of them, almost without any noteworthy exception, were of opinion that the occupation was a fair one, in the light, evidently, of the circumstances.

As a journalist my approach has been rather critical, maybe too critical for some Israeli authorities. But I got convinced that the Israelis try very hard to be ideal occupiers, for the one thing they are desperately afraid of is, just, their reputation as occupying force.

Maybe Mr. Hodgkin has known the places and people he revisited too long to be quite objective, though he certainly has tried. Anyway, I have been a reporter for some thirty years now. And I think it is only fair to let you and your readers know that my conclusion on the matter has been about the opposite of Mr. Hodgkin's.

Yours truly,

Louis VELLEMAN, London and
Common Market Correspondent,
Het Vrije Volk (Amsterdam);
76 Drève Pittoresque, Brussels, Poste
Rhode St. Genève.

C. CALL FOR EVIDENCE

[3 November 1969]

From Mr. Emanuel Shinwell, C.H., Labour M.P. for Easington

Sir, — Several of my colleagues in the Parliamentary Labour Party, most of them of the left-wing variety, and a few closely associated with Mrs. Margaret McKay whose support for the

Arab States and avowed hostility against Israel is well known, have expressed their horror (letter, 31 October) about alleged crimes committed by Israel, including repression and ill-treatment of Arab prisoners; which were mentioned by your Foreign Editor, based entirely on hearsay and not on actual experience. So far as my colleagues are concerned they produce not a tittle of evidence. I invite those who appended their signature to the letter to produce chapter and verse to substantiate their allegations.

It may have escaped notice that not a single word of protest has been uttered about the Soviet Union's refusal to allow Jews to emigrate to Israel, or against the Government of Syria for refusing to release two Jewish persons who were among the passengers on the hijacked American airliner, or any horror expressed about the hanging of Jews in Iraq for alleged espionage, or a protest against the action of Egypt in detaining a substantial number of Jews without trial.

I am reluctant to believe that there exists in the ranks of the Parliamentary Labour Party, despite their radical and anti-racial utterances, any anti-Jewish hostility, but the implications contained in their letter make me wonder.

Yours faithfully,

E. SHINWELL,

House of Commons, 31 October.

D. TO BE FAIR TO BOTH

[3 November 1969]

From Lady Gaitskill

Sir, — In your Leader To be Fair to Both (1 November) you are surprised by the reaction of those who were affronted by Mr. Hodgkin's article on the Middle East. Of course, I was disturbed by Mr. Hodgkin's article, but I was not against it because he criticized Israel. It is too ingenuous of you to suggest this, for no one would deny that Israel gets her fair share of criticism and attack these days.

It did not need Mr. Hodgkin to remind me that any occupation can be unjust, harsh or cruel in varying degrees, and that it is always detested by the occupied peoples. Surely the degree and the circumstances must be taken into account, as well as any efforts by the occupying power

to inject some humanity into the conditions existing.

Mr. Hodgkin wrote throughout as if this were a peace time "occupation" and not one in which a guerrilla war was being waged.

Of course the feelings of the Arabs can be explained, but the feelings of the Israelis cannot be explained away either.

In a country like Israel, where there is no capital punishment, many repressive measures can be seen in a different light. But Mr. Hodgkin went much further. He made grave allegations of torture with evidence consisting of — and here I quote him — "a common belief in the occupied areas is that anyone suspected of belonging to a guerrilla organization is tortured".

What kind of evidence is this?

And Mr. Hodgkin went on to compare the situation in Israel with that of Nazi occupied France in 1942, and the Russians in Czechoslovakia. Is this the objective judgement of a student of Middle East affairs considered a conciliator, and not a propagandist?

For those of us who try to be fair, the most reassuring thing has been the freedom of movement in and out of Israel, and this applies to thousands of Arabs, as well as hundreds of journalists and other foreign visitors. So I find it hard to believe that there is a conspiracy of silence about the conditions of the occupied Arabs.

The Times is a newspaper taken seriously at home and abroad. It has shown a sense of responsibility in this controversy. The serious flaw in Mr. Hodgkin's article was that he was *not* "Fair to Both".

Yours sincerely,

Dora GAITSKELL

House of Lords, 1 November

E. ARABS UNDER ISRAEL

[6 November 1969]

From Mr. Herbert Butler, Labour M.P. for Hackney, Central

Sir — The letter which you published on 31 October, over the signatures of Albert Booth and others of our colleagues, is based upon a complete acceptance of the allegations made

by Mr. Hodgkin (special article, 28 October).

These allegations have been amply refuted by correspondents who write from first-hand knowledge.

Many of us have visited Israel recently and have spent a considerable time in the occupied territories, have conversed with Arabs there and have been given every opportunity of seeing the conditions that exist there. Nowhere did we find anything remotely resembling the state of affairs described by Mr. Hodgkin.

We are astounded that our colleagues, who have not visited the occupied territories and have no personal experience, should rush into print and accept these allegations as true. It is somewhat alarming that they go on to suggest that there can be any comparison with the razing of Guernica or current injustices by the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia.

We suggest that our colleagues who signed the letter should, before condemnation, visit Israel and judge for themselves.

They advocate the implementation of the Security Council resolution of November 1968. So do we. In fact we go further and advocate the resolution of the Socialist International Congress of 19 June 1969, which has the support of the British Labour Party. But these do not call for Israel to withdraw in the hope of an eventual peace, as your correspondents seem to imply. They call for the establishment of a "just and lasting peace" within recognized boundaries. A withdrawal would be the obvious corollary to such an agreement, but this was never meant to be a pre-condition.

Israel has again and again invited direct negotiations to secure peace. The reply of the Arab States has been the Khartoum resolution of "no peace, no recognition, no negotiation".

We find it strange that our colleagues have no word of condemnation for blowing up supermarkets and students' canteens and for button bombs left by Al Fatah for schoolchildren to pick up.

Yours faithfully,

Herbert W. Butler
R. Crawshaw
Jack Dunnett

Ian Mikardo
Maurice S. Miller
Eric Moonman

Maurice Edelman	M. Orbach
David Ginsburg	Gordon Oakes
Hugh Gray	R.T. Paget
Ray Gunter	Roy D. Roebuck
Eric S. Heffer	Arnold Shaw
Stanley Henig	Renée Short
Robert L. Howarth	Julian Snow
Leslie Huckfield	G.R. Strauss
Hector Hughes	Raphael Tuck
Daniel Jones	David Weitzman
Marcus Lipton	Willis.
John Mendelson	

Palace of Westminster, 3 November.

312

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the Secretary-General Transmitting a letter from the Embassy of Israel in London Refuting an Article by D. Leitch Entitled "Eye-Witness in Gaza", Published in the "Sunday Times" of 23 November, 1969.¹

December 19, 1969

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Jordan on 25 November 1969 (A/7792, S/9511).

The article in *The Sunday Times* of 23 November 1969, on Gaza, with which the Permanent Representative of Jordan saw fit to engage the attention of the Members of the United Nations, was promptly analysed and refuted in the same newspaper on 30 November 1969 in a letter from the Embassy of Israel in London.

I have the honour to request that this reply, attached to the present letter, also be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

THE SUNDAY TIMES, 30 NOVEMBER 1969

Israel's reply:

Your article "Eye-witness in Gaza" compels me to object to the presentation of a distorted and false picture of Israel without offering any evidence to substantiate your allegations. I must accept your statement that this article was inspired independently of Mr. Hodgkin's article in *The Times*, but one cannot escape the similarity between the two. The article purports to give a new insight into the dire situation in the Gaza Strip and bases itself on a "disturbing account" of conditions in Gaza given by an Israeli citizen, and four specific cases of alleged torture.

As to the eyewitness who, you claim, prompted the inquiry and report on 31 October, *Peace News*, a publication known for its hostile attitude to Israel and its outright support of Arab terrorism, carried a strikingly similar story.

Furthermore, his statement on the matter of torture in Gaza, which is largely hearsay, is supported by persons who, according to Mr. Leitch, "even President Nasser could not call good witnesses". One wonders, therefore, why you saw fit to publish these allegations.

Mr. Leitch's anonymous informant refers to well-known facts regarding the situation in the Gaza strip. As far as living conditions there are concerned, this is indeed a problem of special difficulty and deep concern to the Israel Government. During nineteen years of occupation, the Egyptian military authorities did virtually nothing to improve the lot of the local population. Night curfew, in force throughout those years, was lifted for the first time after June 1967 by Israel. It is therefore regrettable but unavoidable that, in the search for the saboteurs and in attempts to protect the innocent, curfews and other security measures are imposed from time to time.

The causes of unemployment and at times even of hunger in the Strip are well known. The solution is rather different from that sought by terrorists. What the inhabitants of Gaza need, above all, is to be provided with work. But this is forcibly prevented by the terrorists, who threaten to kill any Arab accepting employment outside the Strip. Even inside the Strip, a citrus-packing plant, which provided employment for hundreds, was recently blown up by the terrorists. The

¹ U.N. doc. S/9575. Also issued under the symbol A/7918.

only real solution is a peace settlement. But the Arabs reject this and the terrorists among them seek only to create chaos.

Evidently Mr. Leitch felt that his Gaza story would not in itself provide sufficient material. He therefore looked outside the Gaza Strip and unfolded the stories of four cases of alleged torture. Here again there was nothing new. Three out of the four had, in fact, appeared in an article some three weeks earlier in *Free Palestine*, El Fatah's organ in Britain, written by Miss Grania Birkett, a known Arab propagandist in this country. Miss Birkett identifies her source — Mrs. Felicia Langer, a lawyer and a prominent member of the New Communist Party of Israel "Rakach", which follows Moscow in its extreme anti-Israel policy. Three of the cases adduced by Mr. Leitch, each of which involved an accused charged with acts of terror, including indiscriminate murder, were tried in open court and represented by counsel, and here, too, the allegations of torture were refuted by the court after investigation.

Even the fourth case of administrative detention is not a revelation of some carefully hidden secret. The matter was twice raised in Israel's Parliament and explanations were given by the Minister.

Mr. Leitch insinuates that restrictive measures are imposed by Israel on international organizations and mentions in particular the Red Cross. Israel co-operates fully with various international organizations in accordance with the conventions and regulations governing their activities. Israel has no need to apologize for its judicial system. Even the more extreme of Israel's critics have not seen cause to impugn the integrity and authority of the Israeli courts.

Israel which, as Mr. Leitch concedes, is a democratic State, stands proud of its record of maintaining the rule of law and human dignity under war conditions, to which he makes but scant references.

One final observation in regard to Mr. Leitch's anonymous informant, who felt it his duty "as a Jew to be a witness against things committed in the name of Israel". If there is one country in the Middle East where there is freedom of expression, it is Israel. If the witness has evidence of alleged atrocities, let him pronounce it openly in his own name and not in secret to a foreign correspondent, who has himself been able to

move around freely in Israel and the occupied areas and contact whomever he wanted.

Your emphasis on the Jewishness of the informant as a means of adding credibility to the story is reprehensible. Surely you should consider the issue on the basis of the proven facts. This makes all the more disturbing your editorial treatment in which you link an unsubstantiated and irrelevant account with reports of mass atrocities elsewhere.

Raanan SIVAN
Consul-General
Israeli Embassy

7. OTHER COUNTRIES

313

Telegraphic Communication from the Representatives of 25 States Expressing Indignation at the Damage to the Al-Aqsa Mosque.¹

August 25, 1969

1. On behalf of our Governments, we, the undersigned, have the honour to draw the attention of the Members of the United Nations to the grave event of 21 August 1969 in Jerusalem when the El Aqsa Mosque, one of the holiest shrines in Islam, was extensively damaged by arson. The occurrence of this outrage during the time that Jerusalem is under the military occupation of Israeli authorities has filled the population of our countries with profound horror and grief.

2. Since the sacred precincts in Jerusalem proclaimed the spiritual brotherhood of man in God, any damage or desecration of the hallowed rites of one faith cannot but cause anguish to the devoted adherents of another. Our Governments and peoples are, therefore, confident that their sorrow will be shared by all Governments and peoples who cherish the abiding values of

¹ U.N. doc. S/9407. The Telegram was sent by Representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, UAR and Yemen.

the human spirit and hold the Holy City in the highest reverence.

3. We recall that when, soon after the beginning of Israeli occupation, a burglary was committed in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the gold halo and tiara of the statue of the Virgin Mary was removed, our peoples were similarly horrified. In that case, their sense of abhorrence was lessened only by the restoration of the sacred object, though after a public outcry and a certain lapse of time.

4. Events of this nature have had no parallel in the history of Jerusalem for centuries prior to Israeli military occupation. Mindful of their symptomatic significance, we wish to impress upon the Security Council and the General Assembly that such events add a vast dimension of human indignation to the situation in Jerusalem and thus further aggravate the threat to peace which that situation constitutes.

5. We therefore emphasize the urgency of suitable action by the United Nations towards —

(A) An impartial investigation into the grave event of 21 August 1969;

(B) Preventing the recurrence of any act of vandalism against, or profanation of, the Holy Places in Jerusalem;

(C) Enabling the representatives of the Governments of Islamic countries to assess the damage to the holy El Aqsa Mosque and to prepare and execute plans for its repair.

6. While wishing to emphasize that such action can be taken independently of the full implementation of Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969), we may recall that, by these resolutions, the Security Council has censured in the strongest terms the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, confirmed that these measures are invalid and called upon Israel to rescind them forthwith and in future to refrain from all actions designed to alter the status of the city. It follows that neither the Security Council nor any Member State of the United Nations, faithful to its decisions, can extend even an implicit recognition to the validity or legitimacy of Israel authority over the Holy City. No tacit consent can, therefore, be given to any measures which, in order to delude

world public opinion, the Israeli authorities may announce towards an inquiry into the cause of the outbreak of fire in the holy mosque and the repair of the damage caused.

7. We request that the text of this telegraphic communication be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Accept, Excellency, etc.

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of India to the Secretary-General Transmitting a Statement by the Indian Foreign Minister on the Fire of Al-Aqsa Mosque.¹

August 27, 1969

I have the honour to enclose the text of a statement made in the Indian Parliament by the Foreign Minister of India on 26 August 1969 concerning the burning of the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

I should be grateful if you could have this letter together with its enclosure circulated as a document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) S. SEN

Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of India
to the United Nations

STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF INDIA IN THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT ON 26 AUGUST 1969

1. According to information received from our Embassy in Amman, the famous Al Aqsa Mosque was set on fire around 0700 on Thursday, 21 August 1969. The fire lasted about three hours and damaged the south-eastern wing of the Mosque. The central portion, including the main dome, has fortunately remained unharmed.

2. The Government and people of India are deeply shocked and pained at this sacrilege of the holy shrine. I am sure the House will join me in

¹ U.N. doc. S/9413. Also issued under the symbol A/7597.

expressing our strong condemnation of this act of desecration.

3. The continued occupation of Jerusalem by Israel in defiance of resolutions of the United Nations is a matter of grave concern. This shocking incident makes it imperative that the resolutions of the Security Council on Jerusalem should be implemented without delay. In this context, Israel cannot be absolved of responsibility for this outrage.

5. Our Missions are already in touch with Governments of some friendly countries to see what further action needs to be taken.

315

Letter from the Representatives of 25 States to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council.¹

August 29, 1969

Pursuant to our telegraphic communication to Your Excellency of 22 August 1969 contained in document S/9407, we, the undersigned, on behalf of our Governments, request Your Excellency to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the grievous situation resulting from the extensive damage caused by arson to the Holy Alaqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

Please accept, etc.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9421. The letter was sent by Algeria, Afghanistan, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, UAR, Yemen.

B. Selected Speeches by the Representatives of Different States in the Security Council

316

Speech by the Nepali Representative Khatri on a Settlement of the Situation in the Middle East.¹ (Excerpts)

March 27, 1969

We are sad because large-scale violence has again erupted in the Middle East. Repeated warnings given by the Security Council have been unheeded; loss of innocent civilian lives and damage to property have occurred, and the cease-fire has been violated.

... we deplore and we condemn all violence, all violations of the cease-fire, all resort to the use of force, and all attempts at setting back the progress made towards our objective. And I submit that, in the question of the Middle East, we all know beforehand what the objective is. It is not as though we did not know our goal. The Security

Council, in its resolution of 22 November 1967, has set forth, very clearly and very objectively, the framework and the shape of a just and equitable settlement of the situation in the Middle East.

The solution lies not in the finding of a new formula, but in the implementation of an existing one, laid down by the Security Council by a unanimous vote.

The views of His Majesty's Government, as stated time and again since the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israel conflict, pre-date the adoption of the November resolution. Those views are motivated by a strong desire for peace and justice. Therefore, it is but natural that our views conform to the provisions of that resolution in all its essential parts.

His Majesty's Government has always maintained the view that a lasting peace in the Middle East is possible only through a settlement, negotiated either between the parties directly concerned or within the framework of the United Nations, which includes, first, the withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territories; and,

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1467, 27/3/1969, pp. 16-21.

second, termination of all claims or states of belligerency, and acknowledgement of and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in the area and of their right to live in peace and within secure and recognized boundaries. We envisaged the settlement as a further guarantee of the maritime rights of all States in the area and as a just solution of the refugee problem.

In the light of this position, His Majesty's Government has lent its full support to the November resolution and the Jarring Mission, as well as to the recent initiative taken by the Big Four Powers towards promoting a just and accepted settlement within the framework of that resolution.

It is a matter of satisfaction for us, therefore, that preliminary consultations have already started between those Powers. It is right that those Powers should start consultations. Under the Charter, it is the duty of the Big Four, as Permanent Members of the Security Council, to take rightful initiative in matters related to the maintenance of international peace and security.

I should also like to say that His Majesty's Government does not condone any attempt from any side to aggravate the situation, which would create difficulties for the establishment of a lasting peace. As the Foreign Minister of Nepal has recently stated, the commando activities carried on inside the territories under Israeli control from across the border, and the reprisals and counter-reprisals, cannot be approved of, in the interest of peace in the region.

While we appreciate that the continued occupation of Arab lands by Israel does provide a cause for provocation, we also feel that such activities do not contribute to an improvement of the situation.

In these troubled times, an excessive show of bravado and a concern for short-term military and political gain are often mistaken for genuine statesmanship. We appeal to the leaders of both sides to rise above the vicious cycle of violence, terrorism and retaliation and display statesmanship of which they are no doubt capable by controlling that cycle and helping to implement the provisions of the November 1967 resolution. By so doing, they would herald together a new and glorious era in the history of the Middle East.

As a distant and peace-loving country, Nepal cherishes its friendship with all the peoples of the Middle East, Arabs as well as Israelis. We hope that they realize that their common destiny lies in friendship, understanding and goodwill. After three rounds of major conflicts and countless armed encounters, it is high time that they realized this. Theirs is a land made holy and sanctified by the lives and teachings of a great many teachers and saviours of mankind.

317

Speech by the Colombian Representative Turbay Ayala in the Security Council on the Situation in the Middle East.¹ (Excerpt)

March 28, 1969

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Events have shown that simple United Nations action has not sufficed to overcome the critical situation in the Middle East. There everything remains the same and there is nothing visible that would allow us to view the immediate future with any optimism whatsoever. The praiseworthy efforts of Ambassador Jarring have thus far proved useless, yet with true apostolic zeal he pursues his noble efforts in the interest of peace. It is an indisputable fact that to achieve the objectives of resolution 242 (1967), the determined co-operation of the Arabs and the Jews is necessary. They are the ones who can best collaborate with the United Nations in getting rid of the international tension and establishing an atmosphere of confidence and security that will bring an end to the longest conflict of contemporary times.

We are grieved at the vain sacrifice of the hundreds of innocent beings who are dying on both sides, and we are horrified to realize that this situation may grow even worse pursuing its course over a pile of useless Security Council resolutions. The violations of the cease-fire, the terrorist acts and the whole range of atrocities that are being committed in the presently existing abnormal state of affairs cannot be mitigated by mere words. Every resource of intelligence must

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1469, 28/3/1969, pp. 36-38.

be put into play to bring about a positive movement towards peace.

Taking into account the unquestionable influence that the four permanent members of the Security Council have over the States of the Middle East, it might well be that the combined action of the super-Powers would have the virtue of obtaining the active co-operation of Israel and its neighbours in removing all factors that disturb the peace. The role to be played by the Arab States and the State of Israel in the stage now starting, with formal contacts being established among the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Great Britain, will be of the greatest significance. We learned with the deepest satisfaction that in the opinion of many of the participants in the meeting of the super-Powers, Ambassador Jarring's mission not only will suffer no interference, but on the contrary, will receive all the support that those Powers can give to it.

We are concerned over the fact that in the Security Council debates the representatives of the States parties to the conflict seek to persuade us that the right policy is that of reprisals, that of terrorist acts, that of invasion, that of resistance, and not the policy of taking a step forward on the road to peace. My delegation would prefer to hear from the lips of such distinguished and authoritative spokesman for the policies of their peoples some statements in favour of the restoration of harmony among nations which, because of their proximity to each other, can prosper only in a climate of peace, confidence and security.

In the Middle East situation, all events have an undeniable interconnexion. Resistance is connected with invasion; invasion with the state of belligerency; the state of belligerency with the refugee problem; the problem of the refugees with terrorism; terrorism with reprisals — and we could go on and on with this sad, interminable succession of calamities.

For us, the thesis submitted to the consideration of the emergency session of the Assembly in June 1967 by the Latin American Group still remains valid, that thesis which later served as the basis for the Security Council's adoption of resolution 242 (1967), of 22 November of the same year.

We insist on the need for providing an over-all

solution to the problem of the Middle East, one which will take into account the tragic plight of the million refugees who wander aimlessly through the Arab countries. My delegation considers that to this question must be attached all the importance it has by its double nature, both political and humanitarian.

It is also absolutely necessary that the Israeli forces be withdrawn from the Arab territories, for it is a fact that force confers no right. But it is no less a fact that Israel needs to channel its energies in the direction of goals other than those of its already lengthy battle in defence of its existence as a state. That country is fully entitled to have its sovereignty and integrity freed from continued and pointless non-recognition. In this regard I think it well worth recalling that the problems of the last twenty years in the Middle East have not arisen from the creation of the State of Israel, but rather from its permanent failure to receive recognition.

The 1967 war must not be repeated, and accordingly, all the recommendations in resolution 242 (1967) must be carried out. That resolution, besides placing in the same category the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied territories and the ending of the state of belligerency among the States of the area, affirms the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation to the international waterways of the area; the achievement of a just solution to the problem of the refugees; guarantees for the territorial inviolability of the State concerned, and the establishment between them of various demilitarized zones.

I hope I may be forgiven for having gone beyond the specific case of the bombing of the town of As-Salt by the Israeli airforce, but my delegation certainly believes that in order to effect any change in the present tense situation in the Middle East it is absolutely necessary, without neglecting consideration of isolated cases, to take into account the situation as a whole.

Our proven spiritual independence and our will to serve the cause of peace enable us to formulate once more, as we did in June 1967, an ardent appeal to our friends of Israel and the Arab countries, urging them to come to the decision to break the vicious circle of reprisals that is blocking all roads to a peace that will suffer no postponement.

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Speech by the Finnish Representative Jakobson in the Security Council on the Situation in the Middle East.¹**March 28, 1969**

Once again an act of violence has prompted the Security Council to meet to consider the situation in the Middle East. The representative of Jordan has told us that Israeli jet planes have attacked a defenceless civilian area, causing death and destruction. The representative of Israel, charging the Government of Jordan with responsibility for the activities of the Palestinian commandos, claims that this was an act of legitimate self-defence. For the Security Council, which has the responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the area, motives and intentions count for less than the act itself. The Council cannot accept as valid any arguments put forward to justify unilateral military action that constitutes a breach of the cease-fire arrangements established in the area.

Yet, neither this nor the many other incidents the Security Council has previously dealt with can be considered in isolation. They must be seen as part of the unbroken cycle of violence that is undermining and eroding the cease-fire arrangements. The fighting continues intermittently not only along the cease-fire lines, as for instance between Israel and the United Arab Republic along the Suez Canal in recent days, but also on a different level, inside the countries involved, in a deadly dialogue of violence and reprisal, adding constantly to the tragic losses suffered by the civilian populations throughout the Middle East area.

The Security Council, in our view, must reject the use of force whenever and in whatever shape it occurs. It cannot ignore any act of violence. It must insist that all the parties to the conflict strictly observe the cease-fire and refrain from any action that is likely to increase tension in the area.

A cease-fire by its very nature is a temporary arrangement. The Security Council resolution of June 1967, calling upon the parties to stop the fighting, said this was a first step. It was intended

to be the first step toward making peace. But the next step still remains to be taken. One thing clearly emerges from all the conflicting claims we have heard here, and that is that the only effective way to put an end to the force and the continued violence in the Middle East is to take that next step and to remove the state of insecurity that has existed in the area not only since June 1967 but for much longer. The latest incident with which we are dealing today only serves to underline this point.

The Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 sets out the principles on which a just and lasting peace can be established. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, is continuing his contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement. At the same time, as we all know, the major Powers, four permanent members of the Security Council, are moving toward joint talks on the subject of the Middle East. This development should be welcomed, we believe, by the international community as a whole, for it gives rise to hope that we may see progress toward creating stable and permanent conditions of peace for all the States in the Middle East area.

The question before us should, in our view, be considered in this wider international context. It would be unfortunate indeed if we now were to proceed in a manner that might make the forthcoming negotiations more difficult. The overriding interest of the Security Council must be to promote unity among its members, and particularly among the four major Powers, in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

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Speech by the Spanish Representative de Pinies in the Security Council on the Conflict in the Middle East.² (Excerpts)**March 28, 1969**

My delegation has always believed that for the solution of this grave conflict political solutions

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1468, 28/3/1969, pp. 6-7.

² U.N. doc. S/PV. 1469, 28/3/1969, pp. 26, 28-31.

must be arbitrated, but when confronted with so many denunciations by Israel of the aggressions which it alleges are being committed by the Arab States my delegation wonders whether Israel has failed to realize that all those actions could be avoided if Israel were to withdraw immediately from the territories it occupies. Had this been done, had this withdrawal been carried out in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the relevant resolutions, all those victims whose loss we mourn today would have been spared or, at the very least, the legal and procedural status of Israel before this Council would be far clearer. My delegation does not understand how we periodically receive denunciations in the Council of those acts of violence when the party that feels itself to be aggrieved, Israel, has in its own hands the solution to the conflict — to do away with the cause, that is to say, the occupation of the territories taken by force in violation of the Charter. Then Israel will see the disappearance of the effects. The remaining pending problems could then be taken up within a different context and with greater guarantees for success. My delegation believes that all the parties to this conflict have or certainly should have a determined interest in finding solutions. Now it is not possible to apply the same criterion when judging those who accept Security Council decisions and those who are only prepared to accept those decisions which are convenient for them and neglect the others.

On other occasions I have said that what is at stake at this time is this Organization itself. If the Council is prepared to tolerate having its resolutions or the resolutions of the General Assembly not being complied with by Members of the Organization we shall reap the sad consequence that this organ, charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, will not be discharging its own obligations, having failed in its most important task, and therefore it will become useless.

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The problem of the Middle East is a difficult and complex one whose solution cannot be expected in a few moments. But quite apart from the general problem, this Organization cannot admit that one of its Members should repeatedly and constantly take justice into its own hands, setting

off genuine wars of aggression, occupying territories that do not belong to it and expelling from them by one means or another thousands of human beings whose only crime is that they were born in the lands in which their parents and grandfathers have always lived.

In the specific case before us there is absolutely no possibility of placing the attitude of the two parties on a footing of equality. This Organization is made up of States and it is the responsibility of States alone that we can consider and envisage. The elements available to us are basically simple. A territory has been militarily occupied by a foreign country. Acts of violence occur in that territory. The reaction of the occupying country against the occupied country is that it accuses the latter of aggression. Anything that may be added to those elements will be purely subjective criteria.

Thus in the light of these facts the problem is also simple. Has there been any proof of the responsibility of the State whose territory is in part occupied in the acts of violence committed against the forces of the occupation? As my delegation sees it, this has not been proved. Can it be considered, even indirectly, that the State whose territory is occupied is responsible for the acts of violence which its citizens commit in the occupied territories?

Obviously not, because apart from the legitimate fact of occupation, the jurisdiction of that State is not exercised over those territories where these events are taking place.

In the light of all these considerations, my delegation emphasizes the gravity of the situation, the responsibility incumbent on all of us at this time, and the urgent need, independently of trying to find a general solution of the problem, for the Security Council to adopt the most appropriate decisions in order to prevent a State Member of this Organization from continuing to violate its resolutions and committing aggression against neighbouring States.

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**Speech by the Paraguayan Representative
Solano Lopez in the Security Council on the
Situation in the Middle East.¹ (Excerpt)**

March 29, 1969

Now the Council is dealing with new events that are very similar to those that occurred last year, so that I would only need to quote my own past statements to establish the position of my delegation. Nevertheless, I believe that a mere reference to such past statements, even though briefly recounted, would not be sufficient and that, on the contrary, we have to state our views once again. We deplore the loss of lives, whether of the Arabs or of the Israelis, and our feelings of regret are deep and sincere. We regret that material losses have occurred, the more so since they have been inflicted on a developing country which for that very circumstance, as in the case of Jordan, is characterized by an essentially weak economic infrastructure.

The losses of lives are irreplaceable and the material damage can only be repaired by great additional sacrifices imposed on a population which has already been severely castigated by the problems of under-development aggravated because of the consequences of a recent war. We have never been, nor are we now, prepared to condone the violent incidents and other serious violations of the cease-fire, nor do we believe that the members of the Security Council or the the Council as a whole can do so.

We cannot accept the theory of the exercise of reprisals whereby a State can arrogate unto itself the right to carry out military operations of the kind now being considered by the Council in the territory of another State. We deplore all those incidents, but at the same time we wish to differentiate between one type of action and another because their nature is essentially different. That consistent and unchanging criterion has led us to vote in favour of all the resolutions related to the Middle East that have been adopted by the Council during 1968; that is to say, since we first participated in the Council.

The bitter truth is that as a result of these incidents and acts of reprisals, the first and most numerous victims are members of the innocent civilian population. The history of the Middle East, particularly during the last two decades, offers a tragic spectacle of wars, death and desolation. They continue even now, and we wonder whether the time has not yet come when we should not put an end to those sufferings, or at least give hope of better days to come.

With the consternation of this horrifying spectacle of the recent past and a present fraught with dangerous prejudice, we believe that it is more urgent than ever to carry out concerted individual and collective action to prevent an obvious deterioration in the present situation leading to a situation the flames of which might involve not only the States in the Middle East but also many others in a sinister conflagration. With this dominant concern, we see all the positive and negative events that occurred and that are related to the situation in the Middle East. Among the negative incidents — that are really and truly negative — are those that have led to this series of meetings of the Council. This negative character is further aggravated because of the time when they took place.

The parties to the conflict, and the United Nations itself, have a basic instrument to obtain a just and stable peace. I am, of course, referring to resolution 242 (1967) that was unanimously adopted by the Council on 22 November 1967, the provisions and principles of which contain the essential elements to bring about peace. The United Nations and the parties also have the means for the implementation of the resolution if tenacity and perseverance are exercised, as they have been by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring.

I need hardly repeat our views on resolution 242 (1967), which was based on the draft resolution that we, with the other States of Latin America, had the honour to submit to the Fifth Special Session of the General Assembly, and which, I repeat, represents the tradition, spirit and philosophy of our continent.

Furthermore, we would be guilty of an excess of innocence did we not recognize the value of the influence which those permanent members can exercise on the parties to the conflict.

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV, 1470, 29/3/1969, pp. 22-26.

All these endeavours, including ours and those supported by us, would not suffice. All our common will would not be sufficient. The unre-served co-operation of the parties themselves is required and the basic co-operation consists in strict compliance with the cease-fire. I have often said that the situation resulting from compliance with the cease-fire must be completely provisional, because of its nature, until such time as a real and just peace will replace it in a definitive manner. But at least we must create the appropriate atmosphere so that the quest for peace, the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative and negotiations among the four permanent members of the Security Council may bring to bear the fruits which we anxiously await.

In these circumstances my delegation does not hesitate to make a new and brotherly appeal for wisdom and caution in the hope that it may result in strict compliance with the cease-fire for the benefit of the peoples directly concerned and of the international community, which is deeply concerned because of the present situation in the Middle East.

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Speech by the Somali Representative Farah in the Security Council on the Burning of Al-Aqsa Mosque, the Status of Jerusalem and the General Situation in the Middle East.¹ (Excerpt)

September 10, 1969

Neither the future of Jerusalem nor the status of the Old City — nor the protection of the holy shrines of Islam and Christianity — can be considered in isolation from the general situation prevailing in the Middle East following the 1967 Israeli aggression. As my delegation has stated in the past, a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem must be approached within the framework laid down by the Security Council resolution of November 1967. There can be no hope of peace in the Middle East so long as Israel is allowed to continue its occupation of Arab territory. No State, whether it be Israel or any other, should have the right to dictate conditions to or claim

anything from the victim of its aggression. If these principles are not upheld by the world community, then, I submit, the United Nations will help to ensure that bitterness, distrust and open conflict will be endemic in the Middle East and in other parts of the world.

The present unsatisfactory state of affairs, culminating in the latest outrage by Israel against the United Arab Republic yesterday, underlines what we must expect in that critical area of the world if aggression is allowed to go unchecked. The latest incident prompted the Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Addis Ababa, to adopt a resolution, supported by forty-one African Heads of State and Government, condemning that provocative and unwarranted attack on an African sister State.

The late President Eisenhower in his book *Waging Peace* wrote, with reference to Israeli aggression in 1956:

“Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal? If we agree that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order.”

That judgement is as true and relevant today as it was in 1956.

There remains to be stated the kind of action that my delegation considers should be taken to deal with this entirely disturbing and distressing situation.

On the question of the Holy City, in particular the burning of the Al Aqsa Mosque, my delegation would like to see the United Nations conduct an impartial investigation into the grave events of 21 August 1969 and other measures taken by the Israeli occupation forces against the Arab inhabitants and their property and against property belonging to religious foundations. My delegation would like the Security Council to recognize that any acts of destruction or desecration of holy places, religious buildings and sites are likely to endanger international peace and security. Furthermore, I should like the Security Council to acknowledge that there should be unimpeded access to the Holy Shrine of Al Aqsa by representatives of Governments of Islamic countries to

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1508, 10/9/1969, pp. 28-31.

assess the damage and to prepare and execute plans for its repair.

On the question of the status of Jerusalem, my delegation is convinced that, unless the Security Council takes meaningful action to enforce its resolutions on this matter, not only will the Council embolden Israel to take further unilateral steps for the complete annexation of the Holy City, but it will create within the United Nations a lack of confidence in the efficacy and seriousness of the Security Council with regard to its own decisions. Israel has been censured time and again for its aggressive acts and for its defiance of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. The Security Council should not preclude action under Article 41 should its decisions continue to be flouted.

On the question of the general Middle East situation, my delegation would like to see the four permanent Powers, in concert with Ambassador Jarring, activate — they have been in a lengthy recess for the last few months — their role in persuading both Israel and the Arab States to bring about a peaceful settlement of the crisis by full acceptance and implementation of the provisions of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

In conclusion, I would say that the incident of the burning of the Al Aqsa Mosque is symptomatic of the general situation in the Middle East, and it underlines the necessity of attacking at its roots this problem which remains as a continuing threat to world peace.

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Speech by the Pakistani Representative Shahi in the Security Council on the Damage to Al-Aqsa Mosque.¹ (Excerpt)
September 12, 1969

...there was one thing in the historic evolution of human culture of which mankind could well be proud. This was the steady development of a certain tolerance, the strengthening of certain restraints, which guaranteed an immunity from attack for the monuments of the human spirit. It

was a basic confidence of our times that, whatever our passions and our prejudices, we could never bear that evil hands should touch those objects which draw the love and devotion of millions of human beings. War apart, vandalism against one people by another had become unthinkable. This confidence was shattered on 21 August 1969, when, under the military occupation of Israel, the holy Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem was damaged by arson. That day will be recorded as a day of shock and shame for the whole human family. That day we witnessed an abrupt regression to barbarity. For the infinite sorrow caused by this grave event, for the collapse of the serenity which is the birthright and should be the unique gift of the Holy City of Jerusalem, we have to thank the military occupation of the City by Israel.

In saying that, let me make it clear that it is not my intention to prejudge the issue of criminal responsibility raised by the event. In approaching the Security Council we do not allege the actual complicity of Israeli authorities in the act which was committed on 21 August. The event certainly merits careful, impartial investigation, but such an investigation cannot be predicated on conditions of military occupation. Yet, beyond the facts which are ascertainable by inquiry, it would be futile to deny that the environment produced by the military occupation by Israel of the Holy City provided an element of encouragement to the individual or group that actually committed or abetted the committing of the most incredible and abominable act.

It may be, I must say in fairness, that some Israeli authorities were genuinely shocked by the crime. I grant that there must be men of goodwill in Israel who to some degree shared the outrage felt not only by Moslems but also by Christians and non-believers throughout the world. Yet can we, in the midst of this universal reaction, forget that many leadership groups in Israel have openly proclaimed the objective of rebuilding a temple on the site of Haram-Esh-Sharif, the Noble Sanctuary on which stands the Holy Al Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock.

The expression of regret in the official statements of Israeli authorities cannot possibly detract from the truth that an act of this nature, even without the direct complicity of the Israeli Government, is a by-product of Israel's military

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1507, 9/9/1969, pp. 11-25.

occupation of Jerusalem. But for the annexation of Jerusalem by Israel, carried out in total defiance of the unanimous resolutions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly, it is inconceivable that conditions would have prevailed in Jerusalem which permitted an individual or a group to seek — earlier by word and now by deed — the destruction of one of the most resplendant shrines of the Islamic faith.

The Security Council has considered the situation in Jerusalem before. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to reiterate the importance of the Holy City for the entire Islamic world. Since, however, inaccurate accounts continue to appear in the Press, let me point out that the sanctity of Jerusalem in Moslem eyes derives from the fact that it is the unique symbol of the confluence of Islam with the sacred traditions of Abraham, Moses and Jesus, all of them prophets held in the highest reverence by Moslems. The Holy City symbolizes the ecumenism which is inherent in Islam. That is why it was the first *Quibla* of Islam and remains to this day the third Holy City of peace and pilgrimage to the followers of that faith. The historic fact that the site of the Noble Sanctuary was encumbered with rubble, that the work of clearance was started in 638 A.D. by the second Caliph and Companion of the Holy Prophet Omar ibn Al Khattab, by his own hands, and that the sacred precinct was thus reconsecrated by Islam, has made Jerusalem a most hallowed part of the Islamic legacy. Except for one relatively brief interregnum from the First to just before the Third Crusades, Jerusalem has been a Moslem city for 1,300 years, a period far longer than those during which it was either Jewish or Christian. During this time the peoples of Islam, who held Jerusalem as a sacred trust, begrudged neither their lives nor their tears in the defence and love of the Holy City. Their philosophers and scholars, their divines and mystics, came to Jerusalem in quest of the ultimate experience of the beatific vision with which the sacred precinct of the Al Aqsa became indissolubly associated by the tradition of the ascension of the Holy Prophet.

The famous *status quo*, as defined and regulated by the firman or decree issued by the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid I in 1757 and as confirmed in the Edict of Toleration promulgated by Sultan

Abdul Magid in 1865, demonstrated how in Moslem hands the rights of other faiths to the Holy Places in Jerusalem were scrupulously respected and securely guaranteed.

It was this *status quo* which settled the disputes between the different Christian rites concerning their privileges in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. It minutely fixed every detail relating to the use of each part of the altars and of the chapels with a view to the avoidance of any sort of dispute between the various rites. This *status quo* was given international recognition in the peace settlements following the Crimean War in 1855 and the Russo-Turkish War in 1878. The universal vocation of Jerusalem was thus fully honoured under Islamic guardianship.

Though Jerusalem's misfortunes began when Palestine fell a prey to colonialism, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army in the Middle East, on his official entry into Jerusalem on 11 December 1917, issued a proclamation which stated in part:

"Since your city is regarded with affection by the adherents of three of the great religions of mankind, and its soil has been consecrated by the prayers and pilgrimages of multitudes of devout peoples of these three religions for many centuries, therefore do I make known to you that every sacred building, monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest or customary place of prayer, of whatsoever form, of the three religions will be maintained and protected according to the existing customs and beliefs of those to whose faiths they are sacred."

I may mention here an important fact which brings out the historic involvement of the people of Pakistan in the fate of Jerusalem. General Allenby's proclamation was a response to an insistent demand of the Indian-Moslem community, the same community which established the sovereign State of Pakistan. One of the great leaders of this community, Maulana Mohammad Ali, lies buried within the sacred precinct. Later, when the Council of the League of Nations entrusted the Mandate to the British Government on 24 July 1922, article 13 of the Mandate Agreement made it the responsibility of the mandatory Power not only to preserve existing rites in the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, but

also "to ensure public order and decorum". The article further stated

"Nothing in this Mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed."

I turn now to the situation confronting us. What the Security Council has to consider, behind the most horrifying crime of 21 August, is a series of occurrences which threaten to destroy the peace and religious tolerance maintained for more than a thousand years. The Charter of the United Nations, as the Security Council has emphasized, does not countenance the acquisition of territory by force. If this principle can be invoked in the case of any territory, is it not much more applicable to Jerusalem, a territory like no other, beloved and sacred to hundreds of millions of men in all continents? Again, if this principle can be invoked against any State, is it not much more applicable against Israel, whose very establishment is founded on a United Nations resolution? Little wonder that Israel's claim to sovereignty by conquest over the territory containing the sites of the Holy Places in Jerusalem, Hebron and Nazareth, should be regarded as intolerable. A distinguished Jewish intellectual, Professor George Steiner of Cambridge, remarked last week:

"To believe that there can be normal relations, let alone real peace, between Israel and the Arab States so long as the whole of Jerusalem remains incorporated in Israel is an illusion."

I would only add that it is not only the Arab States that are involved here, but all States as well whose populations are predominantly Moslem. This is the issue which causes the gravest concern to my delegation and, I would venture to say, also to the other delegations that have requested this meeting of the Security Council. Our joint request in this respect is but a very limited expression of the trauma that is being experienced by all the Islamic peoples in all continents at the burning of the holy Al Aqsa Mosque. While it is only the delegations of Islamic countries that have requested the Security Council to consider the grievous situation caused by the event of 21 August, let us not forget that there are large Moslem communities in other lands that are no

less affected. We have been moved by their demonstrations. We are grateful to the Governments of those countries for their sympathy, for their expression of serious concern and for their responsible affirmation that the situation in Jerusalem cannot be ameliorated except by Jerusalem's release from occupation.

We have no doubt in our minds that the withdrawal of Israeli control from the Old City is an imperative if the conflict in the Middle East is not to be allowed to become uncontrollable. As a conflict involving the self-determination of the people of Palestine and the territorial integrity of the Arab States, it is already grave enough. But as a conflict involving the cherished sensibilities of vast populations even outside the area of hostilities, it can become limitless in its repercussions and implacable in its nature.

In his statement of 31 August, His Holiness Pope Paul showed a deep awareness of the ominous implications of the situation in Jerusalem. After strongly deploring the fire in the Holy Mosque, he said that the Moslems were "shaken by the damage to a place dear to the constant and jealous veneration of millions of men". He added that he understood their bitterness. He then expressed the hope that "the situation would not degenerate into more fierce hatreds which would prejudice even more the higher and impelling cause of justice and peace".

Is there anyone here who would not echo the call of that great religious leader? We all dread these fierce hatreds to which the Pope has referred. Our endeavour here at the United Nations should be not to let them be awakened by such acts as the one we are considering today.

The signatories of the communications to the Security Council contained in documents S/9407 and S/9421 are confident that this grave aspect of the issue is fully realized by the Security Council. It has already been established in the previous debates of the General Assembly and the Security Council that the fate of Jerusalem goes beyond the matters in dispute between the parties to the Middle East conflict. The issue of Jerusalem is recognized as an issue of the universal conscience. Therefore, as I said at a previous meeting of the Security Council, it is one of transcendental importance. It is indisputable that it vitally

affects the interests of many countries which are not involved in the hostilities in the Middle East.

Members of the Security Council will doubtless note that the signatories of the two letters cover a wide range of nations and peoples. The list includes those Moslem countries that do not recognize Israel, as well as those that do and maintain relations with it. It is but natural that the different geographical locations and historical backgrounds of these countries should cause them to pursue different foreign policies and have different external orientations. But if they are united on the proposition that Jerusalem shall not be annexed by Israel, it is because they sincerely believe that this is a question of fundamental principles — that of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by military conquest — and that under Israeli occupation there cannot be any preservation of the sacred character of the Holy Places or any assurance of their safety and of free access to them.

I feel free to confess that we the signatories of the two communications addressed to the President of the Security Council hesitated long before we asked for this meeting. Our hesitation was not due in the slightest to any doubts in our minds or to any anticipation of doubt in the minds of the members of the Security Council that the issue of the preservation of the Holy Places of Islam in Jerusalem, in all their sanctity, impinges directly on international peace and security. If we hesitated, we did so not only because of the immensity of our grief but also because, on an issue which arouses such deep emotions among our peoples, we did not wish to be precipitate in our actions. We held exhaustive debates on what measures would be feasible to remedy this grievous situation. We considered various alternatives. We sought realistically to measure the consequences of different types of action. In the end, we were driven to the conclusion that, while certain interim measures are conceivable, they will not assuage the sorrow of our peoples nor give them real assurance of the safety of their Holy Places as long as the Holy City remains under Israeli occupation.

My colleagues around this table will have doubtless noted that some interim measures were suggested in the telegraphic communication of 22 August 1969 from the representatives of

twenty-five countries (S/9407). For these measures to have any ameliorative effect on the situation in the City, they presuppose the cessation of any activity by Israel in the Old City which goes beyond functions as a temporary occupying Power. Since the Security Council is now taking cognizance of the situation, it must concern itself with the roots of the problem. They lie in the measures of annexation carried out by Israel in excess of the rights of an occupying Power and in acts contrary to fundamental human rights. As a result, an atmosphere prevails in the Holy City which is offensive to the public order and decorum necessary for preserving the sacred character of the holy shrines.

In expecting the Council to discharge its responsibility in this matter, we are not seeking any new departures. The two resolutions of the Security Council on Jerusalem — namely, resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and resolution 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 — are unequivocal. They confirm that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel designed to alter the status of Jerusalem are invalid. The Council has censured such measures in the strongest terms and has urgently called upon Israel to rescind them forthwith.

To our mind, therefore, no ground exists for any reluctance against taking the further action which was envisaged in operative paragraph 7 of resolution 267 (1969). If, however, it is felt that that stage has not yet been reached, the very minimum required at the moment is to reinforce the call embodied in previous resolutions.

I now return to where I began. The grave event of 21 August is unparalleled both in our age and in the history of Jerusalem for centuries prior to the disaster which befell it in 1967. It is not, I must stress, a matter of religious belief only. It is as much a matter of fundamental human values and basic decencies. The outrage of 21 August caused a revulsion among believers and non-believers alike. Some lamented the partial destruction of a noble work of Islamic architecture, rich with history and consecrated by pilgrimages lasting for more than a millenium. Others bewailed the total loss of a priceless masterpiece of religious art: the pulpit installed in the Holy Mosque by the peerless Salahuddin. Still others expressed their abhorrence of the act and the

atmosphere which permitted it, because it disrupted the ecumenical spirit which is probably the most beneficent promise of the modern age. Still others were indignant at the event because it would unleash dark forces of anger and hate. The Islamic communities were the most aggrieved because it affected something which they value beyond life itself.

The Security Council's response to the event has to be based on this whole range of reactions, all having one element: the consciousness that the event demands urgent measures to prevent any chance of its recurrence. Such measures, I must stress, cannot in their very nature relate only to the Holy Places, because these Holy Places cannot be isolated from their physical environment and the social and political order imposed on it. The Holy Places are organically related to the City itself. Their sacred character cannot be preserved for any length of time if the City continues to suffer military occupation. Behind the wound inflicted on the Noble Sanctuary, it is Jerusalem itself which is bleeding.

In conclusion, I shall only say that the cause of many a people and many a land has not always been well served at the United Nations. We hope that the cause of Jerusalem will strike a more sympathetic chord. A famous psalm asks all to pray for the peace of Jerusalem, for peace within her walls. While millions offer this prayer, the action that has to accompany it can be taken only by the Security Council. That action should be such as to release Jerusalem from its present agony.

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Speech by the Representative of Ceylon Amerasinghe on the Fire at Al-Aqsa Mosque.¹ (Excerpt)

September 12, 1969

The act of sacrilege committed in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969 has grievously injured the religious susceptibilities of Muslims the world over, to whom the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which was

damaged by fire on 21 August, was a shrine and a symbol . . . of their faith. The sense of pain and shock has not, however, been confined to the Muslim world. The condemnation of the outrage has been universal, and this, if nothing else, should offer some hope that the means of restitution finally determined would receive universal endorsement.

On 23 August the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mr. Senanayake, in a statement that has been made public, observed:

"That damage should have been caused to so historic a place of worship must rouse the deepest sorrow amongst everyone. The people of Ceylon share with their Muslim brethren this sense of deep unhappiness." He went on to state:

"Whatever may be the cause of the incident it is essential for world peace that the matter should be investigated by an impartial tribunal and that full restoration and restitution should be made. I do not want at this stage without a knowledge of the facts to apportion blame but I cannot help making the comment that when a foreign country occupies by force land belonging to other countries a special onus rests on that country to ensure that places of historic veneration should receive the closest protection."

There are implications, both sacred and secular, in this insane act of vandalism. But the delegation of Ceylon does not see this incident as a confrontation between Jew and Moslem or between a demented incendiary and a bewildered régime whose illegal presence serves to aggravate the situation. The feelings of shock, grief and indignation will be assuaged with time; but it is not with those feelings that this Council has to concern itself. As the organ of the United Nations entrusted by its membership with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security — a responsibility delegated to it by the membership in the interests of prompt and effective action — it is the Council's duty to examine the real circumstances that have made such a situation possible, and to find the remedy.

Surprise has been expressed in certain quarters that the fire at Al Aqsa Mosque should be cited as an incident of exceptional gravity and one of international significance. It has been stated that there have been fires in other places held sacred by Moslems. To draw such a comparison

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1510, 12/9/1969, pp.12-20.

is to ignore, wittingly or unwittingly, the singular feature that distinguishes the Al Aqsa fire from other fires in Holy Places. This distinction provides the principal justification for the inclusion of the item in the agenda of the Security Council. It lies in the fact that at the time of the fire the territory on which the Al Aqsa Mosque stands was under foreign occupation — an occupation established by force of arms and maintained in breach of the principle repeatedly affirmed and emphasized unanimously by the Security Council and the General Assembly, that acquisition of territory by war is inadmissible. If that principle were not scrupulously observed, and if it were not effectively enforced, the United Nations would have no meaning or purpose. That is the heart of the matter.

It has been stated that a civilized man is, by definition, one whose only reaction to the fire is one of shock and concern, undiluted by any other sentiment or motive of prejudice, rancour, or political advantage. But there is another definition of civilized man which has been overlooked and which is equally applicable to the civilized State. By that definition, a civilized State would be one that showed a proper respect for the principles of the Charter and for the unanimous determinations of the organ of the United Nations that is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. For the civilized world, the ideal of peace and security, together with the principles that alone could ensure it, should be pre-eminent. Hatred and mistrust result only when that ideal and the principles relevant to its realization are flouted.

Official Israeli opinion has also been quoted to the effect that any attempt to exploit the fire for purposes of political and religious incitement merits the unqualified condemnation of all enlightened mankind. We are human enough to know, however, that sorrow and indignation often go together, especially when man's deepest instinct is outraged.

In every community, in every society, there are elements that are actuated, on occasions such as this, initially by impulse and emotion. Cold reason and sober reflection are not the attributes of man in the aggregate. If appeals to passion and emotion are the immediate reaction of the aggrieved, they are at least understandable and

can, with time and goodwill, be quenched. What cannot be undone is the act of desecration itself. The solution that has to be sought is one that would avert a similar risk in the future. One fact is incontestable, and if that is recognized the solution is obvious. Had the area not been under foreign occupation, the situation which we are discussing could never have arisen.

Security Council resolution 242 (1967) provided and still remains the soundest basis for a just and peaceful settlement. We have ourselves expressed concern over Israel's failure to abide by the Security Council resolution and have stressed the responsibility of the international community — and in particular the four major Powers — for bringing about a settlement in accordance with that resolution. Our position has always been that Israeli forces should withdraw unconditionally from Arab territory to the position they occupied prior to 5 June 1967. This is an indispensable condition for peace in the area. That is the lesson of the Al Aqsa fire.

Those who continue to waver on that issue would have failed to learn that lesson and would have added one more to history's long and tragic list of lost opportunities. The fire that started in Al Aqsa must not be allowed to spread throughout the world. It must not be permitted to consume and destroy, but must be employed to cleanse and heal. It is neither through the punishment of the culprit nor through the restoration of the shrine, nor through the fervent expression of sympathy — the genuineness of which we have no reason to question — that Israel can redeem itself.

The only act of restitution that can eradicate the bitterness and resentment created by this incident and set in train a process that could lead to peace and harmony is the relinquishment of Israeli control over Arab territory which it now, in the judgement of the Security Council and the General Assembly, unlawfully occupies. This result could be achieved only if the Security Council itself showed sufficient unity and determination to assert its authority. The act of redemption which we seek on the part of Israel might well create that spirit of forgiveness, compassion and mutual tolerance which could prove to be a far more reliable guarantee of a final settlement of the Middle East question than any contractual arrangement.

The portents are there for those who choose to heed them. Indifference could spell disaster.

The task before the Security Council is to find that special alchemy that can transmute this fire into a benediction. We wish the Council success in its efforts.

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Speech by the Colombian Representative Morales-Suarez in the Security Council on the Fire at Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.¹

September 15, 1969

My Government enjoys cordial diplomatic relations with a number of States where the Islamic religion is observed. We also enjoy diplomatic relations with Israel, but this has never in any way prevented us from freely expressing our opinions that very often do not coincide with the views or interests of Israel. An example of this can be found in what my delegation said when in this high organ we discussed the changes in the status of Jerusalem. In expressing these opinions my delegation bears in mind the fact that Colombia is a country whose war-like potential is extremely reduced and, perhaps fortunately, whose offensive capacity is insignificant when compared with that of the great Powers. Our strength, our meaning and significance must and do flow from the freedom we possess to express our views with the calm with which we have always endeavoured to express our judgement and with the unshakable and unvarying adherence we profess to legal principles.

In the specific case before us a careful analysis of the facts placed before the Council do not lead us to feel that the Government of Israel harboured deliberate plans of destroying or damaging the integrity of the Al Aqsa Mosque. On the contrary the present situation itself shows how far Israel can achieve no advantage from what took place but rather further grave reasons for concern and uncertainty.

This tragic event to whose redress the entire world must turn, since the Mosque is a collective spiritual and artistic inheritance, should be in-

vestigated without indirect political derivations, multiplying the bitter realities and the dangers that already abound in the Middle East.

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Speech by the Finnish Representative Jakobson in the Security Council on the Fire at Al-Aqsa Mosque.² (Excerpt)

September 15, 1969

The news of the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem understandably caused shock and anxiety throughout the world — and in particular, of course, among the Moslem nations. The damage suffered by one of the most important religious shrines of the world is a loss to civilization as a whole. It is fortunate that the greater part of the Mosque could be saved and that it continues to serve as a centre of worship.

The issue raised by the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque is the safety and protection of the Holy Places in Jerusalem. That is a matter of universal concern. Accordingly, in August 1967, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Thalmann of Switzerland, when receiving instructions for his fact-finding mission to Jerusalem, was specifically requested to gather information on the situation of all the Holy Places. His mission is worth recalling as an example of an agreed procedure by which the United Nations was able to obtain information about the state of the Holy Places in Jerusalem.

On the question of the status of the City of Jerusalem, to which many speakers have referred, my delegation stated its position in July of this year when the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 267 (1969) making it quite clear that the international community cannot accept as valid any measures or actions that might tend to change the status of the City of Jerusalem. Obviously, nothing that happens in Jerusalem can fail to affect the political atmosphere in the Middle East.

The wave of emotion that swept over Islam after the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque has further

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1511, 15/9/1969, pp. 42-43.

² U.N. doc. S/PV. 1511, 15/9/1969, pp. 53-56.

increased the tension in the area where the strain was already close to the breaking point. Nobody stands to gain from this unfortunate event. It is a tragedy for all the parties to the conflict.

In these circumstances the Security Council, charged with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security and committed as it is to a search for a peaceful solution of the conflict in the Middle East, should in our view deal with the question before us in a manner designed to prevent a further deterioration of the situation. This will be the primary criterion by which my delegation will determine its position on the draft resolution introduced in the Council.

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Speech by the Paraguayan Representative Sofano Lopez in the Security Council on the Fire at Al-Aqsa Mosque.¹

September 15, 1969

I refer now to the deliberate burning of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on 21 August of this year. That fire might have destroyed the entire building. Seldom have we seen the expression of so universal a feeling as that which we have just seen of condemnation of the intention to burn a mosque, a mosque that is sacred to Moslems all over the world, sacred, too, to those who have different religious beliefs but still feel that the Holy Places venerated by any religion must be protected and safeguarded from sacrilege and profanation as well as any possibility of their intentional destruction. My country and the Government I represent have felt and continue to feel the gravest repugnance at this act. We sincerely deplore the damage done before the fire was quelled, and to the believers of all faiths, particularly to the States whose population is predominantly Moslem, we express our unreserved condemnation of the criminal act of 21 August.

The wave of emotion felt all over the world, once again attests to the specific nature and the justifiable concern regarding Jerusalem, this unique city within whose juridical boundaries lie the most Holy Places venerated by the believers

of three of the religions with the greatest number of adherents, believers who in their totality add up to hundreds of millions of human beings. My delegation and Government also wishes to express the collective interest of the international community and of this Organization which is its best representation, namely, the United Nations, that there is an urgent need to preserve the international character of Jerusalem as defined in General Assembly resolutions.

Furthermore, we once again wish to reiterate the importance of the status of Jerusalem within the general framework of peace and security in the Middle East, with which it is deeply and inexorably tied. With regard to that status, the opinion of my delegation has already been expressed on many occasions, the last of which was very recent, since the last time we spoke of it was in the course of the debate that led to the unanimous adoption of resolution 267 (1969) of 3 July. I therefore do not believe that I need reiterate those views, since they are known to all, and I know that the United Nations in general and the Security Council in particular are both fully aware of our views.

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Speech by the Senegal Representative M'Bengue in the Security Council on the Fire at Al-Aqsa Mosque.² (Excerpt)

September 15, 1969

Our Council has been meeting for several days following upon the request of twenty-five Member countries of the United Nations to study the situation created by the fire of the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. My delegation does not intend to incite passions. We deem it our duty to strive to contribute effectively and positively to the search for a just and lasting solution of the tragic problem of the Middle East. This has been a constant element of our policy towards the Middle East problem. We are compelled, however, to state that events such as the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque are not likely to make

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1511, 15/9/1969, pp. 59-60.

² U.N. doc. S/PV. 1511, 15/9/1969, pp. 28-32.

easier the return of peace to that area. The fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque, one of the most venerated shrines of Islam, is an odious act which gives rise to reprobation in the whole world. The setting on fire of the Mosque constitutes an attempt to infringe upon the spiritual values which are fundamental elements of the human mind, and one can easily understand the indignation of all the believers — Moslems, Christians and Jews — in the whole world.

The Senegalese people, deeply attached to the values of the spirit, and respectful of all beliefs, is the example of a country where there is perfect harmony among the various religious communities.

Senegal, which has the good fortune to have at its head a humanist of world renown, a determined and tireless advocate for the cause of mankind, learned with great indignation of the sacrilegious act committed in the Al Aqsa Mosque, one of the most venerated Holy Places of Islam — an act which attests to a blatant contempt for the highest spiritual values.

We know that the Israeli authorities, in the course of public statements, have expressed feelings of indignation and reprobation. But, actually, this problem raises the question of the status of Jerusalem. The problem will in fact not be settled until Jerusalem is evacuated. Only the withdrawal of Israel from Jerusalem and other territories under military occupation will be able to assure the security of the Holy Places.

That raises the problem of respect for all the resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council in this field. However, Jerusalem is still under the control of the Tel Aviv authorities, as are many other Arab territories, as well. The Al Aqsa fire, which is today condemned by the whole world, is not an isolated fact; it is the direct consequence of the forcible occupation of Arab territories by Israel. Therefore, incidents of this sort which we all condemn today will come to an end only when a general solution to this problem is found.

We speak the language of truth, without hatred or hostility towards the Jewish people, which is, as President Senghor has said, together with the Arab people and the black people, one of the three suffering peoples of the world.

But we cannot forget that it is the Arabs who

are at present the victims of physical aggression and occupation.

We have always condemned the resort to violence for the settlement of political problems. That is a fundamental principle of our foreign policy. There is another principle, no less important, however, which we have always advocated: negotiation.

We still consider that the resolution of 22 November 1967 is the best framework for the restoration of a just and lasting peace in that troubled part of the world.

It is up to the Security Council in general, and to the Permanent Members in particular, to strive much more forcibly in order to translate that resolution, in all its aspects, into deeds so that peace may be restored and the countries of the region may devote themselves to the tasks of development in order to ensure a better life for all the people of the area.

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Speech by the Spanish Representative *Canadas* in the Security Council on the Status of Jerusalem.¹

July 2, 1969

Now, that occupation is not justified in any way and, furthermore, is contrary to a number of resolutions adopted by this Organization. Yet, starting from the very fact of that occupation, the occupying State has dictated a series of measures the consequences of which would lead to a change in the legal status of the City and to consolidating a *de facto* situation which the law cannot recognize. Any explanation or justification to be given such provisions cannot stand up to even the most summary analysis. Neither the opinion of a supposed majority of the inhabitants, nor the needs for urbanism measures, nor the theoretical benefits of a unity imposed by force, nor good administrative order — which already existed — could justify a series of measures which gravely affect Jordan and some inhabitants, who are not to blame for all that happens in the City, and which seriously affects the religious sentiment

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1484, 2/7/1969, pp. 106-108.

of many communities, composed of many hundreds of millions of men, which goes against the spirit and even the physical appearance of a monumental mass that has been preserved miraculously, and the very juridical structure of the Organization on which the preservation and respect of peace must rest.

My delegation has already stated the following:

"What Spain whole-heartedly desires is an end to be brought to a situation that has been exclusively maintained by the force of weapons and arms, that peace be restored and that justice be done to some countries."

However, I understand that that general view of the problem is neither easy nor the one on which we have to dwell specifically at this moment. However, we should take into account, as a background of our deliberations, the existence of that general situation in order not to forget that we are acting in an atmosphere where to the original injustice of dispossessing, with imported settlers, an indigenous population of its lands and property, is now added the continued military occupation of territories, and the annexationist intentions which the measures adopted by Israel clearly manifest.

The very authority of this Organization is at stake in Jerusalem and, therefore, so is the future of peace. My delegation cannot but point out the increasing concern with which we are watching the lack of compliance with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and by the Security Council. The path undertaken is certainly a dangerous one and, therefore, my delegation feels that the time has come to try to alter the direction in a most determined fashion.

With regard to the specific request summed up in eight points by the representative of Jordan, my delegation cannot hide the sympathy with which we view some requests that, because they flow directly from resolution 252 (1968) adopted by this Council, as well as others adopted by the General Assembly, seem to be, generally speaking,

both reasonable and adequate. Yet, I wish specifically to stress the fact that because of the importance we believe must be attached to them, I want to bring out the following ideas which come very close to the item we are discussing, but which also have a much wider general importance.

Thus, my delegation considers: First, it is urgent that the Security Council pronounce itself in the most categorical fashion possible regarding the respect due to resolutions adopted by the United Nations. Second, in order to avoid any misunderstanding or ambiguity in the future, it appears necessary for the Council unequivocally to condemn any policy of *faits accomplis* adopted by Israel. We cannot tolerate the fact that based on a policy of that nature positions are strengthened and new situations created that might later be used as a pretext to refuse compliance with resolutions we have approved. Third, it is imperative that we again firmly declare that the use of force cannot justify any territorial annexation, nor can it legitimize any expansionist aspirations or designs. Respect for accepted norms and fulfilment of the contractual obligation are the only ways in which civilized society has found that it can overcome the law of the strongest.

In Jerusalem, the cradle of spiritual values shared by many millions of men, that respect is all the more important. It is more urgent still. The gravity of the situation, the tensions to which it has given rise, and the unexpected complications that may emerge at any moment, make it urgent that we know specifically and definitively whether Israel is or is not ready to comply with its obligations, so that in the light of that information this Council may take consequent action. My delegation feels that the moment has arrived to adopt effective decisions on this matter, since we can no longer continue to wait, without knowing for how long, for hypothetical measures to be taken that might lead to a general solution. In the light of non-compliance with resolutions and the flouting of the rights of many Member States, patience must also have a limit.

PART V

Letters, Notes, Reports and Statements by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and the Security Council

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Interview Statements by the Secretary-General U Thant.¹ (Excerpts)

New York, January 28, 1969

May I begin the questioning with a question about the Middle East situation, which is currently preoccupying Governments and peoples in many parts of the world. Will you give us your evaluation of the Middle East situation and the current prospects for a political settlement?

The Secretary-General: My attitude towards the Middle East question and my approach to the problem are, I believe, well known. (*See Record of the Month page 6, for United Nations spokesman statement on Middle East situation.*)

First of all, I feel that the United Nations must be involved actively in the search for a just and lasting peace in the area. I feel very strongly that in order to enable the United Nations to contribute significantly towards the creation of justice and peace in the area, big Power co-operation is essential. Past experience has shown that, without big Power co-operation in this particular situation, the United Nations is not able to contribute significantly towards a just and peaceful solution of this problem. That explains why I have been advocating for some time that the big Powers must be actively involved in the search for peace, either collectively or separately.

But what is very important from my point of view is that the actions of the big Powers must be solely within the context of the United Nations. In other words, for the moment their activities must be confined solely within the framework of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. Once there is a measure of agreement among the big Powers on the fundamentals —

after meetings, collectively or individually, as I said a moment ago — then the matter should be brought back to the Security Council. Such a procedure would facilitate the work of the Secretary-General's Representative, Ambassador Jar-ring, and I am confident would contribute to a just and lasting peace in the area. I do not see any other sensible and realistic alternative.

Q. Would it be your idea that, under that procedure, the big Powers would work out an arrangement for peace which it would be expected that the parties would accept; or would the parties themselves — the Israelis and the Arabs — be included in the discussions among the big Powers on an arrangement?

The Secretary-General: Of course, in the process of consultations and discussions among the big Powers, the parties primarily concerned in the conflict must be involved at some stages. They cannot be left out of the picture; they must be put in the picture.

I must say in parenthesis that, so far as Security Council involvement is concerned, some sort of pressure is necessary. With regard to almost all the resolutions adopted by the Security Council in the past, in any crisis situations, some degree of pressure has been necessary — and I believe that some degree of pressure in all directions is necessary in the present case.

Q. You have expressed concern about the hangings in Baghdad. Do you intend to bring this subject before the Security Council officially?

The Secretary-General: Let me give you some background regarding the issuance of a statement through a spokesman yesterday. When I authorized the issuance of that statement, I had two motivations. The first was humanitarian. I do not think I need elaborate on that point, since I made it very clear in my statement. The second was my fear that any action in the area that is likely to inflame passions and emotions will impede the efforts of the United Nations and particularly

¹ U.N. Monthly Chronicle, New York, February 1969, pp. 32-42.

the efforts of Ambassador Jarring in the search for a just and lasting peace. Those were the two primary considerations in my mind — first, the humanitarian aspect; and second, the possible impact of such actions on our common search for a just and lasting peace.

Of course, if similar actions had taken place in another area, outside the region, I might not have even thought of issuing any statement. I have recognized and I still recognize that this is purely an internal affair. I think the Government of Iraq is quite right in asserting that it is legally a purely internal affair. But, in the context of the very delicate and difficult crisis situation prevailing in the Middle East, I am afraid — rightly or wrongly — that such action or any similar action likely to inflame passions and emotions may impede our common efforts in our search for peace. It is of course far from my intention to bring this matter before any deliberative organ of the United Nations.

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Q. Mr. Secretary-General, have you had any recent encouragement to believe that a four-Power meeting on the Middle East, such as you have suggested, is now likely?

The Secretary-General: All my meetings with the Permanent Representatives of the United Nations are privileged, and I do not want to disclose any of those privileged discussions publicly, at least for the moment. But I very much hope that the four Powers will work together, as I stated earlier, collectively or singly, towards a practical, realistic and just settlement of the problem of the Middle East within the framework of the Security Council.

Q. Will Ambassador Jarring be available here for such a meeting?

The Secretary-General: I do not think it would be in the public interest for Ambassador Jarring to participate in such a meeting. Of course he will be available to all the big Powers and to all the parties primarily involved in the conflict, as he has been in the past. But I do not think — and he agrees with me — that he should actively participate in the discussions which are contemplated among the big Powers.

Q. You spoke earlier today about Security Council pressures on the parties in the Arab-Israeli dispute following an agreement among the four powers. But Israel has frequently said in the Council that it cannot get justice in that organization. Why do you think Israel will decide that Security Council pressures following a four-power meeting will be less inimical to it?

The Secretary-General: This involves a certain basic principle regarding our attitude to the United Nations. Like all human organizations, like a club or a society or an association, the United Nations has certain rules and regulations to guide its actions and to conduct business. I think for an orderly and civilized functioning of this Organization it is necessary, and, in my view it is even essential, that all Members abide by the rules. In other words, all Members give particular attention to the decisions and resolutions of the principal deliberative organs of the United Nations. To be frank, in my view, if only all the resolutions and decisions of the principal deliberative organs of the United Nations were heeded by the parties primarily concerned in the area, there would be no Middle Eastern problem today. That is my firm conviction. So what is the United Nations here for? The United Nations is here to function and to operate and to act in crisis situations. Any of us who wants to see the United Nations develop into a really effective instrument for peace, a really effective instrument for the creation of conditions for peace, must also favour the concept I have outlined earlier: that this international Organization is guided by certain rules and regulations, and that these rules and regulations require Member States to comply with the decisions and resolutions of the deliberative organs of this Organization. In the past twenty-one years, the deliberative organs of the United Nations have adopted numerous resolutions regarding the situation in the Middle East, the crisis in the Middle East, wars in the Middle East, but the plain fact is that most of those resolutions went unheeded. My point is that, as in all international organizations, if only the members in a club or a society or an association were to comply with the decisions of that organization, through the executive committee, for instance, then that would result in the orderly and smooth functioning of that particular organization. I would apply the same analogy to the

United Nations. The United Nations is here precisely to perform the functions envisaged in the Charter *vis-à-vis* the crisis situation in the Middle East. I do not see any alternative way of dealing with this crisis situation outside the United Nations. So my point is that, if only the parties primarily concerned in the conflict were to pay heed to the previous resolutions of the deliberative organs of the United Nations, then I am confident there would have been peace in the area long ago.

Q. Do you share the fear of President Nixon that the Middle East is in such a state at the moment that the next explosion could lead to a nuclear confrontation between the big Powers?

The Secretary-General: I must say that I agree with the President's assessment on this question.

Q. Are you suggesting that the big Four initially and afterwards the Security Council should work out the details and fill up the ambiguities in the 22 November resolution and ensure that it is implemented?

The Secretary-General: I do not want to suggest to or advise the big Four how they should proceed. I think it should be left to them to define the procedures and modalities of formulating a common attitude towards this problem within the framework of the United Nations.

Q. How do you envisage a piece of paper that might come from Big Four consultations, an imposed peace endorsed by the Security Council or a peace freely arrived at by the parties concerned?

The Secretary-General: I am of the opinion that any imposition on any area, on any country, is likely to generate further problems in the years to come. So I would not use the word "imposition" in the context of big Power action or prospective Security Council action. "Imposition" is a very debatable conception and a contentious word. You will recall that many Member States have even accused the United Nations of having imposed the State of Israel on the Middle East against the wishes of many people in the area. So I do not want to enter into a discussion on this conception of imposition. But, in my view, some sort of moral pressure by the big Powers in all directions, through the machinery of the Security Council, and of course as far as possible by promoting agreement by the Powers particularly involved

would be very desirable. I would prefer to use the word "pressure" and not "imposition".

Q. Mr. Secretary-General, in your earlier comments you spoke about the parties concerned. Did you have in mind the people of Palestine and their liberation movements?

The Secretary-General: Well, there is a very wide recognition of the fact that the question of the Palestine refugees is the crux of the problem. I believe that was the essence of some of the resolutions of the principal deliberative organs also. Without trying to tackle this very tragic problem in right earnest, I am afraid the move towards a just and peaceful settlement will be very slow. Of course the situation in the Middle East cannot remain static forever. Time is not on the side of peace. In all crisis situations like this, they either deteriorate or improve. To improve the situation of course, it is very urgent for the Security Council, and particularly the big Powers, to be actively involved in the search for a settlement.

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Letter from the Secretary-General to the Israeli Foreign Minister on the Attack on an El Al Aircraft in Zurich.¹

February 26, 1969

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter to me of 20 February 1969 relating to the attack upon an El Al aircraft in Zurich on 18 February. In pursuance of your request your letter was transmitted to all Members of the United Nations in the customary form of a note verbale. In response to a subsequent request by the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, it has also been circulated as an official document of the General Assembly¹ and the Council.²

You have inquired as to what constructive international action is envisaged to prevent such acts of violence against international civil aviation in the future. Even before your letter was received,

¹ U.N. doc. S/9030. The attack was carried out on 18 February 1969.

² A/7515.

³ S/9021.

I was in contact with the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Air Transport Association regarding the Zurich incident, and I have kept in close touch with ICAO since. I am also consulting with certain Members of the United Nations specially concerned, with a view to finding means to prevent such acts of violence.

There is no question that every effort should be made to put an end to attacks on civilian carriers which endanger innocent passengers and jeopardize international travel, from whatever quarter they may come. As I said through my spokesman on 18 February 1969 after the Zurich incident,

"Such attacks, involving as they do a great risk to innocent persons and the disruption of an important branch of international communication, are a matter of urgent concern to all Governments and peoples. If the hitherto peaceful world of civil aviation is to be saved from chaos and anarchy, governments and peoples, regardless of their political views, must condemn acts of this kind and take all possible measures to prevent them."

In this connexion, improved methods of international police co-operation and regulations of a national as well as an international character may contribute towards the prevention of those acts of terrorism and violence. However, I believe that the only sure way to bring an end to terrorist acts would be some substantial movement towards a peaceful settlement of the major issues underlying the Middle East conflict. In the circumstances, I hope you will agree that, although there may be some scope for positive action by the Secretary-General in a matter of this kind, the most natural and proper recourse, and that which should hold the best promise for constructive international action, is clearly the Security Council.

It is my firm conviction that the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 offers the only practical basis for the promotion of a just and lasting peace in the area. I also remain convinced that progress towards this goal can be made through the dedicated efforts of Ambassador Jarring to assist and promote agreement between the parties with the active co-operation especially of the major Powers. An essential first step towards this end, in my view, would be a declared

readiness by the parties to implement the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

In this connexion let me recall what I have stated on another occasion, that "if only all the resolutions and decisions of the principal deliberative organs of the United Nations were heeded by the parties primarily concerned in the area, there would be no Middle East problem today".

In spite of the apparent lack of progress in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, my abiding faith in the United Nations as the instrument for obtaining ultimate success remains unshaken. Indeed I can see no practical alternative to the active continuation of this search.

Since your letter under reference has been circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council, I have arranged that this letter be circulated similarly. I am also arranging for my spokesman's statement of 18 February, to which you have referred in your letter, to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.¹

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) U THANT

ANNEX

The Secretary-General has heard with dismay and deep concern of the attack on an El Al airliner at Zurich Airport on 18 February 1969. This is the second attack of this kind within two months on which the same airline has been the target of terrorist activities.

Such attacks, involving as they do a great risk to innocent persons and the destruction of an important branch of international communication, are a matter of urgent concern to all Governments and peoples. If the hitherto peaceful world of civil aviation is to be saved from chaos and anarchy, Governments and peoples, regardless of their political views, must condemn acts of this kind and take all possible measures to prevent them.

The Secretary-General strongly hopes that this criminal act, dastardly as it is, will not be

¹ See annex.

followed by an act of retaliation such as the attack on the Beirut Airport, which was condemned by the Security Council in its resolution of 31 December 1968, but rather by constructive international action to prevent such acts of violence against international civil aviation in the future.

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Report by the Secretary-General under Security Council Resolution 252 of 21 May, 1969.¹

April 11, 1969

1. This report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, which requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution. In this resolution, the Council considered that "all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status" and urgently called upon Israel "to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem".

2. Since the termination of the mission of his Personal Representative in Jerusalem, Ambassador Ernesto A. Thalmann, in September 1967,² the Secretary-General has had no means of obtaining first-hand information on which to base the required reporting. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 252 (1968), the Secretary-General transmitted, by a cable dated 21 May 1968, the text of the resolution to the Foreign Minister of Israel in accordance with established procedure. On 13 February 1969, the Secretary-General addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel the following note verbale:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent

Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968. In this resolution the Security Council considered that 'all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status', and urgently called upon Israel 'to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem'. The Council also requested the Secretary-General 'to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution'.

"The Secretary-General must in the main look to the Government of Israel for the information necessary in the discharge of the reporting responsibilities placed upon the Security Council, as indicated above.

"The Secretary-General, therefore, requests the Government of Israel to provide him with such information and will be grateful to have it at an early date.

"The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to express to the Permanent Representative of Israel the assurance of his highest consideration."

3. The Permanent Representative of Israel replied to the Secretary-General by a note verbale dated 25 March 1969, which reads as follows:

"The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to his note of 13 February 1969 concerning Security Council resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, and on instructions from his Government has the honour to state that the position of the Government of Israel in the matter remains as set forth in the letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 10 July 1967 (A/6753) and in the statements made by the representatives of Israel in the General Assembly and the Security Council.

"The Permanent Representative of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to express to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the assurances of his highest consideration."

¹ U.N. doc. S/9149.

² See the report of the Secretary-General of 12 September 1967 under General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V) A/6793 and S/8146

4. The only other source of information of an official nature pertinent to the implementation of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) which has been available to the Secretary-General is the Israel Official Gazette (Reshumoth). According to this Gazette, which is published originally in Hebrew, the Israel Parliament, on the basis of a bill submitted by the Israel government,¹ adopted on 14 August 1968 the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law",² which is relevant to the situation in Jerusalem. In this regard, it may be recalled that according to the note issued by the President of the Security Council on 10 February 1969 (S/9000), the Israel Government decided to postpone until 23 May 1969 the putting into effect of this law. An unofficial translation of this law as well as the relevant bill and explanatory notes is annexed to the present report.

ANNEX I

*Unofficial translation of the law published
in Sefer Ha'Chukkim No. 542 of
23 August 1968*

LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS (REGULATION) LAW, 5728-1968³

Definition

1. In this Law, "application of law order" means an order under section 11 B of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948.⁴

Holy Places

2. Where any Holy Places are situated in the area of application of an application of law order, the Absentees' Property Law, 5710-1950⁵ shall

not apply to them from the day of the coming into force of the order.

Non-Absenteeship

3. (a) A person who on the day of the coming into force of an application of law order was in the area of application of the order, and was a resident thereof, shall not, from that day, be regarded as an absentee within the meaning of the Absentees' Property Law, 5710-1950, in respect of property situated in that area.

(b) For the purpose of this section, it shall be immaterial whether, after the coming into force of the order, that person was, by legal permit, in a place where his presence would make him an absentee but for this provision.

Plea of Enemy Status

4. Where a person is resident of the area of application of an application of law order a court or tribunal shall not, in a civil matter, entertain the plea that he is an enemy or enemy subject, unless that plea is made by the Attorney-General or with his written consent.

Release of Immovable Property

5. (a) Immovable property situated in the area of application of an application of law order and which immediately before the day on which such area came to be held by the Defence Army of Israel, was vested in a person whom the authorities of the State, which in *de facto* occupied the area, had appointed custodian of enemy property or holder of a similar office or title, or in any of the authorities of, or any body controlled by that State, to which authority or body that person had transferred the property, shall from the day of the coming into force of the other, vest in the Administrator General, who shall deal therewith as hereafter in this section provided.

(b) The Administrator General shall, by certificate under his hand, release the property to the person who was the owner thereof before it was vested in the person referred to in subsection (a), or to the successor of such owner, upon the application of such owner or successor. So long as the property is not released, the Administrator-General shall deal therewith as he is permitted to deal with immovable property of a missing person under the Administrator General

¹ Hatza'ot Chok (Bills) No. 787 of 14 July 1968, pp. 358-362.

² Sefer Ha'Chukkim (Principal Legislation) No. 542 of 25 August 1968.

³ Passed by the Knesset on the 20th Av, 5728 (14 August 1968) and published in *Sefer Ha'Chukkim* No. 542 of the 29th Av, 5728 (23 August, 1968), p. 247; the Bill and Explanatory Notes were published in *Hatza'ot Chok*, No. 787 of 5728, p. 358.

⁴ I.R. of 5708, Suppl. I, p. 1 - *LSI* vol. I, p. 7, *Sefer Ha'Chukkim* of 5727, p. 74 - *LSI* vol. XXI, p. 75.

⁵ *Sefer Ha'Chukkim* of 5710, p. 86; - *LSI* vol. IV, p. 68.

Explanation of Hebrew Terms

Sefer Ha'Chukkim - Principal Legislation. *Hatza'ot Chok* - Bills.

Abbreviations: I.R. (Iton Rishmi) - The Official Gazette during the tenure of the Provisional Council of State. *LSI* - Laws of the State of Israel (English edition).

Ordinance, 1944,¹ and the provisions of that Ordinance shall apply for the purposes of this section.

(c) Where the property was acquired for public purposes under any Law after the coming into force of the application of law order and before being released, the compensation due under that Law in respect of the acquisition shall be paid to the Administrator General who shall deal therewith, *mutatis mutandis*, in accordance with sub-section (b).

(d) Where the property includes a public building erected after the property became vested in the person referred to in sub-section (a) and before the coming into force of the application of law order, the property shall become State property, and the compensation therefor shall be calculated according to the value of the land only, as vacant, on the day of the coming into force of the order or the coming into force of this Law, whichever is later.

Companies — Continuation of Operations

6. A company which immediately before the coming into force of an application of law order or immediately before the coming into force of this Law, whichever is later, had a place of business in the area of application of the order, and which was established under the law applying in that area at the time of its establishment may, notwithstanding anything provided in the Companies' Ordinance² or the Absentees' Property Law, 5710-1950, continue its operations until the expiration of six months from the day of coming into force of the order or from the day of coming into force of this Law or until the Court decides upon an application filed under section 9 or 10 whichever is latest.

Companies — Non-absenteeship of Director or Member

7. A director or member of a company as referred to in section 6 who according to this Law is regarded as a non-absentee in respect of his property, shall be regarded as a non-absentee also in respect of the property of the company, in respect of his rights as a director

or member of the company, and in respect of the operations of the company under section 6, 8, 9 or 10.

Companies — Registration of Charges

8. Where a company as referred to in section 6 has pledged or charged its property, the provisions of section 127 of the Companies Ordinance shall apply to it in respect of the registration of the pledge or charge.

Company — Transfer of Assets and Liabilities

9. (a) Where, within six months from the day of coming into force of an application of law order or from the day of the coming into force of this Law, whichever is later, a company as referred to in section 6 arrives at an agreement with a company registered in Israel for that purpose by all or part of the members of the company referred to in section 6, or with another company registered in Israel, for the transfer to it of its assets and liabilities, the company with which the arrangements was made may, within three months from the date of the arrangement, apply to the District Court of Jerusalem, by way of motion, for an order confirming the arrangement.

(b) Notice of the filing of an application under sub-section (a) and of the time of its hearing shall be published in *Reshumoth*: the text of the notice shall be as prescribed by the Court.

(c) Sub-sections (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (10) and (12) of section 119 A of the Companies Ordinance shall apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to an arrangement under this section.

Conversion of Company into Israeli Company

10. A company as referred to in section 6, whose only place of business is in the area of application of an application of law order and whose directors and members are all residents of that area, may, within six months from the day of the coming into force of the order or from the day of the coming into force of this Law, whichever is later, apply to the District Court of Jerusalem, by way of motion, for an order converting it into an Israeli company, and the Court may make the order on such conditions as it may deem fit, including conditions as to the filing of documents with the Registrar of Companies.

¹ P.G. of 1944, Suppl. I, No. 1380, p. 110 (p. 151 English edition).

² Laws of Palestine, vol. I, cap. 22, p. 161 (English edition).

Partnerships

11. The provisions of sections 6 to 10 shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to partnerships.

Co-operative Societies — Continuation of Operations

12. (a) A co-operative society which immediately before the coming into force of an application of law order or immediately before the day of the coming into force of this law, whichever is later, had its place of operation in the area of application of the order, and which was established under the Law applying in that area at the time of its establishment, may, notwithstanding anything provided in the Co-operative Societies Ordinance¹ or the Absentees' Property Law, 5710-1950, continue its operations until the expiration of six months from the day of the coming into force of the order or from the day of the coming into force of this Law or until the Court decides upon an application filed under section 13 (b) whichever is latest.

(b) The provisions of sections 7 and 8 shall also apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to a co-operative society as referred to in sub-section (a).

Co-operative Societies — Registration and Transfer of Assets and Liabilities

(13) (a) The minister of Labour may, by general or special order, enact provisions as to the registration of a co-operative society to take the place of a society as referred to in section 12, including the determination of its rules, members and organs. A society registered under an order as aforesaid shall to all intents, be deemed to have been registered under the Co-operative Societies Ordinance, and the provisions of that ordinance and of the regulations made thereunder shall apply to any matter not provided for in the order.

(b) The Registrar of Co-operative Societies shall arrange the transfer of the assets and liabilities of a society as referred to in section 12 to a society registered under sub-section (a) and shall apply to the District Court of Jerusalem, by way of motion, for an order confirming the arrangement. The provisions of sections 9 (b) and

(c) shall also apply, *mutatis mutandis*, for the purposes of this section.

(c) An act as referred to in this section shall also be valid if it was done before the coming into force of this Law.

Conversion of Society into Israeli Society

14. The Minister of Labour may, by general or special order, enact provisions as to the conversion of a society as referred to in section 12 into an Israeli co-operative society if all the members of the society and of the management thereof are residents of the area of application of the application of law order.

Licences to carry on Occupation

15. (a) Where, immediately before the coming into force of the application of law order, a resident of the area of application of the order engaged in any vocation, handicraft or other occupation under the law then applying in that area, and such vocation, handicraft or other occupation requires a licence under an Israeli enactment, such resident may continue in such vocation, handicraft or other occupation until the expiration of six months from the day of the coming into force of the order or from the day of the coming into force of this Law or until his application for a licence under the Israeli enactment has been decided upon, whichever is the latest.

(b) A licence may be granted to a resident as referred to in sub-section (a) even if he lacks any of the personal qualifications required by the enactment.

(c) Where according to the enactment the grant of the licence is subject to conditions relating to the place where the occupation is carried on, the Minister charged with the implementation of the enactment may make regulations containing relaxations, for a specific time or otherwise, in respect of the place where the occupation was carried on before the coming into force of the application of law order. So long as regulations as aforesaid have not been made, the authorities competent to grant the licence may grant relaxations as aforesaid.

(d) This section shall not apply to a licence

Explanation; *Reshumoth* - The Official Gazette since the inception of the Knesset (Parliament).

¹ Laws of Palestine, vol. I, cap. 24, p. 360 (English edition).

under the Firearms Law, 5709-1949.¹ or the Explosives Law, 5714-1954.²

Advocates

16. (a) A resident of the area of application of an application of law order who immediately before the day on which such area came to be held by the Defence Army of Israel served as a judge of a civil court, or was an advocate in such area, shall become a member of the Chamber of Advocates on the day of the coming into force of the order or the day of the coming into force of this Law, whichever is later.

(b) The Minister of Justice shall publish in *Reshumoth* the names of the persons to whom sub-section (a) applies.

(c) The Minister of Justice may prescribe by regulations conditions, including relaxations, for admission to membership of the Chamber of Advocates of a resident of Israel who was a resident of the area of application of an application of law order immediately before the coming into force thereof and was qualified to be an advocate, but did not practise the profession of advocacy, or was a clerk in service of such area but had not completed his period of clerkship.

(d) The Minister of Justice may prescribe by regulations conditions, including relaxations for admission to membership of the Chamber of Advocates of a resident of Israel who, at any time before the coming into force of this Law, served as a judge of a civil court, or was an advocate, in any part of Eretz Israel not designated in an application of law order.

(e) A person who becomes a member of the Chamber of Advocates under this section shall have all the rights and duties of a member of the Chamber under the Chamber of Advocates Law, 5721-1961.³

Registration of Rights in Patents and Designs

17. (a) A person who on the day of the coming into force of an application of law order had in the area of application thereof a registered right of ownership in any patent, design or trade mark, or who before that day applied for registration

of such a right, may within six months from the day of the coming into force of the order or from the day of the coming into force of this Law, whichever is later, apply for the registration of his right under Israeli law: and he shall be deemed to have filed the application for registration of the right under Israeli law on the day on which he first filed his application for registration of such right.

(b) The registration of a patent under sub-section (a) shall not derogate from the validity of a patent registered in Israel under an application filed before the coming into force of the Patent Law 5727-1967.⁴

Building Operations

18. (a) Where the laying of the foundations of a building in the area of application of an application of law order was completed under a building permit granted under the law applying in that area before the coming into force of the order, and within one year from the coming into force of the order or the coming into force of this Law, whichever is the later, and where the holder of the permit gives notice to the District Planning and Building Commission of his wish to continue building operations, he shall be entitled to receive a building permit under Israeli law.

(b) The District Planning and Building Commission may, within three months from the grant of the permit under sub-section (a) and after giving the holder of the permit a reasonable opportunity to state his case, amend or vary the permit, prescribe conditions, including relaxations, or cancel it, all for reasons for which it may do so under the Planning and Building Law, 5725-1965,⁵ and it may suspend the permit until the expiration of three months from the day on which it was granted or until its decision under sub-section (a), whichever is earlier.

(c) A permit under sub-section (a) shall be exempt from payment of a fee. Where the laying of the foundations of a building as referred to in sub-section (a) was begun, but not completed, before the coming into force of an application of law order, and an application for a building

¹ *Sefer Ha'Chukkim* of 5709, p. 143, *LSI* vol. III, p. 61.

² *Sefer Ha'Chukkim* of 5714, p. 64, *LSI* vol. VIII, p. 57.

³ *Sefer Ha'Chukkim* of 5721, p. 178, *LSI* vol. XV, p. 196.

⁴ *Sefer Ha'Chukkim* of 5721, p. 148, *LSI* vol. XXI, p. 149.

⁵ *Sefer Ha'Chukkim* of 5725, p. 307, *LSI* vol. XIX, p. 330.

permit under Israeli law is filed, the District Planning Commission may exempt the permit from payment of a fee.

Appointment of Public Servants

19. The Prime Minister may by regulations, for a specific time or otherwise, exempt persons who are residents of the area of application of an application of law order from the provisions of any Law making an appointment to the post of a public servant conditional upon the Israeli nationality of the candidate, and he may, for this purpose, enact different provisions in respect of different categories of public servants.

Continuity of Lawsuits etc.

20. The Minister of Justice may by regulations, either generally or in respect of a specific category of matters, enact provisions as to —

(1) the material and local jurisdiction of courts to hear any criminal or civil matter in connexion with any act, omission or event which occurred in the area of application of an application of law order at any time before the coming into force thereof, including the hearing of cases that were pending before courts which functioned in that area, and appeals against judgements given by such courts, and the rules of procedure in such matters;

(2) the enforcement by the courts of final judgements and of orders and other decisions given or made in a criminal or civil matter, at any time before the coming into force of an application of law order, by courts which functioned in its area of application, and the execution by the Execution Offices and other authorities of orders and decisions as aforesaid;

(3) the recognition and confirmation of documents issued or confirmed, at any time prior to the coming into effect of an application of law order, by any of the authorities which functioned in its area of application.

Transitional Provisions

21. (a) Where an application of law order came into force before the coming into force of this law, section 3 shall apply also to a person who on the coming into force of the application of law order was a resident of its area of application but was absent therefrom, provided that he is

lawfully present there on the day of the coming into force of this Law.

(b) A legal action performed by a trustee for the absentee's property before this Law came into force and which was invalidated if the law order was in effect on the day it was performed shall be considered null and void.

Implementation and Regulations

22. (a) The Minister of Justice is charged with the implementation of this Law and may make regulations for such implementation. Regulations as to a matter within the scope of a Law with the implementation of which another Minister is charged shall be made by that Minister with the consent of the Minister of Justice.

(b) Regulations under this Law may enact provisions as to the extension of times, including times under this Law or any other Law, and as to the adjustment of fees and exemption therefrom.

Levi ESHKOL Ya'kov S. SHAPIRO
Prime Minister Minister of Justice

Shneur Zalman SHAZAR
President of the State

ANNEX II

Unofficial translation of the bill and explanatory notes published in Hatza'ot Chok No. 787 of 14 July 1968 (pp. 358-362)

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS (REGULATION) LAW, 5728-1968

Definitions

1. In this Law, "application of law order" means an order under section 11B of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948,¹ "area of application" of the application of law order means the area established in this order.

Non-application of Absentees' Property Law, 5710-1950, to the Holy Places

2. The Absentees' Property Law, 5710-1950,² shall not apply, from the day of the coming into force of the application of law order, to the Holy

¹ I.R. of 5708, Suppl. I, p. 1; (LSI, vol. I, p. 7); *Sefer Ha'Chukkim* of 5727, p. 74 (LSI, vol. XXI, p. 75).

² *Sefer Ha'Chukkim* of 5710, p. 86 (LSI, vol. IV, p. 68).

Places which are situated in the area of application of that order.

3. A person who on the day of the coming into force of an application of law order was in the area of application of the order and was a resident thereof, shall not be regarded as an absentee within the meaning of the Absentees' Property Law, 5710-1950, in respect of property situated in that area.

Plea of Enemy Status

4. A court or tribunal shall not, in any civil matter, entertain the plea that a person, who was a resident of the area of application of the application of law order, is an enemy, unless the Attorney-General or his representative made that plea.

Release of vested immovable property

5. (a) Immovable property situated in the area of application of the application of law order, and which, before such area came under the authority of the Israel Defence Forces, was vested in a person whom the authorities of the State, which held the area *de facto*, had appointed as custodian of enemy Property or as holder of a similar title, or that that person transferred the immovable property to any of the authorities of that State, or to any body which was under the control of those authorities — shall, from the day of the coming into force of the order, vest in the Administrator General in order that he should deal therewith as provided hereafter in this section.

(b) The Administrator General shall, by certificate under his hand, release the immovable property referred to in sub-section (a) to the person who was the owner thereof before it was vested in the appointed custodian referred to in sub-section (a) or to the successor of such owner, upon the application of such owner or successor; so long as the property is not released, the administrator General shall deal therewith as he is permitted to deal with immovable property of a missing person under the Custodian-General Ordinance, 1944,¹ and the provisions of that Ordinance shall apply for the purposes of this section.

(c) Where such immovable property includes a public building erected after the property became vested in the appointed custodian referred to in sub-section (a), and the property has been acquired under the provisions of the Land Property Ordinance (acquisition for Public purposes), 1943,² shortly after its release under the provisions of sub-section (b), the compensation which will be paid for such acquisition shall be calculated according to the value of the land only.

Companies — continuation of operations

6. A company which immediately before the coming into force of the application of law order had its main place of business in the area of application of the order, and which was established under the law applying in that area, may, notwithstanding anything provided in the Companies' Ordinance³ or in the Absentees' Property Law, its operations until the expiration of three months from the day of the coming into force of the order, or from the day of the coming into force of this Law, or until the Court shall decide upon an application filed under section 9, whichever is latest.

Companies — release from laws on absenteeism

7. A director or member of a company as referred to in section 6, who on the day of the coming into force of the application of law Order was in the area of application of the order and was a resident of that area, shall not be regarded as an absentee in respect of the property of the company which is situated in that area, or in respect of his rights as a member of the company, or in respect of the operations of the company under section 6 or section 9.

Companies — registration of charges

8. Where a company as referred to in section 6 pledges or charges its property, the provisions of section 127 of the Companies' Ordinance shall apply to it in respect of the registration of the pledge or charge.

Companies — transfer of assets and liabilities to an Israeli company

9. (a) Where, within three months from the

¹ P.G. of 1944, Suppl. 1. No. 1380, p. 110 (p. 151 English edition).

² P.G. of 1943, Suppl. 1, No. 1305, p. 32.

³ Laws of Palestine, vol. I, cap. 22, p. 161 (English edition).

day of the coming into force of the application of law order or from the day of the coming into force of this law, whichever is later, a company as referred to in section 6 arrives at an agreement with a company registered in Israel for the transfer to it of its assets and liabilities located in Israel, the company registered in Israel may, within three months from the date of the signature of the documents of the arrangement, apply to the District Court in Jerusalem, by way of motion, for an order confirming the arrangement.

(b) Notice of the filing of an application under sub-section (a) and of the time of its hearing shall be published in *Reshumoth*: the text of the notice shall be as prescribed by the Court.

(c) Sub-sections (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (10) and (12) of section 119A of the Companies' Ordinance shall apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to an arrangement under this section.

Partnerships

10. The provisions of sections 6 to 9 shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to partnerships.

Co-operative societies — continuation of operations

(11) (a) A co-operative society which immediately before the coming into force of the application of law order had its main place of business in the area of application of the order and which was established under the law that was applying in that area, may, notwithstanding anything provided in the Cooperative Societies Ordinance¹ or in the Absentees' Property Law, 5710-1950, continue its operations until the expiration of six months from the day of the coming into force of the order, or from the day of the coming into force of this Law, or until it has been registered under the provisions of section 12 (a), whichever is latest.

(b) The provisions of sections 7 and 8 shall also apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to a co-operative society.

Co-operative societies — transfer of assets and liabilities to an Israeli society

12. (a) The Minister of Labour may, by general or special order, enact provisions as to the

registration of a co-operative society as referred to in section 11, including the determination of its rules, members and organs; a society registered under an order as aforesaid shall, to all intents, be deemed to have registered under the Cooperative Societies Ordinance, and the provisions of that Ordinance and of the regulations made thereunder shall apply to any matter not provided for in the order.

(b) The Registrar of Cooperative Societies may arrange the transfer of the assets and liabilities of a society as referred to in section 11 to a society which has been registered under sub-section (a), and apply to the District Court in Jerusalem, by way of motion, for an order confirming the arrangement; the provisions of section 9 (b) and (c) shall also apply, *mutatis mutandis*, for the purposes of this section.

(c) The day of the coming into force of this section is the sixth day of the month of 'Heshvan 5728 (9 November 1967).

Licences to carry on occupations

13. (a) Where, immediately before the coming into force of the application of law order, a resident of the area of application of the order engaged in any profession, handicraft or other occupation under the law then applying in that area, and such occupation requires a licence under an Israeli enactment, such resident may continue in his occupation until he receives a licence under the Israeli enactment, but not later than until the expiration of six months from the day of the coming into force of the order or from the day of the coming into force of this law, whichever is the latest.

(b) A licence may be granted to a resident as referred to in sub section (a) even if he lacks any of the personal qualifications established in the enactment.

(c) Where according to the Israeli enactment the granting of such licence was subjected to conditions relating to the place where the occupation is carried on, the Minister charged with the implementation of that enactment may, in respect of persons to whom sub-section (a) applies, make regulations containing relaxations, for a specific time or permanently, in respect of the place where they carried on their occupation

¹ Laws of Palestine, vol. I, cap. 24, p. 336 (p. 360 of English edition).

before the coming into force of the application of law order, and he may establish in those regulations conditions for the granting of the licence; so long as regulations as aforesaid have not been made, the authority competent to grant the licence may establish relaxations and conditions as aforesaid as part of the terms of the licence.

(d) This section shall not apply to a licence under the Firearms Law, 5709-1949¹ or under the Explosives Law, 5714-1954.²

Advocates

14. (a) A resident of the area of application of the application of law order, who immediately before the coming into force of the order served in that area as a judge in a civil court, or was an advocate in that area, shall become a member of the Chamber of Advocates from the day of the coming into force of the order or from the day of the coming into force of this law, whichever is later.

(b) The Minister of Justice shall publish in *Reshumoth* the names of the persons to whom sub-section (a) applies.

(c) The Minister of Justice may prescribe by regulations conditions, including relaxations, for admission to membership of the Chamber of Advocates of a resident of Israel who was a resident of the area of application of the application of law order immediately before its coming into force and was qualified to be an advocate, but did not practise the profession of advocate, or was training in the profession of advocate in the aforesaid area, but had not yet completed his period of training.

Registration of rights in patents and designs

15. A person who, on the day of the coming into force of the application of law order, had in the area of application thereof a registered right of ownership in any patent, design or trademark, or who before that day applied for registration of rights as aforesaid in his name, may, within three months from the day of the coming into force of the order or from the day of the coming into force of this law, whichever is later, apply for the registration of his rights under the laws of Israel, and he shall be deemed to have filed the

application for registration of the rights under the laws of Israel on the day on which he first filed his application for registration of those rights.

Continuation of building activities

16. (a) Where the laying of the foundations of a building was completed under a building permit issued under the law which was applying in the area of application of the application of law order before its coming into force, the holder of the permit is entitled — if he gave notice, within one year from the day of the coming into force of the order or from the day of the coming into force of this law, whichever is the later, of his intention to continue the building operations — to receive a building permit under the Israeli law; a permit under this section shall be exempt from payment of a fee.

(b) The District Planning and Building Commission may, within three months from the day of the granting of a permit under sub-section (a) and after giving the holder of the permit, a reasonable opportunity to state his case, cancel the permit, for the same reasons for which it is possible to refuse the granting of a building permit in that place and it may suspend the permit until its decision regarding the revocation of the permit.

Continuity of lawsuits, etc.

17. The Minister of Justice may by regulations, either generally or in respect of a specific category of matters, enact provisions as to —

(1) the courts which shall hear the cases that were pending immediately before the coming into force of the application of law order before a court in the area of application of the order and the procedure in those cases;

(2) the enforcement and the execution by the courts and the execution offices of final judgements and of orders and other decisions given or made before the coming into force of the application of law order by a court in the limits of jurisdiction of which the area of application of the order was;

(3) the recognition and confirmation of documents which were issued or confirmed before the coming into force of the application of law order by an authority in the area of application of that order.

¹ *Sefer Ha'Chukkim* of 5709, p. 143 (*LSI*, III, p. 61).

² *Sefer Ha'Chukkim* of 5714, p. 64 (*LSI*, VIII, p. 57).

Implementation and regulations

18. Any Minister entrusted with the implementation of a law, to which any of the provisions of this law relates, may make regulations for implementation of such provision, and may enact in those regulations complementary provisions, including extension of time-limits, adjustments of fees and exemption therefrom.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

The Law amending the Administrative Matters Ordinance (No. 11), 5727-1967, established the framework for the application of the State's law, judiciary and administration to areas of Eretz-Israel. The proposed law is to arrange for an orderly transition to the Israeli legal régime in certain matters.

Property

It is proposed that the Absentees' Property Law, 5710-1950, should not apply to the Holy Places situated within the area in which the law, judiciary and administration of the State applies (section 2). It is also proposed that a resident of such area who was in that area on the day of application of the Law should not be regarded as an absentee in respect of property in that area (section 3).

Immovable property vested in an "officer in charge of enemy property", who was appointed by the authorities of the State which held *de facto* the area before the application of the Law, shall be transferred to the Administrator General, and the latter shall release the property to its owners (section 5).

Companies

The companies which were established and were operating in the area before the application to it of the state's law shall be able to continue temporarily their operations until the transfer of their assets and their liabilities to companies which have been established under the laws of Israel, under the supervision of the District Court of Jerusalem (section 6 to 12).

Business licences and licences to carry on occupations

It is proposed to authorize a resident of the area to which the law of the State has been applied to continue to carry on a vocation, handicraft or other occupation in which he engaged under

licence previously. The resident shall have to receive an Israeli licence, and for this purpose any Minister in charge of the enactment of regulations regarding such occupation shall be authorized to make regulations establishing the conditions for the granting of the licence and the relaxations which shall be granted to residents as aforesaid (section 13).

A person who was a judge or an advocate in the area to which the law of the state has been applied will be able to be admitted to membership of the Chamber of Advocates (section 14).

Other provisions

Persons who had in the area to which the law of the State has been applied rights in patents, designs or trade-marks shall be able to protect their rights by registering them under the laws of Israel (section 15).

Where the construction of a building has not been completed before the application of the law of the State to the place where it was erected, and the construction was made under the previous law, the holder of the permit shall be able to continue the construction work and to receive for this purpose an Israeli building permit, subject only to his announcing, within one year, of his intention to continue the construction work.

The District and Building Commission may revoke a building permit as aforesaid for the reasons for which it may turn down a request for a building permit in that place (section 16).

The continuation of the proceedings in cases which, on the day of the application of the law of the State, were pending before courts situated in the area to which the law of the State has been applied, shall be subject to regulations made by the Minister of Justice. In such regulations, the Minister may also make provisions for the enforcement of judgements and the recognition of documents issued by the previous authorities (section 17).

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Interview Statement by the Secretary-General U Thant, New York.¹ (Excerpts)

April 17, 1969

Q. In the light of recent developments in the Middle East crisis, would you kindly give us your own assessment of the chances of establishing a just peace?

The Secretary-General: Regarding the situation in the Middle East, I believe my views are well known. To clarify my position, I would say, first of all, that the United Nations must be actively involved in the search for a solution. I feel very strongly that it is the responsibility of the international community to try to contribute towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area, and to enable the United Nations to perform this function effectively, as I said a moment ago, the active involvement and participation of the permanent members of the Security Council is essential. Without this involvement and participation, I do not see how we can have any progress in the direction of peace and justice.

As you all know, the Secretary General's Representative, Ambassador Jarring, has been involved in the search for peace, within the framework of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, for the last one and a half years, with patience, tact and wisdom. But so far, if I may say so, there has been no perceptible progress in our common search for peace. I do not believe that Ambassador Jarring would like to repeat this more or less futile exercise for the next one and a half years or so. So, that is why I believe that the permanent members of the Security Council must be more actively involved in our joint search for peace. Since the stated objective of the four permanent members of the Security Council is to help Ambassador Jarring in the performance of his functions on the basis of Security Council resolution of November 1967, I welcome this and I have begun to pin my very great hopes on the success of their discussions and deliberations, and I believe that this viewpoint is shared by the majority of the delegates here.

Q. There appears to be some difference of opinion about the state of acceptance of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. Could you tell us which countries, parties to the Middle East dispute, have in your judgement accepted the resolution and which have rejected it?

Can you tell us if, in your view, Israel has accepted the resolution? A flat yes or no would suffice.

The Secretary-General: It is very difficult, of course, for me to attempt to enumerate the countries which have accepted the Security Council resolution of November 1967. Some of the countries are on record, as far as this question is concerned. Some of them have accepted the resolution and even expressed their readiness to implement the terms of the resolution, and some countries have not gone that far. So I do not want to give a catalogue of the countries and enumerate their positions accurately. These are all on the record. I believe, as far as Israel's position is concerned, from the public statements of the Israeli leaders, that Israel has also accepted the resolution. But, of course, Israel has not come out with a categorical statement that it is willing to implement it. The formulation used by the leaders of Israel, as you all know, is that they are ready to implement it by agreement. That is the position.

Q. Do you find any points of agreement in the United States and Soviet proposals and in the Israeli and Arab answers to Ambassador Jarring regarding a political settlement in the Middle East? If so, in what respect? How soon would you expect some announcement of progress of agreement?

The Secretary-General: I do not think it would be proper on my part to disclose the substance of the replies given to Ambassador Jarring by the parties primarily involved in the conflict, and even the official papers of some of the big Powers are supposed to be confidential. But as far as my assessment is concerned, the replies to Ambassador Jarring's questions do not reveal any new elements or new positions. That is why I said earlier that Ambassador Jarring, in my view, would not like to repeat a more or less futile exercise for the next one and a half years or so.

¹ U.N. Monthly Chronicle, May 1969, pp. 73-83.

Q. From your repeated observations on Ambassador Jarring's mission, may we justifiably conclude that it — that is, the mission — is shelved pending developments in the Big Four Middle East talks?

The Secretary-General: No, Ambassador Jarring's mission is not shelved or suspended, as I made clear in one of my statements about ten days ago, I believe. As you know, Ambassador Jarring never resigned from his foreign diplomatic service when he accepted my offer to serve as my Special Representative within the framework of the Security Council resolution. From time to time, he went back to Moscow to join his family. He did this during Christmas time and he did it last week. It was nothing unusual.

But I may say that he has been involved in a very patient search for peace and a search for the conditions for the promotion of peace and the promotion of agreement. No perceptible progress has been made in the past one and a half years in which he was involved, and I do not believe that he would like to repeat this same performance for the next one year or so. I believe I know Ambassador Jarring's thinking on this subject more than anybody else, and so whatever I say on the subject is designed not to contradict his thinking. You can conclude that what I have been saying in the past regarding the situation in the Middle East reflects his thinking also.

Q. Would you equate the role of the National Liberation Front and the role of the Palestine liberation movements? And if so, since the Paris talks became meaningful with the presence of the National Liberation Front at the negotiating table, do you consider essential a Palestine liberation movement's presence in any meaningful Middle East peace talks?

The Secretary-General: All I want to say in response to this question is that, as I have said on some previous occasions, when a solution to a serious crisis situation is too long delayed, then extreme forces come to the surface and dominate the scene. That is one great lesson of history. At that time the voices of moderation will be stilled. So this applies to all situations in all circumstances. That is my conviction.

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Report by the Secretary-General on Developments Threatening the Effectiveness of the United-Nations Observation Operation in the Suez Canal Sector.¹

May 2, 1969

1. I am increasingly concerned about recent developments which threaten the effectiveness of the observation of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector. These developments also expose United Nations Military Observers and other United Nations personnel engaged in the observation operation to grave danger and cause heavy damage to United Nations installations, vehicles and equipment. With this concern in mind, I addressed on 21 April 1969 identical letters to the Permanent Representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic. The text of these identical letters is as follows:

"Excellency,

"I have the honour to refer to the situation in the Suez Canal cease-fire sector as described in the supplemental information reports circulated as Security Council documents in the S/7930 series. In the past few weeks heavy exchanges of fire, including the use of mortars, artillery and tank guns, have become an almost routine occurrence in the Suez Canal sector.

"Quite apart from my concern over these breaches of the Security Council cease-fire, I feel obliged to point out certain actions of the parties which substantially impair the United Nations observation operation and to bring to your attention my grave and increasing anxiety for the safety of the United Nations Military Observers and supporting Field Service personnel stationed in the Suez Canal sector.

"The Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lieutenant-General Odd Bull, has on several occasions in the past communicated his concern to the authorities on both sides as regards the impairment of the observation operation, the safety of United Nations personnel and the heavy damage caused to United Nations installations and vehicles in the course of various breaches of the cease-fire. He has complained to them that United Nations

¹ U.N. doc. S/9188.

installations and facilities, although clearly and unmistakably marked, have been repeatedly fired upon by both sides. In this connexion General Bull has remarked that many United Nations Observation Posts have been heavily encroached upon on both sides of the Canal by military positions of the parties and that these encroachments not only reduce the observation capability of the United Nations Military Observers but also gravely and unnecessarily endanger their lives. General Bull has also requested the authorities on both sides urgently to provide assistance for the improvement or, when necessary, for the construction of shelters for the United Nations personnel. This assistance has so far been inadequate.

"A brief summary of some of the damage caused between 8 March and 20 April to United Nations installations and vehicles affords some idea of the risks incurred by the United Nations personnel in the Suez Canal sector. During this period there were twenty shooting incidents with the following damage:

(i) Seven caravans and one small bus used as living quarters completely destroyed; caravans damaged on sixteen occasions, buildings of United Nations Control Centres and Observation Posts damaged on twenty-seven occasions; garage, general workshop and store houses damaged; residential buildings damaged on two occasions.

(ii) Forty-eight vehicles damaged; nine trailers damaged; one generator destroyed and three damaged.

(iii) Two radio antennae completely destroyed; numerous antennae damaged and several radio sets destroyed.

"It is remarkable that, so far, there have been no fatalities among United Nations personnel in the Suez Canal sector. I feel, however, that it is my duty to make every possible effort to ensure that these officers, who have been made available to the United Nations by their Governments, and the United Nations Field Service personnel who assist them, are not subjected to unnecessary or excessive risks in the performance of their duties. Indeed, I do not feel that this operation can, or should, be maintained indefinitely under such conditions, although I realize that in the nature of their functions United Nations Military Observers must inevitably face certain risks.

"I would be grateful if you would convey my views as expressed above to your Government. I would also request that instructions be given urgently to the military forces concerned to avoid as far as possible actions which restrict the observation operation or endanger the safety of United Nations personnel in the Suez Canal sector, in particular by the encroachment of United Nations Observation Posts and by firing at United Nations installations and facilities. I would further request that the construction of new shelters for United Nations personnel be completed as a matter of urgency.

"Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) U THANT"

2. On 23 April 1969 I received two letters from the Permanent Representative of Israel in reply to my letter of 21 April. The text of the first letter is as follows:

"Excellency,

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 21 April 1969 concerning the safety of United Nations Military Observers and supporting Field Service personnel stationed in the Suez Canal sector.

"I have transmitted the contents of your letter to the Government of Israel which will give it careful consideration.

"In the meantime I am in a position to assure you that Israeli forces are under strict orders to do all within their power to prevent danger to United Nations personnel and United Nations installations. It is now clear that the United Arab Republic forces have been recently opening fire intentionally on United Nations Military Observers, United Nations installations and transport in order to inflict injury, damage and destruction on them.

"Particularly deplorable and barbaric was the wounding by the Egyptian forces on 22 April 1969 of United Nations Military Observer Captain Young of Ireland and the subsequent attacks by these forces over several hours on United Nations and Israeli personnel and vehicles which tried to extricate him.

"I shall not fail to inform you of any additional

comments as soon as I receive them from Jerusalem.

"Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH"

The text of the second letter is as follows:

"Excellency,

"On instructions of my Government I have the honour to refer to your letter of 21 April 1969 concerning the safety of United Nations Military Observers and supporting Field Service personnel stationed in the Suez Canal sector and further to the interim reply which I sent to you earlier today, to state the following:

"It is regrettable that the above letter, by referring indifferently to 'the parties' in general terms, is liable to convey a misleading impression, as if the two parties were equally responsible for the situation which prompted the letter under reply. It is beyond dispute, and this is fully borne out in the latest series of reports emanating from General Odd Bull and submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General, that the Israel authorities in general and the Israel armed forces in particular are punctillious in respecting the status and duties of the United Nations Military Observers in the Suez Canal sector, are co-operating fully with General Odd Bull, with a view to maintaining tranquillity in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council, and are doing their utmost to reduce to the absolute minimum any risks to the observers and their equipment, and to United Nations installations. This attitude is in full conformity with the policy of the Government of Israel with regard to the cease-fire. In this connection I wish to repeat what I wrote in my letter today to the President of the Security Council as follows:

"The Government of Israel desires that the cease-fire be scrupulously observed on the basis of complete reciprocity and that tranquillity prevail along the cease-fire lines. The Government of Israel would appreciate it if Your Excellency could use your influence with the Government of the United Arab Republic to abide effectively by its obligation faithfully to maintain the cease-fire."

"The recent supplemental information reports circulated by the Secretary-General as Security Council documents in the S/7930 series, to which the Secretary-General's letter referred, establish that the armed forces of the United Arab Republic are the ones that have repeatedly and openly initiated gross military assaults on the United Nations Military Observers and their equipment and installations, and have been exceptionally obdurate in their refusal to institute any practical steps to minimize the danger and damage. The circumstances of the recent attacks of this character leave no room for any reasonable doubt that the attacks were not the product of miscalculation or carelessness but were deliberate and are an expression of the declared policy of the United Arab Republic. Those assaults on the United Nations cease-fire observation effort are in line with the publicly avowed Egyptian objective of creating tension in the Suez Canal area and of dramatizing it. It is not impossible that one of the factors influencing these activities of the United Arab Republic is an expectation that the United Nations might draw certain conclusions from this situation and decide to withdraw its cease-fire observation from that area — an operation which, as is well known presents considerable inconvenience to the implementation of the United Arab Republic policy of aggression.

"Your letter touches upon a number of specific aspects of the problem of safety of the United Nations Military Observers. I wish to confirm that the letter of 19 September 1968 from the Minister of Defense to General Odd Bull remains in full force and effect. The text of that letter read:

"In reply to your letter of 16 September 1968, I wish to express the regret of my Government and myself at hearing that several United Nations cease-fire installations were damaged during the exchange of fire in the Suez Canal area on 8 September initiated by the United Arab Republic forces in violation of the cease-fire.

If any such damage was caused by firing from our side, I can assure you that this was wholly unintentional. I have given instructions to ensure that stringent precautions should be taken in future to avoid any similar occurrence."

"On the question of encroachments upon observation posts, General Odd Bull or his

representative have approached the Israel authorities on several occasions in the past with requests to increase the distance between Israeli military positions and the observation posts on the east Bank of the Canal. In each instance an agreed arrangement was reached to the satisfaction of the United Nations Military Observers involving either some re-siting of the Israeli positions in question or that of the observation posts. As far as Israel is concerned there are no differences of opinion in this matter, between the Israeli authorities and the United Nations personnel. On the other hand the problem does exist, and is a serious one, on the Egyptian side. To the best of Israel's knowledge, there is no readiness on the part of the Egyptian authorities to accommodate themselves to requests in this matter from United Nations Military Observers. Egyptian positions immediately adjacent to observation posts are clearly visible from the Israel side. These Egyptian positions brazenly abuse the shelter thus afforded them in the knowledge that the Israel forces will refrain from returning fire so as to avoid endangering the United Nations observation posts.

"The Secretary-General's letter contains a summary of some of the damage caused between 8 March and 20 April 1969 to United Nations installations and vehicles as a result of 20 incidents. Study of General Odd Bull's reports relating to these incidents reveals that from 12 March until the end of the period under review no damage whatsoever was caused to any United Nations observation posts on the Egyptian side despite the propinquity of Egyptian positions to them. The sole instance since 12 March of damage to a United Nations installation on the Egyptian side, occurred on 10 April at the Ismailia Control Centre. However, that damage was not caused by a direct hit but consisted of 'external damage to building by impact of heavy calibre weapons immediately in front of building' (S/7930/Add. 154), which itself is about 1.5 kms. from the Canal and invisible from the Israeli side. Damage of that kind could occur despite all the caution and strict preventive measures of the Israel Defense Forces to prevent damage to United Nations personnel and installations. On the other hand, General Bull's recent reports show that in a period of less than five weeks

the Egyptian armed forces attacked United Nations installations on 14 March (S/7930/Add. 141, para. 4 (a)), 24 March (Add. 144, para. 5 (a)), 4 April (Add. 148, para. 6 (a)), 10 April (Add. 153, para. 4 (a)), (Add. 154, para. 2), 11 April (Add. 155, para. 5 (a)), 12 April (Add. 156, para. 4 (a) (11)), 15 April (Add. 160, para. 4), 17 April (Add. 162, para. 4 and Add. 163, para. 1), 18 April (Add. 164, para. 1 (m)) 19 April (Add. 165, para. 4), 20 April (Add. 166, para. 3), and 21 April (Add. 169, para. 1, 2 (a)).

"There is here an obvious one-sided pattern. The attitude of the United Arab Republic became abundantly clear in its utterly barbaric conduct yesterday when Egyptian military forces repeatedly attacked United Nations and Israeli personnel and vehicles attempting to extricate the wounded United Nations Military Observer Captain Young of Ireland. The calculated nature of these attacks also reveals itself in the transparent, and quite artificial, efforts of the Egyptian authorities to manufacture allegations that the Israel forces had been operating from or close to observation posts. The United Nations Military Observers themselves have more than once denied these trumped up charges, e.g. in Add. 148, para. 5, Add. 150, para. 5, Add. 153, paras. 1, 6, Add. 156, para. 1, 3 (a), Add. 158, paras. 1, 4, Add. 160, paras. 3 (b) (vi) and 4, Add. 163, para. 2.

"With regard to the question of shelters for United Nations Military Observers, you are undoubtedly aware that considerable work has already been completed. However, virtually continuous shelling and sniping by the United Arab Republic forces in the last few weeks has rendered further progress practically impossible. The Government of Israel is unable to accept any responsibility for any consequent delay. It is, therefore, regretted that the observation in the Secretary-General's letter that assistance for the improvement or for the construction of shelters for the United Nations personnel has been 'inadequate' might convey an impression that it is applicable to Israel. The Israeli authorities are exerting their utmost endeavours to expedite this construction, and will continue to do so to the extent that Egyptian acts of aggression do not impede it.

"The simple answer to the difficulties to which the Secretary-General's letter adverted is faithful

and scrupulous observance of the cease-fire. This is the policy of the Government of Israel, which considers that the United Nations should insist on the same policy being followed by the United Arab Republic.

"Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH"

3. On 25 April 1969 I received an interim reply from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic, the text of which is as follows:

"Excellency,

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 21 April 1969, the contents of which I have immediately conveyed to my Government.

"Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) MOHAMED AWAD EL KONY"

On 30 April 1969 I received a further letter, dated 29 April 1969, from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic, the text of which is as follows:

"Excellency,

"With reference to your letter dated 21 April 1969, in which you expressed our increasing anxiety for the safety of the United Nations Military Observers and Supporting Field Service Personnel stationed in the Suez Canal Sector, I have the honour, on instructions from my Government, to inform you that while deeply appreciating the courage and perseverance with which they are carrying out the difficult and dangerous tasks under the prevailing conditions — an appreciation already expressed in our letter to the President of the Security Council of 26 April 1969 — I wish to assure you that the United Arab Republic has affirmatively responded to the proposals submitted by Lieutenant General Odd Bull, Chief United Nations Observer, to Ambassador Salah Gohar, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at the meeting held between them on 23 April 1969.

"The United Arab Republic Government has

already taken the necessary steps towards strengthening the shelters assigned to the Observers all along the West Bank of the Suez Canal, with a view to making them safer and more secure for the Observers against Israeli fire from across the Canal.

"I would like to seize this opportunity to reiterate our readiness to contribute to the maximum extent, towards reducing the risks the Observers are faced with and enabling them to fulfil their duties under the dangerous circumstances created by the continuation of Israeli aggression.

"The responsibility for the deteriorating situation and aggravation of the conditions in the area lies squarely with Israel which committed on 5 June 1967, an aggression against three Arab State Members of the United Nations. This responsibility is all the more grave due to the insistence of Israel to annex the Arab territories it has occupied as a result of that aggression. The expansionist aims of Israel and its intention of annexing Arab territories have been repeatedly expressed in statements made by Israeli leaders including the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. We have conveyed those statements to Ambassador Jarring on 8 December 1969 and 5 March 1969, as well as to the President of the Security Council on 13 February 1969.

"Israel has consistently refused to comply with the resolutions adopted by the Security Council putting an end to the Israeli aggression. It is no secret that the Security Council has more than once condemned Israel for its violations of the cease-fire. It is also worth noting that each time a resolution of this nature is adopted by the Council, Israel, through its representative to the United Nations, voices its defiance of those resolutions. Furthermore, it is to be underlined that Israel's flouting of the cease-fire resolutions, by continuing its aggression against the Arab countries and shelling their cities and economic installations, conforms with its aggressive plans aimed at forcing them to accept its diktat. Israel continues to shell Ismailia, Suez and other densely populated areas, as well as the economic installations in the Suez Canal Sector.

"It is clear that the insistence of Israel to pursue its expansionist policies and its attempts to force

the Arab countries into acquiescing to its plans make it inevitable for Israel to systematically violate the cease-fire resolutions. This policy has incurred upon Israel several condemnations by the Security Council.

"Simultaneously Israel has refused the peaceful settlement adopted by the Security Council in its resolution of 22 November 1967. This was made evident by its refusal to implement that resolution or to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring in the achievement of this peaceful settlement. It is common knowledge that Israeli leaders have declared both their opposition to the aforementioned resolution and their determination to continue with their occupation of Arab territories, thus violating the Security Council resolution which requires the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories. The former Israeli Prime Minister has actually stated that the annexation by Israel of Arab territories is not negotiable with the Arab States.

"All this makes it clear that Israel does not intend to abide by the cease-fire resolutions. Israel has also refused the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, as those resolutions conflict with Israel's expansionist aims. In addition, Israel persists in violating the Charter of the United Nations and disregarding the other resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly; in particular, the resolutions pertaining to the refugees and Jerusalem. Israel, furthermore, continues to commit barbaric acts against Arab population in the occupied territories. Eviction from homes, destruction of houses, arrest and murder of innocent women and children are common Israeli practices in those territories.

"Consequently, Israel bears the responsibility for endangering international peace, as well as for the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East. Israel must bear alone the responsibility for this aggressive policy.

"I am confident, Excellency, that you will continue to pursue your constructive efforts for the cause of peace and that you will endeavour to bring to bear on Israel the necessity of respecting the United Nations resolutions, so that the Peaceful settlement approved by the Security Council may be realized.

"Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) MOHAMED AWAD EL KONY"

4. On 1 May 1969 I addressed the following letter to the Permanent Representative of Israel:

"Excellency,

"I have the honour to refer to your two letters of 23 April 1969 which were in reply to my letter of 21 April 1969 concerning difficulties in carrying out the observation operation and the safety of United Nations Military Observers and supporting Field Service personnel stationed in the Suez Canal sector.

"My letter of 21 April was addressed in identical terms to both parties in the Suez Canal sector for the reason that problems relating to the carrying out of the observation operation and the safety of United Nations personnel have arisen on both sides of the Canal. My intention in this letter was to elicit greater assistance from both parties in solving these problems. The day to day events in the Canal sector, which have given rise to these difficulties, are reported in detail to the Security Council in the S/7930 series on the basis of General Bull's reports. My letters to the parties were not concerned with the evaluation of these reports or the apportionment of responsibility for specific developments.

"I note with appreciation the steps which have been taken by the Israel authorities and armed forces to co-operate with United Nations Military Observers and to facilitate the observation operation. I also note the intention of the Israel authorities to exert their utmost endeavours to expedite the construction of shelters for United Nations Military Observers.

"There are a few points arising from your two letters of 23 April on which I believe that further clarification might be desirable on the basis of information available to the Secretary-General.

"(1) Your first letter of 23 April refers to 'the wounding by the Egyptian forces on 22 April 1969 of United Nations Military Observer Captain Young of Ireland'. Captain Young's injury, in fact, resulted from his vehicle striking an anti-tank mine on a roadway which had, according to information received from the

Senior Israel Representative, been checked for mines earlier that morning.

“(2) On the question of encroachments, I am informed that in fact it is UNTSO which has normally resited its positions and that the Israel Forces have not resited their positions in the past in order to give UNTSO a clear area. For example, in October 1968, UNTSO agreed with the Israel authorities to the resiting of OP Yellow, which is completely surrounded by Israel positions. However, the actual resiting of OP Yellow has not yet been accomplished as the shelter in the new location has not yet been constructed. It is, I think indisputable that encroachment is on both sides a primary cause of firing on or near United Nations observations posts. For example, Israel Forces have a number of prepared tank positions near United Nations observation posts which are used only during exchanges of fire, and these draw calibre weapons fire from the other side.

“(3) As regards damage to United Nations observation posts on the West side of the Canal, your second letter of 23 April states that ‘from 12 March until the end of the period under review no damage whatsoever was caused to any United Nations observation posts on the Egyptian side despite the propinquity of Egyptian positions to them’, with the one exception of damage on 10 April at the Ismailia Control Centre, which is stated, in your letter, to be ‘about 1.5 kms. from the Canal and invisible from the Israeli side’. In fact, the Ismailia Control Centre is approximately 200 metres from the Canal bank. Moreover, on 8, 9 and 11 March, United Nations installations on the west side of the Canal did, in fact, sustain a great deal of damage, as reported in S/7930/Add. 134 and 135, and there was also some damage to United Nations installations on the west side of the Canal during exchanges of fire on 8 and 15 April (S/7930/Add. 150 and 160 refer).

“(4) As regards the progress of shelter construction, on the east side of the Canal only the construction of the shelter at Kantara Control Centre has as yet been completed, although the question of shelter construction was first raised with the Israel authorities in October 1968.

“As I have stated above, the intention of my letter of 21 April 1969 was not to open up a discussion on the responsibility for events in the

Suez Canal sector, but rather to secure, as far as possible, increased co-operation in facilitating the task of observation and the provision of all possible assistance and protection to United Nations personnel in carrying out their duties. I fully appreciate the difficulties of the situation in the Suez Canal sector for all concerned and I also appreciate the co-operation which the United Nations Military Observers have received. I think it advisable, however, for the sake of the record, to make the foregoing clarifications.

“Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) U THANT”

5. On 1 May 1969 I addressed the following letter to the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic:

“Excellency,

“I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 25 and 29 April in reply to my letter of 21 April 1969. I note with appreciation the statement in your letter of 29 April concerning the co-operation which the UAR authorities have given to United Nations personnel in expediting the building of shelters for United Nations Military Observers. The progress made in building shelters on the West Bank of the Canal has just now been confirmed to me by United Nations officials in the area.

“May I point out that your reply does not make any specific reference to two other matters of concern which I raised in my letter of 21 April, namely, encroachment on United Nations observation posts and incidents of firing near or at United Nations personnel, installations and vehicles. I would wish to reiterate my continuing concern about these matters.

“Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) U THANT”

6. Since 21 April, the day on which I addressed the identical letters to the two parties, exchanges of fire have continued to take place daily in the Suez Canal Sector. Encroachment on United Nations Observation Posts has continued, and some of these Observation Posts have been hit. With

reference to the exchange of fire of 23 April, General Bull has reported that the nearest United Arab Republic firing positions were one metre from OP Delta and two metres from OP Charlie (S/7930/Add. 172). General Bull has also reported that United Arab Republic forces have fired at United Nations Military Observers (S/7930/Add. 171 and 180) and at a United Nations ambulance (S/7930/Add. 170) and that Israel forces have fired at United Nations Military Observers (S/7930/Add. 182). Since 20 April further damage sustained by United Nations installations and facilities includes two caravans destroyed and one damaged; one vehicle damaged; two radio antennae damaged; OP buildings damaged on four occasions, and residential buildings damaged on two occasions (see S/7930/Add. 169, 171, 177 and 180).

7. The concern which I expressed to the parties on 21 April over the safety of United Nations Military Observers was unhappily borne out by an incident on the very next day, 22 April, when an Observer was seriously injured. The circumstances of his incident and the difficulties encountered in the evacuation of the wounded Observer are set forth below.

8. On 22 April at 1218 hours GMT Captain Joseph Young, an Observer of Irish nationality, who was proceeding from the Kantara Control Centre in the direction of OP Green, was seriously injured when his vehicle struck an anti-tank mine. Earlier on the same day, another United Nations vehicle also proceeding to OP Green, driven by a French Observer, also hit a mine, but in this case fortunately no one was injured. Shortly after the incident involving Captain Young, General Bull informed the Senior UAR Liaison Officer that Israel forces would attempt to evacuate Captain Young by helicopter. The reply of Senior UAR Liaison Officer was conditional upon a number of requirements which under the circumstances could not be met. Therefore the only alternative was evacuation by road, which General Bull did not consider as satisfactory as by helicopter, since the roadway was obviously dangerous. General Bull made arrangements for a United Nations ambulance, clearly marked and flying a United Nations flag, to proceed from the Kantara Control Centre to the scene of the incident and he informed the Senior UAR Liaison Officer

accordingly. The Senior UAR Liaison Officer replied that he could not guarantee safe passage for the vehicle. When asked for the reasons, he gave no details. General Bull then informed the senior UAR Liaison Officer that the ambulance would proceed from Kantara and that he would hold the United Arab Republic authorities responsible for any firing upon it. While this ambulance was proceeding from Kantara to the scene of the incident, it came under fire from United Arab Republic forces on the West Bank of the Canal as reported in document S/7930/Add. 170. Attempts to evacuate Captain Young by road were finally abandoned because of the firing in the area and the possibility that the roadway might be mined. He was evacuated by means of an Israel helicopter at 1945 hours GMT on 22 April. His condition was later reported as "good". In this regard, I have noted with regret some unfounded current news reports which, by exaggerating the nature and severity of Captain Young's injuries, have a harmful effect.

9. When Captain Young was wounded by the mine explosion, he was proceeding with a second United Nations Military Observer to assist two other Observers whose vehicle earlier that morning struck a mine while en route to OP Green to relieve the Observer team at the OP which had been on duty there since 15 April. Because of the mine incidents, and the continuing firing in the area, the relief of this team could be effected only on the morning of 28 April. The three officers with Captain Young finally managed to return to Kantara Control Centre only during the night of 25/26 April. The relief of a number of other United Nations Observation Posts has also met with considerable difficulty and delay because of the recent exchanges of fire, sniping at United Nations Military Observers and frequent mining of roadways on the east side of the Canal. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO is approaching the authorities on both sides in order to discuss with them practical measures to facilitate the observation operation in the Suez Canal sector, and to secure all possible assistance and protection for the United Nations Military Observers and personnel in the performance of their duties.

10. One of the proposals General Bull has in mind is the establishment of safe perimeters

around United Nations installations. He considers, and I agree with him, that each of the United Nations Control Centres and Observation Posts should be surrounded by a free area of agreed dimensions which should be clearly marked and should be free of any manned or unmanned firing positions and of any military personnel and equipment. Another proposal envisaged by the Chief of Staff in which I also concur is the provision, with the agreement of the two parties, of a United Nations craft for the exclusive use of UNTSO; such a craft would be used to relieve United Nations personnel at Observation Posts when relief by road is not possible, to evacuate injured United Nations personnel as necessary, and to cope with other unforeseen situations involving the United Nations observation operation.

11. I take this opportunity to pay a special tribute to the United Nations Military Observers and the Field Service personnel who are manning the observation operation in the Suez Canal Sector. In the face of almost continuous exposure to danger and in increasingly uncomfortable and hazardous conditions they continue to carry out their tasks with a high sense of duty, great courage and with accuracy and objectivity. The Chief of Staff informs me that despite the unhappy developments of recent weeks, the morale of the observers in the Suez Canal Sector is high and their devotion to duty exemplary.

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Note by the Secretary-General on the Appointment of the Members of the Special Committee Provided for in General Assembly Resolution 2443 (XXIII).¹

May 28, 1969

By a *note verbale* addressed to the Permanent Representatives on 23 May 1969, the Secretary-General, *inter alia*, drew the attention of Member States to the fact that the President of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly had been unable to complete the appointment of the members of the special committee provided for in General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII).

The *note verbale* reads as follows:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of ... to the United Nations and has the honour to draw his attention to the following matter.

"His Excellency Mr. Emilio Arenales, President of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, was unable prior to his death to complete certain functions entrusted to him by the General Assembly at that session. In particular, and notwithstanding his efforts and those of the Secretary-General undertaken on his behalf, it had not yet been possible to complete the appointment of the special committee provided for in General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968. The President's death has thus left unresolved the question of the appointment of this committee, and the rules of procedure of the General Assembly do not contain any provision covering the present situation.

"In the circumstances there would appear to be only two practicable alternatives to comply with the resolution:

1. To convene a special session of the General Assembly to provide another method for constituting the special committee;

2. (a) To find a procedure which, through its acceptance by Member States, would permit the designation of one of the Vice-Presidents to undertake the appointment of the special committee;

- (b) Alternatively, and in line with the spirit of rule 30 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, to ascertain from the Government of Guatemala, if possible, who would be the Chairman of that country's delegation for the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, and request him to undertake the appointment of the special committee.

"The first alternative, that of a special session of the General Assembly, would involve considerable time, effort and expense. However, if this alternative is favoured, the special session might be brief and be attended only by members of permanent missions if its business were limited either to the designation of a Vice-President or the proposed Chairman of the delegation of Guatemala to perform the residual function of the

¹ U.N. doc A/7495.

President of the twenty-third session, or to transfer that function to the President of the special session.

"The second alternative would appear to be more convenient. If this alternative is acceptable, it has been suggested that the membership might first be consulted as to which of the sub-alternatives, namely, the designation of the leader of the delegation of Guatemala or one of the Vice-Presidents, to exercise the residual function of the President of the twenty-third session, is generally acceptable.

"In the circumstances explained above, the Secretary-General would like to inquire whether his Excellency's Government accepts one or the other of the above alternatives, and if so which alternative is favoured.

"In view of the time that has already elapsed, the Secretary-General would be grateful for a very early reply, by letter or by telegram, not later than 10 June 1969."

2. The enclosed reply is being circulated at the request of the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations.

ISRAEL

Since the twenty-third session of the General Assembly was declared closed on 21 December 1968, the late President, His Excellency Mr. Emilio Arenales, was actively engaged in the consultations to which he referred in his statement on page 199 of the provisional verbatim record of the 1752nd meeting of the General Assembly, held on that date, with regard to the appointment of three Member States to constitute a special committee established in accordance with resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968. As the Secretary-General is certainly aware, the late President approached a large number of Member States, inviting them to serve on that committee but, at the time of his death, had not been successful in those efforts on account of the refusal of a great many Member States to accept such an invitation. Those refusals are the consequence of the arbitrary and one-sided character of General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII), which, as the record of the 1748th plenary meeting shows, was in fact adopted by a minority of the Members of the General Assembly.

The resolution was objectionable *inter alia* because it contained an adverse prejudgement of the facts the committee was supposed to investigate, and because it took no account of the persecution of Jewish minorities in certain Arab countries in the Middle East area, as tragically highlighted by the recent public hangings of innocent Jews in Baghdad. It is this problem which should be the proper subject of United Nations concern, not the situation in the Israel-held areas, which are in any case open to the scrutiny and observation of tens of thousands of foreign visitors.

The States which refused the invitations addressed to them by the late President acted in full awareness of the real nature of that resolution, as being a transparent political manoeuvre and not an expression of genuine concern for the furtherance of human rights.

In the communication addressed to the Ambassador of Israel to Guatemala on 6 March 1969, the late President of the General Assembly himself expressed his view that the establishment at that juncture of the special committee would add "further causes of friction to the already tense situation in the Middle East". The Government of Israel fully shares that view, which is even more pertinent now than at the date of the above communication.

The Secretary-General's communication under reply confirms that no provision in the rules of procedure of the General Assembly regulates the situation which has come into being following the lamented death of the President of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly. It appears that only changes in existing procedures would make possible further action in the matter, and in the circumstances it is the view of the Government of Israel that such changes would not be justified.

The Government of Israel understands that the practice of the General Assembly in requesting its President to appoint members of committees in accordance with decisions taken at its different sessions entrusts the function not to the President as such, whose term of office is delimited by the relevant provisions of the Charter and of the rules of procedure, but to the individual who has been duly elected to serve as President of the General Assembly for a given

session. When, in the past, for any reason that person was unable to complete any functions which may have been entrusted to him by the General Assembly, the matter has taken its regular course. In fact there have been instances in which committees to be established by the President of the General Assembly were not constituted.

It should be borne in mind that under rule 31, based on Article 21 of the Charter, the President and all the Vice-Presidents of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly ceased to hold office at the close of that session, on 21 December 1968. This fact would appear to negate also the alternative suggestion made by the Secretary-General that one of the Vice-Presidents should act in the matter. Even if the task entrusted to the President could in theory be delegated to a Vice-President (which in the Israel view cannot be done), there is no Vice-President in office to receive such a task.

As for the future Chairman of the future delegation of Guatemala to the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, his sole function under rule 30 is formally to open the session and preside until a new President is elected. The Government of Israel fails to see how it could be regarded as within the "spirit" of this rule to ascertain in advance who might be appointed the Chairman of the delegation of Guatemala and then to ask this person at present to perform a task which the previous President had been requested to perform. Such a course cannot be based directly or indirectly on the language of rule 30, and in any case would appear to contradict the clear stipulation of Article 21 of the Charter.

The Government of Israel sees no reason for departing from established practices and procedures and believes that, in the light of all the circumstances, including the short period which now remains before the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly is due to convene, there is no necessity for any of the extraordinary and largely unprecedented alternative forms of action such as are suggested in the Secretary-General's communication under reply.

It is suggested that the Secretary-General might well limit himself to drawing the attention of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly to this matter, in the context of his

annual report on the work of the Organization.

The Permanent Representative of Israel has the honour to request the circulation of this note as a document of the General Assembly.

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Note by the Secretary-General on the Appointment of the Members of the Special Committee Provided for in General Assembly Resolution 2443 (XXIII).¹

June 19, 1969

1. On 23 May 1969, the Secretary-General addressed a *note verbale* to all the Permanent Representatives by which he consulted them as to the most appropriate way of resolving the question of the appointment of the special committee provided for in General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968. The text of that communication was reproduced in document A/7495.

2. By a *note verbale* dated 18 June, the Secretary-General informed the Members of the Organization of the results of that consultation. The note reads as follows:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of ... to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to his note of 23 May 1969 by which he consulted the Members of the United Nations as to the most appropriate way of resolving the question of the appointment of the special committee provided for in General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968.

"In the above-mentioned note, the Secretary-General indicated that there appeared to be only two practicable alternatives to comply with the resolution namely:

'1. To convene a special session of the General Assembly to provide another method for constituting the special committee;

'2. (a) To find a procedure which, through its acceptance by Member States, would permit the designation of one of the Vice-Presidents to

¹ U.N. doc. A/7495/Add. 1.

undertake the appointment of the special committee;

‘(b) Alternatively, and in line with the spirit of rule 30 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, to ascertain from the Government of Guatemala, if possible, who would be the Chairman of that country’s delegation for the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, and request him to undertake the appointment of the special committee.’

“On 11 June 1969, the Secretary-General sent a reminder to those Member States which had not yet replied to his communication and extended the time limit for the submission of replies to 17 June.

“As of the present, replies have been received from ninety Member States. Sixty-six of these States, i.e. more than an absolute majority of the membership of the United Nations, have indicated that they find acceptable the alternative contained in paragraph 2 (a) above.

“Several Members have suggested that in implementation of alternative 2 (a) the Secretary-General should convene a meeting of the Vice-Presidents of the twenty-third session to entrust one of them with the task of appointing the members of the special committee. In accordance with this suggestion, it is the intention of the Secretary-General to call such a meeting on Monday, 23 June, at 3.00 p.m. Invitations to the meeting will be sent separately to the seventeen Vice-Presidents.

“An analysis of the replies to the Secretary-General’s note of 23 May will be issued shortly as a document of the General Assembly.”

3. The attached communication, which refers to the Secretary-General’s note of 13 June, is being circulated at the request of the Permanent Representative of Israel.

ISRAEL

In a note to the Secretary-General of 28 May 1969 (A/7495), in reply to the Secretary-General’s communication of 23 May 1969 (A/7495) which proposed certain alternatives for the appointment of the special committee provided for in General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, the Permanent Representative of Israel declared *inter alia*:

“Since the twenty-third session of the General Assembly was declared closed on 21 December 1968, the late President, His Excellency Mr. Emilio Arenales, was actively engaged in the consultations to which he referred in his statement on page 199 of the provisional verbatim record of the 1752nd meeting of the General Assembly held on that date, with regard to the appointment of three Member States to constitute a special committee established in accordance with resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1963. As the Secretary-General is certainly aware, the late President approached a large number of Member States, inviting them to serve on that special committee but, at the time of his death, had not been successful in those efforts on account of the refusal of a great many Member States to accept such an invitation. Those refusals are the consequence of the arbitrary and one-sided character of General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII), which, as the record of the 1748th plenary meeting shows, was in fact adopted by a minority of the Members of the General Assembly.

“The resolution was objectionable *inter alia* because it contained an adverse prejudgement of the facts the committee was supposed to investigate, and because it took no account of the persecution of Jewish minorities in certain Arab countries in the Middle East area, as tragically highlighted by the recent public hangings of innocent Jews in Baghdad. It is this problem which should be the proper subject of United Nations concern, not the situation in the Israel-held areas, which are in any case open to the scrutiny and observation of tens of thousands of foreign visitors.

“The States which refused the invitations addressed to them by the late President acted in full awareness of the real nature of that resolution, as being a transparent political manoeuvre and not an expression of genuine concern for the furtherance of human rights.

“In the communication addressed to the Ambassador of Israel to Guatemala on 6 March 1969, the late President of the General Assembly himself expressed his view that the establishment at that juncture of the special committee would add ‘further causes of friction to the already tense situation in the Middle East’. The Government

of Israel fully shares that view, which is even more pertinent now than at the date of the above communication.

"The Secretary-General's communication under reply confirms that no provision in the rules of procedure of the General Assembly regulates the situation which has come into being following the lamented death of the President of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly. It appears that only changes in existing procedures would make possible further action in the matter, and in the circumstances it is the view of the Government of Israel that such changes would not be justified.

"...

"The Government of Israel sees no reason for departing from established practices and procedures and believes that, in the light of all the circumstances, including the short period which now remains before the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly is due to convene, there is no necessity for any of the extraordinary and largely unprecedented alternative forms of action such as are suggested in the Secretary-General's communication under reply."

Indeed, the initiative taken by the Secretary-General in his communication of 23 May 1969 was unwarranted. There is nothing in the Charter or in United Nations practice which required him to take such action. With all respect to the Secretary-General the suggestions made by him constituted dubious means to a dubious end. There was nothing urgent about the matter, it did not concern international peace and security, and it would amply have met the needs of the situation for the Secretary-General to have drawn the attention of the next regular session of the General Assembly to this matter, in his annual report.

With regard to the course of action now proposed by the Secretary-General in his communication of 18 June 1969, the Permanent Representative of Israel has the honour to state as follows:

No Member State elected as a Vice-President at the twenty-third session has any legal standing to assume functions exercised by the President. Firstly, under rule 31 of the rules of procedure

of the General Assembly, the Vice-Presidents ceased to hold office on 21 December 1968. Secondly, the President himself ceased to hold office under the same rule and at the same date, and could continue to perform any function thereafter only in his personal capacity and not as President.

The former Vice-Presidents as a group have no legal authority or standing to confer such a function on one of their number. Firstly, as already stated, they all ceased to hold office on 21 December 1968. Secondly, even during the session at which they are elected, the Vice-Presidents do not under the rules of procedure or existing practice constitute a collective body that can exercise any collective functions or take any collective decisions.

The Secretary-General and the Secretariat have no recognized authority to convene meetings of former Vice-Presidents as a group or to act in accordance with their decisions or recommendations.

The opinions or preferences expressed by a number of Member States in response to the Secretary-General's note cannot confer upon the Secretary-General, upon the former Vice-Presidents collectively, or upon one of their number individually powers and functions which they do not legally and constitutionally possess.

In the view of the Israel Government, therefore, the whole process whereby the function originally entrusted to the President of the General Assembly at its twenty-third session would now be "delegated" to a former Vice-President is without a legal basis at any of its stages. No former Vice-President that accepts such a function will have any *locus standi* to discharge it, and any action taken in pursuance of such an alleged mandate will be *ultra vires*.

The Permanent Representative of Israel has the honour to request the circulation of this note as a document of the General Assembly.

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Note by the Secretary-General on the Appointment of the Members of the Special Committee Provided for in General Assembly Resolution 2443 (XXIII).¹

June 24, 1969

1. By a *note verbale* dated 18 June 1969, the Secretary-General informed the Permanent Representatives of the results of his consultation as to the most appropriate way of resolving the question of the appointment of the members of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, established under General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968. The text of that communication was reproduced in document A/7495/Add. 1.

2. Following the Suggestion made by several Member States in their replies, a meeting of the Vice-Presidents of the twenty-third session of the Assembly was held on Monday, 23 June, at 3 p.m. In his opening statement, the Secretary-General gave an account of the measures that had been taken to resolve the question of the appointment of the members of the Special Committee (annex I).

3. In the course of the meeting it was agreed that His Excellency Dr. Luis Alvarado, Chairman of the delegation of Peru at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, would be entrusted with the task of appointing the members of the Special Committee.

4. As announced in his note of 18 June, the Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Members of the General Assembly an analysis of the replies to the above-mentioned consultation (annex II).

ANNEX I

Opening statement by the Secretary-General at the meeting of the Vice-Presidents of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly

1. I have the honour to call to order this meeting of the Vice-Presidents of the twenty-

third regular session of the General Assembly. This is an unusual meeting, in that it does not derive from express provisions of the Charter or of the rules of procedure. Nor does it derive from an express decision of the General Assembly. It is also without an *ad hoc* precedent in the constitutional procedures which have so far developed in the history of the United Nations. In view of the unusual and unprecedented nature of the meeting, I would request distinguished representatives to bear with me for a few minutes while I recall the background which has led to our gathering here today.

2. At its 1748th plenary meeting, on 19 December 1968, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2443 (XXIII) by 60 votes to 22, with 37 abstentions. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly decided "to establish a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of Occupied Territories, composed of three Member States". By operative paragraph 4, this Committee was requested "to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible". By operative paragraph 2, the President of the General Assembly was entrusted with the task of appointing the members of the Special Committee. At the closing meeting of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly — the 1752nd plenary meeting — on 21 December 1968, the President indicated that he had not yet appointed the members of the Committee, but would "undertake the necessary consultations in this regard as soon as possible". There was no objection to this statement.

3. It is true that there is no express provision in the rules of procedure of the General Assembly for the President to perform residual functions once a session has been completed, and that, therefore, his functions normally come to an end with the closure of the session. The absence of such an express provision does not, however, prohibit the performance of residual functions by the President of the Assembly in so far as the Assembly has tacitly so agreed. On the contrary, there is now a long-standing practice, particularly in relation to the appointment of members of committees, where the President has made these appointments after the end of the session. While it is not for me to discuss the merits of this practice, it is exactly what had been intended in the present

¹ U.N. doc. A/7495/Add. 2.

instance, and would doubtless have occurred except for tragic and unforeseen circumstances.

4. Owing to the illness and untimely death of the President, he was unable to complete the membership of the Special Committee or, within the spirit of rules 32 and 33 of the rules of procedure, to appoint one of the Vice-Presidents to take his place with respect to this residual function. As the General Assembly has accepted the practice of residual functions being conferred on the President, I do not doubt that it would also accept that another of its officers, namely a Vice-President, could perform such functions where circumstances made this necessary.

5. After the death of the President, several Member States, as I in due course informed the entire membership, expressed to me their concern that the Special Committee had not been appointed and their view that this was a matter of special urgency, an urgency which the General Assembly had itself reflected by requesting the Committee to report as soon as possible. In the light of the concern expressed, I decided, in the unprecedented situation which pertained, that it was my duty to poll the membership of the General Assembly on the course of action which the membership would wish to follow.

6. The rules of procedure of the General Assembly do not contain an express provision on the polling of the membership, or on other procedures for consultation in unprecedented situations. However, my responsibilities as chief administrative officer of the Organization, under Article 97 of the Charter, require that I discharge these responsibilities in what I consider to be the appropriate manner in a particular situation. There has been developed over many years a practice of polling the membership, without objection being raised, particularly with regard to the opening date of the General Assembly. That date has been postponed on a number of occasions, through this procedure, despite the explicit provisions of rule 1 of the rules of procedure which fixes a precise date.

7. By a *note verbale* of 23 May 1969, I apprised the membership of the existing situation and made a number of suggestions for resolving it. On 28 May I circulated to the membership in documentary form (A/7495) both my *note verbale* and a note which I had received from a Member

State objecting to my suggestions. As I further reported in a *note verbale* of 18 June (A/7495/Add. 1), more than an absolute majority of the membership agreed to one of my suggestions that a procedure should be found "which, through its acceptance by Member States, would permit the designation of one of the Vice-Presidents to undertake the appointment of the Special Committee." Another of my suggestions, that a special session of the General Assembly be convened pursuant to rule 8 or 9 of the rules of procedure, was preferred by only one Member State among those which had replied by 17 June. The results of my consultations showed that the majority preferred a procedure which, while not expressly provided for in the Charter or the rules of procedure, was consonant with the spirit of both those instruments and provided a more convenient manner of giving effect to the will of the General Assembly.

8. I do not believe that the legality of the preferred procedure can be convincingly contested. There has never been a constitution or a set of rules which provided for every contingency. In all constitutional histories, therefore, there are numerous examples of procedures not expressly provided for which have been devised to give effect to those constitutions. There are, of course, limitations to such developments but, in United Nations practice, they have been accepted by the general membership where they serve the interests of that membership and do not endanger any of the purposes and principles of the Organization.

9. In view of the response I received to my polling of the general membership, and in order to implement the preferences of the majority, I considered that it was most appropriate for me to adopt the entirely reasonable procedure, under the circumstances, which had been suggested by several Member States, namely that I should convene a meeting of the Vice-Presidents of the twenty-third session to designate one of them for the task of appointing the members of the special Committee, in order that effect be given to the will of the majority of the membership of the United Nations.

10. It is in the light of the foregoing background that we are all meeting here today, and I would now like to call on distinguished representatives for their suggestions on the Vice-President who

should be entrusted with the important function in question.

ANNEX II

Analysis of the replies to the Secretary-General's note verbale of 23 May 1969

In his *note verbale* of 23 May 1969, the Secretary-General drew the attention of Member States to the fact that there appeared to be only two practicable alternatives to comply with General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII):

"1. To convene a special session of the General Assembly to provide another method for constituting the Special Committee;

"2. (a) To find a procedure which, through its acceptance by Member States, would permit the designation of one of the Vice-Presidents to

undertake the appointment of the Special Committee;

"(b) Alternatively, and in line with the spirit of rule 30 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, to ascertain from the Government of Guatemala, if possible, who would be the Chairman of that country's delegation for the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, and request him to undertake the appointment of the Special Committee."

In addition to categories 1,2 (a) and 2 (b), the following breakdown indicates in the second column those countries which expressed a preference for the second alternative without specifying whether they favoured (a) or (b). In a number of cases, Member States expressed first and second preferences; in the following table, first preference is shown by "x" and a second preference by "xx". The foot-notes to the table appear on page 540.

<i>Member States</i>	<i>Preferred Solution</i>					<i>Abstentions</i>
	1	2	2 (a)	2 (b)	<i>Postponement to twenty-fourth session</i>	
Afghanistan			x			
Albania						
Algeria			x			
Argentina			x ^a			
Australia						
Austria						
Barbados			x			
Belgium					x	
Bolivia					x ^a	
Botswana			x			
Brazil						
Bulgaria			x			
Burma						
Burundi			x			
Byelorussian SSR			x			
Cambodia			x			
Cameroon			x			
Canada					x	
Central African Republic			x			
Ceylon			x			
Chad			x			

<i>Member States</i>	<i>Preferred Solution</i>				<i>Postponement to twenty- fourth session</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>
	1	2	2 (a)	2 (b)		
Chile			x			
China				x		
Colombia			x ^a			
Congo (Brazzaville)			x			
Congo (Dem. Rep.)						
Costa Rica						
Cuba			x			
Cyprus			x			
Czechoslovakia			x			
Dahomey					x	
Denmark				x		
Dominican Republic					x	
Ecuador						x ^a
El Salvador	x					
Equatorial Guinea						
Ethiopia			x			
Finland						
France		x ^a				
Gabon						
Gambia						
Ghana			x			
Greece	x					
Guatemala			x			
Guinea			x			
Guyana	x ^a					
Haiti		x ^a				
Honduras						
Hungary			x			
Iceland				x		
India			x ^b			
Indonesia			x			
Iran			x			
Iraq			x			
Ireland			xx	x		
Israel					x ^c	
Italy						x
Ivory Coast				x		
Jamaica			x			
Japan		x				
Jordan			x			
Kenya			x			

<i>Member States</i>	<i>Preferred Solution</i>				<i>Postponement to twenty- fourth session</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>
	1	2	2 (a)	2 (b)		
Kuwait			x			
Laos				x		
Lebanon			x			
Lesotho					x	
Liberia			x			
Libya			x			
Luxembourg	x ^a				xx ^a	
Madagascar					x	
Malawi						x
Malaysia						
Maldives				x		
Mali						
Malta						
Mauritania			x			
Mauritius			x			
Mexico			x			
Mongolia			x			
Morocco			x			
Nepal			x			
Netherlands					x	
New Zealand				x ^a		
Nicaragua						
Niger			x			
Nigeria			x			
Norway				x		
Pakistan			x ^a			
Panama					x	
Paraguay						
Peru			x			
Philippines						
Poland			x			
Portugal				x		
Romania			x			
Rwanda					x	
Saudi Arabia			x			
Senegal				x		
Sierra Leone						
Singapore						
Somalia			x			
South Africa						
Southern Yemen			x			

Member States	Preferred Solution					Abstentions
	1	2	2 (a)	2 (b)	Postponement to twenty- fourth session	
Spain		x				
Sudan			x			
Swaziland			x			
Sweden						x
Syria			x			
Thailand						
Togo					x ^a	
Trinidad and Tobago						
Tunisia			x			
Turkey			x			
Uganda			x			
Ukrainian SSR			x			
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics			x			
United Arab Republic			x			
United Kingdom			xx	x		
United Republic of Tanzania			x			
United States						
Upper Volta						
Uruguay					x	
Venezuela			x			
Yemen			x			
Yugoslavia			x			
Zambia			x			
<i>Total as of 17 June 1969 (90 replies)</i>	1	3	61 + 2 (second preference)	11	11	3
<i>Total as of 24 June 1969 (101 replies)</i>	3	5	64 + 2 (second preference)	12	13 + 1 (second preference)	4

a/ Reply received after 17 June.

b/ In its reply, India stated that it "would be willing to support any of the alternatives proposed which is acceptable to a majority of Member States".

c/ In a *note verbale* dated 28 May 1969 (A/7495, p. 3), Israel suggested that the Secretary-General "might well limit himself to drawing the attention of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly to this matter, in the context of his annual report on the work of the Organization". See also A/7495/Add. 1, p. 3.

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Report by the Secretary-General under Security Council Resolution 252 of 21 May, 1968.¹

June 30, 1969

1. The present document is an addendum to the report submitted by the Secretary-General on 11 April 1969 in pursuance of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, which requested the Secretary-General to report to the the Council on the implementation of the resolution.

2. In his report of 11 April 1969 the Secretary-General indicated that, in the absence of the receipt of information from the Government of Israel, the only other source of information of an official nature pertinent to the implementation of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) which was available to the Secretary-General was the Israel official Gazette (Reshumoth). The Secretary-General appended to his report an unofficial translation of a bill adopted by the Israel Parliament on 14 August 1968, entitled the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law" which was relevant to the situation in Jerusalem.

3. This addendum brings to the attention of the Security Council in an annex certain emergency regulations — "Regulation of Legal and Administrative Matters — Further Provisions" — which are in the form of additional provisions to the Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law", the text of which is contained in document S/9149. These Emergency Regulations have been promulgated by the Minister of Justice pursuant to powers vested in him by paragraph 9 of the Law and Administrative Ordinance of 1948 (No. 1 of 5708).

4. Also set forth in this addendum are two sets of Regulations — "Regulation of Legal and Administrative Matters (Extension of Times for Continuance of Operation of Companies)" and "Regulations concerning Continuance of Pursuit of Occupation", the effect of which would appear to be to postpone for a period of six months from the date of their promulgation (27 April

1969) certain of the provisions of the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law".

5. The unofficial translations of the above-mentioned texts are as follows:

A

LAW AND ADMINISTRATION
ORDINANCE, 5708-1948EMERGENCY REGULATIONS CONCERNING
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS TO THE LEGAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS
(REGULATION) LAW

By virtue of the authority vested in me pursuant to Para. 9 (a) of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948,² I hereby institute the following Emergency Regulations:

Addendum Para. 9 (a)

1. In the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law, 5728-1968"³ (hereinafter referred to as the "Basic Law"), there is to be inserted, after Para. 9:

"Registration of Companies and Transfer of Assets and Liabilities

9 a. (a) In the case of a Company which on the eve of the entry into force of an application of law order or of the coming into force of this law, whichever is later, had a registered office or a place of business in the area within the jurisdiction of the Order, and which was established in accordance with the law prevailing in that area at the time of its establishment, and which did not act in accordance with Para. 9 or 10 by the date on which the Emergency Regulations (Supplementary Provisions) to the legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law, 5729-1969, entered into force, the Minister of Justice may instruct by an order its registration in Israel in accordance with the Companies Ordinance, from the date the Minister shall determine in the order, and he may give in the order any instruction in the matter; did the Minister of Justice give an order as above, the Registrar of Companies shall register the said company in accordance with the companies Ordinance.

² Official Gazette 5708 (1948), Addendum A, No. 2, page 1.

³ *Sefer Ha'Chukkim*, No. 542, 5728 (1968), page 247.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9149/Add. 1.

(b) The order according to sub-section (a) shall be published in the Official Gazette.

(c) The Registrar of Companies has the right to demand from the company that is subject to sub-section (a) and from anyone serving as a member of the board of directors, or as a business manager, on the eve of the issuing of such an order in accordance with sub-section (a), that they submit to him certified copies of its Memorandum and Articles of Association, and any additional particulars regarding the company, required for its registration.

(d) The Registrar of Companies shall make the arrangements for the transfer of the assets and liabilities of the company, subject to the provisions of sub-section (a), and he shall apply to the District Court of Jerusalem, by way of motion, for an order confirming the arrangement; the provisions of Para. 9 (b) and 9 (c) shall apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the arrangement under this sub-section.

(e) Para. 8 shall apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the company under this Paragraph, if no prior mortgage or lien had been registered under sub-section (d).

(f) A company subject to sub-section (a) which has not submitted as yet to the Registrar of Companies certified copies of its Memorandum and Articles of Association as aforesaid under sub-section (c) shall be subject to the following provisions:

(1) If the company conducts business within the area of jurisdiction of the law, such business shall be deemed to exist only within the limits defined in the Memorandum;

(2) As long as it did not submit its Articles of Association to the Registrar of Companies, the Articles of Association included in the Third Addition to the Companies Ordinance shall be considered as the company's Articles of Association and it shall act in accordance with same.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of clauses (1) and (2), the Minister of Justice may define in an order the objectives of the company as hereinabove and this definition shall be in force as long as the company fails to submit its Memorandum and Articles of Association as required under sub-section (c).

(4) The Minister of Justice or whoever shall be so empowered by the Minister may issue a certificate in writing as to the scope and authority of the company and as to any other matter arising out of its registration and from the transfer of its assets and liabilities."

Addendum to Para. 11 (a)

2. After Para. 11 of the Basic Law there is to be inserted:

"Registration of Partnerships

11 a. Provisions of Para. 9 (a) shall also apply to partnerships."

Addendum to Para. 15 (a)

3. After Para. 15 of the Basic Law there is to be inserted:

"Licences Additional Provisions

15 a. (a) Where, before the coming into force of the application of law order, a resident of the area of application of said order engaged in any vocation, handicraft or other occupation under the law then applying in that area, and such activity requires a licence under an Israeli enactment, the Minister charged with the implementation of the aforesaid Israeli enactment may issue an order that such resident shall be considered as a holder of the licence from the date the Minister shall determine in the order.

(b) Any person considered as a holder of the licence in accordance with this paragraph, shall be considered in any matter as a person who received a licence under the legislation governing the said vocation, handicraft or other occupation.

(c) The order as aforesaid in sub-section (a) shall be published in the Official Gazette.

(d) The Minister charged with the implementation of the enactment or any person so empowered by the Minister may require the resident to whom sub-section (a) applies to give particulars as to his person and qualifications."

Amendment of Para. 16

4. In Para. 16 of the Basic Law:

(1) In sub-section (a), replace the words "who served as a judge of a civil court, or was an advocate in such area" by "who, in such area or in any part of Eretz Israel not designated in the

aforesaid order, served as a judge of a civil court or was an advocate”;

(2) After sub-section (e), insert:

“(f) In the case of a member of the Chamber of Advocates in accordance with this paragraph, the period of his previous activities as a judge or advocate, as stated in sub-sections (a) or (d), shall, for all lawful purposes, also be considered as a period during which he served as a judge or advocate, as the case may be, in Israel; this provision does not detract from the authority mentioned in sub-sections (c) or (d).”

Addendum to Para. 19 (a)

5. After Para. 19 of the Basic Law, insert:

“Validity of Registration

19 (a). Registration made under this law may not be challenged as to its validity.”

Addendum to Para. 20 (a)

6. After Para. 20 of the Basic Law, insert:

“Implementation date of the Law of State Property

20 (a). From the effective date of the order for the implementation of the Law, Para. 2 of the State Property Law, 5711-1951¹ shall apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to any property of the State Authorities, as stated in Para. 5 (a).”

Title

7. These Regulations shall be called “Emergency Regulations (Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law — Supplementary Provisions), 5729-1969.”

9th day of the month of Iyar 5729 (27 April 1969)

YAAKOV S. SHAPIRA
Minister of Justice

B

LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS (REGULATION) LAW, 5728-1968

REGULATIONS REGARDING CONTINUING ACTIVITIES OF COMPANIES

By virtue of the authority vested in me under Para. 22 of the Legal and Administrative Matters

(Regulation) Law, 5728-1968² (hereinafter referred to as the Law), I hereby institute the following Regulations:

Extension of Dates

1. The period of six months mentioned in each one of the paragraphs 6, 9 (1), and 10 of the Law as extended by the Regulations of the Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law (Extension of Deadlines to Permit Companies to Continue their Activities), 5729-1969,³ is hereby extended for an additional six months.

Title

2. These regulations shall be called “Regulations of the Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law (Extension of Deadlines to Permit Companies to Continue their Activities), 5729-1969”.

9th day of the month of Iyar, 5729 (27 April 1969)

YAAKOV S. SHAPIRA
Minister of Justice

C

LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS (REGULATION) LAW, 5728-1968

REGULATIONS REGARDING CONTINUATION OF BUSINESS

By virtue of the authority vested in me under Para. 22 of the Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law, 5728-1968⁴ (hereinafter referred to as the Law, and under other authority given to me under any law, I hereby institute the following Regulations:

Extension of Dates

1. The period of six months mentioned in Para. 15 (a) of the Law as extended by the Regulations of the Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law (Continuation of Business), 5729-1969,⁵ is hereby extended for an additional six months with respect to any

² *Sefer Ha'Chukkim*, No. 542, 5728 (1968), p. 247.

³ Collection of Regulations, No. 2354, 5729 (1969), p. 1137.

⁴ *Sefer Ha'Chukkim*, No. 542, 5728 (1968), p. 247.

⁵ Collection of Regulations, 5769 (1969), p. 916.

¹ *Sefer Ha'Chukkim*, No. 68, 5711 (1951), page 52.

occupation that is licensed in accordance with the Law that I am charged to implement.

Title

2. These regulations shall be called: "Regulations of the Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law (Continuation of Business) (No. 13), 5729-1969".

9th of Iyar, 5729 (27 April 1969)

YAAKOV S. SHAPIRA
Minister of Justice

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Special Report by the Secretary-General on the Increasing Ineffectiveness of the Cease-fire in the Suez Canal Sector.¹

July 5, 1969

1. On 21 April 1969, the critical situation then prevailing in the Suez Canal sector obliged me to submit a special report to the Security Council (S/9171). I ended that report with the warning that: "In the circumstances, it seems to me that the only conclusion to be drawn is that the Security Council cease-fire has become almost totally ineffective in the Suez Canal sector and that a virtual state of active war now exists there...".

2. In the last two weeks of May 1969 there was some reduction of violence in the Canal sector. There was less use of heavy weapons, and firings were mostly limited to the northern section of the Canal. This relative improvement continued into the first week of June. During the second week of June, however, the observance of the cease-fire again deteriorated, and heavy weapons fire was initiated almost daily, especially from the West side of the Canal, in many areas of that sector. This intensification has continued, unfortunately, until the present time, and daily there are extended exchanges of heavy fire along the Canal, the details of which have been given to the Security Council in the Supplemental Information reports of the S/7930 series which have covered firing on eighty-six consecutive days as of 5 July. The pattern of acts of violence and

reprisal, including a pronounced increase in aerial activity, has become almost routine, and the fact that many of these activities are announced by the parties themselves implies a tacit recognition by them that the cease-fire demanded by the Security Council in June 1967, to all practical intents and purposes, has ceased to be respected in the Suez Canal sector.

3. In a further report to the Security Council dated 2 May 1969 (S/9188) I expressed my increasing concern about the threat to the effectiveness of the observance of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector and about the danger to which United Nations Military Observers and other United Nations personnel were being exposed, as well as the damage caused to United Nations installations, vehicles and equipment. This risk has, if anything, increased in the past two weeks. The United Nations Military Observers in the Canal sector, although carrying out their duties with a devotion worthy of the highest praise, now do so under conditions of continuous danger. Messages have been sent by UNTSO Headquarters almost daily to the authorities in the United Arab Republic, and occasionally, as necessary, messages also have been passed to the authorities in Israel, concerning incidents of firing on United Nations personnel and on United Nations Observation Posts and equipment. These messages, however, have had no noticeable effect. In the month of June alone there were twenty-one reported incidents of firing by United Arab Republic forces and five by Israel forces on United Nations personnel or installations.

4. It is unreasonable to ask men, however well trained, disciplined and courageous they may be, to continue their duties under the physical and mental conditions induced by these recurrent incidents of firing upon them. These are unarmed men doing their best, under extraordinary stress and strain, to fulfil the task assigned to them by the Security Council. They cannot be expected to serve as what amounts to defenceless targets in a shooting gallery. I feel it my duty to warn the Council that if the United Nations Military Observers continue to be fired upon I will have no choice but to advise the Council, after consultation with the Governments providing Observers, on the future course of action, including even the possibility of withdrawal of Observers.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9316.

5. The increased firing on United Nations Military Observers, their posts, shelters and equipment, further demonstrates the degree of disregard which now prevails for the Security Council cease-fire in the Canal sector.

6. The conclusion is inescapable that throughout the Suez Canal cease-fire sector open warfare has been resumed. The task of observing, supervising and attempting to maintain a cease-fire is difficult under any circumstances unless there is a strong will on the part of both parties to observe it. The circumstances in the Suez Canal sector are anything but favourable to the maintenance of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council. The United Nations experience with the cease-fire in that sector underscores the virtual impossibility of ensuring effective observance of a cease-fire for a prolonged and indefinite period in a situation in which two hostile forces constantly confront each other across a narrow no man's land, in this case the Suez Canal, with one of the parties being in military occupation of territory belonging to the other, and with no early prospect of the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967.

7. As the Council knows, United Nations Military Observers are not permitted to operate in the Israel-Jordan sector and, therefore, there is no United Nations reporting on military action there. But all information from other sources points to a similar worsening of the situation in that sector as well. It is certainly true to say that since June 1967 the level of violence in the Middle East has never been higher than it is at present. In fact, never in the history of United Nations experience with peace-keeping has there been such complete and sustained disregard, through the massive use of many types of conventional weapons and also by less conventional means, for a cease-fire called for by the Security Council and agreed to by the parties. I bring this situation once again, and with even greater emphasis and concern, to the attention of the Security Council in the full consciousness that I, as Secretary-General, have been and am unable to effect any noticeable improvement in it. I do so because, quite apart from the casualties, hardship and damage caused on both sides, the situation, if it continues, could soon render vain efforts toward

peaceful settlement and it could even be the overture to more general and intensive hostilities in the Middle East.

8. Without passing any judgement on any party, and without prejudice to the positions and policies of any one of them, I appeal once again to all parties in the Middle East in the strongest terms at my command, to bring an end immediately to all offensive military actions, particularly those taking place daily in the Suez Canal sector — the exchanges of fire across the Canal, the aerial combat, the raids and counter raids. I ask the parties to return to observance of the Security Council cease-fire, in order to avoid frustrating current efforts to restore peace to the Middle East. I appeal to all the parties alike because it takes two sides to end war as it takes both to wage it. I also appeal most earnestly to the members of the Security Council, individually and collectively, and, indeed, to all members of the United Nations, to exert all influence possible, to take such measures and make such approaches as might be regarded by them as helpful in making the cease-fire effective and the peace efforts successful. This is in the vital interest of the whole world.

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Note by the Secretary-General to Israel and Lebanon Proposing the Stationing of United Nations Observers on Both Sides of the Border.¹

August 18, 1969

Presented herewith, for the information of the members of the Security Council, is the text of a letter which I have addressed, in identical form, on 16 August 1969 to the Permanent Representatives of Israel and Lebanon:

“Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to the prevailing situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector, which is currently under discussion in the Security Council. I find this situation, involving serious breaches of the cease-fire, very disturbing and I feel obliged to do whatever I can to alleviate it. It is for this reason that I am making this

¹ U.N. doc. S/9393.

approach, in identical letters to your Government and to the Government of —.

Since June 1967, there has been no effective United Nations observation operation in the Israel-Lebanon sector. There is only token United Nations observer representation on the Lebanese side and none at all on the Israeli side. It has not been possible, therefore, for me to provide the Council with accounts of incidents in that sector, including the most recent ones which have given rise to the present meetings of the Council. This lack of verified information cannot but affect adversely the consideration of the question in that body.

In view of the increasing seriousness of the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector, I consider it to be my duty to propose to both Governments concerned, as I now do, that United Nations Observers, in adequate number to observe effectively, be stationed on both sides, with the function of observing and maintaining the Security Council cease-fire. As in the case of the stationing of United Nations Military Observers in the Suez Canal sector in July 1967, I am making this approach with a view to improving the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector. I believe that the establishment of an observation operation at this time in this sector would be of real service to both parties and would provide an important means, at present lacking, of deterring incidents and of maintaining the cease-fire. I would be grateful if you would communicate this suggestion to your Government for its urgent consideration. It is my earnest hope that your Government will regard this proposal favourably and will advise me of its position promptly.

I am informing the Security Council of this communication to you and it is my intention also to inform the Council of the replies to it which I receive. If both replies are favourable, I will request the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, to consult immediately with the two Governments concerned and to recommend to me the number of additional Observers required and the necessary arrangements for their stationing on both sides in the Israel-Lebanon sector.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) U THANT
Secretary-General"

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Note by the Secretary-General Containing a Letter from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon Declaring his Government's Agreement to the Stationing of United Nations Observers on its Side of the Border within the Framework of the Armistice Agreement of 1949.¹

August 18, 1969

The following is the text of the reply dated 18 August 1969 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General's letter of 16 August, the text of which was circulated to the Security Council as document S/9393:

"Excellency,

In reply to your letter dated 16 August 1969, I have the honour, upon instructions from my Government, to state the following:

The United Nations Observers of the Mixed Armistice Commission continue to be stationed, as you have mentioned, on Lebanese territory. They have always enjoyed full freedom of operation and movement on it since the Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949 went into effect. Their status was not altered after the June War of 1967. The Government of Lebanon shares the views you have expressed in the introduction of your report to the United Nations on 17 September 1967, to the effect that the Armistice Agreement remains valid and applicable. The Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement, I am sure you will agree, contains no provisions for unilateral termination of its application and therefore, could not be revoked unilaterally.

For more than two years, the United Nations Observers have not been able to fulfil their mission because Israel does not allow them to operate on the Israeli side of the Armistice line, thus, preventing them from performing their functions effectively.

Consequently, I would like to reiterate to Your Excellency, that my Government continues to adhere scrupulously to the Armistice Agreement and, should the need arise, would agree to strengthening its machinery.

My Government expresses the hope that you,

¹ U.N. doc. S/9393/Add. 1.

Sir, as well as the Security Council, will take the necessary steps in order to have Israel, in compliance with the principles of International Law and the United Nations resolutions, scrupulously abide by the Armistice Agreement, and allow the United Nations Observers to resume their functions and discharge their duties thereof.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) EDOUARD GHORRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative"

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Note by the Secretary-General Containing a Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel Declaring his Government's Refusal to the Stationing of United Nations Observers on its Side of the Border.¹

August 25, 1969

The following is the text of the reply dated 25 August 1969 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the Secretary-General's letter of 16 August, the text of which was circulated to the Security Council as document S/9393:

"Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to your letter to me of 16 August 1969 regarding the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector and, on instructions from my Government, to make the following observations on it.

You state that 'I find this situation, involving serious breaches of the cease-fire, very disturbing and I feel obliged to do whatever I can to alleviate it'. My Government fully shares your concern. Israel's policy rests firmly on the need to advance towards agreement on a just and lasting peace, and in the meantime to ensure reciprocal observance of the cease-fire.

The cause of the disturbed state of the cease-fire in this particular sector is clear. Armed terrorist groups have established bases on Lebanese territory and openly operate across the cease-fire lines, by means of firing on Israel villages, infiltra-

tion, mine-laying, sabotage and other acts of armed violence in defiance of the cease-fire. Having accepted the cease-fire, it is the unquestioned duty of the Lebanese Government to prevent all violations of it from Lebanese territory whether by regular or by irregular forces. When Lebanon unequivocally accepts and effectively discharges this obligation the cease-fire will be properly maintained, and the situation will cease to be disturbing.

My Government earnestly hopes that the relative quiet previously existing in this sector will be restored. For the reasons explained above, the responsibility for bringing that about rests with the Government of Lebanon. It is self-evident that when Israel is subject to armed attack, it has the inherent right and duty of self-defense.

With regard to your proposal to station United Nations Observers in the Israel-Lebanon sector, it is noted that their function would be that of 'observing and maintaining the Security Council cease-fire'.

It appears from the reply to you from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, dated 18 August 1969 (S/9393/Add. 1), that the Lebanese Government rejects the above functions and insists that the Military Observers be stationed only in the framework of the 1949 Armistice Agreement. However, the armistice period is now behind us, and since June 1967 the international policy is to move beyond the cease-fire to permanent peace. Since the Lebanese reaction does not represent a positive reply to your proposal there is no point in my Government studying it further in detail. If and when we are informed that Lebanon is willing to accept your proposal as defined in your letter, we shall furnish you with our considered views on it. My Government is willing to work for the effective re-enforcement of the cease-fire in the Israel-Lebanese sector, which differs basically from that on the Suez Canal or on the Israel-Syrian sector.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) YOSEF TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations"

¹ U.N. doc. S/9393/Add. 2.

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Report by the Secretary-General on Displaced Persons Who Have Fled the Israel-occupied Areas as a Result of the Hostilities of June 1967.¹

September 9, 1969

1. This report is submitted to the General Assembly in pursuance of its resolution 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the resolution and report thereon to the General Assembly. In this resolution, which deals with the displaced persons who have fled the Israel-occupied areas as a result of the hostilities of June 1967, the General Assembly called upon the Government of Israel "to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities".

2. On 23 July 1969, the Secretary-General addressed the following *note verbale* to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to General Assembly resolution 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, which deals with the displaced persons who have fled the Israel-occupied areas as a result of the hostilities of June 1967.

"In this resolution, the General Assembly called upon the Government of Israel 'to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities' and requested the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly.

"The Secretary-General plans to submit to the General Assembly the report that has been requested of him before the opening of the twenty-fourth session of the Assembly. For this purpose, the Secretary-General would appreciate it if the Government of Israel would provide him with information on the steps it has taken to implement

the above-mentioned resolution and the results thus far achieved. He very much hopes that this information will be made available to him not later than 15 August 1969.

"The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to express to the Permanent Representative of Israel the assurances of his highest consideration."

3. The reply of the Permanent Representative of Israel to the above message was set forth in a note verbale dated 14 August, which reads as follows:

"The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note of 23 July 1969 concerning General Assembly resolution 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 and, on instructions from his Government, to state the following:

"1. The attitude of the Israel Government towards this problem was set out in the statement made by the Israel delegation before the Special Political Committee on 26 November 1968, as follows:

"My Government is acutely conscious of the human aspect of this question. My delegation will inform the Committee of what we have done and what we propose to do about it, under present circumstances. I say "under present circumstances" because it is not helpful to discuss the matter as if it existed in a vacuum and not in a complicated local context. The extent and rapidity with which a return can be facilitated is inevitably affected by the political and security conditions on the spot. We still live in a situation that officially rests on a cease-fire but that is in practice marked by continuous border warfare and by efforts to promote violence and disrupt orderly administration within the Israel-held areas. The Jordanian Government, which foments and supports all these activities, is itself making any large-scale repatriation as difficult and as sensitive as possible...

"Pending a peace settlement, Israel is doing its best to reconcile the return of displaced persons with responsibility for the safety, welfare and security of the local population and the security of the State itself. A programme for an influx of returnees obviously needs to be carefully regulated, though it can be reviewed and expanded as the

situation permits.' (A/SPC/PV.622, 29 November 1968).

"2. In accordance with that policy, the Israel delegation voted against resolution 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, since that resolution dealt with the question in isolation from its local context, and without any regard for the realities of the situation. On the other hand, the Israel delegation voted in favour of resolution 2452 C (XXIII) of the same date, as it had done for two previous resolutions reaffirmed by it, namely 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2341 (XXII) of 19 December 1967. Regarding these resolutions, the Israel delegation stated that:

'The original resolution as reaffirmed, as the Committee is well aware, called upon the Israel Government to ensure the safety, welfare, and security of the inhabitants of areas where military operations had taken place, and to facilitate the return of persons who had fled from these areas since the outbreak of hostilities. These two elements in the resolution are interrelated, as both of them are with the other elements in the same resolution. It must be regarded as an integral whole and cannot be reaffirmed only in part without changing its meaning and purpose.' (A/SPC/PV/ 624, 4 December 1968)

"3. Since the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 2452 A (XXIII) and 2452 C (XXIII), the Arab Governments in general, and the Jordanian Government in particular, have continued to carry out policies and practices that have aggravated the security and political conditions in the area, and made the return of displaced persons more difficult. These Governments have encouraged and assisted terrorism and violence, tried to disrupt normal civilian life, and carried out or co-operated with armed attack from their territories across the cease-fire lines by regular and irregular forces. Moreover, the willingness of the Israel Government on humanitarian grounds to permit the return of a number of displaced persons has been exploited for the purpose of infiltrating trained terrorists and saboteurs.

"4. During the same period, certain Arab Governments in the Middle East have continued ruthlessly to persecute the helpless Jewish minorities in their countries, in violation of the humanitarian resolutions adopted by the Security

Council and the General Assembly since June 1967.

"5. In spite of the difficulties set out above, the Israel Government has continued to the best of its ability to facilitate the return of persons who fled from the west bank in the June 1967 hostilities. This has been done in full co-operation with the Arab local authorities in the area, and in the context of family reunion, hardship cases, and the re-issuance to other applicants of entry permits not utilized by their original recipients. The progress of these programmes will be indicated by the Israel delegation in the Committee debate on the annual report of the Commissioner General of UNRWA, at the next regular session of the General Assembly.

"6. It is pertinent at this stage to make two general observations. Firstly, the majority of persons that crossed from the west bank to Jordan after the end of the June 1967 hostilities, cannot be regarded as 'displaced persons who have fled the Israel-occupied areas...'. They were persons who left the area of their own will, in an orderly fashion, and without being obliged to do so. Secondly, since last year this movement eastward has been negligible, and the only substantial movement of a permanent nature has been that of persons permitted by the Israel Government to return. Apart from that, a great number of permits have been issued by the Israel authorities for temporary visits in either direction, for business, family, and other reasons.

"The Permanent Representative of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to express to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the assurances of his highest consideration."

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Note by the Secretary-General Announcing the Appointment of the Members of the Special Committee Provided for in General Assembly Resolution 2443 (XXIII).¹

September 12, 1969

His Excellency Dr. Luis Alvarado, who was entrusted with the task of appointing the members of the Special Committee to Investigate

¹ U.N. doc. A/7495/Add. 3.

Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, has informed the Secretary-General, by a letter dated 12 September 1969, of the appointment of the members of the Special Committee. The letter reads as follows:

"With reference to the honourable task entrusted to me by the Vice-Presidents of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, namely, to appoint the members of the Special Committee established under General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII), I am pleased to inform you that the Governments of Ceylon, Somalia and Yugoslavia have agreed to become members of the Committee.

"I have spared no effort in carrying out my task, for I believe that the implementation of United Nations resolutions is one of the foundations on which international order should be based.

"In transmitting this information to you for such purposes as may be desirable, I take advantage of the opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration."

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Statement by the Secretary-General. New York.¹ (Excerpt)
September 12, 1969

In the case of the Middle East, you are all aware, that the situation has deteriorated since we last met. The tension and frustration to which I referred when I addressed you last year — the tension in the area and the frustration on the part of the peace-makers — have heightened during this period. In fact, in a recent report I described the situation especially in the Suez Canal area as a resumption of "open warfare". While the active involvement of the four permanent members of the Security Council in the quest for a solution to the Middle East situation is to be welcomed, and any success that they may achieve will greatly help the efforts of the mission of my Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, it seems to me that there is need for even more sustained and concentrated effort on the part of

the four permanent members in the months ahead if we are to save the situation. I am convinced that the Security Council as the principal organ of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security must have a definite role to play in the solution of the Middle Eastern problem. The permanent members of the Security Council, because of their special status under the Charter, have equally a special responsibility in contributing to the effective functioning of the Security Council. I hope that the presence of the Foreign Ministers of these four permanent members in connexion with the General Assembly may give an opportunity for them to meet and take necessary steps to redouble their efforts to contribute towards a solution.

It is needless for me to point out to you, ladies and gentlemen, that in the case of the Middle East the United Nations as an organization has even less of an alibi than in the case of Viet-Nam. Here all the parties involved are Members of the United Nations. There is a unanimous resolution approved by the Security Council almost 22 months ago which lays down a well-conceived framework for moving towards a peaceful solution. And yet, during these 22 months the situation has deteriorated considerably, while we should have expected significant improvement.

The reason for this state of affairs is not far to seek; it is simply the failure of the Member States concerned to abide by their Charter obligations. I have observed on different occasions that when it comes to any country's national interest, it seems to forget its obligations under the Charter. This is particularly true of the Middle East situation. Mutual recrimination will not get us anywhere in a situation like this. It is only when all Member States, and especially those affected by the resolutions and decisions of competent principal organs, particularly the decisions of the Security Council, decide to honour their Charter obligations and to implement these resolutions and decisions, that we can move forward, not only in the Middle East but on the whole front of international peace and security.

¹ U.N. Monthly Chronicle, October 1969, pp. 54-57.

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Interview Statements by the Secretary-General, New York.¹ (Excerpts)**September 15, 1969**

Q. Mr. Secretary-General, on Friday you urged the permanent members of the Security Council to take a more active role to facilitate a Middle East solution. Do you see advantages in Four-Power talks in New York that have not obtained in the Soviet-American bilateral talks that have been taking place in Washington and Moscow?

The Secretary-General: As you know, the four permanent members of the Security Council have been seized of this matter for several months. I understand that their talks were suspended pending the outcome of bilateral talks between Washington and Moscow. Late in July, I was informed of the latest proposals of the United States to the Soviet Union. Late in August, I was informed also of the reactions of the Soviet Government to Washington. If there is a basis for the resumption of the Four-Power talks in New York, I believe that these talks will be resumed immediately. So the arrangement, as I understand it, is that the Four Powers have suspended their deliberations awaiting the outcome of the bilateral talks going on between Moscow and Washington. The two sets of discussions do not conflict. I hope very much that the Four Powers will resume their talks at the United Nations while the Foreign Ministers are here in connexion with the General Assembly.

Q. Mr. Secretary-General, would a summit meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union, or possibly the Big Four, help to promote some sort of progress towards peace in the Middle East, as well as possibly a settlement of the Viet-Nam war?

The Secretary-General: You will no doubt recall that this was one of my proposals last year. But I understand that the Big Four would prefer to have comprehensive and practical preliminaries before they think of having a summit meeting. I have been informed by some of the Big-Power representatives that the time is not very congenial for the conduct of Big Four talks at the summit

level, but I very much hope that serious efforts will be made to create conditions for the conduct of a summit meeting of the Big Powers.

Q. Mr. Secretary-General, on Friday, in your remarkable address at the Hammarshjold luncheon, you said, and I quote in part: "...direct talks between the parties directly involved in the war is the right step for working out a solution ...". Then you said that the parties will "resolve their own differences without outside interference". That was, of course, on Viet-Nam. Do you also think that the application of these principles of international conduct would be a step in the right direction in the Middle East?

The Secretary-General: As far as the question of direct talks is concerned, I believe that my attitude is well known. I am always for exposure, contact and communication by all disputants in any crisis situation. I think that it would be ideal if direct talks could take place between President Nixon and Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, and Chairman Mao Tse-tung and President Chiang Kai-shek, and Premier Fidel Castro and President Nixon, but the question is whether such proposals are realistic, at least for some time, because of the psychological factors, the emotional factors, the political situation and domestic considerations.

As far as the Middle Eastern situation is concerned, as the Secretary-General I have to be guided necessarily by the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The most comprehensive and, in my view, the most important resolution adopted by the Security Council regarding the situation in the Middle East is the one adopted on 22 November 1967. I do not think there was any mention of direct talks in that resolution. But there was mention of the Secretary-General's Representative promoting agreement between the parties directly involved. So Ambassador Jarring, as you all know, has been trying his very best in the last two years to promote agreement. In order to promote agreement there must be some basis for him to come up with some ideas or suggestions.

The most important thing is for the parties directly concerned to tell him their respective positions, definitively. Only then will he be in a position to bring about the situation desired by the Security Council. In this connexion, I am

¹ U.N. Monthly Chronicle, October 1969, pp. 58-66.

reminded of a precedent which took place on the Island of Rhodes in February and March of 1949, when Dr. Ralph Bunche was the United Nations Mediator for the Middle East. The discussions were going on between Dr. Bunche and the parties concerned without involving direct talks. But when there was a basis for agreement, Dr. Bunche was able to bring about direct talks — at last.

So, in my view, it is not realistic to insist on direct talks between the parties in the Middle East just now. If there is a sufficient basis for talks, for agreement, for the reconciliation of positions, then I do not think direct contacts can be ruled out.

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Note by the Secretary-General Declaring Agreement among the Four Big Powers on the Middle East.¹

October 21, 1969

At the request of the Permanent Representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, I am transmitting to the Security Council, for the information of its members, the text of the statement which was released on 20 September 1969 by the Foreign Ministers of the above-mentioned countries.

The statement is as follows:

"The Foreign Ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States met with the Secretary-General for a discussion.

"They directed their attention to the situation in the Middle East, which they regarded as increasingly serious and urgent.

"1. They reaffirmed that resolution 242 of the Security Council dated 22 November 1967 should be supported and carried out.

"2. They agreed that durable peace should be established in the Middle East.

"3. They reaffirmed that all States in the Middle East have an inalienable right to exist as independent and sovereign States.

"4. With the above objectives in mind the conversations and contacts already established will be continued."

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Report by the Secretary-General under Security Council Resolution 267 of 3 July, 1969.²

December 5, 1969

1. The Security Council, in its resolution 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, requested the Secretary-General "to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution". In the same

Q. Mr. Secretary-General, since Mr. Jarring will be here at the very time the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four will be here, do you think that there might be an opportunity for co-ordinating the desires of the Big Four for a Middle East settlement with the work of Mr. Jarring?

The Secretary-General: Yes, Ambassador Jarring is arriving in New York tonight. Of course, as in the past, he will be available for discussion with the representatives of the parties directly involved, as well as the members of the Security Council, particularly the four permanent members of the Security Council. I am sure Ambassador Jarring, with his great diplomatic ability and patience, will be able to contribute materially to the progress of the talks that are likely to go on, particularly among the representatives of the Big Four here, during the presence in New York of the Foreign Ministers.

Q. Mr. Secretary-General, have you received any indication from Israel on its position on the resolution of 3 July on Jerusalem, whether it will implement it or refuse to implement it?

The Secretary-General: No.

¹ U.N. doc. S/9485.

² U.N. doc. S/9537.

resolution, the Security Council, among other things, censured "in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of the City of Jerusalem", confirmed that "all legislative and administrative measures and actions by Israel which purport to alter the status of Jerusalem including expropriation of land and properties thereon are invalid and cannot change that status", urgently called once more upon Israel "to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it which may tend to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, and in future to refrain from all actions likely to have such an effect", and requested Israel "to inform the Security Council without any further delay of its intentions with regard to the implementation of the provisions of this resolution".

2. In order to obtain the information necessary for the discharge of his reporting responsibilities under Security Council resolution 267 (1969), the Secretary-General addressed the following note to the Permanent Representative of Israel on 27 August 1969.

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to Security Council resolution S/RES/267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, concerning the status of the City of Jerusalem. Under the terms of that resolution the Council requested Israel 'to inform the Security Council without any further delay of its intentions with regard to the implementation of the provisions of this resolution' and requested the Secretary-General 'to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution'.

"The Permanent Representative of Israel will recall that on 4 August, in conversation with him, the Secretary-General referred to this question and inquired as to when the response of the Government of Israel to the Security Council resolution might be expected. The Secretary-General would be grateful if the Permanent Representative of Israel would be so kind as to convey to his Government the Secretary-General's hope that its response on this most important matter may be soon forthcoming."

3. Receipt of this note was acknowledged by the Permanent Representative of Israel in the following message dated 2 September 1969:

"The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of the Secretary-General's communication dated 27 August 1969 concerning Security Council resolution S/RES/267 (1969), and to inform him that the communication has been transmitted to Jerusalem for consideration by the Israel Government.

"The Permanent Representative of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General the assurances of his highest consideration."

4. On 15 October 1969, the Secretary-General addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel a second note, the text of which is as follows;

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 concerning the question of Jerusalem.

"In its resolution 267 (1969), the Security Council requested Israel 'to inform the Security Council without any further delay of its intentions with regard to the implementation of the provisions of this resolution' and requested the Secretary-General 'to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution'. It is recalled that on 4 August, in conversation with the Permanent Representative of Israel, the Secretary-General referred to this question and inquired as to when the response of the Government of Israel to the Security Council resolution might be expected. In a subsequent *note verbale* dated 27 August 1969, the Secretary-General requested the Permanent Representative of Israel to convey to his Government the Secretary-General's hope that its response on this most important matter might be soon forthcoming. In a *note verbale* dated 2 September 1969, the Permanent Representative of Israel acknowledged receipt of the Secretary-General's communication and informed the Secretary-General that 'the communication had been transmitted to Jerusalem for consideration by the Israel Government'. So far, the Secretary-General has received no response from the Israel Government, either directly or through the Permanent Representative.

"The Israel Government is, obviously, the only source for the information necessary, for the discharge of the Secretary-General's reporting responsibilities under Security Council resolution 267 (1969). Therefore, the Secretary-General once again requests the Israel Government to provide him with such information and he earnestly hopes that it will be made available to him at an early date. The Secretary-General will in any case be obliged in the very near future to report to the Security Council in fulfilment of the responsibilities placed on him in the above-mentioned resolution.

"The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Representative the assurances of his highest consideration."

5. On 21 November 1969, the Secretary-General addressed a third note to the Permanent Representative of Israel, which reads as follows:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's notes of 27 August and 15 October 1969 concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 on the subject of Jerusalem.

"The Secretary-General considers it necessary to discharge his obligation to submit the report on this matter requested by the Security Council in the above-mentioned resolution within the next week. The Secretary-General, therefore, very much hopes that the information he has requested on this subject from the Government of Israel will be forthcoming before that time.

"The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Representative of Israel the assurances of his highest consideration."

6. The following reply dated 27 November 1969, has been received by the Secretary-General from the Permanent Representative of Israel:

"Excellency,

"I am instructed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you the following letter:

"Excellency,

"In response to your note of 15 October to the Permanent Representative of Israel referring to the Security Council's resolution of 3 July 1969,

I wish to clarify further the present situation in Jerusalem and my Government's attitude to the universal interest in its Holy Places.

"The division of Jerusalem arose out of illicit armed action by Jordanian forces in 1948, in defiance of Security Council cease-fire appeals. Similarly, this division was terminated by hostilities initiated by Jordan in 1967. The circumstances under which the Jordanian régime came to an end were described in my letter to you of 10 July 1967 (A/6753, S/8052), as follows:

"On 5 June 1967, the Jordanian forces launched a destructive and unprovoked armed assault on the part of Jerusalem outside the walls. This attack was made despite Israel's appeals to Jordan to abstain from hostilities. Dozens of Jerusalem citizens were killed and hundreds wounded.

"Artillery bombardment was directed against synagogues, the Church of Dormition, hospitals, centres of secular and religious learning, the Hebrew University and the Israel Museum. Intensive fire was directed against institutions and residential centres from positions in and near the Holy Places themselves, which were thus converted into military positions for shelling Jerusalem."

"The nineteen years during which the City was divided by a military demarcation line were a sombre episode in its long history. Jordanian control of east Jerusalem arose exclusively out of military conquest and had no other international authority.

"Jerusalem has been the focus of Israel's faith and nationhood for three thousand years and has been Israel's centre of Government for two decades. It is inconceivable that Jerusalem should be torn apart again or that any international interests can be served by pressing for the City to be dismembered. These interests are based on the Holy Places of three great monotheistic religions. For the first time since 1948 the shrines of all faiths have been open to access by those who hold them sacred.

"Israel has ensured that the Holy Places be under the responsibility of the religions concerned. Places of worship and religious institutions destroyed or damaged in the assaults of 1948 and 1967 have been or are being restored. I reiterated my Government's willingness to work out agreements with the representative bodies of the three

religions to ensure that the universal and sacred character of the Holy Places is appropriately expressed and free access to them guaranteed. My Government has initiated and maintained contact with all such bodies that are willing to discuss with us these matters of common concern.

'Apart from these universal associations Jerusalem is a living secular city with 200,000 Jewish and 70,000 Arab inhabitants. Municipal and public utilities have been extended to the eastern part of the City and are being steadily improved. Normal movement and visit, residence, business activity and employment are open to all citizens in all parts of the City. Its economic welfare is being advanced and plans are taking shape to enhance its dignity and beauty. The participation of over 7,000 Arab residents in the recent municipal elections in Jerusalem demonstrated their positive interest in the day-to-day administration of the united City.

'The progress of the City during the past two years stands in sharp contrast to the situation which prevailed from 1948 to 1967 in the Jordan-occupied section. After its occupation in 1948 the Jewish quarter of the walled Old City was practically destroyed and scores of synagogues in it were laid waste. The ancient Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives was desecrated and partly demolished. Despite a solemn obligation in the Armistice Agreement, no Jews in Israel or anywhere in the world were allowed access to their most sacred shrine, the Western (Wailing) Wall, or to any other place in Jordanian hands associated with Jewish history, religion and tradition. Even the Moslem Arab citizens of Israel were not allowed by Jordan to reach their Holy Places. Outbreaks of fighting, bloodshed and tension were frequent across the armistice lines which ran through the heart of the City.

'International opinion has every reason to regret that the Security Council remained completely indifferent to the destruction and sacrilege of Jewish houses and prayer, residences and burial grounds and violation of the principle of free access to the Holy Places. It would be incongruous for a body which did nothing to prevent Jerusalem's violent division to work now against its peaceful union or to censure measures taken to ensure the livelihood of all its inhabitants and to maintain public law and order

despite occasional terrorist attacks upon the civil population organized, directed and financed by the very Jordanian authorities which showed such callous disregard for Jerusalem's peace and sanctity on many occasions during the past twenty years.

'The sacred associations which are evoked by Jerusalem should not become the object of political and religious incitement without regard for the genuine interests of the City and its inhabitants, as was the case during the unfortunate recent Security Council debate.

'As I stated in my letter of 10 July 1967, the Government of Israel is confident that world opinion will come to welcome the new prospect of seeing this ancient and historic metropolis thrive in unity, peace and spiritual elevation.

'Our policy is to work for the City's welfare in the interests of all its inhabitants and that when the final peace is established it should embody agreements with the appropriate Christian and Moslem authorities to ensure expression of the universal religious interests involved.

'In my statement to the General Assembly at its 1757th meeting on 19 September 1969 I said:

'"Israel does not claim exclusive or unilateral jurisdiction in the Holy Places of Christianity and Islam in Jerusalem, and is willing to discuss this principle with those traditionally concerned. There is a versatile range of possibilities for working out a status for the Holy Places in such a manner as to promote Middle Eastern peace and ecumenical harmony. In the meantime, our policy is that the Moslem and Christian Holy Places should always be under the responsibility of those who hold them sacred. This principle has been in practical effect since 1967."

'I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

'Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

'(Signed) Abba EBAN'

“(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH

*Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations”*

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Report by the Secretary-General under Security Council Resolution 271 of 15 September, 1969.¹**December 16, 1969**

1. This report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969 concerning Jerusalem, which requested the Secretary-General "to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council at the earliest possible date". This resolution was communicated to the Government of Israel on the day of its adoption.

2. On 24 November 1969, the Secretary-General, having received no information, addressed the following note to the Permanent Representative of Israel:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969 on the subject of Jerusalem.

"Under the terms of this resolution, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General 'to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council at the earliest possible date'. In order that he may fulfil the reporting responsibilities placed upon him by the Security Council, the Secretary-General would be grateful if the Israel Government would provide him, at an early date, with the necessary information regarding the implementation of the above-mentioned resolution, since it is his intention to submit a report to the Council not later than mid-December 1969.

"The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Representative of Israel the assurances of his highest consideration."

3. On 16 December 1969, the Secretary-General received from the Permanent Representative of Israel the following reply dated 15 December 1969:

"The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to

the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note of 24 November 1969 concerning Security Council resolution 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969.

"The genesis of the resolution was the blatant attempt of Arab States to exploit the fire in the Al-Aqsa Mosque for political and propaganda purposes and to incite religious passions throughout the Moslem world. The invoking of the Security Council to further these purposes was one of the most inglorious chapters in the history of the United Nations, and impaired the prestige of the organization itself. Moreover, the tension, antagonism and falsehood artificially and deliberately created over the incident damaged still further the prospects of a peaceful settlement of Middle East conflict.

"These submissions are more fully elaborated in the statements made by the Permanent Representative during the Security Council debate between 9 and 15 September 1969.

"The report of the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the President of the Israel Supreme Court was published on 23 September 1969. The trial of Denis Michael Rohan, accused of arson in connexion with the fire, is still in progress, and judgement is expected to be delivered soon. In the meantime, temporary repairs have been effected to the Mosque, and prayers are conducted in it as usual.

"As for those paragraphs in the Security Council resolution referring to the question of Jerusalem, reference is made to the letter from the Foreign Minister of Israel conveyed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative on 27 November 1969, and circulated in document S/9537 of 5 December 1969,

"The Permanent Representative of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the assurances of his highest considerations."

¹ U.N. doc. S/9559.

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Interview Statements by the Secretary-General. New York.¹ (Excerpts)**December 22, 1969**

Mr. LITTLEJOHNS (President of UNCA):

Now, Sir, to my question. It is about two years since Ambassador Jarring became your Special Representative. Yet the problems of the Middle East, far from abating, seem to have worsened. You may be aware that there have been some small murmurings of discontent about Dr. Jarring's role in the search for peace. Some persons feel that he should be more active, more of a mediator and less of a messenger, more in the Middle East and less in Moscow. May I ask you, Sir, to evaluate the Middle East situation at this time with special reference to Dr. Jarring's mission.

The Secretary-General: I agree with the premise of your question: that the situation in the Middle East has deteriorated. I have been saying that for the past several months, and I am afraid that, if there is no peaceful solution in time, the situation may get out of hand.

As far as the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, is concerned, as you all know he has to function within the framework of the Security Council resolution of November 1967. His primary function is to promote agreement. He is not expected to function as a mediator. I think we have to make that distinction very clear. As I said on a previous occasion, he has exercised his functions with wisdom, with discretion and with a very rare degree of objectivity for over a year. I did not think earlier this year and I do not think now that he would like to repeat this more or less futile exercise without the prospect of a peaceful opening to a solution.

So my position on this question is very clear. First of all, I feel that the Security Council, as envisaged in the Charter, has a special responsibility to contribute towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In order to enable the Security Council to perform its func-

tions efficiently and effectively, it is necessary — it is even essential — that the permanent members of the Security Council exert their utmost to formulate principles or guidelines to facilitate the work of the Secretary-General's Special Representative.

As you all know, in the past two years there has been no real basis for Ambassador Jarring to operate. He has been performing his functions with a keen sense of responsibility, but he is still unable to find a real basis to start on concrete steps. Of course, I have kept him constantly informed of the developments in the political field. Whenever the Big Four met, the host ambassador, the ambassador who happened to preside over the particular meeting, invariably reported to me on the proceedings of the meeting, on the results of the discussion and on the conclusions arrived at. I always transmitted those reports to Ambassador Jarring. I also informed Ambassador Jarring of other political developments which I could gather from the Permanent Representatives of the countries directly involved in the area.

So, the Secretary-General's Representative has been kept fully informed of the political developments, the progress or lack of progress in the Big Four deliberations.

It is my feeling that the four permanent members of the Security Council will come to some substantive agreement regarding the guidelines under which Ambassador Jarring can operate. Of course Ambassador Jarring will resume his functions as soon as there is some progress in the deliberations of the Big Four. But the resumption of his functions does not necessarily depend on the progress of the Big Four talks; it will depend primarily on the progress of the Big Four talks, but not exclusively.

Q. Sir, you said just now that you feel the Big Four will come to substantive agreement on the Middle East situation. Does anything that you know about the recent initiatives in the Big Four or anything that you heard about the Arab summit meeting indicate this? Is your optimism based on anything definite that you heard recently?

The Secretary-General: I am familiar with all the proposals and the substance of the discussions

¹ U.N. Monthly Chronicle, January 1970, pp. 178-187.

that have been going on among the Big Four meetings, and I have come to the conclusion that the Big Four genuinely want to facilitate the work of Ambassador Jarring. Their primary purpose has been and still is to facilitate Ambassador Jarring's work. They are very eager that the Secretary-General's Special Representative should resume his activities promptly, and if I may make a conjecture, I have a feeling that before the end of January there will be sufficient basis for Ambassador Jarring to resume his activities.

Q. Mr. Secretary-General, it is possible for the Big Four, in their Big Four capacity, to do two things which would dampen the fighting in the Middle East. One of those is to embargo arms to all the parties; the second is to offer a guarantee to all parties on the boundaries they might arrive at in the light of your recently expressed fear of a 100 years' war if the fighting continues, do you believe the Powers should take one or both such actions now?

The Secretary-General: I will be very glad to transmit the substance of your questions to the Big Four.

Q. The 22 November resolution and the statements by the Big Four themselves continually emphasized up to now that the parties had to agree on their own terms. When formulations are put forward which change in effect some of the conditions of the resolution, or appear to modify them, is that not a departure from the original purpose of the Big Four? The resolution says nothing

about the Big Four doing anything; it merely authorizes Ambassador Jarring to promote a peace based on principles approved by the entire membership of the United Nations. Are not the Big Four modifying and departing from and reducing and changing — the parties themselves have said distorting — the original proposal?

The Secretary-General: I do not believe that the Big Four are deviating from the framework of the Security Council resolution of November 1967. Their whole purpose is to facilitate the work of Ambassador Jarring within the framework of that resolution. As I have said in the past, the Security Council resolution can be given effect to only if the Big Four are in agreement. That has been the fact for the last 24 years. You will recall that, since the inception of the United Nations, Chapter VII — that is, the Chapter pertaining to the action of the Security Council in situations involving threats to international peace and security — has never been invoked. Chapter VII has never been invoked. So, in order to give effect to the resolutions of the Security Council, the essential element is that the permanent members of the Security Council must agree on the method of implementation. That is what they are engaged in. It is far from their intention, in my view, to deviate from the purposes of the relevant Security Council resolution. They are performing their functions only within the framework of that resolution.

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PART VI

Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, Security Council, Commission on Human Rights, Commission on the Status of Women, UNESCO and WHO

1. General Assembly

350

Resolution 2535 (XXIV) on Assistance to Palestine Refugees Adopted by the General Assembly.¹

December 10, 1969

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963, 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965, 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965, 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966, 2341 (XXII) of 19 December 1967 and 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968,

Noting the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1968 to 30 June 1969,

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussia, Ceylon, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Bolivia, Botswana, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Guatemala, Israel, Liberia, Malawi, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, United States, Uruguay.

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, United Kingdom, Upper Volta, Venezuela. Part C was proposed by 18 powers and was adopted by 108 votes in favour, none against, with 3 abstentions (Laos, Malawi, Portugal).

¹ Supplement No. 14 (A/7614). The resolution was adopted at 1827th Plenary meeting. It consisted of 3 parts. Part A was proposed by USA and was adopted by 110 votes in favour, none against, with 1 abstention (Israel). Part B was proposed by 12 powers in the Special Political Committee and was adopted by 48 votes in favour, 22 against, with 47 abstentions.

3. *Directs* the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue his efforts in taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need;

4. *Notes with regret* that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof;

5. *Directs attention* to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

6. *Notes with concern* that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements;

7. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and therefore urges non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions.

B

The General Assembly

Recognizing that the problem of the Palestine refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Gravely concerned that the denial of their rights has been aggravated by the reported acts of collective punishment, arbitrary detention, curfews,

destruction of homes and property, deportation and other repressive acts against the refugees and other inhabitants of the occupied territories.

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, and 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 calling upon "the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities",

Desirous of giving effect to its resolutions for relieving the plight of the displaced persons and the refugees,

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine;

2. *Draws the attention* of the Security Council to the grave situation resulting from Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories and Israel's refusal to implement the above resolutions;

3. *Requests* the Security Council to take effective measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to ensure the implementation of these resolutions.

C

The General Assembly

Recalling its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967 and 2452 C (XXIII) of 19 December 1968,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1968 to 30 June 1969,

Bearing in mind also the letter dated 24 July 1969 from the Secretary-General addressed to all States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies,²

Concerned about the continued human suffering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 2252 (ES-V), 2341 B (XXII) and 2452 C (XXIII);

¹ A/7577.

2. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;

3. *Strongly appeals* to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

351

Resolution 2546 (XXIV) on the Task of the Special Committee, Adopted by the General Assembly.¹

December 11, 1969

The General Assembly

Guided by the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian

Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Recalling the humanitarian resolutions regarding the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the territories occupied by Israel, especially Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968, Commission on Human Rights resolutions 6 (XXIV) of 27 February 1968 and 6 (XXV) of 4 March 1969, and the relevant resolutions of the International Conference of Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization,

Further recalling its resolutions 2252 (ESV) of 4 July 1967 and 2443 (XXIII) and 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968,

Concerned that the provisions of these resolutions have not been implemented by the Israeli authorities,

Gravely alarmed by fresh reports of collective punishments, mass imprisonment, indiscriminate destruction of homes and other acts of oppression against the civilian populations in the Arab territories occupied by Israel,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions relating to the violations of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel;

2. Expresses its grave concern at the continuing reports of violation of human rights in those territories;

3. Condemns such policies and practices as collective and area punishment, the destruction of homes and the deportation of the inhabitants of the Israeli-occupied territories.

4. Urgently calls upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from its reported repressive practices and policies towards the civilian population in the occupied territories and to comply with its obligations under the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the relevant resolutions adopted by the various international organizations;

5. Requests the Committee established under its resolution 2443 (XXIII) to take cognizance of the provisions of the present resolution.

¹ The resolution was adopted by 52 votes in favour, 13 against and 49 abstentions.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussia, Cambodia, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Bolivia, Dahomey, Ecuador, Gabon, Gambia, Israel, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uruguay.

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Venezuela.

2. Security Council

352

Resolution Adopted by the Security Council on the Israeli Military Action against Jordan.¹

April 1, 1969

The Security Council,

Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1466,

Having heard the statements made before the Council,

Recalling resolution 236 (1967),

Observing that numerous premeditated violations of the cease-fire have occurred,

Viewing with deep concern that the recent air attacks on Jordanian villages and other populated areas were of a pre-planned nature, in violation of resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968),

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation which endangers peace and security in the area,

1. *Reaffirms* resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968);

2. *Deplores* the loss of civilian life and damage to property;

3. *Condemns* the recent premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions and warns once again that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would have to meet to consider further more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such attacks.

353

Resolution Adopted by the Security Council Censuring All Measures Taken by Israel to Change the Status of Jerusalem.²

July 3, 1969

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 252 of 21 May 1968 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967 respectively concerning measures and actions by Israel affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,

Having heard the statements of the parties concerned on the question,

Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has taken further measures tending to change the status of the City of Jerusalem,

Reaffirming the established principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 252 (1968);

2. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to show any regard for the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions mentioned above;

3. *Censures* in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of the City of Jerusalem;

4. *Confirms* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions by Israel which purport to alter the status of Jerusalem including expropriation of land and properties thereon are invalid and cannot change that status;

5. *Urgently calls* once more upon Israel to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it which may tend to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, and in future to refrain from all actions likely to have such an effect;

6. *Requests* Israel to inform the Security Council without any further delay of its intentions

¹ U.N. doc. S/Res./265. The resolution was adopted by 11 votes in favour, none against, and 4 abstentions: Colombia, Paraguay, United Kingdom, and United States.

² U.N. doc. S/RES/267. Paragraph 5 of this resolution was voted on separately and was adopted by 14 votes in favour, none against, and one abstention: United States. The resolution as a whole was adopted unanimously.

with regard to the implementation of the provisions of this resolution;

7. *Determines* that, in the event of a negative response or no response from Israel, the Security Council shall reconvene without delay to consider what further action should be taken in this matter;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution.

354

**Resolution Adopted by the Security Council
Condemning Israel's Premeditated Attack on
Southern Lebanon.¹**

August 26, 1969

ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT
ITS 150TH MEETING ON 26 AUGUST 1969

The Security Council,

Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1498/Rev. 1,

Having noted the contents of the letter of the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Lebanon (document S/9383),

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

Grieved at the tragic loss of civilian life and property,

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from the violation of Security Council resolutions,

Recalling the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon of 23 March 1949, and the cease-fire established pursuant to resolutions 233 of 1967 and 234 of 1967,

Recalling its resolution 262 (1968),

Mindful of its responsibility under the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns* the premeditated air attack by Israel on villages in southern Lebanon in violation of its obligations under the Charter and Security Council resolutions;

2. *Deplores* all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire;

3. *Deplores* the extension of the area of fighting;

4. *Declares* that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts.

355

**Resolution Adopted by the Security Council
on the Fire of 21 August, 1969 in the al-Aqsa
Mosque.²**

September 15, 1969

The Security Council,

Grieved at the extensive damage caused by arson to the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969 under the military occupation of Israel,

Mindful of the consequent loss to human culture,

Having heard the statements made before the Council reflecting the universal outrage caused by the act of sacrilege in one of the most venerated shrines of mankind,

Recalling its resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively, concerning measures and actions by Israel affecting the status of the city of Jerusalem,

Reaffirming the established principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969);

2. *Recognizes* that any act of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/270. The resolution was adopted unanimously.

² U.N. doc. S/RES/271. The resolution was adopted by 11 votes in favour, none against, and 4 abstentions: Colombia, Finland, Paraguay, United States. At the request of France, paragraph 4 was put to vote separately, and was adopted by 10 votes in favour, none against, and 5 abstentions: Colombia, Finland, France, Paraguay, and United States.

and sites in Jerusalem or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such act may seriously endanger international peace and security;

3. *Determines* that the execrable act of desecration of the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque emphasizes the immediate necessity of Israel desisting from acting in violation of the aforesaid resolutions and rescinding forthwith all measures and actions taken by it designed to alter the status of Jerusalem;

4. *Calls upon* Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and international law governing military occupation and to refrain from causing any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Supreme Muslim Council of Jerusalem, including any co-operation that Council may desire from countries with predominantly Muslim population

and from Muslim communities in relation to its plans for the maintenance and repair of the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem;

5. *Condemns* the failure of Israel to comply with the aforementioned resolutions and calls upon it to implement forthwith the provisions of these resolutions;

6. *Reiterates* the determination in operative paragraph 7 of resolution 267 (1969) that in the event of a negative response or no response, the Security Council shall convene without delay to consider what further action should be taken in this matter;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council at the earliest possible date.

3. Commission on Human Rights

356

Resolution 6 (XXV) Establishing a Special Working Group of Experts to Investigate Violations of Arab Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, Adopted by the Commission on Human Rights.¹

March 4, 1969

"The Commission on Human Rights,

"Mindful of the principle embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizing the right of everyone to return to his country,

"Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, General Assembly resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967, resolution 6 (XXIV) of the Commission on Human Rights and Economic and Social Council resolution 1336 (XLIV) of 31 May 1968 and General

Assembly resolution 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 which called upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities,

"Further recalling the telegram dispatched by the Commission on Human Rights on 8 March 1968, calling upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population in areas occupied by Israel, and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms,

"Bearing in mind that Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, Economic and Social Council resolution 1336 (XLIV) of 31 May 1968, and resolution 6 (XXIV) of the Commission on Human Rights have called for the application of Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 in the territories occupied by Israel,

"Noting that the Security Council has once again expressed its concern for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel and deplored the delay in the implementation of resolution 237 (1967),

"Noting also resolution I on respect for, and

¹ U.N. doc. E/CN.4/L.1068. The resolution was adopted at the 1014th meeting by 13 votes in favour, 1 against, with 16 abstentions. In favour: India, Iran, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Ukraine, USSR, UAR, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia. *Against:* Israel.

Abstentions: Austria, Chile, Congo (Democratic Republic of) Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Italy, Jamaica, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, U.U., USA, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

implementation of, human rights in occupied territories, adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights on 7 May 1968 (A/CONF. 32/41) and General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968,

"Deeply concerned about the reported continuation of human rights violations as well as violations of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 in the territories occupied by Israel,

"Having received the report of the Secretary-General (E/CN.4/999),

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of all the inhabitants who have left since the outbreak of hostilities to return, and calls upon the Government of Israel to immediately implement the United Nations resolutions to this effect;

"2. Deplores Israel's continued violations of human rights in the occupied territories, particularly the act of destroying homes of Arab civilian population, deportation of inhabitants and the resorting to violence against inhabitants expressing their resentment to occupation and *calls upon* the Government of Israel to put an immediate end to such acts;

"3. Expresses its deep concern on Israel's refusal to abide by the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and *calls once again upon* the Government of Israel fully to respect and apply that Convention;

"4. Decides to establish a special Working Group of Experts composed of the members of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of Experts established under Commission resolutions 2 (XXIII) and 2 (XXIV) with the following mandate:

"(a) To investigate allegations concerning Israel's violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, in the territories occupied by Israel as a result of hostilities in the Middle East;

"(b) To receive communications, to hear witnesses and to use such modalities of procedure as it may deem necessary;

"(c) To report, with its conclusions and recommendations, to the Commission's twenty-sixth session;

"5. Decides to include the question of human

rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East as a separate item of priority on the agenda of the Commission's twenty-sixth session."

At the request of the Working Group I have the honour to express the hope that Your Excellency's Government would extend its co-operation to the group. In particular, the Working Group would be grateful if Your Excellency's Government could communicate to me... by 27 June 1969, if possible, any information relating to matters within the mandate of the Group as set out above, including the names and addresses of persons or organizations residing within the jurisdiction of Your Excellency's Government who might be prepared to furnish such information, either orally or in writing, to the Working Group. The names of such persons or organizations would be kept confidential by the Working Group upon request."

(Replies by the Permanent Representatives of UAR, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Israel, the Permanent Observer of the Arab League and the Commissioner-General of UNRWA)

UAR

"The Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic wishes to convey to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group that the Government of the United Arab Republic is ready to extend its full co-operation to the expert group in order to ensure the fulfilment of its mandate and the prompt implementation of resolution 6 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights."

Jordan

"I have the honour... to convey to the Working Group... that the Jordan Government is ready to extend to the Working Group its full co-operation to ensure the prompt fulfilment of the Mandate entrusted to it under resolution 6 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights."

Syria

"I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic would be more than happy to extend to the Special Working Group established under paragraph 4 of resolution 6 (XXV) of the Commission on

Human Rights... its full co-operation for the successful fulfilment of its humanitarian mission in accordance with the terms of the aforementioned resolution."

Lebanon

"I have the honour to inform you that the Lebanese Government welcomes the visit of the Special Working Group of Experts to Lebanon and is prepared to do whatever possible to facilitate its mission. Furthermore, the Government and many directly interested organizations and individuals will be willing to supply the Committee with all the documents and evidence which prove the Israeli violation of human rights in the occupied territories."

Israel

"At the time of the adoption of the resolution, the representative of Israel fully explained why the Government of Israel rejected that unbalanced and prejudicial resolution.

"It attempted to prejudice the very conclusions which the so-called Special Working Group of Experts was to reach.

"It failed to have any regard for the vicious trampling on the human rights of the Jewish Communities in certain Arab countries in the Middle East region.

"It was adopted by the Commission on Human Rights by a vote of 13 in favour and one against, with 16 abstentions and two members absent. All the 13 votes in favour were cast by Member States with a record of anti-Israel votes, and nearly all of them are Arab or pro-Arab States that do not maintain any normal relations with Israel and are consistently hostile to it.

"It is clear that a resolution adopted in these circumstances is a purely propaganda exercise lacking any moral validity; and that it does not represent the views of the responsible and impartial majority of the Commission's members.

"It is noted that the Special Working Group of Experts had not been completely or properly constituted when some of its members decided to dispatch the letter of 9 April 1969 to the Government of Israel, which is attached to the Secretary-General's note. It is further noted that the resolution of the Commission on Human Rights setting up the Special Working Group was not subse-

quently approved as required by various resolutions of the Economic and Social Council, including more particularly resolutions 9 (I) of 21 June 1946 and 1367 (XLV) of 2 August 1968.

"In the light of the foregoing, the Government of Israel wishes to inform the Secretary-General that it is unable to consider resolution 6 (XXV) as constituting a basis for co-operation on its part."

Arab League

"I am pleased to inform you that the League of Arab States welcomes the decision of the said resolution entrusting the *Ad Hoc* Group of Experts established under resolutions 2 (XXVIII) and 2 (XXIV) of the Commission on Human Rights to investigate allegations concerning Israel's violations of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 April 1949, in the territories occupied by Israel as a result of hostilities in the Middle East.

"The League of Arab States also welcomes the visit of the group to conduct its investigations and will co-operate to the fullest extent.

"I wish also to inform you that your letter was presented to the Permanent Arab Regional Commission of Human Rights, which expressed its readiness to meet with the *Ad Hoc* Group and render all facilities.

"The League of Arab States is in the process of preparing the requested information relating to matters within the mandate of the group. I shall, in due time, inform you about this matter in full detail."

Commissioner-General of UNRWA

"I have given careful consideration to the request made in your letter, in the light of the mandate of UNRWA as determined by the General Assembly. Although I understand and sympathize with your needs and purposes, I feel obliged to advise you that I have serious doubts as to whether the requests contained in your letter fall within the terms of the mandate, or are consistent with the activities as conducted at present by UNRWA, or indeed, whether UNRWA at present would be able to do what you wish done.

"You may be sure that it is with genuine regret

that I feel unable, for the reasons stated above, to respond favourably to your requests. Permit me to suggest that if you and the Special Working Group of Experts should wish to pursue this matter further, you might seek the opinion and guidance of the Secretary-General."

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Resolution 7 (XXV) on the Question of Human Rights Arising out of the Hostilities in the Middle East, Adopted by the Commission on Human Rights.¹

March 4, 1969

The Commission on Human Rights

Deeply concerned at the conflict affecting the Middle East, which continues to constitute an explosive factor that might spark off a universal

conflagration, and at its consequences for the civil populations,

Aware of its legal and moral obligation to foster universal respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, to promote conditions which guarantee such respect and to eliminate harm and suffering which constitute an affront to civilization.

Makes a fervent appeal to all Governments, their peoples and world public opinion to spare no efforts to ensure a peaceful settlement of the conflict affecting the Middle East through respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and through the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, in particular resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, and, meanwhile, to ensure in that region respect for the fundamental rights of all human beings which will greatly contribute in creating conditions for the restoration of peace.

4. Commission on the Status of Women

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Resolution 4 (XXII) on Protection of Women and Children in Emergency or War Time, Fighting for Peace, National Liberation and Independence, Adopted by the Commission on the Status of Women.²

February 3, 1969

The Commission on the Status of Women,

Conscious of its responsibility to seek and establish, for all women, conditions of life which satisfy the criteria of human dignity and development laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenants,

Convinced that the spread and perpetuation of armed conflicts create particularly tragic conditions of life for women and children in occupied territories ravaged by war and increasingly delay the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations,

Appreciating the attention given and the Emergency Fund established by the United Nations

Children's Fund to help children of the occupied territories and other territories affected by war,

Concerned also for the tragic conditions of women and children in areas struck by natural disasters,

Convinced of the increasing responsibility which women should assume in the conduct of national and international public affairs,

1. *Takes note* of resolutions I and XXII adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights³ and General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII) and 2444 (XXIII) concerning respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories, and human rights in armed conflicts;

2. *Expresses the hope* that women in increasing numbers will be consulted or sent on missions by the International Committee of the Red Cross in occupied territories and territories ravaged by war or struck by natural disasters;

3. *Solemnly appeals* to all women throughout the world to make every effort to contribute, in their

¹ U.N. doc. E/CN.4/L. 1071. The resolution was adopted unanimously at the 1015th meeting.

² U.N. doc. E/CN.6/L.554/Rev. 1.

³ See *Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.XIV.2).

families and in their communities, to the establishment of peace and justice and towards finding a just solution to armed conflicts;

4. *Recommends* that the protection of women and children against inhuman practices in time of armed conflict or occupation should more than ever receive the attention of the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations Children's Fund, which should furthermore render greater assistance to them and to women and children in terri-

tories struck by natural disasters;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the Commission at its twenty-third session a report, based in particular on information in United Nations official documents and in the reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations Children's Fund, on the conditions of women and children in the territories mentioned in operative paragraph 1 of this resolution.

5. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

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Resolution 4.2.5 on Co-operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), Adopted by the Executive Board of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.¹

June 2, 1969

The Executive Board,

1. *Having examined* the Director-General's report on co-operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) (82 EX/8 and Add.),

2. *Recalling* its previous resolutions on this question and, in particular, decision 6.8 adopted at its seventy-seventh session and decision 7.4 adopted at its seventy-eighth session,

3. *Takes note* of the work and recommendations of the Commission of Outside Experts established to examine the textbooks used in UNRWA/UNESCO schools;

4. *Invites* the Director-General to continue his consultations with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to reconsider its position in regard to the implementation of resolutions 6.8 and 7.4;

5. *Calls upon* the Governments of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic to consider the recommendations of the Commission of Experts, transmit their observations thereon to the Director-General and pursue consultations with him in order to reach an agreement in this matter;

6. *Authorizes* the Director-General to lift the ban, before the beginning of the school year 1969-1970, on those textbooks which he will have approved,

7. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to permit without any restriction the import and use of the textbooks approved by the Director-General for UNRWA/UNESCO schools in the occupied territories;

8. *Asks* the Director-General to report to the Executive Board at its next session on the application of this resolution.

¹ See Report of the Commission-General of the UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1968 — 30 June 1969, Supplement No. 14, U.N. doc. A/7614, 15/9/1969, p. 94.

6. World Health Organization

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Resolution WHA 22.43 on Health Assistance to Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Middle East, Adopted by the World Health Assembly.¹

July 24, 1969

The Twenty-second World Health Assembly,

Having considered the Director-General's report² of 17 June 1969 on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons, as well as the Annual Report of the Director of Health Department of UNRWA;

Considering that the World Health Organization should continue its efforts to provide effective health assistance for refugees and displaced persons in order to ensure their health protection and care;

Recalling the numerous humanitarian resolutions of the United Nations which called upon Israel *inter alia* to ensure the safety, welfare

and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations took place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled from these areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

Further recalling its resolution WHA21.38 on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution WHA21.38;

2. *Deplores* the deficiency of the health conditions in the occupied territories in the Middle East;

3. *Takes Careful Note* of the Director-General's report and of the statement by the distinguished representative of UNRWA;

4. *Calls Upon* Member States to exert all efforts towards ensuring the social well-being of displaced persons, refugees and inhabitants of the occupied territories in the Middle East and enabling them to enjoy a normal standard of health and

5. *Requests* the Director-General of the World Health Organization to take all the effective measures in his power to safeguard health conditions amongst refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East and to report thereon to the Twenty-third World Health Assembly.

¹ See Report of the Commissioner-General of the UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1968 - 30 June 1969, Supplement 14, U.N. doc. A/7614, 15/9/1969, p. 95.

² Documents A22/p and B/3 and Corr. 1.

Arab World

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Memorandum Submitted by West Bank Notables to the Israeli Defence Minister Dayan Protesting against the Arbitrary Treatment by Israel of Citizens in the West Bank.¹

Mr. Defence Minister,

The Israeli occupation authorities have recently intensified their campaign of violence and terror against citizens in the occupied territories. Every day new forms of pressure and restriction are applied, in total violation of all legal, human and ethical values. It may be that the authorities hope that such techniques will solve the problem in Israel's favour and in a manner that suits them, but this merely proves that they have learnt nothing from the lessons of the past eighteen months, during which time our people in the occupied territories have clearly shown that they are determined to stand fast, to preserve the unity of the two banks of the Jordan, never to surrender and never to lose touch with the Arab liberation movement. Our people believe that the solution of the present problem can begin only after total and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.

The latest measure taken by your authorities has been to forbid cars of all descriptions to cross the River Jordan into the East Bank or vice versa. Citizens have been forbidden to travel freely between the various cities of the West Bank and cars have been barred from travelling too. This directly affects the economic status of the inhabitants of the occupied territories. These arbitrary measures also aim at isolating the Arab city of Jerusalem from the occupied West Bank.

The Israeli authorities have justified these measures by calling them security measures. In fact they form part of a plan to bring pressure on the Arabs and force them to leave their homeland. The authorities have recently resorted to mass arrests and arbitrary detention and have so far arrested or taken into custody several thousands, as the Israeli authorities have themselves admitted. The Israeli Minister of Police stated unabashedly in the Knesset that he was about to review the

comforts enjoyed by Arab prisoners, which amounted to an official admission of the pressures applied against detainees and prisoners. This is not to mention the torture to which these prisoners are subjected and the outright refusal to allow the Red Cross or other international agencies to see them.

The Israeli authorities have added a new technique, that of deportation, with the intention of depopulating the country and giving scope to the occupation authorities to impose their political schemes. Thus the policy of demolition of houses, of curfews, of settlement, of sequestration of land, of dismissing employees, of restricting travel and of desecrating holy sites has now become one aspect of a hateful military occupation. The latest of these acts of provocation has been the refusal to permit the Islamic Conference to be held in Jerusalem. Concurrently, your authorities continue to Judaize the city of Jerusalem, ignoring the rights of the Arab citizens of their own country and the resolutions of the United Nations.

In reiterating our condemnation of all methods of terrorism, violence and Judaisation, we call in all firmness for an end to such methods, for the release of the detainees and the return of all those expelled. Such methods will not help to solve the problem but will merely increase its complexity, nor will they hasten our surrender, for we are standing fast in this land.

Signatures

Shaikh Hilmi al-Muhtaseb, Chief Qadi.
 Shaikh Sa'd al-Din al-Alami, Mufti of Jerusalem.
 Mr. Hasan Tahbub, Director of Waqfs.
 Mr. Anwar al-Khatib, Lawyer.
 Mr. Taisir Kan'an, Judge.
 Mr. Abd al-Muhsin Abu Maizar, Lawyer.
 Mr. Hafiz Tahbub, Lawyer.
 Mr. Mahmud al-Hejazi, Lawyer.
 Dr. Nabih Muammar.
 Dr. Subhi Ghosha.
 Shaikh Ali al-Taziz.
 Mr. Faeq Barakat.
 Mr. Rida al-Qaddumi.
 Mr. Faez Abd al-Nur.
 Mr. Nuhad Abu Gharbiyya.
 Mr. Jawad Juda.
 Mr. Fahmi al-Hammuri.

¹ *Al-Itihad* (Haifa), 10/1/1969.

Mr. Nabil al-Nimri.
 Mr. Riyad al-Dajani.
 Mr. Mahmud al-Hayya.
 Mr. Muhammad Ziyad al-Husaini.
 Mr. Abd al-Rahim al-Sharif, Lawyer.
 Mr. Isam al-Annani, Lawyer.

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**United Arab Republic Foreign Ministry's
 View of the United States Reply to the
 Soviet Union Memorandum on the Middle
 East Crisis.¹ (Excerpts).**

Cairo, January, 19, 1969

The United States reply was much worse than we had anticipated, because it revealed the total alignment of the United States with Israel. We have the following remarks to make on the subject:

1. There is complete alignment with Israeli aggression. This brings to mind the attitude the American government adopted on June 5, 1967, when it refused to condemn the Israeli aggression, in spite of the fact that it had informed us officially, through a memorandum submitted to us by the American ambassador on May 23, 1967 (i.e. only a few days before the Israeli aggression), that it would strongly oppose, both at the United Nations and elsewhere, any military aggression on the part of any state in the area. The American government assured us, moreover, in the same memorandum, that the United States considers the Armistice agreements to be the best means of maintaining peace in the region.

2. The attitude of the government has made it clear to us that it is not committed to the policy which it had officially informed us of before the Israeli aggression.

3. In its reply, the United States ignored the Palestine problem and did not say a single word

about the rights of the Palestinian people in its memorandum, or about its views on how the problem could be solved.

4. The American government used the term "Arab terrorism" in describing the struggle of the Palestinian people in defence of their cause and their noble resistance to Israeli aggression. Its attitude was that the courageous resistance of the Palestinian people was the major obstacle to peace, thereby ignoring Israel's aggression against Arab states.

5. The American reply spoke of Israel's having accepted the Security Council resolution. Such playing with words is really no longer acceptable. Recently, in fact, Israel has clearly revealed its attitude towards the Security Council resolution by declaring its intention of continuing to occupy Arab territories and of integrating the economy of these territories with its own in any final peaceful settlement.

6. The United States government has so far refused to define its attitude as regards the locations to which Israel is to withdraw. It demands that the Arab states negotiate the fate of Arab territories and the frontiers of the Arab states with Israel under the pretext of safeguarding the security of Israel, at a time when Israel is occupying Arab territories. Indeed, the United States is of the opinion that Israel should not have to return to the June 5, 1967, lines from which it launched its aggression.

7. The American memorandum rejects what it terms "imposing a solution" on the states of the region. What is required of the great powers is that they should rise to their responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations by adopting measures that will ensure the implementation of the Security Council resolution, which Israel refuses to do.

8. However, the United States government did not reject the idea that Sharm al-Shaikh should remain under Israeli occupation in the final settlement. It is of the opinion that the matter should be subject to discussion to guarantee freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba.

9. On the pretext that it was from Sinai that aggression was launched in both 1967 and in 1956, the United States says quite frankly in its memorandum that it thinks that Sinai should become

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 20/1/1969. The U.S.S.R. Chargé d'Affaires in Washington submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of State on December 22, 1968 containing proposals for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 for a settlement of the Middle East crisis. The American Secretary of State submitted a reply to these proposals to the U.S.S.R. Chargé d'Affaires in Washington on January 1, 1969.

a fully demilitarised zone and that any partial demilitarisation of Sinai would be inadequate.

The United States memorandum does not mention the demilitarisation of the Negeb, or even part of it.

10. The memorandum deals with navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal, the demilitarisation of Sinai and the guaranteeing of the security of Israel's frontiers, to be achieved through negotiations with the Arab states. The memorandum fails to mention Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Jerusalem, the Golan Heights or the Gaza Strip.

11. The American reply makes further difficulties for Jarring's mission and obstructs its future activities in search of a peaceful settlement.

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Address by the United Arab Republic President Nasser at the Inaugural Session of the New National Assembly.¹ (Excerpts)

Cairo, January 20, 1969

In this conflict, the first priority, in fact the absolute priority, goes to the military front. We must realise that the enemy will never pull back unless we can compel him to do so through force of arms, that no peaceful settlement stands a chance, until the enemy comes to realise that we can force him to pull back by means of war.

In other words, no military or political action can achieve any progress unless such progress derives from the military front. I want you to realise that the military front must be our first preoccupation. Everything else can wait.

... I want to set the following facts before you:

1. The major part of our recent political efforts has been directed to the strengthening of our armed forces. Here I want to praise the sincere and faithful cooperation we have received in these efforts from the Soviet Union. In fact, to give credit where it is due, I feel it is my duty to tell you that had it not been for that cooperation, all our plans for the future would have remained idle aspirations.

2. Our armed forces — and what I say here is based on what I saw for myself, it is an eyewitness report — are in an incomparably better state than before the June 1967 war.

The heroic members of our armed forces, through their efforts and their performance, have lived up to the nation's confidence in them and to our highest expectations; such is my opinion.

3. I keep in close touch with the activities of the command of our armed forces. I have complete trust in it and think it is a highly responsible body.

4. You will notice, if not at some other time during this session, then certainly while you are reviewing the proposed budget for next year and the allocations that are requested, that there has been a steep increase in the allocations requested for the armed forces. I feel confident that you will not hesitate to give your endorsement, for no price is too high for the restoration of the nation's honour and the recovery of part of its soil which is being defiled by enemy occupation.

5. A great deal has been done to bolster our capacity to defend the vital installations of this nation. The armed forces and the popular defence army have shouldered their part of this responsibility which is acquiring greater significance, particularly in view of the scope of the achievements of the Egyptian people. This has been part of the comprehensive development plan which is in progress. Our people have borne the heavy burden that this has entailed and are going ahead with it. It is among the people that our highest aspirations are born.

Members of the National Assembly:

The topic of defence leads us to the joint Arab action which is now being undertaken in confrontation of the battle of common destiny in which our Arab nation is now engaged.

Joint Arab action has both a political and a military aspect. I cannot but admit, out of honesty to our nation, that as regards the political aspect of joint Arab action, more could have been done and its contribution to the battle for our destiny could have been greater.

Arab political action has certainly fallen short of our expectations. Nevertheless, just as I have given honesty its due, I must also speak the whole truth and tell you that this action has exceeded

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 21/1/1969.

the expectations of those who have always cast doubts on the faith of the Arab nation in its unity, in the joint struggle and in the common future of the Arabs.

The Arab Mutual Support Agreement is still in force. It is fulfilling the function assigned to it in view of the contributions of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya. This agreement is still the most conspicuous achievement of joint Arab action in the field of strengthening endurance.

Negotiations and contacts between Arab capitals are still in progress. Nevertheless, in view of the prospects as regards the coming stage, closer and more tightly knit cooperation is required. Several Arab heads of state have repeated their call for another Arab summit conference; their appeal has become all the more urgent since the criminal attack on Beirut Airport. In our opinion such an Arab summit will become an urgent necessity in the near future.

From the military aspect, we have been doing everything in our power to strengthen and improve the efficiency of the Eastern Front for confrontation with the enemy, the front constituted by the forces of Iraq, Syria and Jordan, so that they may perform their role in cooperation with the Egyptian Front, which is proud to have Algerian, Sudanese and Kuwaiti units stationed on it.

The Eastern Front, which is the channel into which the activities of those intrepid Arab forces pour, has an irreplaceable strategic significance. Furthermore, should it attain the standard of preparedness that we hope, it will provide some sort of direct cover and rapid support for other forces taking part in the Arab struggle.

As we are on the topic of the forces taking part in the Arab struggle, I must call your attention to the splendid achievement of the forces of the Palestinian resistance movement. The growth of Palestinian resistance organisations, the increasingly significant role they are playing and the consequent escalation of their operations has been one of the most conspicuous features of the period since June, 1967. These organisations carried the torch in the dark hours of despair. They proved the existence of the Palestinian entity at a time when the enemy thought he had eradicated every memory of Palestine. These organisations also discharge a positive function in bleeding part of the resources of the enemy and

are making him pay with his blood.

At this point, I wish to salute on your behalf the four major resistance organisations, *Fateh*, The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Arab Sinai Organisation. I wish to convey to them our admiration and appreciation.

It is one of the aspirations of the Arab nation that the resistance organisations should unite within a single framework. But it must be made clear that any move in that direction must take the form of Palestinian political action and should be an expression of the will of the Palestinian people themselves. The Palestinian will must be allowed to operate unopposed; it must be allowed free rein to achieve its own aspirations and must not be placed under the tutelage of anyone.

The United Arab Republic has adopted a firm line with regard to this matter. This has been the case ever since Palestinian resistance organisations first began to perform their heroic role. Part of this policy is that the United Arab Republic should place all its resources at the disposal of these organisations, with no strings attached. In accordance with that firm line, the United Arab Republic appreciated the attitude of the Palestinian resistance organisations when they rejected the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution, although the United Arab Republic itself accepted it. Palestinian resistance organisations had the right to reject that resolution, which may serve to eliminate the consequences of the June, 1967 aggression, but is totally inadequate as far as Palestinian destiny is concerned. We are opposed to any approach to the Palestinian refugee problem that confines it within a framework of charity or humanitarian feelings. The problem of the refugees cannot be and will not be restricted to this level, for it is the problem of a people and their homeland.

With regard to resistance organisations, the conspicuous success achieved by *Fateh* in reaching world public opinion deserves special mention. At a time when Zionism is attempting to portray resistance activity as a series of acts of sabotage, *Fateh's* political action is successfully portraying its true character for world public opinion.

What has given the struggle being waged by all resistance organisations its true dimension is the unforgettable endurance and steadfastness

of the heroic and faithful Palestinian people in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, where they are resisting with rare courage, rejecting the occupation and affirming their independent existence and character.

Members of the National Assembly, Fellow citizens:

Our political action in the international field has involved us in very heavy responsibilities. We accepted the 1967 Security Council resolution despite its shortcomings from the conviction that any political means for the elimination of the consequences of the aggression that might offer itself should receive full consideration.

I repeat what I have said over and over again: we are not warmongers but advocates of peace. We never usurped any other people's land, it was our land that was usurped. We initiated no aggression against anyone; whenever there was aggression, it was directed against us.

In addition to the fact that we ourselves believe in peace based on justice, we have always taken trouble to ensure that the rest of the world should be acquainted with all the facts of the case, unobscured by tendentious propaganda or the various techniques of psychological manipulation.

We have defined our attitude in the following two points: we will not give up any Arab territory, and we will not under any conditions sit down to negotiate with an enemy who is in occupation of our territories.

Our attitude has become clear to the rest of the world, as is indicated by our record of sincere cooperation with Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, the envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations, whose task it is to implement the Security Council resolution.

As a result of this attitude of ours, wide-scale changes have taken place in favour of anti-imperialist forces which seek peace and national independence for all peoples and which are truly desirous of a new system of international relations which is not based on claims to domination, acts of terrorism or slander.

The Soviet Union's attitude to us needs no further praise from me. The cooperation we have received from that great country can never be sufficiently appreciated.

Last July I visited Moscow and had several

meetings with our close friends Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin and Nicolai Podgorny. That visit was a new and successful demonstration of the strength of Soviet-Arab relations.

Moreover, under the leadership of that great French patriot, Charles de Gaulle, who is one of the most outstanding personalities of our age, there has been a great shift in favour of justice and peace. This has found expression in the total embargo on the shipment of arms to Israel.

Furthermore, as the situation has developed, many countries in all continents have adopted truly honourable attitudes.

The states of the socialist bloc, in particular the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia still refuse to resume relations with Israel and are doing everything in their power to cooperate with us.

The non-aligned countries, headed by Yugoslavia, under the leadership of that great fighter Tito, and India, under the leadership of its most capable Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, are making the most extensive efforts to enhance the prospects of peace based on justice.

The Algiers Conference provided the African nations with an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the facts of the case. They passed an unambiguous resolution condemning Israeli colonialist aggression.

In addition, the Islamic nations, with Pakistan and Mauritania as honourable examples, have adopted clear and praiseworthy attitudes.

All this amounts to a fund of world support of a material and moral power that must not be underestimated. There is an extensive credit to draw on in addition to the resources of our own national struggle. However, all the consequences of this struggle and the sacrifices it may involve must be borne by us, first and foremost. For in the final analysis, the land is ours. It is our own fate, rather than the fate of others, that hangs in the balance. There can be no substitute for the liberation of our land or for fighting for our destiny, regardless of the danger or the cost.

It is at this point, fellow citizens, Members of the National Assembly, that I want the entire world, whether friend or foe, whether far or near, to hearken to our voice, to understand our

position, to appreciate it correctly and to interpret it precisely:

We shall not give up an inch of Arab land.

We shall not lose heart, we shall not falter, whatever extremes of intimidation the folly or insanity of force may lead to.

We shall fight for every grain of sand in our deserts and for every last green twig in our plains and our valleys, and on our beloved hills.

The honour of Arab territory, of the Arabs themselves and the Arab way of life all now hang in the balance. We are prepared to make every effort and to shed every drop of blood that may be required to redress the balance of right, goodness and peace.

Members of the National Assembly, Fellow citizens:

It is now time to speak of the home front, which as we agreed, is the prop, in fact the mainstay of the military front.

The watchword of the stage through which we have been passing since I last had occasion to address you has been "change". This was necessary for more than one reason.

We had to remedy shortcomings on our part which were directly or indirectly responsible for the setback we suffered.

It was also necessary that the steps we were to take in the immediate future should be guided by the light shed by the more distant future.

Furthermore, it was imperative that each and every one of us should be able to give his country of his very best. In the case of truly noble peoples it is times of tribulation and crisis that bring out all the latent strength of their citizens.

The March 30, 1968 declaration was an expression of the will for change of a faithful, resolute and capable people; that declaration outlined the scope of the changes that had to be made. It was endorsed by a vast majority in a free popular plebiscite on May 2, 1968.

Among the immediate objectives of that transformation, the following three figured prominently:

1. Military reconstruction.
2. Political reconstruction.
3. Economic reorganisation.

These three objectives took natural precedence because of their direct bearing on the battle of destiny which confronts our people and the entire Arab nation.

I have already spoken to you of military reconstruction. You will be hearing more of the matter.

As for political reconstruction, I think that the convening of this distinguished assembly today is symbolic of it.

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Speech by the United Arab Republic President Nasser at the Inauguration of the Second International Conference for the Support of the Arab Peoples.¹

Cairo, January 25, 1969

...Nevertheless, friends, we hope that your meeting may result in world public opinion getting a clearer idea of certain significant aspects of the struggle, so that peoples, both far and near, may come to realise that the crisis we are facing is something more than a threat to our security, that it is not just a matter of parts of our territory being occupied.

We hope, friends, that you will consider some of the serious questions connected with the struggle in which we are engaged. We hope that you will join us, in a spirit of complete objectivity, in the search for the precise answers these questions require. We also hope that these answers will get the widest possible publicity in the world, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Is it reasonable that legends dating back thousands of years should be used as the basis and justification for an armed invasion and that on the strength of these legends an entire people, the Palestinian people, should be expelled from the heartland of the Arab world, or that other peoples, in the region from the Euphrates to the Nile, which Israel claims as its promised realm, should be threatened with the same fate?

Are these legends and mythical claims the real

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 26/1/1969.

reason, or is it imperialism, which seeks to dominate an area of outstanding strategic, economic and political importance in the world by imposing an alien presence in its very heart to prevent its uniting, and establishing in it a permanent base to threaten it?

What has been the relationship between the Zionist movement and those world powers with a passion for domination, from the Germany of the Kaisers and colonialist Britain to the United States of America with the imperialistic tendencies which have become the hallmark of its policy, an example of which is the bloody war in Vietnam?

Can one find an instance of anti-Semitism or persecution of Jews in the entire course of Arab history? Is it not rather the case that the Jews never found the same tolerance throughout their history as they did in Arab lands? How many peoples had greater sympathy for the Jews at the time of their persecution by the Nazis with their racist theory and practice?

The question that has a direct bearing on all this is: is it the Arabs, then, who are to bear the consequences of the persecution of the Jews at the hands of the Nazis? Are they to pay for it through the loss of the homeland of an Arab people? Moreover, is it right that Zionist racialism should borrow the logic and the techniques of Nazi racialism? Must man learn from his executioners? Must he become the image of his tormentors in more evil form, a shameful replica of them in his thoughts and deeds?

Have Arabs ever initiated aggression? Did they initiate the aggression in 1948? Did they do so in 1956, in collusion with certain world powers? Did they initiate hostilities in 1967? Furthermore has it ever happened in the case of any international problem which led to the outbreak of hostilities, that the United Nations has passed a cease-fire resolution that did not also provide for the withdrawal of the combatants to their previous positions? Such being the case, why were we not accorded the same treatment? In the past, has an aggressor ever tried to present himself as the victim of aggression, has an advocate of military terrorism ever posed as a peaceable nation whose very existence is threatened? Has any nation in the past shown the same disregard for United Nations and Security Council resolutions or for international law as Israel has done?

And if this had happened, would any of the parties concerned have tolerated it in our modern world? And if so, why do they tolerate it from Israel?

Has it ever been the case that those who called for the liberation of their homeland from foreign occupation have been portrayed as rejecting peace and constituting a threat to the stability of world order?

Whenever we declare our determination to liberate our territory Israel takes it to be a declaration of war; whenever we say that we are committed to try and win back our rights, Israel takes it as an intolerable encroachment on our part.

Friends,

We hope that you will discuss these and many other questions as well. We hope that you will answer them, that you will talk them over with us, and that afterwards as large a section of the world as possible will hear from you and get some idea of the facts which are the main cause of our present tribulations in the Middle East crisis.

The outstanding danger is the existence of a conspiracy to distort the real nature of the crisis, to misrepresent the situation and make white seem black. At best, it is a conspiracy of silence intended to erect an impenetrable barrier through which no glimmer of light can pass.

We know, however, that truth is not without friends in this world who are prepared to serve its cause; the distinguished company assembled here is certain proof of this. Nevertheless, as matters stand, further and more extensive effort is required. For what the cause you have championed needs, first and foremost, is that the truth, with all its details, should be disclosed and that all men of good faith should decide their attitudes in the light of that truth.

The enemies of truth have awe-inspiring means at their disposal and they are making use of them. They control vast machinery which can be brought into play to serve their purposes. The most advanced methods, both material and psychological, known to modern science, are being employed in the task.

But in the end truth will triumph with the help of its friends and those who believe in it, those who can carry its message to distant horizons.

Friends,

We deeply appreciate your coming to our country to hold this conference. We take pride in the sentiments that inspire your efforts, and we are confident that those efforts will be most effective in promoting the truth.

I wish you every success. God bless you.

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Interview Statements by the Lebanese Prime Minister Karzami on Lebanon's Policy as Regards Israeli Threats.¹ (Excerpt) Beirut, January 23, 1969

Q. In this case, will you not take into consideration Israeli threats of new reprisals if the commandos continue to infiltrate over the Lebanese frontier?

A. Israel looks for any pretext to justify its aggressive and expansionist policy. The pretext used after the Palestinian commandos' attack on the airliner at Athens is quite absurd. Israel accused us of arming the men who attacked the airliner but offered no proof. On the other hand, Israel refuses to allow United Nations observers to carry out investigations on both sides of the frontier, though we should welcome this. Israel demands that we stop Palestinian resistance fighters from crossing the frontier in spite of the fact that the Israeli security forces, for all their vast resources, have not been able to prevent explosions in the very heart of Tel Aviv. We cannot do for Israel what it cannot do for itself. In any case, this proves that once a people decide to take up arms to defend their rights nothing in the world can stop them. I have said before and I now repeat, that the Palestinian resistance fighters deserve our admiration and respect.

Q. Israel accuses you of sheltering the representatives of certain Palestinian organisations which have opened offices in Beirut.

A. Our country has a liberal and democratic way of life. We give shelter to the advocates of

various political movements and foreign ideologies. For example, supporters and opponents of the war in Vietnam are free to dispute in our country. How can we logically single out the Palestinians and prevent them from expressing their opinions? The resistance organisations have established offices in various European capitals and have been received very well there. In the name of what principle should the Lebanese, who are Arabs, show less hospitality than other nations which are complete strangers to the Palestine problem?

Q. Some Lebanese politicians, especially Mr. Raymond Eddé, call for the stationing of United Nations troops on the Lebanese-Israeli frontier for the purpose of keeping peace. What is your opinion of this suggestion?

A. I do not believe that such an agreement can protect us from an Israeli attack. United Nations troops stationed on the frontiers of other countries have never deterred Israel from carrying out its policy of aggression. In addition, a large sector of Lebanese public opinion does not wish to see a United Nations force stationed on the frontiers. As Prime Minister, it is my duty to avoid anything that might cause divisions among the Lebanese.

Q. How then do you plan to protect Lebanon?

A. By relying first on ourselves and then on our friends. In this connection I wish to express our gratitude to President de Gaulle for standing on the side of justice and peace in the Middle East. Lebanon is happy to have the friendship of France and we are ready to benefit from any aid offered by the Paris government.

Q. Including military aid?

A. Without any doubt, as long as we intend to preserve the integrity of our land and the sovereignty and independence of our country.

Q. Do you prefer to obtain this aid in the form of technical aid, arms shipments, or the stationing of French troops on your soil?

A. Our country is faced with a capable and stubborn enemy. To confront this danger, we shall accept French military aid under any guise which can help us protect our sovereignty and interests. In any case, the problem is now under review. French and Lebanese military staffs are currently exchanging views; as are politicians.

¹ *Al-Jarida* (Beirut), 25/1/1969. Mr. Rashid Karami granted this interview to a correspondent of the French daily *Le Monde* which published it on January 23, 1969.

These discussions will enable us to determine the precise nature and extent of the military aid we need.

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Speech by the United Arab Republic President Nasser at the Inauguration of the Fourth Conference of the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions.¹ (Excerpt)

Cairo, January 29, 1969

To put it in a nutshell, the Arab-Israeli struggle is basically a conflict between the Arab nation with its aspirations for political and social liberation, and imperialism which thirsts after domination and further exploitation.

In the past, colonialism kept the Arab nation at bay with the policy of divide and rule. After two world wars, however, as faith in Arab unity grew, imperialism added a new weapon to its arsenal: intimidation. The mythical claims of the Zionist movement were turned to good account for that purpose. And thus a part of the greater Arab homeland was handed over as a prey to heavily armed racist Zionism so as to make the division of the Arab nation complete. A base was planted in its very heart to intimidate it by constant threats and to drain all the resources of Arab strength in this historically inevitable battle.

The conflict between the Arab nation and imperialism grew more intense with the emergence of the Arab progressive movement led by Arab peasants and workers. This drove imperialism to violent and terrible ventures such as the famous 1956 aggression against Egypt, later known as the "Suez War". This tendency to violence was again manifested in 1967 in what was later called the "Six Day War", but which was in fact only the prelude to a war which has not yet ended. Despite all the efforts of freedom and peace-loving powers, that war still hangs over us, like a dark cloud on the Middle East horizon. This state of affairs is due to the fact that the

imperialist powers and their lackeys do not desire either freedom or peace; they do not even understand the true meaning of these words. Freedom, to them, means domination, and the peace they seek would amount to surrender to their designs and conspiracies.

The Arab nation has never usurped the homeland of another people. The reverse is true; the homeland of an Arab people, the Palestinian people, has been usurped. The Arab nation has never occupied the territory of another state through force of arms and aggression; but territories belonging to three Arab states, members of the United Nations, are at present under military occupation by the forces of Israel, which enjoys the backing of imperialism. Throughout its history, the Arab nation has maintained warm human relations free of any taint of either exploitation or racialism with all races and creeds including, of course, the Jews.

But, the Arabs now under racist Israeli occupation are second class citizens in their own homeland which is ruled by force and coercion.

Such is the basis of the Arab-Israeli struggle; it is a conflict between the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Arab nation and the ambitions, designs and conspiracies of colonialism.

The repercussions of this same struggle are familiar to all of you, and to your thoughts; you even know them from experience in the continents you come from.

Is it not strange that what confronts the Arab nation today should bear the criminal imprint that is so familiar to, and easily identified by all progressive forces, which know how to pass judgement on it?

Our brothers from Europe are acquainted with claims to racial superiority, whether based on colour or creed. Europe suffered terribly from Nazi racialism; much of what it suffered will never be forgotten.

Our brothers from Africa, too, are familiar with settling colonialism, which means that a people's homeland is appropriated by peoples from outside, who come on various pretexts. They form settlements for purposes of exploitation, then these settlements are turned into armed fortresses to subjugate the people of the land and threaten peoples who are its neighbours. These

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 30/1/1969.

peoples feel themselves to be the brothers of the people of the colonised country and are aware that the same fate is in store for them unless they wake up to the facts and resist.

We regard the fact that this distinguished group of representatives of the world labour movement has come to our country under present circumstances as clear evidence of support for our belief in the unity of the struggle against imperialism and its lackeys and against all attempts at exploitation. This is a great source of pride to the Arab nation and reinforces our faith in peace based on justice and progress, untainted by exploitation in any shape or form.

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Speech by the United Arab Republic President Nasser at the Opening of the Fifth Session of the Palestinian National Assembly.¹

Cairo, February 1, 1969

Brothers, companions who share with us a common struggle and destiny:

I was very pleased to be able to accept your invitation to attend this opening session of the Palestinian National Assembly which is being held today in Cairo, at a time of great importance and danger for the work of our Arab nation and its struggle for the most honourable principles and the most sacred rights. My presence here with you on this occasion not only gives me the opportunity of welcoming you to this country — which has given and will continue to give everything, without limits or reservations, in support of the battle of Arab destiny — but also enables me to define for you some of our ideas concerning the issues which have gained added importance in these very serious and dangerous circumstances.

Brothers, I should like to put the following points before you:

Firstly: The whole Arab nation must realise — one of the positive lessons taught by the battle of June 5 — that the issue is not that of the people of Palestine alone but something much more

extensive. The fact is that the Zionist enemy is attempting to achieve his objective of expanding from the Nile to the Euphrates. Therefore the participation of all the peoples of the Arab nation in this struggle between Arab nationalism and Zionist racialism should be based not merely on affection for the Palestinian people, but should be seen as a matter of self defence in any Arab homeland. The Zionist scheme took the land of Palestine as a starting point and the Zionists will not hesitate to carry out the scheme to its end, if they have the opportunity. They imagine that their opportunity has now come because of the setback of June 5, 1967.

It must be clear to every Arab country, that what it gives to the Palestinian struggle should not be given from motives of generosity or mere sentimental solidarity, but should be given in the interests of self defence, to defend the existence both of individual Arab countries and of the whole Arab nation.

Secondly: The most outstanding positive result of the battles of June, 1967 was the emergence of the Palestinian entity in an embodied form for the first time since 1948; that had been the weakest point in the overall Arab struggle in which, of course, Palestine has always been the most important sector.

The history of the people of Palestine will record that after a long remorseless struggle fought in unequal battles, when the enemy thought he had succeeded in liquidating their existence by occupying all of their land, they rose to the attack with irrepressible vitality and an unconquerable will to live, in a brilliant display of heroism throughout the whole field of the struggle.

Every day — hour, indeed — the masses of the West Bank, the masses of Gaza and the masses of Jerusalem are writing splendid pages in Arab history. These pages are being written by men and women, by old and young, even by children, through their steadfastness, their resistance, their endurance of adversity and their continuous and absolute rejection of occupation and surrender.

Thirdly: The expansion of the role played by Palestinian resistance has been, and will continue to be, a turning point of immense importance in the Arab struggle.

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 2/2/1969.

Palestinian resistance has embarked on a great undertaking which has many aspects. It raised the torch of resistance after the thick darkness that prevailed throughout our land after the setback, and kept the fire of hope alive in the hearts of the millions from the Atlantic to the Gulf. It then showed the whole world that occupying a territory is something very different from destroying the will and occupying the soul. It also established the Palestinian entity as a living organism and an equal partner in the battle of destiny. But in addition to this and to the extensive political and psychological consequences it has given rise to, the resistance has achieved two immediate objectives:

The first is that by its rigorous operations it has cost the enemy great losses. The most important of these is that the enemy has lost his feeling of security which, he thought, had been firmly established by his inexpensive military victory in June, 1967.

The second is that the resistance has been able, through its efforts to arouse world opinion, to put the case of the Palestine people in its proper context as one of the most important national liberation issues in the world.

There is no doubt that the political and psychological objectives which have been realised together with the direct practical objectives, have given the Palestinian people a larger role in building the future in accordance with the aspirations and legitimate demands of the Arab nation.

Fourthly: In my speech to the Egyptian National Assembly on January 20, 1969, I explained the attitude of the United Arab Republic to Palestinian resistance. Briefly, this attitude involves the following clearly defined courses of action which I have the honour to remind you of:

— The United Arab Republic offers Palestinian resistance every material and moral support, with no limits, no reservations and no conditions.

— The United Arab Republic wants Palestinian resistance to be united. However, it considers — and this is an experience derived from great national liberation movements which the United Arab Republic has helped to support and assist — that the operation of bringing about unity must be achieved through the political efforts of the

forces of the Palestinian people alone, with no outside pressure and no coercion of any kind.

The United Arab Republic is absolutely opposed to any attempt to impose any form of tutelage on the resistance organisations, because any such tutelage can only lead to impeding the resistance's freedom of action and hence obstructing its natural growth.

And lastly, the United Arab Republic respects the attitude adopted by the resistance organisation in rejecting the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, which the United Arab Republic itself accepted.

I will repeat to you now what I said in the National Assembly:

The Palestinian Resistance organisations had the right to reject this resolution. This resolution may be enough to remove the traces of the aggression which took place in June, 1967 but it is not enough as far as the Palestinian destiny is concerned.

We reject any interpretation of the problem of the refugees which confines it to the framework of charity and humanitarian sentiments. The problem of the refugees is not, and can never be restricted to this level, because it is the problem of a people and a homeland. I cannot see that this attitude of the United Arab Republic is inconsistent with acceptance of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. On the contrary, this attitude eliminates the inconsistency between the Security Council resolution and the natural, historic and irrevocable right of the Palestinian people.

Fifthly: We are fighting an involved and complicated battle on a rough and explosive terrain. There is no one single road which we can follow to realise the objectives of the Arab Nation; there are many roads leading to them. Our preparations to recover our lost territories by force must not be allowed to impede our political action to recover what we have lost, if there is any hope of its succeeding.

Our preparations for our war potential must not impede our preparations for our political potential. But there is a danger that we may allow our political preparations to impede our military preparations. This is because in the final issue there is one single fact in the Middle East situation,

a unique and indisputable fact about which there can be no shadow of doubt or uncertainty. This fact is the absolute necessity for us to recover our territory and completely cleanse every inch of it of enemy occupation once and for all.

I want you to realise that preparation for the political theatre is no less important than preparation for the military theatre.

We must therefore arm ourselves with a profound awareness that will make us flexible without being negligent, pliant without being submissive, that will enable us to win friends everywhere without sacrificing principles, and to strive for peace on the definite understanding that the peace we strive for is not the peace that the enemy wants to impose, but a peace based on right and justice; for it is only with right and justice that peace becomes real.

We lost a battle in June 1967, but the enemy did not win the war in June 1967, because he was unable to impose political conditions commensurate with his estimate of his military victory. The main reason for this was that his military victory was contrary to nature, contrary to logic and contrary to any correct estimate of the forces involved. I do not want to go too deeply into an explanation of the reasons for the enemy's military victory and our military defeat in June 1967. These are matters I have talked about on other occasions, and history will later analyse and evaluate them with unerring precision and absolute impartiality. What is important is that the enemy could not impose political conditions because our nation, its right, its resolution, and its political, psychological and economic resources were much greater than his. Therefore, he was able to win a battle, but not a war. We must redirect our resources and remobilise them to remedy what happened and much more.

Brothers, companions who share with us a common struggle and destiny, there is one more subject which I know you must be anxious to learn about. I would like to assure you that the United Arab Republic is working, building and growing stronger; I cannot say more than that. I am confident of your trust and pray that Almighty God may be with us. May God grant you success.

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Press Conference Statements by the Iraqi Minister of Culture and Information al-Samarra'i on his Government's Policy on Certain Current Political Events.¹ (Excerpts)

Cairo, February 1, 1969

As regards Arab and international affairs, I would summarise the policy of our national government as follows:

1. The revolutionary government of Iraq regards the Palestine problem as the first and foremost issue in its foreign policy. The Iraqi government's relations with other states are determined by their attitudes to Palestine.

2. We believe that the Palestinian people have a legitimate right to engage in commando action to recover their homeland.

3. The Iraqi Government rejected the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, because it liquidates the Palestine problem in the interests of Israel.

4. We support those Arab policies and Arab states which are working to eliminate aggression as a whole — Israel itself, and not just the consequences of the aggression of June 5, 1967. We believe that Palestine belongs to our people who have been evicted from it rather than to the military occupiers who have gathered in Palestine from all over the world and have no bond connecting them with Palestine except that of aggression.

5. When I say that we support the people of Palestine, we mean the Palestinian people who owned Palestine before 1948, including Arabs, Jews and Christians. We are not against the Jews who lived in Palestine. They are entitled to live in Palestine as they lived with the Arabs in peace and freedom in the past. We maintain that those who came to Palestine as usurpers and occupiers from alien lands must return. A variety of languages is now spoken; this shows that these groups are aliens in the land of Palestine.

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Baghdad), 4/2/1969. Mr. Abdallah Sallum al-Samarra'i held this press conference at the Iraqi Embassy in Cairo on his arrival there to attend the Council of Arab Ministers of Information.

Jews have lived in Arab countries for hundreds of years in freedom and prosperity. They were not persecuted as they were in other countries. To those who maintain that Iraq is now anti-Semitic we answer: How can this be so, seeing that we Arabs are Semites?

Here I have something to say to the Arab countries about the domestic, Arab and international policy pursued by our revolutionary government. Iraq's attitude to spies and espionage networks derives from its determination to wipe out imperialist bases in its homeland. These espionage networks are imperialist bases. In this connection, it should be made clear that Israel's relations both with imperialism and with the espionage networks is organic. When we strike at these espionage networks, after a fair and legal trial, and we sentence spies, whoever they may be, we are trying to destroy the fifth column which is engaging in sabotage in the interests of a foreign country. It should be clear to the Arab countries that the problem of Palestine is not the problem of any one Arab country alone, but the major problem of all Arabs, so that there must be clear-cut coordination and organisation and unambiguous collaboration for the cause. We hope that the attitude adopted by the Arab countries will be such that they will not fall short of the demands of the problem that absorbs us, but, alongside Iraq, whose courageous attitude is clear to all, join in the confrontation of one of the forms of aggression to which the Arab area is being submitted.

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Interview Granted by the United Arab Republic President Nasser to Mr. Arnoud de Borchgrave of Newsweek.¹

Cairo, February 2, 1969

Q. Mr. President, you have called for a more "even-handed" U.S. policy in the Middle East. What do you feel President Nixon should do?

A. A fair policy means one that does not agree with the occupation of other countries' territories.

Every day Israel says the occupation will continue and there is no reaction from the U.S. Does this mean the U.S. agrees? If you don't, all you have to do is say so. That would be a good start.

Q. But the U.S. agreed to the U.N.'s Nov. 22, 1967, resolution.

A. Agreeing to a resolution is one thing; condoning continued occupation is quite another. You say Israel should not withdraw before a settlement, but this then means a settlement unfavorable to the Arabs, because Israel now has the whip hand. If you give Israel Phantom fighter-bombers while they are occupying Arab lands, this can only mean you support this occupation. Otherwise, you would make delivery contingent on withdrawal.

Q. What does the resumption of relations between the U.S. and the U.A.R. now depend on?

A. On the point I just made. If the new administration says it does not agree with this occupation, this will change the whole policy.

Q. If, as you have often said, the Soviets do not control anything in the U.A.R., what leads you to believe that the U.S. could make Israel do something against its will?

A. There is a difference between forcing Israel and stating your viewpoint. For instance, when there was a cease-fire proposal during the June war, it called for withdrawal, too. But the U.S. opposed this for the first time in the history of the United Nations. You were, in effect, encouraging Israel. You repeatedly supported the Israeli stand and were against any condemnation of the invasion. So this naturally gives us the idea that U.S. policy is to support their occupation. At first, the Israelis called them "conquered" territories, then changed the label to "occupied" and subsequently to "liberated" and the United States remained silent. It is not a question of American pressure against Israel. Just be fair and just. Instead, you gave them Skyhawk jet fighters and now Phantoms.

Q. You apparently agree with King Hussein, who says the situation is deteriorating rapidly. In that case, what is the relevance of the Soviet peace plan?

A. I was not optimistic about the U.N. resolution or the Soviet plan because I know Israeli

¹ *Newsweek* (New York), 10/2/1969, p. 33. Copyright, *Newsweek, Inc.*, 1969.

strategy and views. I said to Gromyko when he came here just before Christmas: "The U.S. will not agree to your plan." Why? Because I know the U.S. supports Israel 100 per cent.

Q. And if that were to change under President Nixon?

A. We have to wait and see.

Q. You have said that there will be no solution to the crisis until the Israelis believe that you are strong enough to push them out of occupied territories. When do you think Israel will become convinced of this?

A. Well, of course, they have information about our military development. And from that standpoint, the situation is not deteriorating, as King Hussein suggests. He is in a very difficult position, because he was not able to make up the losses he suffered in the war. We are now in a much better position than last year.

Q. Than before the war?

A. [Laughing] You'd better not say that, or the Israelis will use it as another pretext to attack. No, better than last year. At first, I told my people we would have the strength to reconquer what belongs to us in six months. Then I raised it to twelve. We have now been patient for nineteen months. Every day we are getting stronger. But Israel is buying armaments everywhere it can and this, of course, affects the timing.

Q. France has been Israel's biggest arms supplier, and French-made helicopters were used in the Beirut raid. Why, then, are you so grateful to France?

A. I don't know about the helicopters. France kept very quiet about what it was doing. Its most important decision, however, was to embargo 50 Mirage fighter-bombers, and now they have frozen spare parts, too. For this we are indeed grateful.

Q. If the Israelis had pulled back right after the June '67 war, how would the situation be different today?

A. It was not at all in our plans to attack Israel. I promise you, we had no plans for this. In fact, three of our best divisions were in Yemen at the time, and if we had been preparing for an attack, it would have been logical to bring them home first. What I did say, however, was that if they attacked Syria, we would retaliate by attacking them.

So I could not deceive myself and say that if they had pulled back right away we would have forgotten about their attack. But by not withdrawing, they have merely generated more hatred. There is a vast difference between occupation and nonoccupation, because occupation merely forces mobilization against the Israelis. I think if they had agreed to leave in accordance with the U.N. resolution, this step could have been of tremendous effect in promoting a peaceful settlement. The resolution specifically mentioned a settlement. We agreed. We still agree.

Q. And if they pulled back now, how would Israel's security be enhanced? What quid pro quo would the Arab states offer for evacuation?

A. (1) A declaration of nonbelligerence; (2) the recognition of the right of each country to live in peace; (3) the territorial integrity of all countries in the Middle East, including Israel, in recognized and secure borders; (4) freedom of navigation on international waterways; (5) a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.

Q. Do you insist on the choice of repatriation to what is now Israel or compensation for all refugees?

A. The United Nations has said over and over again "the right to return or compensation."

Q. Israel is convinced that neither you nor the Soviet Union wants permanent peace, but only a breathing spell in which to get ready for the fourth round. What can you say to convince Israel that both you and the Soviet Union want permanent peace?

A. First of all, we were not preparing for the second or third round. We did not attack. In 1956 they attacked with the U.K. and France. Books by Western authors have made clear they had also been preparing for the third round, whose success was predicated on a preemptive first strike. Now they are preparing for a fourth round. So we must be prepared, too. You must believe me when I tell you the Soviet Union wants a peaceful settlement. I am convinced that their motives are sincere. As for us, we do not want to go on mobilizing everything for war. We crave peace. We desperately need peace for economic development. But we must defend ourselves. The Israelis have said many times their country stretches from the Nile to the Euphrates.

Q. Do you really believe this is their objective?

A. Of course. Remember what Defense Minister Dayan told the youth of the United Labor Party after the war. "Our fathers made the borders of '47. We made the borders of '49. You made the borders of '67. Another generation will take our frontiers to where they belong." Every day the Israeli Prime Minister, or Deputy Prime Minister, says they will not withdraw from everything they took, that big chunks will be permanently joined to Israel. They are settling Israelis in the Sinai, on the Golan Plateau in Syria and in Hebron in Jordan. So it is very hard to escape the conclusion that their *raison d'être* is expansion.

Q. You have publicly supported the Palestinian commandos in their attacks on Israel. But you also support the U.N. Middle Eastern resolution of 1967 and the Soviet peace plan. How do you reconcile the two positions?

A. Israel publicly refused the Soviet plan. And the U.S. answer to Moscow means the U.S. also refuses the Soviet plan. The Israelis, moreover, refuse to implement the Security Council resolution. We agreed to it. So really what choice do I have but to support courageous resistance fighters who want to liberate their lands?

Q. Would you allow the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Britain to station troops in the Sinai as part of an agreement on Israeli withdrawal?

A. No. We will not agree to the stationing of any soldier from the four major powers in our country.

Q. But don't you already have Soviet military personnel in your country?

A. No, they are advisers, not in uniform, and they take their orders from us.

Q. Would you accept units from smaller countries under the U.N. flag?

A. We would have no objection.

Q. Would you agree to keep the Sinai demilitarized if Israel withdrew to its pre-June boundaries?

A. No. We could only agree to the demilitarization of areas that are astride the boundaries.

Q. If Israel were to pull back as the first phase of a settlement, would Egypt be prepared to sit down with the Israelis to discuss other issues?

A. I could not give you an answer about that until they pull out. Obviously, you would not sit down with a foreign power occupying part of the U.S. until it withdrew. But I can tell you we sat down with the Israelis after the 1948 war under the armistice agreement until the 1956 war, and that we are prepared to do so again. We had joint committees with United Nations observers and it was Israel who refused to continue this procedure after 1956.

Q. You have said that you recognize realities and that Israel is one of them. How does this differ from de facto recognition of Israel's prewar frontiers?

A. This question has been complicated by the Israelis themselves. Under the 1949 armistice agreements, Arabs and Israelis were supposed to agree on the rehabilitation of Palestinian refugees. If this had been done, it would have been a mighty step toward lasting peace. But the Israelis refused to discuss rehabilitation. So the situation got progressively worse. Before, there were under 1 million refugees. Now, there are almost 1.5 million.

Q. Could you spell out how you see a lasting solution?

A. The only way is for Israel to become a country that is not based on religion, but on all religions — a nation of Jews, Moslems and Christians. They lived for centuries together with few problems, but as long as the Israelis insist on depriving the Palestinians of their rights, the crisis will be with us for 10, 20, 30 and 40 more years.

Q. Do you see any chance for that kind of evolution?

A. Perhaps the next generation in Israel. Some Israelis are beginning to say they should think another way, but present leaders are shortsighted.

Q. Do you believe that Israel has a nuclear capability? If so, what do you plan to do about it?

A. Our experts don't believe Israel will develop this capability soon. But, on the other hand, we know they are highly advanced in this field and are spending lots of money to speed things up. There is no doubt that this is one of their top priority objectives.

Since the latest U.S. news reports, we have re-examined our own position. I called a meeting of our top people. The conclusion was that

we have the experts and the wherewithal, but not the money. It would be terribly costly.

Q. How much?

A. About \$250 million. But we have no plans.

Q. And if Israel did achieve nuclear capability?

A. We signed the nonproliferation treaty. Israel refused. And under the treaty, the nuclear powers are obligated to guarantee us against nuclear blackmail.

Q. If the events of June 1967 were repeated, what would happen this time? Would Russia intervene?

A. We were not waiting for Russia last time, and we will not be waiting for her if there is a next time. We will defend ourselves. What helped the Israelis the last time was not so much their cleverness, but the conceit and complacency of our generals. They felt Israel would never dare to attack. They overestimated their own strength. And because of that, they failed to take elementary precautions. The situation is now completely different. It would be impossible for the Israelis to repeat June 5. They could strike first again, but they would certainly not destroy our air force.

Q. Your detractors say that you have mortgaged your country to the Soviet Union. What is your answer?

A. Well, we are not an independent country now, not because of the Russians, but because of the Israeli occupation. The Soviets have never asked me for anything. In Moscow last July, I told Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny: "All I do is ask, ask and ask, but you never ask for anything. What can I do for you for a change?" They replied "Nothing. We support your cause because it is a just one."

But if they asked me for something now, I would do it, if it helped me liberate my country from the Israelis. I need all the help I can get. [Chuckling] I would gratefully accept any help the United States could give us to achieve this objective.

The Soviets give us all the raw materials we cannot obtain in the West because of foreign exchange shortage. They don't ask for money. They take anything we can give them — refrigerators, clothes, furniture.

Q. Aren't you afraid of being absorbed into the Soviet-bloc economy?

A. It is not as complex as you seem to think. When you are in debt to somebody, you are always in a strong position. [Laughing] Debtors are always stronger than creditors.

Q. How do you assess Soviet strategy in the Arab world? Why the enormous military and economic aid?

A. You are exaggerating what you seem to think is a grand design. They just don't want to be isolated. They are trying to win friends and counterbalance American influence. We are accused of giving the Soviets bases. They have no bases in Egypt.

Q. Perhaps not, but they come and go as they please.

A. Before the war, the U.S. Sixth Fleet was free to visit us, too. When your ambassador requested permission for a visit, we granted it. Warships from many countries came to see us.

Q. Looking back on your seventeen years in power, what would you have done differently?

A. There is little time for reflection in my job. It all looks like a machine. It must go forward. This is my destiny. I believe in God and destiny, and that one should not look back.

Q. In 1948, as a young officer embittered by defeat, you resolved to overthrow the regime responsible. If you were a young officer today, wouldn't you be just as bitter and just as determined to overthrow the regime now in power?

A. In 1948, we were a small army of ten battalions — no tanks, no planes. The reason for our revolt was a feudal regime, corrupt from top to bottom, that supported the British occupation of our country. That's how we were let down at the front. But after that, the army was able to get everything it needed. I see many young officers, of course, and they are bitter, but against Israel and U.S. support of Israel. They want to know how long they have to wait.

Q. And what do you tell them?

A. Be patient.

Q. But how long can you go on telling them the same thing?

A. Not indefinitely, of course. But as long as it takes.

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Statement of Policy Issued by the Palestinian National Congress During its Fifth Session.¹**Cairo, February 4, 1969**

Our Valiant Palestinian People,

This session of the Palestinian National Congress was convened at a crucial moment. The Palestinian armed resistance movement and popular resistance throughout Palestine have succeeded in bringing the Palestinian people back into the limelight of world events and history and in forcing recognition for the existence of a Palestinian people with a right to the entirety of its homeland. Now that the Palestinian resistance movement and Palestinian popular resistance have succeeded in defeating the Zionist-imperialist conspiracy to eradicate the Palestinian identity and do away with the Palestinian people, the Palestinian cause is once again menaced with the threat of liquidation (which would be to the interest of Zionism and imperialism) by means of the 22 November, 1967 Security Council resolution as well as all the other peaceful solutions or liquidation schemes, including the Soviet proposal for drawing up an agenda for the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

On behalf of the Palestinian revolution and what it stands for and on behalf of the aspirations of the Palestinian people and with the full force of its determination to hold fast to its sacred right to the entirety of its homeland, Palestine, the Palestinian National Congress hereby affirms its categorical rejection of any of the policies of the Western powers or of the United Nations or any intervention on their part which would impair the right of the Palestinian people to its homeland and its right to direct its own affairs. It rejects tutelage or subservience in any shape or form as it rejects Arab intervention in Palestinian affairs or in the rising Palestinian resistance movement, whether at the official level or through the United Nations.

In accordance with these principles, the Palestinian Arab people vehemently rejects all

projects or resolutions which would entail the liquidation of the Palestinian cause, including the 22 November, 1967 Security Council resolution, the Soviet proposal or any other such projects. The objective of the Palestinian people behind the bitter struggle in which it is engaged for the liberation of and the return to its land is to set up a free and democratic society in Palestine for all Palestinians, including Muslims, Christians and Jews, and to liberate Palestine and its people from the domination of international Zionism in so far as the latter is a reactionary and racist religious movement with a fascistic basis that is integrally affiliated with and serves the interests of world imperialism. Furthermore, Zionism mars interhuman relationships and gains enmity and hatred for the Jews in as much as it provokes anti-Semitism wherever the Jews may be found throughout the world for it encourages dual national loyalties and stands in the way of the integration of the Jews into the societies in which they live and prevents the development of true ties of loyalty to their countries of origin.

The Palestinian National Congress salutes all the fighters in the rank and file of the resistance movement, it salutes all the steadfast and struggling Arab masses throughout occupied Palestine, it salutes all Arab armies that are stationed along the front which are in accord with commando action and it salutes the Arab masses throughout the Arab homeland for the splendid fashion in which they have rallied around the resistance movement, particularly the Jordanian and Lebanese Arab masses which are putting up with constant Zionist raids patiently and in the spirit of self-sacrifice. The National Congress wishes to stress the fact that the road of resistance and liberation is long and arduous, it demands blood and tears and the highest examples of self-sacrifice.

We have been forced to follow that road thanks to the Zionist movement which is a form of settling colonialism and which is in collusion with the imperialist nations, particularly the United States, for there is no other way to repel the Zionist-imperialist invasion of the Arab homeland, which has established a bridgehead in Palestine. Moreover, in order for the Arab nation to develop, progress and flourish, in order for it to awaken from its slumbers and develop its resources, it follows that the Zionist-imperialist

¹ Fatch. *Annual Yearbook 1969*, p. 169.

invasion must be repulsed and the whole of Palestine liberated, for the two are fundamentally interdependent. If this is not done, then both the lands and the people of the Arab nation will remain divided and the Arab countries will be transformed into a permanent sphere of influence for Zionism and imperialism. The National Congress therefore calls on the Arab masses and the Palestinian masses in particular to mobilize all their resources and to back the Palestinian armed resistance with all their strength in view of the fact that the Palestine liberation movement is an integral part of the overall Arab revolution.

As a basic step toward national unity, the Palestinian National Congress calls on all Palestinians and the working force among the Palestinian people to consolidate national unity, for this will increase and boost the potential of the resistance movement. The National Congress feels that it must stress the following unconditional truth: that arms in the hands of our fighters are meant to be used against one and only one target, i.e., the Zionist enemy, seeing as the fundamental conflict at this stage is with the Zionist enemy and with imperialism; all other conflicts of a domestic nature must cease, for these are no more than secondary in importance.

In keeping with the Palestinian National Charter, as amended during the July, 1968 session of the Palestine National Congress, and in keeping with its new, revolutionary formulation, the Palestine Liberation Organization calls on the Palestinian masses to rally around it in an organized fashion and in full force and to ostracize that deviationist and defeatist group of people who advocate the liquidation of our cause and the establishment of a counterfeit Palestinian entity that would be the stooge of Zionism and imperialism. During its current session, the Congress passed the necessary resolutions and formulated an appropriate plan for escalating the activities of the resistance. The priority goes to the unification of commando action, setting up a single organ for the collection of contributions, strengthening the Palestine Liberation Army, increasing its combat potential and further coordinating its activities with the revolution and developing that revolution into a popular war of liberation.

this revolutionary plan will require adequate financing, the Palestinian National Congress calls on the Arab and particularly the Palestinian masses to step up their financial contributions and it calls on the Arab countries to live up to their full financial commitments to the Palestine Liberation Organization. The National Congress furthermore calls on the Arab countries to facilitate work opportunities, visas and the ability of their Palestinian residents to move about freely, with a view to the furtherance of their potential to support the Palestinian revolution in all respects, as mentioned above.

The Palestinian National Congress, which views the Palestine Liberation movement as part and parcel of the world liberation movement, sends its best wishes to all liberated and honourable individuals in the world who support the right of the Palestinian people to their homeland and calls on all the forces of goodness and progress in the world to increase their support for the Palestinian people.

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Statement by the United Arab Republic Foreign Minister Riyad on his Country's Foreign Policy.¹ (Excerpts)

Cairo, February 4, 1969

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The situation we face requires that we should be aware of the real objectives and intentions of our enemy. There are some who imagine that the most that Israel seeks is the mere guarantee of the security of its frontiers and a life of peace within those frontiers. But the fact that stares us in the face is that Zionism's real objective is to create a Jewish state stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates.

Israel's expansionist designs are quite clear to us, and they have gradually become clear to many peoples of the world which now recognise their true character, and how far they go. A glance at a map of Palestine shows how the area of land usurped by Israel in the heart of the Arab world has gradually expanded over the past twenty years. The expulsion of one million and a

In view of the fact that the implementation of

¹ *Al-Muharrir* (Beirut), 5/2/1969.

half Palestine Arabs to live a desolate life in refugee camps is proof of Israel's intention to rid the land they have occupied of its inhabitants in preparation for settling Jewish immigrants to colonise the territories that have been seized. This is all part of a carefully planned policy to realise a specific material objective, namely, the creation of a Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates.

There can be no mistaking Israel's expansionist plan at this stage. It is made perfectly clear both by the statements that have been made by Israeli officials and by the measures that are being taken in the occupied territories. The plan may be summarised as follows:

1. The annexation of Jerusalem.
2. Continued occupation of the Golan Heights in Syria, the West Bank and Sinai.
3. The economic and administrative integration of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into Israel.
4. The establishing of Israeli colonies in the West Bank and the Golan Heights in Syria.

This is what peace means to Israel. This is the settlement it wishes to impose on the Arab states, a settlement based upon continued occupation of Arab territories so that, when they have been rid of their Arab inhabitants and more Jewish immigrants have been brought in, they can eventually be annexed.

Honourable Members of the National Assembly, when Israel attacked us on June 5, 1967, the United Nations Security Council passed a cease-fire resolution, with the aim of halting the aggressor and checking his further aggression. The Council ought to have called for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied as a result of its aggression. But the Council was unable, at that time, to adopt such a resolution. This was due to the policy of the United States at that time.

On November 22, 1967, the Council adopted a resolution submitted by Britain, to which both the United States and the other members of the Council agreed. We accepted this resolution on the clear and unequivocal basis that it implied Israel's withdrawal from all territories occupied as a result of its aggression on June 5, 1967, in accordance with the text of the resolution which states that the occupation of territories as a result of war is illegal and which calls for the withdrawal

of Israeli troops. This is a position which conforms with the principles of the United Nations Charter outlawing aggression.

But Israel rejected the Security Council resolution because it conflicted with the Israeli plan to make continued occupation of Arab territory part of the settlement to be imposed on the Arabs. Israel, therefore, attempted to evade the resolution, to prevent its implementation in various ways, and to obstruct the mission of Ambassador Jarring through deceit, manoeuvre and playing with words. It also rejected the Soviet proposal for a timetable for the implementation of the resolution. It similarly rejected the French proposal for a meeting of the four permanent members of the Security Council to exchange views on the implementation of the resolution, on Ambassador Jarring's mission and on means of ensuring the implementation of the resolution.

In view of the Israeli refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, it would be natural to expect that the members of the Security Council, especially the permanent ones, would face up to their responsibilities, as stipulated by the Charter, to maintain international peace and security, and take the necessary measures to check the aggressor and eliminate the traces of aggression. The Soviet Union has adopted a strong and unambiguous attitude against Israeli aggression, an attitude which is in conformity both with the United Nations Charter and with its responsibilities as regards world peace. The French President Charles de Gaulle has declared that France opposes Israeli aggression and the French Government has declared a total embargo on arms shipments to Israel. This wise decision, which is in conformity with the United Nations Charter, aims at safeguarding world peace.

It is our belief that if all states were to adopt a policy similar to France's embargo on arms to Israel, this would deter Israel from aggression and would secure peace. But as long as certain countries continue to supply Israel with planes and arms at a time when Israel is in occupation of Arab territory, they are in fact encouraging aggression and supporting the aggressor who continues to threaten the Arabs with further conquest of land and further expulsion of Arab civilians.

The positive policy we have adopted as regards the problem of peace, our willingness to cooperate with the United Nations, our acceptance of the Security Council resolution and our readiness to implement it have all led to a considerable change in world public opinion. The realities of the case and of Israel's expansionist character, as revealed in its defiance of the United Nations, its insistence on expansion and usurpation of Arab territory, have become increasingly clear to the world.

Arab cooperation has succeeded in holding the Arab front together and in keeping it steadfast. But in view of the enemy's plans, his expansionist designs and the fact that world Zionism is marshalling all its resources to carry these plans out, more Arab cooperation is needed and more effort is required to mobilise all the potentialities of the Arab nation to face this Zionist threat to the entire Arab world.

All of us are proud to pay tribute to the Palestinian resistance and its courageous deeds. The rights of the Palestinians to their own homeland are legitimate and the people of Palestine are alone entitled to determine their own destiny. Zionism imagined that it had succeeded in suppressing the spirit of the Palestinian people, but this people, both men and women, has now risen to struggle for its human rights and has shown such surpassing bravery that the occupier is beginning to lose his head. The Israeli occupation authorities have resorted to terrorism and to firing on women and girls in Gaza, Rafah and the towns of the West Bank. Palestinian resistance has earned an honourable place in the history of struggle and sacrifice...

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Memorandum Submitted by Official and Civilian Organisations in Nablus to the Israeli Defence Minister Dayan Protesting against the Policy of the Occupation Authorities towards Civilians.¹

Nablus, February 4, 1969

The occupation authorities have carried out a

series of measures and acts which violate moral standards, international laws and conventions and the most basic principles of human dignity and security. Since we cannot enumerate all these actions, we will simply cite a few cases:

1. Attacks against women, girl students and children in Gaza and the Strip. Many were killed or wounded after they had been fired upon.

2. The occupation forces forced their way into the Aishiyya school in Nablus where they beat some of the girls and arrested others. This was done in clear violation of the commonly accepted principle of the inviolability of schools.

3. Students and guardians have been arrested and fined, in violation of the basic principles of justice.

4. Soldiers have been stopping pedestrians in the streets, assaulting them and insulting them.

The occupation authorities are responsible for providing security to civilians and respecting their national sentiments and dignity, as stipulated by the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1949. What is truly regrettable is that it is these very authorities which are threatening civilians by attacking them, killing or wounding them and insulting their dignity and national sentiments.

Civilians and school staff have expressed their condemnation of these provocations by calling for a general strike today, February 4, 1969, in the hope that the authorities will desist from these unjust and repressive measures. We demand an official inquiry into the incidents at Gaza and in the Strip and into the attack on the girl students of the Aishiyya school. We also demand the release of all detainees and that the practice of expulsion be stopped.

The occupation authorities must realise that the fact that the unarmed people living in this region have been subjected to armed occupation does not mean that they have surrendered, been pacified or abandoned their dignity or national sentiment. It is in the nature of things and it is the right of this people to express its rejection of occupation by various means and to show righteous indignation until this occupation is terminated.

Signatures

Representatives of Women's Organisations:
Al-Hajja Andalib al-Amad, Bushra al-Adham.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 8/2/1969.

Al-Hajj Fawzi al-Qadiri
 Hamdi Kan'an, Mayor of Nablus.
 Hikmat al-Masri
 Walid al-Shaka'a
 Qadri Tuqan
 Hafez Tuqan
 Adil al-Shak'a
 Dr. Jamal al-Khayyat
 Muhammad al-Amad
 Al Hajj Ma'zur al-Masri
 Ridwan al-Nabulsi
 Walid Istaitiyya
 Hasan Abd al-Hadi
 Dr. Faisal Kan'an
 Abdullah al-Khatib
 Dr. Nadim Awad
 Mustafa 'Awda, Lawyer
 Husayn al-Jaghub, Lawyer
 Dr. Abd al-Rahman al-Shannar
 Dr. Walid Qamhawi
 Dr. Shawkat Zaid
 Shawkat Kamal, Pharmacist
 Muhammad Abu Ghazala, Pharmacist
 Hani Arafat, Engineer
 Mundhir al-Masri, Engineer
 Zakariyya Hamdan
 Mahmud Sharbini.

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Press Conference Statements by the Iraqi President al-Bakr.¹ (Excerpts)

Baghdad, February 6, 1969

Q. Is it true that a law passed in March specifies that all Jews are to be prevented from leaving Iraq?

A. No such law has been passed in Iraq. But Israel imposes such restrictions on the Arabs of the occupied territories in Palestine.

Q. Are the Jews in Iraq allowed to leave Iraqi territory if they wish to do so?

A. Yes, just like other citizens.

Q. Will Iraq accept a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem if some other Arab states do so?

A. Iraq rejected a peaceful solution at a time when some Arab states had accepted it. I believe that all the Arab states, including those that accepted the peaceful solution, are bound by the resolutions of the Khartum Conference which declare that there is to be no recognition, no negotiations and no peace with Israel. They are bound by the rights of the people of Palestine. We are not advocates of war but we are advocates of rights. We call for an honourable solution which would guarantee the rights of the people of Palestine in their homeland and put an end to the racist character of Israel. This is the view of all the Arab countries.

Q. What are the prospects for peace in the Middle East?

A. In our view peace can only be achieved in the Middle East area through withdrawal of the Israeli aggressors from the territories of the Arab countries and through the full recognition of the right of the people of Palestine to return to their homeland in order to decide their own destiny as a national unit with distinct characteristics.

Q. Do you expect a resumption of relations with the United States and what are your conditions for such a resumption?

A. This depends upon the United States itself and upon its readiness to change its policy of alignment with Israel. The United States must stop its material and moral aid to Israel. Our conditions are that the United States should stop interfering in the internal affairs of the Arab countries and respect their sovereignty.

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Baghdad), 7/2/1969. President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr's press conference, at which he discussed current events, was attended by journalists, and correspondents of foreign broadcasting corporations and news agencies.

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Memorandum Submitted by the United Arab Republic Foreign Minister Riyad to the President of the United Nations Security Council on Israel's Expansionist Designs and the Necessity of Detering the Aggressor.¹

Cairo, February 13, 1969

The primary task of the United Nations, as expressed in its Charter, is to maintain international peace and security. To achieve this end, the United Nations takes joint effective measures to forestall situations that may threaten peace and to repress acts of aggression.

The main responsibility for maintaining world peace and security falls on the Security Council, which performs this role in accordance with the principles and objectives of the United Nations which forbid aggression. These responsibilities which, in the Charter, members of the United Nations agreed to delegate to the Security Council so as to render United Nations action speedy and effective, cannot be said to be fulfilled if the Council merely makes recommendations for the settlement of a situation which, if it continues, will constitute a threat to peace and security.

In addition to its making such recommendation as it deems appropriate as regards measures to be taken, methods of achieving settlements and conditions for the resolution of disputes, the duties of the Council and the nature of its responsibilities, especially those of its permanent members, require continued action to rectify a situation that threatens peace and security.

Both the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter are based upon the prohibition of aggression in the interest of maintaining peace. Given both objectives and principles of the Charter which United Nations members have expressed their intention of supporting, and the primary responsibilities they have delegated to the Security Council, the state of continued aggression in the territories of three Arab states cannot be tolerated. And this despite the lapse of 18 months since Israel attacked the Arab states on June 5, 1967

and despite the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 which outlined a peaceful settlement agreed to by all members of the Council. Thus the Council cannot accept the continuance of a state of affairs which threatens world peace and security as a result of the refusal of the aggressor to abide by and execute this settlement.

Likewise, and in accordance with the Charter, the members of the Council work in accordance with the seven principles set out in Article 2, among which is the principle of abstaining from the threat to use, or the actual use of, force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner that does not conform with the aims of the United Nations.

When Israel attacked in June, 1967, the Security Council adopted a cease-fire resolution on June 9, 1967. The object of that resolution was to halt the aggressor and to prevent him from continuing his aggression. The Security Council should then have required Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied as a result of the aggression, but the Council was unable at that time to take this natural step which is normally adopted in similar resolutions. It was said at the time then that further resolutions must be adopted to establish peace before the aggressor was asked to withdraw. This led to a delay which Israel exploited in an attempt to benefit from its aggression, despite the cease-fire resolution. It then announced the annexation of Jerusalem and faced the world with a new *fait accompli*.

The General Assembly, meeting in extraordinary session, rejected in its resolution 2253 of July 4, 1967 the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem. It declared these measures to be null and void and called upon Israel to rescind them and to refrain from any further action which might change the status of Jerusalem. In its resolution 2254 of July 14, 1967, the General Assembly expressed its profound regret at Israel's refusal to comply with the earlier resolution and again called upon Israel to rescind all measures adopted and to refrain from any further action which might change the status of Jerusalem.

Likewise, Security Council resolution No. 252 of May 21, 1968, reaffirmed the principle that territorial expansion through military conquest is

¹ U.A.R. Ministry of National Guidance, *Documents on Palestine*, Vol. II, 1970, p. 1627.

inadmissible and expressed its displeasure at Israel's refusal to comply with the two General Assembly resolutions. It further declared all legislative and administrative measures taken by Israel to be null and void and that such measures could not alter the status of Jerusalem. It called upon Israel to rescind these measures and to take no further action in this regard. But Israel has continued to reject General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Israeli leaders have, on various occasions, reaffirmed their intention of retaining Jerusalem illegally. This is the place to allude to the press conference held by the Israeli Prime Minister on May 26, 1968 in which he described the Security Council resolution of May 21, 1967 as "irrational and impractical" and as "the best measure taken to impede peace in the Middle East". He further declared on September 22, 1968 that Israel's determination to maintain the unity of its so-called "capital", Jerusalem, was not open to discussion or question and that the "liberation" of Jerusalem lay outside the scope of any political or military analysis.

On November 22, 1967 the Security Council unanimously adopted the proposal submitted by Britain for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. The man who proposed this resolution, and all those who supported it, have taken care to emphasise, both at the time it was submitted and on subsequent occasions, that the resolution rests upon a delicate balance to which the peaceful settlement it proposes is attached. Any addition to this resolution or subtraction therefrom would nullify it as a whole, since it is a balanced unity which creates reciprocal rights and obligations.

The United Arab Republic announced its acceptance of this resolution and its readiness to implement it. It made clear that its acceptance was explicitly based on the view that the resolution calls upon Israel to withdraw from all the territories it occupied as a result of its aggression against the Arab States on June 5, 1967. Needless to say, the United Arab Republic's acceptance of the resolution and its readiness to implement it presumes that Israel too should accept the resolution and implement its provisions.

We have informed Ambassador Jarring that we have agreed to implement the resolution and are ready to implement it. We proposed that he

should draw up a timetable for the implementation of all the articles of the resolution and we further requested that the resolution be implemented under the supervision of and in conformity with guarantees by the Security Council.

So far, however, Israel's position has been that it has rejected the resolution, has worked against it, has refused to withdraw and insists upon continuing its occupation.

Eshkol, the Israeli Prime Minister, stated in the Knesset on November 5, 1968: "When we say that we consider the River Jordan to be a secure frontier for Israel, we mean that, once a peace agreement has been concluded, we shall not allow any foreign troops to cross this frontier, even after the signing of a peace agreement. In any final settlement, Israel will not allow any Jordanian, Arab or any other troops to be stationed on the west bank of the Jordan." He again declared in the Knesset, on November 11, 1968: "Israel will retain the Straits of Tiran as part of any settlement of the Middle East problem." In his interview with the American magazine *Newsweek*, in its issue of February 9, 1969, he said: "What we say is that the Jordan River must become a secure frontier for us, with all that this implies. Our forces will remain in the belt of land lying alongside this frontier." In the same interview he also said: "As regards the Golan Heights, quite simply, we shall never abandon them. The same is true of Jerusalem." Here no flexibility at all is seen. He also declared in the interview that Israel insists on stationing forces in Sharm al-Shaikh. This explains why he ridiculed the idea of creating demilitarised zones. While denying Israel's expansionist designs, he declares in the interview that Israel will not go back to the previous borders of June 5, 1967 and that the armistice agreements are dead and buried.

When we add to these the statements made before and since by Israel's Foreign and Defence Ministers, we obtain a clear picture of Israel's real ambitions in the present period:

Abba Eban, for example, in his interview with the French daily *Le Figaro* of February 5, 1969, reaffirmed Israel's ambition to absorb Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and the West Bank and stated that Israel's occupation of Sharm al-Shaikh was irrevocable. He had already clearly stated at a press conference held on January 17, 1969, that

Israel intended to continue its occupation of Sharm al-Shaikh and of a strip of territory all along the eastern Sinai area. General Dayan has said many things about the West Bank. His latest statement was reported by press agencies on February 11, 1969; in it he repeated his demand for the economic and administrative absorption of the West Bank of Jordan into Israel and for the establishment of Israeli colonies in the occupied territories.

Thus Israeli leaders and officials disclose some of their designs, quite openly and unequivocally; others they try to mask behind a thin veil which hides nothing. Their statements about the West Bank give a complete picture of their designs on it. Israel demands a continued Israeli military presence on the River Jordan, without any Arab forces there, the economic integration of the West Bank into Israel and the building of Israeli colonies in it. This means complete Israeli domination of the area; for there is no difference between this and an official declaration of annexation.

As for Sharm al-Shaikh, Israel not only demands a military presence there but also control over a belt of territory in Sinai which would allegedly protect this military presence. It is clear that Israel's expansionist aims at this stage, as revealed in the declarations of its Prime Minister and Foreign and Defence Ministers, may be summarised as follows:

1. The annexation of Jerusalem.
2. Continued occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights.
3. Continued occupation of the West Bank of the Jordan, total domination of it and the effective termination of Jordanian sovereignty over it.
4. The absorption of the Gaza Strip, economically and administratively, into Israel.
5. Continued occupation of Sharm al-Shaikh and the Gulf of Aqaba area and a continued Israeli military presence in a strip of land in Sinai.
6. The building of Israeli settlements in occupied territories.

Israel's expansionist aims and its designs upon more Arab territory constitute a total rejection of the Security Council resolution. Not content

with merely refusing to implement the resolution, Israel has for more than a year been giving evasive answers to the specific question posed by Ambassador Jarring concerning its definition of secure frontiers. Finally, Israel's expansionist plans were unmasked in the statements made by its Minister and its Defence and Foreign Ministers and other officials. Israel is now working openly against the resolution of November 22, 1967, on the peaceful settlement, which was approved by the international community as represented by the Security Council meeting. In view of Israel's attitude, it is natural that the international community should expect the Security Council, and especially its permanent members, to take the positive measures necessary to restrain the aggressor, remove all traces of his aggression and implement the resolution of November 22, 1967 which ensures the termination of a situation whose continued existence is a threat to world peace and security.

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Address by the Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Prime Minister Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah on his Government's Attitude to Palestinian Resistance.¹ (Excerpt)

Kuwait, February 15, 1969

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Brothers and Friends,

The presence with us at this gathering of a number of representatives of the international press affords me the opportunity of welcoming them, and of expressing the hope that, while visiting our country, they will be able to become acquainted with various aspects of life here.

I sincerely hope that they will take the opportunity, while visiting this part of our Arab world, of trying to see and feel for themselves the misery that Israeli expansion and aggression has brought upon a peaceable Arab people and the results of this aggression: the human problem which besets the entire region, the most obvious example of which is the dispossession of hundreds of thousands of Arabs and their expulsion from their

¹ *Al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), 16/2/1969. Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad made this speech at a social function.

ancestral homes. What makes this tragedy more appalling is that it was the result of a long-term plan which, executed in carefully worked out stages, has in our day led to the occupation of new and cherished Arab territories. Faced with this mischievous and well-coordinated plan, do we not have the right to question the value of proposed peace settlements, if their aim is merely to support planned Zionist expansion and to confer legitimacy on territorial gains at the expense of the Arab people?

The Arab people realise this full well and are convinced that in order to regain their rights and their usurped homeland they must struggle and sacrifice. Liberty has never been hard to win if the will to win it is strong. The courage of the Arab resistance movement in Palestine and its reorganisation under the leadership of young men whose lives are dedicated to the liberation of their homeland and resistance to the Zionist occupation of their country inspires us all, both peoples and governments, to give them our fullest support.

Brothers and Friends,

The tragedy of Palestine and the resulting dispossession of the original inhabitants of the country, who have become refugees, impose certain obvious humanitarian obligations on all who love justice and peace throughout the world, especially on those who work in the field of information. The least of these obligations is that they should see for themselves the nature of Israeli aggression and acquaint themselves with the efforts being made by the Arab nation to recover its legitimate rights and to secure a peaceful life for its people in their own homeland...

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Statement by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to the People of Switzerland.¹ (Excerpt)

Amman, February 18, 1969

1. The Arab people of Palestine appeal to the people of Switzerland, in the name of the leader

of their national liberation movement, William Tell, to appreciate the action we took today. We apologise to the Swiss people and government for any harm done, unintentionally, to Swiss citizens or property. We regret any material or moral inconvenience incurred by the Swiss people or government.

We have nothing but affection and respect for the Swiss people and their way of life. The great Swiss tradition of achieving peaceful coexistence between different nationalities and creeds is what we wish to achieve in a non-Zionist Palestine. This tradition is a source of inspiration to us in our struggle against a racist and Nazi state. We always make a distinction between Jews and Zionists; we harbour no hostility to the Jews but we shall fight the Zionists because they invaded and occupied our homeland. The Israelis have made Zionism a burden on the Jews, just as Hitler made Nazism a burden on the Germans.

2. We regret in particular the violation of Swiss neutrality. We did not do so deliberately. It was Zionist strategy, which selects the appropriate time and place to strike at us which forced us to do so. The Zionists cannot expect us to refrain from adopting a counter-strategy, for the same laws must apply to both sides. Nor can the world applaud the Zionist strategy of striking us at the time and place that suit it, and at the same time condemn us for replying to Zionism in the only language it understands. Circumstances beyond our control have forced us to violate Swiss neutrality. For this, we again offer our apologies.

3. We may have been obliged to violate international laws, under exceptional circumstances and against our will, but the Zionists have violated international law so often that it has become a matter of routine for them. They have shown utter disdain for all United Nations resolutions on the Palestine problem. They have utterly repudiated their obligations under the Geneva Convention which they signed in your country. They have been violating every civilised norm of behaviour in occupied Palestine. Mass evictions of Arabs from their lands, collective murder and torture of school girls, who have been thrown into prison with Zionist prostitutes: these are examples of their daily practice in

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 19/2/1969.

occupied Palestine. The fact that a Palestinian girl from the Gaza Strip took part in this operation constitutes the reply of Arab women to the savage treatment of the Arab women of Gaza by Israeli soldiers.

4. Despite this, we took special precautions in attacking the Israeli El Al plane to avoid risking innocent lives. Our target was the El Al plane itself and its military crew.

El Al planes are civilian only in name. They are used for military purposes in the transport of military equipment from various parts of the world to Israel, of military volunteers from various countries, especially the United States, to Israel and of Israeli military missions abroad. But more important than all this is the use of El Al planes in the transport of Israeli soldiers from one area to another during military operations. If El Al pilots do not want us to attack their planes, they must convince their government that they must not be used for military purposes.

We, Arabs of Palestine, are a small nation, waging a war of liberation without any outside help against world Zionism and its allies. No people in the world, not even the Swiss, have faced such an enemy. Nevertheless, we are determined to wage our war of liberation until we are victorious, as you once were victorious.

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Interview Granted by the United Arab Republic President Nasser to the New York Times.¹

Cairo, February 26, 1969

Q. Are you now ready to re-establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.? Will you take the initiative in this since, after all, it was Cairo which broke relations originally?

A. We are ready to resume relations with the United States, but if the situation and the circumstances facilitate this step — that is to say, as long as the United States supports the Israeli occupation of our territory and as long as the

United States supplies Israel with planes while it is occupying our territory, there will be difficulties, because if we resume relations and Israel receives Phantoms, what will be the reaction? Receive Phantoms while occupying our territory? This means the United States encourages Israel to continue to occupy our territory.

Q. Do you expect more from the Nixon Administration than its predecessor? Did the Scranton visit seem to encourage a better atmosphere?

A. Of course, we hope so. Really, after the June war we faced a situation where the United States supported completely and 100 per cent the point of view of Israel. It was said by Governor Scranton that he thinks the United States must have a more even-handed policy in dealing with the situation. That is to say, we want from the United States not to take sides. Not to take our side, but not to support the occupation of our territory by Israel.

Q. Why is United States policy always viewed so negatively? After all, in 1956 we strongly opposed Britain, France and Israel, and in 1967 we gave no active aid to Israel.

A. We have great admiration for President Eisenhower and for Nixon. When Nixon visited us in 1963, he was out of politics but we received him as Eisenhower's Vice President, although not as a President who will be elected. But of course people still look back today to the fact that there is Israeli occupation of our territory. Nobody could look at 1956 and forget what happened in 1967-68.

Q. Do you foresee a fourth round of war?

A. This is a very simple question. We are striving to end the occupation of Arab territory in Egypt, Jordan and Syria by a political solution — by peaceful means. If we don't achieve it by peaceful means, what result? We must strive by other means to achieve it. One could not accept occupation of his country by aggressive armed force. One has to fight.

Q. Do you feel there is danger of a nuclear explosion in the Middle East?

A. As long as they don't sign the nonproliferation treaty, there is danger. We have signed it. But if they begin, there will be a race also. If they

¹ *New York Times* (New York), 12/3/1969. President Nasser granted this interview to Mr. S. L. Sulzberger. Copyright *New York Times*, 1969.

tried to build nuclear weapons, we would try to have our own. We have the capacity but what we need is the investment money required for production. I do not believe the Israelis have such weapons now.

Q. Would you spell out (A) the short-range and (B) the long-range terms for peace.

A. When I speak of a settlement I don't mean short-term and long-term. If we solve the problem of the occupied territory and of the refugees from Palestine, this will result in a peaceful settlement in spite of what took place during the last 20 or more years. But if we solve only the problem of the occupied territory but neglect the other part, there will be no peace.

According to the U.N., 1948, 1949 and 1966 Assemblies, there were resolutions for the right of Palestinians to return back to their own land. But this was neglected completely by the Israelis and this is the main part of the problem. The Israelis have expelled more than one million Arabs — Christians and Moslems. They wanted a country based on Judaism. If they accept refugees and evacuate conquered areas, there will be lasting peace.

Q. What would be the basis for this Jewish-Arab state in Palestine?

A. After the war of 1948, there were resolutions in the United Nations according to Arab refugees expelled by Israeli terrorists the right to return to their own land. Now they are outside because Israel refused; and they want to return back to their own land. This is the reason for the fedayeen movement. They are mostly the children of those expelled in 1948 and who wish to return. The man who was killed by the Israelis in the recent Zurich airport raid was born in Haifa and expelled.

This is the main problem — the right of the Palestinians in their own land. They lived there for thousands of years and now they are expelled. Sirhan was expelled from his home and village and went to the United States; and he has the desire to return to his own land. Without fulfillment of such claims, this problem will continue for tens of years.

Q. How do you conceive of an Israel with the refugees returned; a larger state?

A. I don't mean that Israel should gain part of our Arab territory and then say in exchange it would accept Arabs. But certainly those expelled have the right to return back to their homeland.

Q. Would you want the 1967 U.N. resolution frontier? That is to say, the June 1, 1967 borders?

A. Nobody will accept the expansion of Israel because if this is permitted, it would merely be a step to achieve the dreams of some of the leaders of Israel to have Israeli territory expand between the Nile and the Euphrates. Yes, we would take the June 1, 1967, frontiers.

Q. What might be the influence of Eshkol's death? Could there be a succession contest of hawks versus doves in Israel?

A. I don't believe there are hawks and doves there. Some people like to speak diplomatic language like Abba Eban. They say he is a dove. Yet last week he was for continuation of the occupation of Arab territory. You say he is a dove? There are no real differences and I don't think there will be any change.

Q. What do you think of Eisenhower's formula for installing several large nuclear plants in the general area of Palestine in order to desalt water for irrigation and provide power for industry in new settlements which could be developed by Palestinian refugees?

A. I will tell you something. We gave great attention to these statements by General Eisenhower and those by President Johnson, and we tried to have contact between American officials and our Government and American enterprises and our Government to put these ideas into effect in our country. All were without any result. The last contact took place two months ago.

But what happened after the ideas of General Eisenhower were only statements. We need water for our deserts, but there is no attempt to put that into effect. We could not neglect the rest of the problem and deal with it from this point of view only. The idea of nationalism, the Palestine problem, the people who want to return to their homeland — this is our character and our inheritance, and we cannot separate it from other approaches.

Q. What is your view of the position of Jews now residing in Arab states? What is the status of the

Jewish community in Egypt? Are the Jews now in Egypt free to leave if and when they wish?

A. First of all, I want to speak about the question of the Baghdad hangings. I am sorry to say that the press of all the Western countries tried to visualize the question as the hanging of Jews. It was not hanging of Jews; it was hanging of spies. Some were Moslems, some Arab, some Christian. It was not a hanging of Jews. After that, the second time, there was the hanging of Moslems only. But these were spies. It was the hanging not of Moslems, Christians, Jews, but of spies.

We have here about 5,000 Jews. We have about 100 under arrest because they are Zionists and are in contact with Israel and put under arrest after the war. Those who want to leave the country can leave, and many got permission to leave the country. The rest live as Egyptians and have all rights.

The Israelis are creating propaganda against that. Yesterday I was reading a report about the visit of the Red Cross in Gaza. Six hundred Arabs were in the prisons of Gaza. Of course, if we speak about the rest of the occupied territory, there will be thousands under arrest by the Israelis for reasons of security. We also arrest for the security of our country.

Q. Given the present situation, do you think that Jews in the Arab world ought not only to be permitted but perhaps even encouraged to emigrate?

A. The Jews are our cousins. Moses was born in Egypt. Don't stress this. I don't want it to be an Israeli claim. They say we are anti-Semitic, which is nonsense. We are Semites ourselves. We look upon Jews in our country as Egyptians. The Jews who live in the Arab countries feel it will be always more suitable for them to live in Arab countries rather than to go to other countries. Their fathers and grandfathers lived here for thousands of years without any discrimination.

Q. What is your attitude toward Al Fatah? I have heard this described as both favorable and unfavorable.

A. I admire them. As a man, I admire them because they are fighting for their rights. They waited for 20 years looking to the world to regain for them their deprived rights. Now they are fighting for these rights. I think everyone must agree with them because they have to fight.

I admire them as we admired the resistance movements which took place, for example, in Europe and the Philippines during the Second World War.

Q. Don't you think there is a danger that Al Fatah may politically take over the Government of Jordan or other Arab states?

A. I am sure the Fatah movement has as one of its main principles not to interfere with the internal affairs of any of the Arab countries like Jordan or Syria. It concentrates on planning on the Palestine question and how Palestinians can end the occupation and achieve their rights in their homeland.

Q. Do you still feel there should ultimately be one single Arab state, a kind of federation of Pan-Arabism? It seems to me that comparable ideas, such as the Pan-Turkish and Pan-Slavic movements, never worked; do you think that present circumstances in the Arab World favor such a concept?

A. I think when the Arabs realize that unity and federation will be in their own interests and strength, this will help to achieve the object of Arab unity. It is not an easy question because of the contradictions politically and socially. These contradictions remain to be liquidated. People of all Arab countries want unity, but how to fulfill it is not an easy question. It can best be started by unity between two or three countries by federation or confederation.

Q. At one time Syria was a member of the U.A.R. but this did not work.

A. I accepted that union in spite of myself. I was not convinced that the time was ripe for union. I said to the Syrians that I don't know Syria. In order to have unity, politicians must know each other. I thought we needed five years, but they insisted. But we now have cooperation with Syria in all fields.

Q. What rights does the Soviet Navy have in Alexandria, Port Said and Port Suez?

A. We don't have any base in our country for any foreign country. Of course, the Soviets were visiting our ports before the aggression against our country and they visit our ports also now. However, no single ship is here right now. We don't have any ships now in Alexandria; but

they visit us every now and then. We welcome visits because the Soviet Union helped us after the aggression, they helped us in the United Nations and they supplied us with arms after we lost our arms.

Q. How many Soviet military training personnel and technicians are there today in the U.A.R.?

A. Really, I don't know the figure, but I am asking for more technicians.

Q. Is it a large figure? five thousand?

A. It is less than 5,000. You know, it is probably even less than 1,000. But I am asking for more.

Q. Does the U.A.R. have greater military, air and naval strength now than on June 1, 1967?

A. Of course, we are trying to rebuild our armed forces and, of course, we have new arms now instead of the older arms which were lost during 1967. Also we have acquired other material. But I could not say we have exceeded what there was in 1967.

That is why we are particularly worried about statements in Western countries that they want to ban arms entering this area. The meaning of an arms ban would be that Israel will have superiority in both army and air force, while we won't get the opportunity to replace what we lost. We are worried because this would leave the Israeli's Phantoms from the United States and tanks from the United Kingdom while we attempt to rebuild. This would put Israel in a superior position and encourage it to continue occupation of Arab territories.

Q. What is the economic situation of the U.A.R. today and has the Aswan Dam had any effect on the standard of living? When the dam was first started you told me the population was increasing so rapidly that at its optimum, the dam would only keep the standard of living at the level it then was. Is this the way things have worked out?

A. No. The standard of living rose because the increase in the economy's annual growth rate was about 6.5 per cent from 1960. The increase of population was 2.8 per cent. This makes a difference of about 3.7 per cent. Last year and this year we were not able to achieve this same level because of the conditions of

occupation and the shifting of part of our budget to defense investment. But we think that we could increase the national economy every year by 7 per cent — not only by agriculture but by industry.

Q. What is your feeling about recent speculation that there is a power contest at the top in the U.S.S.R. today?

A. I will tell you something from my experience. At the top, there is always a power contest in every country. This is my experience. There are always differing points of view and ideas in the top everywhere. I think in every country there is a power contest. I don't know about the United States.

Really, I read press articles from the Western countries on Russia, but I don't think it is like that. Last July I met Brezhnev and Kosygin and Podgorny, and we discussed and were able to agree about many questions. Shelepin later came here and he spent about 10 days and told me he would return and give a report to Brezhnev. I think in Western countries they exaggerate these questions. There are always some differences in governments. Take Israel. Under Eshkol, there were Dayan and Eshkol. At the top, there is always some difference.

Q. What is your feeling about the so-called Brezhnev doctrine — the right of Moscow to intervene in other socialist countries? Tito says he is very much opposed to this and I know you have a high regard for Tito.

A. I will tell you something. As long as the Israelis are occupying our country, we are not concerned with these questions. I am speaking to you frankly. Our main problem is the Israeli occupation of the Arab countries and how we can work to get rid of it either politically or by any other means.

Q. Do you intend to invite General de Gaulle to visit Cairo or do you have any intention of visiting Paris?

A. No, we have no plans for that. But I am sure that the Egyptian people would welcome the visit of General de Gaulle to our country at any time.

Q. I remember in your book, "Philosophy of the Revolution," you discussed the three linked circles of

Arabism, Islam and Africa. Have you made any progress along this philosophical line?

A. I think it is progressing. We have better relations with the Arab countries. We are sending delegations to the Moslem countries. You know how the Moslems look to Jerusalem as a sacred city. We have contacts with all the African countries who supported us when Israel occupied our territory. I would add to that: not only African countries, but also Asian countries.

At the time the "Philosophy of the Revolution" was published, there were only three independent countries in Africa. Now there are more than 30. We have an African unity organization which has its center in Addis Ababa. There is a Moslem congress next month in Malaysia, and you know the Arab League is now stronger. After that there were many Arab meetings of the Kings and the Presidents.

Q. You have told me in the past that you have no ideology as such, that you are pragmatic rather than dogmatic. Have you by now developed an ideology and could you describe this to me a bit?

A. We met the last time in 1963. In 1962 there was a Charter and the principle of the ideas of development in our society and our culture was published in May, 1962. Our line for development after that was clearer than before.

Q. Could you describe this?

A. We don't describe it as socialist democracy, but as a "socialist community." People base their lives on socialism. Democracy, according to the charter, is freedom for the community and freedom of the individual, but it ends exploitation of the individual. The result was nationalization in 1961.

Q. Forgive me for saying this, but it seems to me that you have an unusual talent for turning defeat into victory and for climbing out of pits. What is the secret?

A. You know, I believe that I am a lucky man in spite of the catastrophe we face now. On the other hand, I don't plan it. It is natural. After the defeat, I was willing to leave. But you know when I said that I was selfish. I was trying to escape, but I was not able to.

Nobody was informed of my intention except three men. I was really intending to leave. I was

very tired and sick. But now it is over. When I went to Khartoum, all the people came to the streets and I could not forget what was said in one of the magazines: "Hail the conquered." To be conquered is not a determined issue, but to surrender is. I am not going to surrender. I believe in God. I am a fatalistic man. I believe in his will. I don't plan for any of these crises.

Q. Who most influenced the shape of your life and philosophy — what person during your lifetime or what historical figure?

A. Of course, I was influenced by Mohammed and also by Jesus. I believe in both of them. Did you know that we believe in Christ also? I think many people in our country are influenced by him.

Q. Is there a more contemporary figure who had an influence on you?

A. I think the most effective man was Gen. Aziz el-Massri. I admired him when I was a young officer. He fought for independence, insisted on independence. I met him many times before the revolution and after the revolution until his death. He was appointed in the army as a general. He was in Turkey during the First World War and then he came to Egypt, and he was not in the army except for a period during the Second World War.

Q. What are your hobbies nowadays; do you still play tennis?

A. No. You know my leg was not well last year. I cannot play tennis. The recommendation of the doctor was not to have hard sports but to walk. Now I have returned to being normal, because last year I was not well. But I walk generally before lunch. During the winter it is better to do it before lunch.

Q. Do you watch movies a lot still?

A. Yes, but not as much as before. Only about once a week. When I see a film, I begin about 11 o'clock or midnight. I have so many meetings until then.

Q. Do you read?

A. Last year I was not able to read a lot, but now I am regaining my capacity to work as before, so I read more books. In the last few days

I have been reading a book about Mao Tse-tung by a Canadian author. I can read some 'more now because we are starting a holiday.

Q. What is your dream that Egypt will be in 25 years' time — both in terms of its internal society and its external world position?

A. You know, during the last 17 years we were not able to fulfill all our dreams because of the continuous problems: the occupation, the aggression of 1956, and so on. My main dream is to develop this country. To have electricity in each village and have work for every man. We have work for every man in spite of many problems — the increase of the population by one million per year. We must have an increase in order to have jobs for one-half a million every year. This year we will have electricity in 300 villages. We have surplus electricity and water because now we have the water of the High Dam, which will help in land reform.

We don't have money for investment. We want also to use this electricity, and we have a committee of Soviet experts which handed us recommendations for using surplus electricity of the High Dam. We also want to develop the phosphate and fertilizer industry. We are going into heavy industry. We are building steel mills to give a production of one million tons of steel with a loan from the Soviet Union. The first phase will end by 1972.

We have to encourage investment in industry. This is, of course, my dream. I want to see this country without servants before my death. Now it is difficult for people to find servants. And this always-increasing problem about getting servants means an increasing standard of living.

Q. You are still quite a young man (52); what is your dream for your own person in 25 years? Is there anything out of the realm of political life you would like to have achieved by that time — such as writing a book or painting a picture?

A. I have no personal dreams. I have no personal life. Many people may not believe that, but this is the truth.

Q. What would you consider as your greatest success and greatest failure?

A. You know, as I told you, I believe in God; I am a fatalistic man. I believe that life is a com-

bination of success and failure. It could not be comprised of only success. Look at history. I have to accept failure. I have to do my best in order to change failure to success. I think the main success was the success of the revolution, the success of the 23d of July, 1952. I don't think that our defeat by Israel is a failure. I believe it will be followed by success.

My biggest mistake? Our life is full of mistakes. Always there are mistakes. There are many mistakes. I cannot really see something. Daily we have mistakes.

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Interview Granted by the Jordanian King Hussein to the Lebanese Daily Al-Nahar.¹ (Excerpts)

Amman, February 28, 1969

Q. I have noticed that certain quarters in the Jordanian Government are optimistic about a peaceful solution. Is such optimism justified?

A. The only justification, if what you are referring to can be described as optimism, derives from the fact that the Great Powers seem to believe that if the situation in the area deteriorates any further, this might constitute a threat to peace in this area and the whole world. This, presumably, is why the Great Powers are trying to support the United Nations Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 and making efforts to ensure its implementation. For us here in Jordan, the situation is better now than in the past. Our attitude has always been a sound and reasonable one. If we have not achieved any tangible progress, this is due to the obstinacy of Israel and its refusal to abide by international agreements.

Q. To what extent can the peaceful solution you seek be a just and honourable one? Is it not a contradiction in terms to say that a peaceful solution can be "just and honourable"?

A. The peaceful, just and honourable solution we seek is based upon the Security Council

¹ *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 1/3/1969.

resolution which we and the United Arab Republic have both accepted. Such a solution would take us back to where we were before June 5, 1967. It would mean the rescue of our land and our people in the occupied territories. This is what we regard as a just and honourable solution.

Q. Do the Arabs share this view?

A. The question is one of right and justice. But time passes and in the attitudes they have adopted the Arab states, whose future, destiny and very existence are threatened, have not yet faced up to the extent and the dangers of the problem. So far, the Arab countries have not succeeded in closing their ranks and assembling their forces to the extent required for the confrontation of this challenge with a true appreciation of its real dimensions. There is a difference between participation in moral and material support and the kind of participation which is needed under the present circumstances. The latter requires meetings at the highest levels along with an assessment of the enemy's strength and potential and the preparations that we must make to ensure that we can hold out, to avoid our past mistakes and to secure the superiority required, if we are to achieve our objectives. None of this has so far been achieved. Hence, we who are in positions of authority bear a heavy responsibility. When we speak of the lack of cooperation we mean the Security Council resolution and the fact that some have not helped in securing its implementation. We have responsibilities, but there are other responsibilities to be borne by the other Arab countries. So far, they have not succeeded in doing what is necessary to safeguard their rights fully and to defend their honour, their future, and their very existence. If the consequences are to be eliminated, and the Israeli danger is to be repelled, full Arab participation is essential.

Q. Can you be more specific about the kind of participation required?

A. There is a general sluggishness in all fields. This applies both to financing and coordination. We need more arms, equipment and ammunition and we need to obtain arms which only money can buy. This is true also of our brothers in the United Arab Republic. We in Jordan feel that we are the bulwark of the Arab nation. Our

Arab brothers do not realise how great would be their danger if this bulwark collapsed. All we want is readiness and preparation for the coming battle, in addition to coordination, cooperation and mutual understanding.

Q. Does this mean that the Arab aid which the Khartoum Summit Conference agreed upon has stopped or is in arrears?

A. The Arab aid decided on at the Khartoum Summit Conference is still arriving. Saudi Arabia and Libya are paying their contributions regularly and in full. But our brothers in Kuwait pay in sterling and, as you know, the sterling pound has been devalued, so the Kuwaiti contribution to Jordan is less than the sum agreed on at Khartoum.

Q. What prevents another Arab summit conference being held now?

A. You know as well as I do. We have worn ourselves out calling for a new Arab summit conference. But there are various factors that prevent its being held. So, they maintain, there is nothing for us to discuss until we have exhausted all possibilities of implementing the Security Council resolution. Then, either a miracle will take place and we shall succeed in arriving at a peaceful solution which we can consider at the conference, or we shall have an alternative plan for rescuing our homeland and our brethren which we can also discuss. Also, they say, rebuilding and preparing take a long time. Others maintain that as long as there are radical differences between the Arab countries as regards the Security Council resolution and the course we are to follow, there is no need for a conference which cannot possibly result in our agreeing. Here in Jordan, however, we feel that we are in duty bound to exchange views and attempt to find common ground for action against the Israeli menace. Hence we believe that the holding of such a conference would be of value in that all opinions could be discussed, points of view made clear and difficulties resolved.

Q. Then what is the alternative to a summit conference?

A. What we are doing at present, namely complete coordination with our brethren in the United Arab Republic. We are in constant touch

with them. We discuss all situations and viewpoints with them. We are trying to compensate for the lack of a summit conference by our bilateral contacts with other Arab countries.

Q. If a political solution fails and current diplomatic efforts reach an impasse, what do you think is the alternative?

A. The alternative is clear, as far as Jordan is concerned. If a peaceful solution cannot be found, we shall work unsparingly and unceasingly to build up our homeland so that, if war is imposed upon it again, it can resist and hold out honourably. We are giving it the strength it wants and requires by training and arming it. In armaments, we are now better off than we were on June 5, 1967 and our preparedness for battle is better than ever before. All this makes us one hundred per cent certain that we shall fight over this land and die in its defence. If we can do no more, at least we shall make the enemy pay a very heavy price for his aggression. All the aid we have received from our brethren in accordance with the resolutions of the Khartoum Conference we have turned over to armaments and to the armed forces. By adopting this policy, the East Bank is bearing the burden of endurance along with our brethren in the occupied West Bank. While working at the political level, we are also trying to strengthen ourselves in order to liberate the occupied territories. If no political solution is found, there is no alternative to a resort to arms.

Q. What do you think of the idea of "taking over guerrilla action"? I mean that Jordan should officially adopt commando action?

A. If you mean coordination between the Government and commando activity, that is our main objective. To confront the enemy, we must work constantly and in unison to unite our people here in the East Bank with those in the occupied West Bank so that they may work together to achieve our common objective. We are making constant efforts to achieve this. Greater understanding between us and the commando organisations can assist in this; indeed, all obstacles in the way of our achieving this objective must be surmounted. The door is still open for more cooperation so that we may achieve our common objective.

Q. By "taking over commando action", I meant making Amman an "Arab Hanoi", i.e. that Jordan should be turned into a base which would adopt commando activity and work for it.

A. Frankly, the battle demands that we organise ourselves, that we avoid anarchy and all disturbances liable to have an adverse affect on our situation and our ability to hold out. There can be no alternative to cooperation and coordination. We want this country to be a model of solidarity, cooperation and sincerity in the pursuit of our common objective, the objective of all who are working and fighting — the liberation of our occupied homeland.

Q. Do you believe that commando action is the right way to achieve liberation?

A. If we fail to reach the result we desire — a just solution of our problem, then every one of us will be a commando, both here and in the occupied territories. Our fate depends upon our potentialities and these will increase or decrease according to the extent of our cooperation and coordination. This does not mean that every one of us is not in himself a force in the service of our cause. Our objective is to liberate our land in any way we can and taking into account the circumstance attendant on the ways we choose.

Q. Cairo and Amman are seeking a political solution, while the Palestinian organisations and certain Arab countries reject such a solution. How do you explain this contradiction?

A. There are several factors to be taken into consideration. The first is the international attitude. In order to have a policy, we must rely on specific means and resources; to a great extent these lie in our endurance and the endurance of our brothers. But unfortunately the picture is neither complete nor comforting. There are certain differences in international attitudes, but there is also almost unanimous agreement on the necessity to eliminate all traces of aggression and to help us recover our homeland. This is an attitude on which both East and West agree. But if, having once eliminated the traces of aggression we were to try to go further, either on our own or in some other way, we should find the whole world against us. What I mean is, if we reject the political solution which means accepting

a return to the pre-June 5, 1967 frontiers and go beyond those frontiers, we shall find that the differences in international attitudes have increased, and that the almost unanimous support we enjoy has vanished and turned into support for Israel. But if we make some progress towards a political solution and recover what we lost by peaceful means instead of by force, we shall find that it will be difficult to justify rejection of such a solution. The important thing is to recover Arab rights through any medium, especially if the medium of force is not available, owing to the instability of the Arab position and the lack of other means. The alternative to the use of force is to achieve our objectives by political action. Then the people, whose awareness makes them well qualified to judge, will be able to examine the solution we have reached, and perhaps accept it.

Q. Do you not think that, if efforts to find a political solution fail, a clash between the Arab regimes and commando action will be inevitable?

A. No. If a political solution fails to materialise, this will mean that we all agree upon the necessity of resorting to the other alternative, namely the liberation of our homeland by any other means. Then we shall all be in the battle and we shall willingly make every sacrifice to win it.

Q. But if the political solution succeeds, will not the chances of a clash increase?

A. Again, no. There will never be a clash, because we are confident that the vast majority of our brethren possess such a degree of awareness that if a political or peaceful solution is found, they will recognise that the only realistic thing to do is to try to implement it so as to settle the problem.

Q. If the Palestinians called for a state independent of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, would you be ready to accede to their demands?

A. If you had asked me this question before 1947, it would have answered itself. But when the Arab countries and armies entered the war in Palestine in 1948 the Palestine problem became an Arab problem and not simply a minor Palestinian problem restricted to the Palestinian people. The Palestinian problem has become a major problem affecting the destiny

of all Arabs. Now, since the June war, Israel has occupied all of Palestine plus parts of Syria and the United Arab Republic. Hence the future of Palestine affects all the Arabs, though, of course, the Palestinians first and foremost. Since 1948, we in Jordan have been trying to make the country a single family, fighting the battle side by side. We strongly reject this talk of "Palestinian" and "Jordanian" which is heard from time to time. Unfortunately, some Arabs still entertain this idea. Naturally, if we succeed in removing all traces of aggression and return the occupied West Bank to its rightful owners and inhabitants, we shall reconsider the relationship and make sure that the situation which existed before June, 1967 is improved. We shall try to remain as a single family. But the choice is left to the Palestinians, our kinsfolk over there, to decide their own future.

However, there is also another problem — that of the Security Council resolution, its acceptance, and the recovery of Jerusalem. The resolution states that the pre-June 5, 1967, situation must be restored, i.e. a Jordan consisting of both the East and the West Bank. I believe that this question has not been put to all those in the occupied West Bank. Nor is there any need to put it to them. The vast majority of Jordanians will stubbornly and unanimously resist all attempts to divide them.

Q. Certain quarters in Jordan claim that the Jordanian army is not taking advantage of all available sources of arms. I mean, that it refuses Soviet arms supplies. Is this true?

A. Everyone knows that the Jordanian Arab Army uses Western training methods and Western arms. For many years now we have relied on Western sources for our arms. After the June war, the question was debated at the Khartoum Conference where we told our Arab brothers that if we were to obtain arms from the East, we should have to retrain our army. This would take a long time, more time than we could afford, and we should have to start from scratch. Our brothers agreed. Immediately after the war, we availed ourselves of the Western arms held in stock by certain Arab states that had changed over to Eastern arms. We were therefore able to make good part of what we had lost more rapidly than others

and to face difficult situations with ease. Furthermore, Eastern military strategy bases its training methods on numerical superiority at the expense of individual proficiency, whereas Western military thinking prefers individual proficiency to numerical superiority. Jordan is a small country and cannot expect its army to achieve numerical superiority, therefore Western military thinking is more suitable. These are some of the reasons for our continuing to obtain arms from the West. There is no difficulty in getting arms in the world today; any country can buy them if it has the money. Thus the financial aspect was one of the factors which made us rely on our traditional sources of arms supplies. If we were to obtain Eastern arms, Western arms would be denied to us. We must not forget that Israel fought us with Western arms and Western arms were not inferior in quality to Eastern ones. Furthermore Israel wishes to make the question of arms supplies in the Arab world a subject of conflict between the two camps, and this must not be permitted. Finally, there are several sources of arms in the West so that it is always easy to obtain arms from one of them, whereas there is only a single source of arms in the East. Arms do not constitute a problem; whatever their source, once they come into Arab hands they become Arab arms.

Q. Some people are asking if there is any use in the Arabs maintaining relations with the West, when the West has let us down so often.

A. When Israel fights us, it fights us everywhere. Zionism is fighting against the Arabs in all parts of the world. Hence the Arabs need all the countries of the world, not only certain specific countries. Relations between the Arabs and the West are necessary because we need the support and friendship of everyone. The success of Zionism is due to its long and persistent efforts in all countries of the world. It follows that the Arabs need all the friends they can get in order to explain their cause and win supporters. They must fight Zionism all over the world.

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The Political Strategy of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.¹ (Excerpts)

February, 1969

IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

One of the basic conditions of success is a clear perspective of things: a clear perspective of the enemy and a clear perspective of the revolutionary forces. It is in this light that the strategy of the struggle is determined, and without this perspective, national action becomes an impetuous gamble which soon ends in failure.

To us, political thought means a clear vision of the battle before us, and this is why we stress the importance and seriousness of this matter. What does it mean to fight without political thought? It means to fight in a manner that lacks planning, to fall into errors without realising how serious they are or how to deal with them, to improvise political positions not based on a clear view. When political positions are improvised there is usually a multiplicity of positions which means dispersed forces, with the result that the revolutionary forces of our people are dispersed along many paths instead of all converging on one path as one solid force.

Our enemy then is not Israel alone. It is Israel, Zionism and world imperialism, and unless we have a clear scientific knowledge of our enemy we cannot hope to triumph over it. The opinion which attempts to "neutralise" the Palestine liberation question on the international level by contending: "Why not try to win America to our side in the battle instead of allowing it to remain on Israel's side" is an erroneous and dangerous opinion because it is unscientific, unrealistic and far from being accurate. It is dangerous because it camouflages the truth about the enemy facing us and leads to erroneous calculations during the battle.

Does our definition of the enemy stop at this limit?

¹ Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine pamphlet (In English).

Are these all the forces which we are facing in the Palestine liberation battle?

Is this "all the enemy" facing us?

There is a fourth force which substantially stands on the side of the enemy camp and which we must view and define clearly.

Arab capitalism, whose interests are represented and defended by reactionary regimes in the Arab world, does not constitute an independent capitalist unit and is consequently unable to assume independent political positions.

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This means that, in a real liberation battle waged by the masses to destroy imperialist influence in our homeland, Arab reaction cannot but be on the side of its own interests, the continuation of which depends on the persistence of imperialism, and consequently cannot side with the masses.

These Arab reactionary forces — particularly the intelligent ones — may outwardly support superficial national movements with the object of using them to settle, to their own advantage, some of their side conflicts with Israel or with world imperialism, but in the end they are inevitably against any national liberation movement which aims at uprooting colonialism from our soil and building an independent economy which will serve the interests of the masses instead of going into the pockets of the few representing these reactionary forces.

The growth of the revolutionary mass movement means, in relation to these forces, the growth of the people's authority which acts to destroy the authority of these forces. Therefore, whatever degree their conflicts with Israel and imperialism attain, they are at all times conscious of the fact that their main conflict is with the movement of the masses which seeks the complete destruction of their interests and authority.

The classification of Arab reaction as one of the forces of the enemy is of the utmost importance, because failure to recognize this fact means failure to have a clear view before us.

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In the light of all this the main features of the enemy facing us become clear:

1. Our enemy in the battle is Israel, Zionism, world imperialism and Arab reaction.

2. This enemy possesses technological superiority and definite superiority in production which naturally develops into military superiority and great fighting power.

3. In addition to all this, the enemy has long experience in facing the masses' movement towards economic and political liberation and has the power to defeat such movement unless the masses possess that high degree of political consciousness which enables them to counteract all methods used by neo-colonialists in trying to defeat revolutionary movements.

4. The nature of the battle in relation to this enemy's principal military base represented by Israel is a life-or-death struggle which the political and military leadership inside Israel will endeavour to put up until the last breath.

This clear view of the enemy camp puts matters in the right perspective and eliminates any superficial view of the battle. It is this clear perspective which determines the time and place of the battle and the nature of the fight. In other words, it is this perspective which determines:

1. The importance of the revolutionary theory and revolutionary political thinking which is capable of mobilising all revolutionary forces to confront the enemy, to stand firm in this confrontation and to counteract all enemy measures to thwart and undermine revolutionary action.

2. The powerful political organization which is the vanguard of the forces of revolution in the struggle, armed with a stronger determination to win than the enemy's determination to defend its existence and interests to the last breath.

3. The nature and size of the revolutionary alliances which must be recruited to confront the entire enemy camp.

4. The course of armed struggle taking the form of guerrilla warfare at first and developing in the direction of the protracted people's liberation war which will ensure ultimate triumph over the enemy's technological and military superiority.

It is the nature of the enemy which determines the nature of the confrontation, and here lies the

danger of any superficial or unscientific look at the enemy camp and its main characteristics.

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What are the forces of revolution on the Palestinian level?

It is essential to define the forces of revolution on the Palestinian level from a class angle. To say that the Palestinian people with all their classes are in the same revolutionary position with regard to Israel and that all classes of the Palestinian people have the same revolutionary capacity because they find themselves without a territory and live outside their country, would be unrealistic and unscientific.

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Another opinion states that, since we are in the stage of national liberation, we cannot envisage a class struggle which is only justified in the stage of socialist revolution; consequently in the stage of national liberation a class struggle would mean that the conflict among the classes of the people takes precedence over the conflict between the entire people and the foreign colonialists. Rightist thinking adds here that Israel represents a specific type of colonialism threatening the existence of all classes of the Palestinian people. Thus the question here is not one of class but of struggle between Zionist presence and Arab Palestinian presence, which means that all classes of the Palestinian and Arab people find themselves in the midst of a major conflict.

To allow this trend of political thought to follow its course without facing it scientifically and refuting it, would lead to total loss, to the obscurity of the view of the real revolutionary class forces which constitute the pivot of the revolution. There would also be the possibility of the revolution falling under a class leadership which cannot bring it to the end of its destined course and is incapable of planning the radical revolutionary programmes which alone can help to win the battle.

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As for the contention that we are now passing through a stage of national liberation and not of socialist revolution, this relates to the subject of which classes are engaged in the struggle, which of them are with and which are against the revolu-

tion at each of its stages, but it does not eliminate the class question or the question of class struggle.

National liberation battles are also class battles. They are battles between colonialism and the feudal and capitalist class whose interests are linked with those of the colonialist on the one hand, and the other classes of the people representing the greater part of the nation on the other. If the saying that national liberation battles are national battles is intended to mean that they are battles waged by the overwhelming majority of the nation's masses, then this saying is true, but if it is intended to mean that these battles are different from the class struggle between the exploiters and the exploited, then the saying is untrue.

It is also from this angle that we must consider the statement that the Zionist Israeli peril threatens the entire Palestinian and Arab existence, and that this struggle is one between the Zionist axis and the Arab axis. If this statement is intended to mean that the Zionist peril threatens the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian and Arab masses, then it is true and certain, but if it is intended to deny the meeting of interests between Israeli and Arab reactionaries (in spite of their numerical inferiority to the masses of the people) or to deny the difference in the revolutionary roles of the other classes, considering the revolutionary role of the petit bourgeoisie living in urban areas to be on the same level as that of the rural or camp population, then this is untrue.

To sum up, our class view of the forces of the Palestinian revolution must take into account the special nature of the class situation in underdeveloped communities and the fact that our battle is one of national liberation, as well as the special nature of the Zionist peril. This however, means that we must adopt a scientific definition of the revolutionary classes and their roles in the light of these special features, and should not at all lead to the dismissal of the class view in the definition of the forces of revolution.

Rightist thought is trying to dismiss the class view in the definition of the forces of revolution to enable the bourgeoisie to infiltrate into positions of leadership and obstruct the revolution at the limits imposed by its interests.

We must face forcefully all ideas attempting to conceal the objective facts of the class question under a veil of vagueness and ambiguity. Are all

classes represented on the actual field of battle today, or does the overwhelming majority of combatants belong to the class of workers and peasants? If the overwhelming majority of combatants are the children of workers and peasants, then why should the political thinking of the Palestinian revolution not concur with the obvious objective facts?

Workers and peasants are the mainstay of the revolution, its basic class material and its leadership.

In the light of scientific socialist thinking, the experiences of world revolutions and the facts in evidence on the Palestinian field, we must clearly define and identify the revolutionary classes that are capable of shouldering the entire burden.

The revolutionary classes on the Palestinian field are the workers and peasants because it is these classes which are daily suffering the oppressive exploitation process exercised by world imperialism and its allies in our homeland.

It is the workers and peasants who today fill the miserable camps in which most Palestinians live. When we refer to the camps, we, in reality, refer to a class situation representing the workers, peasants and the destitute sections of the petit bourgeoisie of the Palestinian people. On the other hand the Palestinian bourgeoisie class does not live in camps, nor does the greater portion of the petit bourgeoisie. The camps are the workers, peasants and downtrodden portion of the petit bourgeoisie whose living conditions do not differ much from those of the workers and peasants.

It is essential to have a clear view of things, and to have a clear political thinking which concurs with this view. It is also essential to define the forces and classes of the revolution and to determine which classes shall lead the revolution while we are at the start of this new stage of Palestinian national action. This being done, we must act in accordance with this definition, for otherwise we would in fact be repeating the impulsive fight undertaken by the masses of our people during the past fifty years without conclusive results.

The material of the Palestinian revolution, its mainstay and its basic forces are the workers and peasants. These classes form the majority of the Palestinian people and physically fill all camps,

villages and poor urban districts. Here lie the forces of revolution... the forces of change. Here we find real preparation for long years of fighting. Here are the particular daily living conditions which drive people on to fight and die because the difference between death and life under such conditions is not much.

It is by starting from this objectivity that we are able to define the distinguishing mark between our people's unsuccessful struggle during the past fifty years and this new stage of our struggle, to draw a line of demarcation between clarity and vagueness, and to determine the great difference between a revolutionary march ending in victory and a hesitant, unsteady march ending in failure.

When we have addressed ourselves to the workers and peasants — the inhabitants of camps, villages and poor urban districts — and armed them with political awareness, organisation and fighting means, we shall have created the firm material foundation for a historical liberation revolution. It is the rise of such a solid revolutionary backbone that will enable us to conclude class alliances to benefit the revolution without exposing it to vacillation, deviation or defeat.

THE PALESTINIAN PETIT BOURGEOISIE

What is this class? What is its size? What is its position regarding the revolution? What are the relations existing between it and the workers and peasants, the basic material for the revolution?

The petit bourgeoisie comprises the craftsmen, the educated groups such as students, teachers, junior employees, small shopkeepers, lawyers, engineers and medical men.

In the underdeveloped countries the petit bourgeoisie is very numerous and may constitute a large proportion of the inhabitants. Consequently, in discussing this class, we must realise that we are discussing a large number of our people and that it is necessary to give the position of this numerous class a sound, clear, scientific definition because it would be a gross error affecting the progress of the revolution if we assigned to this class a role greater than that which it is really capable of performing. On the other hand, it would be a gross error if any

mistaken view of this class should lead the revolution to lose one of its forces.

When discussing the *petit bourgeoisie*, we must take into account the fact that it is not possible to view it and to define our position with regard to it as a clearly-delineated class. A portion of this class enjoys comfortable living conditions, assuring it of the basic necessities with some surplus, which makes it always look up to rising to the level of the upper bourgeoisie, while another portion of this class is barely capable of ensuring its basic living requirements, and is consequently closer to the revolution and more desirous of change. This shows the need to make a thorough study of the conditions prevailing among this class and the position of each of its groups in the light of each stage of the revolution.

Unlike the working class, the *petit bourgeoisie* does not live within specific class conditions, and here lies the reason for its vacillation and its habit of shifting from one position to another according to the progress of the revolution and the particular stage it has reached.

However, it is possible for us to say in general that during the stage of democratic national liberation, this class may be an ally to the force of the revolution and to its basic material represented by the workers and peasants, but alliance with this class must be so alert as to prevent it from infiltrating into the position of command because that would expose the revolution to vacillation and deviation or slackness.

Therefore the revolutionary position regarding this class is defined on the basis of two main points:

1. That this class is an ally to the revolution.
2. That this ally is not the basic material for the revolution and consequently it is not permissible for the leadership to be placed under its command or the command of its programmes and strategy. In view of this, the law which governs our relations with this class is one which impels us to take this class as an ally to stand with us in our main conflict with the enemy camp and at the same time to fight any attempts by this class to assume leadership of the revolution through its programmes and strategy.

The application of this law to our relations with this class is a matter of extreme delicacy, and at times, of extreme difficulty, because in

addition to its large numerical size, this class possesses consciousness and knowledge by virtue of its class conditions and has therefore the intelligence to take advantage of this alliance to infiltrate into the position of leadership of the revolution unless the basic classes of the revolution represented by the workers and peasants have the necessary consciousness, organization and efficiency.

To be able to triumph over this class in our struggle with it around the leadership, that is, around the strategy of the revolution, its programmes and organization frames, without allowing this struggle to affect our main battle against the enemy, we must know when and how to accept it as an ally and when and how to fight against it. Unless we know these things, it is feared that this struggle may lead to two fatal dangers:

1. That this struggle may be at the expense of our main struggle.
2. That the *petit bourgeoisie* may win this struggle and assume leadership of the revolution by virtue of the concrete power which it enjoys.

The criterion for the soundness of our position in this connection is to strike an alliance when such a course is demanded to serve the interest of the revolution and the masses and to fight when the masses are capable of feeling and understanding the reasons for this fight. The important thing is that we should be with the masses and the masses with us in both cases. During the periods when commando action faces dangers threatening its existence or periods when the enemy forces try to liquidate the issue we must raise the standard of alliance, work for it and stand before the masses as the forces calling for such alliance. In the event of struggle, the fight should be based on a specific position or specific issue felt by the masses. Our analysis of this class is that by virtue of its class structure it sometimes adopts vague, compromising or vacillating positions. This analysis means that specific occasions will arise when the organizations of this class will adopt such positions. On such occasions it would be possible for the masses to justify the fight and even to demand it, and to side with us in the course of prosecuting it.

The settlement of the class leadership issue in the Palestinian field will not be an easy matter

and will not occur within a short period, nor can it be permitted to take the form of a permanent struggle for leadership with or without occasion. It would be wrong to view this matter in an unrealistic manner. The settlement of the class leadership issue in the Palestinian field for the benefit of the workers peasants and poor classes will take a long time and should occur without affecting our position regarding the main conflict and at a time when the masses are capable of justifying and understanding the bases and reasons for this struggle.

As for the purely theoretical struggle occurring with or without occasion in a form which the masses cannot justify and in a manner which makes it prevalent over the main conflict or makes us forget that this class is our ally in the revolution, such a struggle could very well deviate the course of the battle and make us lose our position of leadership.

The basic consideration in our view of the revolutionary forces on the Palestinian level is the understanding that the workers and peasants are the basic tool for the revolution, and that the strategy, positions, theory and nature of organization of the revolution should be those of the working class. When we attain a deep and clear realisation of this fact and act on this basis, then an efficient political leadership can, during the national liberation stage, win over the petit bourgeoisie as a genuine ally according to the programme laid down by the working class and not by the petit bourgeoisie.

Alliance at the appropriate time on the basis of a programme, and conflict at the appropriate time around a palpable position or issue is the way to settle the question of leadership in the Palestinian field for the benefit of the camp dwellers, with the necessity for a realistic, dialectical, non-idealistic view of the time and method required for this settlement.

The existence of the petit bourgeoisie at the head of the Palestinian national movement today should be understood objectively, for without such understanding it would be difficult for the working class to rise successfully to the top of the leadership. The reason for the existence of the petit bourgeoisie at the head of the Palestinian national movement is that, during the stages of national liberation, this class is one of the classes

of the revolution, in addition to the fact that its numerical size is relatively great and that, by virtue of its class conditions, it possesses knowledge and power. Consequently, in a situation where the conditions of the working class from the viewpoint of political awareness and organization are not developed enough, it is natural that the petit bourgeoisie should be at the head of the alliance of the classes opposing Israel, imperialism and Arab reaction. To all this we must add the special character of the Palestinian petit bourgeoisie and the difference in position between it and the Arab petit bourgeoisie which stands at the head of Arab national régimes. The Palestinian petit bourgeoisie has raised the banner of armed struggle and is leading it today, and the fact that it is not in power makes it more revolutionary than the Arab petit bourgeoisie which is determined to preserve its interest and remain in power by avoiding the long and conclusive struggle with the opposing camp.

If we take all these points into consideration we find that the rise of the working class with its strategy and programmes to the head of the alliance and its leadership is contingent upon the growth achieved by this class in the development of its political awareness and organisation and also upon the escalation of the armed struggle and the growth of the state of revolution so that the Palestinian petit bourgeoisie is no longer capable of maintaining its leading role except at the expense of its own interests and in conflict with its class conditions and consequently with its thought, programmes and strategy.

What then in summary is the picture hitherto as regards the forces of revolution on the Palestinian level?

The basic revolutionary forces are the workers and peasants who alone, by virtue of their living conditions, are capable of leading the revolution to its end. The workers' radical and conclusive thought and strategy alone are capable of confronting the enemy camp, and it is efficient leadership of the workers that is able, through its scientific tactics, to lead along with it in this struggle the petit bourgeois class without this class being in the position of leadership and without allowing it to dilute revolutionary thought, strategy and programmes through its vacillating inconclusive thought and strategy.

The Palestinian bourgeoisie is essentially a business and banking bourgeoisie whose interests are interconnected among its members and are linked with the business and banking interests of imperialism. The wealth of this class is derived from brokerage transactions in foreign goods, insurance operations and banking business. Therefore, in the strategic field, this class is against the revolution which aims at putting an end to the existence of imperialism and its interests in our homeland, which means the destruction of its sources of wealth. Since our battle against Israel is at the same time a battle against imperialism, this class will stand by its own interests, that is, with imperialism against the revolution.

Naturally, this strategic analysis is not perfectly clear to all. It is also natural that it should be pervaded by tactical and temporary positions as well as by some exceptions, but this should not prevent us at any time from having a long-range strategic view of things and of the general picture.

On what scientific basis can it be said that all classes of the Palestinian people are among the forces of the revolution? Our revolution today is an armed one. Are all classes of the Palestinian people among the forces of this armed revolution?

After 5 June 1967 the young men of the camps and villages took up arms, hid in the mountains and fortified themselves in the cities. They directed their bullets against Israel and faced Israeli bullets with their bodies. At exactly the same time, the traditional bourgeois leaderships were receiving Sassoon, Dayan and other Israeli leaders to discuss with them the Palestinian set-up which Israel had planned for the purpose of liquidating the Palestine question thus achieving political triumph after having attained military victory. These attempts would have been successful had they not been foiled by the escalation of commando action. During that period the young men of the camps were giving death to, and receiving death from Israel, while the merchants on the West Bank were seeking to link their interests anew with the enemy state.

In view of all this, is it permissible for us to hear such slogans as "We are all commandos", or "The Palestinian people with all its classes are taking part in the armed struggles", or "No rich and no poor so long as we remain homeless",

without evaluating and criticising them and preventing their spread?

The revolution is science, and scientific thought looks for tangible facts. We will not be misled by deceptive mottoes and slogans which are at variance with the facts and which are launched by certain class forces in defence of their interests.

The Palestinian bourgeoisie which now lives in Palestine under Zionist occupation is not among the forces of the revolution although it has not manifestly associated itself with Israel and will in reality remain the class force through which the enemies will always try to defeat the revolution and stop it in the middle of the road.

The Palestinian bourgeoisie now living outside Palestine has at present no conflict of interest with commando action so long as this action at the present stage lives generally within certain specific theoretical, political and fighting horizons. It, therefore, supports commando action by giving a small portion of its surplus wealth, but we must expect that the revolutionary growth of the Palestinian national movement to the level where it manifestly clashes with imperialism will lead this bourgeoisie to take the stand which conforms to its class interests.

Of course we admit that certain sectors of this bourgeoisie may be an exception to this rule and that, by virtue of the special character of the Palestine question, they may remain on the side of the revolution and abstain from working against it, but such exceptions should not make us lose sight of the general law which will govern the position of this class vis-à-vis the revolution in general.

The principle which advocates the necessity of taking advantage of any force which may assist the revolution temporarily is a sound one, and so is the principle that the qualified leadership is that which mobilises the widest possible front to stand in the face of the main conflict, and we should act accordingly provided that we do not do so at the expense of the clarity of our political thought. Clear political thought is the only road leading to the recruitment and mobilisation of the true forces of the revolution. The recruitment and mobilisation of the true forces of the revolution in the light of clear scientific, political thought is the fundamental condition for success. For the

success of the revolution, it is more important than all financial assistance if the price of this assistance is to be the dilution of our clear view of things.

In the light of this we may now visualise the forces of revolution on the Palestinian level as a whole.

The forces of the revolution are the workers and peasants — the inhabitants of the camps, villages and poor urban districts — in alliance with the Palestinian petit bourgeoisie which also constitutes a revolutionary force, in spite of the fact that such alliance carries with it an intellectual and strategic conflict which must be settled in favour of the worker's leadership, thought and strategy, taking advantage, at least temporarily, of any sector of the Palestinian bourgeoisie without allowing such alliance any advantage to lead to any ambiguity in our view of the revolutionary forces and the clarity of their strategy and programmes.

The bourgeoisie numerically constitutes only a very small section of the community. It is a well-known fact that the bourgeoisie is one-half percent or one percent of the community. Moreover, this is not the class which takes up arms or is ready to fight and die in defence of the freedom of the country and the people. Consequently, any attempt to picture this class analysis of the forces of the revolution as leading to the dissipation of the nation's forces and driving these forces into an internal conflict would be scientifically untrue. In the light of this analysis the revolution does not lose any effective fighting force; on the contrary, it gains clarity of view and a sound definition of the positions of the forces, and places the poor classes face to face with their responsibilities in the leadership of the revolution, thus giving rise to a national battle in which the overwhelming majority of the masses of our people will stand in the face of Israel, imperialism and reaction under the leadership of the poor whom Israel, imperialism and reaction have reduced to a state of misery and poverty which they experience daily and which deprives them of their human character and life value.

Political organization armed with the theory of scientific socialism is the highest form for the

organization and mobilisation of the working class forces on the greatest scale. This is a fact which has been made perfectly clear by all revolutionary experiences in this century. The experiences of China, Vietnam and Cuba, as well as the experience of the October Revolution, all point to and confirm this fact.

Scientific socialist ideology and world revolutionary experiences have indicated clearly how revolutionary political organization armed with a revolutionary theory — the theory of the working class — is the way to self-organization by the working class, the concentration of its forces, the consolidation of its potentialities and the definition of its strategy in its battle. If the experiences of the Palestinian and Arab national movement have not hitherto achieved success in confronting and triumphing over imperialism, Zionism, Israel and the forces of reaction, it is because they have not adopted this organization theory. The failure of political organizations in the Palestinian and Arab field does not constitute a condemnation of the political organization of parties in general, but rather a condemnation of a line of political organizations which have not been set up from the ideological class and organizational viewpoints on the basis of this theory and these experiences. The revolutionary promotion of the Palestinian national movement cannot rest on the condemnation of the idea of revolutionary political organization as a principle, and the only way before it is to adopt the political organization the nature of which has been defined in the light of scientific socialist theory and past experiences.

This organizational form is the organizational framework for the concentration of the basic revolutionary force: the working class. Moreover it is this form which is capable during the stages of national liberation, as the major revolutionary experiences have proved, of mobilising the peasant forces and of concentrating them on the greatest scale.

Consequently, by adopting this form, we would have created the framework for the organization and mobilisation of the basic revolutionary classes represented by the workers and peasants.

THE ROLE OF THE PETIT BOURGEOISIE

But what about the petit bourgeoisie? According to our analysis the petit bourgeoisie is also one of the forces of revolution. Can we mobilise it within this framework? If not, then what is the organizational framework that would enable us to mobilise and concentrate all the revolutionary forces?

The Palestinian petit bourgeoisie will not, in its majority, enter into the organizational framework which rests on the basis of a political party organization armed with scientific socialist theory. The socialist thought of the revolution is not the thought of this class, and the strong, binding and disciplined party organization is not the organizational form in which it finds satisfaction. The petit bourgeoisie prefers to be bound by a general loose thought which does not go beyond general liberation slogans and by a political organization which does not impose on it any demands beyond its capacity. Therefore it will not align itself within this frame but will address itself to other Palestinian organizations which do not clearly adopt scientific socialist theory and the revolutionary political party organization adhering to this theory. In the light of this, the complete organizational form which is capable of containing all the revolutionary forces, is the political party organization form adopting scientific socialism which is capable of mobilising the workers and peasants on the greatest scale, and which at the same time calls for the rise of a national front to achieve alliance between the workers and peasants — the basic classes and mainstay of the revolution — and the petit bourgeoisie as one of the forces of revolution.

This completes our picture of the revolutionary forces on the Palestinian level and the organizational form capable of mobilising them.

In our opinion, this is the form that is fully consistent with the scientific analysis of things and objectively concurs with the interest of the revolution. This form provides a clear view of the battle on the one hand and permits the greatest scale of mobilisation of the basic revolutionary force on the other, at the same time ensuring the widest possible front to stand in the face of the enemy camp.

The wide national front proposed in the light

of this picture is, in our opinion, the revolutionary realisation of Palestinian national unity. If Palestinian national unity is intended to mean the concentration of all revolutionary forces at the stage of democratic national liberation to stand in the face of the basic conflict with Israel, imperialism and reaction, then this is the form which serves this end. These three classes which meet within the frame of the front represent, even numerically, the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian people. The national unity which is advocated by some and which is intended to enable the traditional leaderships, the bourgeoisie and the forces of reaction to infiltrate into the ranks of the revolution, and is intended also to undermine the ideas of revolutionary political party organization and to obscure any clarity in the political thought of the revolution, is clearly against the interest of the revolution.

The foregoing clearly indicates the basic lines of our position with regard to the subject of relations among the Palestinian forces. These lines enable us to define our positions with regard to all subjects and problems arising on this level and serve to clarify our position with regard to the existing picture of the Palestinian field and the direction in which we must exercise our efforts to establish objective relations among the forces and organizations of the Palestinian revolution.

1. We regard Palestinian national unity as a basic factor of the mobilisation of all forces of the revolution to confront the enemy camp, and on this basis we must take an effective position to achieve it.

2. The form of national unity is the rise of a front in which all classes of the revolution — workers, peasants and petit bourgeoisie — will be represented.

3. We must take action to mobilise the workers and peasants in one single revolutionary political organization armed with scientific socialist theory. On this basis we must effectively endeavour to unite all Palestinian leftist organizations which through contact and experience can be persuaded to adopt this analysis.

4. The petit bourgeoisie will not join this form of organization, which adheres to scientific socialism and strong political organization, but will

join those Palestinian organizations which content themselves with general liberation slogans, avoiding clarity in thinking and class view and leading an organizational life which does not demand of it anything beyond its capacity.

5. On this basis, and on the basis of our view of the main conflict and the nature of the stage, as well as the necessity of achieving that national unity which will group together all the forces of the revolution to stand in the face of Israel, we must work for the establishment of a national front which will provide the battle with the necessary class alliance on the one hand, and preserve the right of each to view and plan for the battle according to its class horizon on the other.

This is our view of the forces of the Palestinian revolution and the form of their mobilisation and concentration.

The form which we propose here for the relations among the basic Palestinian forces draws the general strategic line which will govern our course.

Now, does our strategic thought about the Palestine liberation struggle stop at the frontiers of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian field?

If we remember the enemy camp and recall its size and nature, we will immediately realise that any strategic thinking about the Palestinian liberation struggle must cover the mobilisation of all forces of the revolution on the Arab and world levels, because it is only through such mobilisation and concentration that we can create the power which is capable of confronting Israel, world imperialism and Arab reaction. The Palestinian revolution which is fused together with the Arab revolution and in alliance with world revolution is alone capable of achieving victory. To confine the Palestinian revolution within the limits of the Palestinian people would mean failure, if we remember the nature of the enemy alliance which we are facing.

FORCES OF THE REVOLUTION ON THE ARAB LEVEL

The mobilisation and concentration of the revolutionary forces on the Palestinian level, even through a political organization adhering to and guided by scientific socialism, mobilising the downtrodden classes on the greatest scale and forming with the petit bourgeoisie a united front, will not suffice to create a revolutionary camp capable of gaining superiority over the enemy camp consisting of a strong and wide front which includes Israel, the Zionist movement, Imperialism and Arab reaction.

The strategy of the Palestine liberation struggle requires the mobilisation and concentration of all the forces of revolution in the Arab countries in general and the Arab regions surrounding Israel in particular. This is the reason why the Popular Front lays so much stress on the inter-connection between the Palestinian question and the Arab question and on the necessity of coalescence between the Palestine liberation movement and the Arab liberation movement. It is also the reason for the necessity of laying strategic emphasis on the "Arab Hanoi" motto as a revolutionary principle creating coalescence between the Palestinian revolution and the Arab revolution and forming a firm foundation for the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement which would enable it to stand in the face of the enemy camp and gain superiority over it.

Although we do not say that the mobilisation of the forces of revolution in the Arab field is one of the immediate tasks of the Palestinian revolution, we may say that the fate of the Palestinian revolution and the armed struggle — commando action — now being carried out by the Palestinian people depends on the extent of their coalescence with a revolutionary strategy which aims at mobilising the forces of revolution in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iraq and the rest of the Arab countries.

In this light, the Palestine liberation strategy as a battle against Israel, Zionism, imperialism and Arab reaction, requires a revolutionary Palestinian strategy in coalescence with a revolutionary Arab strategy.

The armed struggle against Israel and all imperialist interests in our homeland, the expansion of the armed struggle front which stands in the face of Arab reaction and all imperialist interests and bases in the Arab homeland, and the encirclement of Israel with the strategy of the people's liberation war from every side — from Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and inside the territory occupied before and after 5 June 1967 — is the only path that leads to victory. It is not important that the Palestinian people should register a heroic stand through commando action: the important thing is liberation and victory. In the light of our definition of the enemy camp, the way to liberation is a revolutionary Palestinian and Arab front which will bring maturity, protection and support to commando action and pave the way to its expansion so that it will encircle Israel on every side and involve all the enemy forces which furnish Israel with support and protection.

The strategy of revolutionary Arab action coincides in its broad lines with that of Palestinian revolutionary action. The basis of this coincidence is that the nature of the stage now being traversed by the Arab countries is identical for all of them. In the light of Israel's occupation of Sinai and the Golan Heights its very existence and its persistence as a base from which imperialism prepares to attack any move towards Arab liberation — in the light of this concrete picture — the stage which the Arab people are now traversing is that of national liberation, of democratic national revolution, notwithstanding the class and economic changes which have taken place in Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Iraq in the direction of socialist transformation.

The strategy of the democratic national revolution in this age has become clear through the Vietnamese experience and before it the Cuban and Chinese experience.

The main lines of this strategy are: the mobilisation and concentration of the forces of the poor workers and peasants on the greatest scale; the leadership of the revolution by these classes through a political organization which adheres to and is guided by the ideology of scientific socialism in alliance with the forces of the petit bourgeoisie whose interests do not conflict with the nature of the democratic national revolution; and reliance

on the armed struggle to overcome the enemy's technological superiority through a protracted war commencing with guerrilla warfare and developing into a popular liberation war which the people are determined to win.

The national liberation movement in the Arab countries has not yet crystallised along these lines.

In the nature of the clash between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries, all this will create the objective circumstances which will pave the way for and assist the birth and growth of a national liberation movement that will adopt this strategy under the leadership of the workers and peasants. The alliance, and later the coalescence of the Palestinian national liberation movement with the Arab national liberation movement, will give rise to the Palestinian-Arab force and the Palestinian-Arab strategy which is capable of triumphing in a long and hard battle imposed by the nature of the enemy we are facing.

It remains for the Palestinian national liberation movement to define its Arab relations in the light of the circumstances now prevailing in the Arab field.

Arab capitalism and feudalism are still the ruling class in some Arab countries. The rule of these classes is at present represented by the reactionary régimes in Jordan, Lebanon and certain other Arab countries. These régimes are linked in interest with world imperialism led by the United States, and in spite of the partial, and sometimes purely outward, conflict between these régimes and Israel, this partial conflict exists in the shadow of an objective concurrence with world capitalism. Thus the relation of the armed struggle — now Palestinian and later Arab — is on the strategic level, one of conflict with these régimes notwithstanding any tactical positions imposed on both sides by temporary considerations.

This is as regards the national liberation movement's relation with the capitalist and reactionary régimes. However, the delicate situation facing the Palestinian armed struggle and the Palestine national liberation movement is the definition of relations with the national régimes in the Arab field, particularly the national régimes surrounding Israel or in the vicinity of the field of battle, namely, Egypt, Syria and Iraq.

Any fearless revolutionary evaluation of these régimes must be essentially based on the June defeat and on its consequences and meanings, as well as on the strategy, programmes and positions subsequent to that defeat. Any attempt at diluting or confusing the clear view of this defeat and of its meanings and lessons cannot but be the result of a subjective and biased interest or an idealistic and sentimental view which is remote from science, objectivity and fearless frankness in viewing things.

The June defeat led to the occupation of the whole of Palestine as well as of the Golan Heights and Sinai, the dispersion of hundreds of thousands of citizens and the humiliation of an entire nation. Consequently the revolutionary position is one which cannot temporise or bargain or dilute the clear view which alone enables us to analyse and understand the June defeat and eventually to see the political and military strategy which will assure us of perseverance and victory in our battle.

The Palestinian and Arab masses, as well as the Arab national parties and organizations, viewed these régimes as revolutionary, progressive régimes capable of leading to the liberation of Palestine and the realization of the aims and objectives of the masses.

At the time when indications of the June war began to appear, neither the masses nor the forces concerned expected a defeat of the type which occurred in June.

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What is the sound scientific evaluation of these régimes?

Following the First World War, the occupation by France and Britain of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan and the entrenchment of these colonial powers in Egypt and other parts of the Arab homeland, the national liberation movement waged by the masses against colonialism was led by feudalists, aristocrats and members of the bourgeoisie. Such leaders were Haj Amin Al-Husseini and the Arab Party in Palestine and Shukri Al-Kuwatli and the Nationalist Party in Syria, and there was a similar type of leadership in the other Arab countries. Even the armed revolts which the masses of our people directed against the forces of occupation were under the political leadership of the bourgeoisie. The masses

saw from the course of events that this class, in its struggle with colonialism, aimed at nothing more than obtaining an outward form of independence which would place it at the top of the power pyramid. This made it a partner to the colonialists in their exploitation of the masses' toil and gave it a share in profits from capitalist investments in our homeland, without any regard for the liberation and unification slogans for which the masses had paid their blood. When the masses saw all this, the conflict began between these feudal, aristocratic and bourgeois leaders and their political parties on the one hand and the movement of the masses on the other. At this new stage in the struggle the masses were led by groups of educated young men, professionals and free army officers who mainly belonged to and acted through the petit bourgeoisie. The petit bourgeoisie was a growing class and it was this class that led the masses in their struggle with the bourgeoisie and the feudalists who were directly or indirectly in alliance with colonialist capitalism. In the late thirties and early forties these attempts took the form of political and military parties and organizations, both Pan-Arab and local. In 1948 Israel was set up and the disaster took place. This revealed to the masses the truth about the puppet independent régimes established by the bourgeoisie, their impotence in the face of Israel and their radical opposition to the masses' objectives. Thus the 1948 disaster paved the way for the fall of some of these régimes and the assumption of power by political and military national organizations led by national elements belonging to the petit bourgeoisie. Such organizations generally consisted of members of this class and worked among the workers and peasants who rallied around these new organizations because they stood in the face of the reactionary alliance among colonialism, feudalism and capitalism.

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Thus the basic conflict in the area crystallised in the following manner:

The alliance of the workers, peasants and petit bourgeoisie under the leadership of the petit bourgeoisie against colonialism, Arab reaction and Israel.

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The Nasser régime was and still is the clearest and most crystallised example of this picture.

In any historical evaluation of these régimes and what they represented in the Arab field during the fifties and until June 1967, we must not lose sight of the major revolutionary achievements realised by these régimes, particularly the Nasser régime. This régime was able to get rid of the British occupation forces stationed in the Suez Canal Zone, wage war against all the colonialist military pacts through which colonialism tried to get back into the area under the pretext of defence against the Soviet peril, and do away with the colonialist-reactionary alliance which controlled the destiny of Egypt and its masses. Moreover it broke the blockade imposed by colonialism on the area and established military, political and economic relations with the socialist camp. Furthermore it placed Egyptian national action within its Arab national horizon and framework and accomplished the first achievements of union in modern Arab history. It, also, established a link between political liberation and the social issue, laid down an agrarian reform which involved land ownership and relations between farmers and land-owners, nationalised the major industries and commercial enterprises and raised development projects based on public ownership. It set Egypt on the road of socialist transformation, and accompanied these transformations with similar ones in the field of revolutionary thought. By this it lifted revolutionary thought from the level of general liberation, unionist and socialist slogans to the beginnings of a class view of the revolutionary forces and the beginnings of the adoption of the general socialist course in viewing and analysing the movement of progress.

These achievements created a state of alarm in the opposing camp led by the U.S. for the purpose of thwarting this march through various means including the overthrow of these régimes by force. Such a state of alarm called for a similar state of alarm which these régimes could rise to a new revolutionary level by politically, militarily and economically mobilising the forces of the masses to a degree that ensures steadfastness, perseverance and victory.

But these régimes continued to move within programmes and plans imposed on them by their

class nature. At this point the problem of structure of these régimes and the problems of their plans began to emerge. In the middle sixties the Nasser régime began to live through this problem without being able to overcome it until the June defeat which came to reveal clearly the problem relating to the structure of this régime and its inability within this class nature to triumph over the imperialist-reactionary-Zionist-Israeli camp.

The nature of these national régimes was formed as a result of the organizations which they had set up, their view of things, and of the extent to which they had gone in their socialist transformations and the new class conditions which they had produced. These régimes struck at the interests of feudalism and capitalism and their exploitation of the masses, but they preserved the petit bourgeoisie and its interests in the industrial, agricultural and commercial sectors, at the same time producing a new class of military men, politicians and administrative personnel whose interests became interlocked with those of the petit bourgeoisie, thus forming with it the upper class in these communities. The interests of this upper class required the maintenance of the experiment within limits which did not conflict with its interests or with its thinking and view of the battle. This class is antagonistic to colonialism and reaction but at the same time wants to keep the privileges which it enjoys. It is this state of affairs that has defined the nature of the political, economic, military and ideological programmes of these régimes.

It is on this basis that this class has formulated its view of confrontation with colonialism and Israel through the military institution. For it realises that the popular liberation war means that its right to the position of leadership is contingent upon its willingness to sacrifice all its privileges and follow the same living pattern as the commandos of today. On this basis also a loose form for the political mobilisation of the masses has been put forth, because the truly revolutionary mobilisation of the masses through a political party organization in connection with the armed struggle, means the rise of new leadership from the workers and peasants, as it means the ability of the masses to supervise this class and call it to account. Accordingly, this class has laid down its economic programmes which make the socialist

transformation stop at the existing limits. Eventually, this class has produced political thought which dilutes the view of the true nature of the struggle, the true nature of the stage and the true nature of the programmes which are capable of persisting and enduring, as well as diluting the view of the process, still existing in these régimes, of exploiting the labour of the workers and peasants.

Thus the June defeat does not for us constitute mere military defeat. It is in reality a defeat for these régimes and their programmes and their inability to effect the political, military, economic and ideological mobilisation which is capable of resisting and triumphing over imperialism and its alliances and plans in our homeland.

Even after the June defeat these régimes have continued to move within these same military programmes. Through their alliance with the Soviet Union they aim to be able to wage a tactical military battle ending with the removal of all traces of the aggression if it should prove impossible to implement the Security Council's resolution through means other than war, it being understood that this resolution purports at the same time to obtain recognition of Israel's right to exist within new safe frontiers. These régimes support commando action but only as a revolutionary tactic to exert pressure on imperialism and Israel to push them towards the implementation of the Security Council's resolution on the basis of a settlement which might be acceptable.

The national régimes are still moving within this strategy against the radical revolutionary strategy which seeks a long-term popular liberation war waged by the masses under the leadership of the working class and the peasants on the basis of radical political, military and economic programmes represented before us today by the Vietnamese liberation movement which has proved that it is only with such a formula that we are able to face imperialism and its technological, economic and military superiority.

When we present the Vietnamese liberation movement, which is waging a triumphant struggle against the U.S. and Vietnamese reaction, as an example of successful liberation movements in this age, we do not at all ignore the special nature of our battle both in respect of the nature

of imperialist presence, represented by Israel, in our homeland, and in respect of the special nature of the land. We always mean in fact the main strategic lines of the Vietnam war — represented by the strong political organization which adheres to scientific socialism and mobilises the forces of the masses on the greatest scale under the leadership of the working class and the national front slogan, using the course of guerrilla warfare, the popular liberation war, the political, economic and military mobilisation resulting from all this, the protracted war, the determination to win — that determination which is embodied by the poor classes of the community, the classes that cannot continue to live under the burden of the ugly and dirty exploitation exercised by imperialism and Vietnamese reactionary. We also mean the world revolutionary alliance established by the Vietnamese liberation movement to enable it to face imperialism with all its weight, forces and plans.

In the light of all this we are able to make a scientific evaluation of the régimes and their role in the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement, and eventually, the form of relations between them and the revolutionary Palestinian national liberation movement:

1. These régimes are antagonistic to imperialism, Zionism, Israel and Arab reaction represented by feudalism and capitalism.

2. These régimes have accomplished a number of revolutionary achievements on the way to democratic national revolution which has interlocked — as in the case in Egypt — with the commencement of the shift in the structure of the economic community in a socialist direction.

3. These régimes, by reason of the class structure resulting from their experience, are no longer capable of continuing their progress on the revolutionary road and of raising it to the level which would enable them to face the state of alarm that has arisen in the camp of imperialism, Israel and Arab reaction.

4. The programmes of these régimes in facing the battle are those of the petit bourgeoisie which occupies the top of the power pyramid and the position of leadership in these régimes, although the June war and subsequent developments have revealed the inability of this class to effect

the ideological, political, military and economic mobilisation capable of holding out and harrassing the enemy and of achieving victory.

5. In the light of the fact that these régimes are antagonistic to imperialism and Israel on the one hand, and the fact that they adopt compromising non-radical programmes in the face of the enemy on the other, relations with these régimes must be both of alliance and conflict at the same time: alliance because they are antagonistic to imperialism and Israel, and conflict over their strategy in struggle.

6. There will be two strategies in the face of Israeli occupation and the prosecution of the Palestinian and Arab national liberation war: the strategy of the petit bourgeoisie which adopts in theory or moves in practice towards a traditional war strategy through the reconstruction of the military institution if a peaceful solution proves to be impossible; and the strategy of the working class, which adopts in theory and moves in practice towards guerrilla warfare and popular liberation war, waged by the masses under the leadership of the working class on the widest national front, opposed to imperialism and with revolutionary programmes of mobilisation which will raise the ideological, political, economic and military mobilisation of the masses to the highest level.

7. These two strategies and the forces which they represent will move together for some time under relations of alliance and conflict until in the end the working class strategy prevails on the Palestinian and Arab levels. Then it will face the enemy with a wide class alliance comprising the workers, peasants and the petit bourgeoisie under working class leadership with a working class ideology and programmes and a popular liberation war which is determined and able to win.

This defines the form of relations between the Palestinian national revolution and all Arab forces.

The Palestinian revolution on the strategic level will clash with the Arab reactionary forces and the régimes representing them, and will be governed by relations of alliance and conflict with the national régimes where the petit bourgeoisie occupies the top of the power pyramid. It will establish relations

of alliance in the direction of coalescence with the Arab revolutionary forces represented by the workers and peasants and their political institutions. These forces will be generated in the Arab field in general and the Arab countries surrounding Israel in particular by reason of the nature of the struggle and the nature of the revolutionary strategy which it will produce.

Through this picture — the picture of the Palestinian and Arab revolution led by the working class and comprising all anti-imperialist forces which adopt the course of guerrilla warfare, ideologically, politically, militarily and economically to the highest level — we have a complete strategic view of the Palestine liberation battle, first on the Palestinian level and then on the Arab level.

FORCES OF THE REVOLUTION ON THE WORLD LEVEL

World imperialism at this time has circumstances and conditions which distinguish it from what it was in previous times, and is exercising the process of exploitation of peoples by new methods which differ from its old ones. On the other hand, the camp of the anti-imperialist forces has, in respect of size and power, a new position and level which differ from those before the Second World War. The liberation movements of the world should realise the basic international facts which govern this period of history. The Palestine and Arab liberation movement does not move in a vacuum. It lives and fights in the midst of specific world circumstances which affect and react with it, and all this will determine our fate. The international ground on which national liberation movements move, has always been, and will remain, a basic factor in determining peoples' destinies.

The First World War was a war among the imperialist capitalist powers themselves, and its object was to redistribute world markets among these powers. That war was an armed explosion of the conflicts among world capitalist blocs in their race for the exploitation and plunder of peoples' wealth and for monopolising their markets. That war was not a revolutionary war waged by the working class in the progressive countries and by the enslaved peoples against the exploiting capitalists. The same

applies in some degree to the Second World War. Consequently, conflicts among the colonialist powers were the principal manifestation on the world stage. The forces of revolution represented by the working class in the advanced countries and by the enslaved peoples, were not in a position to transform these wars into revolutionary wars which could place the basic conflict on the world level in its natural position between the exploiters and the exploited. However, the consequences of the Second World War and the events which followed in its wake, crystallized the world situation in a new form. The forces of colonialism concentrated and crystallised into one camp: the imperialist camp led by the United States in opposition to the camp of the socialist forces and persecuted peoples as the opposite pole in this struggle.

The Soviet Union came out victorious in this war, and the socialist camp expanded to include a number of East European countries. The enslaved peoples rose up in vindication of their right to freedom and progress, and the great Chinese Revolution led by Mao Tse Tung and the Chinese Communist Party triumphed. This series of events and developments was the concrete factor which led to the coalescence of all capitalist and imperialist forces during the few years following the Second World War. The traditional colonialist powers represented by Britain, France, Holland and Belgium laboured heavily under the war burdens, while Germany, Italy and Japan laboured heavily under the burdens of defeat, a situation which enabled U.S. capital to extend and penetrate into all these countries through the reconstruction process witnessed by Europe immediately after the Second World War.

All this had the effect of crystallising the imperialist picture and its basic features:

1. All colonialist capitalist forces gathered together in one camp, that of world imperialism, under the leadership of the United States.

2. The immense size of U.S. capital, its wide field of activity and its interconnection with European capital is the concrete basis for the unity of this camp and the unity of its interests, as it is also the concrete basis for United States' leadership of this camp.

3. Conflicts among the partners in this camp which have from time to time taken the form of

of a conflict between colonialism represented by Britain and France and neo-colonialism represented by the United States, have remained only partial in the face of the main conflict which all these colonialist forces have begun to confront in their struggle against the socialist camp and national liberation movements. Although this partial conflict between the United States on the one hand and Britain and France on the other has taken a prominent form — as was the case during the Tripartite Aggression (1956), or during the Algerian revolution, or in certain areas of Africa — yet it has generally continued to be governed by the more important and more serious conflict between imperialism and the forces of revolution.

4. The attempts of de Gaulle's France to break out of this U.S. imperialist ring have not until now made any radical change in the picture.

5. The technical development and immense growth in the means of production and, in the war industry have led to the strengthening of this camp's positions as regards both its control of the world market and its ability to defend its own existence and interests.

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6. The U.S. today is endeavouring to maintain and defend its interests and to face the revolutionary camp with new techniques which differ from those used by colonialism in defending its interests by force and armies of occupation. This new technique is the basic feature of neo-colonialism.

The U.S. has established a series of pacts and defence treaties to face the socialist camp and to encircle it and limit its expansion, and also to neutralise national liberation movements. However, in addition to this policy of pacts, it follows an economic policy calculated to have local social forces participate in the profits derived from its exploitation of the people's efforts so that these social forces, by benefiting from the existence of neo-colonialism, may become a bulwark behind which the U.S. can take refuge in defending its influence and interests. Moreover, by its neo-colonialist technique, the U.S. endeavours to contain national liberation movements through co-existence with these movements and the conditions created by them, and also through

concessions which satisfy their national pride and assure them of some benefits, provided that its own basic interests remain assured and protected. In addition to all this, it is attempting through the threat of nuclear war, to force the Soviet Union to cease its support and backing of these peoples in their wars against colonialism so that it may defeat these peoples through local wars.

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7. Experience in Vietnam, Cuba and the Dominican Republic has shown that, in the event of failure of these modern techniques in the colonisation of peoples, the U.S. will revert to armed force, invasion and the landing of armies to preserve its influence, markets and interests.

In its liberation march to recover its land and freedom, the Palestinian people today faces this unified imperialist camp with its technological superiority, its skill in fighting and neutralising revolutions, its ability to take cover behind other forces, its readiness for direct confrontation whenever it feels that the forces behind which it takes cover are no longer capable of striking at people's movements and its endeavours to isolate national liberation movements from the world revolutionary camp and to neutralise the Soviet Union's efforts through the threat of nuclear war.

The June war and what came before and after it are in reality nothing but a concrete manifestation of all this. The U.S. tried to contain the Arab liberation movement, to bargain with it and to keep it from organic fusion with the world revolutionary camp. It then tried to undermine and destroy this movement through Israel and its military power, and later tried again to contain it while it was in a state of weakness. Today it is still trying through Israel, by providing it with all requisites of power, to keep this movement at its mercy in order to contain or destroy it.

To face this situation, the Palestinian and Arab liberation movement must: (1) have clarity of perspective; (2) mobilise all its forces; (3) produce political, economic and military programmes to ensure such mobilisation; (4) adopt the course of popular liberation war to overcome the enemy's technological superiority; and (5) enter into full alliance with all revolutionary forces on the world level.

It is this effective alliance which ensures the creation of the camp whereby we and all enslaved and anti-imperialist forces will be able to find the force which is capable of defeating imperialism in spite of its points of strength at this stage.

Our first friends are the enslaved peoples who are suffering from imperialism and imperialist exploitation of their efforts and wealth, or who are living in the same danger represented by the U.S. today in attempting to impose its influence on rising peoples. The peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America are daily suffering the life of wretchedness, poverty, ignorance and backwardness which is a result of colonialism and imperialism in their lives. The major conflict experienced by the world of today is the conflict between exploiting world imperialism on the one hand and these peoples and the socialist camp on the other. The alliance of the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement with the liberation movement in Vietnam, the revolutionary situation in Cuba and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America is the only way to create the camp that is capable of facing and triumphing over the imperialist camp.

The Palestinian and Arab liberation movement in alliance with national liberation movements in all underdeveloped and poor countries will, in facing world imperialism led by the U.S., find a strong ally to back its force and augment its power of resistance. This ally is the People's Republic of China which in reality is still facing the same U.S. peril that is attempting to encircle and isolate it and impede its growth.

The great People's Republic of China, which is still experiencing the effects of underdevelopment caused by colonialism and imperialism, and which is still facing the same peril and the same contradictions, adopts this analysis of the basic international contradiction which governs the march of history at this stage, and consequently adopts the same revolutionary strategy of liberation followed by these peoples in facing colonialism. This strategic concurrence creates the concrete ground for a revolutionary alliance which will place us in a better position to face and triumph over the enemy. The People's Republic of China adopts the Palestinian Arab view in its

analysis of Israel as an imperialist base which must be destroyed.

In spite of all the United States' efforts to prevent the Soviet Union and the East European powers from fully coalescing with our liberation march, and although these powers adopt a position which is confined to preventing Israel from expanding its territory and extending its aggression but does not involve the roots and foundation of Israel's aggressive existence, yet there is a contradiction between this position of the socialist camp and the Zionist and imperialist presence in our homeland. This contradiction creates a ground for alliance between us and these socialist powers and it is our duty to extend this ground through the extension of the Palestinian and Arab liberation movement and through its decisive clash with its enemies so that these powers will stand with our liberation movement until its conclusive end.

Imperialism and reactionary forces are today attempting to create a breach in the relations between the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement and the Soviet Union and the powers of the socialist camp, and it is our duty through our vigilance to prevent imperialism from achieving this aim. Throughout the past period the Soviet Union has been a major supporter of the Arab masses in their fight against imperialism and all its projects and plans in our homeland.

Through all these alliances we create the camp which will stand with us in our battle and will enable us to face the enemy camp.

Along with this series of basic revolutionary alliances we must also, through our fighting and political effort and through the clear nature of our struggle as one of national liberation, draw to our side all liberation forces in Europe, America and every part of the world.

With such strategy on the international level we can encircle Israel, Zionism and imperialism and mobilise all revolutionary forces on the world level to stand with us in the struggle.

This picture may seem imaginary in the light of the Palestinian and Arab liberation movement's circumstances at the present stage, but persistent revolutionary action and the promotion of the liberation movement to the level of a true, stead-

fast and long-range revolution will ensure its crystallisation and actual materialisation. The translation of all these alliances will constitute not only moral sympathy but also the true, effective support from which we create the ability to stand firm and triumph.

This completes the chart of enemies and friends on the Palestinian, Arab and world levels. A clear view of this chart will eliminate from our minds any superficial views of the battle and will determine the dimensions, forces and general frame of the battle and its position in respect of the historical dialectical movement which governs this period of human history.

FACING IMPERIALIST TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY

HOW CAN WEAK PEOPLES FACE IMPERIALIST
TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY?

Our confrontation with the enemy camp represented by Israel, Zionism, imperialism and Arab reaction will be through a strategy aiming at the concentration of the forces of the Palestinian revolution on the Palestinian, Arab and world levels so as to face this enemy with a revolutionary camp that is superior to it in size and numbers, but this alone is not sufficient for victory. One of the enemy's basic points of strength is its scientific and technological superiority, and this superiority is reflected strongly in its military capabilities which we will face in our revolutionary war. How can we face and overcome this superiority?

The enemy's scientific, technological and cultural superiority is not a light matter nor is it of a secondary nature. On the military level, this superiority means quick mobilisation for the enemy, the volume of this mobilisation, the standard of training, the high quality of military leadership, surprises in arms and plans during the fighting, over-all superiority in arms and modern warfare and the ability to control and use them with shock-speed.

Any thorough scientific study of the 1948, 1956 and 1967 wars would clearly bring out the role played by the enemy's technological and cultural superiority and the reflection of this role in the military field in the enemy's triumph and our loss of these battles. It would be foolish to give our

military defeats in three major confrontations an arbitrary superficial explanation that would mislead us into the belief that we could have won these battles had it not been for certain coincidences or certain errors. Our failure in facing Zionism and Israel during the past fifty years cannot be explained except on the basis of our weak and meagre political, economic, social and military structure in the face of a movement and a society that are scientifically and culturally superior to us, and our erroneous view of the battle and the confrontation strategy adopted by us until now. Our confrontation with Israel and imperialism cannot lead positively to victory if it consists of a classical military confrontation taking the form of a conventional war between the enemy's army and forces and our regular troops. Such a war would be won by Israel and imperialism because their superiority in arms and quality, their ability to use the modern war machine and move it with shock-speed and flexibility, and their economic capabilities which sustain such a war, would enable them to triumph over us in such battles. Three experiences are a sufficient lesson for us. Conventional warfare which today takes an extremely speedy form is the manner in which the enemy exercises its overwhelming technological superiority, and is also the manner whereby all the points of weakness in an underdeveloped society are revealed. Our reliance on the Soviet Union does not suffice to close this gap at the scientific, technological and cultural level. It is not a matter of "modern arms and the procurement thereof". The basic requirement is the human element capable of thoroughly understanding the power of controlling them and using them in the most efficient manner, and of utilising the modern war machine. This in turn depends on the technological and scientific standard of the humans carrying such arms. This is a factor which at present is not in our favour, with the result that we are not in a position to face Israel (and behind it the United States which would throw its own forces into the battle if the tide should turn in our favour) through a conventional military confrontation. The weapons of weak peoples in facing imperialist forces and their superiority have become well-known as a result of the experiences of peoples who have waged liberation wars in this age and achieved victory over imperialism. The technological and

military superiority of imperialism is faced by weak peoples with guerrilla warfare and popular liberation wars.

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We cannot completely eliminate the forces of the enemy or achieve full liberation through guerrilla war, but guerrilla war is the first stage in a protracted war. The revolutionary army will be able to triumph over the enemy's superiority through the following conditions: be politically aware and coalesce with the organised masses that support it and supply it with its human and material requirements; ally itself with world revolutionary forces who will furnish it with support and reinforcements; gain experience and efficiency through its struggle and coalesce with the revolutionary party which provides it with a clear view and an organic connection with all revolutionary forces at all levels. And with heroic determination engendered in it by years of oppression, humiliation, wretchedness and exploitation exercised by Israel and imperialism on our land, the revolutionary army will be able to triumph over the enemy's superiority.

We do not propose here to draw up a military plan for a long, extremely complicated war, but only refer in a general manner to the general form which this war will assume in the light of the fact that we are an underdeveloped people facing Israel, Zionism and world imperialism with all their capabilities and their scientific and technological superiority.

We propose the popular liberation war formula against the conventional war formula with which we faced the enemy in 1948, 1956 and 1967 and which led to our defeat in each of these rounds.

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"Revolutionary theory", "strongly-organized party", "leadership of the revolution by the workers and peasants", "wide, determined, united national front", "people's liberation war and long-term resistance", these are the political strategic headlines of national liberation movements and democratic national revolution in the present age of imperialism.

THE AIMS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PALESTINIAN WAR OF LIBERATION

That Israel constitutes an aggressive presence against our people from the outset is an indisputable fact. For our people, the rise of Israel has meant the expulsion of this people from its home and lands, the usurpation of all that our people had built through its labour and effort, the dispersal of our people throughout the Arab world and the world at large, and the concentration of the greater portion of it in the camps of misery and poverty scattered in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon without hope and without future.

That Israel constitutes a colonialist expansionist presence at the expense of Arab land and its owners is not a matter for discussion. For us it is the tangible experience before which all spurious claims and allegations fade away. The "National Home" for the Jews in Palestine became the "State of Israel" within the boundaries of the Partition resolutions adopted by the United Nations in 1947. It then expanded to include Israel with its pre-June boundaries which are far more extensive than those established by the United Nations' resolutions of 1947, and finally expanded once again to include the whole of Palestine as well as Sinai and the Golan Heights.

That Israel is an imperialist and colonialist base on our land and is being used to stem the tide of revolution, to ensure our continued subjection and to maintain the process of pillage and exploitation of our wealth and efforts is a self-evident fact which does not need discussion. For us this is not merely a theoretical conclusion but represents our actual experience during the Tripartite Aggression of 1956, during the June 1967 war and throughout the existence of Israel on our soil.

However the truth about our war of liberation has been distorted as a result of several factors. First of all there was the connection between the rise of the Zionist movement and the persecution of the Jews in Europe. Then there was the association made between the rise of Israel and the Nazis' treatment of the Jews in the Second World War. In addition to these there was the dominating Imperialist and Zionist influence over large sections of world opinion, the existence in Israel of forces which claim to be progressive and socialist

and the Soviet Union's and some socialist countries' support for the establishment of Israel. All these together with the error of certain Palestinian and Arab leaderships in the manner of their presentation of the struggle against Israel have distorted the truth about our liberation war and still threaten to distort the proper view of the true nature of this war in the eyes of many people.

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The Palestinian liberation movement is a progressive national movement against the forces of aggression and imperialism. The fact that imperialist interests are linked with the existence of Israel will make of our struggle against Israel a struggle against imperialism, and the linking of the Palestinian liberation movement with the Arab liberation movement will make our struggle against Israel the struggle of one hundred million Arabs in their united national effort for liberation. The struggle for Palestine today, and all the objective circumstances attendant upon it, will make of this struggle an introduction for the realisation of all the aims of the Arab revolution which are linked together. It is a wide and vast historical movement launched by one hundred million Arabs in a large area of the world against the forces of evil, aggression and exploitation represented by neo-colonialism and imperialism in this epoch of human history.

Finally, the struggle for Palestine will, as regards the Palestinian and Arab masses, be a gateway towards the culture of the age and a transition from a state of underdevelopment to the requirements of modern life. Through the struggle we shall acquire political awareness of the facts of the age, throw away illusions and learn the value of facts. The habits of underdevelopment represented by submission, dependence, individualism, tribalism, laziness, anarchy and impulsiveness will change through the struggle into recognition of the value of time, order, accuracy, objective thought, collective action, planning, comprehensive mobilization, the pursuit of learning and the acquisition of all its weapons, the value of man, the emancipation of woman — which constitute half of our society — from the servitude of outworn customs and traditions, the fundamental importance of the national bond in facing danger and the supremacy of this bond over clan, tribal and regional bonds.

Our national, long-term liberation struggle will mean our fusion in a new way of life which will be our gateway towards progress and civilisation.

GENERAL REMARKS

This in general is our strategic view of the liberation of Palestine. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine adopts this strategy as a general guide of action. We must stress, however, that the correctness of any theoretical analysis is contingent upon its success on the field of practical application. It is only by revolutionary experience that the scientific answer to the correctness or incorrectness of any political theoretical analysis is given, and no theoretical analytical attempt can provide fully from the outset a comprehensive view of things. The relation between thought and revolutionary action is a dialectical one. Thought directs revolutionary action which in turn produces results, situations and reactions which influence the theoretical view of things. On this basis, to the extent we stress these strategic lines as a guide to our action, we at the same time assert that we will not understand them in fixed static forms. The experience itself will deepen and crystallise this view, enrich it and complete it in some of its aspects. It will also develop this view and may modify some of its aspects. Such a view of this strategy is the scientific dialectical view which rejects immobility and rigidity, undertakes criticism from time to time, benefits from experience and establishes between thought and revolutionary action an organic and reactive link which enlarges and deepens thought so that it will come to guide action in a more proper and more correct manner. Any other view is, in point of fact, idealistic and rigid, leading to failure.

Looking at it from another angle, this strategy represents a general view of the battle and its main trends and consequently does not stop at many of the details, interlinks and sinuosities which will fill every phase of the battle and accompany each of its lines. For instance, in our definition of the main line of conflict, we have not stopped at the lines of conflict which will exist and react among the enemy forces themselves, or within the ranks of the revolutionary forces. Thus our definition of Israel as one of the

enemy forces is not intended to convey a static picture of this force. Israel does not represent a homogeneous unity within which there is not room for conflict. There will be within Israel more than one politico-social force, and there will be conflict among these forces. The intensity of these conflicts may at times rise or fall according to the progress phase of the battle. Although the conflict now and existing within Israel between the so-called "hawks" and "doves" does not leave any appreciable effect on the image of the battle, yet the more radical conflicts within Israel, which are now dormant, may come out and gain in intensity during coming periods. Similarly, when we say that there is an organic connection between Israel and imperialism we do not mean that there are no latent partial conflicts between them. Moreover, we witness at this time a conflict between Israel and the reactionary Arab régime which sometimes considers its conflict with the resistance to be less significant than conflict with Israel. Also, we witness at this time the willingness of the Palestinian bourgeoisie outside the occupied areas to financially support the resistance movement.

On the other side of the picture there will also be a group of conflicts. The picture of the conflicts existing among the Palestinian armed organizations is clear at this time. Besides, the alliance between the Palestinian liberation movement and regional and Arab revolutionary action will not be entirely smooth and devoid of any conflict. Furthermore, in our presentation of the popular liberation war formula as the revolutionary formula for confrontation with the enemy, we must not fail to remember the fact that the conventional Arab armies of the national régimes will, in defending themselves as well as in their tactical attacks, play for a long time a military role which may at times appear as the leading role on the stage of events although in the long-run, strategically, it is the revolutionary force which will remain behind Israel and world imperialism until radical national liberation is completed.

The main line of conflict defined by this strategy is not a straight geometric line with two conflicting forces standing on either side. It is in reality a crooked dialectical line on each side of which stands a group of allied forces co-existing under the shadow of the alliance. At times this alliance

grows stronger and at other times the conflicts among them grow more pronounced so that the picture becomes sometimes a mixed and interwoven image moving along the two sides of the main line of conflict. Inasmuch as it is important and fundamental to see at every stage of the struggle the accurate and detailed picture which will enable us to determine our tactical step in a scientific manner, it is equally important and fundamental that our detailed tactical view at each stage be guided by our long term strategic view. It is this strategic view which will enable us to lead and direct the struggle and to avoid falling into the error of experimentation, impulsiveness, drifting behind events or reacting to events instead of acting to direct them.

In the light of this understanding, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine adopts this politico-strategic analysis as a guide for its action in the liberation war which the Front is facing, and for which it is preparing.

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Organizational Strategy of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.¹ (Excerpts)

February, 1969

ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY

The people's liberation war against imperialism with its technological superiority, its production and economic capabilities, its long experience in colonising and exploiting peoples, suppressing their movement and neutralising their revolution with new techniques which are developed and adapted according to the circumstances of the age, cannot be brought into existence nor can it continue and finally triumph in an automatic or spontaneous manner. The revolutionary party which works for the generation of such wars and leads them to victory is a condition *sine qua non* for any true radical revolution in our time. It is the party which provides a proper view of the battle and determines its strategy and tactics in the light of its objective study of the forces involved in the battle and the points of weakness or strength in

these forces. It is the party which provides the battle with its leadership and furnishes the frame within which all the potentialities of the masses will be mobilised and directed to the winning of the war and the attainment of the objective. In the light of this, party matters (our understanding of the party, the bases of its construction, its class structure, its working technique, its institutions, the relations governing its bases and leadership and relations between the party and the masses) no longer remain of secondary importance. Organizational strategy here become an integral part of the strategy of the battle and its view thereof. The theoretical discussion which has for some time been taking place between the revolutionary forces of Latin America (the Castroist parties) and the pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese communist parties revolves primarily around matters pertaining to the structure of the revolutionary party which will lead the revolution.

The failure of leftist national parties and communist parties in the Arab world is the failure of these parties themselves and of their structure, formation and adopted strategies, and not of the principle of the party's existence as a condition for the revolutionary presence. The proof is that no revolution in this century has succeeded and continued in triumph, nor has any such revolution achieved radical change in the structure of society and given new life to the masses without a party to lead it and provide it with the ideological and social class basis on which it rests and supports itself, so that it is able to continue to exist by virtue of its objective connection with it.

THE ARAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT (ANM) AND THE P.F.L.P.

At its inception, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was formed of the Arab Nationalist Movement's branch in the Palestinian field, the "Heroes of the Return", the "Palestine Liberation Front" and independent elements which soon took the form of a fourth group within the Front. On this basis and in the light of this formation it was not designed that the Front at the first stage of its life should present a complete leftist political view of the liberation battle proceeding from and based on scientific theory.

¹ The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, *The Political and Organizational Strategy* (Amman), second edition, 1970, p. 129. (In English).

What was implicitly understood actually was that the Front should present a general liberation thought bearing progressive features which would crystallise more and more with the crystallisation of the experiment. This is as regards the Front's political thought. As regards organization, it likewise was not designed that the Front should at that stage of its formation be a unified party organization based on the same revolutionary organizational strategic lines which we have discussed. What was also understood was that the Front would for some time continue to consist of a group of organizations, each of which would maintain its independent existence. However there would be a beginning made to planning for coordination among these organizations and an attempt to unify the educational material given to them in preparation for the realization of a climate that would pave the way for the unification of these organizations in the strategic planning in the light of practice and experience.

In the light of this picture, it is evident that there is a definite objective distinction between the organization of the Palestinian branch of the Movement (ANM) on the one hand and the Front on the other. The Movement, in the light of what was designed by its Central Committee during the July 1967 session, possesses a socialist revolutionary concept through which it views the strategy of the Palestine liberation struggle, while the Front presents a liberation thought with progressive features. Moreover, the Movement represents a unified party organization preparing to rebuild itself according to a revolutionary organizational strategy, while the Front represents a group of organizations which differ in their organizational structure. Consequently, the nature of the picture and the nature of relations at the time of formation of the Front was that of an organization possessing a scientific revolutionary view and entering into a front relation with other organizations within a front which presented a progressive liberation thought and was formed of a group of independent organizations tending towards unification. It was natural, such being the case, that the Movement should have its distinctive existence and its distinctive role within this front.

This is the gist of the picture at the time of formation of the Popular Front. However the

developments and schisms which have occurred within the Popular Front place us now before a totally different picture and consequently present a new picture for the subject of the Movement and the Popular Front and the relation between them.

The "Palestine Liberation Front" has separated from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and with it a group of independents. The Front continued to exist between the Palestinian branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) and the "Heroes of the Return". On the other hand, the new situation has enabled the ANM to present through the Front its revolutionary analysis of the Palestinian situation and its full political view of the struggle for liberation, that is, its complete political thought, so that the new picture is one of almost complete identity between the ANM and the Popular Front. The Popular Front's political thought is that of the ANM in full, and its structure is to a great extent the same as that of the Movement. The ANM's organization constitutes in size a high proportion of the Popular Front's organization. If we take into account also the nature of the origin of the "Heroes of the Return", the rules which govern the organization of their first leading cadre, their general intellectual atmosphere and the nature of comradesly relations between the ANM and the "Heroes of the Return" — if we take all these points into account, then we may say that to a large extent the formation of the Popular Front is largely identical with that of the Movement. If there is identity in thinking and in formation, any specific strategic distinction between the ANM and the Popular Front no longer applies. Any insistence on maintaining the Palestine branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement independent and distinct so that one may actually feel that the ANM is one thing and the Popular Front another, should be based on a well-defined, objective and tangible distinction. What is this thing on which the Movement's distinctive existence rests? Is it the political view? The Popular Front's political view of the battle is now that of the Movement. Is it an organizational distinction? It is true that the presence of the "Heroes of the Return" within the Popular Front constitutes a special organizational issue and it is also true that the speed with which the Popular

Front was organised has made this organization, as regards certain organizational characteristics, less solid and less disciplined than that of the Movement, but is this sufficient to direct our strategy towards maintaining the Movement's special and distinctive organization within that of the Front? In the light of this analysis the February Congress drew the organizational strategic line to direct and guide future relations between the ANM and the Popular Front. This line consists in working for the fusion of the Palestinian branch of the ANM within the organization of the Front and at the same time working for the fusion of the "Heroes of the Return" within the Front as well, and in planning and working for raising the Front's organizational life to the level of the conscious, disciplined, revolutionary, committed party life. On this basis, the conception of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ceases to be that which prevailed at the time of its foundation — that is, a front in the usual political sense with regard to thought and organizational relations — and our understanding of the Popular Front and the direction which we take in building it become something different.

According to our present understanding of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the direction which we take in its building up, it is the revolutionary party based on the political strategy and organizational strategy set forth in this report.

During the process of complete fusion of the Movement and the Popular Front, the sound motto which guides us is:

"The Movement in the service of the Front, and not the Front in the service of the Movement."

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Interview Granted by Dr George Habbash, Secretary General of the Central Committee for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, to a United Press Correspondent.¹

Amman, March 4, 1969

Q. How do you see the future of commando action?

A. Ever since the June War with Israel, we have been convinced that a revolution on Vietnamese lines is the only way — armed revolution by the farmers and workers, who are ready to fight, because they have nothing to lose except the miserable tents they are living in. We believe that scientific socialism is the ideological basis for this revolution.

Q. By scientific socialism do you mean Marxism?

A. Yes, we mean Marxism, but we mean Marxism as a guide rather than as a doctrinally rigid ideology. I am thinking of the Asiatic Marxism of the Chinese and Vietnamese Parties, the Marxism of the Cuban Communist Party, with their insistence that priority must be given to armed struggle. The masses in Palestine can only be mobilised to fight for liberation.

Q. Why did not the poor support armed people's warfare before the June War?

A. Because they were relying on the progressive Arab regimes and waiting for a classical war. In fact the Palestinian people were gambling on who would move first.

But after the June War we were convinced that we could never recover Palestine by means of a classical war.

Both Israel and the United States make it impossible. Technologically speaking, they are both very advanced; they are also a special brand of imperialists who want to maintain their interests here for ever. The weapons of the underdeveloped country are the people's war, guerrilla warfare and the existence of a strong party.

Q. What are your differences with the communist parties in the Arab World?

A. The Arab communist parties want us to stay where we are, or where we were before June 1967:

¹ *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 5/3/1969.

in other words, to accept the peaceful solution. This is something I cannot accept. It means, as far as I am concerned, that I shall never again see Lydda, my home town. Every Palestinian feels this way.

There were other differences also, as regards our evaluation of the leadership of Abdel Nasser. In 1958 we were enthusiastically in favour of the establishment of the United Arab Republic, while the communists opposed it. We believed, then, that the Arab nation was rallying round the leadership of Abdel Nasser, and that through this leadership it would be possible to achieve Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine. But the communists did not agree.

Q. It seems that these positions have now been reversed, to a great extent.

A. We have definitely moved to the left since June 1967. We had waited fifteen years to achieve our goals, and then there was a new tragedy. Now when we think of a people's war, we think of twenty years of struggle awaiting us.

Q. What is your personal opinion of Abdel Nasser?

A. As a person, he is very sincere and I like him very much. But it is a strategic problem, not a personal one. The strategy of the commandos at the present time requires that men should be prepared to give up their comfort and their influence for the sake of the battle.

Q. But the Popular Front itself concentrates on provocative operations instead of depending on guerrilla warfare, as Fateh does?

A. Presumably we are accused of provocative operations because of our attacks on aircraft, but in fact we are concentrating on building a popular army of fighters to fight the Israeli army on the basis of a war that goes on day after day. A thousand attacks on aircraft would not liberate our country for us.

Q. Why do you attack aircraft, then?

A. Because the El-Al company carries out military operations for Israel. During the June War its planes carried soldiers and pilots. We are annoyed when the Foreign press describes these actions as "terrorism". Real terrorism was started by Israel more than twenty years ago, and is responsible for bringing us where we are now. In

addition, attacks on planes help to weaken the Israeli economy.

Q. Why do you attack Israeli civilian centres, like the main market in Jerusalem?

A. That particular attack was our answer to the killing of Abd al-Muhsen Hasan, the commando who was shot by the Israeli security man at Zurich airport after he had laid down his arms. And we will continue in this policy if the Israelis continue to drop napalm bombs on civilians and and to torture our prisoners in the occupied territories.

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Statement by Mr. Ruhi al-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem, on the Israeli "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law, 1968".¹

Amman, March 6, 1969

The Arabs of Jerusalem are at present being subjected to concentrated Israeli pressure to force them implicitly to accept the annexation of Jerusalem by Israel. If they do not humbly submit, they will have no alternative but to suspend their activities, dispose of their businesses and go into exile.

The new method employed by the Israeli military occupation forces to achieve their ends is the law passed by their parliament on August 23, 1968 called the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law, 1968".

This law requires the following of the Arabs of Jerusalem:

1. Every Arab, whether an employer or a professional man, who was formerly licensed under Jordanian law, must obtain a new licence in accordance with Israeli laws within a period of six months ending on February, 22, 1969. This category comprises some five thousand people, including businessmen, professional men and artisans.

2. Every Arab company, whether private, public or limited, which operates in Jerusalem

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 7/3/1969. Mr. Ruhi al-Khatib read this statement at a press conference organised by the Save Jerusalem Committee, which was attended by representatives of Arab newspapers and international news agencies.

and is registered under Jordanian Laws, must re-register at the Israeli courts and in accordance with such Israeli laws whose enforcement is required by Israeli interests within a period that was originally to end on February 22, 1969 but has recently been prolonged for three months and is now to end on May 22, 1969. This involves about 180 companies with a total paid up capital of about five million Jordanian dinars, with some four thousand shareholders and four thousand employees and workers.

3. Every Arab cooperative society operating in Jerusalem and registered under Jordanian law, must re-register with the Israeli authorities and in accordance with Israeli laws and regulations within the period ending February 22, 1969. Twenty three societies, with a total membership of 1518, are affected by this law.

4. Every Arab doctor, engineer and accountant still working in Jerusalem in accordance with Jordanian law must submit an application to the Israeli authorities for a permit to enable him to continue working in accordance with Israeli laws and regulations within a period ending on February 22, 1969. About eighty Jerusalem Arabs are affected.

5. Every Arab lawyer formerly practising in Jerusalem in accordance with Jordanian laws and regulations and still residing in the city will be registered as a member of the Israeli Lawyer's Federation in conformity with an order issued by the Israeli Minister of Justice and published in the official gazette, regardless of whether the lawyer himself applies for membership, within the period ending February 22, 1969. There are at present about thirty Arab lawyers in Jerusalem.

6. Every holder of a concession, trade mark or invention formerly registered with the Jordanian government, who still uses such concession, trade mark or invention in Jerusalem, must re-register such concession, trade mark or invention with the Israeli authorities in accordance with Israeli laws and regulations, within a period ending on February 22, 1969.

7. Any group included in paragraphs 1-6 above which fails to obtain a new permit in accordance with Israeli laws and regulations will be regarded as having broken such laws and as liable to such penalties and fines as are prescribed

in Israeli regulations. If such offences continue, these persons will be prevented from working and earning a living. This will eventually force them either to register or to go into exile.

8. The law includes articles which permit the return of Jewish property in the Arab sector of the city to its owners or their heirs who formerly resided in the Arab sector. But the same law does not permit the Arabs residing in the Arab sector to recover their property in the territory occupied by Israel prior to June 5, 1967. This is a flagrant act of discrimination.

9. The Israeli occupation authorities had already annexed Arab Jerusalem to Israel in an act passed by their parliament on June 27, 1967, which the United Nations General Assembly declared to be invalid in two resolutions adopted on July 4 and July 14, 1967. This new law has the effect of completely absorbing and assimilating Arab property, Arab citizens, the Arab economy and all kinds of Arab activities in the city into the State of Israel. Those who refuse to comply have no alternative but to wind up their affairs and leave.

10. These measures are in complete violation of United Nations resolutions and of the Security Council resolution of May 21, 1968 which reaffirms the United Nations' refusal to recognise the annexation of the Arab sector of the city by Israel and calls upon Israel to rescind all measures which contravene international laws and conventions relevant to occupied territories. It also calls upon Israel to take no further action to change the status of the city or its inhabitants.

11. The Arabs of Jerusalem rejected this law both before and after it was issued. They communicated their rejection to the Israeli authorities, and sent copies to the United Nations Secretary-General. Yesterday we received a memorandum which reiterates their total rejection. Copies of this memorandum have been distributed to those present.

12. The Jordanian government sent to all countries and international organisations copies of a memorandum condemning this law and calling for its repeal. When Israel refused to comply, the Jordanian government asked its permanent representative at the United Nations at the beginning of February last to submit an

immediate complaint against Israel, reiterating the call for the repeal of the law.

13. Israel then resorted to an ingenious piece of trickery. Its permanent representative declared to the Security Council that his government had decided to postpone the implementation of this law for three months. The complaint was then temporarily shelved.

14. Israeli newspapers reaching us from Jerusalem then disclosed that in fact the Israeli authorities had postponed only those articles of the law which deal with the registration of companies for a further 3-month period to end on May 22, 1969; the enforcement of the other articles was not postponed. All that had happened was that the Minister of Justice suggested to his colleagues, the Ministers of Health, Interior and Tourism, that they postpone those sections of the law which concern them for 3 months, as had happened in the case of the section of the law referring to the registration of companies. Up to March 4, 1969, no Israeli newspaper published in Occupied Palestine had reported that these Ministers had agreed to the suggestion of their colleague, the Minister of Justice. They issued no order for a three-month postponement. Moreover, on February 19, 1969, *The Jerusalem Post*, which is a semi-official paper reflecting the views of the Israeli occupation authorities, published a report to the effect that the Minister of Justice himself regarded the law which was the subject of the complaint as still being in force and that he himself had invoked Article 16 to order that all Arab lawyers in Jerusalem should be registered with the Israeli Lawyers' Federation, though none of them have applied to join it. When this was published in the Israeli official gazette, the Arab lawyers of Jerusalem objected and they are still objecting, as evidenced by the protest of some of them published in *The Jerusalem Post* on February 19, 1969.

15. We therefore view this law as a very grave threat to the Arabs of Jerusalem, to the Arab character of the city and to the sanctity of the Christian and Muslim holy places in it. We believe that the pressure that is being continuously exerted against our brothers in the city to force them to accept this law will eventually lead to their total assimilation into Israel or to their winding up their business and going into exile,

as happened to hundreds of thousands of their Palestinian Arab brethren after the disaster of 1948.

16. We further believe that the mere postponement of the law, wholly or partially, is a piece of Israeli sharp practice calculated to deceive our fellow Arabs as well as world public opinion. Its object is to make Israel appear to be a state which takes notice of world public opinion and the United Nations, while, in the meantime, it proceeds to enforce this law gradually and in silence, thereby driving the Arabs of Jerusalem to desperation.

17. The occupation authorities are trying to divide the various classes and sectors of the people of Jerusalem. They have postponed the enforcement of company registration but not of other sectors of the law, with the object of stirring up dissension between the Jerusalem Arabs. But we are confident that the owners of these companies, their boards of directors, their shareholders, employees and workers do recognise this Israeli stratagem for what it really is and will not succumb to the temptation offered them by our enemies in the form of preferential treatment. They will publicly declare their total rejection of this law, in spite of the stay of execution granted them, thereby making the enemy understand that they and their brethren stand united in their opposition to this law and to any other measures that may be taken against Jerusalem and its Arab character.

18. Therefore we first urge our government to continue its efforts at diplomatic and information levels to secure the repeal of this law as a whole and to ensure that Israel's claims with regard to the stay of execution are not believed. We also take this opportunity to salute our Arab brethren in Jerusalem for their refusal to accept the annexation of Jerusalem or to acquiesce to Israeli occupation, for their rejection of orders of confiscation of property and land, for their refusal to accept compensation, for their rejection of this law, and finally, for their total lack of cooperation with the occupation authorities. In this, they are daily sacrificing their property and their lives.

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Memorandum Submitted by the Citizens of Jerusalem to the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant on the Israeli "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law."¹

Jerusalem, March 6, 1969

His Excellency the Secretary-General of the United Nations,

We, the undersigned, representatives of all classes of the Arab population in the Arab city of Jerusalem, protest in the strongest terms against all the arbitrary and inhuman measures taken by the Israeli occupation authorities in the occupied territories. These measures contravene the principles of the United Nations, international agreements and the Geneva and Hague conventions.

The measures taken by the Israeli occupation authorities in Jerusalem, such as the annexation to Israel of the Arab city and its suburbs, the illegal laws passed to legitimise this annexation, to obliterate the Arab character of the city and replace Arab inhabitants with Jewish settlers, the sequestration of Arab property for the benefit of Jews — all these acts demonstrate Israel's contempt for United Nations and Security Council resolutions which stipulate that there shall be no change in the status of the city and that the principles of the United Nations shall be implemented, and its disdain for world public opinion and for the Arab people's right to self-determination in the occupied territories. They provide ample proof of the expansionist designs and territorial ambitions entertained by Israel in this area.

The object of recent Israeli legislation is to obliterate the Arab character of Jerusalem, and to Judaize the city in accordance with Israeli schemes for expansion. This legislation also increases tension in the area and makes the prospect of peace more remote. We therefore appeal to you, to the conscience of the world and to free men everywhere to stand by us in our just struggle to protect our rights and our very existence against the Israeli plan of assimilation. We beseech you to restrain Israel from carrying out its aggressive and expansionist designs and to

work for the establishment of peace with justice in this area.

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Statement by the Iraqi Communist Party (Central Command) on "Solving the Palestine Problem and Liquidating the Zionist-Imperialist Occupation of Palestine."²
(Excerpts)

Beirut, March, 1969

The Policy and Programme of Our Communist Party for Solving the Palestine Problem and Liquidating the Zionist-Imperialist Occupation of Palestine.

1) Our Party, like all other communist parties in the Arab countries, has fought fiercely against the Zionist movement, its racist ideology and its links with world imperialism, constantly struggling both for the unification of the land of Palestine within one Palestinian democratic state and against all partition plans. Our Party, particularly between 1945 and 1947, was the most active of the national political forces in Iraq in scientifically refuting Zionist ideas and propaganda, exposing the plans of imperialism and Arab reaction and mobilising the Iraqi masses in defence of the rights of the people of Palestine. While other nationalist forces, including those opportunist political organisations which claimed to be Marxist, were presenting the issue as a contest with Judaism and were disseminating chauvinistic, bellicose ideas, our Party presented the truth of the matter: that Zionism is an offshoot of colonialism. These same sound, scientific concepts were adopted by progressive Arab forces in recent years.

To the very last, our Party was earnestly and unequivocally opposed to the partition plans. However, with the adoption of the United Nations resolution at the end of 1947, it changed its attitude in the light of estimates and presuppositions that later events have shown to be erroneous.

The Second Party Congress of 1956 criticised mistaken aspects of Party policy which had been pursued for some years, since the adoption of

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 7/3/1969.

² *Al-Hurriyya* (Beirut), 16/3/1969.

the partition resolution. The Second Congress showed how mistaken it was to adopt and disseminate the ideas published in the 1948 pamphlet entitled "Light on the Palestine Problem", which presented an illusory and deceptive picture of the realities of the Israeli entity.

The 1956 Congress constitutes a courageous and resolute return by the Party to that serious concern with Arab nationalist issues which characterised the activities of the Party under the leadership of Fahd.

2) Our Party considers the Palestine problem to be a common political problem facing all Arabs and defines its position on the issue in accordance with the following principles:

a) Zionism is an offshoot and a partner of imperialism. Israel is an inseparable part of the system of world imperialism, although this close affinity between imperialist and Zionist interests does not mean that there are no distinctions between them, nor that Zionism does not have its own interests and objectives, which are, to some extent, independent of those of imperialism.

For this reason, it is not correct to separate the struggle with Zionism from that with imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.

b) The Palestine problem is not only the problem of the Arab people of Palestine recovering their rights and being enabled to freely exercise the right of self-determination in their usurped homeland, nor does it concern that noble people alone; it touches the very core of the interests of Arab countries and of the progressive liberation movement of the struggling masses in those countries. The existence of Israel is a constant, dark threat to the interests of all Arab countries and to the achievements of the masses and the progressive forces in those countries.

c) Both Zionist ideology and the Zionist movement are racist, expansionist and Fascist. However, a distinction must be made between Zionism and Judaism as a religion, just as a distinction must be made between Zionist extremists and capitalists on the one hand, and the Zionist masses who are swept in the train of poisonous Zionist propaganda on the other. Our Party fights against all racial or religious discrimination and against all chauvinistic trends, which it regards as distorting the image of the struggle,

and misrepresenting the just character of the Palestinian cause in the eyes of progressive world public opinion, thereby rendering a great and direct service to Zionism and imperialism.

d) Arab reaction, "the compromising reactionary bourgeoisie, the forces of feudalism and all the other agents of imperialism", are the natural allies of both imperialism and Zionism... Treacherous Arab rulers, and all other forces of Arab reaction — despite all their manoeuvres and claims to the contrary — play the role of a fifth column. They are bound to imperialist interests and strategy, and consequently cannot possibly agree to embark on a serious revolutionary course that would lead to the defeat of Israel or to a solution of the Palestine problem in favour of the Arab nation or of peace and progress in the area.

For this reason, it is an immediate necessity that the conflict with Israel should pass through a stage of struggle with reactionary Arab forces and regimes. There can be no truce with them, no shielding through summit conferences, or any other means.

e) The issue facing the Arab people of Palestine, and all the Arab masses, is not that of "eliminating the consequences of the 1967 aggression", but of eliminating the traces and consequences of the 1948 aggression, i.e., of terminating the existence of the State of Israel. This is the only way to liquidate that seat of provocation and aggression at its source.

f) Revolutionary military, political and economic struggle in the face of Israel's provocations and aggressiveness, the struggle to realise the final strategic aim — the termination of the existence of the state of Israel and the establishment of a revolutionary democratic Palestinian state has, because of its dimensions and historic significance, taken on the character of the world liberation movement. It constitutes an inseparable part of the constant violent struggle between the forces of liberation and socialism on the one hand, and the forces of enslavement, imperialism and capitalism on the other, between the forces of revolution and counter-revolution, that is in progress all over the world. This assigns a responsibility in the struggle to the international forces of socialism and revolution to provide decisive

material, political and moral support for the cause, which will help secure a final and decisive victory for the people of Palestine and all other Arab peoples.

g) Thus the focal point and final objective of the cause becomes obvious: the termination of the existence of the state of Israel. This, in turn, is directly allied to the avowed intention of establishing a revolutionary democratic state of Palestine, that will reject discrimination on the basis of race or religion and guarantee equality to all, save the criminal ringleaders and the Zionist clique now in power. Naturally, the revolutionary democratic state of Palestine will have to put an end, once and for all, to Jewish immigration to Palestine and take measures to facilitate the return to their countries of origin of such Jews as desire it. It is more than likely that this will happen just as it did in Algeria, where thousands of French citizens emigrated after the country won its independence.

However, the objectives of terminating the presence of Israel and establishing a revolutionary and democratic state of Palestine are unlikely to be achieved under the circumstances now prevailing in the Arab homeland. For them to be achieved, the reactionary Arab regimes in the countries neighbouring Israel must be overthrown, a blow must be dealt to the interests of imperialism, and revolutionary popular democratic governments must be set up in a number of these countries. What is also essential is that the Palestinian armed resistance movement should develop into a comprehensive, powerful and genuine popular war of liberation, with competent revolutionary leadership and a progressive revolutionary programme. This war, in which any idea of a truce with the forces of reaction will be rejected, will rely on the resources of the Arab people of Palestine, the support of the Arab masses and their progressive forces. It will also rely on the international forces of liberation, democracy and socialism for sympathy and solidarity.

Our Party believes that the task is both immense and complicated, that the road to its achievement will be arduous and long. The setback we suffered in June 1967 brought to light the treachery and baseness of the forces of Arab reaction and the shortcomings and gaps within the liberated Arab regimes, the ineffectiveness

and failure of petty bourgeois leadership and the bankruptcy of their programmes and policies under the critical test of events. The forces of reaction, in collusion with imperialism and Zionism, sought to make use of the setback to spread despair and pessimism among the Arab masses, to paralyse their capacity for struggle. They tried to use the setback as a springboard from which to impose on the progressive Arab liberation movement a series of concessions and retrograde steps. These attempts met with partial success, by causing certain liberated governments to withdraw from their positions and to return to the policy of summit meetings, to accept the British-sponsored United Nations resolution and to start a quest for suspect political solutions which are nothing more nor less than compromise and surrender to the will of Israel and imperialism, and encourage them to commit further acts of aggression and further attacks.

Yet the will of the struggling Arab masses was not broken; these masses started looking into the causes of the setback and the means by which to overcome it. The loyal, progressive wings of the Arab petty bourgeoisie set out on a search for the right way; slowly they came to realise that the programmes and policies of the working class were the only ones which could lead the revolutionary Arab struggle along the road to certain victory. For it is the working class whose interests are homogeneous and who possess the most advanced revolutionary theory and political organisation. It alone — if its leadership adopts a correct policy and line of action — can mobilise the largest numbers of the masses and launch a struggle that neither vacillates nor accepts compromise. Only a power led by the working class is capable of purging the army and transforming it into a truly popular national democratic army, one capable of standing up to and defeating Zionism and imperialism, of arming the whole people and fully preparing the whole country for the battle and for victory.

Among the most important positive reactions to the setback was the emergence of the Palestinian armed resistance movement and the developments that took place in it. This was proof of the failure of the attempts of imperialism, Zionism and the forces of reaction to break the spirit or weaken the will of the Arab masses, to subdue their

awareness or to instil in them a spirit of passivity. Despite the fact that this movement has not yet reached the stage of a comprehensive popular war of liberation, its horizons are wide.

Israel's back cannot be broken, the usurping state of Israel cannot be liquidated without constant, coordinated and perhaps long-range political, economic, military and ideological propaganda battles.

In the final analysis, the weapon that will decide the outcome will have to be revolutionary violence. The illusion of a "political" settlement is being dispelled ever more forcefully in the face of the growing arrogance of the Zionists, their increasingly aggravated provocations and their recurring acts of aggression, regardless of world public opinion.

The issue can only be decided in the field of battle, the same field in which the Palestinian popular war of liberation leads the way, and with effective participation and support from revolutionary Arab armies and armed masses in the Arab homeland.

3) At present, the tasks facing the Arab masses and all progressive forces before the final objective can be achieved are the following:

a) *The Political Aspect*

i) The struggle of the masses and progressive forces against reactionary Arab governments must be intensified. However, while the goal must be the establishment of revolutionary popular democratic regimes, increased efforts must be made and greater pressure brought to bear on those governments, to extract from them everything that may be of use in the confrontation with Israel.

ii) In liberated Arab countries the popular masses must fight to win their democratic liberties, to make their governments adopt revolutionary measures against reactionary regimes, purge the army and arm the masses.

No new, effective confrontation with Israel can take place until the popular masses are mobilised and their revolutionary initiative is allowed free rein, and it is they who must be relied upon, for, essentially, the battle is theirs.

iii) One of the most vital and urgent matters is the struggle of the Arab masses to impose

recognition of their demands for military training and arms for the people. A government that is afraid to arm the masses in the battle of destiny cannot be acting sincerely, whatever slogans it employs and whatever façade it shows to the world.

iv) Efforts must be made to secure the cooperation and coalition of the progressive forces in every Arab country so as to consolidate the home front. Moreover, in the case of Iraq, the Kurdish problem must be settled by granting the Kurds home rule. This will consolidate national unity and solidarity between the Arab and Kurdish nations in the struggle against the common enemy.

v) There must be cooperation among the progressive forces throughout the Arab homeland. We must foster solidarity among all Arab masses and their various organisations.

vi) Resolute, unflagging war must be waged on imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. The nests of espionage of imperialism and Zionism and other centres of support for imperialism must be uprooted in every Arab country. We must foster our alliance with the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and all other forces of liberation, peace, democracy and socialism throughout the world.

vii) The foreign policies of liberated Arab countries must be coordinated to the greatest possible extent with those of states belonging to the international socialist system. It is also essential to purge the diplomatic service, whose staff must be replaced by progressive, upright, competent and loyal elements.

b) *The Military Aspect*

i) Liberated Arab states must unite at military level.

ii) Arab armies must be purged of disloyal and reactionary elements. The technical capacity of these armies and their readiness for battle must be improved. As far as Iraq is concerned, the army must be withdrawn from Kurdistan and put in a state of full preparedness to take part in the national war. All progressive officers and non-commissioned officers who have either been discharged or retired must be recalled to active service.

iii) The general public must be given military

training and armed, particularly the workers, peasants, young people and students.

iv) Liberated Arab states must come to the aid of any Arab country in case of attack. These states must play a direct role in the battle and must take the initiative in the military sphere. Moreover, they must not stand up for or provide political protection for the reactionary regimes under the pretext of the Zionist peril.

c) *The Economic Aspect*

i) All-out war must be declared on imperialist oil monopolies. Oil must be brought into play as a deterrent in the battle. The nationalisation of oil companies is acquiring an increasing significance, whether viewed as a means to economic independence or as a political weapon that can be brought to bear directly on imperialism and its Zionist offshoot.

ii) In all cases where there is the possibility or need for liberated Arab countries to coordinate their economic activities they must do so.

iii) There must be radical agrarian reform. Serious attention must also be given to the living conditions of the masses so that the struggling masses may approach the battle with greater enthusiasm and better mobilisation. The deterioration of the material conditions of labourers in Arab countries, even the liberated ones, is of direct service to Zionist and imperialist plans and propaganda.

iv) A scientific, programmed economic policy must be adopted to foster an independent and liberated national economy. Heavy industry must be set up and developed. Mineral resources must be directly exploited by the countries concerned, with help from the socialist states.

v) The insatiable exploiting classes must be fought and their fangs must be drawn. They must bear the brunt of taxation.

vi) Economic and technical cooperation with the socialist countries must be promoted.

d) *Palestinian Commando Action*

This is bound up with the military tasks that lie ahead of us; nevertheless, it has an extraordinary significance and stands quite on its own.

i) All forms of material support (arms and money) must be given to Palestinian commando

organisations. This is a national obligation of highest priority. We must help so that the struggle in which these organisations are engaged may advance from the stage of resistance to that of a popular war of liberation.

ii) Progressive forces must make it their duty to consolidate the affinity between their battle and that in which the commando organisations are engaged. They must genuinely take part in the armed struggle these organisations are waging in usurped Palestinian territory and work for the establishment of a common front in this stage of the struggle, a front that will adopt a revolutionary and progressive programme for liberation. We call on these organisations, and all other progressive forces, to fight against all reactionary and suspect attempts to infiltrate commando organisations or the attempts of any Arab government to dominate them or link them to its own policies or attitudes. The battle requires that the objectives of the commando organisations should be unequivocally progressive, with clear-cut foundations and strategic dimensions.

e) *The Ideological and Propaganda Struggle*

i) The most comprehensive campaign possible must be mounted to acquaint the masses with the essential nature and dimensions of the battle and its direct association with the interests and progressive aspirations of the popular masses. We must expose, unmask and defeat the suspect notions being disseminated by Zionism, the forces of reaction and imperialism, with the object of spreading despair and indifference among the masses and of numbing their vigilance.

ii) A scientific and convincing propaganda campaign must be launched to present the case to progressive and organised propaganda of the Zionists. Liberated Arab countries must allocate sufficient resources for this important activity. It is also very important that Arab propaganda should have a progressive and scientific basis and emerge once and for all from the jungle of racial feeling, superficiality and shallow emotionalism. It must break free from the effects of imperialist notions and machinations.

iii) The Palestine cause and all other progressive Arab causes stand in need of support and backing from progressive and socialist forces in

the world. Our common enemy is world imperialism and its protégés. It is therefore the national duty of progressive Arab forces and the revolutionary liberation movement in the Arab homeland to fortify, consolidate and further develop solidarity in the struggle. The victory of the Vietnamese or any other people in this world would be of direct service to the struggle of the Arab masses; moreover, the victory of the Arab masses in any Arab country would support and consolidate the stand of the world revolutionary front in the face of imperialism, under the leadership of the United States.

While national and patriotic interests require the revolutionary liberation movement to foster its ties and consolidate its alliance with the world revolutionary front, that front, in its turn, (particularly the socialist countries and communist and labour parties) is called on to aid and support the Arab liberation struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction. For the struggle is one and indivisible.

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Speech by the Tunisian President Bourghiba on the Occasion of Palestine Week.¹ (Excerpts)

Carthage, March 15, 1969

In this way, as I have said, a return to the Partition resolution resembles to a great extent my call for a return to the concept of the protectorate in Tunis; it is not at all a peaceful solution, for there would certainly have to be a bloody struggle to force Israel to accept the Partition resolution. For it would not be easy to implement this resolution and it is something which Israel will never willingly accept. When I said this to the Arab countries which have made themselves responsible for the Palestine problem, they expressed the same opinion. I found that what I had said in this respect was in agreement even with what Gamal Abdel Nasser had told the French magazine *Réalités*, and with what he had said at the Bandung Conference; it even agreed with

what he told me personally. When I impressed on him the necessity of returning to the United Nations resolutions, he made the excuse that he feared that he would come into conflict with public opinion. I told him that we must use our minds and be frank with our peoples so that they might understand the facts and gain the sympathy of the world. For these resolutions were only issued by the United Nations when they had been passed unanimously by its members, including Russia, America, France, Britain and China. If Israel has been recognised by all the states of the world, whether in the third world or in Africa or elsewhere, are we to remain alone in political isolation talking uselessly by ourselves?

In spite of this, some people say that we must not conflict with nationalist sentiments for fear of popular resentment and disapproval.

For war is a calculation, and emotion has nothing to do with it, nor are high ideals enough where war is concerned. There are ways of going about things gradually and in stages. Others have also said this, but later they denied it and attacked us. In the same speech at the first Arab Summit, I analysed the Palestine problem and showed the way to reach a solution. I pointed out that there is something more important than the Partition resolution, which I regard as matter of tactics, when I said: "The Arabs will gain no advantage from traditional warfare. Only guerrilla warfare can compensate for the great disparity between the Arab regular armies and the Israeli army, which is due to the high level of technological development attained by the Israel army. For in guerrilla warfare the enemy is harrassed and his security is disorganised, and by endurance and continued resistance he can be forced to return to the road as being the lesser of two evils."

This is the major strategy which I proposed in 1964, when Al-Shuqairi was thinking of a Palestinian division attached to the Egyptian army. I told him then that it was the duty of the Palestinian people to take their fate in their own hands and throw off all forms of tutelage. I added that it might even be necessary for them to return to the struggle which they had begun thirty years ago, because guerrilla warfare had been going on in Palestine from 1924 to 1926 and from 1936 to 1938, and in fact only stopped in 1948 when

¹ *Al-Amal* (Tunis), 18/3/1969. President Habib Bourghiba made this speech at the conclusion of the Palestine Week organised by the General Federation of Tunisian Students.

the Arab regular armies took the matter into their own hands, on the assumption that their intervention would be decisive, whereas in fact guerrilla warfare is the only means really capable of shaking the enemy's will and eventually tipping the balance. It is the course followed by Tunisia when it combined diplomacy with guerrilla warfare; this completely undermines security, if it goes on long enough, regardless of the cost and sacrifice involved.

What I said is on record. The Palestinian resistance has now resorted to it. Their present plan is exactly what I have indicated. In brief, it means that the issue is not one of Arabs and Jews, but a colonial problem which is substantially the same as all colonial problems. If we admit this, we must agree that victory will not be the result of a war between two armies in which the subject people conquer their colonisers. Therefore we must tackle the problem as we have tackled all colonial problems, including those of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Angola. The case of Vietnam provides the strongest evidence of the effect of harassment, continued disturbances and permanent pressure which, in the end, will develop into direct action.

I expressed these opinions openly in Cairo, at the meeting of the Arab League. I always have a predilection for a combination of diplomacy and war, with the aim of isolating the enemy in the international field and making him appear unbending and opposed to the will of the United Nations. It was in this way that the question of partition arose; in fact it is a question of tactics, not a final objective. But the strategy which will bring final achievement can only be built on guerrilla warfare. During the war, interests may require partial compromise on certain specific points when the time comes for negotiations. This is a matter of political tactics. My position on the Palestine issue is that traditional warfare must be avoided and a relentless guerrilla war embarked upon until the enemy returns to his senses. Then agreement on a solution satisfactory to both sides may be possible. It does not matter if, in the course of this, there is a compromise on a non-essential issue. I have a great deal of personal experience of this form of struggle, and it may happen that, during the struggle I may give way on part of the objective I have

set before me, postponing it to the next stage. These are marginal questions with respect to the strategy of the struggle, the principal concern of which is to decide how to make the enemy return to the road, and what are the factors which will be most effective in the war against him. It is not a matter of numbers of tanks and planes, for in a traditional war it may well be that an Israeli force is superior to all the Arab forces combined. The Israelis have experience of the *Blitzkrieg* which the Germans invented in the Second World War, and they have ways and means of whose effectiveness we were given tangible evidence when we saw how thousands of tanks melted before them like butter because their drivers did not know how to use them properly. Not to mention the planes and the missiles which our brothers did not use at all.

I also said in my speech at the above-mentioned Summit that:

"The problem of Palestine is a colonial problem, and all the characteristics of a colonial problem can be found in it.

"... and another characteristic is the selfishness shown by the colonialists in their demands for *Lebensraum*... and that is why we must concentrate on harassment, continued disturbances and the permanent pressure." Then I said:

"The issue then, is not limited to a struggle between Israel and the Arab states. Since 1948 the Arab states have been concerned only with Israel and the liberation of Palestine form the Israeli yoke, and they have not succeeded. Nor can they expect to succeed if they persist in believing that Palestine can be liberated by a traditional war, in which Israel may well be stronger than all of us..."

Though it was a painful thing to have to say this, I told our Arab brothers that the unification of the armies of Kuwait, Jordan, Tunisia, Libya and other Arab armies would have no effect; no one had even dared to say such a thing at an Arab meeting. So much for the armies; what about the claim that we are one nation, and that the Arabs from the Atlantic to the Gulf constitute an effective force? We saw how flimsy are these claims in a crisis which lasted only six days and in which the Tunisian army did not have time to reach the firing-line.

So we must set the problem within its real framework, which is Palestine. It is possible that the Palestinians, and even *Fateh*, are ignorant of a great many things about Tunisia as a result of the misrepresentation and slanted propaganda that went on for twelve years; this propaganda only stopped after the defeat. What is regrettable, or what we are entitled to regard as regrettable, is that the "Voice of the Arabs" did not hold its tongue or stop accusing us of being reactionary until after the tragedy which befell us all.

I repeat what I have been saying since 1964, that the solution depends on direct, continuous and unceasing reaction on the part of the Palestinians, no matter what the cost. And on the assumption that if Israel shells Karameh, Irbid, Suez, or Port Said or Cairo, there will be no retreat or withdrawal; this is the only effective plan. I have also said that, in addition to the endurance of the Palestinian people, the neighbouring Arab peoples, and even non-Arab and non-Islamic peoples, must give help, because of the colonialist character of the problem. Just as they sympathise with and support Angola, Mozambique and Vietnam, they should also support a people that is resisting an occupying power that has usurped its homeland. I see no objection even to ending the state of war between the Arab countries and Israel, because that will not liquidate the Palestine problem as long as the people of Palestine continue to struggle and sacrifice for their cause. I repeat this statement and lay stress on it to refute the claim that is often made that to recognise Israel is to liquidate the problem. Let me give you an example that supports this view: when we assisted the Algerian revolution we were not in a state of war with France, and this situation probably helped us and also benefitted Algeria, because if France had reacted by attacking us it would have been attacking a country which was in a state of peace with it and would therefore have found itself in an embarrassing situation because of this. That is why we did not enter into a war with France. For we said that it was in Algeria's interests that we should not be in a state of war with France, so that we could help her because we were protected by a state of peace.

The same is true of the Arab countries in confrontation with Israel. It is of no concern to me if

they come to an agreement with Israel, or if the state of war between the two sides is terminated, because these are emotional matters of interest only to those concerned. What does concern me is that Palestine should be liberated, that an acceptable solution for the problem should be found, and that the Palestinian people should be in Palestine itself to harass the enemy constantly and continuously, with the support and backing of the neighbouring peoples, according to their capabilities and whatever the cost. We are ready to give our share of assistance according to our ability, but we cannot help the commandos as we helped the Algerians because of the geographical situation, which has to be taken into account.

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Helping one's neighbours involves sacrifices, hardships and the shedding of blood, but this must be accepted, as I said in the following passage of my speech:

"I do not say this to avoid responsibility and throw it on to our brothers who have been vanquished by the enemy and weakened by colonialism.

In fact our duties will then be no less onerous, for we must work to revive the resistance movement, we must support and sustain it continuously and effectively, we must protect and cherish it irrespective of the sacrifices involved...

In dealing with this issue we need the precision and finesse of a chess player, so that we may be able to exert pressure on the enemy and force him to accept a compromise and to return to the road. Instead of reflecting on the judiciousness of my statements, my listeners dismissed them, only picking on what I said about the Partition resolution, as something to criticise. The Partition resolution is not very important as long as it is regarded only as a stage on the course to a main objective; we only advocated it to make it easier to tackle the main issue. There are also the statements of the *Fateh* authorities, who now aim at eventually establishing a secular Palestinian state in which all the inhabitants, whatever their religion, will have equal rights and duties. This is a solution that can be envisaged as the stage coming after that of partition — there could be two states which eventually join together to form one state.

In choosing partition as a solution our object is to secure world sympathy for the problem; it is by no means incompatible with the main objective. For an Israeli state with frontiers determined by the United Nations cannot live long; eventually it will be forced to cooperate and be absorbed into a federal or confederal state incorporating various languages. This is the solution which the resistance people have decided on for the present; we will support and assist them in this. But they must repudiate the old propaganda which calls this solution defeatist.

Let us then see if it is in our interest to accept this solution as a preparatory move that will make it easier to attain the main objective. We have to weigh the opposing forces against each other so that we may know how and when we shall gain our objective — even if this takes ten or twenty years. Despite the rejection of my view which was based on my long experience of struggle, I am ready to assist the Palestinian resistance fighters if they follow the road which leads to the objective — I mean a people's war which is continued until the enemy returns to his senses; this is the basis of accepting partition, the object of which is to make it easier to reach a solution. There is obviously a difference between choosing the course and deciding by what means the situation will be changed: will this be achieved by tanks and planes, by diplomacy and traditional warfare, or by guerrilla warfare?

But the one thing that is clear and incontestable, is that continuous people's warfare, unimpeded by complications or by events of the kind which have taken place in Zurich, Athens and Algiers, is effective, because it draws the attention of the world to a people who are fighting for their freedom and their very existence. I recall how a member of the resistance who is here today, Mr. Al-Bashir Zurq al-'Uyun, consulted me when he was leaving the prison where I was still being detained, about what he should do. I answered him by saying that any action which confused and disturbed the situation was useful until such time as France returned to the road, and agreed to discuss an honourable solution with me.

This is the principle which must be thoroughly understood; resistance from radio and television studios is no good. In any case, thank God, things have returned to normal since the Six Day

War; the situation is now that a people are under the occupation of colonists of superior military strength, and that this occupation has led to resistance which produces a reaction that in turn brings about a further reaction, and the chain of action and reaction goes on until there is an end to the great injustice we have been suffering for so many years. Again I repeat that if the struggle is conducted in this manner, it will not matter whether the Arab countries are in a state of peace or in a state of war with Israel, as long as the Palestinian people themselves continue the struggle.

There is another question which is affiliated to this. I mean that the Arab governments, no matter what their inclinations and complexions, even those that come to an understanding with Israel, will find themselves forced by their own peoples to support Palestinian resistance willy-nilly. In the past these governments have belittled the resistance on the grounds that it was ineffective, or that they were in the course of preparing for war, so that the resistance might force war on them before they were ready. But it is now clear that they were merely making empty excuses, because they were not ready for war and will never be ready for war. I said the same thing to the Palestinians in my speech, and called on them not to wait for a sign from the Arab states; for the whole world would come to their aid when they gave proof that they were ready to sacrifice for their country. I said:

"... But the pivot of resistance must be in Palestine, in the cities, in the deserts, and on the mountain tops. There is no other way if we want to be serious in action and sincere in speech, if we want our actions to prove the truth of our words.

Let not our brothers in Palestine think that the matter is beyond their powers, for the important point is not the great numbers, or the vast armaments of the enemy; it is first and foremost the spirit of the resistance and continuous harassment; equally important is the way things are arranged and the way events are controlled."

... I did not even give any encouragement to those members of the resistance who talked of forming large divisions. I convinced them that their mission was not to conquer but to ensure that the struggle went on; and that a war of

direct confrontation is a disaster for those who are weak. The wise and sensible course, I said, was to trick and delude the enemy, to attack him where he least expected it, and to go on doing this for a year, for ten years, or more if necessary. The clever leader does not accept direct confrontation for fear of falling into a trap like a hyena, when he can strangle Israel and harass her with ten thousand men scattered over the plains, the hills and the deserts, rather than exchanging gun-fire across the Canal which cannot smash Israel. However, it is possible that alongside this plan artillery fire may be effective if it is considered only as assistance and cooperation between the two fronts. But the effective force is the force of the people which led to Tunisia's success, and which course Algeria followed...

There are four important points. I have quoted from the speech I made at the Summit Conference to fix in your minds the four important points in it and to recall them to the heads of state whom I addressed on that occasion.

I gave the example of the Algerians as the first important point to be considered, without mentioning Tunisia. I said:

"The people of Algeria who fought against France did not wait for help from outside, nor did they wait for the Arab League to draw up a plan of campaign to liberate them." They did not wait for the League, nor did we. We even implored it not to concern itself with our case lest it should founder as the Palestine problem had foundered.

"The second point is that when they entered the struggle, and showed that they were serious in their struggle, assistance and supplies poured in on them from all the nations of the world."

This meant that their struggle confronted the Arab states with a *fait accompli*. Now the Palestinian struggle has, thank God, entered into its positive stage. It is to be hoped that there will be unity in its ranks and that a collision between the resistance groups, or between them and any of the Arab states, will be avoided. In this connection, I have heard much that is regrettable. The Arab States must make sacrifices and bear the responsibility for sheltering and protecting the resistance fighters, no matter what the cost. If all

of them agree to stand firm, the Israeli army will not be able to bomb all of them with its planes. If it tries to do so, it will make the Middle Eastern situation even more rotten, and the saying: "The more serious a crisis becomes the sooner it comes to a head" will apply.

But that the internecine strife between the commandos and certain Arab countries should reach the stage where the guns of the resistance fighters are trained on the armies of the countries in which they are stationed, as I have heard is the case — this is intolerable. Our Algerian brothers know what we suffered during their war of liberation. Therefore it is a state of general chaos and disturbance throughout the Near East, with resistance in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, that will return the aggressors to the road. For they will only come to their senses when things have gone too far for remedy. Let people understand my words as they wish, and then let Moshe Dayan look to his army and make of it a magic potion which he swallows but hardly enjoys.

"The third important point... the struggle must be continuous and uninterrupted, despite the sacrifices and savage blows which will only make it more steadfast and resolute."

"The fourth... the solidarity, support and protection which the Algerian revolution encountered in the two neighbouring countries." This is essential, especially as there has been so much glorification of Arab nationalism. Let its advocates accept some of the duties it involves, just as we accepted the consequences of being neighbours and brothers of the Algerians. Let solidarity be the guiding principle in the struggle against colonialism, regardless of Arabism and Islam.

What we want the East to understand, and we insist that it should realise, is that the worse things get, the closer we are to deliverance, to the outcome, to the goal. I hope that our Palestinian brothers, who avoid visiting Tunisia while passing through it on their way to Algeria, will realise this. Sometimes people tell the Tunisian Ambassador that his country is pro-American, but in fact we fought French colonialism, and have established good relations with all states, including Russia, Rumania, Poland, America, Italy, Spain and others. This is what has enabled Tunisia

to enjoy a certain degree of freedom despite her small size, and thus to avoid committing suicide in the name of fighting imperialism.

Which of the great powers is not marked with the brand of imperialism, when they are all in agreement that Israel should exist and survive, that it should be protected and that its continued existence should be guaranteed? And this includes countries which some of the Eastern Arab states regard as their friends and supporters; they all insist that Israel should continue to exist. When people understand this fact their view of the situation will change, and they will throw off the myth of colonialism; if not the result will be, sooner or later, that they fall into the melting pot of the cold war and communist influence. It is non-alignment that keeps a man free, not belonging to one camp for the sake of continuously opposing another, until he finds himself up to the neck in one of them.

A middle course is best; it is better for a man to leave himself scope for conciliation so that he may not be at the mercy of a giant who gains advantages at his victim's expense, and who is concerned only to reach his own objectives. The best way to escape from this danger is for a man to work for the establishment of good relations with all so that he does not have to stand alone against a great power and so that all his interests may not be dependent on that power's will, which will choke him.

These are the four important points which I have extracted from my speech at the first Arab Summit meeting. I followed them with a question to the Palestinian people, and a second to the neighbouring peoples, whose duty it is to bear the consequences of their struggle. I asked:

"Are the Palestinian people ready to perform their leading role in this battle as the sole possessor of the right which has been infringed?"

"Are we ready to assume our responsibilities and perform our duties honestly and sincerely regardless of the cost?"

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The Jordanian Government's Reply to the Questions Put by Dr Gunnar Jarring, the U.N. Delegate to the Middle East.¹

Amman, March 23, 1969

Your Excellency,

The following are my government's replies to the list of questions you submitted to us in Amman on Saturday, 8 March, 1969. The answers are in corresponding order to the questions.

These answers represent my government's attitude as expressed to Your Excellency on several occasions during our past meetings.

I should like to take this opportunity to send you my best wishes for success in the important task with which you have been entrusted.

Sincerely Yours

ABDUL MUN'EM RIFA'I
Minister for Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Ambassador Gunnar Jarring,
Personal Representative of the Secretary General
of the United Nations,

Answer No. 1: As previously announced, Jordan accepts the 1967 Security Council resolution no. 242, and is prepared to implement it in the pursuit of an acceptable peaceful settlement to be in keeping with the articles and the principles contained in that resolution.

Answer no. 2: Jordan is prepared to guarantee that it shall relinquish all claims or all states of war. This guarantee will come into effect immediately upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all territories occupied by Israel as a consequence of its 5 June, 1967 aggression.

Any guarantee on the part of Israel to put an end to the state of war will only become meaningful once Israel withdraws its forces from the Arab territories it occupied following 5 June, 1967.

Answer no. 3: On 5 June, 1967, Israel mounted an aggression on three Arab states, thereby violating their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Any agreement guaranteeing respect for and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity

¹ *Al-Hadaf* (Beirut), No. 18, 22/11/1969, p. 12.

and political independence of each of the states in the area is conditional on the termination of the Israeli occupation of, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied as a consequence of its 5 June, 1967 aggression.

Answer no. 4: Jordan agrees to the right of each state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, in security against all threats or acts of violence, on condition that the state in question shall implement the 22 November Security Council resolution.

Answer no. 5: When the Palestine problem came up before the United Nations in 1947, the General Assembly passed a resolution, no. 181(11), of 22 November, 1947, for the partition of Palestine, setting down the boundaries of Israel.

Answers no. 6: (General question no. 5)

Our attitude has always been that a just solution for the refugee problem is already contained in paragraph (11) of the General Assembly resolution no. 194, of December, 1948. This has been endorsed time and again by the General Assembly in every single session it has held since the passage of that resolution.

Should a plan be drawn up on the basis of this paragraph and submitted to the parties concerned for consideration, then the acceptance of that plan by these parties accompanied with a declaration of intent to implement it in all honesty and adequate guarantees for its full implementation will provide valid justification for the implementation of the other articles within the resolution.

Answer No. 7: (General questions no. 9 and 11)

We do not believe that it is necessary to set up demilitarized zones. In general, Jordan is not opposed to the establishment of such zones on condition that this be done on both sides of the borders.

In the event that demilitarized zones should be set up, Jordan would accept United Nations supervision over these zones and the presence of United Nations observers.

Answer No. 10: (General question no. 14)

In view of our past experience with Israel, and the fact that it has backed down from all four agreements it has signed with the Arab countries, our position is that the document to be signed by

Jordan setting forth the commitments it will be incurring, shall be addressed to the Security Council. Similarly, Israel should sign a document to be addressed to the Security Council, guaranteeing the implementation of the commitments required of it within the context of the 22 November, 1967 Security Council resolution. The ratification of these documents by the Security Council and a guarantee on the Council's part that they shall be implemented shall constitute a final multi-lateral agreement.

Text of the Questions:

The 1967 Security Council resolution, No. 242, has laid down the considerations and principles on the basis of which an acceptable peaceful settlement for the Middle East problem may be arrived at.

Certain of these considerations impose certain specific obligations on each of the two sides to the conflict. Certain of these obligations will have to be borne by one side. An agreement has been reached to respect the general substance of these conditions and to take them into consideration. The following questions are designed to clarify the attitudes of all the parties concerned toward the considerations contained in the Security Council resolution and are put forward under the assumption that it is necessary to understand each of the considerations contained in the resolution in so far as each constitutes an inseparable part of the framework of an overall settlement.

Question no. 1: Do the Middle East states concerned (Israel- Jordan- Lebanon- The U.A.R.) accept the 1967 Security Council resolution, No. 242, and do they agree to implement the said resolution so as to effect an acceptable peaceful settlement for the Middle East problem in accordance with the considerations and the principles contained therein?

Question no. 2: Do the aforementioned states agree to guarantee the termination of all disputes between them and the cessation of the state of war in the region?

Question no. 3: Do the states concerned (Israel- Jordan-Lebanon-The U. A. R.) undertake to recognise the sovereignty of each of the other states, and the right of these states to exercise that sovereignty over their own territories? Do they

furthermore undertake to respect the political independence of each of the other states?

Question no. 4: Do the states concerned consent to peaceful coexistence within secure and recognised boundaries for each of them in freedom from any encroachments or the use of force?

Question no. 5: If the answer to the last question was yes, what do you understand by secure and recognised boundaries for these states?

Question no. 6: Does Israel agree to withdraw its armed forces from the territories it occupied during the June, 1967 war?

Question no. 7: Does the United Arab Republic agree to guarantee the right of navigation for Israel across international waterways in the region, particularly in the case of

- a) the Straits of Tiran?
- b) the Suez Canal?

Question no. 8: In the event that a just settlement plan is found for the refugee problem, and in the event that such a plan is submitted to the parties to the conflict for consideration, would these states agree in principle to such a plan and do they agree to declare their intention to implement it in all sincerity so as to provide adequate justification for the implementation of all the clauses within the Security Council resolution?

Question no. 9: Do the states concerned agree to guarantee the territorial inviolability and the political independence of each of the countries in the region? Do they furthermore guarantee

- a) establishment of demilitarised zones?
- b) the adoption of additional measures for this purpose?

Question no. 10: Does Israel agree to the presence of such demilitarised zones within the border territories of each of the two sides?

Question no. 11: Does Jordan consent to the presence of demilitarised zones within the Jordanian territories that are evacuated by Israeli forces?

Question no. 12: Does the U.A.R. consent to the presence of such zones in

- a) Sharm al-Sheikh;
- b) Other parts of Sinai?

Question no. 13: Do the states concerned agree that the demilitarisation of these zones should take place under United Nations supervision?

Question no. 14: Do these states agree to sign a final agreement that shall contain all the proposed clauses and conditions that are agreed upon for the establishment of a just and lasting peace?

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Speech by the United Arab Republic President Nasser at the Inauguration of the Second Session of the General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union.¹ (Excerpts)

Cairo, March 27, 1969

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This session of the National Congress starts its work at a time when our struggle is at an extremely important and an extremely dangerous stage, particularly as regards the military and political aspects of the Middle East crisis.

With regard to the military side, this phase is characterised by the continued escalation of military operations on the Egyptian front, the escalation of the operations of the Palestine resistance organisations, and the escalation of the endurance of the Palestinian people, who are now openly and unreservedly defying Israeli occupation. At the same time, the enemy's offensive fury has escalated. This takes the form of repeated raids on Jordanian towns and villages on the pretext of curbing Palestinian resistance.

This escalation means that we are entering on a stage which has always been inevitable, in view of continued Israeli aggression on one side, and on the other the constant increase in our capacity for endurance and the daily reinforcement, consolidation and development of our overall strength, for the defence of our sacred rights. We are now entering on a stage in which we must expect blows from the enemy which we must return with even more forceful blows. We will discuss this in detail later.

¹ B.B.C. ME/3037/A 1-2 (Edited).

As regards the political side, this stage is characterised by intensified international political activity in connection with the Middle East crisis, which activity is about to be embodied in the forthcoming meeting of the Big Four, the permanent members of the Security Council, which adopted the November 22, 1967 resolution on the Middle East crisis. The meeting, coming nearly eighteen months after the adoption of the resolution, will discuss the resolution and the measures that have been taken to implement it, against a background of pressures which make it perfectly clear to all judicious observers and to all persons sincerely concerned for peace that the Middle East crisis cannot possibly wait any longer for a solution.

Indeed, it is a miracle that the crisis has lasted so long without exploding, with vast and incalculable consequences. This means that at both political and military levels we are entering on a highly critical and delicate stage. Representatives of the four Great Powers are going to meet in New York. They are going to study and debate various possibilities. What is significant is that the attitude of these four powers will provide us with new, clear and decisive criteria for distinguishing between friend and foe. To be perfectly honest, the attitudes adopted by each of the countries concerned will determine the nature of its relations with the Arab nation for years to come, with all that this involves.

In this connection — I will deal later with further details of the political aspect — I want to make it clear to you that the destiny of the Middle East will be determined in the Middle East itself, and that nobody can dictate to the Arab nation anything that it regards as encroaching on justice or infringing its legitimate historical rights. Peace cannot be imposed, but peace can come by itself if it is based on justice. We must always remember that the balance of power may change, but the principles of justice are unchanging, everlasting and eternal.

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Let us turn to some details of the military aspect. The current explosive situation on the cease-fire line was unavoidable; it was the natural outcome of the contradictory factors which have beset all efforts in the field of the Middle East crisis. It is

the natural outcome of the interplay of these contradictions. It was bound to turn into a clash. For what reason? Why? One aspect of the situation is that the Security Council adopted a resolution calling for a cease-fire, but this resolution did not — for the first time in the history of the United Nations — stipulate the withdrawal of the combatants to the positions they were in before the outbreak of hostilities, so that it is balancing on one leg, and on dangerous ground that is liable to explode at any moment. Because of terrific American pressure on the United Nations, the forces of Israeli aggression were allowed to remain in positions in which they must not be allowed to remain any longer. These positions are not international frontiers; on the contrary, they constitute a violation of the international frontiers of three Arab States which are members of the United Nations. Nor are they armistice lines, like those we held for eighteen years from 1949 to 1967. They are cease-fire lines; they may mark the place where a battle ended, but certainly not where the war ended. This is not merely the way we interpret them, it is the generally accepted definition of cease-fire lines in legal, international and practical terms.

The other aspect of the series of irreconcilable factors and the inevitable clash they involve, is that the Israelis are trying to hold on to and freeze these lines. They are also trying to achieve further territorial expansion beyond these lines in accordance with their celebrated scheme: From the Nile to the Euphrates. Evidence of this is provided by the statements which Israeli political and military leaders have been making all these months since the aggression. All these statements confirm Israel's intention of expanding and acquiring territory. By these statements the Israelis are trying to legalise the situation, when they talk of reaching an agreement on secure and recognised frontiers. The Israeli leaders say they will not go back to their June 4 positions; this quite obviously means expansion. In a statement to an American magazine the Israeli Premier spoke frankly of Israel's expansionist designs. This of course results in a situation of mutual contradictions which must inevitably end in a clash.

This is happening at a time when Arab endurance is definitely proving effective, at a time

when the Arab countries have definitely established their growing ability to increase their political, military and economic strength, and their strength in the field of ideas, both individually and collectively. The growth of Arab strength in the political field is clear to all observers. It was illustrated by the Israeli Foreign Minister's reply to a question put to him a few days ago. He was asked what he thought of the fact that world public opinion had started to realise the truth about Israel and to veer away from its support for the Israeli point of view. He replied: "We are not interested in world opinion. What interests us is the security of Israel." Thus from a political point of view, in many parts of the world and in international circles, Israel's position has been exposed. There has been a change. We cannot expect a complete change all at once, but it is coming gradually.

We have already spoken about the military aspect, and will return to it later.

As for the economic aspect, the enemy and those who support him thought that we could not survive economically, but following the Khartoum Conference, and thanks to the resolutions it adopted for the provision of aid to compensate for the losses resulting from the aggression, we have been able to surmount all kinds of economic pressure and hold out economically in Egypt, at the Arab level and in the field of ideas.

At the beginning of the crisis — that is, immediately after the setback — we clearly proclaimed certain principles from which we will not and cannot afford to deviate, for to deviate from such principles would mean surrender to the enemy. They are: No negotiations and no peace with the enemy; not a single inch of the Arab territory occupied since the June 1967 aggression will be abandoned; no bargaining over Palestinian territory, because it belongs to the Palestinian people.

When we speak of these principles, which we clearly and definitely proclaimed immediately after the setback, we must keep in mind the enemy's strategy — the strategy of Israel. Israel's strategy can be summed up in one sentence: the imposition of peace by force; in other words, reliance on the logic of force. All the enemy's logic is based on the logic of force: the occupation of Arab territory by force and the

imposing of peace by force. Thus, by imposing peace by force the enemy will dictate his terms by force. The enemy occupied territory by force. This is the situation we are facing now. To fulfil his plans the enemy must impose peace by force. We have said, and we say again, that we will not accept the imposition of peace by force, because if we accept a peace imposed by force, if we accept peace talks while the enemy is still occupying our territory and speaking from a position of strength, we shall be surrendering to the enemy who is occupying our territories.

Now, brothers, after nearly two years of endurance, these principles — which have been both the bulwark and the inspiration of our endurance and an immense source of strength — cannot be thrown to the winds. These two major incompatible elements which are on a collision course are the main cause of the deterioration in the situation. Israel is trying to overburden the cease-fire line beyond the point of endurance. The Arab nation regards the presence of Israel on this line as a daily repeated aggression and a continuing insult. Moreover, Israel is insisting on achieving territorial gains by aggression.

Meanwhile, the Arab nation — thanks to the fact that it has succeeded in consolidating its position materially and economically through political endurance, which was decided on from the first moment — is today in a stronger position to reject and challenge any attempted aggression, regardless of the sacrifices, difficulties or length of time involved.

Brothers, we will now take a look at some of our fronts with the enemy.

The Egyptian Front. When talking of the Egyptian Front, we must begin with the operation of reconstructing the armed forces. We all know the state our armed forces were in after the aggression and the cease-fire resolution. The reconstruction of our armed forces was a difficult operation, by no means an easy task. First of all we needed to replace the arms we had lost, then we needed reorganisation, then we needed strict training. All this requires great effort and means that our officers and soldiers must accustom themselves to leading a hard — a very hard — life. Of course, the formation, organisation, and training of our armed forces is not enough. We must also train the minds that command these

forces and units; this too has not been an easy task. The formation, training and proper functioning of all levels of command has not been easy. When we speak of the reconstruction of the armed forces, we mean that we are reconstructing an army in whose armament, organisation, training and command we have confidence. The armed forces command is the brain that directs the battle and operates when the fighting starts. There is also the question of the standard and efficiency of the men in our armed forces.

All these were delicate operations that required planning. What was wanted was fighting spirit, a spirit of sacrifice, and the restoration of confidence in our armed forces after the world-wide campaign of defamation to which they had been subjected.

It is true that we lost the battle. But we lost the battle in 1967 without coming face to face with the enemy. We lost the war without entering into it. We lost the battle without fighting. In spite of this, our armed forces have been repeatedly defamed. The only confrontation in 1967 took place on June 5. On that day, our armed forces fought well. However, in view of what happened to our air force on June 5 instructions to withdraw were issued on June 6. We never had the opportunity of fighting the war, so how could we have lost it? We never had the opportunity of confronting the enemy. What happened was that an attempt was made to defame our armed forces so that the people would lose their confidence in themselves.

Therefore, after the organisation and arming of our armed forces and after the creation of a command, we had to test the standard of our men and make sure that a spirit of confidence had been restored, to make sure that a fighting spirit had spread among all members of our armed forces. We had to make certain that the members of our armed forces had recovered their spirit of sacrifice, that there was a feeling of solidarity between officers and men. We had to see everyone sacrificing his time, and work going on day and night.

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With regard to arms, the matter of the supply of arms requires careful consideration by us, for

by such consideration we can learn lessons, and further satisfy ourselves that the attitudes we have adopted are sound. Several points have to be considered in this connection.

(i) The Soviet Union is supplying us with the weapons we need. Immediately after the setback and the aggression the Soviet Union began supplying us with arms, with aircraft. In a short period we were able to obtain enough arms to help us meet any Israeli aggression. Had it not been for these arms we could never have succeeded in attaining a position from which we could retaliate or repel the enemy.

(ii) The United States and its allies are supplying arms to our enemy, Israel. There is a difference between the United States supplying arms to Israel and the Soviets supplying arms to us. After the June 1967 aggression Israel had more arms than it needed, while we hardly had enough. Moreover, we needed the arms to defend our homelands and to liberate our occupied territories. Supplying arms to Israel — which is the aggressor — can only mean that Israel is being encouraged to continue the aggression and incited to persist in its attempts to achieve gains through this aggression.

(iii) The Soviet Union is supplying us with arms we need without this taxing our present financial resources, which are bearing the heavy burden of the war. This will be clear when I tell you that we got all the arms we now possess from the Soviet Union without paying a penny. The first consignment of arms we received from the Soviet Union was free. And the following arms deals were for consignments to be paid for later on long-term loans.

I want you to know that the United States gives arms to Israel practically free of charge. The United States Export-Import Bank offers Israel long-term loans with which it purchases arms for nominal sums, while generous American donations to Israel take care of these loans as they come up for payment.

(iv) When arms are obtained from a country — as long as they are not smuggled — it is not a question of a purely commercial transaction; the deal is firmly tied up with the policies of the countries exporting the arms. One country would never give arms to another if this conflicted with

its own policy. This means, quite frankly, that the imperialist powers have never given arms to countries which openly oppose and challenge imperialism, even if these countries are ready to pay for the arms in hard currency. They will never get arms unless they submit to imperialism, or unless there is some hope of making them submit. We tried this with Britain in 1953 and with the United States in 1954. I want to say quite clearly that supposing we did have the foreign hard currency to purchase the arms; even if we could manage that — and I say that we could manage it — if we had the currency and went to Washington or London to purchase the arms, we should not get anything. We have incontrovertible evidence of this.

(v) Our being supplied with arms by the Soviet Union is a firm safeguard for our national independence, or rather our very existence. It is the only door open to us. This makes us feel constantly grateful for the Soviet Union's attitude to us, to problems involving our destiny, and to our legitimate struggle for our cause.

We have been getting arms from the Soviet Union since 1955. Since then, the Soviet Union has never imposed any political restrictions on us or made a single condition. It has not made any demands which could affect our national prestige in any way. Our relationship is essentially based on belief in the popular liberation movement, hostility to imperialism, and resistance to imperialist influence and plans.

Having obtained arms, we must learn to make the best use of them. That is just what the armed forces are now doing, day and night, adapting and training so that the arms may be fully effective on the battle-field. After obtaining the arms, we asked the Soviet Union to provide us with Soviet military technicians — who are at present with our armed forces in the various units, and the different branches of the armed forces. We asked the Soviet Union for technicians and insisted on our request. Why? To remedy shortcomings. These shortcomings made themselves felt in various fields in June 1967 — in the use of arms, in the command and in various other aspects. We also asked the Russians to assist us in training, in adapting to these arms, and in training the various commands — from the supreme to the subordinate commands. I insisted on

requesting Soviet experts to work with the armed forces because of my conviction that to confront the Israeli enemy we needed the full assistance of Soviet arms and also of those who could instruct us in the use of the arms and help us in command training.

In fact, in the last few months we have benefited greatly from the Soviet experts and advisers who are with our units. They have left their families behind and are earnestly working with us day and night so that we may benefit from their experience and so that our armed forces may attain full proficiency to enable them to fight the battle to liberate the land.

Every blow at Suez in the early days that followed the setback caused heavy casualties among civilians. Men, women and children were killed. In doing so the enemy thought he was putting us under severe psychological strain.

For instance, in the evenings we were often informed that a large number of people had been killed and wounded as a result of the shelling of Suez. At that time we were unable to take any deterrent action against the enemy; in other words, we were unable to counter the enemy's shelling. Our circumstances were such that it was impossible for us to fire back. In fact, at one time our armed forces asked me for permission to fire back — that is to strike at civilians, just as the enemy was striking at our civilians. This request was made over a year ago, but I did not grant it. This was because we needed time to acquire the capacity to deter the enemy — to be able to strike at the enemy's civilians when he struck at ours. Therefore we had no choice but to evacuate the inhabitants of Suez and Ismailia. We have been able to evacuate the majority of the inhabitants of those towns. Thus we have deprived the enemy of an advantage — that of continually striking at Suez and Ismailia and inflicting losses on civilians, losses which pain and demoralise us.

Naturally, since the evacuation of the inhabitants the enemy has been unable to inflict heavy losses on us in Suez and Ismailia as he used to do before. Only small losses are suffered. For this reason, in every battle the enemy directs his fire at the oil refinery. And every time the enemy

boasts that he has set fire to the oil. Since the oil refinery is only 200 metres from the edge of the east bank of the Canal, we have — and I have — written it off from the very first day, as no longer to be taken into consideration. Of course the fires caused by burning oil have to be fought. On many occasions firemen have made great efforts, tremendous efforts, to bring the flames under control.

Since the evacuation, the enemy has always directed his fire at the towns, at Suez and Ismailia, to damage houses and installations and of course to hit as many civilians as possible. This, of course, is what war is all about. The day will come when we shall reply to enemy strikes at civilians by striking at civilians ourselves. Such is war.

I told you that I did not agree to this, although I saw tears in the eyes of those who asked me to take such a decision. That was a year ago. Today, a year later, things have changed a great deal. In those days we had to be patient, bear the blows and losses and remain quiet until the day came when we could repel and avenge.

Why do I say this and tell all these stories? I say this so that the entire homeland will know the difficulties the Canal people have been through — the people who had to leave the Canal and live as refugees. Some 350,000 people have left the Canal Zone and are living as refugees in various cities in the United Arab Republic. We are trying by every means to give these people monthly wages, assistance and housing facilities. The Government has taken a decision on this.

I tell the people whose homes have been destroyed — and I have seen pictures of houses and installations in Suez, Port Taufiq and Ismailia and have heard that some people refused to leave and preferred to remain in their homes — that the day will come when our people will devote the biggest part of their resources to rebuilding this area and restoring it to prosperous life in honour and recognition of the sacrifices they have made.

The next point I come to is the endurance of the home front behind the battlefield. Actually, I want to tell you that after the aggression, after the resignation decision of the 8th, one had to weigh the many factors involved in what happened on the 9th and after the 9th and 10th.

The tally showed that things would be difficult indeed; there were hard times ahead of us.

Naturally, in June, we began to take stock at once. Specifically, what was left of our armed forces? Moreover, what time would be needed to rebuild the armed forces? We did not say this at the time. Of course it was clear to us that the time needed to rebuild the armed forces would not be short, that it was not a matter of months. We concluded that we should find it difficult to reassure the masses and the people who had been affected by the setback and by Israeli occupation in Sinai, Gaza or the West Bank. We said that the enemy and the imperialist countries would try everything to shake our home front before we had time to completely rebuild our military forces. Israel and those behind it would thus achieve their objectives.

But the outcome was a testimony to the noble heritage and deep awareness of this people and to the long history of their civilisation. People sent me letters saying: "Six months have already passed. What are you waiting for? Six months should have been enough to rebuild the armed forces." Of course those who are familiar with military affairs know that six months is not enough to train soldiers and commanders, rebuild, reorganise and create new traditions.

Having calculated the time needed to rebuild the armed forces, we had to take two things into consideration: the stability of the economy and the stability of the home front behind the battlefield. Following the closure of the Suez Canal, which used to bring in a revenue of about £E 110 million, and the loss of the Sinai oil, which used to bring in about £E 20 million, and the Sinai mines, it was obvious that economic endurance would be difficult, in fact impossible, particularly with regard to the wheat for which we had to pay in hard currency.

At that time we needed £E 60 million in hard currency to obtain our wheat requirements. Even the year before, we had experienced difficulties in this respect, not to mention the year before that — those years before 1967, ever since the United States suspended its aid to us. We barely managed to secure the £E 60 million. Here we were again helped by the Soviet Union, which gave us £E 20 million worth of wheat under agreements.

Then the Khartum Conference took place, and we were able through this conference to obtain the support that would enable us to hold out economically. The Khartum Conference solved the problem of obtaining the hard currency needed to purchase the wheat as a result of the closure of the Suez Canal. The problem of economic endurance was solved; there remained the problem of endurance on the home front.

In those days, in those past months, great efforts were made outside Egypt to influence the home front. Hundreds of thousands of leaflets printed abroad were sent to Egyptians in European cities. New names — Free Egypt Societies and Egyptian Constitutional Societies — appeared on these leaflets. A large number of these leaflets were sent to us here.

Of course we tried to trace the sources of these leaflets. They originated in Germany and certain other European countries. It was clear from the printing and the wide dissemination of the leaflets that they were being financed generously. Naturally, psychological warfare is not new to us. We have accustomed ourselves to it ever since the Revolution when we started taking an independent, anti-imperialist, nationalist line.

From those publications, the various methods used, the statements made by various Israeli leaders and also from the United States' attitude of full support for Israel, it was evident to us that Israel and the imperialist countries were hoping that continued Israeli occupation of Arab territory might lead to the collapse of our home front. However, I can really say now that our home front is standing firm behind our battle-front. I feel that every day our home front is becoming firmer and stronger because there is a feeling of confidence. Thus, we need have no misgivings about the following three points: reconstruction of our armed forces, our economic endurance and the endurance of our home front.

While speaking about our fronts with the enemy, there is another point which I must bring up. This concerns the Popular Army. This army depends on volunteers from all over the Republic. When it was announced that this army was to be formed, it was of course obvious that its formation would not be an easy or simple operation. It was obvious that the operation was a difficult one that required time and effort.

However, volunteers poured in from everywhere to join the Popular Army. Of course such volunteers are not paid, they look after themselves. Now the Popular Army exists everywhere. Our policy is to expand this army further while ensuring a high standard of strength and training so that it may be capable of confronting the enemy in any part of our country.

Brothers, there is another point too, which I believe is extremely important. This is the people's deep sense of awareness and steadfastness. This has been illustrated by the endurance of the masses and their determination to overcome defeat and to meet all the conditions required for victory, from the very first day after the setback.

Fellow citizens, Members of the National Congress. Before leaving the subject of the Egyptian Front to consider the other Arab fronts with the enemy, we must take a very serious look at the splendid activity initiated by the Arab Sinai Organisation. The activities of this Organisation, which consists of the young men of Sinai and of other groups of young men from all over the homeland who have voluntarily joined its ranks — who defied danger and found their way to this part of our beloved homeland — began to make themselves felt some months ago.

During the past few weeks the Organisation has been extending its activities under extremely dangerous circumstances, and resisting the enemy under unfavourable natural conditions. Despite all this, the young men of this Organisation have been silently performing the most magnificent tasks with sublime courage. They have made direct, face to face attacks on the enemy's military forces concentrated in the desert. They have formed fighting patrols to clash with the enemy, they have raided enemy headquarters and laid mines. Not a single day passes without the sound of the explosion of these mines reaching the enemy's ears. These explosions inflict losses on the enemy's personnel and equipment.

Regardless of the enemy's repeated threats of reprisals against the Organisation, it is no longer possible for anyone to prevent these patriotic young men from performing their role in the battle. Arab commando action is linked with the Israeli occupation of Arab soil. Therefore, as long as this occupation continues, the people's resistance

to it cannot be stopped. This resistance is manifested in all possible ways — there is passive, popular and military resistance. This resistance will continue until the occupation ends.

Brothers, let us now consider the other fronts of Arab military action. The things I am going to talk about are not secret, because some of Israel's leaders have discussed them and they may have also been published by newspapers in Israel or in the Arab press.

The second point I want to discuss is the Eastern command. In fact ever since June 1967 we have been thinking of co-ordinating the Arab Fronts. Meetings, some of them long secret meetings, took place, until it was eventually possible to establish the Eastern Front and form a command for this Eastern front. This command is of importance; the Eastern front is of great importance. There must be an Eastern Front and a Western Front. There must also be full co-ordination between the Eastern and Western Fronts. The enemy knows how important this is, and is aware of the possible consequences of strong Eastern and Western Fronts.

The importance of the Eastern Front was stressed in a book published by the Institute for Strategic Studies. The book points out that Israel's principal objective these days is to break up this Eastern Front. I can say that the establishment of the Eastern Front has succeeded to a great extent. What has been achieved?

The Eastern Front has been formed by Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. A command for this Eastern Front has been established and complete co-ordination has been achieved between the forces of Syria, Iraq and Jordan. What I am telling you is not a secret, because the Israeli Defence Minister has mentioned it in the Israeli press. Contacts are now taking place between the Eastern Front and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

After this short discussion of the Eastern Front, I want to talk about the resistance forces. We have spoken about the resistance forces before and said what we think of them. We have also spoken of our policy. Briefly, our policy as regards the resistance forces is to strengthen resistance forces by every material and military means. We have also said that it is the right of the Palestinian people to resist occupation, to fight and to demand their full rights. It is our duty to offer the Pales-

tinian people unlimited political support.

I now want to talk about Palestinian popular resistance, which has flared up everywhere in the territories the enemy occupied after June 1967. In this connection we must not forget the resistance of Gaza — the Palestine Arab people in valiant Gaza, who refuse to surrender. We are aware of the difficult circumstances under which the people of Gaza live, the economic and various other hardships they face. Despite this, the people of Gaza — young men and girls, men and old people — absolutely refuse to surrender or to keep silent.

We must also mention Palestinian popular resistance in the West Bank. We must mention Palestinian popular resistance in Jerusalem and the resistance to Israel which wants to turn Jerusalem into a Jewish city. To our brothers, the people of Jerusalem, I say that we, the people of the United Arab Republic, give our pledge that we shall under no circumstances accept the *fait accompli* Israel is trying to impose in Jerusalem. Jerusalem is a part of the Arab nation and no one can abandon Arab Jerusalem.

Brothers, in discussing Palestinian popular resistance and Jerusalem we must not forget Nablus, Hebron and all the other towns. We must not forget the young people of both sexes, the men and women who have been arrested and are now in prison and those who are fighting armoured vehicles with bricks in every town, village and everywhere. To them we say that, God willing, the day is near when we shall be able to unite our efforts with theirs.

We must also remember the Arabs in Israel, who refused to leave their homes in 1948, who chose to stay. I think that these are some of the bravest people in the world, because by not leaving they faced certain sacrifice, for they were treated as second class citizens. They have sacrificed much for the sake of staying in the land of their fathers and forefathers. Demonstrations of great significance and importance were recently staged in Nazareth, in the territories that have been occupied ever since 1948, not only since 1967.

These are the different fronts with the enemy. I now want to discuss our constant political activity behind these fronts. Firstly, we must seek to reaffirm and perpetuate the spirit of

the Khartum Summit Conference. We must strive through every means to prevent any conflict from arising between the resistance forces or between the resistance forces and the Jordanian Government — a conflict which the forces opposed to the Arab struggle movement are attempting to create and foster. Fortunately, everybody — in both the Jordanian Government and the resistance organisations — is aware of what is intended and is acting in such a manner as to foil the enemy's aims. We must support the resistance forces by every means and prevent any conflict of any sort.

I will now discuss the recent visit by the Foreign Minister to Syria and Iraq. The purpose of the visit was to effect reconciliation and to strengthen the Eastern front. The Foreign Minister's contacts with Syrian and Iraqi officials were successful. The Foreign Minister then visited Jordan, where he also succeeded in consolidating the aims of the Eastern Front. He was successful in all these visits. Afterwards the Foreign Minister visited Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to explain our objectives and policy. An understanding was reached as a result of these visits.

Later, Hasan Sabri al-Khauili visited Libya. He delivered a message to King Sanusi of Libya and explained the situation to him. King Sanusi has promised us full support in all fields.

The other thing I should like to point to in our policy at this stage, since June 1967, is that we are definitely resolved to avoid the exchanges of abuse in which certain quarters are trying to involve us. We have said that these matters should be shelved and deferred.

What I should like to tell you quite frankly is that Tunis radio and the Tunisian press are attacking us almost daily. However, it is our policy not to answer Tunis radio or the Tunisian press or any statements originating from Tunisia.

From the political aspect, we are doing all we can to ensure the greatest possible co-ordination. The Foreign Minister's visits, the visits by Hasan Sabri and General Muhammad Fauzi to Algeria were for this purpose. During the visit, Algeria promised to extend full support in all fields.

I now want to talk to you about the bilateral meetings. The most important of these was the meeting with King Hussein during his recent

visit to Cairo on his way to visit Washington at the invitation of the United States Government. After full discussion of all topics and developments related to the Security Council resolution, and the implementation of that resolution, agreement was reached on two fundamental points: no negotiations with Israel and not a single inch of Arab soil to be surrendered.

Fellow citizens, I am aware that there is a big question in your minds and in the minds of our people and nation. The question is: when will the battle be? My sense of responsibility obliges me to tell you that I cannot answer this question. I can only say that everything humanly possible is being done in the way of mobilising for the day of the battle. Indeed, superhuman efforts are being made for the battle. Credit for this goes to the work, knowledge, faith and resolve of our men in all fields of national struggle, both at the front and on the home front immediately behind it.

Therefore I hope that you will agree with me that we must not rush things to make the battle take place before its due time, not by a single day. However, at the same time I promise you that we shall not put off the battle a single day after its proper time.

Fellow citizens, Members of the National Congress, before leaving military matters to discuss political matters, I must remind you that the War Minister will be here at a closed session with you tomorrow to provide you with such further details as you may like to know or to have made clear to you. The same applies to the Foreign Minister, who will also attend the closed session with you tomorrow. He will talk to you about things that you may want to know in his field.

For this reason, I shall make my talk about political matters as brief as possible so as not to make difficulties for the contacts between the Big Four powers which are due to begin within a few days. However, it may be a good thing to review certain broad outlines so that we do not expect more than is possible.

1. No one can ask us to do more than we committed ourselves to do when we accepted the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution. Despite our absolute belief in a principle which we have declared and which we shall

untiringly repeat — that what has been taken by force can be recovered only by force — we have offered every possible facility, within the framework of the principles we believe in, to Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, the United Nations Secretary General's envoy to the Middle East, who is to supervise the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

2. We have realised from the start that any hope of Ambassador Jarring's mission succeeding is unlikely to be fulfilled because Israel rejects the Security Council resolution. It rejects this resolution because it makes two extremely important stipulations. These are: (i) Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied after June 5, and (ii) that no territory can be annexed by force through aggression. Israel wants to expand and is seeking further territory. We have brought to the attention of the world statements by Israel leaders and officials which suffice to condemn them out of their own mouths and to expose their intentions and plans.

3. Towards the end of last year the problem once again returned to the Security Council, indirectly. It was then clear that Ambassador Jarring was unable to proceed with his mission and that the quarter which issued the resolution would have to express another view on it before it was too late.

4. Since that time there have been three new attempts. The first was a timetable for the implementation of the resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. The second was a set of ideas on how the resolution might be implemented, submitted by France for discussion at a meeting, proposed by France, of the four major powers which are permanent members of the Security Council, as constituting the effective strength of the Council. Finally, a few days ago, there was the United States working paper.

5. I do not want to express an opinion as a result of which it might be said that we are setting obstacles in the way of the meeting of the Big Four. However, I cannot conceal from you the fact that the United States must be allotted a major share of the responsibility for the dangerous course on which the Middle East crisis is now proceeding. From the beginning of the crisis, the United States attitude has been identical with that of Israel all along the line, without

reservations, despite its alleged friendship with the Arab world — about which there is room for doubt — and despite its enormous interests in the Arab world — about which there is no doubt at all. After the recent United States Presidential elections, which brought in a new government, we tried — and I add further that we are still trying — but I am bound in honesty to say at once that so far I do not see any indications of a change in the attitude of the United States, which supports Israel all the way.

Brothers, after perusing the recent United States working paper, I can state that the United States attitude is one of complete support for the Israeli point of view. I have only one answer to this United States support for Israel — the constant support before and after June 1967. I have only one answer: it is that we Arabs will under no circumstances surrender or accept any pressure.

Brothers, the Israeli newspapers have reported that, during Eban's visit, the United States accepted Israel's point of view on the subject of negotiations between the Arabs and Israel and on the subject of the refugees. The Israeli newspapers have said that the United States has adopted Israel's point of view on these subjects.

Brothers, a serious situation may arise if the Big Four powers, in their capacity as the main force in the Security Council, are unable to find a means of implementing the Council's resolution — we and everybody else are aware of this situation.

Fellow citizens, Members of the National Congress, whatever happens one fact stands out above all others: our nation will never relinquish its right to have the final say on the ultimate issues of the struggle in which it is engaged. Our nation will not relinquish any of its principles, rights or territory. It will work, struggle, resist and fight so that its will may always watch over its destiny. God is with our nation. He will grant it victory. Peace be with you.

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Text of the United Arab Republic Government's Replies to the Questions Put by Dr. Gunnar Jarring, United Nations Envoy to the Middle East.¹

Cairo, March 27, 1969

The memorandum dated March 5, 1969, submitted to you during your recent visit, expresses the realities of the present situation. In its paragraphs Nos. 1-7 the memorandum again presented the standpoint of the United Arab Republic, which is based upon acceptance of the Security Council resolution No. 242 of November 22, 1967. The memorandum also affirmed the readiness of the United Arab Republic to meet all obligations arising from that resolution.

The memorandum also drew attention to Israel's continued refusal to accept the Security Council resolution and to implement the obligations arising from it, in addition to Israeli schemes to annex Arab territories through war. This is a policy which is not only forbidden by the United Nations Charter but clearly contravenes the Security Council resolution, which states specifically that the acquisition of territory through war is illegal. It has become clear that Israel, in its attempt to realise its expansionist objectives, is no longer content with mere rejection of the Security Council resolution but is actively working against it.

The memorandum also draws attention to Israel's expansionist designs in the light of declarations made by Israeli leaders. These designs aim at the following:

1. The annexation of Jerusalem.
2. The continued occupation of the Syrian Heights.
3. The occupation and complete domination of the West Bank of Jordan, which will effectively mean the end of Jordanian sovereignty in that area.
4. The economic and administrative absorption of the Gaza Strip into Israel and the systematic expulsion of the inhabitants of the Strip.
5. The occupation of Sharm al-Shaikh, the

Gulf of Aqaba area and the maintenance of a continued military presence in the eastern part of Sinai.

6. The building of Israeli settlements in the occupied areas.

Israeli policy constitutes a clear violation and a definite rejection of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and of the peaceful settlement which that resolution seeks.

In the light of these undeniable facts, I feel that it is incumbent upon me to declare unequivocally, before I answer the specific questions submitted to the United Arab Republic on March 5, 1969, that all the United Republic's answers which affirm its acceptance of the Security Council resolution and its readiness to fulfil the obligations arising from it, require that Israel should also accept the resolution and fulfil all obligations arising from it, especially withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied during the aggression of June 5, 1967.

First Answer: The United Arab Republic, as it has declared previously, accepts the Security Council resolution No. 242 (1967) and is ready to implement it for the sake of achieving a peaceful and acceptable settlement, as stipulated in the provisions and principles of the resolution.

Second Answer: The United Arab Republic agrees to undertake to terminate all demands or states of belligerency. This undertaking will be fulfilled once Israeli forces have withdrawn from all Arab territories occupied by Israel as a result of its aggression on June 5, 1967. A pledge by Israel to end the state of belligerency can have no meaning until it has withdrawn its forces from Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967.

Third Answer: On June 5, 1967, Israel launched aggression against three Arab states, violating their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United Arab Republic's readiness to pledge to respect and recognise the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area requires that Israel should end its occupation, withdraw its forces from all Arab territories occupied during its aggression of June 5, 1967 and implement the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

Fourth Answer: The United Arab Republic accepts the right of every state in the area to live

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 24/1/1971. For Dr. Jarring's Questions see ante, doc. 44.

in peace within secure and recognized frontiers, free from the threat or use of force, provided that Israel withdraws its forces from all Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967 and takes action to implement the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967.

Fifth Answer: When the Palestinian problem was brought before the United Nations in 1947, the General Assembly passed its resolution No. 181/11 of November 29, 1947, for the Partition of Palestine. That resolution clearly delineates the frontiers of Israel.

Sixth Answer (concerning the seventh general question): We have declared our readiness to carry out all the provisions of the Security Council resolution which include, among other things, freedom of navigation in international waterways in the area, provided that, in return, Israel implements the provisions of the Security Council resolution.

Seventh Answer (concerning the eighth general question): Our policy has always been that the complete settlement of the refugee problem is covered by paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution No. 199, first adopted in December, 1948, and repeatedly reaffirmed by the General Assembly, at every session held since that date. If the parties concerned are presented with a plan in accordance with that paragraph, for examination, and if they accept it and declare their intention to implement it in all honesty, and if sufficient guarantees are provided for its implementation, this would justify the implementation of the other provisions of that resolution.

Eighth and Ninth Answers (concerning the ninth and eleventh general questions): We do not believe that the creation of demilitarised zones is necessary. In general, the United Arab Republic will not oppose such zones if they are located on both sides of the frontiers.

Tenth Answer (concerning the thirteenth general question): In case such demilitarised zones are created, the United Arab Republic accepts United Nations supervision and observation of these zones.

Eleventh Answer (concerning the fourteenth general question): In view of our past experience with Israel, which has repudiated the four agreements it once signed with Arab states, we consider that

the document to be signed by the United Arab Republic, which it will pledge to implement, should be submitted to the Security Council. Likewise, Israel must sign a document and submit it to the Security Council, clearly stating its commitment to carry out its obligations arising from the Security Council resolution of November 22 1967. The guarantee by the Security Council of these documents will constitute the final multi-lateral agreement.

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Statement by the General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union during its Second Session.¹ (Excerpt)

Cairo, March 30, 1969

In assembling for its Second Working Session the General National Congress is carrying out the task entrusted to it by the will of the people a year ago. Responsible as it is for following up and directing the different stages of the national struggle, it is an expression of the will of the masses to fortify endurance and struggle until victory is achieved.

The Congress has reviewed achievements in the political, military and economic spheres of the struggle, and studied developments in the Arab position both along the line of confrontation with the enemy on the Western and Eastern Fronts and in the field of armed and popular resistance in occupied territory. The Congress has furthermore reviewed all stages in the development of the Middle East crisis in the international field and the attitudes of the powers involved.

The Congress has no doubt about the scope of Israeli plans. Israel's objective is to perpetuate its occupation of Arab territory, and to consolidate its economic and administrative control over these territories as a preliminary to subjugating them to its political authority and expelling their Arab population, as it did in the Arab territory of Palestine in 1948. These plans rely completely on world imperialism and enjoy its constant support.

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 31/3/1969.

The Congress observes the ever increasing potential of our armed forces in terms of armament, preparedness and training, and notes that these armed forces are now capable of energetic mobile defence, of functioning as an immediate deterrent and of retaliating in more than equal measure for every blow struck at them.

In the Congress's estimate these several factors have combined to produce a new fateful stage in our struggle. Now we are facing both danger and hope; we have to live with both of them.

Therefore the Congress must try to build up a picture of this new phase, in the light of which we can determine what sacrifices we shall have to make and what tasks and responsibilities lie ahead.

1. Political Confrontation

Political action on various fronts has succeeded in reorienting large sectors of world public opinion in favour of Arab rights. Arab rights have daily gained new supporters throughout the world. Political action has set Israeli aggression in its proper perspective as a conspiracy by imperialist powers against the movement for liberation and progress in the Arab homeland, and established the character of the Arab-Israeli conflict as an integral part of the world-wide struggle by the forces of liberation against imperialism and by the forces of progress against those forces which seek to keep peoples in a state of under-development.

It was the magnificent example of endurance set by the Arab masses which made possible this political confrontation at international level between the Arab nation and Israel and enabled public opinion to exert pressure for a meeting of the Big Four Powers, the permanent members of the Security Council, to examine and discuss prospects as regards the critical Middle East situation which threatens to explode at any minute with consequences that are incalculable.

Regardless of what such a meeting may result in, we feel that we must once again affirm two basic principles that it is impossible for us to depart from or bargain over.

1. No one can impose on the Arab nation what it regards as surrender, not peace.

2. Any decision that does not guarantee total

and unconditional withdrawal from all the occupied territories will be rejected by the entire Arab nation.

Whatever attitudes are adopted as a result of this meeting, they will provide the Arab people with new and decisive criteria which will help them for a long time to come in deciding who are their friends and who are their enemies.

Every country must expect its interests in the Arab world to suffer, or the reverse, to the extent that its policy leads it either to support and aid aggression, or to condemn aggression and support the legitimate rights of the Arab nation. In any case, as far as we are concerned, this meeting marks the end of one phase of Arab political action and the start of another, very different in character from what has gone before.

Arab political action should seek to prepare world public opinion to accept the fact that the battle between us and Israel is inevitable and to gain the support of the largest possible sector of world public opinion in that battle. Under no circumstances must Israel be allowed to dupe world public opinion again.

The Congress commends the significant contribution made by the government and people of the United Arab Republic towards depriving Israel of the opportunity it seeks, by fostering cooperation among the different states in the Arab nation; and maintaining Arab solidarity in the face of the danger which confronts all Arab states and territories equally.

II. Military Confrontation

On the very first day after the disaster, with the masses insisting that the defeat must be overcome and that all resources must be mobilised to ensure victory, the voice of our leader proclaimed that what is taken by force can only be recovered by force. This has been the basic principle of our military enterprise and the mainstay of our military confrontation with the enemy. This is our only way of liberating the occupied territory. To ensure that this principle is put into effect Arab action has been necessary on more than one front.

As far as the Egyptian Front is concerned, we have rebuilt our armed forces, replaced their lost arms and reorganised them. This reorganisation has extended to the structure of command, to the

type of arduous training given to the armed forces and to the mental approach of those in command of our forces and military units. All this has been a vital necessity without which any effort would have been useless.

The Congress is aware that in declaring its admiration for our armed forces it is expressing the sentiments of our great people, who themselves gave expression to this love and admiration at the funeral of our fallen hero, Lieutenant General Abd al-Mun'em Riyad.

In the context of this military confrontation, the General National Congress emphasises the importance of the Eastern Front which includes Jordan, Syria and Iraq, and the importance of efforts to consolidate and unify this front. The Congress supports all efforts to achieve this major objective and to ensure coordination between the Eastern and Western Fronts.

It is the opinion of the Congress that armed popular Palestinian resistance has been a factor contributing to the restoration of the balance of power in the area and has helped to make possible the confrontation with the enemy. On behalf of the whole Egyptian people, the Congress expresses its great admiration for Palestinian commando action and for the concerted popular resistance in the Gaza Strip, in Jerusalem, Nablus, Hebron and throughout the whole of the West Bank of Jordan.

The Congress also salutes the heroic resistance of the Palestinian people in occupied territory over the past twenty years, whether in Nazareth or elsewhere. We salute their defiance in the face of all manner of pressure, terrorism and Fascist racialism which has surpassed even the conduct of the Nazis in its savagery and brutality.

The Congress supports the outstandingly important role which the Arab Sinai Organisation is playing at this serious stage in the confrontation. This organisation is composed of citizens of this nation who, working silently for resistance in the most difficult and dangerous places, and reckless of their lives, daily provide the most splendid examples of valour and self-sacrifice.

To them we say that the work they are now doing is absolutely necessary, inevitably bringing closer the day of the outbreak of the battle of liberation.

The Congress is also expressing the feelings of our noble people when it declares its gratitude to and appreciation of the people of the Soviet Union, their friendly leaders and their government for having made the reconstruction of our armed forces possible.

The Soviet Union has contributed much to our just and legitimate struggle and continues to do so. For generations to come the Arab people will feel gratitude and appreciation for the worthy and honourable attitude of the Soviet Union, an attitude born of belief in those noble principles that must prevail throughout the world.

The Congress thanks the people and governments of socialist countries who hastened to the support of Arab rights against the forces of aggression and imperialism. We salute the friendly peoples who came to the defence of our just cause and supported us in our struggle, which is an inseparable part of the struggle of the peoples of the world against imperialism.

Similarly the Congress wishes to express the appreciation of the Arab people for the just and courageous attitude adopted by France, under its great leader, Charles de Gaulle when, at the beginning of the Israeli aggression against Arab territory, it condemned the aggression, rejected the acquisition of territories through aggression and took all the measures required by such an attitude in its dealings with the aggressor.

III. *Resistance on the Home Front*

Thanks to their clear-sightedness, their inherited strength of character, their unprecedented capacity for endurance and their faith in their political leader, our great people have emerged intact from a psychological ordeal of extreme severity; through their endurance and determination they have created a situation in which it has been possible to rebuild the armed forces; through their loyalty to each other and their determination not to accept defeat they have robbed the enemy of the chance to realise his ultimate objectives.

The present firmness of the home front is due in great part to its solidarity with the army. The more our armed forces enjoy the full confidence of the people, the greater will be their capacity.

Our leader and President has said that each and every member of our armed forces is awaiting the order to liberate the occupied land. We, in

turn, say that each and every one of the people is awaiting the order to fight alongside the armed forces in the battle for liberation.

Nothing is dearer to the masses than liberation and victory.

This requires more efficient political organisation, for all successful political action relies, of necessity, on efficient organisation.

The Congress declares its full support for the President's statement and regards it as a starting point for political and organisational efforts in the coming stages. The Congress moreover endorses the reports of the permanent committees which were submitted by the Central Committee as the general outline for forthcoming organisational tasks.

The Congress furthermore endorses the principles put forward in the reports of the subcommittees and calls on the Central Committee to work out the necessary details for their implementation.

Finally, the Congress can only praise the achievements of the people at this fateful stage; their splendid endurance, their appreciation of the historical and cultural responsibilities facing them and their solidarity with their revolutionary and clearsighted leaders whom they love, support and trust and for whom they have striven with superhuman endeavour. The Congress joins with the people and their leader in affirming that this is our battle, our destiny; victory has to be worked for, it does not come gratuitously; it is we, through our faith and deeds, through our unwavering resistance and struggle, who have the power to create victory.

RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONGRESS

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

A. *Military and Political Action*

1. All the requirements of the armed forces must continue to be met and they must be afforded every facility to further improve their combat potential and capacity to liberate the occupied land and to achieve victory.

2. The Arab Sinai Organisation must be supported. Young Arabs must be allowed to enlist in it and offer their lives for the realisation of

their aspiration: the liberation of their land.

3. Palestinian commando action must continue to receive our support, in both material resources and man-power, to enable it to liberate the Palestinian people from racialism and Zionist colonialism.

4. The Eastern Front must be reinforced. Action on the Eastern and Western Fronts must be unified; their destiny requires this of all the governments and peoples of the Arab nation.

5. We must continue to pursue our foreign policy of opposition to colonialism and foreign domination and cooperation with the peoples of the world in their quest for the welfare of all mankind. We must work for the establishment of peace based on justice.

B. *Popular Defence*

1. Measures must be taken to provide better on-site training for those who volunteer for popular defence organisations. New groups of volunteers must be trained, to increase the number of those trained in the use of arms and to help maintain their technical proficiency and effectiveness at a high level.

2. It is the opinion of the Congress that the decision to create a highly competent and responsible military command for the popular defence forces is a significant and appropriate measure which will increase solidarity between the people and their own armed forces on the one hand and the front-line troops on the other. This measure will ensure that the people become a natural and organic extension of the confrontation with the enemy and will provide the defence forces with better training, improved arms and a higher level of expertise.

3. The Congress regards the establishment of the Arab Sinai Organisation as the fulfilment of a popular aspiration which was expressed by the General National Congress in its first session.

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Statement by the Jordanian Communist Party on the Need for a Popular Revolutionary Front and a Government of National Unity.¹ (Excerpts)

Amman, March, 1969

The situation is nearly ready for the establishment of a popular revolutionary front. Basically, this should include the representatives of revolutionary parties and organisations, representing workers, peasants, the various categories of labourers, students and revolutionary intellectuals. It should be capable of providing the popular masses in the West Bank with mature leadership. The tasks of such a front would be to enhance the political status of the masses and the calibre of their resistance. It should instil in them the spirit of organisation, step up their resistance and set up resistance organisations in different quarters of the towns, in educational institutions and places of work, and in the villages.

The new phase in the escalation of the resistance in the occupied territories, which is beginning, demands that all revolutionary forces and parties and commando organisations in the East Bank should get together to form a revolutionary popular front, in addition to forming a national coalition. The task of such a front will be to fortify resistance in the occupied territories, provide it with material support, bolster its morale and coordinate efforts between the two sectors of the resistance, that which is inside the occupied territories and that which is in the East Bank.

At official level the task of forming a government of national unity remains an urgent matter. It is dictated by the circumstances of the battle against the alliance of imperialism and Israel. The establishment of such a government would bolster the confidence of the people in both Banks of Jordan, and would provide opportunity for coordinated action at every level and in all sectors. This would strengthen resistance, place the whole country on a war footing, enhance the efforts of the popular masses and mobilise their forces.

The establishment of a government of national unity would consolidate both the home front and the Arab front. Moreover, the people in the occupied territories would come to feel that, in their fight against occupation and oppression, there was an extensive, deeply rooted and unyielding front on which they could rely for support. They would come to feel that there was real solidarity between their struggle and that of the people of the East Bank and the Arab people. This would depend on the latter standing fast, and developing their military and political capacity to terminate the occupation by military means, should the aggressors and their colonial masters prove intransigent in their refusal to implement the United Nations and Security Council resolutions and withdraw totally from the occupied Arab territories.

Furthermore, the fact that the immediate objective for which the Palestinian popular masses of Palestine are fighting is to terminate the Israeli occupation does not in any way mean that they have thereby waived their claim to their usurped rights.

The cause of the Arab people of Palestine is just; their rights, as set forth by United Nations resolutions on Palestine, are legitimate. These resolutions guarantee the right of the Arab people of Palestine to recover their rights which Israel usurped in 1948; they guarantee the right of that people to return to their lands and their homes and they guarantee them the right to exercise self-determination in complete freedom.

There can be no doubt that the termination of the Israeli occupation will clear the way for a further struggle, which will lead to a just solution of the Palestine problem in favour of the Arab people of Palestine and the Arab liberation movement.

At present, the Palestinian cause has become very much an issue which is an integral part of the Arab liberation movement and the world struggle for liberation from imperialism. The more soundly and realistically this cause is presented, the more power and support will the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine win from the anti-imperialist front in the world, particularly from the forces of liberation, progress and socialism.

¹ *Al-Nida* (Beirut), 4/4/1969.

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Address by the Jordanian King Hussein at the National Press Club on the Middle East Crisis.¹ (Excerpts)**Washington, April 10, 1969***Mr. President, Members and Guests of the National Press Club :*

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This is my sixth visit to the United States in the last ten years — and each time I have come away from your country with a heart full of gratitude for the kindness you have shown me, and for your willingness to understand the problems that confront the small country of Jordan. On one occasion, however — in fact, on my last visit here — although my heart was full, my hands were empty. This time, my hope is that I will receive “even-handed” treatment.

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We have from the outset agreed to accept every single one of the principles of the Security Council resolution of 22 November, 1967 and so indeed has the United Arab Republic. We are still waiting for Israel to do the same.

Consider this, for example. If, before the war, on the first of June, 1967, the Arabs had agreed to terminate the state of belligerency with Israel, to provide her with guaranteed access to Sharm al-Shaikh and the Suez Canal, to recognize her right to live in peace and security, and to agree to provisions which would finally solve the refugee problem — if the Arabs had agreed to such terms on the first of June, 1967, such a move would have been so dramatic and such a concession on the part of the Arabs that Israel would very likely have found it impossible not to acknowledge the magnanimity of the offer; and so would everyone else in the world.

The fact of the matter is that the Arabs are making Israel that same offer today, and the Israelis are rejecting it. There are only a limited number of conclusions that one can draw from this. The most obvious one is that Israel is more interested in holding on to the territory she now occupies than in genuine peace. Even if one accepted the fact that Israel felt she deserved some fruits for her 1967 victory, one could hardly deny

that these concessions that the Arabs are willing to offer amply provide it.

It seems to me that future peace in the Middle East must stand or fall on the implementation of the November, '67 United Nations resolution. The Arabs have agreed to abide by its provisions, and so far the Israelis have refused to do so.

Their contention that negotiation directly between the parties involved is essential to agreement is a rather curious and arbitrary position. The United Nations itself, for example, recommends eight legitimate, accepted methods of solving international disputes. In article 33 of its charter, it cites negotiation, mediation, conciliation, inquiry, arbitration, adjudication, the use of regional agencies, and finally the use of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. In this instance, the United Nations has worked through the Security Council and adopted a resolution whose implementation, it believes, will resolve the dispute. Moreover the Secretary General has appointed a special envoy, Dr. Jarring, to assist the parties involved.

Yet Israel has rejected the resolution and insists on direct negotiation. Does this reflect an honest desire for peaceful settlement, or a frank acknowledgement that she rejects its provision that territory acquired by war should be given up as a condition of peace?

In this connection may I read you a quotation:

“Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal? If we agree then I fear we have turned back the clock of international order.”

That was spoken by one of your great presidents, the late General Eisenhower, in 1956 following the invasion of the Sinai and the attack on the Suez Canal. Today two of the three nations involved are signers of the United Nations resolution. Only Israel remains in opposition.

So the situation remains — the Arabs have agreed to the implementation of the Security Council resolution, and the Israelis are walled up behind their cliché — “Only the parties to the conflict must be parties to the peace.” This has paralyzed all progress for more than 20 months, and I have no doubt that it was the Israeli purpose to do so.

¹ *Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.*

It has become quite clear to me that peace in the Middle East is too important to the rest of the world to be blocked by such a narrow view point. In fact, the world powers and the world itself are parties to whatever happens in the area — whether it be war or peace. An area which holds more than half the world's supply of oil, which is the crossroad between Europe, Asia and Africa, which straddles the major lines of communication between Europe and Asia, and which has a population larger than some continents is of necessity important to everyone. In fact, the issue of peace in the Middle East is too important to be left to the parties. Particularly when failure to find a peace could bring on World War III.

The Israelis are saying, of course, that war is not imminent, that we Arabs are not prepared for war nor will we be in the foreseeable future. This, of course, has been a carefully calculated attempt to keep the big four powers from intervening. There is no urgency, they say, and thus no need for the powers to be stampeded into hasty action.

If there is one thing that the past twenty months have proven it is that nothing could be further from the truth. It is probably true that a major war is not imminent, but it is equally true that if events continue on their present course — without a settlement, war is unquestionably inevitable. And whether war comes next month or next year, it will be no less catastrophic.

I predict that if progress toward a solution is not made within the next very few months, not only will no one be willing, or in a position to talk about peace — but no outside force, even with best of intentions will be able to divert the area from permanent conflict and eventual war. If the Middle East does not become unrecognizable in the process it certainly will in the end.

Perhaps unwillingness to give up the territory Israel overrun during the war is not the only reason she is unwilling to accept the United Nations resolution — and that is the provision concerning the Palestine refugees. The resolution calls attention to the “necessity for achieving a just settlement to the refugee problem.” And I, for one, am fearful that no settlement of the refugee problem that is “just” is one that Israel will agree to. This is the crux of the whole Middle East situation — as important as troop withdrawal,

boundaries and guarantees of passage through international waterways. It is more than a refugee problem — it is the problem of the Palestine people.

Most people tend to group all refugees together, as people who have fled from oppression and who seek refuge in some other country. This was the case with the Jews in Europe during the Hitler reign of terror; and it's the case with the Chinese flooding into Hong Kong from the Communist Republic. But not so with Palestinians. These were driven from their homes during war time. Their homes and their land are occupied by the enemy. And they don't want to find refuge in another country. They want to go back to their homeland. This is certainly the case of the refugees of the so-called Six Day War of June of 1967 who should already have returned to their homes and land. As for all refugees, here again, the United Nations has been very clear on where the “just” solution is to be found. In a resolution passed in 1948, and which has been re-adopted in every General Assembly for the last 21 years, it states that Palestinians “wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors shall be permitted to do so, and those who do not, shall be compensated for their losses.” Nothing could be clearer in meaning. This is the choice which has been promised to the Palestinians for 21 years, and nothing has been done about it — nothing — for each one of those twenty-one years. It is the existence of the Palestinians — as exiles — unwilling exiles from their homes in Israeli occupied territory — that is at the bottom of all that is wrong in the Middle East.

Can anything be done about it? Not by anyone but Israel. They have traditionally taken the position that the Palestinian refugee problem is not their problem — that it is up to their fellow Arabs to look after them. And far from what is generally believed, this we are prepared to do and have been doing. We in Jordan have not only done that, but we have given them Jordanian citizenship. But the great majority — more than a million of them — still want to exercise their right which had been denied them for twenty years, the fundamental right of self-determination in accordance with the repeated resolutions of the General Assembly. And their fellow Arabs are committed to help them attain their rights.

This is an obligation shared by the world community.

And this is the danger of the refugee problem — the Palestinian refugees. It is not a question of looking after their physical needs. The United Nations, with generous aid from the United States, has been doing this for almost a score of years. It is a question of their rights. Once these rights have been restored — by Israel's acceptance of their right to repatriation or compensation — then the final step toward peace will not be far off. That step is the right of every state in the area "to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." And until those rights are restored, it is only natural that there would continue to be "threats of force and acts of force."

That is why when I am asked, "Why don't you stop the fedayeen, the commandos in their raids against Israel?", I reply, "I would not stop them." It is their land that the Israelis are occupying. And they see no way out for them except to struggle to achieve their rights. If they can't succeed in regaining the occupied land, then their aim is to exercise their right of active resistance to the forces of occupation. To practical people this may seem quixotic — but to people with anger in their hearts and a conviction that they are in the right, the practicability of their acts is of no consequence. Nor the sacrifice. And I am not willing to be responsible for the security of the forces of occupation.

Again about the commandos. I am frequently asked, "What good does it do you to seek a peaceful solution when members of the resistance forces say they will not accept it?" And my answer to that is simply this: "there is no difference in my aim in seeking a peaceful settlement and their aim in a settlement by conflict." What we both want is the restoration of our rights. I would never accept a peace that did not fully restore these rights. When we have regained them, there will cease to be a reason for commando action. It is the intolerable situation that produces the commandos, not the commandos who provoke the situation.

Two other questions frequently arise when I am talking with people from the West — and the first is, "Despite the fact that the United Nations resolution does not call for it, why don't you sit

down over a peace table and hold direct talks with the Israelis?" And my answer is that direct conversations with the Israelis is far down on the agenda of things that would make for peace. There is no basis for any negotiation anyway since Israel has not yet accepted the resolution. We have welcomed the mission of Dr. Jarring and have given him every opportunity to succeed in his efforts to implement the Security Council resolution. If further progress is to be made, Israel must declare its acceptance of the resolution and all the principles it contains and her willingness to work with us positively under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring and through his intervention for its rapid implementation. This would require that Israel realize that she must withdraw her troops from all the territories which she occupied in June 1967.

Moreover any plan for withdrawal must include our greatest city — our spiritual capital, the Holy City of Jerusalem. To us — Christian and Moslem Arab alike — Jerusalem is as sacred as it is to the Jews. And we cannot envisage any settlement that does not include the return of the Arab part of the City of Jerusalem to us with all our holy places. As a religious inheritance of all three of the world's great religions, Jerusalem must not become an obstacle on the road to peace. Once our rights are recognized in Jerusalem, we will do all we can to have it become what its name implies — the city of peace. And when peace finally does come, Jerusalem will be the means of bringing all believers in God together for all times.

In this search for peace I have been encouraged by the growing concern of the Four Big Powers over the failure to find peace. Obviously neither the Arab states nor Israel want to have a peace imposed upon the area by the great powers. And equally obvious is the fact that they have no intention of imposing one. However, I continue to be suspicious of Israel's objection to their getting together to discuss the problem, and possibly to reach some conclusions that might be helpful to suggest to both sides. Could it be that Israel fears what the powers might recommend as a just solution to our problems?

I personally would value the opinion of the combined diplomatic experience of France, Great Britain, Russia and the United States. Since they

are concerned most intimately in preserving world peace, and since the situation in the Middle East could possibly lead to the destruction not only of peace but of civilization, I feel they are entitled to give us their opinion, and that it should be worth listening to. I wonder why Israel doesn't think so.

Moreover the Big Four are sponsors of the United Nations resolution, and with other members of the Security Council, it is their concern to see to it that it is implemented, and how it is implemented. We ourselves have a right to go to the Security Council and demand its implementation, and we have refrained from doing so because we were confident the council members themselves would recognize their responsibility and give Dr. Jarring their full support in his efforts to bring about full implementation.

And the more I think about it, the more suspicious I am of the repeated statements of the Israeli spokesmen that the situation is not likely to develop into a serious war. That they should go so far to prevent the four powers from getting together is strange indeed. But if Israel is trying to lull the great powers into a false sense of security, Israel is not lulling us. That she continues to destroy our country in what she refers to as "active defence" will inevitably lead to an explosion.

My plea in all of this is to be even-handed in your support of the two sides, and to be even-minded in your thinking of the problems that confront us. We in the Middle East are perhaps not as aware as we should be of the tremendous responsibility that you feel for the preservation of Israel — a state that you had a large part in creating. We should acknowledge that to ourselves and not be overly disturbed when this natural feeling for your own creation, so to speak, is aroused.

But we too have a call on your thinking in this respect. If Israel is to be preserved, it may well be that it would best be preserved through adopting policies other than those which she now pursues. It might be possible for Israel to survive for years as a Zionist armed fortress in the midst of a hostile Arab world. But is that what you want for her?

The Jews and the Arabs have lived peacefully together for centuries in our part of the world.

This would have continued had it not been for the Zionist militant and expansionist ideology. As fellow Semites, we find Israel's anti-Semitism difficult to live with.

In conclusion, may I sum up for you, the people of the United States, who perhaps have as great a desire for peace in the area as any other outside nation, just what it is that we are prepared to offer Israel. And in this I am speaking for President Nasser as well as for myself. As recently as three weeks ago I had his personal authority to speak to you on his behalf. He does not want war for the sake of war. He, like us, wants nothing more than the restoration of our rights and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area. The United Arab Republic has accepted the Security Council resolution and is willing to implement it.

On our part, we are prepared to offer the following as a basis for a just and lasting peace, in accordance with the Security Council Resolution:

1. The end of all belligerency.
2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the area.
3. Recognition of the right of all to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of war.
4. Guaranteeing for all the freedom of navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.
5. Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability of all states in the area through whatever measures necessary including the establishment of demilitarized zones.
6. Accepting a just settlement of the refugee problem.

In return for these considerations, our sole demand upon Israel is the withdrawal of its armed forces from all territories occupied in the June 1967 war, and the implementation of all the other provisions of the Security Council Resolution.

The challenge that these principles present is that Israel may have either peace or territory — but she can never have both.

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Statement by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation on the Four Power Talks on a Settlement of the Middle East Crisis.¹

Beirut, April 10, 1969

Representatives of the Big Four are continuing their meetings to discuss the so-called Middle East crisis in New York in the hope of reaching a common international attitude to the solution of the crisis on the basis of November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution, and in accordance with the Soviet understanding of this resolution as expressed in the Soviet draft resolution, which in principle enjoys the support of France, and also in accordance with the American understanding of it, as expressed in the American working proposal, which in principle enjoys the support of Britain.

If the guiding principle of the superpowers is to arrive at an agreement, it is to be expected that each of the parties will draw closer to the other; one with its draft resolution, the other with its working proposal, until a point of agreement is reached. This will necessarily entail further concessions to Israel. The whole procedure will take place, moreover, in an atmosphere of artificial and misleading Israeli opposition, inspired by the policy of forcing further concessions from the Arabs in the interest of Zionism.

The Big Four, which control the United Nations, got together once before, in 1947, for the first time as far as their international dealings are concerned. On that occasion they violated the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homeland, which is the whole of Palestine, and their right to self-determination in that homeland. The Big Four then decreed that Palestine should be partitioned and that the Zionist entity should be established in most of Palestine.

Now the Big Four are meeting again for the second time in twenty years, to formulate plans that will inflict further injury and injustice upon the people of Palestine.

We are not surprised at the attitudes of the imperialist powers, particularly those of America and Britain. They have common cause with

world Zionism in view of their organic links with it, their common interests (exploitation and expansion), and their common enmity to the Arab Nation. What does surprise us is the attitude of the Soviet Union. We thoroughly appreciate the aid it has provided to many Arab countries in a variety of fields, but our duty to our nation now demands that we place on record the fact that the Soviet Union is persisting in its error by adopting this attitude to the Palestine problem, and by ignoring the rights of the people of Palestine to their homeland, which is the whole of Palestine, and their sacred right to liberate that homeland, to return to it and to exercise their right of self-determination in it.

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which is charged with the responsibility of leading the Palestine liberation movement, speaking on behalf of, and representing the people of Palestine, hereby declares that the Palestine problem is the province of the people of Palestine alone. Neither the superpowers nor any other party has the right to dispose of the problem. The Palestine problem is this: The people of Palestine have an unconditional right to their homeland, which is the whole of Palestine; they have the right to liberate that homeland, to return to it, to terminate and liquidate the Zionist presence in it and to set up a free, democratic Palestinian State in the whole of Palestine.

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Statement by an Official Jordanian Military Spokesman on the Reasons for the Recent Changes in the Jordanian Army Command.² (Excerpts)

Amman, April 14, 1969

Nowadays the development not only of the armaments, equipment, material and precision instruments used by modern military establishments, but also of military theory and concepts, is so rapid that it is essential that these establishments should constantly renew their commands and general staffs. In fact, it has become normal practice for such renewal to take place once every

¹ *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), 11/4/1969.

² *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 15/7/1969.

two years. This system is followed by the vast majority of countries in order to infuse new blood and energy into the command of their armed forces. Therefore the changes that have been made in the command of the Jordanian armed forces were quite normal and constitutional.

It is difficult to find any justification for the suggestions made in the Western press and in other foreign quarters to the effect that the purpose of these changes was to liquidate commando action or that they were due to other considerations not worthy of mention. It would have been better if they had shown some understanding of the Jordanian political and military scene rather than plunging headlong into error.

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Appeal and Recommendations of the Fifth Arab Archaeological Conference.¹

Cairo, April 24, 1969

The Fifth Arab Archaeological Conference which met at the Arab League Secretariat in Cairo in April 1969, and was attended by archaeological scholars and experts in the Arab World;

Having taken note of the reports and statements submitted by the delegations of certain Arab states on the violence done by Israel to Arab property of cultural significance and Muslim and Christian antiquities in the occupied territories, by the carrying out of excavations, the seizure, abuse and plundering of the contents of Arab museums; the destruction and disfiguring of archaeological sites and of Muslim and Christian places of worship and the theft of their contents; the destruction of historical sites and quarters in Jerusalem under the pretext of town planning; the demolition of parts of certain mosques such as the main central gate of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and of the Asbat minaret; the demolition of considerable parts of the churches of St. Anne and St. John, the theft of the crown of the Virgin Mary from the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and its later return without its valuable gems;

the removal of the famous Dead Sea Scrolls from the Palestine Museum to an unknown place; the demolition of the historic Maghareba Quarter in Jerusalem, and countless other acts of this nature;

Having reached the conclusion, after reviewing international agreements and recommendations which enjoin the protection of property of cultural significance during armed conflict, particularly the Hague Agreement of 1954 and the New Delhi Protocol of 1956, and the recommendations and achievements of UNESCO in this field, that the Israelis have violated international principles and agreements and vandalised Arab cultural property, especially in the city of Jerusalem;

Condemns this spirit of inveterate hostility to Arab civilisation and the Arab cultural heritage and resolves to hold Israel fully responsible for the destruction and mutilation of archaeological and historical sites and for the plundering of museums;

Urges all cultural organisations, scientific and archaeological institutes and all peoples of the world to help put an end to these Israeli acts of violence which are directed not only against the Arab heritage but also against the cultural heritage and sacred traditions of the whole of mankind;

Further urges all scholars, universities and learned circles, from regard for scholarly integrity and intellectual honesty, to refrain from collaborating with the Israeli occupation authorities in undertaking excavations in occupied Arab territories, and thereby both ensure that such flagrant outrages against human civilisation and cultural heritages are not allowed, and to promote cooperation between scholars, universities and learned circles on the one hand and the Arab countries on the other in protecting this rich archaeological heritage and in bringing more of it to light.

¹ The Arab League, *Resolutions of the Council of the Arab League at its 52nd Ordinary Session* (Cairo), 11-13/9/1969, Supplement No. 3.

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Speech by the Jordanian King Hussein on the Middle East Crisis.¹ (Excerpt)**Amman, April 28, 1969**

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In Cairo I had discussions with His Excellency the President, and reviewed with him, in the presence of his advisers and aides, all aspects of the Arab situation as it now stands. We observed that political action to overcome aggression and remove its traces had not so far yielded any positive results because of Israel's obstinacy and arrogance. We also observed that the efforts of the United Nations envoy had not achieved any success for the same reason, and that the efforts of the Big Powers were still no more than positive attempts. We decided that, in our political effort, we must not deviate from the basic principles of our legitimate rights and our national policy. We shall not, under any circumstances, accept anything but a complete withdrawal from all the territories which Israel has occupied.

His Excellency the President and I observed that Israel, as is clear from its declarations, intentions, plans and actions, hopes to acquire further Arab territory, and also wishes to take possession of the whole of the Holy City. Faced with these expansionist Israeli intentions, and with Israel's increasing and repeated aggressions, we decided that we must intensify and complete our preparations to recover our territory, liberate our people, rescue our sacred places and establish peace based on right and justice.

It was clear to us that this would require individual efforts and mobilisation of local capacities to enable us to continue to hold out and to be in a position to move from the defensive to the offensive. We gave special attention to building up, organising and co-ordinating the Eastern front, so that it may be a defensive force capable of preventing the enemy from continuing his penetration and attacks.

Furthermore, in our conviction that the Palestinian people, who have been made homeless

by aggression, whose land has been seized and whose resources and possessions have been usurped, are entitled to struggle in order to repel aggression and resist occupation, we concluded that commando action is legitimate, because it is directed against an illegal, usurping and invading power, and because it is trying to achieve by fighting and armed struggle the same objective as we are trying to achieve by peaceful political means: the liberation of territory and the termination of the occupation.

In this there is no contradiction between us and the commando movement. For it is a spontaneous movement which decides its own course that meets with us in the cause of liberation. I agreed with the President, that there was one thing that could not be allowed to continue for much longer — the occupation by the enemy of our sacred Arab soil. It therefore followed that the liberation of our territory is our first duty and our dearest desire.

My discussions in Cairo were another successful step towards increased co-ordination and unity of views, outlooks and attitudes between us and the United Arab Republic. This is a policy which, as time passes, is constantly being consolidated, strengthened and more firmly established, so much so that I can speak for His Excellency the President with his full approval, just as he can speak for me with my absolute consent.

We wish that an Arab conference at summit level could be held in the present situation, but in view of differences of opinion as regards the desirability of convening such a conference at the present juncture, we have to make do with bilateral contacts between the Arab capitals. I therefore went on to Jedda to meet His Majesty King Faisal, and had it not been for the lack of time and the fact that the date of my trip to the United States was fast approaching, I should have followed that with visits to other Arab capitals.

In my talks with King Feisal I was very happy to find that we were in complete agreement on everything that we had agreed on in Cairo, and I cannot speak too highly of the continuing support the Saudi Ruler is providing to meet the requirements of defence.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 29/4/1969. King Hussein broadcast this speech on radio and television after a tour of Arab and foreign countries to discuss the Middle East crisis.

Arab people,

I began my trip by going to Paris and from there went on to America, with a thorough knowledge of the Arab situation and the facts of the case; I had consulted the opinions of the parties and was aware of the will of the nation. I knew the course I must follow and was well aware of my responsibilities. My task was twofold: to explain to Western leaders our true position without over-statement or ambiguity, and to discover the real attitude of these leaders to the grave Middle East crisis which has been under increasing pressure for two years, and is now on the verge of explosion.

I aimed to be successful in both tasks. I was determined to get a response from American public opinion to Arab thinking and an appreciation of the soundness of this thinking. I also attempted to penetrate the screens of darkness and misconception with which Zionist propaganda has obscured Western thinking about the Arab nation, its principles and teaching, its morals and aims in life, its concern for world peace and the progress and stability and progress of mankind, even about the Arab attitude to the armed aggression which has taken place in the Arab homeland, firm and unambiguous though this attitude is.

I was extremely satisfied with my talk with his Excellency President Charles de Gaulle, which filled me with hope and confidence. This unique leader, believing in the victory of right wherever it may be, regards this victory as inevitable in the battle of right against aggression. Believing as he does in peace, he counsels moderation and self-control, so that the will of the nations may make itself heard and establish right and justice between man and man. It was with profound regret that I learned that this great man has relinquished presidential responsibilities in France. His leaving the international stage will leave a serious vacuum — this is a great tribute to his greatness and his high moral tone. But I am certain that his view of the Middle East crisis has become the firm policy of the French government, because it derives from the principles of freedom, right and justice for which the noble French people are so justly renowned.

In fact it is a matter of great importance that we should do all we can to support the Great

Powers and to make them understand our viewpoint better. This is necessary, first because they are responsible for maintaining peace in the world and for implementing the Security Council resolutions on peace because they are permanent members of it; and secondly because they have now started discussions among themselves in the hope of finding a practical method of implementing the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

It was only natural that I should make my greatest efforts in the American capital. I attached particular importance to my talks with the American President, Richard Nixon, and with the officials of his administration. I spoke to American society and the American press as one who is sure of himself, who knows his rights and is aware of the lies and falsehoods which world Zionism and the organisations which support Israel are fabricating.

Visiting the American Capital for the first time since the new administration took over, I felt that I was speaking from a very strong position — a position which owed its great strength to Arab right, to the Arab nation's will for victory and for life and to the fact that the armed aggression against my nation and homeland depended for the growth of its power on American financial support, arms and political support, and that the aggression was continuing largely because the United States of America was reluctant to do anything to stop it.

In the United States I said on more than one occasion that war in the Middle East is inevitable between the Arabs and Israel if the countries that are responsible do not hasten to implement the Security Council resolution, so that the Israeli occupation is ended and Israel withdraws from all the Arab territory it has occupied.

I pointed out that, as Arab states entrusted with maintaining peace in the area, we cannot be expected to continue patiently meeting our responsibilities if our territory is occupied longer, and that it is not only our right but also our duty to liberate Arab soil.

I was absolutely frank with the American President and explained to him and to his Secretary of State that, while we agree to the termination of the state of war with Israel and to the implementation of the Security Council resolution,

we are by no means ready to relinquish any part of our territory. Israel cannot have both peace and territory. If it wants peace, it must return the territory in its entirety and if it wants the territory, it will forfeit peace.

Therefore the question of Jerusalem is not a matter of bargaining between ourselves and Israel, because Jerusalem is an indivisible part of Arab territory, and Israel must withdraw from it just as it must withdraw from the other occupied territories. Without this there can be no peace. I emphasised to the American government that the Middle East area is living on an active volcano, that time is not on the side of peace, and that every day that passes with no results lessens the prospects of peace. I also emphasised that the new American administration, headed by its new President, is a continuation of the administration of the late President Eisenhower, who opposed Israeli occupation during the 1956 Israeli aggression.

The American President and his government appreciated my point of view, and I found them attentive and responsive. I also found that American officials reject Israel's expansionist ideas, and insist on withdrawal from the occupied territories.

The American government shared my conviction that procrastination in dealing with the Middle East crisis is not in the best interests of world peace, and I believe that the American government is actively attempting to find a solution, within the framework of the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

I had two main objectives in addressing myself in this positive manner to the American government, and to American society through its press; the first was to persuade the Americans, to an appreciable extent, that the Arab position is a sound one; the second was to get Israel into a corner and to force it into a position where it has to defend itself, even to its supporters and advocates in America.

Thus what has been described as my "peace proposal" was in fact no more than an ordered and systematic exposé of the principles and articles of the Security Council resolution. My object was to make American public opinion understand the significance of our acceptance of the Security Council resolution, which has been obscured by so many months of discussion.

In this connection there is a point which I must mention here: our political activity in connection with other countries, in international circles and in the major capitals, must be persistent and continuous, whether the peaceful solution succeeds or fails, as long as our problem continues to be so vast as to be an object of concern to the world and to require strenuous international efforts if it is to be solved.

Israel was able to carry out a concentrated large-scale aggression against us, and at the same time carry on an ingenious and misleading propaganda campaign against us. It would therefore be the height of folly if we were to make the mistake of being negligent again and thereby allow it to repeat the performance.

I left America more convinced than ever before that right will triumph and that injustice can only win one round, after which it will pass away. I left the country feeling that there had been an appreciable change for the better in its attitude, at official level in particular and at popular level in general.

My visit to United Nations headquarters was no less important than my contacts with the American administration. I met the Secretary-General, our friend U Thant, and had a long talk with him. I also met the representatives of the Four Powers and discussed with them their attempts to solve the present crisis. I found that France and the Soviet Union were particularly active and enthusiastic; they were both greatly concerned to find a settlement in accordance with the Security Council resolution. Their attitude is a result of the clear, frank policy of their governments.

We also felt that America was now convinced that it is essential to find an early and just solution. This is also the attitude of Britain, which has continued to call for such a solution and which took the initiative by submitting the Security Council resolution.

I understand that the United Nations envoy, Gunnar Jarring, will temporarily suspend his contacts with the parties concerned to give the Big Four discussions a chance to yield results. These results are expected to help him resume his work profitably.

I next went to London where I continued the

task which I had undertaken in Paris, Washington and New York. I had wide-ranging and full discussions with the British Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, with the leader of the Conservative Party and a number of other personalities. These discussions were all useful.

People of Jordan,
Arabs everywhere,

I wanted to put this full picture before you, to show you that, while holding fast by our right, our principles and our objectives, we can at the same time work to convince others of our position. This we can do if we are in a strong position, if we use the correct methods, if we think clearly and if we are determined to reach our goal.

But this picture must by no means be allowed to distract our attention from our fundamental duty to complete our preparations to confront aggression. Israel is still doing all it can to consolidate its aggression in the Arab territories which it occupies, and is still increasing its armed attacks and Fascist raids on our towns, villages and military positions. It is still disregarding the wishes of the community of nations and defying every effort to settle the crisis by peaceful means.

So we must arm ourselves, prepare, build and continue to do so, so that we may be able to fight the battle if the aggressor forces it on us, or if the last frail hope of peace is shattered.

In this connection I must mention that we are going ahead with our armaments programme as fast as possible in accordance with the established timetable. Soon we shall be able to protect our airspace as we protect our land today.

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Press Conference Statements by the Jordanian King Hussein on the Middle East Crisis.¹ (Excerpts)

Amman, April 29, 1969

Partition resolution adopted by the United Nations in 1947, and usurped further territories in Palestine. Your Majesty has indicated in one of your statements that you are demanding that Israel should return to the pre-June 5, 1967 aggression frontiers, because the world will not allow the Arabs more than that. Would Your Majesty explain your point of view in this respect? If there is a return to the pre-June 5 frontiers, does that mean that the Arabs will accept the policy of the fait accompli which Israel has imposed in the territories it usurped in spite of the Partition resolution?

A. Thank you for this question. In reply I will describe certain events, and examine the actual situation. In the course of my contacts, my journeys and my talks with responsible officials in the various capitals of the East and West, I became aware of a fact. This fact is that the world is on our side and ready to assist and support us as regards our right and the recovery of the territories we lost in June 1967. But the world is also in favour of the continued existence of Israel in this area. This means that if we did succeed in reaching something like the June 4, 1967 line, and wanted to go beyond it, we should not only be opposed by Israel; we should find the whole world opposing our attempts to go further.

The second fact is that it may be inevitable for us to fight the battle. If so, the battle will begin in the Arab territory where we are now, and end at the June 4 line; it will be fought stage by stage through our towns and villages until we reach that point. Then, as I said, we shall find the world opposing us if we want to go any further.

The third fact is that the Arab Nation, which can do much to change and influence the situation, has been given aid, for which it is extremely grateful, to help it to endure in the face of the danger which threatens it. But there is a great difference between the position which we have been able to reach because of this aid and the point we might have reached. Basically our present position is the result of our own endurance, our determination to endure and stand firm in the face of danger, and to cling on to the land, whether in the occupied territories or in the areas of confrontation. The situation could have been very different had there been the necessary cooperation at all levels based on a careful study of our requirements and on a true knowledge of the enemy's strength, of what could

Q. Your Majesty, as we know, Israel ignored the

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 30/4/1969. King Hussein held this press conference, which was attended by correspondents of foreign news agencies, newspapers and broadcasting systems in the Royal Diwan, Amman.

be accomplished within a certain period of time, and of what we must do to recoup our losses and attain the standard which will enable us to recover all we have lost through force.

Thank God, the picture is now much better than it was in recent months, and the situation continues to improve. We are trying, by all available means, to build up our strength and prepare ourselves to perform our duty of defending our nation, and also to exercise our rights, in the event of the failure of all the attempts and efforts that are being made to obtain these rights, and to recover what has been lost.

Israel does not stand alone, dependent on its own manpower and resource; behind Israel stands international Jewry, which sympathises with it, supports it, and provides it with all it needs to enable it to build up its strength and continue to challenge us and defy the whole world.

On the other hand, there is still hope that every individual in our Arab homeland will feel that he must make great sacrifices if he wants to safeguard himself, his destiny and his future, and if he wants this battle to end with our recovering our full rights. It was under these circumstances and in view of this situation that we accepted the Security Council resolution of November 1967, as also did the United Arab Republic. We declared that we were ready to implement it; this was our position, and we shall maintain it, but at the same time we are aware that the battle between ourselves and Zionism will have to be fought throughout the world, not only here.

Our case is a strong one, and we must defend it in every field and on every front. We must show by our moderation and our strong case that we are in the right. In this way we can hope to win the support and backing which Israel has enjoyed all these years, as a result of our neglect to ensure that international circles would not take the side of Israel. If Israel continues in its arrogant defiance of the world, we shall make every effort to bring over the great weight of world public opinion to our side and to the side of our rights. With God's help, this will also ensure that we recover all we have lost.

Q. The Security Council resolution of November 1967 says that Israel is to be guaranteed secure and recognised frontiers. How do you explain this provision? How does it affect the Arab resistance movement?

A. The resolution includes several principles. These principles have been accepted by us and by the United Arab Republic, while our enemy's attitude to them is still negative. The struggle between us and our enemy is still continuing violently here, in the occupied territory, and throughout the world.

With respect to the resistance, it is resistance to illegitimate occupation, to resist which is a legitimate right. In this country, both the occupied part and the part that is on the line of confrontation, in this great Arab homeland — without going into details, I can say that we are doing our utmost, with all our resources, to serve our cause, to serve our nation and to protect it from injury.

In this country, which is a protective wall to prevent Zionism from penetrating into other parts of our great homeland, every individual knows that he has a great duty to perform. This country, and I am one of its soldiers, is fighting the battle continuously day and night, and making sacrifices which it is our duty to make and which do honour to every Arab in the great Arab homeland.

We have a great duty to perform, but the Arab nation which can and should support us, has an even greater duty to perform. If such support was forthcoming — and, with God's help, it will be forthcoming, thanks to awareness and knowledge of the danger and its significance to the great Arab homeland and the Arab nation — the picture would be different, both as regards Israel's arrogant attitude and defiance of us and the whole world and as regards the situation as a whole. We can say nothing and shirk our responsibilities, but in no circumstances can we take such an attitude. For it is not a question of overbidding or inflaming emotions; it is a question of very great responsibilities. We are concerned for the judgement of history, and we are particularly concerned for our people and brothers in the occupied territories, and our duty towards them is to rescue them as soon as possible from their present grievous situation. If anyone is worthy of admiration, it is those who held fast in their land and who suffered and are still suffering. We are dealing with the situation in all its aspects, we are offering all our resources, everything we have; we are offering our lives. We are also dealing with it realistically, and we do not want

to deceive ourselves, and deceive our people or deceive our nation, because it is a question of its destiny and its future.

As regards Israel, the only officially recognised frontiers so far are the Partition frontiers. The Security Council resolution calls for withdrawal from all the territories occupied in June 1967. This resolution was accepted by us and by the United Arab Republic.

To attain this objective we are working at world political level, and at the same time, as I said, through legitimate resistance to illegitimate occupation. This, I believe, is the proper framework of resistance in the Arab homeland, nor is there any inconsistency or contradiction with respect to the objective and the efforts being made to attain it. At the same time, with the aid and support supplied us by the Arab nation — for which we are most grateful — we are building up our strength and preparing to die in defence of our nation. This is the most that we can offer.

Q. You insist on the recovery of the occupied territories. Could you give us a definition of these "occupied territories"?

A. The Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, contains principles which have been completely accepted by Jordan and the United Arab Republic, both of which announced that they were prepared to implement the resolution. When we say "the occupied territories" we mean that under no circumstance are we prepared to relinquish a single inch of the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967. This includes Jerusalem and our rights in it and our sovereignty over the Arab section of it.

Q. You said on the radio last night, Your Majesty, that there is no contradiction between your aims and the aims of the commandos. But the commandos say that they will not accept a peaceful settlement, while you accept. Is not this a contradiction?

A. I do not believe that it is a contradiction. They are exercising their right to resist continued unlawful Israeli occupation. We accepted the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and declared that we were prepared to implement it. As I said before, Israel can either have territory or peace, but it can never have both.

Q. For some time now the countries of the Eastern Front have been subject to pressures, with the object, no doubt, of destroying the Eastern Front. What steps does Your Majesty think can be taken to meet these pressures so that the Eastern Front may be made as strong as possible?

A. It would not be wise to discuss in detail what has happened and what is happening now, but what I said was: the issue requires greater efforts, greater sacrifice, greater material resources. So far the situation has greatly improved, thanks to cooperation between the Arab countries which are firmly united in their stand against aggression, and also thanks to reorganisation and rearmament. But there is a difference between a good defensive position and the preparations that must be made to confront the possibility of our failing to reach our goal through political action. This is a shortcoming which I am always drawing attention to. I hope this will be looked after, and I am certain that, with God's help, it will be looked after, thanks to the awareness of the leaders and their appreciation of the danger which is a threat not only to certain countries, but to the destiny of our whole nation and its future in the great Arab homeland.

So far the picture looks good, and the battles we are fighting daily to prevent our enemy from achieving any kind of advance, prove that the situation has changed, and that it is improving. But we want more, and we have been inviting our brother Arab leaders to meet and cooperate and study things, but nothing of this kind has been achieved so far. Instead, we are doing what we can through bilateral contacts and meetings. I believe that by our steadfastness, our endurance and our sacrifices we shall make it incumbent on the Arab Nation and the world to stand by us, so that we can reach our goals. I am certain that our victory is inevitable.

Q. The Palestine problem, and the problem of Jerusalem in particular, is the problem of the 650 million Muslims in the world, and not of the Arabs alone. Has the Islamic world been brought to face its responsibilities as regards this problem? What steps have the Arab countries taken to secure the support of the Islamic world?

A. What you have said about Jerusalem is true; as we see it, the problem of Jerusalem is

not a problem that concerns Jordan only, nor the Palestinian people or the Arab nation; it is a problem that concerns the whole Islamic world, and the problem of a right that has been exercised for over 1200 years. Therefore, we cannot relinquish our rights there in any shape or form, no matter what the circumstances. We are in constant touch with both the Arab world and the Islamic world. We are confident that they will support us as regards our rights in Jerusalem. We shall continue these contacts so that the world may realise the importance of Jerusalem for Muslims throughout the world.

Q. Your Majesty, in view of the Big Four meetings in New York, do you think that it is a suitable time to intensify military operations on the frontier as a means of showing the urgency of the problem, or do you believe that it is a time to reduce the intensity of these operations?

A. It is not a question of increasing or reducing intensity. Continued occupation has brought about resistance to occupation and created hatred, as hopes have faded of anything being achieved except through long over-all struggle. These operations have resulted in counter-operations, and the situation has deteriorated and is constantly deteriorating. I believe that something should be done immediately to save the situation before it is too late. The Big Four are well aware of the urgency of the situation, and the future of the area and the struggle depends on their success or failure.

I believe that if some sort of measure is not taken within a relatively short time, regardless of whether the explosion takes place or not, the situation will get better, or worse, and that if no measures at all are taken then the situation will deteriorate or improve. When there is no longer any hope of achieving a just, honourable and permanent solution for the problem, the only course will be that of long struggle. When we start on the course of struggle there will be no turning back. So there will still be an opportunity for a while, but not for long.

Here I would like to emphasise that we are not deliberately escalating operations in an attempt to attract the attention of the world to the problems; it is an automatic process.

Q. Was there any reaction from Israel to your speech in Washington? If so, what do you think of it?

A. All I can say is that the reaction was extremely negative. All I said there was an attempt on my part to translate the Security Council resolution into a language that people can understand, to explain what the resolution means to us and what we ought to do, and that we are prepared to act as a result of our acceptance of the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

Israel's attitude to this resolution has been ambiguous. But Israel's reaction to my explanation was clearer than anything that had been said before. This proves that the resolution does not mean much to Israel, at least that is what it looks like so far.

Q. Your Majesty said yesterday that you noticed a perceptible change of attitude at official level in Washington while you were there. Could you clarify this point?

A. What I can say is that there was some degree of improvement, that there is a higher level of understanding of the problem, and that there is a feeling that something must be done to save the deteriorating situation before it is too late, before there is further deterioration of the situation which could lead to irreparable damage, not only in this area but also to world peace. The policy of the United States will be a balanced one; it is concerned with establishing friendships and maintaining them with all those concerned in the area, and it is careful not to seem aligned with one side rather than the other. From this it becomes clear that the United States can play an important role in this region once it has adopted a balanced policy.

Therefore I returned from my visit reassured, not only about opinion at official level, but also at the level of public opinion. The improvement is not only perceptible, it is substantial.

Q. (To a question about the Jordanian air defences in the present and the future, His Majesty replied):

A. The situation with respect to air defence in Jordan is improving steadily. After the June, 1967 war we passed through a stage of reorganisation and rearmament, and we also drew up a schedule of priorities for defence and where

defence should be concentrated. By the nature of things we have given the army the highest priority so that it could be our first safeguard against any possible large or small scale operation by the enemy. Gradually the field of action is expanding and will continue to expand. Naturally, also, because of our proximity to the places from which enemy aircraft take off, it is not possible to cover every city and every village and every house with air defence, but work is continuing to build an anti-aircraft force and also to equip the air force so that it can effectively perform its role of protecting our air-space in the near future. We have made every possible effort in this direction.

Q. The policy of your government is one of non-interference in the affairs of other Arab governments, but what is now going on in Lebanon affects the Arab nation in general. Do you feel that it is possible for Lebanon to be of service to the Arab nation with its present concept of such service, or could it be of greater service if it opened its doors to the commandos, as you did in this country?

A. I do not think I have the right to talk about this problem, certainly not at the moment. My policy has always been one of non-interference in the affairs of others, and I think that it is up to the government of Lebanon and the people of Lebanon and the President of Lebanon to decide what is in the best interests of Lebanon. I am convinced that they are our brothers and are with us. At the same time we shall not do anything liable to create problems and difficulties for them. We hope that they will overcome the present crisis with all possible speed. I am in favour of any policy which will lead to the peace and security of Lebanon, for we are as much concerned with the security of Lebanon as we are with our own security in the face of threats.

Q. Your Majesty has expressed the belief that the best thing for the Arab countries now is to work for a peaceful settlement. At this particular stage is it better to open a third front against Israel from Lebanon, or is it better that Lebanon should not be involved in further complications?

A. If Lebanon could defend itself and its security I believe that Lebanon would do all it could, without any pressure, to participate effectively in the struggle which involves us all. When

Lebanon is in a position to defend itself, I am certain that it will not hesitate to perform its duty and that it will participate of its own free will.

I would like to say something else. For my part, I am concerned that no further losses should be suffered anywhere by the Arabs who are in confrontation with Israeli threats. I am concerned that Lebanon should be secure, that its strength and capacity should grow, so that it may work to the best of its ability as a member of the Arab nation in the face of this threat or any other. I hope that those who are concerned with the matter will succeed in finding the best possible solution for the present problem. It is also to be observed that it was not the Arabs who opened this front, but Israel, when it bombed Beirut International Airport; this was the clearest possible proof of Israel's aggressive designs against the whole Arab world.

Lebanon must not be embarrassed or exposed to danger. But I also believe that all must cooperate to build up the strength of Lebanon, and I am certain that, when it is able to serve general Arab interest, Lebanon will not shirk its duty.

Q. Your Majesty, there have been reports that during the last few weeks there has been friction between the Jordanian Army and the commandos. In view of what you said in your speech yesterday, what are your plans for eliminating this more or less continuous friction?

A. All I can say in this respect, is that there is no friction. The Aqaba incident, as I have said in different parts of the world, and on many occasions, was an individual incident and it was dealt with on that basis.

Q. With respect to the air force, air defence and the completion of air defence in Jordan, Jordan has asked America for Phantom planes. But Skyhawks were offered. Why did we not ask some other country, the Soviet Union for example? Iran has received armaments from the Soviet Union, despite the difference in their social systems.

A. I am glad you asked this question. There has been absolutely no problem in obtaining arms from anywhere in the world. The essential point is that we should obtain what is of use to us and what we can use efficiently and quickly in confronting our enemy and aggression. Our arms

have always been Western, as has our training. Our armed forces are small in size but their standard is high. We have always known that the aim of Israel and Zionism is to change the struggle between us and Israel from an Arab struggle against aggression to a struggle between the two world camps, with a view to freezing the situation, and I do not believe that that would in any way be in the interests of any Arab or of the Arab nation.

Our cause is one of right, and this right we must defend in every field and on every front, and to some extent do what our enemy has done in the world. Then we shall certainly win, and attain the results we want. After what happened in June 1967 it was impossible, with the money we had at our disposal — it had been impossible even with the money we had at our disposal in the days of the unified Arab Command and the Summit meetings — for Jordan to change over from Western to Eastern armaments. The reason for this is that the moment we obtain or contract for armaments from the East, the West will cut off its supply of arms, which we have to continue using until the changeover is complete. We should have to make a total changeover of armaments and we do not have the money to do that. There are also other factors which it is not in our interest to discuss now.

As for the Air Force, there is no doubt that Eastern planes are excellent, as are Western planes, for our needs and requirements here in Jordan, and our training and methods and the preparations we are trying to make.

So it is not just a matter of choosing but of choosing what is better and more suitable. For example, Eastern planes have a very limited range, and this does not suit us at all. So we have once again turned to the West for armaments. At the start we met with some difficulties and obstacles, but they have now been surmounted. We buy arms from those who have them and we buy the arms which suit us. I believe that we could buy the most modern plane in the world if we had the money.

As far as the Israeli Phantom deal is concerned, Israel succeeded in collecting the sum required to buy the planes from the Jews of the United States in a very short time.

At the moment, we are expecting to receive

the first squadron of F-104 planes, and we expect to receive the second squadron shortly after that. We believe that for the protection of our air-space, in view of our situation and what it requires, they will meet our needs and perform their task efficiently. There is really no difficulty about arms and obtaining them from these quarters.

We have always taken care in the past to obtain enough arms and ammunition and spare parts, so that we could carry on for a long time even if a situation arose in which it might be difficult for us to obtain anything at all. This in fact is what we did after June 1967, until the new arms began to arrive. It is also probably a good thing that the whole Arab world should not depend on a single source for arms, but several. This has been confirmed in practice, for on the occasions when we had difficulties in obtaining arms from certain Western sources, we were able to get some from our Arab brothers who had the kind of armaments that we needed and which we used immediately. These then are the factors involved in the question of arms and arming.

Q. Your Majesty, what is your attitude to the proposal that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia should join the Eastern Front? Do you intend to visit Cairo shortly and meet President Abdel Nasser within the framework of coordination between Jordan and the United Arab Republic?

A. As regards the second part of your question, Yes, I do intend to go to Cairo, God willing, next Monday, to visit His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser and to discuss the situation with him, and to inform him of what took place during my last trip to European capitals and the United States.

As for the first part of the question, I believe that contacts are being made and that talks are in progress. However, it would not be in the public interest to discuss them now.

Q. (His Majesty then answered a question on the implementation of the Security Council resolution by saying):

A. Jordan is facing up to all its responsibilities in this respect. We accepted the Security Council resolution and declared our readiness to implement it. As regards Israel and the Israeli peril, I believe that the battle between us and Israel has never been a military battle only. We shall

recover our rights in full, God willing, but at the same time we shall give our full attention to the operation of building here and in every part of the Arab homeland, and we shall move forward, and the Israeli peril will pass away and become no more than a drop in the ocean.

In a situation that requires that we face up to our responsibilities and be absolutely honest with our people and our Arab brothers, it may be as well to review the past, and the many occasions on which we adopted negative attitudes, and the consequences of our doing so. We decided to accept this resolution and show our readiness to implement it. In this way we are performing part of our duty to the people of Palestine — to ourselves indeed — for we regard ourselves as people of Palestine; our links go back to the time of the great Arab Revolt, whose leader now lies in Jerusalem. When we talk about Jordan and the Jordanian family, we also mean Palestine and the people of Palestine. For me, the Palestine problem is a personal problem because it concerns the people of Palestine, and we all belong to one family, and are fighting for the same objectives.

Q. Your Majesty, the Egyptians have recently declared that they are no longer bound by the 1967 cease-fire agreement. Will Jordan be bound by it?

A. What is now happening on the Suez Canal is a result of Israeli attempts to build fortifications and establish more or less permanent positions, which is unacceptable. Again, what is happening as a result of continued occupation and continuous provocation, is also due to Israel's negative attitude to the Security Council resolution of November, 1967. As I said before, conditions will inevitably deteriorate. They cannot stay frozen like this; they will either improve if there is any progress towards a permanent, honourable and just peace, or deteriorate if no progress is made towards this end. Things are getting worse, but we are optimistic for one reason — the fact that the Big Four powers are aware of what is going on and of the dangers which may result therefrom, and of our efforts to deal with the situation before it is too late. But if there is no progress, then I believe that the situation will deteriorate and deteriorate fast, and that the whole world will become involved in the problems of this area.

All the same, what is happening on the Canal

Front is insignificant compared to what is happening here, and what could happen here if no progress is made towards a permanent, just and honourable peace.

Q. Do you intend to respond to aggressive military operations with force?

A. In fact, we are reacting with force to all incidents at this stage. Perhaps you meant by your question: shall we return the fire immediately, so that the operation escalates to the stage where the so-called "cease-fire" no longer exists? Is there actually a state of cease-fire? Unfortunately I do not believe that such a state exists while our towns and villages, our positions and our citizens are being attacked. Naturally we return the fire, and consequently the fighting escalates. This is what is actually happening, in addition to fading hopes and increasing despair.

I repeat that the cease-fire resolution was adopted by the United Nations, and we accepted it, and then the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 was adopted and unanimously approved, and we accepted it but the other side did not accept it.

If the United Nations is incapable of implementing its resolutions and obliging others to respect them, no one will abide by a cease-fire, if such a resolution is adopted. The resulting problems will involve all concerned, and will also have disastrous consequences for world peace.

Q. It is well known that Israel never submits to any Security Council or United Nations resolution which does not suit its plans and aims. Are any attempts being made by the Security Council, or the Great Powers, to force it to accept what the Big Four powers or the Security Council decide?

A. The Big Four powers are now engaged in contacts and consultations and are discussing the subject. They appreciate the gravity of the situation, and I believe that we must wait until we see the results of Israel's defiance of the Security Council resolution, of the Security Council and of the United Nations. I also believe that, by following our present course, we are constantly gaining more sympathy, support and understanding of our situation throughout the world. This means that Israel is constantly losing.

Q. As we know, when the cease-fire order was given, Israel did not stop at once, although it had accepted the resolution, but continued to advance into occupied Arab territories. A few days ago the United Arab Republic declared that there is no such thing as a cease-fire line on the Suez Canal, and in my opinion the situation here on the River Jordan is similar to that on the Suez Canal. Does Jordan intend to take similar steps?

A. We have never regarded the line as final; we have never regarded it as acceptable at all, as is shown by the fact that we refused to allow observers to be stationed on the line in the Ghor or anywhere else. In our view what we accepted was the implementation of the Security Council resolution, and that means the withdrawal of Israel from all the territories it occupied in June 1967.

Q. Your Majesty, you have said that the Big Four talks have passed the stage of procedural questions and started real discussion. Your Majesty has also said that we must wait and see the results of these discussions. In view of the fact that the United Nations envoy's talks have been proceeding in a vicious circle for a whole year, how long does Your Majesty think the Arabs can wait for the results of the Big Four talks? Thank you.

A. In fact, when we say that we must wait for the contacts of the Big powers and their discussions, this does not mean that we should just wait. We are making the greatest possible efforts to equip and prepare ourselves in the area in general, and here in particular, to face all possibilities. The fact that we talk about political action does not at all mean that we are wasting our time on political action and doing nothing else.

I believe that the Great Power talks will not take very long, and that some results will probably appear within weeks, or a month or two, at the very most.

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Labour Day Speech by the United Arab Republic President Nasser.¹ (Excerpts)

Helwan, May 1, 1969

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Over the past few days, we have been hearing

many threats from the leaders of Israel. Israel has been threatening retaliation and pressing for peace and quiet along the cease-fire lines so that, as time goes by, it can say that they have come to form its frontiers. We have also been hearing Israel and its leaders saying that they would never withdraw from the occupied territories.

We have heard these threats and, as I told you before, were expecting Israel to take some form of retaliatory action. Ever since 1948, and even earlier, Israel's line of thinking and policy have been based on terrorism, on actions calculated to demoralise our people and make them despair.

I followed that unsuccessful raid from the moment our forces detected it. I was informed that two aircraft were heading for Nag Hammadi and Edfu; I was also informed of the results of that action.

Let me tell you something: on Sunday, before the operation, the supreme command of our armed forces had predicted what action Israel would take and had even specified that Israel would strike at our sources of water supply. Under the circumstances, the planes came, but were unable to carry out their mission. They jettisoned their bomb loads far from **their** targets. I knew, possibly at about one o'clock that night, that the Israeli operation had failed altogether, once it had been intercepted by our anti-aircraft. I also knew that the forces of the Popular Army were on the alert everywhere. I then went to sleep that night.

On waking up next morning, I heard a broadcast from a foreign radio station which said that Israel had destroyed the Nag Hammadi dam, the Edfu bridge and the High Dam power relay stations. When I heard these things, I rang up General Fauzi. I thought that perhaps after I had gone to sleep the Israelis had launched another raid, one that had succeeded, and the General had been reluctant to wake me up to inform me during the night. I enquired over the telephone if anything had taken place after our last conversation that night. He said no, nothing had happened. I told him they were saying that they had flooded upper Egypt and that the district of Qena was under water. He replied that it would seem that the Israelis had had the communiqués prepared beforehand; they took it for granted that the raid would succeed.

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 2/5/1969.

The result of the whole affair was that we sent foreign press correspondents from Cairo to the site, as you read in today's papers. They were taken in a military plane to Nag Hammadi and Edfu and found that no damage had been done to the dam; cars were crossing over the dam; the bridge was intact. Today, broadcasting stations all over the world announced the truth. It has come to light, they are saying, that the Israelis made up a big lie yesterday.

Israel is going back on what it said yesterday. They're saying now that their intention had not been to inflict economic damage on us. They are saying their purpose had been to create a demoralising psychological impact on the Egyptian people. Well, that did not happen to the Egyptian people even on June 9, 1967, after we had lost everything. Certainly the defeat was unsettling, but we did not bow down to it. Neither our spirit nor our morale was broken.

Israel wants us to surrender, but we have refused to give in. We have rejected defeat and are resolved to struggle for the liberation of our land, inch by inch.

Today, twenty three months after achieving a great military victory, Israel is saying all over the world that its army is invincible. But I say that deep down inside, Israel and the Israeli leaders now sense that the resounding victory they were able to achieve in June, 1967 is changing from victory into a defeat. This is due to the fact that the Arab people who resolved to stand fast and put up a fight, who have not yielded to defeat, are bound to win back the territories they lost in June, 1967.

Israel's strategy has always been based on imposing a settlement by force, that is, imposing a settlement on the Arabs through the use of military force. The Arabs are meant to suffer and then give in and sign their names to whatever Israel wants.

Israel has succeeded, through its machinations and thanks to the arms shipments it has been receiving, in defeating the Arabs and winning victory. Nevertheless, thanks to the fact that the entire Arab nation has stood fast, Israel has not been able to dictate its terms to the Arab people.

The Arab nation is making preparations now; the Arab nation has learnt its lesson. It is on this basis that we must compare the raid which took

place the day before yesterday with last October's raid on Nag Hammadi. The latter penetrated well behind the line of fire, in fact, we had no forces there; the raid on Nag Hammadi, the destruction of the power station and the damages done to the Edfu bridge as well as part of the Nag Hammadi dam took us by surprise. After October, we decided to set up the Popular Army and to station defence battalions everywhere. We decided to have a home army throughout the country to defend us against Israeli infiltration or any acts of aggression. That army has been formed. The real difference between what happened today and what happened last October is that when the Israelis came in October, they were able to hit the power station and the dam. There were no units of the Popular Army there nor any anti-aircraft units. This time, however, Israel was unable to achieve any of its objectives. The proof of the failure of this raid lies in the fact that the aircraft taking part in the raid jettisoned their bomb load far from their targets, turned tail and ran.

Israel's objective behind the raid of last October was to get us to withdraw our forces from the Canal Zone and disperse them so as to defend our vital installations. But we resolved then not to play into Israel's hands. We did not withdraw any of our forces from the Canal zone, we did not withdraw a single unit of our army which is training actively and preparing every day for the forthcoming battle, which is awaited by every citizen of this nation. Instead we formed the Popular Army to defend our home front. Members of the Popular Army are under arms at every vital site, in every governorate and every city. We say to Israel today that all the citizens of Egypt, all the men and all the young people in Egypt form the home army of the United Arab Republic. Every person defends his own village, everyone is engaged in the defence of our vital installations. We shall not, under any circumstances, give Israel the opportunity to realise its objectives by withdrawing the forces we are preparing for the battle and scattering them here and there in the different governorates in order to defend our vital installations.

Fellow citizens,

There is a considerable difference between the way things are now and the way they were on

October of last year. The raid of the day before yesterday was meant by Israel to turn this meeting into a sad gathering and an occasion for despair. Had Israel succeeded in destroying the Nag Hammadi dam and flooding a quarter, half or perhaps three quarters of a million feddans in Upper Egypt, we should not have been able to raise our voices at this meeting today. Thank God that we are able to do so. One might perhaps say that two years ago, following the setback, we were unable to raise our voice. Nevertheless, in spite of the setback and thanks to the steadfastness of the people and the armed forces of this nation, our voice rings louder day by day and our strength is growing from one day to the other.

Fellow citizens,

The vigilance of our armed forces and of the Popular Defence Army is the main factor behind Israel's failure. When Israel issued its communiqués, which were the opposite of what actually happened, and when this became known — the morale of the people of this country is unshakable, the psychological war has not been able to sway us. I feel today as I read the text of radio broadcasts that perhaps it is the morale of Israel which has been shaken. They claimed that the Israeli army was invincible. This reminds us of World War II. When we were officers in the armed forces, they used to say then that the German army, Hitler's army, was invincible.

Actually, in 1967 we were building up our armed forces but we had not made proper plans for a confrontation with Israel and the Israeli armed forces. Today, part of our land, part of our country is occupied. Today, we are doing the right thing, we are planning for attack and for repelling the aggressors. That had not been the case in 1967 or before 1967.

While I am on the subject of what happened the day before yesterday, some people may be wondering how two Israeli planes managed to get through from the south and to reach Nag Hammadi and Qena — we hear questions to that effect. We all know that the Nile valley, that our country covers a vast area; we live on only 4 % of the land, 96 % of our country is desert. It is not possible for us to station anti-aircraft units throughout all these regions, whether in the Eastern or the Western deserts. Furthermore, aircraft

flying really low cannot be detected by our radar installations. It is therefore possible for Israeli planes to reach us; we must remember, however, that our planes can also reach Israel. As I said in my last speech to the National Congress, we have the right — Israeli attacks on civilians give us every right to retaliate by striking at civilians. We must be aware of this and the entire world must know it too.

I say today that Israeli attacks on civilians targets inside our country give us the right to attack civilian targets in Israel; the whole world ought to be aware of this fact.

What I want to call to your attention is that we refuse to get involved in an adventurous course of action. Our calculations are far more thorough now than they were in 1967. Some people in Egypt or in the Arab nation may be in a hurry, and in the case of some people this may not be in good faith. They want us to attack before the time is ripe, and they want us to be defeated, so that they may rejoice. We make our calculations not once but two, three and four times. I believe that you will grant that we have the right to be very precise in our calculations so as not to give Israel the chance to win a victory.

There have been changes in the situation. Previously, in 1967 and 1968, the enemy used to get here; in 1967, his aircraft used to reach Cairo. Now the enemy does not dare, his aircraft do not cross the Suez Canal. Once they crossed the Suez Canal and flew over Suez; three of their planes were hit. They did not come back after that. In October of last year, the enemy succeeded in attacking Nag Hammadi. This time the enemy was able to get there but was not able to strike.

Some people will want to ask me: after the enemy came, how did they manage to leave? I hope that the next time the enemy comes, he will not be able to leave.

We are achieving progress gradually. What I want to say is that we are vulnerable to attack. To look back at the Second World War, we must recall that there were raids on England and on Germany. We must wake up to the fact that we are at war; that has to be taken into account. It implies that we kill and get killed, we kill our enemies and our children get killed, too. We have to sacrifice and to die, for nobody fights without

risking death. War means that we strike at the enemy and the enemy may also strike back.

We have to distinguish, however, between two different cases. In one case, the enemy may strike at us, and we may be powerless to retaliate — well, that was how things were in 1967 and well into 1968. It is different, however, when the enemy strikes at us and we are able to absorb the blow. It is our duty to absorb the blow, provided that we are able to retaliate. Well, we are able to retaliate today.

Fellow citizens,

In referring to the incidents of last Tuesday, what I would like to convey to you is that Israel's aim was to shake your morale; that raid was meant as a psychological blow; that is to say, we are fighting a psychological war.

Furthermore, Israel's aim, contrary to what it has been reiterating today, was to undermine our economic resources.

Fellow citizens,

All of us know that during the past two months there has been an escalation in the situation along the front. The leaders of Israel had a great deal to say during the past phase about their refusal to implement the Security Council resolution which stipulates the withdrawal of invading forces from the territories they occupied after June 5, 1967. The leaders of Israel said they do not recognise any frontiers for their state and that they want the Arabs to sit down with them in order to determine those frontiers. The leaders of Israel said that they had annexed Jerusalem, the West Bank, parts of Sinai and the Golan Heights in Syria. They said: "let the Arabs come and negotiate with us." The Prime Minister of Israel said: "Let the Arabs come and sit down to negotiate with us and we shall be ready to talk to them. But we are not ready to negotiate over Jerusalem, we are not ready to negotiate over the West Bank or the presence of Israeli forces along the River Jordan; we are not ready to negotiate over the Golan Heights." That was what the Israeli leaders and the Prime Minister of Israel said. They are not ready to talk about Sharm al-Shaikh either.

What does it all mean? It means that Israel wants to expand by annexing the Arab territories occupied after June 5th, 1967. As they put it, if the Arabs do not go and sit down with them at the

negotiating table, they are happy with the existing frontiers, along the Suez Canal, the Jordan River, and the Golan Heights.

It was obvious that Israel wanted to turn the cease-fire lines into a permanent frontier and to exploit the Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire in order to enjoy peace and quiet in the occupied territories. To that end Israel refused the other Security Council resolution stipulating the withdrawal of its forces. Israel insists on the Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire, so that it can stay in the occupied lands till doomsday. But it rejects the Security Council resolution calling on it to withdraw from the occupied territories.

Naturally, after the passage of 20 months, once we had stood our ground and the difficult period was over, we had to do our duty. Our armed forces had to play the role expected of them. After Nag Hammadi, Israel began to build fortifications along the Suez Canal, and at the same time we began forming the Popular Defence Army in order to protect the interior and our vital installations. Israel afterwards announced that it had built a fortified line on the east bank of the Suez Canal and named it the Bar-Lev line. Israel claimed that no kind of weapons could have any effect on the emplacements it had built, nor would the Egyptians ever be able to destroy them. Thus, Egypt would never be able to cross the Suez Canal and return to Sinai. Of course, our Armed Forces had to come to grips with this situation, once they reached a state of perfect readiness both on the battle-field and on the home front. Early last month our Armed Forces said that they were fully prepared. From the statements of Israel's leaders, we knew that they wanted quiet along all fronts so that they might go on constructing their fortifications so as to turn the cease-fire lines into permanent frontiers.

Our armed forces began to put into effect the plan that had been drawn up earlier. That was at the beginning of last March. At that time, the objective of the armed forces was to destroy the Bar-Lev line which Israel claimed was indestructible. After a period of battles along the Suez Canal, Lieutenant General Fauzi, the Minister of War, informed me and the Council of Ministers last week that our armed forces had so far destroyed 60 % of the Bar-Lev line of fortifications built

by Israel along the Suez Canal. Lt. General Fauzi also informed us at the Council of Ministers' meeting that the armed forces will continue with their plans until they complete the destruction of the remaining 40 % of the Bar-Lev line built by the Israeli forces east of the Suez Canal.

Israel said that these actions took it by surprise and that it was entitled to set up fortifications east of the Suez Canal.

In other words, such fortifications imply that Israel wants to stay in these occupied areas indefinitely. That we cannot accept.

Then all the units of our armed forces said that they were prepared to go on forays into the Sinai desert and to perform their sacred duty to the homeland. In this way we started to carry out operations on the east bank of the Canal.

You must all have heard about our forays, about the engagements and the artillery duels.

I feel that I can say that the objective of the artillery duels, namely, the destruction of Israeli fortifications, has been achieved to a large extent. So have the objectives of the forays.

Israel wants to freeze the cease-fire lines. I say, however, in the name of this struggling people, which refused to yield to defeat in June 1967, that we shall not accept this, we shall not allow Israel to freeze the cease-fire lines even if we are subjected to reprisals.

They may be able to send planes and bomb us. But I would like to point out that the difference between us now and in 1967 lies in the fact that if Israel should send its planes over now, we shall be able to retaliate, unlike 1967 or the first part of 1968.

Can anybody blame us if we come to the defence of territories which they will not give up, as they tell us day in and day out? When we look at the cease-fire lines we are reminded of the link between the Security Council cease-fire resolution and the Security Council resolution of November 1967, which provides for withdrawal before anything else. The entire world must know that unless they withdraw, we shall fight them to their last man or our last man.

Fellow citizens,

We shall not accept this *fait accompli*, we shall not remain passive, nor shall we give in. Either the Israelis withdraw from the occupied territories,

or fighting will continue. We are not talking politics here, nor does the subject allow of evasion or circumlocution. It is a question of land, a homeland, a question of honour, a question of life. And it is not only a question of our land, but of all Arab lands. It is not only our country that is involved but the greater Arab nation. Our honour and our life are integral parts of the honour and life of the Arab nation.

Fellow citizens,

We are engaged in a struggle here in Egypt; the entire Arab nation is engaged in a struggle. But Israel claims that 100 million Arabs will not be able to stand up two and half or three million Israelis. Two and a half million Israelis have defeated 100 million Arabs. These words, brethren, are faulty and deceptive. Two and a half million Israelis had fully mobilised themselves, one hundred per cent. Every man in Israel does military service and every woman in Israel as well. Every man and every woman in Israel is a soldier in the Israeli Defence Army, in the Israeli military establishment. We, the Arabs, had not mobilised all our forces.

Unfortunately, on the other hand, we, the Arabs, the entire Arab nation, the 100 million Arabs have not yet mobilised our forces even now. Here in Egypt, and in the Arab countries surrounding Israel, we are exerting our utmost efforts. But the 100 million Arabs, the entire Arab nation, have not so far mobilised their forces. In this way, Israel may gain the upper hand; two and a half million Israelis may surpass 100 million Arabs.

Today I say from this place that it is time for the Arab Nation to mobilise its forces. Words are of no use and we cannot fight with speeches. There are many words and many speeches; but mobilisation is more than that. We want to mobilise the entire Arab nation so that there may be an Eastern Front, comprising all the Arab countries in the East, and a Western Front, comprising all the Arab countries in the West.

But I am sorry to have to say that a great deal has still to be done in this respect. We talk about the sacred battle, the sacred war, the armed struggle but the Arab nation has not so far mobilised all its forces, not even half or a quarter of its forces. We, who are on the line of fire, have

to mobilise our forces. We are mobilising our forces and our brothers have done their duty; the Arab Nation has helped us in our battle of endurance. But we can do still more.

Israel knows that this battle is a battle of life and death. Hence, the brazenness of Israel and of the Israeli leaders. Last week, one of the Israeli leaders said, "Let the Arabs in all parts of the Arab nation know that they will not, under any conditions, surpass Israel's military strength. Israel will maintain its superiority for an indefinite period to come."

When the Israeli leader said this, he was challenging us. It is a challenge not only to us in Egypt but to all the Arab nation, in all parts of the Arab world.

It is certain that when the Israeli leader made that statement, he knew what Arab forces were being mobilised for the battle.

In fact, brethren, I am saying this in order to refute the claim that all Arab forces had been mobilised for the battle against imperialism, and to refute the allegation by Israeli and Zionist propaganda everywhere to the effect that two and a half million Israelis have succeeded in defeating one hundred million Arabs. I say no; the hundred million Arabs had not mobilised all their forces, nor were they in a position to do so. We, in Egypt, had not mobilised all our forces in 1967 because we wanted to develop in all fields.

But today we face a battle, a battle that will be decisive not only in the life of Egypt but also in the life of the whole Arab nation. If Israel — God forbid — were to win the forthcoming battle — they say in Israel that they are preparing for the fourth war between them and the Arabs and that they will never allow the Arabs to win; if — God forbid — this ever happens and we are defeated in this fourth war, the Arabs will never get to their feet again.

In order to avoid that, we shall have to mobilise our forces or at least half our forces; and when I say our forces I mean the forces of the Arab nation. In this manner, brethren, the struggle of the Arabs would become complete and real.

In speaking of these things we have not forgotten the struggle that is taking place now: the struggle of the Arab nation through the resistance

movement. These resistance movements were started by the Palestinian people, the struggling people of Palestine, who were exposed to the greatest act of persecution in history, the people of Palestine who were thrown out of their land in 1948. The United Nations adopted resolutions in 1948 providing for the rights of the people of Palestine. Every year since the United Nations has reiterated these resolutions; yet Israel has never paid any attention to them or implemented them. These are the people of Palestine who struggle, sacrifice and die, for whom the resistance movement is the main source of hope, it is their principal hope in life. The people of Palestine are struggling in Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and every part of the occupied territory of Palestine. These people are being subjected to occupation, they are exposed to death, persecution economic pressure and imprisonment. Yet they have never given in to Israel, to Israeli rule, or to the Israeli military machine, which now occupies every village and every town in Palestine. They have struggled and fought, and are causing Israel sleepless nights and days. The Palestinian people today are truly harassing Israel, they are getting at it, they are exacting a daily toll of casualties from Israel, dead and wounded. But Israel never admits these facts.

This was the resurgence of life for the Palestinian people. This was their resurrection after the 1967 setback, which was also the resurrection of the entire Arab nation in every place, in each country and in every city. After the defeat, while our deep wounds were still worrying us, these struggling people lifted up the banner of struggle and rose to fight for their land, their honour, their dignity and their rights. Many died, many were martyred and others, both men and women, were thrown into prison.

Fellow citizens,

Such was the struggle in which the Arab nation was engaged. The Arab nation did not have aircraft, tanks or machine-guns at that time, it only had guns and hand-grenades. During those days, the Palestinian people set the highest example of resistance, of the spirit of resistance, and of the determination to resist and to struggle.

Fellow citizens,

As we celebrate Labour Day, the festival of

those who labour in the most honourable occupations for the sake of their present, their future and their homeland, it is our duty at this time and place to say to those fighting and struggling people that we, the people of Egypt, shall not forsake them under any circumstances, we shall not abandon any part of their land which was occupied by Israel.

Israel says that it has annexed Jerusalem, but we say to the struggling people of Jerusalem that we, the Arab nation, and we, who are part of the Arab nation, will not accept that, but will struggle for Jerusalem to the last drop of our drop. This, fellow citizens, is a pledge on our part to the struggling people of Palestine everywhere.

Fellow citizens,

When we speak of the struggle of the Arab nation, we have to mention the brave people of Jordan who are exposed to daily Israeli air raids and artillery bombardments. We all know that Jordan does not have the planes to intercept Israeli planes, but the courageous and struggling Jordanian people are standing fast against the planes. They have not been broken by the air raids or the bombs, even the napalm bombs. Throughout these two years, they have been resolved to struggle and fight, and to recover the occupied territory.

Such is the struggle in which the Arab nation is engaged, a nation which has always fought in the past; it has always repelled the invaders and defeated them. Our morale, brethren, will neither be shaken by an Israeli raid on Nag Hammadi or the Edfu dam, nor by the psychological warfare by which Israel wants to strike terror in our hearts. Day by day, we sense that we are better fitted to channel all our efforts to the restoration of the usurped rights and the recovery of the occupied territories, not only in Egypt but also in every part of the Arab land. The enemy and his friends wanted us to withdraw from the battle. They gave us to understand that if the problem were to be confined to one between Israel and Egypt, Israel would be ready to withdraw its forces from Sinai. In this way, we could get out of the whole problem and have nothing to do with what is going on in Jordan or Syria.

Fellow citizens, this proposal was made to us last year; the United States spoke to us about

this question; that the problem be turned into an Egyptian-Israeli problem and a Jordanian-Israeli problem. But we understood what this meant, that if we were to get out of the battle and reach a settlement on our occupied territory in Sinai, we should be sacrificing the West Bank and Jerusalem. But we made a pledge to ourselves and to God that we would never give up the West Bank or Jerusalem. We want to eliminate the traces of the aggression from all the occupied Arab territories whether in Egypt, in Sinai; in Jordan, in the West Bank and Jerusalem; or in Syria, in the Golan Heights.

Fellow citizens,

We have been exposed to several attempts but the steadfastness of this nation, and the persistence of this people has enabled us to overcome all these attempts, whether emanating from Israel or the imperialists and their supporters. We have been able to set up the Eastern Front, and to coordinate the Eastern Front. Of course, more is needed, more co-ordination, and more mobilisation. We are working for this with all our strength.

In the previous stage, we and the Arab nation were exposed to several intrigues. Naturally, Israel, which has occupied Arab territories in Sinai, the West Bank, the Golan Heights — along with the lackeys of imperialism, whether in the Arab lands or anywhere else — tried to undermine our home fronts. Should our home fronts collapse, Israel would be able to realise its objectives; Israel, which won a military battle in 1967 but which has failed to consolidate its victory since then, would succeed in bringing the Arabs to the negotiating table where it would dictate its own terms. If our home fronts were to collapse, Israel would naturally be able to impose its conditions on the Arab nation.

These intrigues bore no fruit. The internal front, our internal front, was subjected to psychological campaigns and campaigns against our morale. It came under attack from hostile forces, but it remained a steadfast front.

These forces, the forces belonging to Israel, imperialism and the imperialist lackeys, which constitute a fifth column in the Arab world, failed to undermine the home front in all parts of the Arab nation bordering on Israel. I am confident that the Arab people, in every Arab country, are

fully aware of the fact that the steadfastness of their home fronts and national unity are basic at this stage in the life of the Arab nation. It is a basic factor on which our struggle and the restoration of the territories occupied by Israel depend.

Fellow citizens,

Israel and our other enemies, Israel's friends, are attempting to sow dissent between the resistance and the Arab countries and among the Arab countries themselves, between the public and their governments, between the public and the resistance. This has not worked so far, however. It has been two years, twenty two months, since the setback, and endurance grows stronger each day. Our endurance is growing stronger day by day. Our endurance and staying power are firmer, hope in the future is growing stronger.

Fellow citizens,

Many attempts are being made, under various names. We must not allow these attempts to deceive us or for one moment to dampen our enthusiasm for struggle, for there is the unity of struggle and the unity of struggle is none other than the unity of destiny. That is why we in Egypt concern ourselves with the struggle in every Arab country. We are aware that Israel, and those who stand behind Israel, are trying to undermine the struggle in all parts of the Arab nation.

Fellow citizens,

Our justification for struggle is our justification for life. Concerted action is the foremost guarantee for the struggle.

Fellow citizens,

Today, as we stand before this stage in our history, we must realise that no conflict must come about between any of those forces. No conflict is possible between these forces. No issue can take precedence over that of joint struggle, commando resistance and popular struggle.

When I speak of this aspect, the struggle, reconstruction, reconstruction in the armed forces, sacrifice, the resistance forces, I must also speak of the other endeavour in which we are engaged. It is not the case that there is a peaceful solution and another, military, solution. Rather, there is a political endeavour, an interconnected poli-

tical endeavour that incorporates both political and military action within it. With this understanding, we announced in November, 1967 that we in Egypt agreed to implement the Security Council resolution. We committed ourselves to that resolution, we agreed to accept the resolution; Jordan announced that it would accept the resolution along with us. We now say that there is one resolution which we have accepted. That is the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution. We are not willing to accept any departure from that resolution.

If, my fellow countrymen, that resolution were to be implemented in letter and spirit as far as the matter of territory is concerned; if Israel were to withdraw from all the occupied territories; if that resolution were to be implemented where the rights of the people, the rights of the people of Palestine are concerned, as they have always been set forth in United Nations resolutions, resolutions guaranteeing the rights of the Palestinian people, there would no longer be a problem.

Such is our view of the Security Council resolution, withdrawal and the rights of the people of Palestine. Israel has been saying that we — it has been telling the outside world that over the past twenty years, we have been declaring war against it for no reason. The fact is that the state of war has continued over the past twenty years because of Israel's refusal to implement the Security Council resolution dealing with the rights of the people of Palestine. Israel has been telling the outside world that the Arabs want to slaughter all the Jews, for no other reason than Arab racialism. This is to cover up Israeli racialism, Zionist racialism. We have been answering these charges; we have constantly reiterated in the foreign press, that throughout the years, Muslim and Christian Arabs have lived side by side with the Jews. It was the Zionists who usurped Palestine. Even after the Partition Plan, and before British withdrawal from Palestine, Zionist forces managed to occupy Arab towns.

Fellow citizens,

We speak of making preparations, we are building up our armed forces, we speak of the struggle, putting up a fight, the liberation of the occupied territories inch by inch. We are trying to destroy Israeli fortifications east of the Suez Canal. We

are sending our armed forces to Sinai to engage the enemy face to face, in hand to hand combat. In spite of all these things, we are prepared, as we said, to implement the United Nations resolution which calls for total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories but which also provides for the rights of the people of Palestine. Israel actually refuses to implement that resolution. Israel, and Israeli leaders maintain that according to that resolution, Israel would be entering into certain commitments; that Israel is being asked to withdraw and to take on certain obligations. As for the Arabs, what is their contribution? The Arabs would only be giving promises; how are we to know that the Arabs will keep those promises? Israel says that it will not implement that resolution unless Arab leaders come to the negotiating table and sign a peace treaty.

This is not included in the United Nations resolution. The United Nations resolution does not stipulate direct negotiations with Israel. The resolution does, however, provide for a personal representative of the Secretary-General to call on the parties concerned and to work for the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

Fellow citizens,

As I told you now, we do not believe it to be the case that there is a military solution and another peaceful solution. On that basis, we believe that there is such a thing as a political solution comprising both diplomatic and political action, in fact, all forms of action at once. I have on all occasions taken political and diplomatic action on that basis, through all the means available. Despite the fact that diplomatic ties between us have not been resumed, we contacted the United States. We waited for the United States to adopt a just attitude, one that is not biased in favour of Israel. Despite this, despite the fact that the United States has always shown a bias for Israel, we did not break off contact, nor did we break off the dialogue with the United States. During his last visit to attend the funeral of General Eisenhower, Dr. Fauzi met with American statesmen and explained our position to them.

We are convinced that it is in our interest and in the interest of the Arab cause for everyone to

be familiar with our views and our position. Therefore, when Mr. Nixon sent us his personal representative, Mr. Scranton, I met him. On the same basis, when Dr. Fauzi went to United States, he also met Mr. Nixon and explained to him our attitude on the matter.

Fellow citizens,

At this stage, we have to carry on the struggle in all fields, whether political or military. We have to win new friends to our side, we have to acquaint a larger section of world public opinion with our just cause. We must no doubt have sensed that this has already begun to have an effect, that a change is taking place at present, a change in world public opinion. Not that the change has been considerable; however, in the past, world public opinion had always been under the impression that Israel was a small state with a population of two million surrounded by one hundred million Arabs who want to slaughter the Israelis for no reason, except a love for killing and slaughter.

We must inform people everywhere in the world that this is not true; we must tell them that it was Israel which usurped Palestine, which drove out, killed and slaughtered the Arabs of Palestine. We must tell them that there are more than one million refugees, people who were driven out of their homes; and that the United Nations has passed resolutions providing for the return of these people to their homes and for reparations to be made for the losses they suffered, but that Israel has refused to implement these resolutions.

Fellow citizens,

We must not at any point weary of the efforts we are making or of the words we use to explain our cause to world public opinion. We went ahead; and we found those who understood our cause. In France, General de Gaulle understood our cause; he resolved to oppose the aggression and decided to stand on principle, he resolved that the aggressor should withdraw from all the occupied territories. That was a gain for our side. We are confident, moreover, that France's attitude to the Arabs will not change. Did not the French people once take up the banner of revolution and set forth those illustrious principles? We felt that General de Gaulle, in taking the attitude that he did, was in fact working for the

realisation of the objectives of the French Revolution.

Fellow citizens,

Considering the events of the past two days, and what lay behind those events; our growing capacity for reconstruction, which is to be seen everywhere and which we shall never forsake; considering our capacity to deter the enemy, as I mentioned; considering the endeavour to liberate the occupied territories; the development of our armed forces, our valiant forces, in preparation for the liberation of the territory, we must acknowledge a debt to those who have truly proved to be our friends — the people and the leaders of the Soviet Union. They stood by us at our darkest hour, in June 1967. I recall a letter that I received from the leaders of the Soviet Union on June 10, 1967 telling me that we must endure; that Egypt and the Arabs have always managed to emerge stronger than ever from the calamities that befell them. They promised me in that letter that the Soviet Union would help us in every possible way to reconstruct our armed forces and to hold out in all fields. Today, 22 months later, as I acknowledge our debt to those friends, I want to tell you that they have lived up to the promise they gave me on June 11, during the darkest hours of 1967.

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Statement by the Save Jerusalem Committee on the Expulsion of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories.¹

Amman

In 1948, the Zionist movement employed a variety of means to drive the Palestinian people from their land in preparation for building their state on its ruins. Among the means employed was collective expulsion, the spreading of fear and terror among the citizens to compel them to leave their lands, and massacres such as that at Dair Yasin. The result was the expulsion of more than one million Palestinians who are now dispersed in different parts of the world.

In 1967, during and after the June aggression, the occupation authorities forced approximately four hundred thousand Palestinians to leave their country; one of the many methods employed was to evacuate the inhabitants from villages and towns and then to send some of them to the East Bank. Another was to expel citizens under the pretext, unsupported by any evidence, that they had infringed public security. This has been done, despite the fact that the Geneva Convention of 12 September, 1949, in Article 49, concerning the protection of civilians during conditions of war, states the following: "Individual and mass forcible transfers as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power or that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited regardless of their motives." This Article makes it perfectly clear that the occupying power is prohibited to deport the citizens from their places of residence, and transfer them outside the frontiers of the territory it has occupied.

However, faced with the outcry against such deportations, which were condemned by public opinion both at home and abroad, the occupation authorities have resorted to a new method, in the hope of deluding public opinion. Their new method of evicting people from their homes consists in persecuting persons who are in detention or serving prison sentences, to force them to sign statements to the effect that they are ready and willing to leave the occupied territories for the East Bank if they are released from prison. The occupation authorities have also threatened a number of citizens with prosecution and imprisonment on charges of engaging in activities directed against the occupation, and have told them that if they wish to avoid imprisonment they must leave the country after signing a document to the effect that they are leaving voluntarily.

To secure such signatures, the authorities sometimes subject detained persons to cruel psychological pressures. Subjecting them to all sorts of physical and psychological torture, the authorities threaten them that if they refuse to sign they will be detained in prison for long periods, or even for life. By this pressure and moral coercion, they are forced to sign statements to the effect that they agree to being removed from their homeland.

As we have seen, the occupying state — which

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 8/5/1969.

is foreign to the country it occupies — is forbidden to deport citizens or to force them to leave their occupied country and to prevent them from exercising their right to return to it.

The International Declaration of Human Rights states that every individual has the right both to leave and to return to any country, including his own.

The occupation authorities have practised this method in the case of dozens of citizens in the West Bank and deported them from their homes to the East Bank of Jordan.

The Save Jerusalem Committee appeals to world public opinion, to international organisations and to international legal associations to condemn this Nazi Zionist measure which, if the occupying authorities continue to employ it and extend its scope, will mark the beginning of a large-scale operation of forced emigration, reminiscent of the manner in which the Palestine Arabs were forced to emigrate in 1948 and 1967.

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Interview Granted by the United Arab Republic President Nasser to Time Magazine.¹ **Cairo, May 12, 1969**

Q. What are the prospects of a Mideast settlement?

A. It has been almost two years since the occupation of Sinai, and there is continuing occupation. We have agreed to a peaceful solution, implementing the 1967 Security Council resolution. Until now, Israel has not accepted it. She says she will not leave the occupied areas until we sit down with her to talk peace. But we refuse to sit. It is not called for in the Security Council resolution. If we sit now, we sit as defeated people, sitting only to capitulate. This we cannot do.

Q. Are you satisfied with your military performance along the Suez Canal?

A. Yes. The Israelis want us to respect the

cease-fire resolution, but they do not respect the other resolution about withdrawal. If a big part of your country is occupied by enemies, you can wait a reasonable time for withdrawal. But the people are asking us to liberate the Sinai. Our artillery begins the liberation effort, for it is our right and duty to liberate occupied territory.

Q. If Israel is persuaded to withdraw from the occupied territories, how would you visualize the next step?

A. If Israel agrees on two main points, this will solve the problem. The points are land—withdrawal from all occupied territory—and people—the Palestinians must have the choice of returning to their homes.

Q. Could there be some sort of international occupation of that territory, say by a U.N. force, while further negotiations take place?

A. No, we could not accept the international occupation of Sinai.

Q. Not even an interim step toward solution?

A. Israel wants to have Sinai demilitarized. We could agree to such a situation with the Security Council, with Dr. Gunnar Jarring—something like that—for a short period. But on the permanent demilitarization of Sinai, we refuse.

Q. Can you conceive any negotiated territorial adjustments in the Sinai?

A. It is beyond discussion. These boundaries have been here for hundreds of years.

Q. What about in Jordan?

A. That is for the Jordanians to decide.

Q. In Syria?

A. There is nothing in the Security Council resolution about border rectification. If we agree to rectification, we go beyond the resolution, and this we cannot do.

Q. If a solution is somehow achieved, would you sign a non-aggression pact with Israel?

A. If there were a solution to all problems, this would be something to think about.

Q. If all other matters are settled, would freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal be a problem?

A. The canal would be no problem.

¹ *Time*, May 16, 1969, p. 29. President Nasser granted this interview to Mr. Hedly Donovan, *Time* Inc. Editor and Mr. Henry Anatole Grunwald, *Time* Managing Editor. Reprinted by permission from *TIME*, The Weekly Newsmagazine; Copyright Time Inc., 1969.

Q. Are you ready to accept the existence of Israel if there is a withdrawal and a permanent settlement?

A. I accept the reality of Israel, and so will my people, if there is a humanitarian solution. Call it Israel, or whatever they want to call it, and I will recognize it.

Q. Would you agree to an internationalization of Jerusalem?

A. Jerusalem is a holy city for Moslems, Christians and Jews. No one should be deprived of his religious rights. In any internationalization, the Jews, with a well-organized and rich world-wide community, might take advantage of us. We are for complete withdrawal from Arab Jerusalem. Without that, there can be no peace. We were not planning for war in 1967, but we must plan for war now in case everything else fails.

Q. There is a growing body of U.S. opinion that we are too much involved in several parts of the world. How would you feel if the U.S. were less interested in this area?

A. After World War II, I looked upon the U.S. as a great and just power, taking no sides. I was proud of the U.S., but I have had many disappointments since then. The U.S. has refused us arms. In the Middle East, the U.S. has supported reactionary elements against progressive elements, and Israel against the Arabs. Maybe the best solution for the U.S. is not to withdraw but just to be more even-handed. We assure the U.S. that we don't want to be Communist or influenced by anybody. Besides, it is impossible for the U.S. not to be concerned with the Middle East. You have interests here, and you cannot isolate yourselves from these interests. The Middle East is of great importance to both the U.S. and Russia.

Q. Would you rather have the Soviet Union or the U.S. here?

A. I would rather have neither one, but it is not my decision. The Soviet Union has been a good friend to us for many years.

Q. How about China?

A. China is not directly involved here. We have had a misunderstanding with the Chinese.

They say I try to cuddle up too much to the Soviets.

Q. What is the state of civilian and military morale?

A. We are against a big increase in morale because it might bring pressure from the people for military action that could be unwise. My tone of peaceful solution is not very popular in this country, and it poses a dilemma for us. I have told the people we do not want adventures, that we should not move against our will or out of frustration over 1967. This does not make me popular. One of my own children left home to join the armed forces after the war.

Q. It was said after the 1967 war that you were getting misleading information from your military. Are you confident you are getting correct information about your capabilities now?

A. I was not handling military matters before the 1967 war. Now I am handling them directly. I am confident that I am not being misled.

Q. If another war comes, and if you should win, what would your terms be to Israel?

A. That is like selling the fur of the bear before killing it. It is difficult to say. If I get any ideas about it, I will write you.

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Memorandum Submitted by the Arabs of Jerusalem to the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant Rejecting all Measures Liable to Impair the Arab Character of the City or Arab Sovereignty over it.¹

Jerusalem

H.E. The Secretary General of the United Nations;

We, citizens of the Arab city of Jerusalem now under Israeli occupation, submit this memorandum to Your Excellency, with the request that you forward it to the representatives of the Big Four who are at present meeting to discuss the Middle East. We wish to make our position as regards Israeli occupation quite clear, having

¹ *Al-Dastur* (Amman), 23/5/1969.

already done so on many previous occasions. On the basis of the principles of the United Nations and the right of nations to self-determination and to be free from foreign occupation, we declare to the whole world our utter refusal to be annexed to Israel. We reject the internationalisation of the city and the imposition upon us of any solution liable to impair complete Arab sovereignty over our city or deprive us of our rights in our homeland. We affirm that solutions of this kind will meet with resistance from our people and will lead to a deterioration of the whole situation in the area. Israel's attempts to colonise our lands, to evict us, to imprison us by the thousand, to kill or persecute us and blow up our homes—regardless of world public opinion or United Nations resolutions calling for withdrawal of the occupying forces and condemning annexation and expansion—none of this will shake our faith in our right to our homeland, evict us from our homeland, or alter our resolution to liberate our homeland.

While stressing our resolve to preserve our freedom and the Arab character of our city, we call upon the United Nations, the conscience of the world and the countries of the world, both great and small, to stand by us in demanding the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from all occupied Arab territory, in particular from Arab Jerusalem. This must be done in order to reaffirm the principles of international morality and the right of all peoples to live in freedom, dignity and peace. We remind the world that in arbitrarily and unilaterally annexing a people who have no desire whatever to be annexed, Israel has built wells of hatred and hostility in the place of the walls that once stood in Jerusalem. We call upon all free and honest men wherever they may be to join with us in pressing our just demands for our freedom, our dignity and our national liberation.

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**Speech by the Sudanese Prime Minister
Awadallah on his Government's Policy.¹
(Excerpt)**

Omdurman, May 25, 1969

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In the sphere of Arab affairs, the actions of the revolutionary government will be based on the absolute understanding that our revolution is part of the Arab revolution and that the destiny of our people is inextricably linked to that of the forces of Arab revolution. The revolutionary government will, therefore, endeavour to establish economic, military and cultural ties and relations with our sister Arab states to strengthen the position of the Arab nation in its bitter struggle against neo-colonialism and Zionism, put an end to the aggression and eradicate the Israeli entity from Arab soil so that Palestine may return to its people, and become a progressive Arab state.

In this respect, we are gratified to note that, over the past two years, the Arab nation has been able to stand fast in the face of the aggression and foil the Zionist-colonialist plot to transform the military setback into a political one. We are very proud to note, moreover, that the Palestinian revolution has made considerable progress towards the unification of resistance organisations and the escalation of commando action to the stage where there will be total solidarity between its struggle and that of the Arab masses both within and outside the occupied territory.

The government of the revolution will do all in its power to bring about the total mobilisation of all resources at its disposal and will arm and train the masses. All this will then be placed at the service of the Palestine cause, and commando action will receive material and political backing.

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 26/5/1969. This speech was broadcast on Omdurman Radio.

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Press Interview with Mr. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Official Spokesman of the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh).¹

Q. *What is Fateh and when was it born?*

A. The idea of *Fateh* was born in 1956. The idea of a Palestinian underground organization began when the Tripartite aggression against Egypt took place. This idea spread through refugee camps scattered all over the Arab countries. In 1958, the first Palestinian secret organization was formed under the name of *Fateh* and in 1958 its first publication was issued called *Falastinuna*. Our military activities, however, started in 1965 with the formation of *Al-Assifa* (The Storm).

Q. *What are its goals and strategy?*

A. Our goal is the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle which, we believe, is the only means to our goal—through action and not words. Our struggle is spearheaded by the Palestinian people and its base is the Arab people as a whole. Liberation cannot be achieved through an army or armies that are divorced from the people. Armies will decide the final conflict but only after we have unified our energies for an armed revolution. Palestine was forgotten for twenty years. Zionist colonial aggression and the creation of the Israeli state have deprived us of our right to live as a free people.

Q. *Why haven't you formed a Palestinian government in exile?*

A. There is one in existence now within the Arab League but it is useless. We will succeed only if our revolution succeeds; victories have brought attention to our cause and not political demagoguery.

Q. *Do you expect to liberate Palestine alone, and what is the alternative if you fail?*

A. We are the nucleus around which the

Arab people of Palestine will unite, and with the help of the Arab peoples we hope to win, and in the end form a democratic Palestinian state in which all can live. We do not expect to fail, but if we do, at least it would be better to die fighting in the battlefield than rot away in refugee camps.

Q. *Do you object to any peaceful means of trying to end this dispute?*

A. We do not object to any political way of trying to end this dispute. War and violence are not goals in themselves. Our goal is the liberation of our motherland and restoration of the lost rights of our people. We seek security, justice, and peace; we have been attacked, terrorized, and thrown out of our lands, and now are merely exercising our right of self-defense. We want everyone to know that we are not seeking war for war's sake; we will fight and are fighting because war has become a necessity.

But if political action becomes effective enough to restore our lands and safeguard our rights, then we would welcome such a political solution. Our lost lands and the rights of our people are at stake here. Israel does not want a peaceful way of solving this problem. When she continues to block a way to a non-military solution, and makes political action to safeguard our rights impossible, then we are left with no choice except to resort to armed struggle — a path which has been followed by all oppressed peoples.

Q. *The Zionists claim that Fateh and the Arabs are waging a war of extermination against the Jews, and in the event of their defeat they will be "thrown into the sea." How do you respond to this?*

A. The goals of *Fateh* and Arab nationalism are humanitarian in principles and method, unlike Zionism which uses Nazi-like tactics in achieving its ends. Our revolution is aimed at the liberation of man from all kinds of discrimination. We reject the techniques of brutality and murder used by Zionists. Arabs have never discriminated against the Jews; historically, many Jews found a haven in the Arab homeland when they were being persecuted by Europeans. We also sympathized with the suffering of the Jews under the Nazis, but this sympathy does not mean that we ought to pay the price for Hitler's crimes. Why do we as Palestinians have to suffer terror, hunger

¹ *The Arab World* (New York), No. 5, May 1969, p. 26. Mr. Yasser Arafat granted this interview to Mr. Edmund Ghareeb, Editor-in-Chief of *Torch Magazine*, during the latter's visit to Jordan. Copyright, *The Arab World*.

and deportation for what someone else has done? Our aim is to bring an end to the concept of a Jewish Zionist state, a racist expansionist state. Our aim is to destroy this state, this concept—but not its people. We want a democratic Palestinian state. We will not force anyone out who is willing to live under the banner of this state as a loyal Palestinian. It does not matter whether he is Christian, Moslem, or Jew.

Q. What are the effects of Arab defeat on your movement?

A. Arab negativism is the cause of defeat. However, the defeat has served to awaken our people. They have come to realize their identity from which they were alienated. The defeat has shown the Palestinian people that choosing the path of armed struggle is now the only way for them to liberate their homeland. The spearhead of this movement is the Palestinians themselves. They are the vanguard of this movement—realizing at the same time that it is the Arab nation that is the substance of this battle and that the potentialities of the Arab people should be dedicated to this role. We must keep in mind that this problem is primarily that of the people concerned and that liberation can be achieved only through an army that has the total support of the people. The Palestinians now reject words without deeds, as all revolutionary peoples do.

Q. Israeli propagandists claim that your war is useless. Do you believe that it is?

A. Our war is aimed at this stage of the struggle towards bringing down the social, economic and political structure of Israel, through a war which might be long and bloody but which will succeed inevitably. The Turks were here for six hundred years, the Tartars were here for seventy years, and the Crusaders about two hundred years—however, they were all driven out in the end. We want to act, and inside the occupied territories, in order to harass the enemy continually, cut his communication lines, sabotage his installations and industries. We are applying the principles of revolutionary war. We have faith in the power of our people when organized and armed.

Q. What will happen if the Israelis, in retaliation for your efforts, deport the Arab population of Gaza

and the west bank, or invade the east bank of Jordan?

A. Israel is following a campaign of terror, humiliation and deportation of the Arabs at this very moment. There is now a war without casualties, but most of the casualties in the Arab struggle with Zionism for the past twenty years have been ours. This however is beginning to change. We plan to resist. Isn't it better to die bringing down your enemy than to await a slow, miserable death rotting in a tent in the desert? Two million Palestinians have done this in vain for the past twenty years, and now they are tired of the humiliation, the starvation, the misery. Our new generation is tired of waiting for something to happen. Thirty percent of the refugees in Gaza before the June war were born after 1948. How long can this continue? Neither the U.N. nor anyone else has been able to solve this problem. Our war is a people's war and we have chosen this path.

Q. Are there any women in Fatch?

A. Yes—many women have joined our organization. This is nothing new: Palestinian women have been active in the resistance movement since the 30's. Many have participated in missions—sometimes very delicate ones—in occupied territories. The Palestinian woman, like her Algerian sister, is very active in this struggle for liberation. The devotion to our martyred Palestine is not limited by age, location, or sex.

Q. Are you at present operating from bases in the west bank, or are you dependent on infiltrating commandos?

A. At present we have forces on the west bank, in the mountains of Galilee in Northern Israel, in the Negev and in the urban centers where we have few men but intend to grow stronger. Israeli occupation of the west bank has helped us move most of our bases there, and thus unwittingly, we had Israel's help.

Q. The Israelis claim that most of the attacks are committed by infiltrators from neighboring countries that later withdraw to Arab havens.

A. The Israelis are always claiming that our bases are outside occupied territories; however, the recent clashes deep inside the occupied land have proven to the whole world the falseness of

their claims as well as their anxiety and concern over our activities. Their brutal reaction to the recent activities in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv by the beating of Arab civilians and the wanton destruction of their property, which was quietly allowed to take place by the military authorities, has also served to shatter the myth of coexistence which they are trying to portray. The Israeli claim that our bases are in Arab territories is only a pretext to justify their aggressive designs against the east bank, and is merely an extension of their imperialist designs on the Arab world. The Israelis used the same argument before June 1967 to justify their attack on the Arab countries and went on to swallow more Arab territory. Israel is doing the same thing now with Jordan in order to implement its designs of expansion against the east bank.

Q. What is the strategy you follow in order to weaken Israel?

A. Our primary goal is the weakening of this experimental state, which was planted in our midst and on our lands by imperialism—very much the same as the British did in India with the East India Company. We mean to exploit the contradictions within Israeli society and to make foreign Zionists think twice before they venture to Israel. For instance, in Israel there is a great deal of discrimination and persecution, not only against the Arabs—Christians and Moslems alike—but against the Oriental Jew as well. The East European Jew is a symbol of discrimination and arrogance.

Q. Do you have any men training outside of Palestine?

A. Yes. We are training our men for guerilla war especially in areas where people's wars have taken place or are being waged. The experience of our Algerian brothers in their struggle against French imperialism has been a very useful experience from which we have learned a great deal. However, we can only adapt the specific experience of other people to our specific conditions. The natural conditions here are not the same as those in Algeria or Vietnam. We must not overstep the limitations imposed upon us by military, material and natural conditions but we can and will overcome within these limitations if we adapt our strategy to them.

Q. Do you receive any support from non-Arab sources?

A. Our revolution is not merely a Palestinian or Arab revolution but part of a world-wide revolution for human liberation, for freedom, social justice, dignity, self-determination and unity. We expect and receive support from Arabs and Moslems who have a special stake in this struggle. We also expect support from all those who believe in the justice of our cause and in the struggle against imperialism and racism. As a matter of fact, we do have some European supporters. We welcome them, along with all those who believe that ours is a just cause.

Q. What are your sources for weapons and supplies? Are you getting any aid from Arab governments or from the Jordanian and Iraqi armies?

A. One of our main sources for weapons is the enemy, as well as any other possible source. We have captured many American weapons. We are not getting any support from the Arab governments—our support comes from the Arab people. We are getting support from individual Arabs in meager sums; many people walk in and give us or send us small donations. The Arab people are giving us their support since this is their battle. There has been some coordination with the Jordanian army, as in the battle of Karamah where we fought side by side and the enemy suffered heavy casualties. We share similar goals and aspirations with the Jordanian and Iraqi armies since we share the same destiny. However, our actions are independent of any Arab government.

Q. What is the difference between you and other liberation organizations?

A. The difference is that we believe in action, and we depend on the masses for our revolution. We do not have any ideology—our goal is the liberation of our fatherland by any means necessary. Anyone who is willing to work for this alone may join us. Some of the other organizations have done a good job in the political arena, and we are trying to unify our forces and work with other organizations towards this purpose.

Q. What are you doing on the international level to give the people outside the region a better idea of your movement?

A. Public relations and the circulation of

information has not been one of our strong points—we are primarily an action organization. However, we realize that one of the main reasons for Arab failure has been in our inability to match the Zionist propaganda machine and to explain our case to the world. We hope to be able to do this when we have the money and material.

Q. Do you see any possible change of the situation in the area?

A. Merely an intensification of the struggle against the Zionist state.

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Speech by the Algerian President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister Boumedienne.¹ (Excerpt)

Al-Madya, June 4, 1969

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Nor must I fail to tell you on the eve of the painful anniversary of June 5 — that ill-omened day for the Arab homeland, the day on which the Arabs tasted the bitterness of defeat — that the way to restore Arab dignity and liberate martyred Palestine, the only way to liberate that holy land, lies through sacrifice and not through speeches and futile international meetings.

On behalf of you who in the past learned the meaning of struggle, of sacrifice and martyrdom, we convey sincere greetings to all our Palestinian brethren who are resisting so as to recover their dignity and their homeland.

As we have done many times before, we hereby declare on your behalf our absolute support of the Palestinian commando movement and of our Palestinian brethren. We unequivocally declare our disagreement with those who impede commando action.

We also unequivocally declare our disagreement with those who try to create difficulties for the commandos or throw them in prison.

The prisons of Israel and the prisons of the Zionists are enough for our Palestinian brethren.

¹ *Al-Sha'b* (Algiers), 5/6/1969. President Hawari Boumedienne delivered this speech at Al-Madya during his tour of the Titary district.

What they need is support, backing and arms. What they need is unity, and not spurious movements whose aim is to destroy them.

Our Palestinian brethren have suffered enough imprisonment at the hands of Israel and the Zionists.

These operations, which are intended to disunite the ranks of the Palestinian freedom fighters, are in no way different from those of imperialism in Algeria in the recent past. The Algerian revolution has also known the Ballounis movement in this area and the Misaliya movement, which were fostered by imperialism.

The Palestinians ask only one thing—that the Arabs should help them to die for their country.

When I speak about Palestine I am not expressing my personal opinion or that of the Government. I am truly and faithfully expressing the opinion of all Algerians, both men and women.

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Petition Submitted by Jerusalem Notables to the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Allon Protesting against the Destruction of the Fakhriyya Zawiya, Adjoining the Al-Aqsa Mosque.²

Jerusalem, June 16, 1969

On Sunday, May 15, 1969, Israeli occupation authorities demolished the Khanqah al-Fakhriyya, adjoining the Al-Aqsa Mosque. This was a Waqf instituted by the Qadi Fakhr al-Din in 1339 A.D. This is a clear act of aggression against sacred Muslim property and is ample proof of the intention of those authorities to wipe out Muslim holy places of historical and archaeological value. Persistent Israeli violations of Muslim sanctuaries began with your occupation of these holy lands and has not yet ceased.

Several months ago, the Ministry of Religious Affairs commenced excavations below this *madrasa*. Many protests against these excavations were sent to your government, but in vain. Yesterday, the Ministry demolished this sacred and historic site, paying no regard to the sentiments

² *Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.*

of Muslims or their sacred property. Excavations are now under way under the Tunkuziyya Madrasa and its unique and historic mosque. Muslims have been forbidden to come near the site, which is a Muslim Waqf, and have not been allowed to restore it. The Ministry alleges that it respects sacred sites and that its only task alongside the Buraq Wall (Wailing Wall) is to remove garbage. Can the demolition of this sacred and historic *madrasa* be construed as respect for sanctuaries or the removal of garbage?

The eviction of the guard appointed by the Islamic Waqf Department from his house under the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the occupation of that sacred spot, which is part of the structure of the Mosque, constitutes a terrible danger to the Mosque and a flagrant violation of one of the most sacred shrines of Islam.

The Muslims of this city register their protest against and condemnation of these continued acts of immorality on the part of the Israeli authorities against Muslim sanctuaries, and demand that these acts of provocation should cease forthwith.

Signatures

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Petition Submitted by Jerusalem Notables to the Israeli Defence Minister Dayan Protesting against the Decision of the Occupation Authorities to Evict the Inhabitants of Certain Villages in the Bethlehem District.¹

Jerusalem, June 22, 1969

We have learnt that the Israeli authorities have decided to evict the Arab inhabitants of the villages of Bait Askaria, Tallat al-Ballut, Al-Samika and Wadi Shukhait in the Bethlehem district, to turn them out of their homes and occupy their lands by force.

Such acts will completely undermine all possibility of peace and make the Arabs in this country feel insecure about their continued presence in their homeland.

Evicting the Arabs from their homes, demolishing their houses and their sanctuaries and adding

to the number of refugees are not measures calculated to inspire confidence.

International law and human principles do not give any state the right to seize vast areas of land and villages with all their buildings and sanctuaries and to evict the inhabitants by force. An occupying power has even less right to do so since international laws require such a power to show special care and good faith. A homeland is something precious, more precious than land itself. It has never been, anywhere in the world a commodity to be bought and sold; there can be no question of compensation for homes, property and sanctuaries, as is being proposed. In these lands are Muslim Waqf land and holy places, chief of which is the Tomb of the Prophet Zechariah, upon whom be peace.

Therefore, we urgently request that this whole matter be reviewed, that confiscation orders be rescinded and that the inhabitants be left in peace in their homeland.

(Signatures)

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Editorial by Haykal in the Egyptian Daily Al-Ahram on the United States Proposals for a Settlement to the Middle East Crisis. (Excerpts)

Cairo, June 27, 1969

The main features of the American proposal:

Without going deeply into the matter, without going into details or into the precise wording of the text, the following are the main features of the thirteen-point American proposal:

— The termination of the state of war between Egypt and Israel, and its replacement by a state of peace.

— The use or threat of force is to be outlawed in the future.

— Support for the commandos is to stop.

— The Arab boycott of Israel is to cease.

— Political propaganda in the Middle East is to stop.

¹ *Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.*

— Israel shall have no claim on Egyptian territory:

It shall accept the original internationally recognised boundaries between Egypt and Palestine. However, territories from which Israeli forces withdraw are to become demilitarised zones.

— There shall be no restrictions on freedom of navigation in "international waterways" in the area, meaning the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.

— The Gaza Strip shall come under the supervision of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring; its future is to be determined in Jarring's discussions with Egypt, Jordan and Israel.

— A solution is to be found for the Palestinian refugee problem, on condition that this shall not delay the final settlement (there is a hint that there may be an understanding that not more than 10 % of the Palestinian refugees should return to their lands).

— At some time or other during negotiations for a settlement there is to be direct Arab-Israeli contact.

— The final agreement must be signed by both sides.

— There is no mention of Jerusalem in the recent proposal; however, an earlier United States proposal stated that Jerusalem is to "remain united".

Translated into concrete terms, this means that Jerusalem is to remain under Israeli occupation.

— The Security Council is to guarantee the implementation of the settlement. It is to take measures to safeguard it, such as stationing United Nations forces in the area which can only be recalled on orders from the United Nations.

These are the main features of the latest American proposal, the thirteen-point proposal.

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Memorandum Submitted by the People of Jerusalem to the Jordanian Prime Minister Al-Rifa'i on Economic Pressures Exerted upon Them by the Occupation Authorities.¹
Jerusalem, 1969

The people of Jerusalem are being subjected to intense pressure by the Israeli authorities. The great majority of them have received official notifications demanding that they pay government and municipal taxes and tariffs and submit detailed lists on special forms of all their movable and immovable property, including even their women's jewelry. Failing this, they are threatened with punishment and the severe penalties stipulated in the appropriate Israeli regulations.

Such duties and taxes are very high and sometimes astronomical, being in no wise proportionate to the limited means of the Arabs and the crushing conditions of life they are experiencing under the occupation. These taxes levied upon the Arabs in accordance with rules and regulations that are in force in Israel are clearly contrary to international law and international agreements, which require all occupation forces to respect and abide by the regulations and laws in force in the territories prior to their occupation. They also violate the two Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem adopted in 1967 as well as the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, adopted unanimously, with Israel the sole dissenter. All these resolutions require Israel not to make any changes in the status of Jerusalem as it was prior to June 5, 1967. The Israeli authorities have resorted to a number of arbitrary and inhuman means in order to levy and collect these taxes from the Arab inhabitants, for example:

1. Notices, signed by the Israeli Governor of Jerusalem, have been sent to a number of tenants of hotel, residential and commercial property directing them to stop paying rent to their landlords and, instead, to pay the rent to the Israeli taxation authorities, in payment of the taxes due from the landlords.

2. Notices have been sent to owners of businesses, limited companies and employers directing

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 29/6/1969.

them to deduct the required taxes from their employees' wages and to pay them directly to the taxation authorities.

3. Income tax and municipal tax officials, accompanied by police, have sequestered the assets of a number of commercial establishments and hotels, including the St. George and Watani Hotels. In the case of these hotels the sequestration was temporarily suspended after representations had been made to the authorities and the hotels had paid a sum on account. What is even worse is that the Arab tax payer in the city is legally obliged to contribute to Israeli defence expenditure and to the purchase of arms and military equipment for the Israeli army, just like Israeli citizens. He is obliged to pay a so-called "security tax"; this is a surcharge of between 10 % and 20 % on all taxes collected — income tax, car registration fees, telephone fees, etc. For example, in the case of income tax, if a person pays income tax of 10,000 Israeli pounds, he has to pay an additional 10 % i.e. 1,000 Israeli pounds, as "security tax". As regards car registration, he has to pay a surcharge of 20 % on the registration fees as "security tax". The same applies to telephone fees and calls made. You must be well aware of all this, as we have sent you copies of the official notices we have received. You will also have noted that these notices were sent in accordance with Israeli laws and regulations, a matter of the utmost importance which we cannot possibly ignore. We have on many occasions sent official protests to the Israeli authorities against these taxes and against the "security tax", pointing out to them that these harsh measures and high taxes are out of all proportion to the limited means of the Arab population, that they ignore the harsh conditions that confront the Arabs under occupation and are a flagrant violation of international law and of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly. But all our protests have been in vain, and have met with total indifference. There can be no doubt that the Israelis intend ultimately to destroy the Arab economy in the Arab city, to impose their economic and financial control over it and to place the Arabs in an intolerable financial position by pressuring them with unbearable taxation so that they are obliged to leave the city. In addition, the owners of land and of businesses are being

pressured to sell them in order to pay the various taxes imposed. In our opinion, this is an even more serious matter for the Arab population, and will have more far-reaching effects upon the Arab inhabitants than the Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law. It is extremely urgent, indeed it is essential, that the Jordanian government, which is responsible for the Arab inhabitants and their welfare and for this Eternal City, and the maintenance of its Arab character, should lodge a positive and effective official protest against these measures in order to stop them before they become a *fait accompli*, by raising the issue in the Security Council and at the highest diplomatic levels.

We are confident that the Jordanian government will at once take the effective measures required to ensure that the extreme pressure to which the Arab inhabitants of the city are being subjected through the imposition of these exorbitant taxes is reduced.

There follows a list of those taxes and their ratios, in the belief that it may be of assistance to you when explaining the problem at various diplomatic and international levels. We also enclose various notices and warnings which are being sent daily to the Arab inhabitants in accordance with Israeli regulations, so that you may use them as documents in the case. In addition we enclose a comprehensive study we have made of the deteriorating economic conditions of the Arabs in the city.

1. *Income tax*

This tax is levied upon the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem in accordance with Israeli law, as evidenced in the various notices sent by the Israeli Income Tax authorities. It ranges between double and ten times the tax levied in the Jordanian income tax law. We must bear in mind that under Jordanian rule the economy was prosperous and there was great commercial activity — a situation in no way comparable with the economic collapse and slump in commercial activities that are now the rule under Israeli occupation.

2. *Car registration and renewal of licence fees*

These are also collected according to Israeli laws and regulations. They range between four and five times the Jordanian fees, depending on

the make and horsepower of the car. For example, the registration fees for an American six-cylinder Chevrolet are around 110 dinars per annum, and for a smaller car such as the Fiat 1100 they are 40 dinars. The registration officials impose an additional 20 % as "security tax", as mentioned above.

3. *National Insurance tax*

This is collected from all Arab residents in the city and from all companies and commercial and professional establishments in accordance with Israeli laws and regulations. This tax was not imposed by the Jordanian authorities and has no equivalent in Jordanian law.

4. *Telephone fees*

They are also collected according to Israeli regulations and are more than double the Jordanian fees. There is also very high tax on land and buildings which they have not yet begun to collect. The reason is that Israeli officials formerly regarded all Arab buildings, land and real estate in Arab Jerusalem as absentee property until the enactment of the recent Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law, which treats the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem as being present, as far as their property in Arab Jerusalem is concerned. However, we understand that they are making the necessary arrangements to impose and levy this tax through retroactive legislation covering the period since the beginning of the occupation.

5. *Municipal taxes*

a. General tax or "Residence Tax". This tax is levied on all tenants of dwelling-houses, shops and offices and is collected according to Israeli laws and regulations. This tax was not levied by the Arab Municipality.

b. Tax on trades and professions. This is collected in accordance with an Israeli Law and levied on all professions, businessmen, companies and firms, doctors, engineers and other professional men. It ranges between two and five times the taxes formerly collected in accordance with Jordanian law.

c. Social and Recreational tax. This is levied on restaurants, cafes and hotels in accordance with an Israeli law. It is extremely high and has no equivalent in Jordanian taxes.

d. Tax in commercial signs. This too is levied in accordance with an Israeli law and is, again, high.

The residents of Jerusalem have decided to write to you about this grave and urgent problem, urging you to take swift action to resolve it.

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Telegram from Jerusalem Notables to the United Nations Secretary-General Protesting against Continued Israeli Measures to Change the Character of the City.¹

Jerusalem, June 30, 1969

To the United Nations Secretary-General.

Israel is still taking measures aimed at changing the Arab and Muslim character of Jerusalem, thereby defying the wishes of its original inhabitants, the Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations resolutions No. 2253 (July 4, 1967), No. 2254 (July 14, 1967) and Security Council Resolution No. 252 (May 21, 1968).

Most aspects of the city have changed. If such changes are allowed to go on much longer, the city which has always been the third city of Islam will become purely Jewish.

We have lodged complaints with the Israeli occupation authorities but they have taken no notice. We have submitted a total of 62 complaints to ministers and other officials who, instead of acting upon them, threw some of us in gaol and exiled others across the River Jordan. We are not even allowed to express our feelings in peaceful demonstrations. Woe to him who opens his mouth.

We have never experienced more unjust rule. They have impounded the keys of the Haram gates and, under the pretext of excavating for antiquities, they have been digging up land belonging to the Muslim Waqf which adjoins the Al-Aqsa Mosque. In addition to the 135 Arab houses they demolished immediately after the war in the area of the Wailing Wall, five days ago they demolished Arab houses situated near the Fakhriyya Zawiya at the western corner of the

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 9/7/1969.

Haram area. The total number of Arab houses destroyed in Jerusalem since the cease-fire is 231.

In the other occupied territories of Palestine the total number of Arab buildings and homes destroyed by the Israeli army to date is 7,140. We have detailed lists to substantiate this with names, dates and figures.

Demolition work is still going on in Jerusalem in the Arab quarters they have occupied inside the walls and in the lands they have sequestered outside the walls. It seems that this nightmare will never end.

This has prompted us to submit our complaint to the Security Council requesting a speedy investigation and an end to this injustice which is being inflicted upon us, which is without parallel in history.

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Interview Conducted by Mr. Lufti al-Khuli, Editor of *Al-Tali'a*, with Abu Iyyad, Member of the Central Committee of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fateh), on the Current Situation of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, and the Attitude of the Palestinian Resistance to the Zionist Movement.¹

Q. It would be advisable in my opinion to begin this dialogue from the point of the present position in the battle with the enemy. May we know how Fateh views this position? Perhaps you will agree with me that to arrive at this knowledge we must be aware of the strong points and the weak points on the enemy front as well as on ours. When I say "ours" I mean the Palestinian front in particular and the Arab front in general.

A. Naturally, scientific analysis of any position must cover the weak points as well as the strong points — the positive and the negative. Starting our discussion with the Palestinian position, Fateh is of the opinion that many positive results have been achieved, but at the same time we are meeting with certain negative aspects.

The most prominent positive result achieved is perhaps that new trend represented by the meeting together of large, highly influential

groups to undertake commando action. This association has taken the form of the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command (PASC).

This step, if given the required opportunity to work in an atmosphere which is remote from previous susceptibilities, will have a great effect in consolidating commando action.

The Palestinian Armed Struggle Command is an actual body which goes beyond the previous structure of the Military Coordination Bureau and the commando organisations because it tends to be an actual command consolidating four large contingents of the resistance movement: the Popular Liberation Forces, the al-Saiqa Forces, the Al-Asifa Forces of Fateh and the Popular Democratic Front Forces. If we add to these the Palestine Liberation Army which has entered the armed struggle in accordance with the PLO Executive Committee's recent decision, we have a considerable force actually comprising over 90 % of the combatants under this Command. All this indicates the participation of the fighting revolutionary groups in a national front within the frame of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). In point of fact, these positive developments have deprived the enemies of Palestinian action of any justifications they may have had for trying to show that there are discrepancies among the forces of Palestinian action. This position, however, is faced by a counter-position. I wish to make it quite clear that by this counter-position I do not mean the position of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). As we see it, the PFLP will inevitably concur in this new form of the front when it comes to understand the true position. It is not a matter of Fateh or anybody else assuming exclusive control of the Command.

Q. Would you please explain what you mean by your last remark: understanding the true position?

A. It is no secret that the PFLP's failure to join the PLO and ultimately PASC rests on certain bases connected with what have become known as "representation proportions". Naturally there are those who are trying to exploit this with the object of maintaining this situation and preventing the accession of the PFLP. To this end they resort to a spurious argument accusing Fateh and others of trying to assume exclusive

¹ *Al-Tali'a* (Cairo), June 1969, pp. 51-87. Fateh official translation.

control of the PLO and PASC. I am in a position to affirm here that the matter is not one of exclusive control in any way. It is precisely in response to Palestinian and Arab opinion which you yourself, like so many other patriots, have expressed and called upon *Fateh* to implement. The object which we and the rest of our compatriots have aimed at is to bring together the greatest possible number of influential organisations within the frame of a consolidated national front and a united command.

Q. We have not ceased to insist on the unity of action for the organisations at least, if not full unity on the basis of common tactical and strategic objectives. Do you not agree that this has become a vital necessity?

A. Exactly. We therefore believe that extrinsic differences concerning the enemy, proportions and profit and loss accounts in the building of a national front for the Palestinian people will undoubtedly all disappear if our brothers of the PFLP understand the true position which they should take regarding their combative structure vis-à-vis the PLO and the new Palestinian Armed Struggle Command.

Generally speaking, the building of the national front through the PLO and the military command consolidating commando action constitute the essence of the positive aspects of this stage.

Q. What about the negative aspects?

A. In our opinion the negative aspects essentially consist in the positions adopted by the small organisations which arise from time to time and which are used in attempts to undermine the main forces engaged in Palestinian action. What shall I say? This is enough, I should think.

Q. I do not believe it is enough. What you say is extremely serious and I am of the opinion that the Arab peoples are entitled to be made thoroughly aware of this matter so that they may adopt an understanding attitude towards it. It is not enough to speak in general terms or in the passive voice, as this would be tantamount to making accusations without factual basis or without evidence or specification of responsibility. The battle cannot countenance such a state of affairs and we should steer clear of it. Any details or clarifications?

A. The matter is serious indeed. Well, there are for instance certain limited groups which have tried to put in the field what is called "*Fateh* of

Islam", recruiting for the purpose dubious elements under certain commands whose accounts have been totally closed by the Palestinian people. Their aim is to undermine Palestinian action in the name of "*Fateh* of Islam" or other small organisations which have been formed lately for reasons altogether unconnected with the resistance movement. It is to be regretted that they are being formed with the support and assistance of certain forces. This is all the clarification I can make at present.

Q. But how do you face this situation?

A. We are sure that, once we have completed the building of the front and the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command (PASC) and both have begun with all their weight and effectiveness to occupy their true position in the Palestinian movement, this abnormal state of affairs will come to end through persuasion.

This is about all concerning the Palestinian position. I believe that there are other negative factors connected with aid which is sometimes withheld and sometimes subjected to heavy restrictions. Other instances are the policy of repression and the attempt by some to link Palestinian action with the official Arab position. This is dangerous in more ways than one. First of all, it purports to impose a sort of hegemony by confining material aid to the official Arab position, and at the same time to isolate commando action and the Palestinian revolution from the Arab masses. The important thing is not to have a contribution collector but that the Arab citizen should feel that he reacts with this revolution through his personal contact with the militant forces. I must add that certain Arab quarters are waging a concentrated psychological war against the commandos and, I must say, particularly against *Fateh*. Believe me, I do not say this out of arrogance or narcissism. It is based on considerations which actually exist. They believe that if they succeed through their planned rumours and machinations in undermining *Fateh*, then it would be easy for them to undermine the entire commando action, on account of *Fateh*'s popularity and its great magnitude as a militant force. Strangely enough, this campaign began to increase and gather momentum after *Fateh* had made its entry within the frame of the PLO. *Fateh* pressed for national unity, while as a basic

force in Palestinian action it was treated as an obstacle to unity. It was stressed — and rightly — that *Fateh* was called upon to work for unity. This unity had several forms. It was possible to have a national front in which the PLO would be one of the parties and not the entire frame of the national front, as its covenant provides when it says that it is a national front grouping together organisations and individuals. It was possible to disregard this provision and to treat the PLO on the same footing as any other organisation, such as the Popular Front for instance. *Fateh* would then enter the national front on a level of fundamental equality with the organisation. This trend was not opposed by *Fateh*; on the contrary, we were prepared to follow it to the end. However, there was another view regarding the PLO, an objective view which considered the welfare of the Palestinian people before that of *Fateh*. According to this view, the PLO represents for the first time official Arab commitment to the Palestinian people. To regard the PLO as a private force would result in weakening the PLO itself and dissolving this commitment. The question arose as to whether it was possible for the PLO to be the national front, the general frame, particularly since it had never been organised in the political sense, consisting as it did of a basic military force which was the Liberation Army and the Popular Liberation Forces. It was decided that the PLO was a suitable background for the national front which would group together all Palestinian forces, and that our insistence on entering it on a level of equality was possibly unrealistic, besides the fact that it would paralyse the PLO. This would create a situation where these equal forces would under all circumstances have to agree unanimously on any action or decision. Failing such unanimity, any small organisation would be in a position to oppose any decision, thus creating a vicious circle by veto from this or that organisation. The idea which won acceptance was that the PLO should have a backbone, or what in other fronts is termed as the leading force. This does not at all mean that the others should lose their existence within the PLO or within the front, since the decisive factor is not the presence of four members representing the PLO and five members representing *Fateh*, but *Fateh's* magnitude in the Palestinian arena and its reflections within the front. The voice of any

organisation's representative would have the weight actually carried by that organisation in the field of action. Thus, if we plan to carry out a big operation, the decision and prevailing opinion concerning that operation would lie with those who have the material stature to support the operation. Consequently it is not a matter of imposing this or that opinion, but of determining what this or that organisation is capable of contributing, what its actual magnitude in action is, and what opinion it holds on which the executive decision will depend. I believe that where good faith prevails, both subjectively and objectively, in the relations of a sound front, it would be possible for the party having relatively fewer representatives to obtain the execution submitted by it regardless of any other considerations.

So much for the Palestinian position. To sum up, we find that there are strong positions, such as the growing popularity of the movement which the Palestinians are seeking to join in numbers far exceeding the present capacity of Palestinian organisations, and the development of operations in size, quantity and type. I believe that the future will enable the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command to take more positive action, thereby imposing itself on the field of responsibility.

There remains the existing line which I believe is connected with the solutions suggested for the area. It is the subject of the smaller organisations, and this is a new danger facing commando action.

Q. In your review of the negative aspects, I note your emphasis on the manifestation represented by the rise of new small resistance organisations from time to time. Undoubtedly this is an unhealthy manifestation which is causing increasing concern among the Arab masses looking forward to the unity of the Palestinian struggle in the military as well as in the political field. It is to be noted that this manifestation comes at a time when efforts are being directed towards building the Palestinian people's front and its commando forces, with certain important results already achieved. This manifestation requires a quick and effective remedy. It is not sufficient to recognise its existence: it is imperative to learn its causes, roots and objectives. Would you please clarify this matter? How does Fateh explain this manifestation? How does Fateh evaluate it and, again, how does it propose to deal with it?

A. There is no doubt that this is an absolutely unhealthy manifestation. We believe that this

manifestation has connections in various forms and shapes within the commando action itself, with the aim of subverting it. The method of subversion used is neither open nor direct, but underhanded and indirect. The smaller organisations are intelligent in their own way. Each of them has certain specific mottoes as if to lead the masses into believing that these mottoes are not adopted by the existing Palestinian action contingents. For instance, "*Fateh of Islam*" raises the motto of Islam with the specific aim of suggesting to the masses that *Fateh* is anti-Islamic. Thus "*Fateh of Islam*" appears, according to its allegations which it itself fully knows are untrue, as wanting to fill this gap in Palestinian action. Much the same is true of other organisations. I have mentioned "*Fateh of Islam*" in particular because it used the name of *Fateh*, but there are other small organisations existing today on the basis that *Fateh* and other true commando organisations have a regional outlook or that their outlook is not clear. Other small organisations are engaged in leftist overbids which are altogether unrealistic. These are roughly the new forms adopted by these organisations.

Q. To determine the size of this manifestation, how many new organisations have been formed this year 1969?

A. Three, claiming a religious or regional basis, or engaged in leftist overbids. As to the manner of dealing with this manifestation, we are of the opinion that our people does not believe in violence as a basic principle and mode of behaviour to settle differences, particularly since Palestinian action has not yet achieved its final form. Consequently we have followed, and are still following with revolutionary patience, the method of persuasion and direct discussion, because we believe that the base of these small organisations is undoubtedly noble, and that bad motives and deviation come from the leadership. It is therefore necessary to by-pass the leadership and descend to the level of the base for direct discussions to set forth the extent of the danger presented by these small organisations. We must not tire of talking to the base until we have deprived its leaders of every justification for the formation of these organisations and their continued existence.

Q. How does such discussion take place?

A. It takes place through information media, and sometimes through direct contact. It is believed that many of the militant young revolutionaries, once they know the truth, will join the true Palestinian action forces which have proved their effective presence in the struggle against the enemy.

Q. Has any positive result been achieved in consequence of this discussion?

A. Some positive results have actually been achieved, and it is believed that, with further discussion and greater and deeper contact, more positive results will follow.

Q. The method of discussion which you have adopted in dealing with the manifestation of small organisations now being formed on the Palestinian field leads us to a specific question: Why do you not continue to use this same method with the PFLP, which in your opinion is a truly commando organisation, to overcome the obstacles which stand in the way of its participation in the PLO or in the front, and in PASC? I believe that I am right in holding Fateh responsible for the realisation of this participation, considering that Fateh represents the greatest weight in the field of Palestinian action.

A. As regards the PFLP, we constantly hold discussions with it, and we on our part will not stop this discussion. It was we who first began the discussion before the PFLP was split resulting in the separation of the National Liberation Front, known as Ahmad Jibril's Group, from the PFLP. Then intellectual developments took place within the PFLP which split it further into two divisions, the one declaring itself to be Marxist-Leninist under the leadership of the *Al-Hurriyya* magazine group and Nayef Hawatima and calling itself the Democratic Popular Front, and the other advocating Marxism under the leadership of Dr. George Habbash, but their method of action is different from that of the others. These circumstances of division within the PFLP constantly hampered our discussions. Instead of trying to talk the PFLP into entering the frame of the unity of Palestinian action, we had to talk them into restoring talks among themselves first. This was a very important aspect which took much of our time, particularly when we wanted to speak frankly. When matters reached the

point of conflict between the two divisions, it took considerable effort on our part to stop armed clashes between them in the streets of Amman and elsewhere. It was necessary to exert effort to prevent armed clashes between groups of the PFLP. The dialogue was therefore continuous, but it could not bring about the desired union between the PFLP and *Fateh* or PASC unless the basic problem was solved within the contingents of the PFLP itself. Thus the discussions lasted long days and nights, centring around the unity of the PFLP itself. We succeeded in preventing armed clashes, as we succeeded in distinguishing between the Democratic Popular Front, the Popular Front originally representing the Arab Nationalist Movement, and Ahmad Jibril's group which took the distinctive name of "General Command". At the first stage of the discussion we succeeded in establishing these verbal differences in nomenclature among the three divisions. This stage lasted more than two months... nearly three months. When it came to discussing the constitution of the National Congress of the PLO, none of the members of the PFLP was in a position to discuss the National Congress but certain groups in the Front demanded postponement of the meeting. Others, like Ahmad Jibril's group, demanded a higher proportion of representatives, while a third group, the Democratic Popular Front, refused at first to regard the PLO as common ground for the meeting of all groups, but later abandoned this position and joined PASC. Thus you see that the dialogue with the PFLP has never been interrupted, but has involved matters of first priority concerning the PFLP itself. After matters had been settled within the PFLP and after the meeting of the National Congress and the election of the new leadership, we made attempts to contact the three groups of the PFLP. The Democratic Popular Front applied to join PASC, and the condition imposed by the PLO Executive Committee was that the Democratic Popular Front should recognise the PLO's National Covenant in writing. The group submitted its application and declared that it considered itself to be bound by all the terms of the National Covenant (as a minimum programme) in respect of relations within PASC.

Our contact with the General Command group continues. As to the Arab Nationalist Movement,

and the PFLP, we established contact with them through the PLO Executive Committee directly. At that meeting all the reservations which the PFLP had on the subject of the PLO were put forth, and it was understood that no difference existed on the subject of joining the PLO except on the level of broad generalities. It was agreed to hold another meeting to discuss all these matters in a specific manner. Another meeting was also held between *Fateh* and the PFLP to persuade the latter to join PASC as a first stage. PASC does not impose any conditions, nor does it involve any susceptibilities, because it has to do only with unified military action which has no direct connection with the PLO and its present form, but is connected with the military effort itself. Our brothers of the PFLP were of the opinion that the whole structure of the National Congress should be revised to enable them to join PASC. This meant that we were to go back to the first discussion when it was proposed that the coming together within the National Congress should be on the basis of equivalent proportions for the Front and all other organisations. The discussion went on about the subject of the small organisations and how they were to be represented. The PFLP stipulated that all small organisations should be represented in equivalent sizes within the Congress. This would restart the discussion about the front and what structure it should have. Generally speaking, the dialogue is still going on and will continue.

Q. We hope so, as we hope that through this dialogue you will achieve positive results, the minimum limit of which, in my opinion, is unity of action. There is another point which I would like to discuss: it concerns the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command. As I see it, this Command comes after what was called the Military Coordination Bureau. The first question here is this: Is the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command, as its name implies, a more advanced formula in the unified field of resistance action than the Coordination Bureau? The second question is: If the name expresses the actual fact and if therefore PASC is more advanced than the Coordination Bureau, in what ways is it more advanced? The third question is: Is PASC, in Fateh's opinion, the last and final step towards the unity of resistance action or are there further steps to be taken? How do you conceive these steps, within publishable limits, of course?

A. The Palestinian Armed Struggle Command is an important step towards the unity of commando action. Furthermore, it is undeniably more advanced than the Coordination Bureau.

The Coordination Bureau was a sort of gathering which included representatives of the various organised groups. To tell you frankly — for we believe that we should discuss our affairs with the utmost frankness — the Bureau unfortunately confined its activities to co-ordinating relations among the commando organisations and attempting to settle problems which might arise among military operations or military plans, or any joint action to be planned and executed under a single command, although the organisations had of their own accord undertaken joint operations on the field of battle to face enemy defiance.

True, the Coordination Bureau was a first step forward, but I believe, as practical experience has shown, that it was neither sufficient nor satisfactory, nor was it specific enough for any person who wanted to give the Palestinian people a general command for their armed struggle. When the Palestine Liberation Organisation's new Executive Committee was elected, it set out to lay down new bases for closer relations among the organisations taking part in the National Council and the leadership of the Liberation Organisation. Care was taken to avoid setting up a command merely on paper, or one of a purely ceremonial character with a resounding name, or one that simply inherited the Coordination Bureau. What was needed was a real command which was effective in action, and which grouped together all the contingents taking part in the leadership. It may appear as a unity of information, or a mere title, but, as we know, every action requires first a thorough objective study of the actual situation and of the possibilities, followed by a third stage consisting in the actual implementation of the plan. We may say that we have almost completed the first two stages and are now entering the third stage: that of implementation of the plan.

Q. Can we infer from this that we are about to witness joint resistance operations participated in by all the forces of the organisations affiliated to the Liberation Organisation under the unified Armed Struggle Command?

A. Yes. Training for the operations will take place under a unified command and will be participated in by *Fateh's* Al-Asifa forces working side by side with the Liberation Army forces, the Al-Saiqa forces and the forces of the Popular Democratic Front. All the forces will undertake combined operations according to unified standards and considerations of efficiency, potential and circumstances of operation. Thus in some cases within the framework of the plan a particular group may be chosen to undertake a specific operation consisting entirely of, let us say, Al-Saiqa elements, or a group consisting of Al-Saiqa, Al-Asifa and Liberation Army forces working together, and so on, as the command may deem suitable considering training, efficiency, knowledge of the land, etc.

I do not disclose a secret when I say that the Armed Struggle Command will commence its functions on an important scale very shortly.

Nor do I disclose any secret when I say that the recent operation which resulted in the occupation of Al-Hamma (May 2, 1969), was undertaken on the basis of a plan made by the Armed Struggle Command.

Although the operation was executed by *Fateh's* Al-Asifa forces alone, yet the plan was the result of a new thinking on the part of the Armed Struggle Command itself.

Q. I notice that you have used the term "new thinking" in connection with the planning for the Al-Hamma operation. Does this mean that, in your opinion, the Al-Hamma operation represents a new development in resistance action?

A. Undoubtedly the Al-Hamma operation was a turning-point and a new development in commando action.

Y. *How?*

A. As you know, our commando action was confined to the traditional rule of "hit and run" in guerrilla warfare. Although adherence to this rule is necessary, particularly in the beginning, we have actually practised a limited type of confrontation with the enemy in some of the phases during which the hit-and-run rule prevailed. Such confrontation took place on a relatively large scale in connection with the Israeli aggression against Karameh in March 1968.

After Karameh, we undertook other types of limited confrontation, as in Karantal and Wadi Al-Kalt for instance.

This limited confrontation was an introduction to the Al-Hamma operation. What does Al-Hamma operation mean? It means the occupation of an enemy-controlled position for a limited period of time during which the enemy's forces and potentialities in that position are wiped out. Thus with the Al-Hamma operation we enter a new phase in the guerrilla war, the phase of occupying certain positions and completely wiping out all enemy forces there. Naturally, we select these positions carefully on the basis of extremely complex considerations with the object of striking at the greatest possible number of targets, considering the political, military, economic and psychological effects of such occupation and mopping-up operations within the enemy camp.

This phase is in itself a preparation for the next phase which is now occupying the attention of the planning and strategic thinking authorities in the resistance movement. I am referring to the phase of occupying positions, mopping them up and holding them. This phase will begin once we have completed the transfer of all our bases into the occupied territory, at which time there will be full, deep and effective engagement of all forces within the occupied territory.

Q. This means control of what in guerrilla terminology is known as "liberated areas".

A. Exactly.

Q. There is no doubt that, once the resistance movement has succeeded in wresting "liberated areas" from the occupying enemy, it will enter the phase of total liberation war. But allow me, since we have undertaken from the outset to face our problems with frankness for the purpose of taking a real and firm stand, to raise here one question. It takes into consideration the often repeated allegations by certain Western press observers and by Israeli sources themselves that Israel has achieved success against resistance operations through the use of electronic defences and electrified wire around certain occupied areas, and also that Israel has discovered a number of resistance cells inside the land. Although I am convinced that there are intentional exaggerations in this kind of talk for the purpose of achieving a psycho-

logical effect, yet there is the specific fact that such electronic defences and electrified wire have actually been installed, and that there are cells which have fallen into enemy hands. Consequently, the question here is this: To what extent has all this actually affected resistance operations and the required development towards the liberated areas stage which you have mentioned? Naturally, historical experience assures us that no liberation movement in any land has failed to face such obstacles or failed to overcome them in the end.

A. Naturally... not everything the enemy or Western observers say in this connection is true. Exaggerations are made with the express intention of influencing us psychologically.

But as honest and responsible people we must admit that some of what is being said is true. We neither deny this nor try to conceal it. On the contrary, we face it and endeavour to take it in our stride. In the past, when we began our armed struggle before the war of June 1967, we did so with limited numbers, but today we are pursuing the struggle with a human, technical, military and organisational force which is altogether out of proportion with that of the past. In any event, we have not for a moment lost sight of the fact that the enemy whom we are facing possesses considerable power and potential, especially since the whole experience of imperialism in the area is placed at his disposal. The enemy has learned from Nazism and from America's experience in Vietnam. We all know that Dayan stayed for some time with the American forces in Vietnam before the June war to familiarise himself with America's experience in facing the Vietnamese Liberation Army and its guerrilla operations. Moreover, the enemy is constantly developing its arsenal and taking advantage of colonial experience against the people's armed resistance in all parts of the world. You are therefore in the face of an enemy who possesses advanced science, advanced technique and advanced experience. To face this, the resistance movement must be armed with advanced science, advanced technique and advanced experience. We keep this fact in mind night and day.

As a matter of fact, the question of Arab tendency to support Palestinian resistance has been raised in this connection. The resistance movement is now totally self-reliant. Arab attitudes, Arab science and Arab experience still have a long

way to go towards serious and effective participation or even helping Palestinian resistance to solve the problems facing it, and they are now insistently called upon to contribute their part. There is for instance the electronic line established by the enemy. There are the fortifications and other installations set up along the frontiers, the small area of our land, the organisation of the occupied territory dividing Palestine into special security zones. Thus Nablus is a special security zone comprising air fighters, helicopters, armoured vehicles, infantry, parachutists and communication units, the whole constituting a security unit capable of moving with all speed in times of danger. The first thing that Israel did on the West Bank and in all occupied areas was to construct a wide network of roads assuring the security units of extreme mobility towards any area where any clash or resistance operation took place.

The secret of Israeli mobility lies here and not, as the enemy claims, in the strength of the intelligence system. I am in a position to declare here from experience and with full responsibility that what is being rumoured concerning the strength of Israeli intelligence is a myth. Israel does not possess an advanced intelligence system, but it is admitted that it makes use of the scanty information received, which it immediately communicates to its various units for their use.

The fact to be stressed here is that the resistance movement is in need of Arab support on the level of scientific knowledge and technical know-how to enable it to face and outwit the Israelis' developed science and know-how.

Q. Naturally this is an urgent duty which is incumbent upon all scientific and technical institutions in the Arab homeland. One possibility is the formation of a technical bureau manned by Arab scientists and experts on a voluntary basis. However, I note that you have not replied to my specific question about the effect of the electronic defences and electrified wire on resistance action and the extent of this effect. Does it, for instance, prevent entry into the occupied territory at the required rate?

A. It has not prevented entry. It has, however, affected entry operations and has consequently led us to change our entry tactics. We continue to enter as evidenced by the constant attacks made by our forces. Not a single day passes without our

forces undertaking more than one operation within the occupied territory.

Q. In this connection, how do you estimate the enemy's losses as a result of your operations? I recall that in a discussion with Guevara while he was in Cairo in 1965 he said that the estimation of the enemy's real losses is one of the most complicated problems for any armed resistance movement or guerrilla war.

A. This is true, and it is for this reason that we in Fateh — you may have noticed this — have adopted the policy of not mentioning the full number, as reflected by the communiqués of Al-Asifa. Although this sort of statement is conventional, yet it is less heavy on the ears than saying that we killed 10 or 20 and injured 30 or 40. Also, it has been agreed within the Armed Struggle Command not to mention the number of men killed or injured, although in many cases we are sure of the actual figures. This, however, does not prevent us from estimating enemy losses for each of our operations on the basis of reports submitted by the combatants taking part in that operation. Each combatant submits to his command a detailed written report about the operation and the losses involved, and the estimate is always taken as the average of all these reports. We do this to avoid falling in the error of exaggeration, since we know that our people are very sensitive on this point.

Q. Now permit me to move to another point which in my opinion is of extreme importance: that of Fateh's understanding of the relation between military action and political action, and consequently between the military command and political leadership. Which shall direct the other? Which shall have the authority to make decisions? Whose opinion shall prevail in the event of a difference on major issues? You are undoubtedly aware of the criticism directed against Fateh for having confined itself to purely military action without linking it with specific political objectives along specific lines and with the organised popular mobilisation of the Palestinian masses. This criticism, in my opinion, is highly significant and calls for comment on your part, particularly since Fateh was the first to open the way for armed resistance in the Palestinian field.

In your reply to this criticism, I hope that you will elucidate a number of points. First, how was Fateh formed, or what were the objective circumstances which gave rise to Fateh and led to the adoption of the armed

struggle line? Secondly, does Fateh consider that armed struggle is an end in itself? To put it more correctly, is it a strategic aim or only one of the means to the end which it seeks to attain through its struggle? If it is one of the means, what place does it occupy among the various means? Thirdly...

A. One by one, please.

Q. Do you not agree that it is preferable for me to give you first a complete idea about this matter instead of discussing it piecemeal?

A. I agree, but may I ask you to clarify further the second point in your question? The point regarding the circumstances which attended the formation of *Fateh* and its adoption of the armed struggle line is clear enough. It is the second point as to whether *Fateh* considers armed struggle to be a means or an end in itself which needs further clarification.

Q. What I mean is this: Does Fateh in its conception of the methods for fighting Zionism and its Israeli manifestation stop at the method of armed struggle alone or does it consider that besides armed struggle there are other essential methods which are vital for the management of the effort? In other words, is Fateh impelled by a purely military concept or by an all-pervading political concept armed with a whole variety of skills, including military skill?

A. All right. As a matter of fact, *Fateh* was initially a reaction to a combination of Arab situations and errors which characterised Arab politics and Arab political parties. All this made many Palestinians of the younger generation feel that party politics and disunion did not provide the right setting for the solution of their country's problem. The fifties presented an odd situation in which all young Palestinians, with rare exceptions, were members of some party or political movement, and those who were not so affiliated were held in disrespect and regarded as a burden on society. The affiliations of the young Palestinians ranged from the extreme right to the extreme left. There were some who believed that the problem could be solved by religious means, while others regarded communism as the right path. Still others took a nationalist direction through the nationalist parties which at that time were represented by the Ba'th Party and later by the Arab Nationalist Movement which began its activities with vengeance, blood, steel and fire.

Our youth who mingled with all these parties and movements but found that they did not provide the way for the liberation of their country detached themselves consciously from such parties and movements. This detachment originally involved party affiliations rather than ideological matters. I believe that we have now reached a stage where the entire world is experiencing rifts in the left. We hear of a left and a left of the left, and we may still hear of another left. Thus the objective circumstances were those of an Arab homeland in great ferment. In the beginning, the Palestinian people gave expression to this ferment through the formation of a number of secret organisations. It may also be said that the success of the Algerian revolution had much to do with this trend of thought, since our young Palestinians came to feel that they were not of a lower mettle than their Algerian brothers and that they too were capable of raising the banner of armed struggle and of putting it into effect as well. But the Arab situation as a whole was against this, and consequently the young Palestinians were inevitably led to resort to secret action. When the Palestine Liberation Organisation was formed, it was believed by some that the purpose of the Organisation was to absorb the discontent which had begun to permeate all sections of the Palestinian people and to give expression to the Palestinian people's unrest and its determination to build a Palestinian national revolutionary movement. In brief, the formation of the Liberation Organisation was at first an attempt to circumvent this true revolutionary unrest. This is the reason why at first we objected to the Organisation. It was much too superior and overbearing. It did not spring from below, but was imposed from above. Under these circumstances, secret Palestinian action began to be considered. Admittedly, secrecy has its drawbacks as well as its advantages. If we analyse these organisations, we find that many of them are part of a plan to undermine the truly revolutionary movements. Some organisations were formed by a number of Arab embassies, while others were formed by certain Palestinians whose historical role had ended at a point beyond which they were incapable of advancing. At the same time, a number of Arab parties were trying to form secret organisations in a vain attempt to keep pace with the truly revolutionary groups. *Fateh*

believed that words were no longer of any avail and that it was imperative to launch a serious and effective struggle, even with modest possibilities at first. This is how we began.

Q. At that starting point, what exactly was Fateh?

A. At that time *Fateh* was a group of young Palestinians who revolted against the situation then prevailing, a situation characterised by disunion, particularly after the secession coup, and the defeat suffered by the Arab parties in undertaking any real act of struggle. The young men who dissociated themselves from this situation and revolted against it were the founders of *Fateh*.

Q. What was the social nature of these young men who founded and led Fateh in the beginning? To my mind, they were mostly, if not wholly, educated Palestinians, the majority of whom sprang from the middle class.

A. Naturally they were essentially educated Palestinians. They reasoned that some way must be found to change the existing situation, and it was therefore necessary to take action, that is, to embark upon an armed struggle. Under the circumstances, this action had to rely on extremely modest potentialities.

It is no longer a secret that at the time there were two points of view, the one asserting that no armed struggle could be undertaken before *Fateh* had achieved such popular and military entrenchment as would enable it from the beginning to undertake strong action capable of continuing without interruption, and the other stating that it was necessary to commence action even with the most modest potential, which was bound to grow and develop in the course of action. The second point of view prevailed, and we began to act.

As in every truly revolutionary undertaking, *Fateh* faced a strong attack at the outset. In each country this attack took the form of an accusation directed against *Fateh* according to the circumstances of that country.

Naturally, some countries regarded *Fateh* as reactionary, etc., while other quarters accused it of being communist, Marxist, and what not.

Q. While in reality it was...?

A. As I have already mentioned, it was a national liberation movement. In brief, it was decided to launch action — armed struggle —

in spite of inadequate potential. Before the commencement of military action, we used to publish a magazine called *Our Palestine* which expressed the opinions of the younger generation without openly referring to *Fateh* or Al-Asifa. When this magazine wrote that the Palestinian people would inevitably establish itself as an independent entity which had its own will and identity, we were accused of regionalism. This accusation originated from the parties which had nationalist dimensions, but these parties have now begun to reconsider their attitude towards this matter. In the face of all these accusations, in addition to those alleging that we were Nazis or Fascists, we saw the necessity for identifying ourselves before the Palestinian people in particular and the Arab people in general with an armed action on a progressive national level which would lead the nation on the right path to liberation. Thus, as I have said, the point of view advocating immediate action in spite of inadequate potential at the time prevailed. At that time, the rise of *Fateh* as a militant force coincided with the appearance of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Q. Before proceeding to another subject, I should like to know, if I may, what financial resources Fateh had for undertaking its military operations initially. However inadequate its possibilities were, there was undoubtedly the question of financing.

A. The movement was financed from purely Palestinian sources. In view of our secretive policy — a policy which we carried to an extreme in the beginning, we decided not to take a single millieme from other than *Fateh* members. It may now be said — this is no longer a secret — that we followed the policy of obtaining employment and business activity in the oil-rich Arab regions, like the Arabian Gulf. This was possibly one of the reasons which created a particular kind of atmosphere around *Fateh*, but this did not deter us because our aim was to achieve self-sufficiency for the revolutionary movement in everything, particularly the financial aspect. Our members used to deprive themselves even of the barest essentials needed by a person working in the Gulf area because they were anxious to save the greatest possible portion of their income or salaries for the benefit of the movement — one-half at least, and often more.

Before starting operations — this secret may now be disclosed — we imposed on every member the requirement of paying to a special fund a large sum of money which he was to secure by any means, even by borrowing if need be. The reason for this was that before starting our armed struggle operations we took into account even the worst possibilities, such as the possible failure of the movement and the death of a large number of comrades, and it was incumbent upon us to assure their families of a certain sum of money which would help them to survive irrespective of all else. We deposited this fund in trust with a group of reliable Palestinians for disbursement, particularly to martyrs' families, in the event that any untoward thing should happen to Palestinian action or to the movement.

Q. Fateh began its armed struggle on 1 January 1965, did it not?

A. Yes, on 1 January 1965, after the decision was taken to commence operations in spite of inadequate potential.

Q. May we know something about Fateh's first military operation? What exactly was its objective, both militarily and politically?

A. The first operation was a clash with an Israeli military patrol. But the first operation that was really significant for *Fateh* was the next one which struck at the Jordan tributaries diversion lines. In 1965, as you know, the main subject of discussion for which summit conferences were held was this diversion. We saw that from this diversion point it was possible to start the Palestinian revolution, a revolution which would continue and produce its effect on the colonialist racial Zionist presence in our country, and from there to develop the diversion scheme into the supreme cause: liberation. This was to be done by striking at Israel's diversion operations with our then modest means. We performed the operation during which the first Al-Asifa combatant, our brother Mahmoud Hijazi, was taken captive. He was tortured and tried, and is still bravely suffering torture in prison until this day. The reason why he was taken captive was that his rifle was rusty and unfortunately did not help him.

Another unfortunate incident in this operation was the death of our first martyr, Ahmad Musa,

not by enemy fire, but by an Arab bullet upon his return following the completion of the operation. The orders issued to him and to all men in the contingents which were sent for the first time into the occupied territory commanded them to refrain under all circumstances from engaging Arab troops upon their return, even if fired on. They were to die, if need be, without firing a single shot at any Arab soldier, who was totally innocent and a brother to us. Our aim was to prevent our commandos from killing any Arab, even in self-defence, and to ensure that commando action shall from the start draw a clear picture of the bloody tragedy which our Palestinian people is suffering.

Q. What was the reaction to your first operation?

A. We felt the response which the Palestinian and Arab masses had to our action. In fact, the response was mostly favourable, if we except certain groups and voices, some of whom adopted the line of direct attack, as in the case of certain Arab papers in which the combatants read while returning from their heroic operation an accusation to the effect that CENTO agents had been operating in the area. Others, also adopting a direct line, admitted that the operation was good and worth-while, but blamed it for failing to co-ordinate in advance with the free Arab countries, some demanding a joint plan between the commandos and the Arab governments at the time. A third group said that the timing was wrong, and others said that it was a matter of one or two adventures which had ended and there was no future in such action.

But the operations succeeded one another, and so did the communiqués... the third communiqué, the fourth, the fifth... The tongues of accusation and criticism became silent to a large extent, and popular response widened.

Alongside the inadequacy of our arms and the lack of support from the national forces which were expected to back our armed struggle, official Arab quarters for the most part fought *Fateh* in various ways. For instance, the Unified Arab Command issued recommendations and circulars which fell into our hands, calling upon the Arab countries not to encourage the commandos and not to publicise any military operation carried out by *Fateh's* Al-Asifa forces.

Q. What, in your opinion, was the purpose or motive behind this?

A. I believe that it was an attempt to disorganise the masses from armed struggle. At that time we were faced by a conspiracy of silence in most Arab countries, the aim of which was to prevent the masses of the people from adopting the principle of armed struggle and from giving it all they could. To be fair, we must mention that some Arab papers tried to publish Israeli communiqués about our operations where they were not in a position to publish *Fateh's* military communiqués.

Naturally we did not stand helpless before the wall of silence which we endeavoured at all times to penetrate through all means. For instance, we issued secret publications which were distributed throughout the Arab homeland, but in spite of the great number of copies which we distributed, the circulation was essentially limited in view of the vastness of the area.

Q. How long do you think this wall — the wall of silence — continued to stand? How did it collapse? When? Was it after or before the June 1967 defeat?

A. In reality it was before the June 1967 defeat, when the Israelis committed their aggression against Samu' Village (November 13, 1966), with the result that the Jordanian masses rose as one man to proclaim their strong support for commando action and to demand that it be given full freedom of action. The demonstrations, which spread all over the country, took everybody by surprise because they were spontaneous, not planned in advance, and expressed the true feelings of the people. The national and progressive forces were not capable of comprehending the full significance of these demonstrations, nor were they agreed on a unified programme to reap their fruits. They soon lost momentum and measures were redoubled against commando action. Adverse propaganda through press conferences and radio broadcasts announced that the subject of the commandos was not peculiar to Jordan alone, that the position to be taken with regard to it was a general Arab position, and that this position was being taken in compliance with the orders of the Unified Arab Command. Naturally this Command was subject to organised exploitation because it comprised at

the time, in addition to Jordan, several other régimes.

However, the most important thing in all this was that the conspiracy of silence which had been woven around the commandos collapsed, even through the action of the counter-measures themselves. The number of detainees in some Arab countries reached a very high figure. They were not all members of *Fateh*; any patriot suspected of having any connection with or of supporting *Fateh* or commando action was put under arrest.

Q. What took place after the June defeat?

A. We all know that the defeat engendered a state of bewilderment among the Arab masses who at the same time rejected any notion of surrender. The enemy may imagine that their victory of June 10 put an end to the Six Day War, as the Israelis call it, but on the very next day June 11 *Fateh's* Al-Asifa men carried their arms into the occupied territory for the first time after defeat. The value of the June 11 initiative lay in the fact that it ignored all attitudes of despair and bewilderment and gave effect to the determination of the Arab people in general and the Palestinian people in particular not to give up but to continue fighting the enemy without respite.

Thereafter our patrols closely succeeded one another inside the territory. I may be divulging a secret when I say that the great majority of *Fateh* leaders entered the occupied territory to join those who were already there for the purpose of organising the resistance of the Palestinian masses.

It was not easy at first, and many difficulties had to be overcome. In training for instance, we faced the difficulty of combat training under enemy occupation, in spite of the absolute secrecy which we imposed. The enemy was very active in deploying its communications and observation posts at a time when our observation posts and communications had not yet the capacity for effective confrontation which they now have. Consequently, the enemy from time to time discovered training cells in the mountains and took ruthless action against them. The commandos were not capable of hitting back effectively at the time because the arms which they had were

of a very archaic type dating back to past wars and revolutions. Naturally this resulted in some casualties during training.

Q. With due regard to military secrets, how then did you face the problem of modern armament?

A. As a matter of fact the setback here brought an advantage in the matter of armament. After the defeat we sent special contingents to the occupied battle areas with the specific object of collecting the greatest possible amount of Arab arms abandoned in large quantities. It may be said in all frankness that, after the defeat, *Fateh* took a quantity of arms which far surpassed, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the amount it had taken throughout its period of struggle and even after the Arab countries' recognition of the Palestinian resistance movement and its effort. This was our main source of supply.

Q. But the need for arms to carry on resistance recurs and increases with the growing breadth and depth of its operations, and it is therefore necessary to find other sources. According to historical experience in all resistance movements, one important source of arms supply is always the enemy side itself, the arms that are captured. Did you take this into account? If so, what was the approximate proportion?

A. Enemy arms are a basic element in guerilla warfare, an element which we have taken and will continue to take into consideration at all times. To be realistic, I must tell you frankly that we still consider that the quantity of arms which we have taken from the enemy is not sufficient, and I estimate its ratio to total armament at not more than 10 %. Naturally, this ratio will inevitably be doubled and redoubled, and this matter is part of our calculations and plans.

Q. With your permission, we shall now return to the general trend of our discussion. How did you face the situation and its difficulties and complications immediately following the defeat?

A. We concentrated mainly on battle training for guerrilla warfare on the one hand, and on the reorganisation of former cells which existed under Arab rule — I mean Jordan — as well as the formation of new cells to face the requirements of the situation after the whole of Palestine had fallen under Israeli occupation. The response to reorganisation and the appeal to join the resis-

tance movement was so great that it exceeded all expectations, and the people's immense enthusiasm provided us with great potential.

It may now be said that this training and cell reorganisation stage ended precisely on August 29 1967 and a new stage began: that of the commencement of organised and relatively large-scale resistance.

Q. Why precisely August 29 1967?

A. Before that date we had gone a long way towards completing our training and had organised our major cell systems. The important thing was that we had completed the operation of transferring the greatest possible quantity of arms abandoned in occupied Arab territory.

I should like here to clarify an important point. It was possible to postpone the commencement of organised large-scale resistance a few weeks after 29 August 1967 to enable us to complete the training of greater numbers and the establishment of wider cell systems, and to develop further the level and quality of our organisations, but we were compelled to launch resistance on that date by an operation in Jerusalem and other operations in Tulkarm and other areas.

Q. Why?

A. For a number of important considerations. First of all, it was not sound from the political, military or psychological angles to immobilise the organisations and fighting forces after we had reached such a degree of training, organisation and armament. Secondly, immobilisation would have exposed us to greater danger. Thirdly, the enemy had begun to be aware and to molest some of our secret bases.

Accordingly we decided to strike to avoid being taken by surprise in the event of a counter-attack by the enemy. We actually began and *Fateh* remained alone in the field, carrying on armed resistance, until December 1967, when some of our brothers of the Popular Front joined us in the struggle from the first half of January 1968. Thereafter the operations continued, and small organisations were formed one after the other until we reached the situation which I have already described. These are the main points concerning the formation of *Fateh* as well as its thinking and action, within publishable limits.

Q. Before proceeding to another subject, I should like to know, if I may, how the decision of August 29, 1967 was taken, and who took the final and binding decision in the matter. In other words, was the decision taken on the basis of a political view and a full analysis of the situation in all its aspects, or on the basis of a purely military view to forestall a possible counter-attack by the enemy, or the wish to avoid immobilising the cells and combatants who were eager for military action? By whom was the decision taken? Was it by the Organisation's political leadership or by the combatants' military command? May I request that the reply include if possible, a more complete definition of the relation between political action and military action in Fateh?

A. Thank you for giving me by this question the opportunity of explaining *Fateh's* understanding of this important matter. You are undoubtedly aware of the accusation directed against *Fateh* to the effect that it is concerned with military action alone, that it is a group of nationalist adventurers — this has actually been said — whose sole concern is to strike and kill and terrify the enemy, and that it is imprisoned within this antiquated circle from which it does not wish to come out to the wider political horizon.

To tell you the truth, I am still unable to understand the reasons on which this accusation is based. Is it possible in any armed resistance, guerrilla war or liberation movement for military action to exist separately from political action? We in *Fateh* see clearly that no military action is of any value unless it serves a political line and forms part of an all-inclusive political plan. *Fateh's* first nucleus arose as a political entity under the circumstances of a political situation which it rejected and opened for itself a different political path in the belief, which it still holds, that it is the right path leading to the goal. From this political line taken by *Fateh* grew the military action of armed resistance as an embodiment of this political configuration. Military action is a sequel to *Fateh's* political action in its true perspective. In a liberation movement, political policy springs from the mouth of the rifle, and we in *Fateh* are fighters in the political field as well as in the military field. Each of these fields serves and complements the other within *Fateh's* general strategic plan. Thus we do not differentiate between political action and military action, and to emphasise this we refrain from sending

to the armed resistance field any combatant unless he passes through our political organisation.

Q. Does this mean that all Al-Asifa combatants first passed through the stage of political membership in Fateh and linked themselves with its political organisation which then submitted them for military action?

A. This is the basic principle which is now in full application. But, to be honest with you, an exception to this basic rule has been made under certain specific circumstances on the basis of political appreciation. I do not wish to conceal from you the fact that, in spite of the compelling circumstances which led to this exception, it caused us some problems which I am not now in a position to disclose or discuss. These problems deepened our belief in the necessity of adhering to the basic rule that *Fateh* men should first be politicians and then fighters. The exception was made during the first difficult period following the defeat when we were compelled to accept fighting volunteers directly without passing through the membership of *Fateh's* political organisation, but we soon returned to the application of the basic rule about two months after the Battle of Karameh. Fighting volunteers are no longer accepted directly but through our political organisation. This will show you that political organisation and political thinking is the leader.

Q. One question for further clarification: When a particular operation is under consideration, the fighting force may have an idea. Is its military command permitted to carry it out directly, or is it first discussed on the political level along with the military considerations, the final decision to be taken by the political leadership?

A. It would perhaps be advisable for me to reply to this question by giving you an actual example which has been kept secret until now but there is no longer any harm in revealing it. When we decided that the time had come for the launching of organised large-scale armed resistance, what happened? Our brothers inside, mostly military and political figures, wanted resistance to start on August 20, 1967, but those outside had a different idea. What did we do? We called the entire political leadership including those who were inside, like Brother Abu Ammar, specifically for the purpose of debating the matter on the political and military levels with such

thoroughness as to take into account all circumstances and considerations. We asked those inside to accept postponement of operations until the leadership arrived at a decision, instead of the suggested August 20. Consequently operations did not start on August 20, and as a result of the discussions the situation became ripe for the commencement of armed resistance. This took nine full days, and therefore resistance did not start until August 29. This proves that we never undertake any military action except in the light of a general political line, for although resistance drives are of a military nature, yet they are at the same time political drives with planned political objectives. Where they are confined to purely military operations they become acts of demagogues, of adventurers. These false impressions, which have now been obliterated as proved by actual circumstances, may have resulted from the fact that, in facing the then existing political circumstances, we stressed that our basic method of fighting was armed struggle. Well, would you be surprised to learn that *Fateh* has no professional soldiers or military commanders? All combatants in *Fateh*, at any level, were originally university students, engineers, cultured persons or workmen. We have only a very small number of traditional militarists. This was regarded by some as a drawback for which we were blamed. Thus our first dispute with some of our brothers in the Organisation's Liberation Army concerned this very point. They used to ask us: "Where are the officers? The lieutenants? The captains? The majors?" etc. Our reply was that we were waging a war of liberation in which the men and the leaders were learning how to make war by actually making war. This would enable the army and its commanders to become a real and effective force in undertaking and leading the armed struggle in the long run according to plan. We do not have a single military commander who studied at a military academy. All our commanders have received their training in battle and have learnt the art of war by making war with the enemy, by experiencing and practising war daily.

Fateh's General Command has its Central Committee. Naturally, there is a sort of distribution of responsibilities and specialisation. There are those who have political duties and others

who have military duties, but all constitute one integral whole. When we began action in 1965 we issued a political statement, and we published another after 1967.

In this connection, there is one point which I would like to make clear. This is probably our first chance to announce that there is no such thing as *Fateh's* Military Wing, as mentioned in the press and radio broadcasts.

Q. How? What about Al-Asifa?

A. This is precisely the point. How did the term Al-Asifa originate? The basic and only thing we have is *Fateh*. However, when we began military operations in January 1965 — I have already explained that the majority in the conference which we held for this purpose were of the opinion that it was necessary to start in spite of inadequate means because potentialities could not grow except through action, while a minority disagreed with this opinion — the minority whose opinion had been rejected demanded that action be taken initially under a name other than *Fateh*, so that if the first operations should fail the result would have no effect on the continuity of *Fateh* and the completion of its preparations for the resumption of operations. Thus we used the name of Al-Asifa to launch the first operations under its banner without referring to *Fateh*. We did not mention *Fateh* or identify it with Al-Asifa except after about the tenth military communiqué and the success of the operations. Thereafter we decided that the name of Al-Asifa should continue because it had become a historic name and because in reality it was synonymous with the original name of our movement: *Fateh*.

Q. I do not know whether information concerning Fateh's organisational structure is today regarded as secret. It is up to you to determine this. What interests me is the kind of relations governing action among the combatants on the various levels in Fateh, from the base to the summit.

A. *Fateh's* organisational structure is a secret indeed, but, regarding the kind of relations, I can assure you that, following the complex circumstances of *Fateh's* secret emergence and after it had become fully prepared for organisation, these relations changed from extreme centralisation into a type of revolutionary democracy governed by specific organisational rules which were

binding on everybody from the base to the summit without distinction.

Q. There is another point. I have noticed from my contacts with you that you are all intent on stressing the collective character of Fateh's leadership. Then came your decision to designate Brother Abu Ammar as Fateh's official spokesman. What is the main idea behind this decision, and what are its repercussions on the principle of Fateh's collective leadership and its applications?

A. As you have said, collective leadership in *Fateh* is a basic and essential principle which has been arrived at not because we are fond of revolutionary expressions, but as a result of the conflicts suffered by us and by our young men who have had previous party experiences where individualism was one of the causes of failure or setback. Thus we have strongly reacted against individualism in all its forms and have been brought up to prefer, both subjectively and objectively, the principle of collectivity — the collectivity of leadership in particular. This collectivity is perhaps one of the reasons why *Fateh* has maintained its unity and cohesion in both organisation and action. *Fateh* was formed as a secret movement and consequently none of its leaders was known to the public. Their names were kept secret, and had it not been for personal contacts which were inevitable in the process of implementation none of them would have been known by name. Thus we were compelled to bring to light a few names, but there are members of our collective leadership whose names have remained unknown and who nevertheless may be better and purer than the rest of us whose names have been revealed because the requirements of our work have so dictated. With the expansion of our field of action and our success in justifying the existence of our movement and in proving its ability to shoulder responsibilities, we had to present to the masses a responsible person to be an authority, particularly since we noticed that certain publications and statements had begun to appear in Beirut under the name of *Fateh*, while in reality they had no connection with *Fateh*, nor did they express our opinion. Who could stand openly before the public and announce in the name of *Fateh* that this statement comes from *Fateh* and that does not? There was none. Moreover, the Israeli press and broadcasts

had begun to concentrate on the name of Brother Abu Ammar considering that he was one of *Fateh's* leaders inside the occupied territory and at the same time a leading combatant who shouldered both political and military responsibilities. We took a decision at a meeting of the leadership to designate him as *Fateh's* official spokesman. He himself was not present at the meeting, and he heard of the decision in the same way as many others did. There may have been a special reason for selecting him in addition to other reasons connected with his steadfastness in the fight. He is a man of few words, the least spoken of us all. The press has sometimes tried to lead him into discussion but he always succeeded in extricating himself except where it was really necessary to speak out and to clarify *Fateh's* position. It was actually suggested during the meeting of the leadership to designate three official spokesmen for *Fateh*, but none of them accepted. Since Brother Abu Ammar was the only member who was not present in the meeting, his designation was announced and he had to comply with the decision. As a matter of fact, the combatant in any liberation movement always prefers secrecy unless the imperative requirements of the movement dictate otherwise. You know the extent of the difficulty which we faced in nominating some of our colleagues in the leadership to the Palestine Liberation Organisation's Executive Committee in its new form because the nomination involved the announcement of their names. Thus there is no connection between Brother Abu-Ammar's designation as an official spokesman for our movement and the principles of collective leadership. The designation was made in response to urgent requirements.

Q. You have stated in the course of the discussion that military action is subject to Fateh's political lines and is intended to serve these lines. May we know the principal characteristics of these lines?

A. *Fateh's* political lines cannot be isolated from the objective circumstances in which *Fateh* was formed and under which it operates. Generally speaking, it is a national liberation movement which aims at mobilising the resources of the Palestinian people in their armed struggle to liberate the whole Palestinian territory from Zionist colonial settlement. When we say that *Fateh* is a national liberation movement — this

was announced from the very beginning, although perhaps in an inaudible voice — we mean that it regards itself as part of the general Arab revolution which has begun to take shape in certain sections of the Arab homeland. It also regards itself as part of the world liberation movement against imperialism although, for objective reasons and circumstances of which the Arab citizen is well aware, its effective and conscientious pursuit of this clear-cut political line has been confined to Palestinian territory. *Fateh* is sometimes taken to task — this will perhaps clarify the political line indirectly — for advocating the liberation of the territory alone, without reference to the human individual or society. We say that this is absurd, because the liberation of the territory cannot but lead us to the liberation of the human person. Every revolution which raises the standard of liberation and practices the armed struggle technique must necessarily be of a progressive nature. We have never heard in the whole history of the world that an adventurer has successfully opposed colonialism. During the stage of formation, *Fateh* willingly agreed to gather together all the young Palestinians who had been caught in the whirlpool of party politics in their attempt to give expression to their feeling of pain as Palestinian refugees. By so doing, it opened the door, without any complexes, for all these young men to reconsider their until then unproductive political activity and to take up the type of political activity that was productive, effective and armed with power. *Fateh* opened the door for all these young men who had been harbouring views and ideas connected with this or that group to bring them together within the frame of armed struggle which purifies the soul, does away with prejudices and leads along a truly progressive revolutionary line. Thus *Fateh* took it upon itself from the beginning to bring together all these people from the extreme right, as I have said, to the extreme left. Through reaction in the melting-pot of the revolution and through armed struggle, a truly revolutionary young generation cannot but arise and be prominent.

Q. What was the condition for their joining Fateh in view of the diversity of their ideological and party affiliations?

A. That they should dissociate themselves in

all consciousness, not from their ideas, but from their party affiliations; that Palestinian youth should believe in liberation and in armed struggle. This was a basic condition. In this connection we must make a distinction between strategy and tactics. Everything that *Fateh* has announced or will announce may be more connected with the requirements of the immediate stages of the national liberation movement than with long-term strategy. Let us take as an example the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab countries, a principle announced by *Fateh* as an obligation to which it commits itself. *Fateh* has been reproached for adopting an allegedly "rightist" policy, but I say that this is objectively sound since it requires *Fateh* not to concern itself with who shall become prime minister in this country or that. However, there is in reality an interconnection between Palestinian action and Arab action, and consequently we have always proclaimed that we are part of the Arab revolution. Where does this interconnection come from? We believe that none of the progressive policies announced by the Arab nation is capable of implementation except through our battle and the liberation of Palestine. Even the socialist régime and union cannot be achieved except through a real battle for the liberation of Palestine because the Arab nation's entire productive effort must necessarily be channelled towards this battle, regardless of whether this productive effort has or has not yet given forth its fruit. The important thing is that it should be directed towards the battle, for how can we build a progressive society in our country while we are having to allocate all our income and productive effort to the procurement of military hardware for use against the colonising aggressor? Therefore this policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab countries does not preclude interconnection between the Arab countries and Palestine. It is calculated to make its contribution towards the ripening of the concrete circumstances favouring the Palestine liberation movement with the full force of Arab effort without subsidiary disputes, and at the same time to create a revolutionary atmosphere around the Arab frontiers with the enemy and among the Arab people in the vicinity of these frontiers. The same contact may spread even to remote Arab lands to create a revolutionary atmosphere in which the whole

Arab nation will fight side by side with the Palestinian people. In this way the Arab nation's aspirations and revolutionary concepts will materialise through a real battle inside Palestine itself. Let us take Jordan or Lebanon as an example. All national and progressive forces, irrespective of their ideological beliefs, can act. There are some who hold that the small bourgeoisie has fallen and is no longer entitled to take part in the struggle, but *Fateh* has realistically progressed beyond such contentions as a result of its experiences. It believes that every Palestinian has a right to take part in the fight, irrespective of his situation. However, the leadership of Palestinian action must be placed in revolutionary hands which will not sell, bargain or divert this action to serve the interests of any reactionary forces. This is extremely vital. Nobody has the right to restrict action to a particular class. Besides, such restriction would weaken the liberation movement. There are classes or sections of classes now which were unknown in the days of Karl Marx. Did Marx study a class called the "displaced persons' class" which has appeared among the Palestinian people? The displaced person was a labourer who used to work as such in his country, but now he no longer works as a labourer. The displaced person was a farmer who is no longer engaged in farming. How do we evaluate this or that one? There is thus the displaced persons' class which imposes its presence and which cannot be defined according to traditional standards, although its circumstances and origin may be of a revolutionary character. It is a problem which we are treating without any complexes or fears.

There may be some who find fault with *Fateh* for failing to adopt a Marxist-Leninist line or something of this sort which would enable it to be described as progressive. My reply is that, if we examine the background and previous practices of those who now advocate this line, we find that these practices and background are remote from Marxism-Leninism. *Fateh*, which has never called itself Marxist-Leninist, was the first to practise armed struggle, the first to open the long way to this battle. However it may be, words alone are useless: actual practice is the real criterion. We assert that *Fateh* has many practices whose connection with progressive thought is stronger

than that of the self-styled partisans of this thought. The important thing in any revolutionary movement is not the mere announcement of an idea, but its actual implementation. No idea is of any value unless it is put into actual practice.

Q. This leads us to the question of Fateh's social structure. To put it more clearly, it was evident during Fateh's early formation that the prevailing element in its social structure was that of educated persons in the sense that most of its members and leaders were educated Palestinians. The question now is this: After the great evolution and expansion which Fateh has undergone, is the prevailing stamp still that of educated persons or has this stamp changed with the entry into Fateh of other social groups, such as workers, farmers, artisans, etc., after June 1967?

A. This is all closely and organically connected with the main policy which Fateh has consistently upheld: that of national liberation. The policy of national liberation is necessarily a broad one which accepts under its banner all the national forces, groups and classes which believe in national liberation. Nevertheless, one cannot under the circumstances deny the fact, which is quite in evidence, that the prevailing classes and groups in the armed struggle today are those of the revolutionary educated workers and farmers without distinction.

Q. In the formation of its members for the struggle, does Fateh concern itself with political formation along with fighting military formation? Do you find the opportunity while you are in the thick of your armed struggle to bring up politico-military cadres in special schools set up for this purpose? How does this take place, if such schools do exist?

A. Naturally, the formation of political and military cadres for Fateh is a fundamental matter without which it could not have continued to exist or to develop and grow stronger. With regard to national liberation, the thinking of our cadres is open to the Palestinian reality and to its problems and aims, in addition to the Arab reality and the international situation. Similarly, we give concentrated attention to the enemy reality because thorough knowledge of the enemy from every angle, including politics, economics, parties, ideologies, armed forces, etc., is a basic thing for every combatant in Fateh. Also, in the course of bringing up our cadres, we are aware of world

experience in national liberation, believing in the necessity of benefiting from this experience, but also believing at the same time that, to achieve real success, we must draw from our own circumstances and reality a national experience which would enrich world experience. We have been studying world revolutions and liberation movements and have published them in booklets which are distributed regularly and periodically to our cadres who discuss them freely at regular intervals. As to your question about cadre schools, we do have them but, to tell you the truth, we are dissatisfied with them and are now considering possibilities for their development and reinforcement. The work of some of them has been interrupted for reasons beyond our control during the phase of transition and development of our operations.

Q. As a matter of fact these transitional operations which you have just mentioned remind me of certain opinions stated about Palestinian resistance. I personally do not agree with these opinions, but I shall present them to you for your comment. Briefly, these opinions state that the guerrilla war, or the revolution, should spring from inside the occupied territory, while in fact, according to these opinions, Palestinian resistance takes place from outside the occupied territory. Naturally these are conventional opinions which do not take into account the nature of the objective conditions underlying the Palestinian resistance movement. I do not wish here to give you my detailed opinion, but I am anxious to know your opinion as well as the possibility and extent of mobilisation of all Palestinian forces inside and outside the occupied territory?

A. I believe that these opinions confuse two things: the armed liberation action led from the outside — in the present case it involves only part of the leadership — and a mass revolution actually originating from the inside. This fact is historically well-known in all national liberation movements.

As regards our revolution, the Palestinian people are revolting under objective conditions which are different and quite distinguishable from those of any other revolution in the world. Why? Because the people is disunited socially, politically and geographically. This situation inevitably imposes new, unconventional techniques and forms of struggle. Nevertheless we do not, in the general concept, constitute an innovation among

world revolutions. Let us consider the Yugoslav revolution for instance. In that revolution, there were vast areas and natural fortresses — Montenegro as I recall — where the revolution was led under Tito from inside Yugoslavia itself. This is one example, but there is another, the Algerian revolution, which was mostly led from the outside in spite of the vastness of the land and its natural fortifications, and notwithstanding the fact that the whole Algerian people was inside, but this did not prevent the revolution from going on and triumphing in the end.

In our Palestinian revolution, we are both inside and outside, which is normal. On the inside we are in our occupied country because we do not recognise the Zionist Israeli presence. Consequently we are in a perfectly natural situation which one cannot compare — as some Western papers try to do — to French resistance against the Nazis which was led from London. The external part of our leadership is separated from the occupied territory by a few metres.

The Zionist colonial settlers in our country have expelled part of our people from part of the land. As a result of this expulsion, it was inevitable that those who had stayed behind and kept their land should take up resistance. Where is the point of issue of our revolution? It is in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, both of which are parts of Palestine. We do not recognise a land called Israel, and the revolutionary movement must take place there because we regard it integrally as Palestine. It is part of the group of Arab lands surrounding Palestine all of which constitutes one single unit: the land of the Palestinian revolution. Our bases are located all throughout this land, and many of them are inside the occupied territory. Without these bases we could not at any time have undertaken any military action. Without them, our revolution would be as isolated as a stranger. Our internal and external bases provide the revolution with continued reinforcement by reason of the situation of our people as I have already indicated.

Q. In this connection, do you not agree that there has been constant neglect of the Arabs inside Israel and lack of appreciation of their difficult circumstances?

A. Frankly, I cannot say that there has been neglect or lack of appreciation. The proof is that

we all recognise that the greatest and most striking contemporary Arabic poetry is that of our brothers in the occupied territory, like Samih al-Qasem, Mahmud Darwish, Tawfiq Ziyad and others. Every one of them has enriched the Arab revolution in general and the Palestinian revolution in particular with the noble word which express human feeling and which urges the combatants on in their struggle.

At the same time, we fully appreciate their circumstances and do not try, either directly or indirectly, to embarrass them or to give the Fascist Zionist power any grounds for intensifying the oppression which they are facing with courage. We do not ask them to carry arms, nor do we expect them to do so.

Furthermore, we deeply appreciate the demonstrations — of which we and the whole world have heard — recently carried out by Palestinian men and women in Nazareth and the neighbouring villages in Upper Galilee. This furnishes proof of their adherence to the land and country in spite of all the torture, acts of terrorism, detention, imprisonment, expulsion from homes, forced residence, confiscation of the means of livelihood, etc. All such acts have been copied by the Zionists from the Nazis.

Thus we are not trying to organise them along the lines of *Fateh* because we are aware, as I have told you, of the Zionist brutality which dominates their treatment.

Q. But what about the Palestinian Arabs in the occupied territory since 1967?

A. I do not need here to say more than that mobilisation does exist, and is effective. The best proof of this is the daily demonstrations and the many and varied forms of passive resistance to the occupation. At this point we must refer with high appreciation to the Palestinian woman's part in the struggle which has reached the point of armed resistance. Israel's Nazi prisons are full of thousands of our people, both men and women, who reject the occupation and resist it by all means, suffering in the process the worst forms of mental and physical torture. In connection with prisons, let me tell you a story which took place more than two months ago at the prison in Nablus. Under pressure of world opinion, Israel permitted a Red Cross mission to visit our sisters detained in Nablus prison. The entire

group of women received the mission with a patriotic song which the prison warders vainly tried to stop. The women went on singing with a defiance which inflamed the whole prison, and very soon the male inmates joined in with a thunderous effect which echoed all around the prison area. In view of this courage displayed by the men and women of Palestine, the members of the Red Cross mission could not hide their deep feeling.

The fact is that one of the most important results of the Palestinian armed revolution has been the emergence of the Palestinian woman in her role as a combatant on an exactly equal footing with the Palestinian man in action and sacrifice, carrying arms, transporting them and effectively using them in battle. The main thing in all this is that, through the revolution, the Palestinian woman has set aside all the traditions by which we were brought up in the old Palestine. For the sake of her country's liberation, she is willing to brave torture, imprisonment and even death. This is where Israeli intelligence has failed, since its psychological propaganda has been based on the assumption that ancient tradition rules out the Palestinian woman as a fighting force. This is where the Palestinian people, both men and women, have triumphed over enemy propaganda. The enemy has launched accusations of rape, etc., but has been powerless to stop the Palestinian woman from joining the revolution and taking up arms in the face of the enemy.

Q. This is natural. In the course of armed national resistance true equality between man and woman is always realised through struggle and resistance to the enemy. This has happened in all colonised or occupied countries where armed liberation revolutions have taken place on a background of underdeveloped social relationships, such as Algeria, the underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia and Vietnam, and now Palestine.

A. This is true.

Q. With your permission, we shall now move on to another point. From reading Fateh's statements and documents and from discussions with its leaders like you and Brother Abu Ammar as well as others whom we do not need to mention, it is quite clear that Fateh is emphatic in making a careful distinction between Judaism and Zionism and that, while fighting Zionism, it bears no ill-will towards Judaism as representing

a human group and a religion. What does this mean in actual practice?

A. It means that the Palestinian revolution is fighting racialism, Fascism and colonialism and that consequently it is entirely free from racialism, Fascism and colonialism. It therefore does not take action nor does it bear arms against the Jews as human beings and as an integral part — or so it ought to be — of human society. It is against the racist Fascist Zionist movement which is occupying the homeland of the Palestinian people for the purpose of settling therein, thus proving that it is a colonial movement closely connected with imperialism. It is this movement with its concepts and organisations which elicits our enmity, and we are determined to fight it to the end.

This movement has two basic lines in its strategy:

The first line rests on the exploitation of what has happened to Jewish individuals and groups in Europe at the hands of the Nazis with the object of strengthening the persecution complex in the minds of the Jews so that they may easily fall in the net. Under the effect of this complex and other factors which are beyond the scope of this discussion the organisations in charge of the movement impel them to emigrate to Palestine, imbuing them with the evil spirit of revenge.

The second line is based on the assumption that the Jews cannot be accommodated in Palestine except through expansion, not only at the expense of Palestine itself but also at the expense of the neighbouring Arab countries.

These two lines of Zionist policy interact with each other under all circumstances. The best proof of this is that when immigration becomes slow in any year, Zionism and its organisations resort to the formation of secret societies manned by their own terrorists under cover of the Nazi emblem, the swastika, to start a Jew-baiting campaign with the object of spreading terror and strengthening the persecution complex among them to such a degree that they are impelled to emigrate to Israel. It has been possible to lift the veil off the face of these societies and to reveal their organic connection with the Zionist movement, as has happened in Brazil and various other parts of the world where anti-Semitism has broken out in a conspicuous manner. We therefore base

our word and deed on a deep consciousness of the distinction between Judaism and Zionism, and in this we are faithful to our long heritage, our Arab heritage and history. Even in the darkest ages we Arabs lived with the Jews in harmony and on a level of equality without prejudices of any sort. But no sooner had the Zionist movement come into existence than it began to poison the atmosphere, lay obstacles and subject our people to all the barbarous methods which it had learned from the Nazis, not to mention its colonialist usurpation of our homeland and the dispersion of the Palestinian people. The Zionists have put into effect their racial colonial plan under the slogan that God's *Chosen People* must dominate the earth. That Zionism takes every step to exploit religion most ruthlessly and to the greatest possible extent is quite evident. It has even gone the length of distorting and faking religious books to lead the Jews in all parts of the world into believing that their place is in the land of Palestine. In this connection we note the concurrence of all the dominant Zionist parties, which are non-religious. Take Dayan for example. He proclaims that he is non-religious, and yet following the occupation of Jerusalem he hastened to the Wailing Wall to kiss it. Why? To exploit religion and religious observances in trying to convince the Jews. Thus we are aware that the subject of the Jewish religion and the Jews is separate from that of Zionism and its colonial movement. Consequently, when we announced that the aim of our struggle was to build a democratic Palestinian state, it was not a tactical move on our part but the embodiment of a principle and the true expression of our strategy. We are convinced that among the Jews there are excellent individuals with whom we can co-exist in peace. It is our belief that those who resist this line of ours are the Zionists themselves. Take for example the Zionist Israeli press. Every resistance operation is reported on the front page with such comments as: "These are the *Fateh* terrorists who want to set up a democratic Palestinian state." They always do this even when the operation is not ours.

Q. What precisely is Fateh's concept of the democratic Palestinian state?

A. We have always believed and declared, and continue to declare, that armed struggle is not an end in itself, but a means to a great

humanitarian end. It consists in the belief that this portion of the world map called Palestine, which since 1917 or thereabout has been a land of wars, revolutions, fighting and blood, is perfectly entitled to live in peace and to enjoy its existence like the rest of mankind, and that it is high time for the bloodshed to stop. Thus we have taken up arms to arrive at a genuinely peaceful solution for the problem, not a spurious peace by aggression and racialism. This peaceful solution cannot be arrived at except within the framework of a democratic state in Palestine. What are the details? I believe that the national struggle in the course of its development will take care of the details, but this is the broad strategic line which governs all particulars.

Q. Within the context of this broad strategic line, will the democratic Palestinian state accept the Jews as citizens on an equal footing with the Arab nationals?

A. Naturally we accept the Jews as citizens on an equal footing with the Arabs in everything. The meaning of the democratic Palestinian state is clear: it will liquidate only the racist, Zionist presence inside Palestine.

Q. To further clarify this point, the importance of which you undoubtedly appreciate like myself. I again ask you more specifically: Is the right of citizenship guaranteed by Fateh to those Jews whose thoughts and acts are against Zionism and the Zionist state and who declare their agreement to Fateh's objective of establishing the new democratic Palestinian society? Is this right of citizenship guaranteed to such Jews regardless of whether they were in Palestine before or after 1948?

A. I affirm once again that *Fateh* as a national liberation movement with human dimensions guarantees this right to every Jew who not only works against Zionism but has also purified himself of all Zionist thinking so that he has become convinced that Zionist thinking is an intruder on human society.

Q. How does Fateh now view Israeli society? Does it still view this society as a solid aggressive, reactionary, racial, colonialist block or does it find that certain progressive forces and trends — though still small and feeble — that are against aggression, Zionism and racialism have begun to appear in this society? In the event that Fateh feels the existence of such forces and

trends, what is its opinion and position with regard to them?

A. There is no doubt that Israeli society as it actually exists is a colonialist, imperialist, racist society which we are exerting every effort to liquidate and to establish instead a non-racial democratic society which will be open to humanity and the world. Israel is actually a society which is closed to humanity and to every liberation movement in the world, and has never stood beside any liberation cause. When we say that we want to co-exist with the Jews in a non-racist democratic Palestine it follows that we call upon all progressive forces, if they do exist, to strengthen their position. There are some in Israel who claim such progressiveness, but in reality it is a false progressiveness based on Zionism, racialism and colonialism.

This, however, does not prevent us from admitting that there is a small progressive nucleus which has begun to emerge, and we feel it. It demands the liquidation of the Zionist body politic, and we are sure that once its voice begins to be heard and to find response there it will face more violent torture and persecution than those faced by the combatants of *Fateh*. It is therefore true that there are progressive beginnings — small beginnings — which we hope will grow and become stronger and will assert their belief in the Palestinian people's right to live on its own land. When I say the Palestinian people I mean the whole people with all its communities: Christians, Moslems and Jews, but without the Zionist state which is connected with colonialism, without racialism, without Zionism, without religious fanaticism.

Q. Following the principle of complete frankness to which we have committed ourselves in this discussion, I take the liberty of addressing to you this question: There are those who, notwithstanding their appreciation of Fateh's heroism and its pioneering efforts in the Palestinian armed struggle, say that it has begun to take interest in publicity for its own sake and it acts so that on paper and in radio broadcasts it has come to look bigger than its real size. What are your comments?

A. I do not wish to begin by recording that this saying is not objective and is completely untrue. But let us examine the matter calmly, step by step. Has *Fateh* begun to take interest in

information matters? The answer is emphatically in the affirmative, but if it should be alleged that it is more interested in information than in military matters, then this would constitute a basic error in the imagination on which such sayings are based. Why? Because to us, as a resistance movement, information is a type of political action which accompanies and supports military action, and not an act of publicity. Publicity essentially revolves around persons, an attitude which we reject and even resist because it is prejudicial to our struggle and our movement. If there are cases of this sort — unfortunately there are — responsibility therefore is not attributable to Fateh but to some of our brothers in the Arab press who are led by what they call “journalistic requirements” and the desire for sensation to be sometimes over-enthusiastic. We in *Fateh* disapprove of this, as we have told them frankly on several occasions. We have even told them that we regard sensationalism in some of our Arab newspapers as a disease which should be eliminated. Brother Abu Ammar, in his capacity as *Fateh*’s official spokesman, has talked to them quite frankly on this subject more than once in connection with their habit of publishing his photograph regardless of whether the occasion did or did not call for such publication, while the combatants as a group and as a movement are not treated in the same manner. I should like to assure you once again that the publication of our leaders’ photographs greatly embarrasses us in our work because it restricts their freedom of movement. The three or four leaders whose pictures have been published are extremely embarrassed. This is not an attempt to defend them, but the requirements of our work compel us to take this position. On the other hand, I wish to assure you that the publication of a photograph of one or more of our members does not give rise among our leadership or the movement in general to any sensitivity of any sort, because the collective structure of our movement is so deep that the individual is completely integrated into the collectivity. Therefore to us the photograph of Abu Ammar or any other of our members is the photograph of *Fateh* as a whole.

Q. You have said that information in Fateh is not an act of publicity but a political act. What do you mean by this?

A. I mean that it is part of the total battle. It is not a matter of mere military communiqués that are issued and published without constant and rational clarification of *Fateh*’s thought and objectives. We must not forget the important fact that before the June war we were in a sort of blockade as regards information because all the doors of information and of contact with the Arab masses to clarify our thought, aims and fighting techniques were firmly closed in our face, but now these doors are open, and it has therefore been incumbent upon us to lay our political thinking and the principles of our struggle before the masses and to deepen them as far as we could, otherwise we would have been grossly negligent of our duties to our movement and our all-embracing Palestinian struggle. This has necessitated the establishment of contacts and the divulgence of names. The fact that some newspapers deviate — I stress the word “deviate” — in their presentation of all this for reasons of sensationalism or individualism cannot be blamed on *Fateh*, however remotely.

Q. Let us take Fateh’s information activity as a political act directed to all non-Arab peoples of the world... the capitalist world and the socialist world. What are Fateh’s main lines in this field?

A. Our main step consists in presenting ourselves to the peoples of the world as a national liberation movement which combats racialism and colonialism and distinguishes in its struggle between Judaism and Zionism, and consequently is a part of the human movement, while Zionism, which we have undertaken to fight and liquidate, is the enemy of all mankind and not of the Arabs alone. If you review all that has been published recently about *Fateh* in the foreign press, both Western and Eastern, you will realise how successful *Fateh*’s plan in this connection has been. If we have failed — although it is not our fault — in respect of the press in the socialist camp which has not sufficiently clarified *Fateh*’s aims, the reason for this failure is not attributable to us but to the press of the socialist camp itself which has not given us much attention. In saying so I mean only to express a kind reproach and not to censure or cast reflections on the socialist camp and its press.

Q. Does Fateh, within the framework of its political information policy, consider taking measures to win over world Jewish opinion that is against colonialism and Zionism? If so, what steps have been taken towards this end?

A. Naturally this is of interest to us, and our interest springs from our fundamental view which distinguishes between the Zionist and the Jew, between Zionism and Judaism. Consequently we try to establish all sorts of relations with all those Jews who do not take part in the entrenchment of the closed racial colonialist Israeli society — the Zionist society. But words alone are of no value if they are not put into actual practice, and I shall therefore cite to you *Fateh's* actual practices in this field. Take for example the Second International Conference for the Support of Arab Peoples held in Cairo early this year (1969). I believe that all the circles, forces and personalities, both Arab and foreign, including Jews, who attended the Congress testified that *Fateh's* position as a matter of principle with regard to this matter saved the Congress because it urged every progressive Jew outside or inside Israel to work for the liquidation of Zionism and its body politic and to call for the setting up of a democratic Palestinian state.

Let us take another actual example. In February 1969 the Palestinian Theatre Troupe presented a play in Rabat, Morocco, for the benefit of *Fateh*. The Moroccan police wanted to forbid Moroccan Jews from attending the performance for fear that they might be molested by the enthusiastic Moroccan audience, but our comrades there took it upon themselves to ensure the protection of the Moroccan Jews during the performance and persuaded the police to allow them to attend so that from the play they might learn the truth about Israel's racialist and inhuman reality. In the theatre, the Moroccans made contributions to *Fateh* in support of its armed struggle. Among the contributors was a Moroccan Jewish professor at the Engineering School of Mohammad V University called Ibrahim al-Sarafati, who donated one thousand dirhams and said that as a Jew he was making this contribution to *Fateh* in support of its struggle for the setting up of a democratic Palestinian state. He presented to us a letter written in French explaining his position and why he was making the contribution to *Fateh* itself. His

wife translated the letter into Arabic and gave her wedding ring as a contribution to the resistance movement against Zionism and its racial policy.

Such attitudes favouring *Fateh* have now become common in many European countries.

At this point I must make the important remark that this new approach to the Jews who are against colonialism and Zionism would never have taken place had *Fateh* not actually taken up arms. In other words, this approach has been made possible by the armed struggle for liberation. Had this approach been made before *Fateh* had resorted to arms it would have been received under the then existing circumstances of recession by a strong attack from Arab opinion in general and Palestinian opinion in particular. Thus this strategic approach has been made possible by the force of *Fateh* as a national liberation movement and political and military strength.

Q. This is true to a very great extent. I have other remarks which I wish to present to you for your comment. These may be presented as follows: From the time Fateh began its armed struggle in January 1965 until June 1969, I notice that there were two stages, the first being the difficult start and the trail-blazing work before the June 1967 war when Fateh was isolated as a result of the blockade imposed around it and was haunted by accusations of adventure and...

A. This was outside its control...

Q. Of course. After June, the blockade fell and Fateh became open to the Arab masses and the Arab homeland. Then came the Battle of Karameh in March 1968 in which Fateh asserted itself both politically and militarily. From then on it embarked upon its great experience in resisting the enemy. As you have said, this started in August 1967. Now can you explain to me the precise benefit derived by Fateh from these two stages and from its experience after August 1967? Have the results of the experience gained been reflected in specific changes in Fateh's resistance techniques and activities?

A. The basic benefit derived by *Fateh* from the first stage was the formation of its first cadres, or what may be called "the nucleus of the true Palestinian struggle", which later gave rise to the ever expanding and increasingly growing armed resistance movement. The experience which we stressed most and actually gained

during that stage was bringing up the fighting individual to shun individualism and egotism and completely merge himself with the collectivity, and to endure himself to the most arduous work of struggle and sacrifice under difficult and strained circumstances. At that stage you entered and began a battle with little support. Even the forces which were supposed to be your allies did not back you at that time. Under these conditions *Fateh* was able to rid itself of all the diseases of the society from which it had emerged, such as individualism, ostentation, and escape from responsible action into pointless discussions. When the post-June War stage began, *Fateh* had benefited from the previous stage and had prepared itself for the new stage with politically and militarily successful cadres. Nevertheless there have been some mistakes. These mistakes may be attributed to the fact that the interchange between *Fateh* and the Palestinian and Arab masses after the June War was so vast that *Fateh's* real capabilities in organisation and arms during the period which immediately followed the June War were not sufficient to absorb the huge numbers of volunteers. A difficult period which was full of problems had to pass before we could bring these problems under control and enter the stage of organised and large-scale resistance in August 1967.

At all stages there is one reality elicited by the experience gained: it is that any pioneering group believing in a thing which springs from the will of the people and insisting on and fighting for that thing will inevitably attain its goal in spite of all sacrifices and difficulties. I do not know whether I have sufficiently replied to your remarks.

Q. I believe this is sufficient. All the same, let us try to go on from the ground on which Fateh now stands, since it has achieved world renown and has become synonymous with Palestinian armed struggle. From this ground, how does Fateh address itself now to the Palestinian people in general and to the other resistance organisations in particular?

A. I have no objection to answering your question, but in replying I am afraid of being taken to assume the role of a preacher, a role which I refuse to take in view of my upbringing in *Fateh*. I do not want to stand on a platform and say: "Brethren, do this, don't do that."

Therefore, with your permission, I wish to reword the question as follows: "What can *Fateh* offer under the existing circumstances in which several resistance organisations operate? How, in spite of all these circumstances, is it possible to establish healthy relations for the benefit of Palestinian liberation action?" Do you agree to this wording?

Q. I do. Please proceed.

A. I believe that there is a fact which should be admitted by all our brothers in the various commando groups. Such admission must, however, be preceded by an admission from *Fateh* itself that not everything in *Fateh* is perfect and flawless. And because there are mistakes in *Fateh*, every other resistance group is expected and bound by duty to help *Fateh* see its mistakes and to assist it in eliminating these mistakes in which any national liberation movement is apt to fall, particularly since he who examines matters from the outside has a greater sense of objectivity than the inside observer. Similarly, our brothers in the other commando groups must admit that all colonialist and Zionist circles and the intelligence systems of all imperialist powers in the world, in addition to other anti-revolutionary forces, are working within the same plan to undermine and disfigure *Fateh*. Naturally, it is difficult for them to fight *Fateh* with direct and palpable physical means, and they therefore resort within an intelligent plan to waging a psychological war against *Fateh* from the inside as well as from the outside. At times they try to sabotage *Fateh* from the outside. At times they try to sabotage *Fateh* by magnifying it on the publicity level, and we are aware of this. At other times sabotage is attempted through the surreptitious injection into *Fateh* of elements to make statements which do not express *Fateh's* beliefs. In some instances the sabotage plans are based on the attempt to misinterpret the essential methods followed by *Fateh* in its relations with the Arab countries for the purpose of using this misinterpretation as a weapon with which to fight *Fateh*. From all this, it is expected that our brothers in the other groups understand that to do away with *Fateh* would undermine the entire Palestinian commando action and the whole Palestinian people's movement, and even the Arab progressive movement as a whole.

Q. I believe that we can now reach the point where I hope you will explain Fateh's view of the existing Arab position regarding the battle and the relation with the Palestinian armed struggle movement from another angle. I do not know whether it would be advisable to divide discussion on the point into stages. This naturally is left to you.

A. There are several remarks in this connection. The first and basic remark to start with is that we have not truly and effectively mobilised all Arab potentialities for the battle. Not infrequently we feel as if the Arab being in some of its aspects does not live the raging battle in all its dimensions.

Q. What do you suppose is the reason for this?

A. In my opinion the participation of the Arab masses in the battle means that these masses live the facts going on around them, and that they understand all these facts objectively without any sort of concealment or exaggeration. It is necessary that these masses be given their true role. When a country is occupied by an invader, the masses' role is obvious: the mobilisation, training and arming of the people, and their participation in the battle in various ways. The Arab masses have not yet been given this true role, and although we have regained much of our military strength in our official conventional armies yet this also is not enough.

This is a fact which must be mentioned. It is not shameful to avow it, but it would be shameful to hide it, because we are all expected to live for the battle. This is the first remark. In other words, if you meet the masses anywhere in their daily life you will find them eager for the fight.

The second remark is that there is a difference between the Arab countries surrounding Israel and those that are more remote. If we feel the separation between the man who lives at the front and the man who lives in the city in the same country near the frontier, how much greater the separation becomes in the remote areas? Therefore I say that the remote Arab masses should know the truth about the Zionist peril, that it covets not only specific areas in Palestine or in this or that Arab country, but the entire Arab nation. Consequently, it is not right for the Arab who lives in an Arab land that is remote from the regions surrounding Israel to say that

this is not his battle, and it is my belief that the Arab masses even in those areas that are geographically remote from the battlefield want to take part in the fight with all their potentialities.

I must add that it is the duty of every responsible national leadership in each country to influence the position of its government — I shall not say more — so that it will participate effectively in the fight.

The third remark concerns Palestinian resistance. It is incumbent upon Palestinian resistance to develop its internal activities and to escalate its operations more and more. These responsibilities should be shouldered by the Arab peoples. We should like to ask: "Is the escalation of resistance a mechanical operation? Is it a matter of pressing a button for resistance to escalate and releasing the button for Palestinian resistance to drop?" No, it is not a mechanical operation. It is one of reaction by the Arab people, the giving of the Arab people's experiences to the combatants who have truly and genuinely taken up the fight after twenty years of stagnation. Has the Arab nation offered to Palestinian resistance all that it requires?

Here I wish to state frankly that the Arab people is ready to offer, but obstacles are being laid between the Arab people and Palestinian resistance. In other words, if Palestinian resistance had the chance of meeting the Arab masses away from all complexes, away from all formalities, then the Arab people would make a large contribution to Palestinian resistance in the fight. It is not true that Palestinian resistance is regional. When we say "Palestinian resistance" and "Palestinian people" — the purpose of these appellations is quite clear — it is not true that we are trying to separate the Palestinian people from their Arab nation, the one nation with the one destiny. The unity of the nation does not preclude the existence of an Egyptian people, an Iraqi people, etc., and the Palestinian people is therefore entitled to emerge after twenty years during which it was buried in the earth and made the object of a thousand accusations. The emergence of this people is the emergence of the whole Arab people. There is no conflict at all between the emergence of the Palestinian people and the fact that it is part of the big Arab nation. Thus Palestinian resistance is not regional, nor is it

isolationist. It demands to be sponsored by the whole Arab people with all its potentialities. Take for example the subject of financial aid for the resistance movement. Is there an Arab government which has made an allocation in its budget for Palestinian resistance? Frankly not one. On the contrary, even private contributions which the resistance movement used to receive directly from the Arab peoples have now begun to assume an official form which hampers the work. Every Arab country now thinks of forming a body called the "Commando Action Support Commission" which alone is empowered to collect contributions, and which is invariably headed by a cabinet minister or some other responsible state official, so that the operation is subject to government control. Thus, if the government wishes the commission to go on with its work, it will go on, and if it wishes it to stop, it will stop, and collection will stop, as if it were merely a matter of collecting money or new taxes from the people. We believe that the conduct of the operation in this manner does not make for interaction between the resistance movement and the Arab people. It is this interaction which is the essence of the operation.

These are my three remarks about the Arab situation. Now, what is our hope? Our hope is that the three remarks will disappear, that the masses will be truly mobilised for the fight, and that we avoid diluting the battle. What do we mean by dilution? It would be diluted for instance by confusing between political action and military action. The people should be made to understand in its true light the meaning of political action and military action, and the masses should be made to take active part in the operation rather than sit on the fence. I say that the participation of the masses is possible and necessary. We must believe in the role of the people's army because if this army existed no enemy aircraft would venture into any Arab air space. There are many things which could be said in this context, and we hope that the subject of Palestinian resistance will be given its due share of attention, both material and moral. At the same time we cannot but tell the masses the truth without any misrepresentation.

Q. In this connection I have three specific points:
 (1) *Has it not become necessary to work for the setting*

up of an all-Arab popular front with the specific and only aim of protecting and backing Palestinian resistance? (2) *What is Fateh's position with regard to the wish expressed by large numbers of non-Palestinian Arabs to join the resistance movement and participate in armed action?* (3) *This point concerns what may be termed as co-ordination, a subject which has arisen from time to time between Palestinian armed resistance and the regular Arab armies. Within the context of this point, there are those who advance the opinion that Palestinian resistance alone will not be able to liberate Palestine, and that consequently the intervention of the regular Arab armies is necessary. To what extent, in Fateh's imagination, is it practically possible to attain a stage in the struggle wherein two forces and techniques are used together: guerrilla warfare and movement of regular armies? All this of course without prejudice to the Palestinian resistance movement's freedom of action and independence.*

A. Among the intermediate goals announced by *Fateh* is the building of the Arab front. This is not the responsibility of *Fateh* alone, but also and at the same time of the remaining Arab national forces. *Fateh* has tried more than once to establish contact for the purpose of building the front, but it seems that the multiplicity of Palestinian organisations has hitherto stood in the way of setting up this front in an organised manner.

In the matter of information *Fateh* has also appealed for the formation of an Arab front to support commando action, and in practice *Fateh* has regarded many young Arab forces in the Arab countries, particularly in national and progressive circles, as constituting this front. It is true that this front has not been organised, although such organisation is imperative, but, as I have already said, responsibility for this situation is shared by *Fateh* with the rest of the national and progressive forces. As a matter of fact we have noticed in some instances that response concerning the formation of the front is fraught with lack of conviction as a result of local differences in this country or that.

It is highly essential that we think of a practical plan for this front. I recall your repeated appeal in *Al-Tali'a* and *Al-Ahram* for the holding of a preparatory conference for this front to include all national and progressive forces in the whole of the Arab homeland, but what can be done when these forces are divided among themselves?

There is for instance one Arab country, Lebanon, where the national and progressive forces have been unable to unite in one strong effective front, each wanting to have the exclusive credit of supporting the armed struggle, or *Fateh* in particular, without the participation of the others. Thus the various currents inside the national and progressive forces in the Arab homeland prevent the establishment of this front. We hope that these forces will in the near future succeed in changing their attitude and in minimising the sensitivities and differences existing among them for the benefit of the Arab struggle in general and the Palestinian struggle in particular, and will, as you have so aptly put it, agree on a minimum programme to support and back the Palestinian armed struggle, regardless of whether it is undertaken by this or that organisation. The important thing is that it should be in both letter and spirit an armed liberation struggle, at least to enable us to prevent the recurrence of the treatment meted to us recently by one of the Arab states, and to understand our true position as reflected by this front.

Q. I believe that even under the existing circumstances we are capable of surmounting all these problems and differences to arrive at the Arab front. This is the role of us all in the struggle. Our only pivot in building the front is the Palestinian armed struggle which has become the only true and practical road to the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state, at the same time rendering the greatest service to Arab national liberation from imperialist bases in their various forms. In the last resort Israel today is an imperialist military base in the form of a state directed against all Arab national and progressive forces without exception, irrespective of their thinking and their social and political views concerning other problems in the Arab homeland or in the individual Arab countries. The main thing is that they should support and back the Palestinian armed struggle. I believe that the Palestine Liberation Organisation is now in a position to take the initiative of calling a preparatory conference for the Arab popular front.

A. This is indisputable, and we fully support it. *Fateh* as part of the PLO is capable of taking active part in achieving this great and necessary objective.

You have referred to the question of non-Palestinian Arab volunteers for resistance action,

and I take this opportunity to affirm on behalf of *Fateh* that *Fateh* accepts unreservedly any young Arab who wishes to volunteer. However, there are obstacles for which not we but official Arab attitudes are responsible. Once these attitudes permit, we are ready from this instant.

In this connection there is another important point which we should not ignore. It is that the number of would-be volunteers is great. For instance, we had 12,000 young applicants from one single Arab country. How can the resistance movement, with its present facilities, arm, train and feed 12,000 new young men? This again indicates the importance of the Arab front and its role in supporting, backing and enlarging the resistance movement. Through it all such matters could be organised so that volunteering would become a driving force instead of a burden on us.

Q. A number of Iraqi and Sudanese brothers have communicated to me their desire to volunteer with their own arms.

A. All brothers of this type are welcome.

We now come to the point concerning the possibility of coordination between the resistance movement and the regular Arab armies. In point of fact we have our own clear-cut concept of coordination from which we do not deviate. In our view, coordination is first of all anything contributed to the resistance movement by way of support, assistance and training. We do not refuse any of these things, but welcome them heartily. Moreover, we are not willing to be part of a regional coordination plan. In other words, if we find Arab régimes which have a serious plan for the liberation of Palestine and want us to be part of this plan, then we have no objection at all; but if certain Arab régimes want to contain us under the name of coordination and the preservation of their regional frontiers, then, frankly, we will refuse. We reject coordination in the sense of containment and hegemony.

Q. You mean to say that, as you respect the independence of each Arab country, you want each Arab country to respect the independence of the Palestinian armed resistance movement.

A. Exactly. This is to avoid entering into international labyrinths. So much about the subject of coordination and our view regarding the

combination of guerrilla warfare with the movement of regular armies. There is one very important point. When we raised the banner of armed resistance and said that the Palestinian people wanted to undertake this operation... let us examine the matter objectively and look back a little. When the banner was raised and taken up by the revolutionary vanguard in *Fateh* in 1965, we were aware that the blowing up of a bridge or culvert could not be a decisive act in the liberation campaign, but we were also aware that the blowing up of a culvert could lead another ten young men to join *Fateh*. We were aware that the blowing up of a bridge could awaken ten young men and get them to believe in this road to liberation. We did not live on the understanding that it was a matter of profit and loss. If we damaged one culvert for the Zionists, they would blow up ten of our wells... one bridge, ten bridges. No, we did not view matters in the light of profit and loss in the short run, a view impressed upon us by the colonialists with the object of restricting our movement by forcing us constantly to think in terms of enemy reprisals. We believe that the Palestinian people's armed resistance will in any serious battle with Zionism inevitably lead to a popular battle for liberation on the entire Arab level. For further clarification I say that as regards classical computations in the war with Israel, at least during the present stage and under existing Arab circumstances, we might be the losers, but this does not mean at all that the Arab countries are not called upon to have strong armies. On the contrary, we want strong armies capable of defending the frontiers, but if we were to measure the Palestine battle on the basis of a tank for a tank, an aeroplane for an aeroplane, an airman for an airman, a tank driver for a tank driver, then undoubtedly the Zionist state which now exists on Palestinian territory is more capable than us because it is backed by world imperialist forces and because it arms itself through its own means and with greater scientific efficiency.

Q. You are against mechanical computation.

A. Exactly, this mechanical computation is positively rejected. Therefore we say that the armed struggle is for the moment required to be on the Palestinian level. However, it is a well-known fact that Israel cannot psychologically afford to lose a battle, not even a partial battle.

It has to avenge itself at all times, because this artificial state cannot survive unless it is always victorious, and any defeat, though partial, affects its people's morale. This explains the constant Israeli threats. Any small operation on our part elicits from them a tenfold replication to frighten the Arabs and to instill into their minds that there is no use and that the Israeli army is an invincible legend. Therefore we must confirm our peoples in the belief that the classical battle is not the only battle. We as Palestinians earnestly wish the Arab armies to be on the highest level of strength and to co-ordinate with us in a double battle in which guerrilla warfare will play its part and the classical armies will play theirs. But are we really prepared for this now? And because we are not prepared now, must we allow those who are in the fight to feel that they are fighting in a vacuum? Here lies the seriousness of this proposition, the proposition that the Palestinian cause cannot triumph except with classical armies. We know — and the actual situation imposes on us this knowledge — that the classical armies are not now in a position to achieve this aim.

Therefore we must take it into our heads that our war is a guerrilla war which should develop into a popular liberation war in which the Arab masses will be prepared around Palestine to face the Zionist enemy and its expansionist policy and war. Later on, a situation may develop in which the regular Arab armies will become capable of shouldering the burden. For the moment, we are living the present and its circumstances. Thus the Palestinian vanguard is the vanguard of the popular liberation war embracing the whole Arab homeland. It is this which frightens Israel, Zionism and all other enemy forces. Why? Because the accounting here would not be on the basis of an aeroplane for an aeroplane, or a tank for a tank, but of a fighting people embarked on a long-term war — this is what the enemy fears most — intent on defending its land and on putting an end to this Zionist presence. This information comes to us from inside the territory where they hear the Voice of Al-Asifa broadcasts telling them that we are waging a long-term war. We do not say that our battle will end in victory for us after one or two years. We only say that it is a long-term war, and we firmly believe in this. We are sure that many of us will succumb. Thus you see that we are not

against strengthening the regular Arab armies; on the contrary, we expect these armies to grow more and more powerful. However, these regular Arab armies are not an alternative for the Palestinian people's struggle and its fight on its own territory. They are not an alternative at all. The Palestinian revolution is not a tactical card in the hands of the Arab armies or Arab régimes, because if we regard it as a tactical card, it would be as if I were gambling and selling these men who are falling every day for the sake of a tactical plan sponsored by this or that Arab country. This is a basic factor. Even the efforts of regular soldiers are included within the frame of our armed struggle. I do not wish here to refer to international conditions and the regular Arab armies' commitment through their respective states to the official international position, nor to the likely effects on us if we were announce that it is a battle of regular armies alone.

Q. I notice that in referring to the Arab countries you have used two expressions: the Arab countries surrounding Palestine, and the Arab countries that are remote from Palestine. This differentiation of yours must mean something: that each of these two categories of Arab countries has its own role to play in the battle, a role which differs from that of the other. What, then, is your evaluation of this role as regards each category? What has already been achieved, within this role? What has not been achieved, and why?

A. To put it briefly, the real role of the Arab countries surrounding our occupied territory consists, as regards the armed struggle, in enduring all Israeli reprisals resulting from resistance operations, and in rebuilding their armed forces and developing their armies. This is what is taking place in the United Arab Republic, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. They are expected to bear the brunt of Israeli reprisals. Israel lies when it says that it strikes at commando bases on the East Bank or elsewhere, while in reality its raids are directed against civilians, civilian vehicles and civilian residences with the object of impressing the Arab masses, in Jordan for instance, in an attempt to persuade them that giving shelter to the commandos is a desperate act which will cost them dearly. Israel is well aware that it cannot raid all commando bases for the simple reason that it does not know — and we will never allow it to learn — their whereabouts.

Israel also tries to lead world opinion into believing that resistance is useless and that world sympathy for the resistance movement is of no avail. This, then, is what the Arab countries surrounding Palestine are expected to do; to mobilise and strengthen their armies, to mobilise the masses and organise them for the battle, and to be prepared to bear all consequences connected with Palestinian resistance. The same thing happened in Morocco and Tunisia with regard to Algerian resistance, and in Egypt in 1956 when the country bore the consequences of its support for Algerian resistance and stood in the face of the 1956 Tripartite Aggression against Suez.

As for the other Arab countries that are remote from the occupied territory, their role essentially consists in constant material backing. They are remote from what may be termed immediate danger and are therefore expected to substitute the mobilisation of the masses for the mobilisation of armies, and to furnish the frontier countries with the necessary financial backing. We are in the face of a Zionist state which receives from imperialism and world Zionism constant and strong support.

Q. Two years after the defeat of June 1967, let us throw a glance at the international position with regard to the cause and the battle. What is your analysis of the present international position in relation to the Palestinian armed struggle which has asserted itself and exacted world recognition?

A. This is a question which has always occupied our minds. The whole world — all the peoples of the world — have no respect except for the strong. I do not mean those who pile up aircraft, tanks and powerful weapons. The strong are the organised popular groups which believe in their rights and work to regain them at any price, using the force which springs from their internal being regardless of the size of the opposing force. I believe that, starting from this concept, we have succeeded in making up for the past years, during the last twenty years, when our work and publicity centred around “the poor helpless refugees” who humbly stood in crowds before the offices of UNRWA. We have completely transformed the picture of these crowds into that of combatants who bear arms in quest of freedom. At first many used to ask: “What can this small, weak group do in the face of a state which is

backed by imperialism and which has defeated Arab armies?" We were accused of being adventurers. But now, since Palestinian resistance has proved, both politically and on the battle front, that it is an influential and effective force in the area and is capable of survival and growth, the whole world and its information media have begun to open up politically before us. They are now before a new political development in the area which has taken up arms to liberate a homeland.

As we know, the world is in practice divided into three parts: the Eastern Camp, the Western Camp and the Third World. I believe we have succeeded to some extent in explaining our cause in these camps, though in varying degrees, and have won the constantly growing support of the peoples of the world. The Second International Conference for the Support of Arab Peoples held in Cairo with the participation of many forces of various trends from all parts of the world, constituted a world measure of the weight of our movement and struggle. All the delegations which attended the Congress affirmed their support for the presentation of the question by *Fateh*. Naturally, this was not derived from the Congress' policy but was the positive fruit of a political effort which preceded the Congress. The thing to which we aspire even more keenly is to find a deeper and wider response in the Socialist Camp and the countries of the Third World. Is it not strange that Western information media are more open to the resistance movement than socialist media for instance?

Q. How do you explain this?

A. I explain it by the default of Arab progressive forces because in this field they are expected to take the burden off the shoulders of Palestinian resistance, in addition to the responsibility of the country itself to some extent.

Q. I think this explanation is not sufficient. Why do you not also explain it by the fact that the resistance movement has failed to present itself well in this field? In other words, why do you not explain it by saying that there are mistakes on your side as well?

A. What mistakes does the other side hold against us?

Q. They say that you make a non-objective separation between political action and military action, that

you always prefer military action to any political activity, that you even denounce any political act undertaken for the Palestinian cause at any level to vindicate the national rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab peoples as a bargaining affair.

A. I believe that the matter is not as they imagine. It is a fact that socialist information is in default with regard to the resistance movement. I wish here to emphasise first of all that our discussion on this point is meant as friendly reproach and not as an act of censure or attack against the Socialist Camp for which we have every friendly feeling, appreciating as we do the generous and valuable assistance furnished by it to some Arab countries. We would not be friends if we were not frank with one another.

The default, then, occurs in two points:

The first point is connected with the Palestinian question itself, with regard to which the Socialist Camp at first took a position which was unsound and unobjective in our view. This, however, may be attributed to the fact that, due to our particular circumstances at the time, we were not on good terms with this camp, particularly in 1947 and 1948. This is in addition to the Arab communist parties' failure at the time to explain the true situation and to present the question in its true light. The Socialist Camp viewed the matter on the consideration that any liberation movement should rest on the basis that, say, 60 % of the local inhabitants believe in it, and that, since this was not the case, it did not consider that there was a Palestinian revolution. Let us assume that the Socialist Camp wishes now to apply this view to the present situation in the state of Israel. It will not find 60 % of the local inhabitants who are for the revolution and the termination of Zionist existence. We find that such a view in relation to the Palestinian question is unsound, because the subject here is basically one of a racial Fascist state which has been founded on the manifest usurpation of another people's territory by colonial settlement and has been able through the methods of the Fascist Zionist movement to drive out the original inhabitants, exactly as is happening in Rhodesia and South Africa. This is the true situation which we think the Socialist Camp has not understood well enough. Also, we have not seriously contributed towards explaining it to the Socialist Camp.

Q. Therefore in your opinion both sides, ours and theirs, are at fault. How then do we remedy the situation?

A. Both sides are indisputably at fault. To analyse the subject I say that there are two points, the first concerning the Socialist Camp's original position with regard to the Palestinian question. I wish also to declare for the record that one of the main factors which has greatly weakened the communist parties in the Arab area has been their erroneous position vis-à-vis the Palestinian question at the outset. This position has restricted their growth and expansion and confined them to a limited number which they do not exceed. This may not have been the case in Egypt as it was in the other Arab countries.

Q. It was the case in Egypt.

A. The second point is that, after June 1967, the Socialist Camp failed to understand our true position with regard to the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

Q. At this juncture it behoves you — to follow up your trend of thought — to explain why Israel refuses to comply with the resolution.

A. The explanation is quite simple. The victor wants to achieve further results from his aggression. According to our enemy's calculations, the aggression was intended to end the existence of everything called Palestine or Palestinian. Many Arab régimes could have collapsed, and Arab conditions could have been forced into such a state of defeatism and apathy that they would recognise the Zionist existence. None of these ends was achieved as a result of the aggression, and the victory was therefore one on paper, on the map, and not a real one. Palestinian resistance has grown bigger and stronger. Some Arab régimes which were expected to fall have not fallen. Lots of things. The submissive peace which they appealed for has not been accepted by any Arab country. I think the Khartoum Conference achieved a positive result in one basic thing when it said no peace, no recognition, no negotiation. Therefore the aggression has achieved nothing. The Security Council's resolution provides for withdrawal but, naturally enough, they do not want simply to withdraw, they do not even want safe frontiers, because the Arab countries might accept safe frontiers — on paper. In

reality they want more guarantees. What can they lose? They occupy lands which might solve their economic problems, because Zionist aggression is always connected with the needs of daily life inside Israel. If we refer to official Israeli records we find that in 1956 the unemployment figure in Israel was 36 %. These are actual figures which appear in their yearbooks. In 1967 unemployment rose to 39 %, and they again took to war.

Q. It is not possible to say that the Palestinian resistance movement fears that, assuming the Security Council's resolution is put into effect — which I do not believe will take place — the Arab countries, or at least some of them, might change their position with regard to the resistance movement?

A. As a matter of fact I have not consciously referred to the suggestion that, in the imperialist countries, the liquidation of Palestinian resistance is a condition for the implementation of the Security Council's resolution. I have abstained from referring to this matter because — and I am not saying this out of arrogance — resistance has become a popular movement which cannot be liquidated or driven back.

Q. It would at least be faced with problems which are not easy to deal with.

A. Even this... In spite of its numerous internal gaps, Palestinian resistance has become the property of the Palestinian people and the Arab people as a whole, and it is neither easy nor simple to do away with a deep-rooted movement sponsored by the masses, a movement which is fundamentally compatible with the logic of the age. Naturally when colonialism thinks of implementing the Security Council's resolution it thinks of its own methods and interests, and these methods and interests require the suppression of Palestinian action and commando action at least by offering a symbolic alternative. Thus we hear from time to time about the proposed "Palestinian State" which is in reality intended to nullify the Palestinian people's liberation movement and its armed resistance, a Palestinian state which would be completely subject to Israel and to colonialism and would embrace the West Bank and Gaza with a passage connecting them. This is how they propose to settle the matter. Do you want a Palestinian state? There it is, and

that is the end of the fight. According to our sources about the talks going on among the big powers in New York, such a spurious "Palestinian State" is actually under discussion. Strangely enough, it is the United States Delegation that is presenting and defending this proposal.

Q. What is so strange about it?

A. The strange thing about it is that the Americans who have continued to ignore the Palestinian people all these years are now showing so much interest in the Palestinian state.

Q. Exactly as they have shown interest in the fate of socialism in Czechoslovakia. But why do you not hold talks about all these matters and differences in points of view with the Socialist Camp?

A. All I can say is that we have asked and are still asking them to hold such talks. We are always ready to hold talks with all the forces of the world, and are open to any assistance or debate without complexes. But, as you know, such openness must necessarily be on both sides.

Q. What is the position of the Third World countries and peoples with regard to you?

A. As a matter of fact their position is highly sympathetic and is growing constantly. Naturally, the internal problems which are now facing the Third World restrict its possibilities, and we are aware of this.

Q. What about the peoples of the Capitalist World?

A. We are constantly winning friends there. We may not be able to say that we have won an important portion of public opinion, but we continue to win, particularly in the North and in France and Britain. The new leftist generation fully supports us.

Q. A week ago I had a talk with some Western journalists about resistance. I was told that there is an opinion in the world which fears that, if the present situation persists in the area with Palestinian resistance continuing to reject all peaceful solutions, the explosion may occur, and that this time it may lead to a world war. In their opinion, the Palestinian resistance movement is called upon to be conscious of its responsibilities towards the cause of world peace.

A. Really, we are unable to understand these people. Sometimes they say that the resistance

movement is weak and insignificant and that it is unimportant to get in touch with it and learn its opinion and position, and at other times its role becomes so great as to constitute a threat to world peace!

These people must define their position. Is the resistance movement weak and unworthy of being contacted or considered as having any weight, or is it a basic movement which has its weight in the area?

Does our resistance with arms to a racist Fascist enemy who occupies our home constitute a threat to world peace, or does it constitute a threat to the colonialist and racist warmongers? We are a liberation movement. Why is such talk about world peace not tendered to the liberation movement in Vietnam for instance? Vietnam likewise could threaten to cause a world war. Why is this accusation specifically directed against us? What threatens world peace is the continued usurpation of the Palestinian people's rights in its land and home and the continued existence of such a colonialist Zionist structure in our country. There will be no peace and no progress in our country unless this Zionist presence is eliminated from the Arab homeland. The peoples of the world should understand that when the Palestinian people bear arms they work seriously to serve the cause of world peace.

Q. That is, Palestinian resistance is waging a liberation war against colonialism and racialism, so that, like every other liberation movement in the world, it is rendering a concrete service to the cause of world peace. This is true. Let us discuss another matter. It has been remarked that during recent weeks some violent and unobjective criticism was made against the Soviet Union by the Fatch sponsored Voice of Al-Asifa. Do you not agree that differences in views should not obscure the important fact that the Soviet Union is a valuable friend and an objective ally to national liberation movements in the world, and that consequently such differences should be settled on the basis of friendship?

A. We are fully agreed that our view of the Soviet Union must be based on the consideration that it is a friend to the Arabs and that it has actually translated this friendship into material assistance and strong moral support to the Arab countries, particularly after the June war. However, this does not prevent us from indicating the

difference in views with regard to the situation. I believe that in this connection it would be preferable to establish direct relations between the Palestinian people and the Soviet Union. The fact that these relations are not direct is not our fault.

The Soviet Union should appreciate our strong sensitivity to the meetings of the big powers, because as a people we have always had to face the determination of our destiny in our absence. In our criticism we wanted to explain to the friendly Soviet Union, which is taking part in the talks, this essential point which we believe finds support in its own principles. Our criticism was that of one who wanted to bring a friend closer, not to alienate him.

Q. Then the criticism should have taken a different form without, for instance, comparing the Soviet Union to the United States and Britain.

A. No, we did not compare the Soviet Union to the United States and Britain. Please read the criticism again to reassure yourself. We said that the United States and Britain contributed to the creation of the Zionist structure and are still giving it their strong support, while the Soviet Union, the friend of the Arabs, is expected to desist from its 1948 position concerning the Palestinian question.

Q. Now, I wish to know your view of the enemy. How was this view before you took up armed resistance and how is it now?

A. To begin with, there is a general fact which I must present. The Zionist movement has always aimed at convincing both us and its own adherents, and has largely succeeded in doing so, that it cannot afford any defeat, whether in a side battle with psychological effects on its own people or in a major battle leading to the liquidation of the Israeli set-up and the Jewish masses.

It is to be noted with regret that, inasmuch as before the 1948 war we grossly underestimated the Zionist soldier's courage and fighting spirit, this soldier's stature came to be magnified inordinately after the June war.

We feel that, as a human being, the man in Israel — particularly the soldier, with the exception of the leaders who are working within the plan of the colonialist Zionist movement — does

not believe in this war except from the angle of self-defence. If we can by our behaviour reach the heart of this man to convince him that in reality we are not, as the Zionists would have him believe, barbarians who want to kill him and throw his women and children into the sea, then it would be possible to separate psychologically between the man and the Zionist, between the Jewish soldier and the colonialist Zionist military institution.

We have proposed to the Arab countries to declare officially that they are prepared to receive back all their Jewish nationals who have emigrated to Palestine and to restore to them their property and civil rights as Arab nationals of these countries on an equal footing with all other Arab nationals. If we succeed in doing this, and in making clear our true human position with regard to the Jew as a human being, we are certain that the colonialist Zionist military institution would collapse, for it would then be deserted by the Jewish soldier who is now acting under the influence that if he does not fight and shed Arab blood he is bound to be killed. We have a deep understanding of this matter. Take for instance an actual observation in connection with the Battle of Karameh. After the battle, about 300 Jewish officers and men who had refused to take part in the fighting were put on trial. Regrettably, we proceeded in our press to draw an untrue picture of these officers and men, calling them cowards and deserters, while if we had examined the matter carefully and read what they had written before and after the battle we would have discovered a great human significance in their behaviour: that they did not believe in war of aggression, or even in destroying Palestinian resistance. On this basis, if our information effort succeeds in revealing our truly human character, and if we are able to convince the Jewish soldier, the Jewish officer and the Jewish man in general that he is not in any way a target for our resistance, the target being Zionism and the Zionist structure, then the whole myth will peter out, our battle will be easier to prosecute and the liquidation of Zionism and its structure will be possible with less sacrifice.

I may have concentrated on the military aspect and the military institution. In point of fact this is a source of strength as well as of

weakness for the enemy. Recently we met a foreign journalist with progressive ideas who had just left Israel and asked him about his main remarks. He said that there was understanding in certain progressive circles and even in some non-progressive quarters, though small in size, of why the Palestinian bears arms and takes to resistance, and that Israeli intelligence hunted out such people and terrorised them. Unfortunately the scarcity of information in our press about what takes place inside Israel is the reason why such important facts are unknown to the Arab citizen. Thus the truth about Palestinian resistance has penetrated into the human conscience, and they no longer recoil at the idea of a Palestinian holding a grenade and throwing it at an Israeli patrol. On the contrary, they recoil at and often condemn the Zionist military authority's act of blowing up Arab houses and the ill-treatment meted out to captives and prisoners.

Our view of the enemy extends to include also its social structure and social conditions. Until now there has been no real assimilation or fusion in Zionist Israeli society. It is only a coalition of interests based on facing the danger as impressed on them by Zionism. All that those coming from Syria, Iraq and Europe have in common is that they feel persecuted and have to face the danger, neither more nor less. Such a conglomeration cannot be a viable human society. Moreover, Eastern Jews are generally treated as second-class citizens. There is a clear distinction between them and the European Jews (the Ashkenazim), and harmony between the two communities is uncertain and difficult, even groundless. The European Jews are alone first-class citizens enjoying all the privileges and high posts. Most of them were originally settled in Beersheba which, as you notice, is in the south. This cannot be a fortuitous manifestation, revealing as it does the rift and communal division in the depths of Zionist society, regardless of what may appear on the surface to the contrary.

Generally speaking, all these and other factors which we do not wish to reveal guide us in our complicated plan to face the enemy objectively, that is, as it actually is, not as we picture it in our imagination. You may rest assured that we carefully take into account the points of strength as well as the points of weakness without ignoring the dynamic relation among all these points.

Q. In concluding this dialogue for which I thank you, as well as for the frankness with which you have expressed yourself, I wish to address to you a question which has been often put to me by some foreign friends: "What would be your position with regard to any act of persecution suffered by a Jew anywhere?" My reply has always been: "I would stand by him and support him against persecution." What would Fateh's reply be if it were to be asked this question about the persecution of a Jew inside or outside Palestine?

A. Our reply is clear and unequivocal. Since we welcome co-existence with the Jews after the liquidation of the Zionist set-up and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state, it follows that we will stand by any persecuted Jew and will be prepared to give him a rifle and fight by his side.

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Television Interview with the Syrian Head of State Al-Atasi on the Palestine Problem.¹ (Excerpts)

Damascus, July 1, 1969

Q. The fact is that, while we are involved in the battle, people are interested in knowing what is going on on the battle fronts with the enemy. The Arabs everywhere want to know what has been done on the Eastern Front. It is extremely important that this Front should be strengthened, and this depends basically on complete cooperation between the three countries which form this Front — Syria, Iraq and Jordan. Can you tell us, Your Excellency, without divulging any military secrets, naturally, what steps have been taken in this respect?

A. The Arab Front for the confrontation of the enemy is one front only; it is just an expression to talk of the Eastern Front and the Western Front; and all steps taken to reinforce this single Arab Front must be coordinated between the different Arab countries. The three countries which form the Eastern Front are working together to strengthen and reinforce this Front. I want to talk in particular about the role of Syria in strengthening the Front. Syria has put all its military resources under the command of this

¹ *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus), 2/7/1969. The interview was transmitted by United Arab Republic television.

Front, and its defensive capacity has been satisfactorily reinforced since the June 5 aggression. I do not want to talk about the role played by the other countries in strengthening this Front, but I will say that it is the duty of these three countries to reinforce this Front with the full weight of their resources.

Q. Your Excellency has called it "a single Arab Front", and said that it is just an expression to talk of the Eastern or Western Fronts. So that we, the Arab people, may realise that it is a single Arab Front, could you tell us to what extent there is coordination between the Eastern and Western Fronts?

A. There is coordination between the Eastern and Western Fronts, but I believe that the nature of the battle demands a higher degree of coordination, that it demands that the forces on the Eastern and Western Fronts should be really unified.

Q. The Arab people would like to be reassured about the Syrian forces; may we ask what has been done in this field?

A. One of our principal objectives at this stage is to increase our defensive capacity and to reinforce the Syrian armed forces. Certain important steps have been taken, which, it is not too much to say, have made the Syrian armed forces an important and effective element in forming the Eastern Front. But I think that we must continue to work for this objective — the strengthening of Syria's defensive capacity — at a level which corresponds to available resources.

Q. Your Excellency, you have adopted the slogan of the popular war of liberation. What role do you think the popular war of liberation can play in our battle with Israel? And what are the respective roles of the popular and regular armies?

A. In adopting the popular war of liberation the Ba'th Party turned to account the experiences of all the peoples which had confronted forces stronger than their own and had been able to draw on extensive resources, both in the technological field and as regards financing and arms. Thus when we call for a popular war of liberation we mean that the nation in its entirety must face the invading forces with all the arms it can muster.

The developing countries may not have what the colonial states have, or the states which are

supplied by imperialist states with all kinds of destructive armaments. A people who are subjected to foreign invasion and to forces of aggression will certainly fight for their existence and defend their destiny. And the Arab people have in fact waged a popular war of liberation. We all know that the Arab people have confronted the forces of colonialism in various stages of their history. They have confronted bullets with stones, with their breasts armed only with faith, and with their confidence of victory. The fact that they had no arms has not stopped our people from standing up to colonialism and external aggression. The best example of the Arab people waging a popular war of liberation is provided by the revolution of the Arab people in Algeria. We are faced with invading forces assisted by world imperialism, and in particular by the United States of America, and assisted also by world capitalism and its vast resources. We are determined to face these arrogant invading forces, and our whole Arab nation is fully prepared to struggle with relentless determination against Zionist imperialist aggression.

Q. Does the nature of the terrain allow of a popular war being waged on all fronts?

A. The point at issue, as I understand it, is not one kind of warfare as opposed to another; it is that popular warfare means that the whole people take part in the defence of their existence and their destiny. As for the form such warfare takes, and the methods employed in waging it — it is simply a question of the whole people playing their part in confronting the aggressive forces, using the means available to them. And I think that the geographical configuration of every area will enable the people to find the way and employ the available means to defend their existence and destiny. It is not a question of there being forests, trees and mountains; street fighting, which means that the whole people help in defending their existence, is familiar to all peoples. The Arab people have been familiar with this kind of warfare in all the stages of their struggle.

Q. Will all the Arab people everywhere take part in this popular war? If so, how?

A. I think you mean by your question the theatre of war. We cannot forecast where the theatre of war will be, what will be its extent and

dimensions, because it is a question of the will of the masses and of the means employed by the masses to defend their existence and their right to live.

Q. There remains the second part of my question — I mean the roles played by the popular and regular armies.

A. Everyone knows the role of regular armies — it is to defend the territory of the homeland, to defend the objectives of the people, of the masses. Of course, regular armies have their own particular way of achieving their objectives; this is obvious. But it is equally obvious that they must be supported by a people who stand fast and fight with them. The precise roles to be played by regular armies and by the struggling sections of the masses and the people depend on the circumstances of the battle, the conditions in which the fighting takes place and the methods employed by the enemy, and on how these methods can best be confronted to ensure that the war is in the interests of the people and the masses who are defending their rights and their existence.

Q. Your Excellency, you have employed the slogan of progressive steps towards the unification of the progressive countries, but do you not think that the character of the battle requires more general and all-embracing cooperation between all the Arab countries? I mean, surely what is required is that the efforts of the whole Arab world should be united for the battle? And another thing, before unity becomes a reality it must have cultural, economic and military foundations to rest on.

A. From the way you asked your question, it might seem that the two slogans are incompatible. Actually, it is essential that the whole Arab nation should face the present Zionist-colonialist challenge, and that all Arab resources should be mobilised to this end. But if it is impossible to mobilise all resources, is it not better to unify all the available resources to constitute a base around which other Arab resources can gather? The slogan of progressive steps towards unity does not imply the exclusion of other Arab resources; on the contrary, there must be a base around which all Arab resources can be gathered. And by the formula of the union of the progressive countries we mean that we shall go further than we have so far gone; I mean that it will be an advance on all previous formulas, the previous formulas for

Arab cooperation and the formulas for Arab coordination which have previously existed. The character of the battle dictates that we should find a progressive formula to establish some kind of union of the progressive Arab states, which have similar social systems and the same objectives, and which are following the same course as we are. Steps towards a union of these countries must constitute a base for the whole Arab nation to rally round.

Q. What Israel is afraid of is that all Arab resources should be placed at the disposal of the battle. How can these resources be mobilised?

A. I think that the battle will unify these resources. During the June 5, 1967 aggression, the whole Arab nation was with us in the battle. The Arab masses, in the whole Arab homeland, were with us heart and soul in the battle and the fighting. In my opinion, a progressive formula for the union of the United Arab Republic and Syria will constitute a base which will attract all the masses of the Arab nation, and it is my opinion that this is one way of mobilising the resources of the Arab nation.

Q. Will Your Excellency allow me to ask about another point? I mean the Palestinian resistance which has emerged as a new and effective factor since 1967, and established the existence of the Palestinian people as an essential part in the struggle between us and Israel in the area. Has the Palestinian resistance received sufficient support to permit it to play its true role?

A. I believe that the Arab resistance has a very special place in the heart of every Arab. I believe that every Arab is fully prepared to give all he can to support this resistance, which has provided a decisive answer to defeatists in the Arab homeland, and restored to the masses their self-confidence after the June setback. It is the duty of all Arabs, both private citizens and officials, to strengthen Arab resistance. I believe that the steps that have been taken to support the resistance have not been up to the standard required by it and by the masses' support for and trust in it.

Q. Turning to the foreign policy of Syria, we should like to ask Your Excellency this question: Syria rejected the Security Council resolution which is described as a political solution for the Middle East crisis, and Syria's

point of view on this matter is well known. Does this rejection of a political solution mean that there is to be no political struggle?

A. On the contrary, any struggle must depend on political action. In all armed revolutions which have taken place in all parts of the world, political action has been considered an essential part of revolutionary action. And naturally we also, in this battle of destiny in which the Arab nation is engaged, have clearly emphasised that political action does not mean that there should be a dialogue with imperialism and colonialism. Because the only language which imperialism and Zionism understand is the language of armed struggle. But this does not at all mean that we neglect political action; we believe that political action is just as important as armed struggle, and that political struggle must always be at the service of armed struggle.

Q. With respect to the attitudes of Britain and West Germany, they sometimes, though very rarely, try to show some good-will for the Arab cause, but much more often stand by Israel. Would Your Excellency give us a clearer idea of the attitudes of Britain and Germany to our cause?

A. So far I am not aware of any favourable attitude to us on the part of either Britain or West Germany.

Q. In statements, perhaps?

A. Britain is mainly responsible for there being a Zionist base in Arab territory, in the heart of the Arab homeland. And I believe that British policy is still the same. Of course it is based on a colonialist master plan for the establishment of the Zionist base to constitute a human barrier to divide the Arab homeland.

Q. It is true that there is no change in the British attitude; this is quite clear and the Arab world knows it. But recently, and directly after the aggression certain British delegates came and tried to make a show of supporting Arab rights, but all the time they were secretly pro-Israel.

A. With respect to the attitudes of Britain and West Germany, no visits by their delegates or the contacts they make can disguise their true nature.

Q. All press reports from Tel Aviv tell of disquiet and disappointment after the June War, because they

believed that the war was going to end all wars. In view of this atmosphere of disquiet and disappointment, does Your Excellency believe that this will make Israel wage another war against us or that it will realise the situation in which it has landed itself by the June War?

A. I am convinced that Israel and its imperialist goals, and the June aggression, are not the result of causes within Israel itself. Of course we all know that there is Zionist pressure for continued expansion into Arab territories and for the establishment of an Israeli state from the Nile to the Euphrates. But when Israel moves, its expansionist plans are in harmony with the plans of imperialism, and I believe that colonialism still aims at bringing the Arab homeland back into spheres of influence, and I also believe that the Arabs must realise this, and that we must expect a new aggression by Israel and Zionism any day, and that we must plan for the battle on this basis.

Q. May we ask, sir, what lessons the Arabs have learned from the 1967 war?

A. I believe that the best evidence that the Arabs have learned the lessons of the setback is provided by the increasing violence of Arab resistance, and I believe we are offered many opportunities and useful lessons which we must take advantage of. I believe we have profited from all these lessons, and the best example of this, in my opinion, is that the June battle established that the main cause of the setback was the fragmentation of the Arab homeland. And if the Arabs have profited from the lessons of the setback, they must take new steps along the road towards mobilising the resources of the Arab nation and channelling them into the battle of destiny.

Q. Your Excellency previously mentioned peace, and said that Israel does not want peace but is trying to destroy peace. What, in your opinion, is the peace we are striving for?

A. The main object of the Arabs as human beings is to live free, and when others let us live free in our lands and actually possess the wealth of our homeland, our people will be able to progress. I am sure that we have absolutely no idea of attacking others, and also that it is absolutely unacceptable that peace should mean surrender. And we, as Arabs, — our existence and our territory are being attacked, as is our Arab

homeland and our wealth, and it is our right, as it is the right of all peoples in the world, to fight for our existence and defend our territories, and to possess our own resources. I believe that there will never be peace in Arab territory until the Arabs achieve full liberation and unity, and gain possession of their resources and place them at the service of the masses.

Q. Particularly when Zionism is internationally active, in all fields?

A. Of course the essential characteristic of the battle is armed struggle in Arab territory, but we must make the objectives of the struggle and the character of our battle clear to world public opinion by all available means.

Q. The June War provided us with a standard with which to determine our attitude to different countries. On this basis, would Your Excellency tell us about Syria's relations with certain foreign countries involved in the problem, such as the Soviet Union, for example?

A. The Soviet Union has provided us with extensive aid in all fields, and naturally, as Arabs, we must recognise the value and importance of this aid. Syria's relations with the Soviet Union are based on friendship and also on recognition of the importance of the aid which the Soviet Union has provided us with. There is no doubt that our relations with the Soviet Union are constantly improving.

Q. Mr. President, before and after the crisis, the United States has shown that it is completely biased in favour of Israel, and this is still being made clear to the world in international assemblies. How does Your Excellency analyse America's attitude, in view of the fact that it has interests in many Arab countries?

A. I believe that so far America has not felt that there is any serious threat to its interests. When the masses of the Arab nation take action and constitute a real threat to these interests, I think that then the United States will be forced to appreciate the situation.

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Speech by a Representative of the Palestine Liberation Organisation to the Advisory Committee of Non-Aligned Nations in Belgrade.¹ (Excerpt)

Belgrade, July 11, 1969

We believe,

1. That the people of Palestine possess sole right in their homeland and that they are capable, in their struggle for liberation to recover their usurped rights, of bearing all hardships;

2. That the Zionist movement is a racist, religious and imperialist movement, that Israel is a base for world imperialism, and that it is our duty as human beings to shoulder our responsibilities, in full awareness that we are doing so to save the world from this danger;

3. That our battle, by its very nature, is inseparable from that of liberation movements throughout the world; therefore our victory will be a victory for all nations struggling for national liberation, and similarly the victory of any people fighting for its liberation will undoubtedly help our struggle and strengthen our own hopes of victory;

4. That we must rely on ourselves in our struggle for it is we who have suffered most from the crimes of Zionism, and for this reason we shall always remain in the forefront of the struggle but, at the same time, we shall conduct the struggle in close cooperation with all friendly and peace-loving nations.

Mr. Chairman, Honourable Members,

Our revolution calls for the destruction of Zionism and for the creation of a democratic state in Palestine in which citizens of all religious denominations will enjoy equal rights.

However, this slogan is not intended as a political programme which we are offering to the Fascist clique that is ruling in Palestine. It is the slogan we employ in our struggle, with the object of appealing to members of the Jewish faith in

¹ Fatch. *Annual Yearbook*, 1969, p. 181.

Palestine to fight against Zionism and free themselves from its exploitation so that all the people of Palestine may live in their homeland in brotherhood and peace.

The masses of the Palestinian people have taken matters into their own hands. They are firmly resolved to continue their armed struggle until their goal of liberation is achieved.

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Speech by the United Arab Republic President Nasser at the Inauguration of the Third Session of the General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union.¹ (Excerpts)

Cairo, July 23, 1969

Ever since their great revolution, and even earlier, the Egyptian people have been in the vanguard of the struggle waged by the Arab nation. They have been a pillar of that struggle. Had the Egyptian people shirked that responsibility, had they wavered, history — the history of the Arab nation — would have been different. That great nation would never have shaken off the old fetters, neither would the Egyptian people.

We can say this without prejudice, while we are still suffering from the setback and its after-effects. The destiny of a people is not determined by a transitory reversal; rather, it is the calibre of the will of our countrymen and of the Arab nation, it is the readiness to face up to danger and to difficulty that will determine their destiny.

We are not alarmed by the fact that precious sections of our land are under enemy occupation; it would have alarmed us far more had our countries all remained unaware of the danger lying in wait for them, had they accepted surrender, mistaking it for peace, while the enemy proceeded unopposed with the implementation of his hostile designs. Had the enemy found no one to stand up to him while he did as he pleased, and defeated our countries while they remained in a stupor,

unable to tell friend from foe or organised inroads from deceptive security, that would have been far greater cause for alarm.

In spite of the setback, the Arab world today is not what it was years ago. Its economic, political and international weight, its cultural significance and the social developments that are taking place in it are quite different. Perhaps the best indication of the contradictions which beset the Arab world is that those who had control over it were the self-same makers of Israel, those who exploited it were none other than those who financed Israel, and those who possessed political and strategic influence in the Arab world were the protectors of Israel.

Despite the setback, which we wish had never taken place, and which should have never happened on such a scale — there can be no justification for that — at least the Arab world did gain a certain clarity of vision, an unadulterated vision of the truth which revealed itself to us free of dissimulation. We ought to thank God for the fact that, at its difficult hour, the Arab nation proved that it could face up to the truth and that it had the strength to challenge a *fait accompli* which was inimical to truth.

Nor were we the first to experience such matters, many nations had done so before us. They did not confuse a transitory *fait accompli*, no matter what strength lay behind it, with the scientific and accurate essence of the truth, which never lacks force. This is so, even if the instrument of the truth should at one time or another prove not to be as potent at its essence.

Power is created and grows through material and human agencies, through faith and work. The extent to which a cause agrees with the essence of the truth is the criterion that decides its authenticity or falsehood. It is this agreement which decides in favour of either final victory or inevitable defeat.

There has never been a cause for which people have fought, whether old or recent, that is more in harmony with the essence of truth than the battle of the Arab people against Israel. Israel embodies a colonialist plan, rooted in racialism and designed to terrorise the Arab lands, break up their unity and drain their resources.

What other cause is there, for which people have fought in modern or ancient times, in which

¹ United Arab Republic Ministry of National Guidance, *The Third Session of the General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union*, 23-25/7/1969.

one can find the same factors: An alien racist minority laying claim to what does not belong to it by right, covetous of a territory, stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates, which it wants to wrest away from the Arab nation? Or a colonial power, namely Britain, giving a pledge to that racist minority concerning something that is not hers to give, something that, on the contrary, it has been entrusted with through a Mandate from the international community? The usurpation and organised killing to which the Arab people of Palestine are being subjected? The support that minority is receiving from neo-imperialism, American imperialism, so that it may set up a state on usurped Arab soil, which state is being turned into a permanent base for organised large scale terrorism as we saw in 1948, 1956 and 1967?

Not once in those years, in which the greatest acts of aggression were committed, was the Arab nation the first to take up arms; rather it was the victim of that great conspiracy. The Arab nation never initiated hostilities; it was enemy who took up arms on each occasion when it appeared to that enemy that the Arabs were progressing to the point where they would have the necessary strength to ensure respect for the essence of truth.

The 1967 aggression then took place. It came as a reaction to far-reaching transformations within Arab society, first and foremost the process of industrialisation, the development of means of production, the socialist transformation and the approach of a technological revolution. These several factors are the best enhancement of unified Arab action. Even since the 1967 aggression, there have been daily manifestations of the fact that no cause for which men have fought could reveal as much as our just cause.

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... despite the United States affirmation in May, 1967 that it would oppose any aggression in the area and that it supported the liberty, independence and territorial integrity of each of the states in the region. However, following the Israeli victory, the United States chose to forget all about these declarations, made by the United States President at that time and which they claimed to be a reaffirmation of President Kennedy's statements on the subject.

The United States supported Israel in the most vainglorious and blatant fashion so that the Arabs might give in completely to Israel's demands. Fellow citizens,

This does not only apply to the political side of the question. Ever since the 1967 aggression, further evidence has been forthcoming — in addition to what happened in 1948, 1956 and 1967 and what Israel, its backers and its supporters did — of the fact that they still entertain plans to subdue the Arab nation and realise the objectives of Israel.

There has been an increase in the American supply of arms to strengthen Israel. Coming at a time when Israel occupies territories belonging to three Arab states, it is a clear affirmation of American support for the Israeli occupation of these Arab territories.

So much for America. But there are other sources of support; there is Britain. Despite all the attempts on its part to dissociate itself from what is taking place, we do not believe that Britain is far removed from these events which constitute a threat not only to us in Egypt but to the entire Arab nation.

Israel could not keep up this arrogant behaviour; Israeli leaders could not keep up this daily stream of declarations, to the effect that they intend to annex the West Bank, Jerusalem, the Golan Heights — they have even said Sharm al-Shaikh, and finally parts of Sinai — unless they could count on certain guarantees, as in the past, of Israeli supremacy in armament. It has always been planned that Israel should have the upper hand, where armament is concerned, over all the Arab countries combined.

Today, following the Israeli occupation of these territories, now that Israel is conscious of the fact that the Arab nation has held out for two years, it could not have kept up that brazenness and arrogance had there not been a certain and totally committed source of support on which it could rely.

It is obvious to us that the United States of America is solidly behind Israel, enabling it to go ahead with its aggression, usurp Arab lands and expand at the expense of Arab territories and of every Arab citizen.

We also feel that Britain is contributing to that end, although the channels it uses are not as overt

as those of the United States, by supplying Israel with arms.

Fellow citizens,

Israel has made its ambitions known; it covets our Arab lands. Israel is in favour of annexing a good portion of the occupied Arab territories, in fact, Israel has already begun to annex new territories in Palestine, Jordan and Syria — even in Egypt, in the Sharm al-Shaikh area. In spite of these acts of hostility against the entire Arab nation which constitute a violation of any set of principles you might care to name, Israel enjoys the support of the United States of America, it receives supplies of arms from the United States and Britain.

Fellow citizens,

Faced as we are with these things, we ought to be aware of the scope and intensity of the battle in which we are engaged. We are engaged in regular warfare on all fronts, yet the battle is not confined to actual exchanges of fire. We are being subjected to relentless psychological warfare. What is the objective of this warfare? To instil fear and despair, to transform a transitory setback into full-scale defeat. The objective is to subjugate our will to the wishes of the enemy, giving him license to do as he pleases with our lives, our land, our people and our thoughts, victimising us so that he may fulfil his ambitions.

Fellow citizens,

Although we are harassed by daily fire from the enemy and are occupied with actual fighting, we have to look deeper into the matter. We have to focus attention on the psychological warfare that is in progress, to identify Israeli political strategy at this phase.

Israel's political strategy at the present stage is to cause widespread despair in the Arab world. How? Why, by convincing us that there is no hope for the future, regardless of what we do, that there is no hope, no use. Some people... perhaps you have heard some people say that it's no use, there is nothing we can do politically, militarily or economically. We heard things of this sort in 1967. Some people also tried to say so in 1968.

Israel played this up in 1967 and in 1968. The imperialist countries, the American press, the

British press too, the French press, the Western press played these things up in 1967 and '68: there's no use, the Arab people are underdeveloped, the people of Israel are technologically developed.

They wanted to implant groundless fears in our minds, so that we would give up hope and say it was no use for us to try and change the state of affairs that was forced on us in 1967.

But did Israel succeed? Did America, did the imperialist countries or the countries hostile to the Arab nation, did they succeed, in 1967, in spreading despair in the Arab nation? Well, perhaps they succeeded with some people, but the Arab nation remained steadfast, well entrenched, in its rejection of the defeat, as when people went out on the street in every Arab country, on June 9 and 10, to declare their rejection of defeat and despair and their determination to realise their objectives.

They tried in 1967, and they tried again in 1968 and in 1969. Nevertheless, it became apparent that Israel's stratagem had not worked even under the most gruelling circumstances, during the most severe crises, in our most difficult hour.

Fellow citizens,

The cause for which we are fighting is unlike any other cause for which men have fought. It is as clear as the sun, there is no doubt about our cause.

But what counts is: are we strong? Are we growing stronger day by day so that we may come to the point where we shall be able to change the *fait accompli* and enforce respect for the truth?

Fellow citizens,

It is possible to answer this question by going back to the past. There are two criteria for us to go by in answering the question as to whether we are strong; and as to whether we are growing stronger day by day, so that we may come to the point where we shall be able to change the *fait accompli* with which we are faced, and enforce respect for the truth, for the unadulterated and pure essence of the truth.

The first criterion is: do we possess the will to reject and challenge the setback? That, fellow citizens, has been shown to be true. All the people of the Arab nation; the Arab people in every Arab country and city — the entire Arab nation;

every individual, every man and woman, every youth and every old man, even every child in this nation; all of them together, with no exception, showed their will to be as strong as any will can be. They said we shall not accept what has taken place; we shall not surrender to the enemy; there shall be no peace without right and justice; we shall stand fast and endure, we shall fight and sacrifice. Martyrs and heroes may fall, but our banners shall not be lowered. We shall go on with the struggle regardless of the cost or the burden it may entail.

That criterion, fellow citizens, we have shown that we can satisfy. That was brought home to us and to others too. It was brought home to us in 1967, at our hardest, most difficult hour, at the darkest, the blackest hour. The point was made once again in 1968, and again two years after the setback. Today, we feel that every member of the Arab nation had a part in it. Everyone had a hand in rejecting defeat and in the decision taken by the entire Arab people: no surrender to the enemy.

The second criterion, fellow citizens, is: can we increase our power to the point where we can meet the responsibility imposed by our will, that will which rejected defeat and resolved to endure?

The answer to that, fellow citizens, is before your eyes. It is perceptible to the eyes as to the mind. Two years ago today, on July 23, 1967 we hardly knew what to do as a result of what had happened to us in June, 1967. One of the consequences of that event was that our lines were exposed to the enemy. I have already told you that we had no forces in those areas. I have already told you that the vital targets in our country were at the mercy of the enemy's air force. Our armed forces had only recently emerged from the setback, they had suffered a major defeat. There was no Palestinian resistance yet; it had not yet made its voice heard in the world. Or rather, there was Palestinian resistance, but its voice had not yet been heard in the world. There was no concerted Arab action as yet to meet the demands of the phase through which our nation was passing so as to alter the *fait accompli*.

Fellow citizens,

No doubt you would like me to give you detailed answers to these questions now. However, Lieutenant General Muhammad Fauzi, the Minister of War, will give you a detailed report of the military situation during the closed meeting of this Congress tomorrow.

Our armed forces and our military effort are now at the beginning of a new phase. We are embarking on a phase which leaves no room for comparison with the situation we were in when I addressed this Assembly on July 23, 1967, and still differs markedly from the situation we were in when I addressed this Assembly on July 23, 1968. In July, 1967 we had nothing. In July, 1968 our situation did not permit us to do any more than offer passive defence. Now it is July 1969 and the situation has changed. Events themselves, and not we, speak for that fact.

Fellow citizens,

Our circumstances today differ from those of 1968 and 1967. We are in the position of someone who is determined to fight for liberation, and we are able to fight for liberation. In this day and age with the complexities that have been introduced in the field of armament and war materials, reconstruction in the armed forces is no easy task. Yet we can take pride in our armed forces today.

What does the enemy want from us following 1967? There was a cease-fire resolution, which, as I told you, was the first instance in which such a resolution was passed without providing for the withdrawal of the forces of the aggressor. Actually, the draft resolution that was submitted to the Security Council in 1967 calling for a ceasefire, also stipulated that the forces of the aggressor should withdraw. However, the United States intervened and insisted that the paragraph dealing with withdrawal be struck from the resolution. This is an indication of the collusion that has existed since the very start between the United States and Israel. In this way, a cease-fire resolution was passed. 1967 and 1968 went by; now 1969 is running out. Considering these factors, Israel has been imposing its own conditions and has rejected the (November 22, 1967) Security Council resolution. Israel says that it is not prepared to discuss anything with a United Nations delegate but that it would willingly talk

all these matters over with the Arabs if the latter were willing to sit down and negotiate with it. The Israeli leaders are saying that if the Arabs do not want to accept that, why, they are quite happy with the territories they hold and with the cease-fire line. This in effect means that the perpetuation of the cease-fire along these lines is but the implementation of Israel's policy not to withdraw from the occupied territories, as announced by its leaders. Are we to accept this?

We are of the opinion that the cease-fire decision cannot be everlasting. We are of the opinion that the cease-fire is inseparably connected with the withdrawal of the forces of the aggressor, otherwise it would amount to surrender on our part. It would be surrender on the part of the countries which were the victims of the aggression, considering that Israel has occupied our lands for two, no, for over two years now, considering also that Israel refuses to withdraw, and, what is more, considering its declared intention of annexing a good part of these lands, in which it has the blessing of the United States. What does the cease-fire mean? It means that we are putting into effect the Israeli policy — which is also United States policy, for the United States supports Israel in this matter — of usurping parts of Arab lands or expanding at the expense of these lands.

We therefore have to fight. It is not only our right to fight for the recovery of our occupied lands, it is our duty to do so, as the whole world admits, and as it has admitted in the past. We are in duty bound to fight for the recovery of the occupied Arab territories, to evict the Israeli forces which have occupied these territories. On this basis, fellow citizens, we proceeded with the implementation of the phases which are familiar to you all: there was the phase of energetic defence, then the phase where we were able to offer a deterrent to the enemy, then the phase of attacking the enemy and finally came the operations across the Suez Canal. These were quite normal for our armed forces, in fact, the different units in our armed forces have vied with one another in requesting missions involving crossing to the east bank of the Canal and attacking enemy positions there.

Our attitude is that we have waited over two years. We have implemented the cease-fire resolution. But we find that Israel is pursuing a

devious policy. In doing so, it enjoys the backing of the United States. One might also add that it enjoys the support of Britain, although not quite out in the open. British support for Israel is underhand, given in a hush-hush sort of way, so that the Arab nation may not find out, lest British interests should suffer. Britain comes along and submits vague resolutions. Now the British interpret those resolutions one way whenever we and they get together, yet when British delegates sit down to talk to the Jews, or rather, to Israel, they of course offer the interpretation that pleases Israel. What they want is that the cease-fire resolution should be put into effect but that Israel should go on occupying Arab territories until we give in.

Fellow citizens,

We are now embarking on an operation to liberate the occupied territories, as we said. That is not going to come cheaply; it is going to cost us a lot. We shall fight; we shall fight to recover our territories. When we say territories, fellow citizens, we are not by any means referring to Egyptian territories alone. It is not only Sinai that we have in mind. We are referring to all the occupied Arab territories; Jerusalem first of all, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, Gaza; all the Arab territories, and we mean what we say. This is our right. That right belongs to each and every one of us. Furthermore, it is our duty.

It has been two years. We accepted the cease-fire, we accepted the Security Council resolution, we accepted a peaceful settlement, we did everything we could. We went on accepting. Some people even reproached us for accepting the Security Council resolution. Yet we wanted a peaceful solution; we never said that we wanted war for its own sake. We want to liberate our territories, we want to liberate our people, we want to liberate our Arab people.

Some of our enemies feel that time is against us. We, on the other hand, feel that time is in our favour. During these days, these months, this period, Israel has been trying to propagate the myth of the Israeli army.

But I have followed all operations across the Canal very closely; I have also followed up the escalation of these operations and everything that took place, in detail. Actually, the initial

purpose of these operations was for our soldiers to see for themselves the true nature of the Israeli army and to gauge the calibre of the Israeli soldier in close, hand to hand combat. In that way they could see those who cry out, who scream and run. They saw, and they knew that imperialist-Israeli propaganda in 1967 was one thing and the things they had seen with their own eyes on the east bank of the Canal were quite another.

Many operations took place, large-scale operations. At one time operations were being carried out, but the Minister of War preferred not to have communiqués issued on the matter. Even they did not issue any communiqués. Forays were being made each day to the east bank, clashes would take place, there would be fighting, and our men would come back. It went on like this until we started to issue statements about the operations that took place.

These operations then began to escalate. Furthermore, they all used to take place at night. Their books had said that the Egyptian soldier does not like to fight at night; they had written all sorts of things about the Egyptian soldier. They were unjust to the Egyptian soldier, they said many things about him in their books and their propaganda. However, what they used to write and what they saw were two different things. They saw Egyptian soldiers crossing the Canal at night, fighting at night, attacking enemy posts at night, attacking tanks at night, withdrawing at night, taking their wounded and even their dead with them. We displayed several favourable characteristics; we fought at night and we brought our dead and wounded back with us. Naturally, there are no battles in which there are no dead and no wounded. Yet all these factors are an indication of the nature, the calibre and the constitution of the Egyptian soldier that we have in our armed forces today. Then came the Port Tawfiq operation. They had always tried to belittle the value of our armed forces, but then the Port Tawfiq operation took place. They were powerless to deny or belittle the importance of that battle. The whole world wrote about that battle; telling how a corps of fighting men swooped down on enemy fortified positions in the fading 8 o'clock dusk and overran those positions; they captured, blew up, destroyed those positions, and then returned to the west bank.

Fellow citizens,

It has been clear during the past phase, ever since 1967, that Israel has been trying to implant a conviction in the Arab nation, in you, and in the whole world, that the Israeli Air Force is the unassailable master of the skies. Israel used to conceal any losses it suffered; attempting, through its propaganda — in which it had the cooperation of the imperialist nations — to tell us that it was no use. No matter what we did it was no use; they were the masters of the skies, after all, their Air Force was king, and all that. Naturally, we cannot say that this did not affect our spirit, the spirit of the people, the armed forces and the Air Force. To a certain extent, this propaganda has an effect on us. But this did not prevent our Air Force, our pilots, our sons from carrying out every order that was issued to them. Our planes flew continuous missions over Sinai. Sometimes as many as thirty planes would go out on missions over the north, central and southern sectors. We did not broadcast these facts, and they kept silent as well.

Nevertheless, Israel kept up its propaganda on Sunday, July 20; that was three days ago, in the wake of the Gazira Khadra battle. I should like to talk about the Gazira Khadra battle before taking up the battle of July 20. In the operations that we carried out, our forces would attack fortified positions, protected by mines, barbed wire and equipped with bunkers made of reinforced concrete. Our forces would overrun these positions; they would open a path in the mine-fields, blow up the bunkers and engage the enemy in close-range combat. Did the enemy once mount this sort of operation against us throughout that period? Never. The enemy — and we know the traits of our enemy — was always on the look out for a cheap victory to talk about, one that would make a big splash in all news agency reports. The enemy attacked the coastguard station south of Adabiyya. The coastguard crew at that station — well, perhaps the enemy was clever, after all, in that he actually managed to acquire such valuable information concerning a spot where he could score a cheap victory — the enemy went there, he carried out his operation, and discovered that the coastguard crew there do not constitute a part of the front at all. He did manage to go back home and say that he had attacked Egyptian positions.

Of course one could see that this was a case of political or psychological warfare. It is a question of who could cause more damage, more casualties to the other and then broadcast the fact.

Then there was the case of the frontier checkpoints on the Red Sea. Each was manned by seven border guards; rather old people at that. The enemy left the entire front alone and mounted an attack on two points, one manned by seven people, I believe, and the other by eight. The enemy landed his commandos there and carried out an operation. The enemy went in to attack these two checkpoints and it is given out that he has attacked "important positions in the Red Sea". That was the sort of operation it was. After that, we realised that there were certain gaps, perhaps, which the enemy might exploit. Our armed forces managed to cover these gaps so as not to leave weak spots for the enemy to practise his heroics in.

As a result, the enemy lit upon Gazira Khadra. It's an isolated area and there's nothing there except anti-aircraft units, anti-aircraft batteries. That was the target of Sunday's operation. The enemy did not succeed in occupying the island, however. Had he succeeded, he would have remained there, for it's in the middle of the Gulf and it's just as close to him as it is to us. The enemy suffered some losses and then withdrew. Actually, the whole thing began at three o'clock on Sunday afternoon, July 20. Enemy aircraft attacked our forces along the front. Now, our forces along the front are equipped with a powerful and organised defence system. It was clear to us that our powerful defences along the front could stand up to these Israeli air attacks and could inflict heavy losses on the Israelis. We therefore decided against bringing in our Air Force at the initial stages of the battle, leaving our air defence system to deal with the enemy aircraft, because the entry of our aircraft would have invalidated the use of our anti-aircraft batteries and missiles, for our aircraft would have been in the skies along with his. We brought our Air Force in at six o'clock. The minute our aircraft went up, they shot down — the first communiqué I received informed me that two Mirage planes had been hit in aerial combat — then our aircraft entered enemy air space and hit enemy positions, the

Hawk missile sites, their radar stations, and so it went on. Israeli positions, troop concentrations and ammunition dumps inside Sinai were hit. Israel later admitted the loss of two planes, the ones that were shot down in dogfights.

This means, then, that we have been planning and thinking, that every opportunity is open to us, that we can in fact stand up to any sort of situation. We have our men, we have our planes, we have our forces and we are ready to come to grips with the enemy on land and in the air. As I have said already, we have moved from the stage of being on the defensive to the stage where we can offer a deterrent to the enemy. Furthermore, I repeat once again that if the enemy were to strike at civilians, we would strike at civilians too; nothing can change that. We are all aware what result July 20 had.

As a matter of fact, just what is it that happened yesterday? Something very peculiar happened. No doubt you are all familiar with the military communiqués that were issued yesterday. They informed me at about 3:30 or four o'clock yesterday, that enemy aircraft were attacking an area called Tina. Tina is next to Qantara. The area is empty; there's nothing there whatsoever. Yes, of course there are small defence posts, but they have no artillery. Naturally, I would not be giving away information to the enemy if I were to say that there are no tanks there either. The enemy knew this; he had come just to strike at the sand.

Two planes came along and fired missiles. Nothing happened. Then two other planes came along and also fired missiles. Still nothing happened. For a third time, two planes came along and fired missiles in this one area called Tina. They did not go at all to any of the areas where we have anti-aircraft defences. They did not cross our threshold either in northern or southern Sinai; well, perhaps they did make a pass over Port Said afterwards.

Afterwards, I read a dispatch from Tel Aviv — Reuters, Tel Aviv — saying that Israeli planes were attacking Egyptian artillery positions: "An Israeli military spokesman announced that Israeli planes today attacked Egyptian artillery positions all along the Suez Canal for the second time in three days. The spokesman added that at 14:30 hours, Israeli planes attacked Egyptian artillery

positions and put them out of action.” That would be at 2:30, or 3:30 their time. “The planes then returned safely to their bases. The spokesman said that Egyptian artillery positions had opened fire on Israeli units in the Qantara area and to the north at an early hour that morning, and that the Israeli Air Force went into action after the Egyptians had kept up the artillery barrage for some time”. The agency reports that “the full impact of the Israeli air strike is not known yet. The spokesman said that no immediate details were available as to the exact damages inflicted on Egyptian positions”.

The spokesman said that they had hit us all along the Suez Canal. Actually, the entire operation was a matter of three strikes on the Tina area. Not a single soldier was wounded; they did not even harm a bird, although they certainly did strike a blow in the sand.

Why are they saying these things? One in fact wonders why they put out such talk. We heard the BBC repeat these things over and over again, we heard it at five o'clock and then at six. The BBC is saying that Israeli planes are attacking Egyptian positions.

But they did not come anywhere near Egyptian artillery positions; they had already tried that on Sunday, and they saw what sort of air defence we had. But the real operation is psychological in nature, and while it is directed against us it is also aimed at their own people, at the people in Israel. The impression they mean to convey is that despite what happened on Sunday the 20th, they came back and attacked Egyptian positions all along the front.

Fellow citizens,

Naturally we are not deceived by these things. We have already spoken of psychological warfare; we shall now speak of the tactics of the enemy. I should like to say, however, that we have been countering that psychological warfare — furthermore we have defeated it over the past two years. Today, as we are more confident and better fit than before, psychological warfare cannot shake us, as we have always said, radio stations notwithstanding.

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Well, what I want to convey to you at this time is that our air force — and I have been

meeting and talking with its commanders — these people are truly worthy of our trust. Perhaps the only remark I have to make is that they are still over-enthusiastic. We want to cut down on that over-enthusiasm and go about our work in cold blood, for the enemy before us is a treacherous enemy. But as I told the commander of our Air Force, when he and the Minister for War came to see me, our people have confidence in their Air Force. We now have full confidence in our air defence forces. Our armed forces have made great efforts in the two years since 1967. As you all know, little leave is granted, training is constantly in progress and work is going ahead all the time so that we may realise the aspirations of every citizen of this country, in fact, of every member of the Arab nation, which is liberation. The fighting spirit and morale of our armed forces are high. I and our armed forces sense that there is full popular sympathy and solidarity with our armed forces which are determined to live up to the national obligation to liberate the occupied territories.

Fellow citizens,

Notwithstanding the things that I have described, what I have said and the hopes that we cherish, I must also tell you that the road before us is long and arduous, if I am to be true to my responsibilities. The issue before us is not a matter of statements, words or speeches. The issue is that we are engaged in a bitter struggle, a bitter pitched battle. There are only 200 meters between us and the enemy, but the road before us is not any shorter or less difficult for that. There are two standards that we must be sure about:

1. That the will should be there; and it is there, it has been established that our people have the required determination. We have already spoken of that.

2. That the capacity for action, which feeds that will, is there. It is there, it is growing and daily gives proof of its efficacy. A transition is taking place from one phase of action to another, more effective phase, one that will have a wider impact.

Fellow citizens,

If we always judge by these standards we can be confident that we are on the right path. We

must be aware, however, that the more progress we make, the more savage and vindictive the enemy will grow, as will those who are behind our enemy, those who want to subjugate this area are using Israel as an instrument to that end. They will grow more savage and vindictive towards us. Everywhere you turn there are conspiracies, money is being spent, spies and agents are being used, help is being given to Israel.

We have already spoken of the tactics the enemy uses and we continue to speak of them. We must be clear about these things. I repeat once more: the objective of the enemy is to bring us to the point of despair. My response is that we have not yet despaired; on the contrary, we feel daily more confident that the Almighty will make it possible for us to attain our objectives. The enemy is trying to make us doubt everything. Of course the enemy conceals his own casualties. That is quite clear; it is clear that the enemy is very clever, perhaps he is more clever than we are in this respect. We announce that a battle took place, that there was an exchange of fire which continued for such and such a length of time, that we hit and destroyed such and such, and so on. Then the enemy comes along and says that the exchange of fire lasted for twelve hours, let us say, but that he lost one man dead, one wounded and, well, all right, perhaps two wounded.

Perhaps the matter calls for a bit of vigilance. People say: "Ah! The enemy says that only one man on his side was wounded". Naturally, the battle we are fighting today, at this stage, is a psychological and political battle, and so it will be until the day comes for a decisive encounter. Everyone wants us to lose hope, while we want the confidence the enemy acquired on June 5, 6, 7 and 8, 1967 to be shaken. We have succeeded.

On June 8 and 9, 1967 they were dancing in the streets. In 1968, a year later, they held a celebration. By the time '69 came along, they had grown sad; they neither held a celebration nor did they dance. Why was that?

They had understood that they had won the war; they had been victorious in battle; they had defeated the Arabs; they had defeated Egypt, they had wiped out the Egyptian army. They had done this through their military strength, that was what we heard in 1967. They danced while

we cried; while people were crying in the streets here on the 9th and 10th they were dancing in Tel Aviv. Now, thank God, things have changed, the whole picture has changed. There never was a "Six Day War"; by now it has become the "Two Year War"; and it will go on to become the "Three Year War" and the "Four Year War". We have been learning. Perhaps over the past twenty years they have been more clever than we have. We admit that they had been preparing to strike at us, they had been mobilising everything for the battle. We were not then in a position to say that the Arab nation was mobilising everything for the battle, not at all, really.

All over the world, Israel is saying that two and a half million Jews have the upper hand over a hundred million Arabs. I repeat: psychological warfare, the political battle, is the most significant factor in the present situation. The enemy will leave no stone unturned to make us give up hope, that is the objective of his concentrated campaigns. He wants us to doubt our own communiqués, he wants us to give away information about everything, information about our losses. Well, we shall not give him that information.

We, our people, have grown sensitive to the nuances of this war. An indication of that was that on Sunday the 20th, our people could detect that a battle was taking place from the very start; they could also sense that Israel had indeed lost that battle. The people are sensitive, they have a way of knowing. The people have confidence in their armed forces today, despite the concentrated campaign the enemy has mounted, despite that concentrated imperialist campaign against our armed forces and against our air force. The people can sense these things, they can tell. The people are confident today, they will not be swayed by what Israel tells them, naturally. It is clear, as time will tell, that your confidence in your armed forces and in your Air Force is well placed. Furthermore, the fact that our people are consciously willing to put up with any losses we may suffer has an influence on all attempts at psychological warfare. No one fights a war without losses. We are at war, we are fighting; there is no escaping the fact that some people on our side will die, just as some of the enemy will die. That will be the case so long as we are fighting and inflicting losses on the enemy. The people are

conscious of it; it is apparent that they are knowingly willing to put up with any losses they may suffer.

Fellow citizens,

We are engaged in a long-range war, and we are prepared for such a war — a long-range war of attrition. All the Arab states should base their policies on attrition. A *Blitzkrieg* such as that of June 5 cannot possibly be repeated. There is constant warfare between us and Israel. The United States is going to deliver Phantoms to Israel, England gives it tanks, and other countries give as well. An arms race is in progress. Moreover, we all know that Israel can put half a million men in the field. However, potentially, we can outman them. We must then try to place more than half a million men under arms, for this battle is decisive. Our human resources are greater than Israel's; nevertheless, we have to mobilise everything for the battle. As I have already said, the battle is long and it is big. We have not yet entered the real battle; so far, the battle is in its initial stages. Its predominant aspect is psychological warfare. The enemy tries to hide the truth in the communiqués that he releases. When they tried to attack us by crossing over in boats but were hit themselves, they said it never happened. We announced the fact, but they denied it categorically. Later, when we pulled the body of the leader of the expedition out of the water and handed it over to them, the whole world could see that they had been hiding the truth. When they came to attack Nag Hammadi and claimed that they had hit Nag Hammadi, blown up the dam and inundated an area of 300 thousand feddans, it was established that they had been lying, of course. What they mean to tell us is that it is no use; no matter what we do they will still be able to hit us again and again.

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Fellow citizens,

We now turn to another aspect of the situation, we shall look at the resistance movement. The allegation they used to make against the resistance was that its members made a practise of opening fire at nearby settlements from across the River Jordan. They said that they had rid themselves of the resistance movement, that the resistance was a fable and the whole thing had been exag-

gerated. Naturally, it has been shown that such statements — Bar-Lev said that he had managed to contain the resistance, that the movement had become ineffective, only that members of the resistance were opening fire from across the River Jordan. Today there was an explosion in Tel Aviv, no doubt you all heard about it on the news. I do not intend to go into the operations of the resistance, suffice it to say that they carried out an operation in Haifa; the operations of the resistance have reached Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Eilat. High tension towers linking the entire Negev were blown up. The port of Eilat came under attack. Many other operations, other than combat operations, have been carried out as well. Furthermore, in the case of combat operations, these are carried out by young men who fight out of conviction, who are carrying on the struggle and who engage the enemy inside the occupied territories.

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Fellow citizens,

The resurgence of the Palestinian people has been an incredible phenomenon. It speaks of deathless life and a strength of character that will not be diverted from its path. The role played by the Palestinian masses in this respect cannot be denied. The Palestinian people who labour under the burden of the occupation are engaged in constant struggle.

Over the past few weeks, we have all been following the struggle of the masses in Nablus and their resistance to brute force. I saw the pictures that came out of Nablus; they had arrested the whole city, they had arrested everybody, all the inhabitants of Nablus were under arrest, sitting by the wall. But will this serve to intimidate them? Will it make them despair? I believe there is an old theory which says that brute force and the heavy hand of the occupiers will increase resistance. I am confident that the people of Nablus, whose picture I saw as they sat by the wall with the guns of the Jewish soldiers trained on them, will resist more fiercely than before. Such has always been the nature of the Arab people, throughout the years.

We have seen the resistance and the struggle offered by the masses in Gaza, by the men and the women, by our people. I also saw the pictures

that came out of Gaza, I saw the guns in the hands of the Jewish soldiers. This is our message to the people of Gaza: we salute your endurance and your struggle; we await, God willing, the day of reunion, the day when we shall liberate these occupied territories.

We have witnessed the struggle in Jerusalem, Hebron and Tulkarm, in every city, everywhere throughout the West Bank. The role of the masses, of the Palestinian people, is immortal. They will not despair, psychological warfare will not affect them. Furthermore, it is evident that the Arab people are solidly behind the resistance.

Fellow citizens,

We are still of the opinion, as we said, that there is no truer or more accurate standard to judge by in the case of any individual, group or government than their attitudes toward the cause of the resistance; furthermore, this is the case with regard to the question of offering aid or facilities to the resistance and what we do on our part to strengthen its hand.

Fellow citizens,

We are giving all that we have to the resistance, in the military, political and technical fields. We are prepared to do this without restriction or reservation and make no demands on our part except the one demand of the entire Arab nation: to fight the enemy.

Fellow citizens, Members of the National Congress,

I shall now turn to unified Arab action at official level. It is our estimate that the new stage we are at needs to be studied at the highest levels. Our circumstances have changed since Khartum, our strength is different now from what it was in 1967. We met in Khartum in August 1967; we are now in July 1969. The situation that obtained with respect to our strength has changed, the tactics of the enemy have changed, the international attitude to our struggle has changed. The United Nations issued a resolution, following which we heard that Ambassador Jarring went around for a year and a half and then returned to Moscow. Then there were the Big Four meetings; the Big Four held weekly meetings, then their representatives went on leave. No meetings are being held now. Talks were also held between the United States and the Soviet Union. In other words, the international situation

has changed entirely. All this means that the situation ought to be re-evaluated at the highest level, where a decisive and resolute decision can be taken by the Arabs.

Fellow citizens,

I should like to lay down a number of principles:

1. We do not want to involve anyone in any more than he can do.

2. There is only one battle; there is none other in the whole world. This is the battle of the Arab nation against Zionist racialism which enjoys the backing of the forces of imperialism.

3. We do not favour setting up different axes in the Arab world. I am referring to the fact that certain people are trying to make it appear that this and that Arab country form an axis against some other Arab country. We do not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab country; our only concern is that each and every Arab country should take part in the battle. We are in favour of any change that will increase the Arab forces that are mobilised for the battle, and we stand opposed to any personal or ideological conflict or any form of factionalism that does not contribute to the war effort, but detracts from it.

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Fellow citizens,

I should like to give you a glimpse of our plans for concerted Arab action in the coming phase. We shall mount a new effort; however, I do not wish to go into details at present, before discussing the matter with the other parties concerned in order to coordinate the united Arab effort at the highest level. Furthermore, the forces of the resistance movement, which represent the struggle of the Palestinian people, ought to join in coordinating that effort. We shall also make additional efforts to strengthen the Eastern Front, which we believe has a vital role to play. Finally, we shall make new efforts to remobilise all the forces of the Arab masses so as to stiffen their resistance. The battle requires a wider-reaching contribution, it no longer requires merely material support. More than anything else, and more than ever before, the battle requires concerted thinking, planning and action, for the field of battle is wide, we are

facing vast hostile forces and the danger menaces all our peoples, with no exception. I do not wish to anticipate events, but I pray God that our efforts may meet with success, that everyone will act in good faith and that their sincerity will give us the clearness of vision that will enable us to attain our objective.

Members of the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union,

A review of our positions in the years 1967, '68 and '69 ought to include a look at the international atmosphere in relation to the struggle in which we are engaged. An appraisal of the reconstruction of our armed forces and of the arms we lost in the war inevitably leads us to mention the support we have received from the Soviet Union, our friend. What is the value of this support? I have a simple example to illustrate that point. After 1967, Moshe Dayan made a good number of statements. Each week he would make two statements. He said that war was out of the question, that no one could do a thing, not even after ten years. We heard those statements and we kept quiet in 1967, we did not open our mouths. They were in high spirits while we were busy with reconstruction. After a while they started saying that there could be no war for several years, whereas previously they had said ten years. A few months ago they started saying that it would seem the matter would require several months. Finally, Dayan said that the situation was not that of a cease-fire but that we were in a state of war, only that the warfare was sporadic rather than continuous. The truth is that the support of the Soviet Union, without the backing and the military support we have been receiving from the Soviet Union, Dayan could have seen his words come true,

Not a single country in the West is willing to sell us a single bullet, not one will sell us tanks, artillery or anything else, for that matter. Without the support of the Soviet Union, Moshe Dayan would have been free to strike at us and we should not have been able to retaliate, for in that case we should have had no arms to fight with whatsoever. This is the military aspect of the case.

As for the political aspect, the Soviet Union has supported us in all international spheres of action, at the Security Council and the General

Assembly and in all discussions among the Big Four, even with the United States. The Soviet Union keeps us informed of everything. I have already said this before and I repeat it now: the Soviet Union has told us that it would not agree to anything relating to this issue unless the Arab nation agrees to it too. Brezhnev said this during his visit last year and I received a letter from him saying the same thing only yesterday.

Furthermore, while we are on this subject, I want to tell you that the Soviet Union has responded to all our requests in military matters and has been true to all the agreements we made. The Soviet Union was a friend in need in 1967. At the time of crisis, at the time of difficulty, we found military, political and economic support from the Soviet Union. I feel that it is my duty, in addressing this Congress, to once again thank the people and the leaders of the Soviet Union for their constant support for us in our struggle for liberty and for the liberation of our lands. We thank them again from the bottom of our hearts and we say to them that we shall never forget the fact that they stood at our side at the time of our affliction.

Fellow citizens,

Having looked at the attitude of the Soviet Union, we must now turn to the attitude of the United States. I say that there has been no change in the attitude of the United States. The attitude of the United States is that of full support for Israel; the United States responds to every demand that Israel makes. They have shown compliance with Israel's demand for expansion. Perhaps the Americans are saying that the expansion that takes place should not be large-scale, that there should be expansion or land should be taken, but that these should not be extensive. However, is anyone aware of the facts? Everything in the thirteen-point memorandum that they submitted is in favour of Israel. We are supposed to agree with Israel on what Israel is to take from us, we are supposed to agree on which of the refugees they are to take back.

As far as Jerusalem is concerned, it was the United States that stood firm at the United Nations and refused to object to Israeli measures in Jerusalem; all the other nations objected.

As far as the attitude of the United States is

concerned, there may be a change in that attitude insofar as the approach is concerned. At first they were quite distant and cool toward us. Now their approach has changed, there is room for discussion and for give and take. Yet in the final analysis what does it come down to? Their attitude is in complete harmony with the demands of Israel. What was the United States memorandum containing the thirteen-point proposal? If we look at what Mr. Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, has been saying, we find that the United States simply took what Abba Eban had been saying, put it in the form of a thirteen-point proposal, and then presented it to the Soviet Union as their opinion on how the problem should be solved.

Naturally this attitude serves to encourage Israel; in fact, it is the main source of encouragement for Israel. It is an encouragement to Israel to continue its aggression against our territories and to refuse to withdraw from them.

In our treatment of the international situation and the international atmosphere, we spoke of the attitudes of the Soviet Union and the United States; however, before I leave the subject of the attitude of the United States, I want to mention that some people have been asking: Why do we not remedy the condition of our relations with the United States? Why do we not improve our relations with the United States? Why do we not resume diplomatic relations with the United States? Certain people here have been asking these things — I know who they are, and I know that people have been saying these things — the idea is that perhaps these are the things that have turned the United States against us and motivated it to take such an attitude.

Well, actually we have an example before us of what happens in such a case. King Hussein has diplomatic relations with the United States. He visited the United States and met with United States leaders on three separate occasions. He talked to them; and what did they do? What did they do for Jordan? The entire West Bank is still occupied. Quite on the contrary, nothing at all has come of these things.

We may conclude then that it is not a question of political or diplomatic relations. It is not a question of the presence of an ambassador, visits being received or holding discussions at all. The issue, rather, is that there is a planned United

States policy to support Israel and to materialise the Israeli demand for expansion at the expense of the Arab nation. We repeat that proof for this is to be found in the fact that the United States supplies Israel with arms. The United States promised to supply Phantoms to Israel in spite of the fact that we had lost our aircraft during the war, as the United States very well knew, while the Israeli air force was not short of planes.

We shall now turn to Britain. We can only say that the British attitude is devious in political and propaganda matters. We must speak clearly and be frank in our appraisal of attitudes. Actually, there was a time, while diplomatic relations between us were still suspended, when they spoke of Israeli withdrawal. The matter ended there, however. It would appear that the United States is using Britain for certain political ends. A glance at what is going on in international circles reveals that the United States and Britain are working hand in hand for the benefit of Israel. Whatever Israel wants, they put in the form of a resolution and put pressure on other nations to support that resolution. The British attitude is also underhanded in the field of propaganda. If you read their papers, you find that they say poisonous things in their press. So extensive is this that we frequently feel the presence of an animus toward us. Naturally, there are some free souls. There was the case of a journalist working for a British paper who developed an enthusiasm for the Arab cause and the Palestinian people after '67. Despite all that is said about the freedom of the press and this and that about the British press, that man was forced to leave the paper. They threw him out because the Zionists and Jewish centres of power in Israel brought pressure to bear on the paper. The British attitude is devious in political and propaganda matters.

The French attitude during the de Gaulle era was sound and principled. Following de Gaulle's resignation and the election of Pompidou to the Presidency, the French attitude remained sound and principled. In fact, we should like, on this occasion, to thank the French people for their determination to stand on principle. This, in fact, offers the whole world hope for peace and for the future. Furthermore, we thank President Pompidou for the sound and principled policy that he has adopted, as set forth at his press conference.

There is also the attitude of the non-aligned nations to consider. Their position was made clear during the recent conference in Belgrade. It is total support for the Arab states and condemnation of the Israeli position which is founded on arrogance and aggression.

Moreover, there is the attitude of the African states. Delegates to African states could sense this attitude after the Algiers Conference. During the Algiers Conference last year, the African states expressed full support for our cause. That support is growing from day to day. The same can be said for the attitude of Asian states regarding the Middle East issue, particularly in the case of those states joined to us by the bonds of friendship.

There remains the attitude of the states of the Eastern Bloc. The states of the Eastern Bloc have supported us in all fields since the very start, in political, economic and technical fields. We finally recognised East Germany. Actually, that was not such a major event in itself, for we had had relations with East Germany for many years, which developed from a trade bureau into a diplomatic mission. We altered the status of that mission to that of an embassy. The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) in fact stood by us and supported us in times of difficulty. They stood by us 100 % and supported us in every way, they satisfied several demands for us in various fields. Certainly, after we had recognised East Germany, some people took to saying that pressure had been brought to bear on us; they could not have said otherwise. How is it then that pressure had been brought to bear just at this time? How about the relations which had existed between us for all those years?

There is also the attitude of many nations of the West. Our Foreign Minister visited several of them and found that a change had taken place, he found that they had grown aware of Israeli brazenness and arrogance.

Fellow citizens,

We can say that we have gained a great deal through our attitude in terms of intellectual respect from the world. Naturally, as part of the political effort, our Foreign Minister visited Western states, he issued statements and held press conferences. This political drive has been exploited, however, by certain hostile forces as a means to implant suspicion.

Fellow citizens,

These attempts to implant suspicion do not disconcert us; we disdain them and simply trample them underfoot. The Arab masses can see everything for themselves. The salient point is not what is printed in the press but what takes place at the front, in the fields of battle. What is of consequence is not words but bullets, determination and action. There is but one criterion to decide what the attitude of any man is — the enemy's attitude to him, as well as his attitude to the enemy.

Fellow citizens,

The ultimate criterion is whether one fights or does not fight. We have decided to fight for the recovery of our lands. We do not look on this merely as a prerogative we enjoy, but as the duty of each and every one of us.

Fellow citizens,

We make sacrifices but we do not bandy slogans. The Arab masses are sufficiently clever not to be deceived; they have experienced, they have tried, they have lived through a great deal; they have acquired a rich fund of experience and knowledge to judge by; the last word will therefore be theirs.

Members of the National Congress,

The struggle in which we are engaged is not restricted to the battlefield, the struggle is going on in every field. That has been a salient point in the case of every all-embracing struggle. It is particularly true of the battle in which we are engaged, due to the circumstances that characterise our case. The enemy is attempting to conceal the fact that the element of time is working against him by bringing his full weight to bear on all fronts of military and psychological warfare.

For this reason, fellow citizens, the battle will be fought in all fields. This, in turn, imposes certain demands on us. We have already fulfilled certain of these demands; we must also fulfil the remaining ones.

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Statement of the Third Session of the General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union in the United Arab Republic.¹
(Excerpts)

Cairo, July 25, 1969

On June 9 and 10, 1967, the masses of the Arab people declared that they insisted on rejecting defeat and on continuing to follow the course of struggle until victory is won. This insistence has become more profound and determined thanks to the military, political, economic and intellectual endurance manifested by the masses of our struggling people on the firing-line facing the enemy, in farms, factories and offices and in all fields of thought, literature, science and art.

The enemy is still holding on to all the land he occupied with the object of realising his aggressive and expansionist designs, with unlimited help and support from the forces of Zionism and world imperialism. He still refuses to submit to the resolutions of the Security Council and the United Nations and is still trying to make the cease-fire line permanent. His aim is to turn the present lines of confrontation into permanent possessions, on which basis he hopes to initiate discussion of an over-all solution for the dispute and to impose surrender on the Arab nation from positions gained by aggression. By maintaining this intransigent attitude, the enemy is putting more strain than it can bear on the explosive situation in the area, and driving Arab struggle into a position where it has no alternative but to fight for liberation. To fight for liberation, to fight to recover our occupied territories, is our right, our duty and our destiny.

Since our Congress took upon itself the responsibility for continuing the struggle, it has become our custom to measure every step we take so as to be sure that we are following the right course.

So that the picture may become clear to us, we must determine what is the scope of this new stage and what prospects it holds out, by examining the situation in which we are now living, in

its various military, political, economic and domestic aspects.

(1) The slogan "what was taken by force can only be regained by force" has provided the inspiration for the great achievements which have been realised in the field of military confrontation, and which must be seen as miraculous by any material or moral standards. This could not have been achieved without a unique determination and a unique belief which together have given the people and their revolutionary leadership one great objective: to snatch victory from the heart of defeat.

The period which has passed since the General National Congress met in March 1969 has witnessed a continuous improvement in the capacity of our armed forces, in terms of weapons, preparedness and training. Today, proud of their heroic men on the line of confrontation, they are capable not only of vigorous defensive action but also of immediate deterrent action.

Having heard the statement of the Minister of War, which gave the masses a picture of the deterrent air and land battles and the successful operations which crossed into enemy positions, the Congress expresses its faith and pride in the armed forces and its unlimited belief in their ability, which is increasing day by day, to fulfil the sacred duty entrusted to them by the people — the liberation of the land and the achievement of victory.

The Congress also expresses its pride in the highly important role being played by the Arab Sinai Organisation which, during this period, has carried out intrepid operations that have inflicted on the enemy heavy and repeated losses in forces, supplies and centres of troop concentration in Sinai.

(2) Although by escalating this vigorous, positive defence we have, to some extent, laid the foundations of victory, these operations must be accorded their true value. We must not, while striking with all our force, minimise the danger of the enemy or underestimate his strength. The enemy will not waive the military victory which he achieved in the battle of June, 1967, or surrender an inch of the land which he occupied as a result of his aggression, unless he is compelled to withdraw, under the pressure of long battles and great losses.

¹ United Arab Republic Ministry of National Guidance, *The Third Session of the General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union*, 23-25/7/1969.

The way ahead of us is still long and difficult and the struggle hard and bitter. We must always remember that however far we advance there will be a corresponding increase in the enemy's ferocity and aggressiveness and in the pressures and conspiracies of the forces supporting Israel and lying in wait for us. All this must, without a doubt, be taken into account by a people who are determined to liberate their land, to fight the battle for their way of life and destiny, to the last Israeli or the last Arab. We must, while striking blows, be prepared to receive the blows of the enemy anywhere in the Republic.

Although the battle will be long and far-flung, our most urgent duty is to believe that time is always on our side. What is even more urgent is that we should make use of our great superiority over the enemy in manpower; that we should alert the masses so that they may always be ready to meet the enemy anywhere in the Republic; and that we should fortify them against the material and psychological dangers of war so that they may face these dangers with increased confidence and activity no matter how long or far-flung the war.

(3) All these operations have been accompanied by vigorous, wide-scale political activity, which has been aided by our military steadfastness and by the firmness of our domestic front. This official and popular political activity has been characterised by the frankness and lack of ambiguity which are the stamp of every just and lawful cause.

The whole world now knows our position. We do not agree to bargain over or to concede one inch of the Arab territory occupied as a result of the June, 1967 aggression, whether in Sinai, in the West Bank of Jordan, in Jerusalem, in the Syrian Golan Heights or in the Gaza Strip. We refuse to negotiate with the aggressor and we refuse to bargain away the legitimate rights of the Palestine people.

Within these limits, which enjoy the support of the Articles of the United Nations Charter and the resolutions passed by that body, we have shown our desire for peace on every occasion and have supported every effort for peace on the basis of these lawful and just principles. But if a peaceful solution is not achieved, our position will be that of every people whose land is occupied: we shall fight till death or victory.

But even though this is our attitude, Israel still

persists in refusing to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories, still persists in its flagrant defiance of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and is still doing its best to frustrate every effort to reach a just and peaceful solution for the critical situation which constitutes a danger of incalculable proportions.

It would not have been possible for Israel to take this attitude, which contravenes all international moral and human principles and values, without the wide support and unlimited help it receives from the United States of America and the forces of world imperialism, whose interests coincide with Israel's expansionist ambitions in the Arab area.

In an attempt to deceive world public opinion, statements by Israeli officials have recently concentrated on the argument of Israeli security; thus these statements indicate the course of action which Israeli policy has adopted towards the problem and its solution.

This solution sees the map of Israel as including large sections of the West Bank of the Jordan, the whole of Syrian Golan Heights, Sharm al-Shaikh, the Gulf of Aqaba and the surrounding territory in Sinai. All this Arab territory, so Israeli officials think, must be annexed to Israel to achieve security for Israel. In addition there is their annexation of Jerusalem which, according to statements by Israeli officials, they claim to be an irrevocable measure.

Just recently, several attempts have been made to find a peaceful solution based on the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. These attempts have taken the form of meetings in New York of the representatives of the Big Four Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council, and of bilateral talks in Washington between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. These attempts, however, have accomplished nothing new, because Israel has insisted on maintaining its attitude and because the United States of America has supported the Israeli viewpoint in its entirety, in an attempt to force the whole Arab nation to surrender, which it refuses, and always will refuse to do.

But whatever the results of these discussions, we do not depend on them to establish Arab rights, since "what was taken by force can only be recovered by force". But it is a good thing that they

should continue, as this will give world public opinion a chance of learning the truth about Israel's aggressive and expansionist nature. At the same time they will reveal to Arab public opinion the attitudes of those countries who claim traditional friendship with certain Arab countries, and of those which have extensive interests in the Arab homeland. These discussions will also make it possible to define the Arab attitude more clearly, which will assist us in achieving the truly effective mobilisation we require for the confrontation of the enemy.

The continuing supply of arms to Israel by the United States, by England and by certain colonialist quarters, at a time when Israel is declaring its determination to continue its occupation of Arab territories, and refusing to implement the United Nations resolution calling for its withdrawal, can only be understood by the Arab people as support for the aggressor, assistance to aggression, encouragement to continue aggression and support for Israel's expansionist schemes to usurp more Arab land.

This period has witnessed a continuous enhancement of the friendly relations between the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union. In all situations the Soviet Union has shown a mature and precise understanding of the basic facts of the Arab-Israeli struggle, and has given generous support to the legitimate Arab struggle.

The Congress is pleased to express once more its gratitude to the Soviet Union, both government and people, for this noble support which takes many forms and which derives from the Soviet Union's profound belief in the principles of freedom, justice and peace, and in the unity of the struggle against the strongholds of colonialism.

The statement on the Middle East crisis by the Communist Summit Conference held in Moscow at the beginning of June was one more example of the numerous forms of the support and assistance in many shapes and forms which the socialist countries have given to the just struggle of the Arab states against the Zionist aggression which is supported by world imperialism.

The recognition by the United Republic of the German Democratic Republic officialised relations that have grown and developed between two peoples and two countries through aware and creative understanding, and that have taken a

noble form whose aim is to serve freedom, peace and progress among nations.

Although General De Gaulle has relinquished the reins of power in France, the significance of his attitude will remain. This noble and historic attitude of condemning the Israeli aggression against Arab territories, of striving to hold back the waves of this aggression and to remove its hateful consequences, will remain a proof that freedom and justice will always find those who will support them, no matter how many forms of pressure are exerted, no matter how far the waves of deception and fraud roll or how thickly the sky is overcast with the clouds of specious bargaining and manoeuvring.

France's attitude to the Middle East crisis, as expressed by General de Gaulle, is no more than an extension and an expansion of the attitude that is appropriate to a country which occupies that leading position in the world which France occupies today, by virtue of its international status and responsibilities — to the problems of our world today, and to ensuring the peace, security and stability of the world. The Congress welcomes the statement of President Pompidou, the new President of the French Republic, that France will continue to follow this sound policy, which is built on the noble principles which the people of France believe in.

The United Arab Republic has continued to follow a foreign policy which is based on opposition to colonialism and to every form of domination of peoples and their resources, and on a belief in the right of peoples to struggle for freedom and for self determination. In this field, it has recognised the revolutionary government of South Vietnam, as representing the people of South Vietnam who are waging a bitter struggle to liberate their land from foreign occupying forces, and to build their future according to the freely-exercised will of the people.

(4) The latest period has been distinguished by a great increase in the Palestinian resistance forces, by a sharp rise in the number of their operations and by the extension of these operations to Palestinian territory that was under Israeli occupation before the aggression of 1967.

The armed Palestinian resistance represents — to the consciousness of the Arab people — the greatest force of Arab awakening to spring out

of the severest and most painful trial that the Arab nation has experienced. It has been, and still is, one of the factors which have helped to restore the balance in the area.

The armed Palestinian resistance has, through force and violence, resuscitated the cause of the land of Palestine and of the people of Palestine, which Israel has been trying for twenty years to cover with a screen of oblivion. It has forcefully and violently shaken the conscience of the world into waking up to the facts of the Palestinian cause and of Israel's expansionist, racist and aggressive nature.

The attitude of the people of the United Arab Republic is one of unconditional and unlimited support for the armed Palestinian resistance. They have offered, and will continue to offer, the resistance all they can in the way of material, moral and technical support, because this is something that the Arab people of Palestine are entitled to expect from the entire Arab nation.

The Congress also expresses the pride of the Arab people in the brave and unrelenting resistance to the occupying usurper by the people in Gaza and Jerusalem, in Nablus and Galilee, in Ramallah and everywhere in the occupied West Bank of Jordan. The Congress is confident that this resistance will increase in violence and in extent in proportion as the enemy increases his terror and oppression, and that in no way can the enemy escape punishment for his continuing crimes against the Arab people.

All countries throughout the Arab homeland will suffer the effects of the present aggression, if Israel and world Zionism succeed in winning this war. Nothing can protect them except their positive ability to mobilise all their resources and energies and to bring these forward to take part in the battle of destiny which the Arab nation is now fighting. Therefore, support for the Eastern Front, the coordination of the armed forces in Jordan, Syria and Iraq, and the organic link between them and the Western Front, have become matters of immediate urgency as a result of the escalation of operations and the present likelihood of a general clash.

While support for the Eastern Front requires that the efforts of both officials and the people should be continuous and commensurate with the importance of this Front and the fact that it is

essential for the battle of destiny, action at Arab level needs joint thinking, joint planning and joint effort to mobilise Arab forces and Arab potentialities and resources. All these must be put in the service of the battle with an enemy whose short- and long-range ambitions become clearer with every day that passes. These ambitions are not limited to usurping the land and evicting its Arab inhabitants so that new Jewish immigrants can take their place, but go beyond this to include the achievement of schemes of economic exploitation which involve all Arabs and all Arab lands. This makes it essential that every Arab homeland should participate with all its potentialities and resources in this battle of destiny.

(5) The overall struggle for the battle of liberation and victory, for which the responsibility has been shouldered by the working forces of the people, has spread to include the economic field, where the masses of our people have proved their steadfastness and willingness for sacrifice and, not satisfied with frustrating the expectations of those who had calculated that the economic structure would collapse, have made economic steadfastness a shield to support and meet all the requirements of the fighting front, while at the same time pushing firmly ahead on the path of socialist growth.

The Arab financial support which was decided on at the Khartum Conference, and which is being supplied by our Arab brothers in Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait, has been extremely effective in helping to realise this marvellous steadfastness and in supplying it with the means and resources to confront the enemy in order to liberate the land and achieve victory. The economic and technical assistance the government and peoples of the Soviet Union are providing gives extensive support to the development of our economy and to the promotion of the operation of socialist growth, so that it may be capable of meeting the increased demands of our armed forces for greater resources, and also of meeting our society's increasing needs for further development.

Our economic capacity is constantly increasing, and our power to do more and withstand more is becoming more insistent and determined; our "everything for the battle" must be now applied in all fields of action and activity, and our masses

are still insisting on the promotion of this slogan so that it may become the basic fact of the daily life of all the forces of our working people.

(6) The solidity of both the fighting front and the home front, at this decisive stage of confrontation with the enemy, is due to their daily increasing interaction and cohesiveness. Every heroic action and every victory achieved on the battlefield is a true indication of the rising morale of the home front. Similarly, the continued firmness, unity and cohesiveness of the home front and its unshakable confidence in its destiny, have a positive effect on the capacity and effectiveness of our armed forces on the fighting front.

Our resolute home front has for two years withstood many forms of psychological warfare, directed against our people's standards of civilisation, and their human and material values. More than that, this home front has been able, by action, sweat, belief, confidence and sacrifice, to turn this psychological warfare back on the hostile forces which planned it. For after two years, the enemy is waking up to a fact which he has for too long attempted to hide or to ignore — the fact that he has won a battle but has not, and will not, win the war.

The picture has changed, and it has become clear to all that the final and decisive victory which Israel sought, after its military aggression, is today further than ever from being realised.

The degree of firmness which the home front has attained under the urgent stimulus of the desire for liberation, and to which the primary merit for what has been achieved must be attributed, has come to constitute a deeply disquieting factor to Israel and to the forces which are aligned with Israel and support it. We must, therefore, expect greatly increased pressure and more desperate efforts in the psychological war on the part of these forces in an attempt to weaken our front, as the hope of liberation comes nearer to being realised. It therefore follows that the new stage requires that our steadfastness should attain new capabilities and an increase in power and firmness commensurate with the gravity of the stage and with our mounting hopes of victory.

A will that is firm and cohesive and that insists on the total liquidation of the traces of aggression, is the answer to all the enemy's attempts, because it alone is capable of achieving victory.

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Resolutions of the Third Session of the General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union in the United Arab Republic.¹ (Excerpts)

Cairo, July 25, 1969

The National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union, meeting in its third ordinary session, having studied the President's speech and the reports of the Central Committee, affirm that the battle which our masses are fighting has two aspects: the battle of liberation until victory is won for the individual Arab, and the battle of socialist change until progress and a decent life are achieved for the individual Arab. It also affirms that these two aspects of the battle have always been essentially and fundamentally linked. This means that by defending and protecting socialist change in our Republic we shall also be supporting the battle and preparing the weapons with which it will be fought, and thereby assuring the masses of support and continuity for their legitimate rights and aspirations. All this paves the way to victory in the battle of liberation.

The Congress has devoted this session to the battle, and the President, in his speech, gave a full description of its scope. The Congress therefore recommends the following:

First: The Battle of Liberation and Victory

1. In order to move forward with and within the masses towards the battle and in order to remove all intellectual and material obstacles which impede the impulsion of the people in this direction, it is necessary:

(a) That Committees of the Socialist Union should undertake the formation of "Citizens' Committees for the Battle" in accordance with principles to be issued by the Higher Executive Committee. The basic task of these Citizens' Committees will be to mobilise the masses for the battle and to prepare them to perform their duties.

¹ United Arab Republic Ministry of National Guidance, *The Third Session of the General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union*, 23-25/7/1969.

(b) That, to meet the requirements of the battle, the basic units of the Socialist Union should increase their activities, in conformity with timetables drawn up and supervised by the Provincial Secretariats.

(c) That the minority hostile to the aspirations of the people — liberation and socialism — shall be resisted and exposed to the masses, and that the resolution adopted by the Congress in its extraordinary session shall be adhered to. This requires that members of this minority of counter-revolutionary elements should be isolated and struck down wherever they are found, by all legal and political means, and that they should be deprived of the protection which is ensured by our society to the popular forces which believe in liberation and socialist development.

(d) That intellectual support for the battle should be made more effective by deepening and developing firm intellectual unity among the popular forces in conformity with a carefully thought-out plan for all the information media which will execute this plan and ensure that they all work towards the same ends.

2. That the organisational leaderships in all fields of political action should be thoroughly on the alert in the face of the concentrated psychological warfare which Israel and the forces which support and aid it are waging against us, by deepening awareness and understanding of Israel's intentions and objectives and of the character of the war which faces us, and by increasing confidence in the inevitability of victory.

The Congress considers that the battle we are fighting, even though it is a shooting battle on all fronts, is not only a shooting battle, but must also be seen within the framework of a vast and dangerous psychological battle, which Israel and the forces which support it are waging against us with the aim of destroying our will and subjecting it to the will of the enemy, so that he may thereafter dispose of us just as he likes.

Israel's aim in this psychological battle is to spread despair and fear in the hearts of our masses so that our whole nation may be brought to surrender. The Congress is well aware that throughout their political history the Arab masses have never surrendered to despair or fear and that, moreover, in our battle with Israel and Zionism

our masses have, through their will, risen above everything calculated to make them despair. It is also aware that the battle in its present stage is essentially a psychological battle, and that whoever wins it will win final victory. It has therefore decided that it is essential to confront Israel's psychological warfare with all force and effectiveness until final victory is achieved.

Methods of Confrontation

This requires:

(a) That the leaderships make it their task to inform the masses that the coming stage will depend on psychological endurance and that Israel, by attacking parts of the homeland separately, is trying to shake this endurance which must stand firm and grow stronger on a foundation of profound realisation that the battle must continue, and that in it we must be ready to receive the blows of the enemy, and even more prepared to return stronger and more violent blows, until we win final victory. This endurance must also be based on the understanding that, by its very nature, war requires of us that we suffer losses and inflict on the enemy heavier and more serious losses, and that no operations by the enemy can shake, even temporarily, our psychological endurance which is the true basis for winning the battle;

(b) That the leaderships make it their task to strengthen the belief of the masses that our battle with Israel and Zionism will be long and violent, and that however long and violent it is it will in no way affect the endurance and unity of our home front;

(c) That every effort be made to expose the propaganda methods employed both by Israeli information organisations and by information organisations controlled by Zionism in certain countries, with the aim of belittling every victory that we achieve and of inflating the enemy's operations; and to show they pursued this policy throughout the years of the revolution and failed because of the steadfastness of the popular forces, that steadfastness which has lasted until now, and which must increase as the battle continues;

(d) That the scope of popular defence organisations should be extended to cover the whole of

the Republic; that these organisations should be supplied with material and moral resources, and given extensive training in all methods of civil defence, to increase their potential, while at the same time the responsibilities of every individual working in both these fields must be precisely determined.

3. The Congress, while appreciating what has been accomplished in this respect during the last stage, considers it to be of vital importance that we should continue to increase our efforts in the following ways:

(a) That the leadership of the Socialist Union at all levels, and in all localities should set an example by joining the civil and popular defence organisations, this being the most serious and important form of political action in the present stage;

(b) that the individual members of these organisations, who are to take the necessary defensive action, should be chosen from among the best, most efficient and strongest elements in our political organisation; and that we should all work to raise their intellectual awareness to the standard required by the escalation of the struggle and the battle;

(c) that the standard of training should be raised to ensure that the fighting efficiency of the members of these organisations constantly improves, and also to ensure the formation of a strong permanent reserve that can be moved to anywhere it may be required for the confrontation;

(d) that all units of the Socialist Union and all its members and all its supporting organisations, such as labour unions, trades unions and student federations, should employ all their available material resources to support the activities of these organisations; and that this should be given absolute priority over the employment of such resources for any other objective.

The executive machinery must also assist these organisations by offering them some of its own resources, making up for the loss of these by the proper disposal and employment of its remaining resources, this being a national and political, rather than an administrative, duty.

4. That the executive machinery and the units of the Socialist Union should continue to increase

their efforts to perform their duty which is based on national solidarity, and which requires that every effort should be made to ensure the welfare of refugees from Sinai and the battle-front, and of the families of soldiers stationed on the firing line.

6. That our activity in the Arab field should continue and increase at all levels; and that initiatives should be taken to channel Arab action in all fields towards ensuring victory in the battle; and that our political efforts in the international field should be redoubled, in an attempt to gain the support of new sectors of world public opinion for our just cause; that unceasing efforts should be made to disclose the real character of Israel and the truth about its aggressive, expansionist policies and poisonous propaganda.

While appreciating the efforts that have been made at both official and popular levels in the Arab, African and international fields, and what these efforts have achieved in the way of expanding the circles of world public opinion which understand our cause and sympathise with us;

While saluting our brothers in the armed Palestinian struggle, whose resistance has brought the rebirth of the Palestinian nation, and the blows which they are aiming at the enemy and which will daily increase in violence until they succeed in imposing the aspirations of the people of Palestine, the Congress believes that activity in these fields must be strengthened and consolidated in the following ways:

(a) More vigorous efforts must be made by the Arabs at the highest levels to study the Arab position, with a view to achieving unity of thought, planning and joint Arab action to face the changing international situation, the developing Arab situation and the escalating military situation, and to support the general principles of Arab action which the President has expounded.

(b) The field of Arab meetings at all political, organisational and popular levels must be extended, and efforts must be made to extend intellectual dialogue to comprise all Arab groupings, with a view to drawing up a unified Arab plan of action, agreed on by all the Arab popular organisations, with the object of bringing about Arab mobilisation and recruiting Arab resources to

meet the requirements of escalation in the present stage of struggle.

(c) Greater efforts must be made abroad, at all official and popular levels, to isolate Israel, to make clear our positive attitude to the resolutions of the United Nations, and to affirm that it is our right and our duty to fight for the liberation of the occupied territories.

(d) The organisation must make greater efforts to contact foreign political parties and organisations with a view to extending the field of mutual understanding and exchanging information in all fields.

(e) Similarly, labour and trades unions, cooperatives, the Socialist Youth Organisation and the student unions, must make all possible contacts with corresponding foreign organisations abroad, in an effort to expand the field of understanding and support for our just and legitimate cause.

(f) Armed Palestinian resistance must be provided with all forms of military, political and technical support, and offered every possible assistance to enable it to continue and escalate its struggle against the enemy.

415

Interview with Shaikh Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah, Ruler of Kuwait.¹ (Excerpt)

Q. Kuwait was not one of the Arab states which accepted the United Nations Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. What are the aims and objectives of Kuwait's Middle East policy and what is your Highness' opinion of the Big Four talks now in progress at the United Nations?

A. Kuwait has made its policy on this matter clear on more than one occasion. At the risk of repetition, I would say that the policy of Kuwait can be summarised in one sentence: the Palestinians have an absolute right to return to their homeland and to recover their land and property. In the past, Arabs and Jews lived amicably side

by side until world Zionism conspired to create the so-called "State of Israel" in 1948... Kuwait, as part of the Arab nation, hopes that the Palestinian Arabs will recover their rights, return to their land and homes and be compensated for the losses they have suffered. As regards the Big Four Talks in New York, Kuwait is following them closely to see what results will ensue.

Q. What is Kuwait's opinion of the Palestine commando organisations, especially Fateh? Since Kuwait has played an important role in financing this new force in the Middle East, we should like to know whether you have taken any effective measures to unify the various commando groups and coordinate their actions.

A. If an aggressor occupies a state, it is only natural that the people of that state should resist occupation by all means. All laws and regulations give that people the right to resist occupation in any way. This is what the Palestinians are doing now. Kuwait, of course, helps the commandos in their struggle and offers them advice. It encourages them to organise and coordinate their activities so as to achieve their objective.

Q. Kuwait took on a heavy financial burden at the Khartum Summit Conference. Is Kuwait satisfied with present military preparedness in the face of increasing Israeli aggression?

A. At the Khartum Conference, it was decided that the Arab oil-producing countries should help the economies of the countries affected by Zionist aggression in 1967, and would offer financial aid to enable these countries to make up for the deficit in their economies and rebuild military defences. We think that the military preparedness of these countries and their resistance to Israeli attacks are improving day by day.

416

Petition from the People of Amwas, Yalu and Bait Nuba to Uri Avnery, Member of the Israeli Knesset, Requesting that They Be Returned to their Villages.²

Two years ago, the Israel Defence Army attacked us and drove us out of our homes. Then, two

¹ *Al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), 29/7/1969. Shaikh Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah granted this interview to the Indian journalist, Mr. Karanjia, who was on a visit to Kuwait. The interview was published in the Indian newspaper *Blitz*.

² *Hadha al-Alam* (Tel Aviv), No. 54, July 1969, p. 23.

weeks later, they destroyed our villages; Amwas, Yalu and Bait Nuba. We have repeatedly asked to be sent back to our lands but no one pays any attention. They offered to build houses for us, but far away from our villages, and we refused. Now, two years later, they come forward to offer help. They are ready to offer us some money to open shops and want to give us some cattle and sheep and cars, and there is a whole list of projects from which we can choose. All this aid will be granted provided we remain far from our lands and villages. Meanwhile they forbid us to visit our lands. What do they want? Why do you expropriate our lands when you have already committed the foul crime of blowing up our homes and all that was in them?

Give us back our villages and lands and we will live in tents and caves until we have rebuilt what you destroyed. We do not want any help from you; just give us back our villages.

417

Speech by the Libyan Prime Minister Wanis al-Qadhafi on the Anniversary of the Establishment of the Libyan Army.¹ (Excerpt)

Al-Baida, August 9, 1969

In the Arab field, our policy is based upon a clear and unambiguous right and stems from our faith in our religion, our Arabism and the destiny we share with our Arab brothers. As you know, our country, guided by our beloved King, has always and will always fulfil all its obligations in support of issues of concern to the Arab world, above all the problem of Palestine. It gives all the help it can to the resistance against Zionist aggression and expansion and will continue to contribute to Arab states which have suffered injury, as well as giving its continued support for Palestinian commando activity.

418

Statement by King Faisal to the Muslim World on the Burning of the Aqsa Mosque.²

Riadh, August 22, 1969

At this historic moment, when criminal Zionist hands have desecrated the Aqsa Mosque, which was the first place to which Muslims turned in prayer and is their third holiest sanctuary, the site of our Prophet's ascent to heaven, I appeal to all Muslim leaders and peoples all over the world to rise and liberate the Muslim sanctuaries in Jerusalem. Let them be armed with faith which is stronger than any weapon and let them bear in mind what God has promised them in His Glorious Book "It is our duty to support the faithful" and "We support our apostles and those who believe in this world and the next". The Zionist menace, which continues its criminal aggression, paying no heed to morality or religious sanctity and spurning all United Nations resolutions and human ideals, believes only in the logic of force, especially now that the United Nations has become incapable of forcing Israel to implement any of its resolutions.

All the peace proposals which crop up daily are no more than a smoke-screen which provides world Zionism with an opportunity to carry out its expansionist schemes and spread its domination over the world.

My Brothers,

I appealed to you during the last pilgrimage season to rise and liberate our religious sanctuaries in Palestine. I appeal to you today to declare a holy Jihad, now that all peaceful means have failed. We firmly believe that all nations which believe in God and cherish truth and justice in the world will support our cause and give us aid. We, the Muslims, must fix an early date for us to meet on the soil of Jerusalem, to liberate our usurped land and rescue our holy sanctuaries from the evil talons of Zionism, to win either victory or martyrdom.

¹ *Al-Alam* (Tripoli), 10/8/1969.

² *Al-Bilad* (Jedda), 24/8/1969.

419

Statement by the Leaders of Christian Confessions in Jordan on the Fire in the Aqsa Mosque.¹

Amman, August 23, 1969

...The execrable crime perpetrated by the Israeli authorities in setting fire to the holy Aqsa Mosque has shocked spiritual leaders, the entire clergy, and Christians throughout the world, no less than it has shocked their Muslim brethren. Religious leaders in Jordan have therefore sent a telegram of protest and condemnation to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to church leaders throughout the world, asking them to intervene to prevent the recurrence of such crimes.

But Zionism, which thrives on intrigue, has made impudent attempts to shirk responsibility for this heinous crime, with the object of creating dissension between Muslims and Christians. These Zionist intrigues, however, have been exposed as such throughout the world. Various lies have been told to justify the crimes. After claiming at first that the fire was the result of a short circuit, the Zionists yesterday disclosed that the perpetrator of the crime was an Australian. Alleging that he was a member of an obscure sect, they entirely ignored the fact that his name, Rohen, is Jewish. According to the *Daily Star* this Rohen had spent four months in a kibbutz, or Israeli settlement, where he was trained by the Israeli authorities to commit this crime and to desecrate religious sanctuaries as a prelude to the realisation of their dream of rebuilding the Temple of Solomon.

We hereby emphatically declare that all citizens of the Arab world, whether Muslim or Christian, are united by the same sentiments of national brotherhood and are threatened by the one common enemy who has usurped our homeland and our holy places. We regard any violation of either Muslim or Christian religious sanctuaries as a crime against all citizens, whether Muslims or Christians. We refute the charge of the Zionists, and assign the full blame to them. We also declare that the continued occupation of the city by the Israelis constitutes a desecration of both Islamic and Christian sanctuaries. We appeal to the

Islamic and Christian worlds to unite and make joint efforts to rescue the usurped homeland and holy places from the hands of the Zionists.

Signed:

Archbishop Theodoros, Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese.

Archbishop Ni'ma al-Sam'an, Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese.

Archimandrite Nicola Barghil, on behalf of Mikhail Assaf, Archbishop of the Greek Catholic Archdiocese.

Rev. Shafiq Farah, Head of the Arab Evangelical Episcopal Church.

Rev. Butros Tuman, Head of the Syrian Orthodox Confession.

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Statement by Mr. Ruhi al-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem, on the Burning of the Aqsa Mosque.² (Excerpts)

Amman, August 24, 1969

This is Jerusalem's darkest hour in the reign of Israel, terror and perfidy the like of which has never been experienced either under the Nazi regime in modern times or during the barbarian invasions in the distant past.

The burning of the Aqsa Mosque was but one link in the chain of an Israeli plan to Judaize Jerusalem and disperse its people. I do not say this lightly; for the statements of Israeli leaders I heard and the measures I saw adopted by the Israeli authorities during the nine months I stayed in Jerusalem after June 7, 1967, and what I have since read in their papers and heard on their broadcasts, has only served to confirm the existence of an alarming plan of this nature, a plan to which Jerusalem is presently being subjected and to which its people are constantly exposed. I fear that, if this goes on, it will be a blot on the scutcheon of the history of mankind, of the United Nations, of the Arabs, of Christianity and of Islam.

² *Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.* Mr. al-Khatib read this statement at a press conference at the Jordanian Ministry of Information.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 24/8/1969.

Israel's policy, as seen to date, has been to commit one crime after another and one violation of human values after another, to confront the world at first with a smoke-screen of deceptive propaganda and later with a *fait accompli*.

As I said before, when I learned of the barbarous act of burning the holy Aqsa Mosque, I was not surprised. I then said that I had been expecting that this, or something like it, would happen. In justification I referred to a number of statements by Jewish religious leaders and to a number of measures which the Israeli occupation authorities had taken as a preliminary to the occupation of the Haram al-Sharif and the rebuilding of the Temple of Solomon on the remains of the two great Islamic mosques in the Haram: the Dome of the Rock and the Aqsa.

In view of the gravity of these statements, I feel that I must repeat their texts to you. On August 8, 1967, the Israeli Minister of Religious Affairs made a statement at a large Jewish religious gathering in Jerusalem which was attended by prominent international Jewish religious figures, headed by the Chief Rabbis of the United States, Britain and France. These were his actual words:

"The liberation of Jerusalem has placed all the Christian and some of the Muslim holy places under the authority of Israel and has restored to the Jews all their synagogues in Jerusalem. However, Israel has other holy places in the East Bank of Jordan and inside the Haram al-Sharif, which is the Holy of Holies for the Jews."

On July 22, 1969, the Israeli daily *Ma'ariv*, published in Tel Aviv, carried a statement by the Chief Rabbi of Israel. The following is a translation of that statement:

"This morning, July 22, 1969, the Chief Rabbi of Israel issued an appeal to Jews to observe August 9 [the anniversary of the destruction of the Temple] as a day of mourning, despite the fact that the sanctuary and the Old City of Jerusalem are in our hands [i.e., in the hands of Israel]. The Chief Rabbi said that we have not yet succeeded in restoring the glory of bygone days to these sacred places. For this reason, he said, mourning for the destruction of the Temple of Solomon [Beith Hamiqdash, in Hebrew] should still be taken seriously, and

called for the tradition to be observed until it is possible to rebuild it."

Recently, *Fateh's* information bureau distributed photocopies of a news item and a photograph which had appeared in the Israeli daily *Yediot Aharonot* of August 18, 1969, only three days before the fire in the Aqsa Mosque. A translation of the news item appeared in Arab papers yesterday; it provides a clear indication of the spirit of Israeli youth, who want to take possession of the Haram al-Sharif without delay and to rebuild the Temple of Solomon on its ruins.

There have been scores of similar statements, accompanied by press and propaganda campaigns. Offers have been made, notably the one made by two Americans claiming to represent a Masonic lodge in the State of Texas. They offered the Islamic Council in Jerusalem a hundred million dollars for permission to build a Masonic lodge in the Haram al-Sharif. Here is a photocopy of it.

The measures taken by the Israeli occupation authorities over the past twenty-six months, both inside and outside the Haram, have been a series of Israeli schemes to remove the mosques in the Haram with a view to taking possession of it: The following are some of these measures:

1. On June 11, 1967, 135 properties, constituting the greater part of the Maghareba quarter behind the west gate of the Haram, were demolished. By this action 650 inhabitants of the quarter lost their homes.

2. On April 14, 1968, 595 further Arab and Islamic properties in the quarters adjoining the demolished area were confiscated. 6,000 Arab residents were brow-beaten into leaving their houses so that Jews might be settled in their place.

3. Excavations have been carried out round the western and southern walls adjacent to the Haram so deep as to threaten to crack the structure.

4. On June 14, 1968 fourteen properties adjacent to the Aqsa Mosque were demolished, whereby 82 metres of the western wall of the Haram were uncovered.

5. On June 20, 1968 seventeen Arab and Islamic properties, some of them situated at the main approach to the Haram, leading to the Gate of the Chain, were confiscated, to extend the Jewish zone around the Haram.

6. On August 3, 1967, the Israeli authorities seized the keys of the gate of the Maghareba quarter, which is one of the gates of the Haram al-Sharif. This gate is constantly being opened to crowds of Israelis who are allowed to enter the Haram without Islamic supervision or control.

7. Members of the Israeli armed forces, lead by Rabbi Shlomo Goren, Chief Rabbi of the army, have conducted religious services in the courtyard of the Haram. The first such service took place on August 10, 1967 and has been followed by four others since, the last being in April, 1969.

8. On July 15, 1969, an official spokesman announced the intention of the Israeli authorities to clear the western wall of the Haram al-Sharif for a further two hundred yards or more. The object of this, as is clear from the plan I have been outlining to you, is to get possession, through expropriation or confiscation, of no less than 300 more Islamic properties, which will make no less than three thousand more Arabs homeless and extend the zone around the Haram al-Sharif, in preparation for when a suitable occasion arises to take possession of the inside of the Haram.

Officials of the Islamic Waqfs have constantly protested to Israeli occupation officials against these inroads. According to a recent statement by the President of the Islamic Council, there have been seventy such complaints. His Eminence Shaikh Muhtaseb has made it known that the Israeli authorities have not deigned to reply to a single one of these complaints. On several occasions, our colleagues in Jerusalem have forwarded copies of their complaints and of memoranda to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the President of the Security Council and to foreign diplomatic representatives in Jerusalem.

The contrived fire of August 21, 1969 was but one link in the chain of the dreaded Israeli plan for taking possession of Islamic holy places, which is to follow the expropriation of most of the Arab properties both inside and outside the walls. I believe that the fire was contrived by certain Israeli bodies or authorities and that the plan was

carried out with the greatest precision, exactly as these same bodies or authorities contrived a whole list of serious incidents which paved the way to the establishment of Israel. These are just a few of the incidents I am referring to:

i) The assassination of Lord Moyne in Cairo during World War II.

ii) The blowing up of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 1946.

iii) The Dair Yasin massacre near Jerusalem in 1948.

iv) The assassination of Count Bernadotte in occupied Jerusalem in 1948.

After each of these incidents, first the Jewish Agency and then Israeli leaders immediately disclaimed responsibility for it. They denounced the incident, expressed their profound emotion and attended the funerals of the victims. But as time passes, memoirs are written, facts come to light, and it is now known that it was the Israeli leaders and agencies of the Israeli army who planned and executed every one of these incidents and calamities.

Today the drama is repeating itself, act by act, in the case of the fire in the Aqsa Mosque. Israeli authorities and leaders are disclaiming any connection with the crime, expressing their profound regret for the incident and setting up a committee of inquiry.

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Statement by the Syrian Foreign Ministry to the Heads of Diplomatic Missions in Damascus on the Burning of the Aqsa Mosque.¹

Damascus, August 26, 1969

1. On the morning of August 21, 1969, the Israeli authorities committed a new crime by arranging for a fire to be started in the holy Aqsa Mosque, and then intentionally delaying efforts to put the fire out — they stopped Arab citizens from helping to extinguish it. They also had shots fired into the crowds of Arab demonstrators who had rushed to save the Aqsa Mosque using every means available to them, thus com-

¹ *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus), 27/8/1969.

mitting a reprehensible crime in broad daylight and in sight of the whole world.

2. The Israeli authorities' arrangement of this act is only one more step in their Zionist plans and acts which aim at Judaizing Jerusalem and obliterating all its Arab and Islamic characteristics. They are destroying all its historic sites in order to prepare it to be their capital, and thus they are completely disregarding the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council and ignoring the Declaration of Human Rights and international laws and agreements, particularly the Geneva Conventions, and the agreements on the protection of historic sites.

3. The Israeli authorities began their operations to Judaize Jerusalem when they issued the Legal and Administrative Measures (Regulation) Law, 1968. It was approved by the Knesset in its final form as it appeared in the Israeli official gazette No. 92, published on August 22, 1968. This law obliges all cooperative societies and companies, all lawyers, doctors, engineers, businessmen and professional men in occupied Jerusalem to re-register with Israeli departments in conformity with Israeli regulations within six months, and also sequesters the property of absentee Arab owners. The Ministry has explained to the Diplomatic Missions the extent to which this law runs counter to international laws and agreements, in its statement No. A-127-2-1-10-2256 dated 21 June, 1969.

On July 4, 1967 the United Nations General Assembly issued its resolution No. 2253, on the City of Jerusalem. It forbids Israel to annex Arab territories and to make any changes in their status, and regards all measures involving such annexation or change of status as null and void. Because of Israel's continued violations, the United Nations confirmed this resolution with another one, No. 2254, of July 14, 1967.

4. The Security Council adopted resolution No. 252, on May 21, 1968. This resolution states that the Security Council regards all Israeli legal and administrative measures, and all other actions taken by Israel, including the expropriation of land and property in Jerusalem in order to change its legal status, as null and void and incapable of changing this status. The resolution also requires Israel to cancel all these measures and to desist immediately from taking measures aimed at

changing the status of Jerusalem.

5. In his report of April 11, 1969, the Secretary-General of the United Nations declared that Israel had refused to implement the above Security Council resolution and that it had also refused to accept the previous United Nations resolutions. This refusal certainly constitutes a flagrant and open defiance of the United Nations and of all those countries which voted with an overwhelming majority for the resolution.

Furthermore, according to reports from occupied Jerusalem, on May 7, 1969 the Israeli Minister of Justice declared that the Ministry of Justice, the Israeli Supreme Court, the Jerusalem Court, and the Police headquarters will shortly be moved to the Arab sector of occupied Jerusalem. There are also daily reports of operations of search and reprisal being carried out by the army, which employs a variety of methods with the object of forcing Arab residents to leave their country, destroy their homes and confiscate their property and wealth.

It is no secret that the Israeli authorities destroyed the Maghareba Quarter, which adjoins the Aqsa Mosque, and forced its Arab inhabitants to evacuate it; they also enlarged the square around the Wailing Wall, in preparation for their expansionist plans of rebuilding the Temple of Solomon, in spite of the resolutions of international bodies to the effect that the Arab character of Jerusalem must be preserved unchanged.

Finally the burning of the Aqsa Mosque has come as undeniable proof of Israel's disregard of United Nations resolutions and defiance of world opinion and the conscience of mankind.

The Ministry's only object in bringing the above to the attention of the Diplomatic Missions, is to point out Israel's continued determination to annex Arab Jerusalem; thereby violating all international agreements and the resolutions of the United Nations which created Israel.

The Ministry would be grateful if the Diplomatic Missions would request their governments to take effective measures to condemn these actions, to force the Zionist authorities to implement the United Nations resolutions, and also to impress on these governments the need for imposing against the Zionist authorities the sanctions stipulated in the United Nations Charter.

We fear that, if these actions are not checked, this tragedy will be repeated in the deliberate burning of other holy places which are sacred to the revealed religions and respected by all men of high moral ideals.

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Press Conference Statements by the Syrian Head of State on Some Current Issues.¹ (Excerpts)

Damascus, August 28, 1969

In June, 1967, the Arab nation was faced with a great challenge. This was not the challenge of Zionism alone, for behind it were all the forces of international imperialism and colonialism. Despite the defeat sustained by the Arabs, these forces were unable to weaken the steadfastness of the nation, or its resolution and determination to achieve liberation. Every day that passes strengthens the steadfastness of the Arab nation. This steadfastness is most clearly illustrated by the escalation of the Arab resistance in the occupied territory and by the wide and deep support which this resistance receives from the masses of the whole Arab nation. In spite of this, we say that this resistance is still only in its initial stages and that all possible Arab efforts must be made to strengthen, unify and escalate it. Every day the Arab nation feels more strongly that the only way to achieve liberation is through armed struggle. This does not mean that we should neglect political action, but that political struggle can only become truly effective through the escalation of the Arab resistance movement and continued advance along the course of armed struggle.

The experience of the Arab people and of all peoples is that the way to win over world public opinion lies in large-scale popular struggle and in continuous sacrifice.

Q. What do you think of convening an Arab summit conference, especially since the burning of the Aqsa Mosque?

¹ *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 29/8/1969. This press conference was attended by correspondents who were in Damascus for the opening of the Damascus International Fair.

A. The subject was discussed at the Foreign Minister's conference, and they decided that a conference of Arab Defence Ministers should be held. We shall attend the Defence Ministers' conference, and we are in favour of all efforts to unify the energies of the Arab nation. What is important is that the efforts should be genuine and that they should lead to results.

Q. Do such conferences achieve any positive results, apart from the military agreements?

A. Like you, I feel the bitterness which every Arab citizen experiences. The efforts which are being made to concentrate all Arab energies on the battle have not so far been as strenuous as they ought to be. We too feel the bitterness which is felt by every Arab, but it must not be allowed to make us despair. For the battle is the battle of the whole Arab nation, and every Arab is confronted by the challenge, so we must make every possible effort and struggle resolutely and unremittingly until we attain a unified Arab military policy to confront this challenge, no matter what the difficulties.

Q. To what extent do you think there should be participation in the battle?

A. The battle is open to every one to the extent of his responsibilities, whether he is a private citizen or an official, and there is nothing to stop anyone from contributing all his resources. It is a question of historical responsibility. Classifying countries on the basis of those which participate in the battle and those which do not can only result in a renewal of mutual recriminations, which proved worse than useless in the past. Every Arab citizen, every Arab ruler is responsible to himself, to history and to his nation. Overbidding without any real action is extremely injurious. There must be an attempt to mobilise all energies; certain energies are being dissipated, and these must be really unified. For Israel struck at every Arab country individually in 1967. The time has come for the Arab nation to recruit all these energies into a really effective unity to confront our enemy, under a single leadership, and with resources effectively co-ordinated so that our nation can confront the challenge.

We do not intend to single out any one for blame; what we are trying to do is to make

things easier for all by removing all obstacles capable of preventing them from participating seriously.

Q. What about the new stage, after that of the Khartum Conference?

A. The Khartum Conference has passed and we are now at a new stage. We are looking to the future and not to the past; we do not want to be reckless about the events of the past, but we are looking to the future and the door is open for every Arab to participate. We in Syria are ready to accept any Arab who comes, and provide him with arms; we are also ready to receive any Arab force that comes. For our land is open to them, as are our hearts, without hesitation or reservations.

Q. What are your views on the unity of the resistance organisations, and what about the arrest of members of the Liberation Front?

A. The field of resistance is the last place in which political susceptibilities can be indulged. Everything possible must be done to strengthen resistance. The resistance has made some progress towards unity. There is the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command established by the Palestinian National Assembly, which is a nucleus and a base for the unification of Arab resistance. All resistance fighters unite their ranks under the banner of armed struggle. A very hopeful beginning has been made, and the Arabs must make all possible efforts to ensure that progress continues.

The question of the Arab Liberation Front has been widely discussed, but we in Syria have not reacted — not that we could not if we wanted to. The whole affair is a fabrication with no basis of truth whatsoever. The so-called “Arab Liberation Front” has never existed in Syria; there has never been a resistance group here under the name of the Arab Liberation Front. What happened was that there were people receiving salaries without engaging in any kind of commando activity. What the authorities did, was to show them the road to commando action, by summoning all the Arab resistance movements and the people who were being paid salaries without doing any work at all, and saying to them: Those of you who really want to take part in serious commando action can join any of these movements, which are making themselves felt in the occupied territories every day.

But not more than ten of these people joined the serious movements; the rest did not want to resist or to work for the Arab struggle. So everything that has been said about arrests in the ranks of the so-called “Arab Liberation Front” is lies.

Q. What happened to the “idea” of a conference of Arab revolutionary forces?

A. There is no substitute for the battle which we are now engaged in. We are working for everything than can mobilise the energies of the Arab nation. Of course the Ba‘th Party, at all its conferences, has laid stress on the need to hold a conference of all progressive revolutionary forces and mass organisations. The Party is still trying to get such a conference convened, in the belief that it will be the first step towards mobilising all the energies of the Arab people, and organising them in a practical and effective manner within the framework of the battle.

Q. Are you going to attend the Islamic summit conference, if it is held?

A. So far there has been no serious prospect of its being held.

Q. Is there any idea of lifting the ban on the activities of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine?

A. There is no ban on anybody; whoever wants to bear arms and enter our land will find our frontiers open. But our choice is the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command, and we believe that by supporting it we are taking the first step toward the unification of Palestinian Arab resistance. In our view all efforts must go to supporting this first step, and to support anything else is to disrupt the resistance, not to strengthen it. This is a matter for the resistance alone; we have no control over it and do not interfere in its affairs. Our task, and I believe that it is the task of every Arab — is to support and strengthen it and to give it complete freedom of action without any interference or control. The only way we can interfere is by helping and supporting it.

Q. What about the Eastern Front?

A. There are rumours about the Eastern Front; they are being spread by suspect parties — everything that comes from these parties is suspect. From the start we have worked in conformity with the strategy laid down by the Party’s conferences. Our objective is to achieve a unified

Arab military policy and to channel all the energies of the Arab nation into the battle. We will follow any course, without reservation or hesitation, that will lead us to this. We were the first to call for the Eastern Front, and the first to join it, and we put all our military resources at the disposal of its leadership without reservation or hesitation. All the Syrian forces are under the command of the Eastern Front; they receive all its orders and execute them without hesitation. We are doing nothing to hinder any one who wants to associate himself seriously with the Eastern Front; on the contrary we are struggling to bring every available resource, every new rifle and every new Arab into the Eastern Front. To achieve this aim we will take everything in our stride and close our eyes to all provocations. Our Arab policy, in this field, is to support the Eastern Front, to reinforce it and eventually unify it with the Western Front. All efforts in every direction and at every level must be exerted to that end.

Q. Has your attitude to the Security Council resolution and the peaceful solution changed?

A. Everyone who accepted the Security Council resolution and received the United Nations envoy, Mr. Gunnar Jarring, has become absolutely convinced that an impasse has been reached and that the only hope lies in armed struggle. This has been our attitude from the start because we have always been able to see the picture as a whole. We are convinced that it is a question of the Arab nation recovering its unity and its historic role, and that this can only be achieved through armed struggle. Through armed struggle we can force others to respect us, and then we can talk from a position of strength.

Q. What do you think of President Charles Helou's letter about commando action?

A. Attempts are being made to involve Syria in what is going on in Lebanon; I do not believe that these attempts are at all in the interests of the Arab nation. It is for the Lebanese masses to assess and appraise Lebanese policy. Our constant concern is that Lebanon should retain its truly Arab character and always embody the aspirations of its Arab masses. Therefore I would like to take the opportunity of saying that we have no connection whatsoever with what

is happening in Lebanon. Our most earnest wish is that we should not become involved in what is happening in Lebanon, just as it is impossible for us to interfere in the affairs of the Arab resistance. We consider it our duty to supply the Arab commando movement with support and help of all kinds; our role is restricted to supplying it, supporting it and backing it. We advise others not to interfere in the affairs of the Arab resistance.

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Political Statement by the Arab Liberation Front.¹

Amman, August 30, 1969

June 5 created an atmosphere of objectivity and self-criticism: it relieved Arab life of the pressures formerly exerted by group fanaticism, party priggishness, claims to hold the monopoly of truth, exclusiveness, and dissension between revolutionary organisations. It left the way open for the reconsideration and reappraisal of beliefs and institutions. This is the most propitious atmosphere for commando action, and for its spirit and character, because it rejects all tendencies to exclusiveness and unilateral action, all restrictions and contentiousness.

In the face of world imperialism and reactionary Zionism, the very existence of the Arab nation is threatened, and its only hope of salvation lies in its assembling its revolutionary forces and mobilising all its resources for the battle.

The two years which have passed since the defeat have shown how essential it is that commando action should make a new leap forward to complete the glorious advance initiated by the heroes of this nation when they chose the course of armed struggle, and to make commando action stronger and more impregnable in the face of the danger of encirclement and blockade to which the Arab revolution in Palestine is exposed.

This danger is manifested, in particular, in the attempts to contain the revolution within its regional framework and to cut the artery which joins it with its sources of strength, ability and competence in the masses of the Arab revolution.

¹ *Al-Ahwar* (Beirut), 19/9/1969.

These attempts are a preparation for the day when it will be possible to crush the revolution in Palestine.

Exaggerating Palestinian Capacity :

The hostile forces of conspiracy have exploited an urgent necessity which has been felt by commando action, especially in its early stages. This is the necessity to affirm the Palestinian identity so as to rescue the popular will from the tutelage of Arab regimes and to create an image of the usurped rights and dispersed people of Palestine which is compatible with this identity, recognises it and even actually helps it to emerge. The object of this is to provide the Palestinian identity with an image that is distinct from the Arab identity and even, whenever possible, at variance with it. By allowing the Palestinian identity its full expression such an image will enable commando action to become a regime with the status of the other regimes.

These hostile forces are gradually exaggerating the capacity of the Palestinian identity, as distinct from the Arab identity, to fight, to endure and to achieve total liberation, with the eventual object of calling on the Palestinians to stop fighting, enduring and struggling for total liberation, on the pretext that it is impossible for them to do so alone.

In this way they hope to oblige the Palestinians to relinquish their false hopes for unjustifiable despair.

These hostile forces have also exploited the reluctance of the Arab revolutionary forces to respond to the real and immediate need for popular armed action in Palestine, so as to present the Arab revolution as abandoning the Palestine cause, and to say that Palestine was neglected in the previous stage because it was the stage of the Arab revolution. In fact, of course, the previous stage was not that of the Arab revolution, because it had not yet assumed its true form, which involves arming the Arab masses. Admittedly there was a sporadic and partial resort to arms, but this was not regarded as a permanent principle or an essential characteristic of the revolution.

Connection with Arab Unity :

Ever since commando action started, it has been the target of attempts by a number of parties to prevent the revolution in Palestine from being

openly, unambiguously and ideologically connected with Arab unity.

The enemy is well aware how greatly his interests would be endangered if the principle of the connection between the liberation of Palestine and Arab unity were to be proclaimed and affirmed. He realises how vital is this principle and to what extent it is in conformity with the Arab situation and with the readiness of the Arab masses in all parts of the Arab world. This is why he is ready to make concessions, and sometimes even to offer aid, to prevent this connection being achieved.

They have done this to every Arab revolution everywhere, and today they are trying to do the same thing to the Palestinian revolution. This applies not only to the colonialist countries, which are only too pleased to regard every Arab problem as purely regional, and in particular to refuse to recognise the existence of any connection between the Palestinian identity and the existence, unity and resurgence of the Arab nation. It also applies to the majority of the traditional Western non-communist leftist movements, and the reactionary Arab regimes. Even some of the regional leftist movements in the Arab homeland have been involved.

The traditional Western leftist movements vied with each other in their support of the Algerian revolution on one condition, that it should remain Algerian, and some of them are making the same condition today in supporting commando action. The explanation of this attitude is that these movements are still under Zionist influence which does not tolerate any support being given to any Arab action which implies aspirations to Arab unity. Moreover, these movements have not completely severed their links with colonialist interests; they can oppose particular forms of colonialism, but they cannot go all the way in opposing all forms of colonial exploitation and influence to which Arab unity spells certain destruction.

This has always been the attitude of the Arab League and the reactionary Arab regimes, both to the Palestine problem and to all Arab revolutions.

This attitude has always been illustrated by the way each country insists on maintaining its sovereignty, and by the refusal to recognise the

connection between the Zionist invasion and the creation of the State of Israel on the one hand, and the domestic situations in the Arab countries on the other, and the connection between these reactionary countries and colonialism.

For example, these regimes refuse to use oil as a weapon to exert pressure on the colonialist countries. They also refuse to abrogate the treaties and abolish the foreign bases which exist in some countries, as their contribution to the Arab confrontation with Israel.

Thus the extent to which the Arab countries are contributing to the liberation of Palestine still goes no further than providing assistance and donations and making declarations. In this way they belittle the extent of the issue, ignore its profundity and deny the blatant and undeniable fact that what is involved is a Zionist-colonialist invasion.

The Arab regimes, as has always been the case, do not want the Arab revolution in Palestine to reach them or to affect their social and political situations. They are therefore trying to restrict the problem to the Palestinians as a form of bribe, in the hope of preventing themselves from becoming involved in the effects of this revolution.

The attitude of certain progressive Arab regimes and certain leftist movements in the Arab homeland to the Palestine problem differs only in degree, not in kind, from that of the reactionary regimes. Their exaggerated, sometimes even extremist, leftism, is based on their suspect and conspiratorial silence as regards the connection between the Palestine problem and Arab unity, and this silence is to be explained by their acceptance of the facts of fragmentation and regional action. In return for ensuring acceptance of, appreciation for and favourable propaganda on behalf of commando action in Arab and international fields, these circles require that it should ignore the organic link between the liberation of Palestine and the Arab revolutionary movement, and be content that the matter should be restricted to the framework of aid, generosity and brotherly help.

What they are proposing should be tried today is what the Arabs have been trying to do for fifty years. Since the Balfour Declaration, throughout the successive Palestinian revolutions, the war of 1948, and the series of events which led up to

the creation of the State of Israel, the impotence of revolutions has been only too obvious; they have been contained and stifled.

The Arab Liberation Front:

The revolutionary pulse with which the spirit of our nation has been throbbing since June 5, while concentrating the nation's attention on the deep wound inflicted on it in Palestine, has made armed confrontation of the enemy the true criterion by which to judge how serious are the Arabs in their attachment to their homeland and in their devotion to values and ideals. It is a test not only of their willingness for self-sacrifice, but also of the extent they appreciate how essential is science to any revolutionary struggle. It is a challenge to place science in the service of the revolution, and to raise the revolution in its thinking, its organisation, planning and means of action to a high and constantly developing scientific, technical and technological level, because to aspire to and attain such a level is essential for any organisation if it is to be honest with itself and to its mission.

Today a new force is entering the battleground of sacrifice. Called the Arab Liberation Front, it is blazing a new trail for the revolution to follow under the banner of Arab revolutionary ideology, and with a national organisation which includes Arab fighters from all corners of the Arab homeland, who have promised the eternal Arab nation to recover Palestine for it and to stain the earth of the Holy Land with their blood.

The Arab Liberation Front is open at ideological and organisational levels, and as the framework for a broad front, to every national, to every fighter who chooses the course of armed popular struggle as the only way for the nation to confront the historic challenge, to repel the invaders and to liberate the land and the people.

The Popular War of Liberation:

The Arab answer to the Zionist colonialist invasion which will prove effective against the conspiracy of hostile forces to detach commando action from the Arab revolution, lies in enhancing every aspect of the Arab revolution and raising its standards so that it may rally and concentrate its forces and devote itself exclusively to transforming armed popular struggle into a popular war of liberation.

The popular war of liberation will only really start and deserve the name, when Arab resistance has expanded to comprise the whole people, pitting the weight of Arab numerical superiority against colonialist and Zionist technological superiority, and assuming its true form as a vast Arab tide which will sweep all before it as, employing all the vast resources, powers and means possessed by the whole Arab people, it clashes with the artificial ethnic group brought from all corners of the globe, and with the colonialist military, political, cultural and economic bases which have been implanted in Arab territory.

The function of this popular war is to recruit the whole Arab nation, freely and voluntarily, and to ensure that every Arab enters the battle side by side with the Arab armies which, in their structure, consist of popular struggling elements, and in their spirit are intrepid and devoted, on the understanding that this battle requires that every single Arab should participate in it.

The Arab liberation war, in its sacred struggle against the presence of the Zionist-colonialist enemy and his interests throughout the whole homeland, is one of the fundamental international fronts in the struggle against imperialism, headed by the United States of America, and is laying the solid foundations of a human society in which freedom and peace will prevail and from which every form of exploitation will be excluded.

The Arab revolutionary movement failed to build up the Arab revolution, because it did not build it in the form of armed popular struggle, and armed popular struggle will remain unable to reach the level of a popular war of liberation unless it links up with the principles of revolutionary Arab ideology.

Arabism, Socialism and Democracy :

The sort of commando action which is capable of fully representing the total presence of the Arab nation in Palestine, which is indispensable for the achievement of equality with the vast forces which colonialism, Zionism and reaction deploy in the battle, is armed popular struggle characterised by Arabism, socialism and democracy.

By involving the whole Arab homeland, armed popular struggle will ensure that all parts of the

nation are aware of the danger to its existence of the Zionist and colonialist invasion and will undertake to confront this danger.

Concentration on Palestine will both create unity and liberate Palestine, and just as unity will restore to Palestine its freedom, so Palestine will restore to the Arabs their unity. Palestine is the road to unity and unity is the road to Palestine, and any attempt to separate or contrast these two slogans can only weaken and impair both the battle for liberation and Arab unity.

Henceforward the Arab people will only accept unity if it aims at liberation from the start, and there will be no unity unless it is established by the masses with the object of liberating Palestine.

Moreover, the people will not believe that a front is capable of achieving liberation unless it approaches it with the strength of the whole Arab entity — the strength of the whole Arab nation employing all the means at its disposal and embodied in an organisation comprising the fighters of the whole Arab homeland.

Only if this struggle is socialist in character will it be capable of giving the toiling masses of the Arab people full awareness, mobilising them for the revolution, and raising their standards of organisation and efficiency, thereby isolating all classes, institutions and regimes that have historical links with the interests of colonialism and its political and economic entity. The revolutionary atmosphere generated by armed struggle is injurious to these interests, and the very first step that is taken towards raising the level of support for this struggle will threaten them with complete destruction.

These classes act against the revolution either by confronting it directly or by clinging to it and its organisations, sucking its roots, stopping its growth and obstructing its advance.

Moreover, it is socialism that will guarantee that the leadership remains in the hands of the toiling masses who will be most persevering in their efforts to ensure that the struggle attains the level of a popular war of liberation, because they have the greatest interest to do so.

The socialist and progressive character of this struggle will also make Zionist-colonialist propaganda less effective in deceiving the peoples of the world and presenting Israel as a country intended to be a refuge for an oppressed, advanced and

progressive people. It will disclose the colonialist and racist character of Israel to every freeman in the world, and, what is more, even liberate the Jews from the domination of the Zionist movement, and reveal to them the truth and justice of the Arab cause.

The democratic character of this struggle lies in its connection with the mind and spirit of the people, whom it protects from the maladies of tutelage and self-deception and from the dangers of deviation and dissociation from revolutionary principles and values. It also protects them from bureaucratic inflexibility and the proliferation of organisations. On the other hand, it provides them with a spirit of security and frankness in the relations between leaderships and the bases, and creates for every individual a place in the battle in which he can perform his duty and deploy his energies to the full.

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Preliminary Technical Report on the Fire at the Aqsa Mosque.¹

Jerusalem

The committee, whose members were the engineers Rizq Esber Khuri, Muhammad Nusaiba and Ibrahim al-Daqqaq, surveyed the site of the fire at the Aqsa Mosque and came to the following conclusions:

1. Two separate fires broke out in the Mosque, one in the area of the Mihrab and the Minbar of Saladin, and the other in the roof of the south-east wing and the Mihrab of Zakariyya which is about 15 metres above ground level.

2(a) The ceiling of the south-east wing and the Mihrab of Zakariyya were completely destroyed, the total area being approximately 400 square metres, including the ornamentation and carving.

(b) The whole of the Minbar of Saladin was burnt.

(c) All the inner walls of the Mihrab were damaged and the historic carvings and ornamentation irreparably damaged.

(d) The fire reached the dome of the Mosque and destroyed part of the ornamental lining of the

wooden dome and the mosaics which covered the supports of the dome. The lining of the dome is now liable to collapse.

(e) The two marble pillars connecting the dome to the area of the Mihrab were damaged, together with the arch they support, so that their capacity to bear the load of the dome and the Mihrab has been impaired.

(f) All the decorative woodwork in the ceiling of the Mihrab area was damaged.

(g) Flames reached the woodwork in the west of the dome, damaging the ornamentation and impairing its stability.

3. The Committee was unable to determine the stability of the dome, its supports and the other walls, or how much they were damaged by the fire, because the firemen were at work.

4. The Committee was unable to estimate the value of the damage done to the historic carvings and ornamentation. The value of the structural damage will be estimated later.

5. In the opinion of the Committee, the cause of the fire was arson, as evidenced in the attached Report of the Electrical Engineers, which excludes the possibility of the fire having been caused by an electrical fault.

Report of the Electrical Engineers:

Engineers and electricians from the Jerusalem District Electricity Company submit the following information concerning the measures taken by them:

1. At 7.30 a.m., the duty officer at the Company received a telephone message informing him that fire had broken out in the Haram al-Sharif. The duty officer, Mr Auni Muhtadi, immediately proceeded to the Bab al-Maghareba, which leads to the Haram and the substation for the Dome of the Rock, where he pulled out the main fuses connecting the subscriber, i.e., the Haram al-Sharif, with Company lines, in accordance with Company procedures in case of fire. This task was completed within a few minutes. The Committee is satisfied that the duty officer carried out the required precautionary measures as specified in his instructions in case of fire or any other emergency.

2. The above-mentioned fuses were examined at the Company. No evidence of any defect or

¹ *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 30/8/1969.

burnt fuse wires could be detected by the electrical engineers. The duty officer confirmed, furthermore, that he had found them to be quite cold when he pulled them out. This, in the opinion of the engineers, conclusively indicates the absence of an overload on the fuses, i.e., the absence of any significant short circuit. For a short circuit would cause the fuses to blow or, at least in the case of Company fuses, would cause a rise in the temperature of the porcelain holders. The fact that the fuses were found to be quite cold so soon after the outbreak of the fire leads the Company engineers to believe in principle, that is to say, in default of any further evidence, that no short circuit had occurred in the wires at the subscriber's end.

3. At 10.20, Mr Umran Abu Mayzar, an engineer, went to the site of the fire inside the Mosque, accompanied by the duty officer who had stayed at his post all this time. They both stated that they did not notice anything unusual about the wires.

4. At 12.00, two electrical engineers from the Jerusalem Electricity Company, Messrs. Hisham Zalatu and Hisham al-Khatib, accompanied by the electrician of the Haram, Mr Muhammad Mahmud al-Sabbagh, arrived at the site. They found that the main area of the fire was in the south east wing. Here, all the electrical wiring was along the surface of the wooden beams between the columns of the Mosque at an approximate height of four metres. It was ascertained that these beams had not been directly exposed to fire, which excludes the possibility of a short circuit on their surface, i.e., where the wires were located. The wires were also found to be in good condition. The main site of the fire was in the roof, at least eight metres above the wires. There are no electrical wires in the roof at all and no traces of wires were to be found there, since all the wiring is laid out at a height of approximately four metres above the level of the tiled floor.

5. The chandelier in the dome receives its current from a free hanging wire which is no more than four metres from the tiled floor.

6. The engineers found that the electric switches which control current to the chandelier in the dome, the Mihrab and electric fans in that area, were in excellent condition and had not been affected by fire. The main switch was in

excellent condition and there were no signs of an overload which usually appears in cases of short circuit.

All this confirms the opinion of the engineers that no short circuit took place in that area. Moreover, this switch was of the satisfactory type in which connection and interruption is "phase and neutral". Some of the wires around the Minbar were found to have been affected by the fire. Among these were microphone wires which have no connection with the electrical set-up at all. Due to the burning of the wooden Minbar, only the insulation of the electric wire fixed to the wall behind the Minbar was burnt. The rest of the wire was sound at both ends.

7. The electrical engineers found no grounds for suspecting that an electrical short circuit in the Mosque could possibly have caused the fire, whether directly or indirectly. On the contrary, the location of the fire and the levels at which it broke out, as the engineers ascertained from some of the firemen on the spot, were far from the site of any electric wires.

8. We are professional engineers employed by the Electric Company. Some of us have worked there for ten years, and during these years we have not heard of a single case of fire due to an electrical short circuit in the Jerusalem area or the surrounding region.

In the "inner" roof, there are no electric wires at all. Above the "outer" roof there were four wire "3 phase and neutral" cables, which supply a main fuse box in the western side of the central arcade. This fuse box supplies current to a crane on the western side of the Mosque and to a four-wire "3 phase and neutral" cable which goes round the dome from its northern side and proceeds from west to east ending in a fuse box at a point north east of the dome. This last wire, which is free hanging, was the only one affected by the fire, and then only a small part of it. Its two terminals, the one connected with the fuse box and the other attached to the dome, are still in good condition. We also found that the current was cut off from all these wires from a post to the east of the distribution box and at a distance of 100 metres from it. All these wires were dead. We found no sign of an electric welding machine on the roof. The only electrical apparatus we found on the roof was a small

grindstone motor which was not connected up to any lines. But a few aluminium soldering rods were found. These had not been used and had been on the roof since before the June, 1967 War.

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Interview with Mr. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee at the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Official Spokesman of the Palestine National Liberation Movement Fateh.¹ (Excerpts)

Q. Fateh has offered an alternative to the Jews in Palestine — that is the creation of a progressive, democratic State for all. How do you reconcile this with the slogan “Long live Palestine Arab and Free”?

A. A democratic, progressive State in Palestine is not in contradiction to that State being Arab. The social, geographical and historical factors play a major role in determining the nature and identity of any State. Anyone who has tried to look at the Palestinian problem in its historic perspective would realise that the Zionist State has failed to make itself acceptable because it is an artificially created alien state in the midst of an Arab world.

Palestine has acquired its identity through the historical development of the area. It is impossible for any Palestinian State to isolate itself from its geographical surroundings. It has been proved historically that any State, created on the land of Palestine which had been aliens to the area, was unable to survive.

It is claimed that the main reason for the establishment of the State of Israel was to find a solution to the Jewish problem, but the experience of the past twenty years has proved that the absorbing capacity of the State has been insufficient to solve the problem of the 16 million Jews in the world.

The Zionist Movement has, as a result, to face one of two alternatives: either to carry on an expansionist policy which will enable it to absorb all the Jews of the world or to admit the failure of its experience and try and find a solution for those Jews who have been uprooted from their

countries of origin to be settled on the land of Palestine.

We have offered our solution: that is the creation of a democratic Palestinian State for all those who wish to live in peace on the land of peace. Such a State can only acquire stability and viability by forming a part of the surrounding area, which is the Arab area. Otherwise this State with its Jewish, Christian and Moslem citizens would be another alien and temporary phenomena in the area, which will arouse the antagonism of its neighbours, exactly as did the first Jewish State and the Crusaders' State. Neither of these States lasted for more than 70 years.

The word Arab implies a common culture, a common language and a common background. The majority of the inhabitants of any future State of Palestine will be Arab, if we consider that there are at present 2,500,000 Palestinian Arabs of the Moslem and Christian faiths and another 1,250,000 Arabs of the Jewish faith who live in what is now the state of Israel.

Q. The immediate objective of your Movement is the liberation of your occupied homeland. What are your long term objectives after achieving liberation? How do you envisage the future State of Palestine?

A. As you have rightly mentioned, the immediate objective of Fateh is the total liberation of Palestine from Zionism and the destruction of any racial or sectarian notion which might exist among the Arabs.

Accordingly, we believe the only way to realise our objective is by overcoming our differences and achieving national unity. Our struggle in its present stage is a struggle for survival and for recovering our national identity. We aim ultimately at the establishment of an independent, progressive, democratic State in Palestine, which will guarantee equal rights to all its citizens, regardless of race or religion.

We wish to liberate the Jews from Zionism, and to make them realise that the purpose behind the creation of the State of Israel, namely to provide a haven for the persecuted Jews, has instead thrown them into a ghetto of their own making.

We wish to help build a progressive society based on liberty and equality for all. We also aim

¹ *Free Palestine* (London), Vol. II, August 1969, p. 1.

at participating actively in any struggle led by any Arab nation to achieve freedom and independence and to help build the united progressive Arab society of the future.

We support the struggle of all oppressed peoples in the world and we believe in the right for self-determination to all nations. We do not know for how long our struggle will go on until the liberation of our homeland is achieved. It might be a few years, or perhaps tens of years. It will be up to the generation that will finally liberate Palestine to decide upon the structure of their State.

Q. The Palestine National Liberation Movement has certainly been able to achieve a break-through in what used to be a Zionist domain: the Western Leftist movements. Fatch has become to many synonymous with freedom fighting and an expression of struggle against oppression everywhere. Yet the new Zionist propaganda tactic is to smear it, by accusing it of accepting help from what is termed by them as "reactionary sources". What have you to say to this?

A. Our Revolution accepts help, whether technological, material or military, from all sources. We seek the support of all those who wish to see Palestine liberated from Zionism, provided it is unconditional. We address ourselves equally to those who wish to offer help because they wish to see the holy places liberated or to those revolutionaries in Africa, Asia and Latin America who consider our struggle as part of the struggle against oppression everywhere.

We have formed very strong ties with the liberation movements all over the world — in Cuba, in China, in Algeria and in Vietnam. We must not forget that in a war of liberation we should make use of every available source and means that will help us reach our ultimate goal — that is the liberation of our homeland.

I would also like to point out that other nations who have entered a war of liberation have adopted the same methods: for example in Vietnam the National Liberation Front includes 23 different organisations ranging from the Catholics and Buddhists to the Communists.

Can anyone accuse the Vietnamese Revolution of being a reactionary force? Add to this that the Palestinian Revolution in undertaking to lead the struggle against the Zionists, and to prevent

any further aggression against the rest of the Arab world is entitled to use all the resources available in the Arab area.

Q. Plans for a "peaceful settlement" of what is termed an "Arab-Israeli" conflict seem to be speeding up, with the Four Power talks going ahead. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are eager to impose such a solution. How will Fatch react, or rather act?

A. The United Nations Security Council and the Big Powers have chosen to call their solutions "peaceful", whereas, in fact they are political solutions which are in no way related to peace as they all aim at safeguarding the state of Israel and ignoring the Palestinian Revolution. As such we declare that we will not under any circumstances accept any so-called peaceful solution which is being concocted by either the "Big" States or the "Small" States. We regard any such settlement as a document of self-humiliation which our people are forcibly asked to accept.

I believe that if our generation is unable to liberate its homeland, it should not commit the crime of accepting a fait accompli, which will prevent the future generations from carrying on the struggle for liberation.

What seems strange is that the call for a peaceful settlement started to be heard only when the Zionist enemy began to feel the blows dealt him by our Revolution.

I would like to mention here that immediately following the June War 1967, when President Johnson was asked about the problem in the Middle East, he replied, "is there a problem?" This goes to prove that a problem exists only when Israel considers it as existing. We, the Palestinian people, refuse to capitulate or to give legality to usurpation. As long as Israel is an invading, racist, Fascist State, it will be rejected. Let no one think that any resolution taken outside the will of the Palestinians will ever acquire viability or legality.

We have waited twenty years for world conscience to awaken, but it was at the cost of more dispersion. And here I would like to state that in this we do not only have the support of the Palestinian masses, but also of the whole Arab masses. We must also not forget that our Movement started before the 5th of June 1967, with the purpose of liberating Palestine and we will

not lay down our arms until victory, no matter who stands in our way.

Q. Your Movement has on more than one occasion declared that it will not interfere in the affairs of other Arab countries. Don't you think that owing to recent developments in certain neighbouring Arab countries, this policy should be revised, especially as these developments aim at threatening the Palestinian Revolution?

A. We will not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab country that will not in its turn put obstacles in the way of our Revolution or threaten its continuation.

Q. During her last visit to Britain, Golda Meir denied the existence of a Palestinian people or a Palestinian resistance movement. What is your answer?

A. Her predecessor, Levi Eshkol, also denied our existence for a very long time. Yet before his death, in an interview with the American magazine *Newsweek*, he had to admit that we do exist. In 1967 Moshe Dayan claimed that the Palestinian resistance was like an egg in his hand, which he could crush any time. Yet in 1969 he was quoted as advising the Israelis to "deepen their graves". Our answer therefore to Golda Meir and to anyone who doubts our existence can be found in our actions inside the occupied territories, whether in Haifa or Jerusalem or Tel Aviv or Eilat or elsewhere. Besides, you are now living amongst us and you can judge whether a Palestinian Resistance Movement exists or not.

Q. Besides the military field, what are Fateh's achievements, for example, in other fields such as the emancipation of women, the education of children, social services and so on?

A. As a progressive revolution, we consider that all members of our society, whether men or women, should enjoy equal rights. We therefore encourage the total emancipation of all our women and we endeavour to give them every opportunity to participate actively in our struggle. The Palestinian woman has since the days of the Mandate fought side by side with our men. In the occupied territories at present, it is our valiant sisters who are leading the civilian resistance against the occupying forces.

We do not place any obstacles or restrictions in the face of any woman who wishes to join in our Movement. In fact, we are encouraging

them to join both our military and political ranks.

As for the education of children, we have established schools for both girls and boys; we have the "Cubs" training centres, we have organisations for caring for the families of our martyrs. We have founded our own hospitals and clinics which provide free medical treatment to the displaced persons in their camps. In fact, we know that our struggle is a long-term one and we are preparing ourselves accordingly.

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Q. Do you consider your struggle as part of the struggle against imperialism and colonialism everywhere and why?

A. Our struggle is part and parcel of every struggle against imperialism, injustice and oppression in the world. It is part of the world revolution which aims at establishing social justice and liberating mankind. Outside the Palestinian and Arab masses our greatest support comes from all freedom-loving people who have realised the true nature of Zionism and its association with imperialism and neo-colonialism. Israel's natural allies are sufficient proof of this. We only have to look at the support it receives from the United States, at its close links with the racist Republics of South Africa and Rhodesia.

As for its ties with the puppet regime of South Vietnam, let us only remember that its defence minister Moshe Dayan found it necessary and useful to spend a few months there learning their methods. The 1956 aggression against Egypt is another very clear example of the reasons for the creation of a Zionist state in the area. To sum up, we consider Israel as playing the new role of the East India Company in the Middle East.

Q. Do you accept non-Palestinians in your fighting forces?

A. We have at present both Arab and non Arab freedom fighters in our ranks.

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Speech by the United Arab Republic President Nasser at the Opening of the Conference of Kings and Heads of the Arab States on the Line of Confrontation with Israel.¹

Cairo, September 1, 1969

Brothers,

In that true spirit which is created and made more profound by companionship at arms, unity of aspirations, a common destiny, and a firm belief in both Egypt and the Arab nation as a whole, I welcome you to this meeting. I believe that, with God's will and help, it will be a prominent landmark on the course of our lawful and just struggle to liberate and cleanse Arab territory of the traces of an inroad that is probably the hardest and most violent which our Arab nation has faced in its history of struggle; there has not been a single day of respite on the various fronts, because of the ambitions of the forces of domination and imperialism; as regards its land and wealth and their aspirations to gain control over the resources of its peoples.

This summit meeting between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Iraqi Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic, is described as a meeting of the countries that are in confrontation with Israel. But I want to point out that, although it is so described, this does not mean that it has any special significance for us, apart from the fact that it means that each of us has specific responsibilities. That is to say, by holding this meeting we are not claiming that our role in the over-all national struggle is greater than that of any of the other states of the great and eternal Arab nation, but that we are necessarily aware of the duties that our position on the firing-line imposes on us. These are duties which must be performed within the framework of the vast movement in which

our whole nation is now inevitably engaged.

Therefore this meeting is but a part of a whole, a vanguard for others to follow, a necessary duty within the framework of a broad plan. For this plan to succeed we must mobilise not only all our nation's forces and intellectual, military, economic and manpower resources, but also its people's courage, strength of character and faith in the dignity of life.

Brothers, I do not want to speak too long, so I shall not describe developments, situations or particular incidents. It is perfectly clear that we are in the right; the Arab nation does not need to be persuaded of this. Indeed there can be no doubt that, thanks to their clear vision and their profound conviction, it is the masses themselves that are mainly responsible for directing our confrontation with God's enemy and ours.

Brothers, I speak for all of you when I end this speech with a message to our steadfast and patient masses everywhere. To them we say that in meeting in this hall — in working in this hall — we are inspired by our responsibilities to the masses of our nation, their history, their destiny, and their aspirations to advancement in all fields of civilisation. Nothing helps us so much in shouldering these responsibilities as our absolute confidence in the right of our nation and in the masses of its peoples and their armed forces, including the fighting revolutionary vanguards of the great Palestinian nation, which, as fate would have it, is represented today in Cairo by the Palestinian National Assembly which is now meeting here. Brothers,

We pray that God will grant us aid, assistance, guidance and success in our work. I now beg your permission to begin the discussion of the questions which have brought us here.

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 2/9/1969. Among those attending the Conference were: Mr. Nur al-Din al-Atasi, Head of State of the Syrian Arab Republic, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic, King Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and Lt. General Saleh Mahdi Ammash, Vice President of the Iraqi Council of Ministers, representing President Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr, President of the Iraqi Republic.

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Draft Resolution Submitted by the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine at the Sixth Session of the Palestine National Council Concerning "a Popular Democratic Solution for the Palestine Problem".¹ (Excerpt)

September 1, 1969

Draft Proposals:

In accordance with the desire of the Palestinian people for a democratic solution to the Palestine problem, the Palestine National Council has decided on the following:

1. All chauvinistic, reactionary, Zionist and imperialist solutions based on the recognition of the State of Israel as an established fact within the Middle East are hereby rejected, for not only do such solutions conflict with the right of the Palestinian people to self determination in their own land, but they also entrench the existence of the expansionist Zionist entity which is affiliated with imperialism and is hostile to the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movements and to all the forces of progress and socialism in the world.

2. All chauvinistic solutions of Palestinian or Arab origin, whether predating or subsequent to the June, 1967 war, that depend on massacring the Jews or driving them into the sea are hereby rejected. Furthermore, all reactionary solutions which presuppose the acknowledgement of the existence of the State of Israel within secure and recognized boundaries, as in the case of the ill-reputed Security Council resolution, are also rejected, for such solutions would be implemented at the expense of the right of the Palestinian people to self determination in their own land and would install a racist, capitalist and expansionist state in the Middle East, one that has controversial links with world capitalism which is hostile to the Palestinian, Arab and world liberation movements and to all the forces of progress and socialism in this world.

3. The Council is resolved to work for a popular

democratic solution to the Palestine and Israeli problems. Such a solution would mean doing away with the Zionist entity, as embodied in all governmental institutions, i.e., the army, the administration and the police force, and in all other chauvinistic Zionist political institutions and unions. Such a solution would mean setting up a popular democratic Palestinian state for Arabs and Jews alike in which there would be no discrimination and no room for class or national subjugation and in which the right of both Arabs and Jews to perpetuate and develop their indigenous cultures would be respected.

4. In view of the fateful and historical affiliation of Palestine with the Arab nation, the popular democratic state of Palestine shall form an inseparable part of a federal Arab state in this area. That state shall be democratic by nature and shall be opposed to colonialism, imperialism, and the forces of Arab and Palestinian reaction.

5. The proposed democratic solution is capable of liberating every Arab and Jew from all chauvinistic or racist trends in their culture. It would emancipate the Arabs from any reactionary orientation in their culture and the Jews from Zionist culture.

6. That democratic solution, which is opposed to class or national subjugation, would free Palestine from its ties with imperialism and would transform it into a bulwark for revolution and progress so that it might take its place at the side of all anti-imperialist forces and world counter-revolution.

7. The only way for the national liberation movement to set up a popular democratic state of Palestine is through armed struggle and a popular war of liberation against Zionism, imperialism and reaction. It must succeed in doing away with the Israeli state and liberating the Jews from Zionism. This involves incessant daily armed struggle against all the proposed chauvinistic, reactionary and imperialist solutions until the total liberation of Palestine becomes a fact; it involves, furthermore, the establishment of a democratic state in which Arabs and Jews shall enjoy equal national rights and responsibilities. That state shall be at the service of all forces engaged in the struggle for national liberation and progress.

¹ *Al-Hurriyya* (Beirut), No. 480, 9/9/1969, p. 12.

In putting forward this democratic solution, the Sixth Palestine National Council calls on all anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist elements or groupings within Israel and among the Jews to support this solution and rally to the cause of joint Palestine armed and popular struggle for the implementation of this democratic and revolutionary solution.

The Sixth Palestine National Council furthermore calls on all the forces of national liberation and socialism in the world to adopt this democratic solution and to join the struggle of the Palestinian people for its implementation, so as to enable that people to exercise the right of self determination.

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Communiqué on the Summit Conference of the Countries on the Line of Confrontation with Israel.¹

Cairo, September 3, 1969

To comply with the requirements of the fateful stage which the Arab nation is passing through, in response to the challenges which are facing this nation and which have reached their climax with the criminal burning of Al-Aqsa mosque, which occupies a special place in the hearts of Arabs and Muslims, and in a spirit of Arab solidarity and unity of purpose, a Summit Meeting of the countries in confrontation with Israel was held in Cairo. The following attended the meeting: His Majesty King Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, General Ja'far al-Numairi, President of the Sudanese Revolutionary Council, Dr. Nur al-Din al-Atasi, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Lt. General Saleh Mahdi Am-mash, Member of the Revolutionary Command Council representing President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic.

All aspects of the present situation were discussed in the light of all possible contingencies.

The Kings and Presidents of the countries in confrontation with Israel adopted the necessary resolutions on all the issues under discussion; this

was a true expression of their unity of attitude and marked a start on the road towards liberating the occupied territory and cleansing it of the traces of aggression.

One of the most prominent results of the meeting was the agreement by all parties attending the Conference that the Arab forces can be reinforced in their confrontation of the enemy by the mobilisation of all the efforts of all Arab countries, and that such mobilisation is essential for the achievement of victory.

The Arab economic support provided to certain countries in confrontation with Israel has played an important role in increasing their ability to stand firm.

The Arab nation is abundantly rich in potentials and unexploited resources that have not been developed or exploited to the extent required by the historic responsibilities of the present situation, which requires redoubled efforts. The Conference calls on the Arab states to make use of their potentialities and resources and to place them at the disposal of the battle.

The Conference believes that the battle is too great to be limited to one place because it is a battle of destiny. Therefore the same call must be addressed to one and all to mobilise on behalf of the day when, God willing, the Arab nation recovers its prestige, its dignity and its usurped rights.

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Political Statement Issued by the Sixth Palestine National Assembly.²

Cairo, September 6, 1969

The Sixth Palestinian National Assembly was held in Cairo from September 1-6, 1969. It was attended by representatives of the following Palestinian movements and organisations:

1. The Independents.
2. The Palestine Liberation Army and the Popular Liberation Forces.
3. The Movement for Palestinian National Liberation (*Fateh*).

¹ *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), 4/9/1969.

² *Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.*

4. The Organisation of the Vanguard of the Popular War of Liberation.

5. The Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

6. The Front for Popular Struggle.

7. The Arab Organisation for Palestine.

8. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command).

9. Students', Workers', Writers' and Women's Associations. The stage in which this meeting was held was an important and critical one in view of the circumstances now attending on armed struggle. The first stage of the development of the struggle into a full-scale popular war inside the occupied territories was overshadowed by the conspiracies of the various enemy and counter-revolutionary forces.

In view of this, the forces represented this session at the National Assembly were more representative of the Palestinian people. Care was taken to ensure the representation of Palestinian forces active in the field of armed struggle as well as of federations, trades unions and experts who are working in the national field.

In its resolutions and recommendations the Assembly reaffirmed the determination of the people of Palestine to reject all solutions leading to surrender, especially the United Nations Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. It affirmed that the goal of the Palestine revolution is the achievement of the total and complete liberation of all the territory of Palestine from Zionist occupation, which is based on Israel and which has the forces of world imperialism supporting it. It declared the determination of the people of Palestine to go forward with their revolution until victory is achieved and a Palestinian democratic state is created, free of all forms of religious and social discrimination.

The Assembly asserted that the method followed by the revolution is armed struggle, supported by other forms of struggle, to recover the usurped homeland. The instruments of revolution are the Arab masses inside and outside the occupied territory, supported by the increasing participation of the struggling Arab masses and various other forces of liberation and progress in the world.

The Assembly affirmed, in all its deliberations and recommendations, the complete independence of Palestinian action and its rejection of all attempts to impose influence, domination, repression or tutelage from any quarter. The Assembly, however, preferred not to stress the national and human dimensions of the Palestine revolution which it regarded as part of the Arab revolution and of the international liberation movement.

The action of the United States, the leader of world imperialism, in delivering Phantom aircraft to Israel, is one more indication of the extent to which world imperialism and Zionism are acting in collusion in threatening the entire Arab world through their base, Israel.

To confront the imperialist-Zionist challenge, it is essential that the Arab masses should form a solid front to protect the Palestinian revolution and to support the steadfastness of our people in occupied Palestine. They must call upon the Arab governments to fulfil their obligations to the Palestinian revolution, especially their commitments to the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

The National Assembly reaffirmed its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Arab states, provided these states undertake not to impede the progress of the revolution, the liberty of Palestinian action and the right of our people to determine their destiny and safeguard their cause.

Bearing these principles in mind, the Assembly debated the crisis that has been fabricated in Lebanon; it emphasised the right of the Palestinian masses to freedom of action and movement in any Arab territory and condemned all attempts to use force against our unarmed masses in their camps.

While condemning these suspect expedients which can be of service only to the designs of imperialism and Zionism, the National Assembly wishes to express to the Arab people of Lebanon its appreciation for their support of the Palestinian revolution.

The Assembly paid special attention to the problem of national unity, affirming its determination to continue its efforts to achieve it in the most complete form so that it may help to escalate and develop the armed struggle.

The Assembly recommended that the measures undertaken to unify the collection of financial contributions be finalised, especially in Jordan. It recommended that the Palestine Liberation Army be strengthened and developed to meet the needs of the future. It delegated the task of providing medical services to all combatants to the Palestine Red Crescent, and called on the Executive Committee to increase its welfare services for the families of killed, wounded and prisoners.

The Assembly discussed ways and means of placing the revolution on a more scientific basis so that revolutionary action may be, both in theory and in practice, based upon planning programming and statistics. It therefore resolved to strengthen the Palestine Planning Centre by supplying it with the necessary staff and equipment.

One of the most important resolutions adopted by the Assembly during this session was the decision to establish a revolutionary tribunal to be the only legal body empowered to pass judgements ensuring justice, safeguarding the security of the revolution and frustrating attempts to destroy it inspired by the enemy or his agents.

The Assembly sanctioned full interaction between the Palestine liberation movement and liberation movements in the Arab homeland and the world at large. It also expressed its appreciation to all friendly nations and states and to all forces of liberation in the world for their support of the struggle of the people of Palestine.

The Assembly resolved to salute the struggling masses in the occupied territories and to express its appreciation and admiration for their firm resistance to Israeli occupation, affirming that these struggling masses are the greatest guarantee of success for our revolution.

Revolutionary masses,

The Assembly is aware of the attempts that are being made to contain and conspire against our cause and our revolution. But basing ourselves upon the resolve of the Palestinian and Arab masses to continue the armed struggle until the total liberation of our usurped homeland is achieved, whatever the cost in sacrifice, we pledge ourselves to be faithful to the cause of revolution and to lead it forward to victory and liberation.

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Statement by an Official Spokesman of the Syrian Foreign Ministry on the Decision of the United States of America to Supply Israel with Phantom Planes.¹

Damascus, September 7, 1969

All informed political sources have affirmed that the government of the United States of America has actually begun delivering Phantom planes to the Zionist occupation authorities. By this the United States of America has given absolute confirmation of its support for the Zionist authorities and for their expansionist policy of retaining the Arab territory occupied as a result of the June 5, 1967, aggression, in defiance of resolutions of the United Nations and all its organisations, and in disregard of all international laws and moral principles.

The Foreign Ministry of the Syrian Arab Republic condemns in the strongest terms this action in support of aggression, which it regards as a further illustration of the United States government's policy of rewarding, even encouraging, the Zionist authorities in their constant and persistent violation of the most fundamental principles of human rights and international conventions, and in their destruction of the lives and holy places of the Arab nation.

The Foreign Ministry regards this action as actual participation by the United States of America in the aggression against the Arab nation, and warns it of the consequences of its attitude which may well constitute a threat to world peace. The government of the United States of America must bear all the consequences of this action.

The Arab people in all parts of the Arab world will remember this constant iniquitous support by the government of the United States of America for the Zionist forces of aggression. They will always remember with bitterness that the napalm bombs which fall on its women and children, and the treacherous bullets which kill its sons, are of American manufacture and are used at the wish and with the encouragement of the government of the United States of America.

History will also record that the government

¹ *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus), 8/9/1969.

of the United States of America has ranged itself on the side of the Zionist occupation authorities whose aggression the Arab nation, from the Gulf to the Atlantic, has decided to confront resolutely until victory is won.

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Joint Communiqué on the Jordanian King Hussein's Visit to Lebanon.¹ (Excerpt)

Beirut, September 13, 1969

During both these meetings, the two parties studied the Arab and international affairs that concern their two countries, exchanging views and information on these subjects, concentrating their attention, in particular, on factors which have arisen recently, such as the escalation of Israeli acts of aggression and the burning of Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the Arab and Islamic diplomatic initiatives it has given rise to, at the United Nations and elsewhere.

They also focussed attention on the Cairo conference of the four countries on the line of confrontation with Israel, and on the probability of the Middle East problem being once more brought up as a subject of discussion by the permanent members of the Security Council and in the deliberations of the United Nations General Assembly.

In the light of the faith of both parties in the sanctity of the cause for which they are working, within the framework of the mutual understanding and agreement they have achieved with the object of realising the goal for which they are striving, and in order to determine the course that must be followed, they declared their determination to continue their mutual consultations and cooperation and to coordinate the efforts they are making. They also agreed to continue efforts to ensure that consultations at present in progress between Arab countries may result in meetings, at the highest levels, being held in the near future, to prepare a comprehensive plan for Arab action, which will distribute the burdens and responsibilities among all the Arab countries, and in the light of which the share of each will be

determined according to its resources. They expressed their conviction that such meetings can only increase the Arabs' ability to resist in the face of the aggression which is being directed against all of them, clear the atmosphere of Arab relations and establish a basis for cooperation and solidarity between them on the foundations of brotherhood and mutual respect in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Arab League Charter and the Arab Solidarity Pact. They affirmed their determination to continue to make every possible effort in the defence of Jerusalem, which embodies all that is most lofty and sacred in the cause of Palestine. They also agreed to make further efforts to arouse the conscience of the Islamic and Christian worlds to understanding of, and support for, this sacred cause.

They also reaffirmed their endorsement of the right of the Palestinian people to their homeland and their determination to support of their cause with all their power. They decided to establish permanent links with each other in order to achieve the lofty objectives of the Arabs.

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Speech by the Saudi Arabian King Faisal at the Annual Celebration of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.² (Excerpts)

Jedda, September 18, 1969

... And the biggest disaster which has befallen this area is Zionism, may God protect us and you from its evil aims. It made this region a target for its invasion, a target for its aggression against the people of the region, the land and holy places. Unfortunately, we find that in some parts of the world there are those who support this attitude and this aggression. In doing so they are assisting Zionism to achieve its object — which is to play fast and loose with the world, both East and West, in order to achieve its objectives of destroying, obliterating and controlling the world.

Zionism is not the friend of either East or West; in fact it is nobody's friend; there are even Jews

¹ *National News Agency Bulletin* (Beirut), 15/9/1969.

² *Al-Bilad* (Jedda), 19/9/1969.

who oppose and condemn the policy of Zionism and say that it is not in the interest of the Jews themselves, because there will come a day when the world will discover the real objectives and schemes of Zionism and will then destroy it; at that time the innocent may suffer for the crimes of the guilty and then remorse will be of no avail. But the world today must take note of, reflect on, and understand what Zionism wants. Zionist objectives know no bounds, but bounds must be set to them, or the problems in the world will not end; for a careful and expert examination of the problems of the whole world discloses that Zionism has had a hand, directly or indirectly, in creating them. We pray God that those who hold positions of responsibility in the world may become aware of this situation. They must strike hard at these criminals and tyrants and check their activities in the interests of the adherents of the Jewish religion who may otherwise be wiped out of existence if the world should turn on them.

As for us in the Arab countries, we have not committed aggression against anyone but have ourselves been the target of aggression — yet we are branded as aggressors. Never in history has there been a case like this where a people, a nation, or a state occupies a land by force, deports its people, takes possession of their land, homes and property and leaves them dispersed in all parts of the world. As if this were not enough, this aggression is constantly being renewed every day, every year, the last aggression being that which took place in June 1967 — the results of it are there for all to see, and yet to our sorrow there are some people today who attempt to justify this by claiming that the aggressor is only safeguarding his peace and security! Must the safeguarding of one's peace and security be ensured at the expense of others? What crime have the others committed, those whose security and peace have not been safeguarded, and whose property, land and life have not been protected, are they not human? Are the people of the country who have been dispersed, whose money, homes, lands and dignity have been taken away, outside the pale of humanity? I do not think so; we must not be deceived or cheated, we must understand that the honeyed words intended to please us are nothing but words. We see today what is being discussed and urged in international gatherings, but all of it is as far away from the heart of the matter and the seat

of the malady as it can possibly be. If the world wants to put an end to these problems, it must end them in a way which conforms with right and justice. Every man, every individual, in the world, has the right to live in his homeland and to defend his life, his livelihood and his existence. Why have the Arabs, out of the whole world, been excepted? No one cares about their rights, or about their attachment to their homeland, or about their peace or their right to self-determination — again I say, why have the Arabs been made the only exception to this in the whole world? Today I heard President Nixon declare to the United Nations that all America wants in Vietnam is to guarantee the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination. Are the people of Vietnam human and the Arab people not?

We do not demand anything, we have no desire to aggress against anyone or to hurt anyone; what we do want is to guarantee for this people their right to self-determination, their freedom to return to their homeland and their homes. If this is guaranteed, then we have no further demand. But to ask the Arabs and the Muslims to agree to the dispersal of their Palestinian brothers, both Muslim and Christian, to agree to their being evicted from their land, to their having their money and property taken away from them and having their dignity insulted and becoming the target of aggression, and then to be told that they must accept this situation simply because it has come about — this is wrong and completely unacceptable. For if any country, any people, any state, aggresses against someone and then confronts the world with a *fait accompli*, it means that the balance of the whole will be upset, and this is a dangerous precedent, not only for the Arabs, but for the whole world.

We have been arguing and appealing to the world for twenty years to judge our case rightly and justly; all we want is right and justice. But to our sorrow, there has been no answer to our appeals and no one seems to be aware of the danger. In fact the Arabs are described as aggressors and as crossing their frontiers and encroaching on others!

Some of our Palestinian brothers, who are fighting in an attempt to recover their land and country, are described in broadcasts from different parts of the world as gangsters. How can they

be called gangsters? It is a natural right for a man to defend his home, his honour and his dignity, and he cannot be labelled a terrorist gangster for doing this. Unfortunately no one seems to accept this. So, as the Governor has said, all we can do, as Arabs, as Muslims, all that our Christian friends who feel the same way can do, is to return to God, but we must turn to Him in humility and sincerity, not with mere words and empty shows or with acts of worship and other meaningless forms, which omniscient God will know are neither sincere nor truthful. We may lie to one another, but we cannot lie to our God who knows what we say and what we try to hide, and if we do not give Him truth, belief and sincerity, He will accept nothing we offer. The tragedies, disasters and misfortunes that have befallen us have been the result of our neglecting our duty to God, the result of our turning aside from the right road, the result of our abandoning our religion and belief and allowing ourselves to be ruled by passion and earthly systems. This is where we stand now, and we must return to the true path. Yet even so, I want to emphasise and repeat that we as Muslims do not want to aggress against or do harm to anyone; but at the same time, and I have said this many times before, we cannot allow aggression against us and we will not permit others to deny us our rights.

There is a wise saying to the effect that if disaster strikes you, you should offer your money but not yourself; if the disaster becomes bigger, then you should offer yourself but not your faith. This is what we must do now; for our lands are occupied, our dignity is trampled underfoot, and our shrines and sacred places are plundered. And yet we are asked to wait; wait till when? Till we are all wiped out? I think it is impossible to wait. I am sorry to dwell on this matter at such length, but I want everyone to know what we are up against. I want everyone to understand the problem which we in the Middle East, and particularly in the Arab countries, are facing, and which, we are sorry to say, has caused us to neglect the needs and requirements of our peoples and our countries. We have had to neglect the field of public services and waste the resources of our country instead of developing them to secure a better life and progress for our people.

Yesterday, while looking at the budget figures, I saw that the defence figure, the appropriation

for defence, is over 30 % of the total budget. Does this please us? No indeed! But this is forced on us by necessity; had it not been for these problems and disasters, we should have spent all this money in the service of our country and to secure progress for our peoples, because we have not yet reached a standard of living acceptable either to ourselves or to any fair judge of our peoples and our countries. We are still at the beginning of the road and we have not yet done anything. We have been forced to prepare and equip ourselves as far as possible to defend ourselves, our land, our dignity and our holy places. We ask Almighty God that He grant us, our brother Muslims, and all adherents of other religions who believe in Him, the power to continue in our belief in Him and in our faith, to cooperate with each other for the good of all, and to eliminate the aggression and injustice that have been committed against us. We ask Him for this, so that every individual, every community, may turn their attention to raising the standard of living, creating production and producing benefits for their countries, and so that the people may reap the fruit of their labour and efforts, God willing.

We hope that God will grant us this. But even though we in our country, thank God, enjoy peace and certain benefits, we must nevertheless think of the pitiful and regrettable condition of our brothers in other countries, whose misfortunes were caused by this disaster. This reminds me of what has been said of wine: it is said that a religious leader once described wine as the mother of evil; I say that Zionism is the mother of evil, because it is the cause of all the world's problems. Communism came from Zionism, moral disintegration came from Zionism, destructive principles came from Zionism, the abandonment of all traditional values, of all acknowledged standards, of all decency, and of all dignity and honour came from Zionism. It is therefore the mother of evil, the foundation and the origin of all evil. As I said before, they are trying to control the world by spreading these principles among the peoples until they reach such a degree of laxity and disintegration that they can no longer resist. It is then that the Zionists will be able to control the world and thus achieve their object. Now, we are sorry to say, there are both in the East and the West those who claim that the Zionists

are their friends, when in fact they are the friends only of the devil, and they wish no one well. But people are blindfolded and can neither see the truth nor understand it.

I ask Almighty God to deliver us from these trials and difficulties and grant us strength to eliminate all the consequences of the aggression against us and the problems we face, until there is stability and security. There will come a time when anyone who wishes to can serve his country, his people and his nation, and then he will be able to perform his duty.

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Memorandum Issued by the Popular Conference of the People of the Hebron District on Pressures being Exerted by the Occupation Authorities on the Districts of Bait Sahur and Hebron.¹

Amman, September 23, 1969

The Popular Conference of the People of the Hebron District, held in Amman, has reviewed the series of inhuman and barbaric crimes and atrocities that are being committed by the Israeli military administration throughout the occupied Arab territories by its harsh and malicious treatment of our unarmed people. The Conference has also reviewed the lengths to which the chauvinistic and Nazi Zionist regime has gone in its use of the techniques of terrorism, oppression, torture, pressure and coercion in Hebron. First the entire Bait Sahur District was cordoned off, and later the Hebron District, thus isolating both areas. By this action over a quarter of a million Arab inhabitants are today confined in an area which has become nothing more nor less than a prison. Even their supplies of foodstuffs are prevented from reaching them.

Those attending the Popular Conference have been deeply moved by these crimes which have given them once more positive proof of the brutality of the Zionists and their flagrant hostility to the spiritual values of civilisation and humanity.

The Conference has examined Zionist plans,

particularly the "Allon Plan" for the creation of a greater Hebron Municipality. This follows the lines of the Greater Nazareth Municipality. It would settle 2,500 Israeli families in the city in the first phase of the plan, set up four Israeli military settlements on the outskirts of the city and turn the Sanctuary of Abraham into a Jewish synagogue, to be called the Machpelah Synagogue.

In exposing the criminal Israeli conspiracy for what it is, the Conference calls the attention of the world to the methods of the Israeli military administration. Now that it has failed to implement its plan to Judaize the Arab city because of the courageous, intrepid and obdurate rejection of these conspiracies by the inhabitants of the District, it has resorted to blowing up dozens of houses, exiling scores of young men and prominent citizens of the District and imprisoning thousands of residents. Even before that it had some of the citizens killed in an attempt to sow discord among the citizens.

With the failure of its previous malicious and criminal methods, the military administration has resorted to the Nazi and Fascist technique of inflicting collective punishment on the population of the District; it has created economic hardships and material difficulties for them and subjected them to psychological pressure in an attempt to undermine their resistance. The aim of all this is to make it possible to implement the criminal Zionist plan to create an Israeli Greater Hebron Municipality.

We categorically reject the military administration's attempt to represent these actions as security measures against members of the resistance. Resistance in the Hebron District, as is the case throughout the occupied territories, is unanimous in the rejection of the Zionist presence in a single inch of our occupied land. Furthermore, the attempt on the part of the military occupation authorities to represent resistance in the Hebron or Bait Sahur District, or in any town or village in our occupied homeland, as individual action or as connected with the Palestinian resistance organisations only, is an old, hackneyed technique of Israeli rule, whose foundations have started to give way in the face of the endurance of our people and the resistance offered by the organisations that are the fighting arm of that people.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 24/9/1969. This memorandum was submitted to Mr. Ahmad Tuqan, Jordanian Acting Prime Minister.

Our heroic people, who are holding out in every inch of the occupied territories, now face a new, bitter attempt to undermine their courageous resistance. The only way to frustrate this criminal attempt is to indoctrinate and arm the Palestinian and Arab masses and to offer genuine and adequate support, financial and military, to the inhabitants of the occupied territories in their battle of endurance. Failure to contribute to this support is a dereliction of duty.

The Popular Conference of the People of the Hebron District, held in Amman, therefore believes that:

1. Cordoning off the Districts of Hebron and Bait Sahur is only one step in a Zionist plan to Judaize these areas and to eradicate their Arab character once and for all.

2. Arab governments and peoples must fulfil all their responsibilities to the Palestinian revolution. Under no circumstances must they neglect the material, military or mass potential which they can contribute to the battle. This is the way they can translate their support for commando action into practice.

3. Resistance organisations and resistance movements in the Arab world are called on to form a wide national front that will gather in its ranks all fighters and combatants, to foil the Zionist plots and to aid the Palestinian revolution in the struggle for liberation.

4. Arab countries in confrontation with the enemy should be asked to adopt a decisive attitude at official level to the enemy and his acts of terrorism and attacks on our brothers.

5. The Jordanian government should be asked to provide the material support that the Hebron District requires to enable it to hold out against the enemy and to provide aid to the citizens, particularly to workers and peasants.

6. The government should ensure that the people are militarily prepared and should supply everyone with arms for the expected battle of liberation.

7. Palestinian resistance organisations should be asked to step up the pressure of their attacks on the enemy to force him into relaxing his grip on all the areas that have been cordoned off.

In conclusion, the Popular Conference of the

People of the Hebron District is convinced that the Zionist enemy knows no pity. We therefore refuse to surrender and thereby leave it to him to decide on how and where we are to die. To carry arms is one of the most elementary rights of a citizen.

The Popular Conference salutes the steadfast masses in the occupied territory. It salutes their resistance and their courageous attitude. We assure them that the Arab nation is with them in their struggle which will never be forgotten, the struggle for liberation.

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Telegram from the Save Jerusalem Committee to Various International Bodies Protesting against the Measures Taken by the Occupation Authorities to Seal off the District.¹

Amman

Since September 19, the Israeli occupation authorities have thrown a tight cordon around the Hebron District (population 150,000), isolating it from the rest of the West Bank and the outside world and cutting off provisions. Furthermore, the occupation authorities are conducting wide-scale campaigns of Nazi terrorism, arresting hundreds of people and confiscating dozens of shops.

To keep silent in the face of these inhumane, barbaric acts would only encourage the terrorist Zionist occupation authorities to enforce still further measures of collective punishment against our defenceless people. We therefore call on you to make your voices heard in condemnation of this siege of the Hebron District and the terrorism being practised there, and to take serious steps to put an end to these violations.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 24/9/1969.

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Declaration Issued by the Islamic Summit Conference.¹ (Excerpt)**Rabat, September 25, 1969**

Following a discussion of the incident of arson in the holy Aqsa Mosque and after reviewing the Middle East situation, the heads of state and prime ministers of Islamic countries and their representatives issue the following declaration:

The tragic incident of 21 August, 1969, in which fire caused serious damage to the holy Aqsa Mosque, has deeply troubled more than six hundred million Muslims throughout the world.

Acts of this nature, the violation of the sanctity of one of the most holy religious places of mankind, the acts of vandalism in the holy places and the desecration of religious sites which have occurred during the Israeli military occupation of the holy City of Jerusalem, a city revered by all Muslims, Christians and Jews, have contributed to the rise of tension in the Middle East and merited the denunciation of all the peoples of the earth.

The heads of state, prime ministers and their representatives hereby declare that the current threat to Islamic religious sites in the city of Jerusalem is a result of the occupation of that city by the Israeli armed forces and that, in order to preserve the holy character of these places and to guarantee the freedom of access to and of movement in these places, the holy city of Jerusalem should revert to its status prior to the June aggression, which has the tradition of 1300 years behind it.

They consequently declare that their governments and peoples vehemently reject any solution to the Palestine problem that does not guarantee the return of Jerusalem to its status prior to the June, 1967 aggression.

They further call on all governments, particularly the governments of France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States of America to take into consideration the strong attachment of all Muslims to the city of Jerusalem and their governments' determination to work

for the liberation of that city.

Their governments and peoples are deeply distressed by the continued Israeli military occupation of Arab territories since June, 1967 and by the total Israeli disregard for United Nations Security Council and General Assembly appeals to cancel the measures relating to the annexation of the holy city of Jerusalem.

In view of this critical situation, the heads of state, prime ministers and their representatives issue an urgent appeal to all members of the international community, particularly the major powers, which bear special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace, to dedicate further effort, whether individually or combined, to ensure Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied since the June, 1967 war, in keeping with the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory through military invasion.

Moreover, in view of their deep distress over the Palestine tragedy, they offer their support to the people of Palestine in their fight to regain their usurped rights and in their struggle for national liberation, on condition that it be founded on honour and justice.

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Letter from the Inhabitants of Bait Sahur to Mr. Ruhi al-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem, on the Injustices they are Suffering at the Hands of the Israeli Authorities.²

We ask you to acquaint the world with the tragedy of the inhabitants of the sealed off districts in Beit Sahur. The area of these districts is 15 thousand dunums and they have a population of 1520. These have been under a state of siege for twenty six days on end, since August 29, 1969. There is a 22 hour daily curfew in force (not a 12 hour curfew as was reported by the daily *Al-Quds* of September 17, 1969). No one is allowed to open any door or window in his house, to go out into his garden or even to stand by a window inside his house.

The Israeli Defence Minister and the Military Governor of the District have put two alternatives

² *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 26/9/1969. The letter was submitted by Mr. Ruhi al-Khatib, to the Jordanian Acting Prime Minister, Mr. Ahmad Tuqan.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 26/9/1969.

before the population of the District: either to go on living like this or to be dispatched to the bridge. Red Cross representatives, the Papal Nuncio, members of the foreign and local press and doctors are not allowed to visit the sealed-off District. Schools have been closed down, water is getting scarce and poultry and most livestock have been consumed.

Terrorism is continuous, day and night. The enemy authorities detonate explosive charges near peoples' houses after dark to increase the pressure on the unfortunate people so as to make them leave the West Bank.

We ask you to convey this tragedy to the United Nations, the Security Council and the Committee on Human Rights, and to place it before the conscience of the world. Please ask to have these measures terminated and request that a committee of inquiry be sent.

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Letter from Jordanian Archbishops to Pope Paul VI and the Patriarch Athenagoras on Israeli Acts of Injustice in Arab Territories.¹

Amman, September 27, 1969

His Holiness Pope Paul VI - The Vatican.

His Holiness, the Œcumenical Patriarch Athenagoras I — The Phanar, Istanbul.

With the deepest respect and trust, we submit this letter to Your Holinesses, knowing full well how ceaseless are your endeavours for world peace and how you share in the sufferings and afflictions of your children everywhere, and particularly in these holy lands that are so dear to the paternal hearts of both of you.

For nearly a quarter of a century, our people, Christians and Muslims alike, have been suffering and dying in dispersal, refugees in camps, as a result of Zionist oppression. Since the 1967 war, they have been subjected to air attacks and napalm bombing by the Israeli air force which flies daily raids on towns and villages, showing no mercy for the innocent population, whether they be old people or children.

Yet another tragedy is taking place today in the dim recesses of prison cells in the occupied Arab territories, where the Israeli authorities do not hesitate to use Nazi methods. Many men, women and children are being subjected to cruel torture or inhuman exile.

In addition, the Israeli authorities have recently devised new methods of torture and examination. They impose curfews and seal off entire districts, such as Hebron, Nablus or Bait Sahur. They are blockading people in their homes. In areas where these measures are taken, no windows or doors may be opened, no one can go out, people are cut off from their means of livelihood and forced to live, or rather to die, as prisoners in their own homes.

Furthermore, the Israeli authorities continue to defy United Nations and Security Council resolutions; they ignore the resolutions on the annexation of Jerusalem and the alteration of its historic and religious features; they refuse to take back the refugees or to withdraw from the occupied territories. Israel publicly defies United Nations resolutions, attacks the Big Four meetings intended to find a just solution to the Palestinian tragedy and to the problems of the Middle East and announces that it will refuse to comply with their resolutions and decisions before they are even made.

For twenty seven months now, ever since the June war and the start of the occupation, the Israeli authorities have been proceeding with their acts of injustice and oppression in defiance of United Nations and Security Council resolutions. They have demolished houses in Jerusalem, and in other parts of the occupied territories; they have refused to take back refugees or displaced persons, they have dispersed the population and exiled them from their homes, they have made life so impossible for the people that many have emigrated. These are not allowed to return. The holy places have been turned into museums and lifeless monuments, empty of believers. These provocations culminated in the act of setting fire to the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque in open defiance of the religious sentiments of millions of Muslims throughout the world. We fear that what happened to Al-Aqsa Mosque today may happen to the Church of the Nativity, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and other holy places, tomorrow.

¹ *Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.*

With the burning of the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque, the tragedy of the June 1967 war entered on a new and most critical phase. Recently, an Islamic Summit Conference was convened in Rabat. This means that the sphere of conflict and challenge has expanded from an Arab to a world-wide Islamic one. It has assumed a grave and momentous religious character; the Rabat Conference was the first and only one of its kind to be held in the history of the Arabs and of Islam. God knows how it will affect the present situation or what long-range repercussions this new phase in the Israeli Arab-Islamic conflict will have.

It grieves us, as it grieves our people, whether Christian or Muslim, that the Christian countries of Europe and the Americas should be so affected by the influence and the deception of the Zionist movement and its supporters. Today, the Arab and Islamic worlds have become convinced that the Christian countries and their peoples in the West are content to remain silent at the acts of injustice committed by the Zionists against Christian and Muslim Arab citizens and against the holy places. They observe that these countries and their peoples have never once raised their voices in defence of Jerusalem or the holy sanctuaries and believe them to be indifferent to the implementation of United Nations and Security Council resolutions for a settlement of the Middle East problem and the establishment of peace in the area, which will bring relief from injustice to a people who have lived in refugee camps for almost a quarter of a century and who have drained the bitter cup of torture, displacement, exile and poverty under the yoke of occupation since the June War.

As an example of the desecration of Christian sanctuaries, the crown of the statue of the Virgin was stolen from Mount Calvary in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the picture of the Madonna and Child was replaced by a contemptible and shameless representation of a female dancer, which was hung under the original Latin inscription "Peace be unto thee, Mother of Christ". The Orthodox Church of Mar Elias on the Jerusalem-Bethlehem road has been desecrated, its icons stolen by the Israelis and the sacred vessels of the church horribly defiled. Also they have recently turned the Greek Orthodox church in Ain Karem into a public convenience for the second time, after the Patriarch had restored it following the

first incident. All these things are taking place in the holy places and the world remains silent and complacent.

We consider it our duty to submit this letter to Your Holinesses as we know that you are the apostles of peace and that you feel with humanity in your paternal hearts and that you suffer whenever human beings suffer anywhere in the world. We beseech you to use your effective and exalted influence in religious, popular, or governmental circles to put an end to the tragedy that is being enacted in the Holy Land and in the Middle East, and to rescue Jerusalem and the holy sanctuaries, arrange for the return of the refugees and displaced persons to their homes and establish peace in the land of peace.

In conclusion, we ask His Holiness the Pope and His Holiness the Œcumenical Patriarch to bless us and to bless all the people of our land. We pray that the Almighty may grant you both long life and guide you in establishing peace throughout the whole world for the sake of mankind.

Archbishop Ni'ma al-Sam'an

Archbishop Mikhail Assaf

Archbishop Theodoros

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Press Conference Statements by the Moroccan King Hasan II on the Islamic Summit Conference and the Palestine Problem.¹

Rabat, September 26, 1969

So that I may be absolutely clear in my own thoughts, and for your enlightenment, I think I had better say a few brief words about this Conference.

His Majesty King Faisal and myself, on different occasions, both advocated the idea of holding an Islamic Summit Conference which would be attended not by Islamic jurists and scholars but by political leaders who could enter into commitments on behalf of their countries at both national and international levels.

¹ *Al-Anba'* (Rabat), September 27-28, 1969. This press conference was attended by Moroccan officials and Arab and foreign press correspondents.

Recent events in the Middle East, in particular the burning of Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem have, as you know, provoked a wave of anger throughout the Islamic world, both in Asia and Africa.

Confronted with an incident of such gravity, the Arab League met, and the United Arab Republic proposed that Saudi Arabia should be asked to call for an Islamic Summit Conference. While acceding to this request, His Majesty King Faisal also indicated that, as he was not the sole originator of the idea, Morocco should not only be consulted but also invited to organise the conference. We returned to the Arab League which requested the two capitals, Riyadh and Rabat, to issue invitations to attend an Islamic Summit Conference without specifying a time, a place or what steps should be taken to prepare for this conference.

After numerous consultations, the preparatory committee met in Rabat, and decided to issue immediately invitations to a Summit Conference to be held in Rabat, without any preliminary preparation by the foreign ministers of the Islamic countries.

It may be asked: why this hurry, why this haste? Why did we not wait until the beginning or the end of October? But Morocco and the countries to whom the invitations were sent insisted that this Conference should be held as soon as possible. There were two reasons for this:

Firstly: It was desirable that our Foreign Ministers should not go to the United Nations before a common attitude for all the Muslim countries was adopted.

Secondly: World events follow each other in such rapid sequence, that we feared that something might happen in our much disturbed world which would detract from the peculiar importance of the burning of Al-Aqsa mosque.

All the member states having accepted these arguments, the Conference met in Rabat on September 22. It was stated in the invitations we sent out that the Conference would meet from September 22 to 24, but in fact it did not conclude its business until September 25.

The India-Pakistan incident is no secret to anyone, but we were able, with God's help, to solve it in a peaceful manner without excluding

India, which could have resulted in the failure of the Conference. It was this incident that prolonged our work by half a day, so that we did not end until 25 instead of 24 September. I want to emphasise to you that all other explanations of this delay are pure fantasy and fabrication.

You know the results of the Conference from the recommendations that were made and from the final joint communiqué. What emerged from this conference was the will of the Islamic peoples to make themselves responsible for the problems of the Middle East. I do not say the demands, I say the problems and concerns of the Middle East. This will lead to these peoples wishing to help the Arab countries in their problems and concerns by all possible means, insofar as these are compatible with the policy of each member state attending the Conference. This, in my opinion, is an extremely important point, particularly when we remember how many differences have beset both the Islamic world and the Arab world until recently.

There is also another result which is equally, if not more important. I mean that this Conference may be said to have been like a ball which hits a wall and then bounces back — it was not just a question of the sound made by its impact dying away in the empty air. Though it was the first, this Conference will not be the last of its kind. We therefore decided that our Foreign Ministers should meet in Jedda in March to consider the establishment of a permanent secretariat. This will make the conference a permanent organisation. The secretariat will also be a connecting link, or rather factor which, should serious incidents occur, will make it easier to arrange either a meeting at summit level or coordination between the ministers of our governments, in political, religious, cultural or economic fields. This, ladies and gentlemen, is a general overall summary, since it is impossible to go into details. Of course, every recommendation and every paragraph, and every section of every recommendation, requires much more lengthy comment than this, but as I say, this is a general outline of the Conference.

Q. *Your Majesty, some observers consider that the final resolutions of the Conference bear the stamp of*

compromise and that they will do nothing to prevent Israel from committing further barbaric acts against the holy places. Did the Conference perhaps adopt secret resolutions which were not announced in the final communiqué?

A. We have long since passed the stage of secret diplomacy, and there were no secret resolutions. In the event of the Israeli authorities allowing themselves to commit a further aggressive act against Al-Aqsa mosque, I believe that the countries which attended the Conference will regard it as an unacceptable and impermissible act of provocation. In such an event every one of us would have to face, individually and collectively, his responsibilities to history and to the six hundred million Muslims in the world.

Q. A number of the states which have diplomatic relations with Israel have recognised the legitimacy of the Palestinian people's struggle for national liberation. Does this amount to withdrawal of their recognition of Israel?

A. The countries which recognise that Palestine and the Palestinian people have a legitimate right to demand the restoration of their usurped territories are those that voted for the United Nations resolutions which stipulated recognition of Palestinian rights. As you know the problem of the Palestinians was submitted to the United Nations long ago, and the United Nations itself has recognised the right of the Palestinians to recover their usurped territories. On this basis, I do not believe that the fact that these states gave their approval to these United Nations resolutions long ago means that they have reconsidered their relations with Israel.

Q. I have read in news reports from Cairo that Mr. Anwar al-Sadat, who headed the United Arab Republic delegation to the Summit Conference, has declared that the results of this Conference showed a deplorable lack of faith. He said that the Conference's communiqué did not refer to support for the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and did not venture to demand Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. He said this after his return from the Conference. What are your comments?

A. At first sight it seems to me unreasonable that the head of the United Arab Republic delegation should have made such statements. However, if he really did make them, they are obviously inconsistent, for a number of reasons.

Firstly, faith is a relative issue, and in this case the head of the United Arab Republic delegation can only talk about his own faith. The second reason is that the Conference's resolutions do call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories occupied by force. I therefore find these statements very surprising indeed, and what is more surprising is that they should be attributed to such a responsible person as Anwar al-Sadat. Personally, I can only hope that these are rumours put out by a news agency; I find it difficult to believe that these statements are authentic.

(Here the director of the daily *Al-Anba'* asked a further question on the point raised in the previous one, mentioning that, the day before, Cairo radio had tried to belittle the significance of this historic conference. His Majesty the King answered:)

A. In view of the many and varied interests involved, such a Conference was bound to be attacked from various quarters; it was only to be expected that, not only when the idea of it was first mooted, but while it was actually meeting and later, there would be false interpretations, a war of nerves and futile speculation. I believe that such of the states attending the Conference as made a serious and practical evaluation of what was in the interests of the Conference and what was not, acted on the principle of the Arab proverb: "The caravan passes; the dogs bark".

Q. The statement on support for the Palestinian people in their struggle for national liberation, which was unanimously approved by the states which attended the Rabat Conference, calls on all of them to recognise commando activity. Will this support continue to be moral and thus political, or will it be material and financial?

A. The Islamic peoples have a faith and traditions that are known to the whole world. The reason why the heads of these peoples met was to strengthen the links which unite them. In particular, the Conference was held to give a new and correct interpretation of these traditions. It has never been the custom of the Arabs and the Muslims to support people who change the course of aircraft, plant explosives in embassies, or declare at the United Nations or elsewhere that they intend to slaughter the last Jew in Palestine and the last pregnant woman and kill her unborn child. These methods have been

doing the Arab and Islamic cause the greatest possible harm. As a result of this, even the most anti-Jewish people, the majority of them in the United States, have been weeping for the unborn child and its pregnant mother and doing all they could to save her.

Furthermore, we cannot agree with those who injure their country's cause. The blowing up of the pipe-lines caused Saudi Arabia a daily loss of 500 million riyals which we could have spent on other things. These actions belong to the realm of fantasy and self-willed enthusiasm, and they do not serve to convince the United Nations or the countries of the world of the justice of the cause of those that perpetrate them. To those who confuse the widow and the orphan with those who have usurped their territory, and to those who turn the Greeks against us by hijacking one of their planes, and the Swiss by hijacking one of theirs, and the Americans by hijacking one of theirs, to those I say: "God, protect me from my friends, I can take care of my enemies". As for the second question, I said yesterday in my speech that the delegates to the Conference came from a variety of different backgrounds; they all had different obligations at geographical, economic, strategic commercial and cultural levels. Since the Palestine problem first emerged twenty-three years ago, they have had their traditional attitudes and policies. They could not possibly be expected to change not only their attitudes but also the whole of their foreign policy in four days from September 22 to 25.

But they have been convinced that they must change this policy. The Conference has confidence in all of them and firmly believes that all of them will help according to their ability and according to their means, in a manner that is compatible both with their policy and with the Palestine issue. It may well be that this assistance will vary from an open letter, or moral support, to the supplying of arms and material support.

Q. Has it been decided to send delegations to the Great Powers which you requested to work for a solution of the Middle East problem? And what are Your Majesty's views on cooperation between the Islamic countries at the United Nations?

A. It was decided not to send delegations to

the Great Powers to inform them of our views. This was firstly because, although discussions were behind closed doors, they were not secret, and certain radio stations and newspapers in the Middle East have published what went on. Secondly we believe that to send delegations to the Great Powers would be rather theatrical, because these states know better than we do what they have to do, and they also know that our resolutions have asked them to devote themselves to this problem with all care, sympathy and earnestness.

So much for the first question. As for the second, I have already said why we held the Conference on September 22: We wanted our Foreign Ministers to have a well-defined framework for their activities before they went to the United Nations, so that they could all work together.

Q. The Vatican has published extracts from His Holiness the Pope's personal letter to Your Majesty. From these published extracts it is to be concluded that His Holiness the Pope proposes that the three religions should watch over the holy places. Can Your Majesty tell us anything about this?

A. I have in fact received a letter from His Holiness the Pope which touched me very deeply; however, it was not directed to me personally, but to me as the head of the country in which the Conference of Islamic States was being held. And as you know, although there are no official diplomatic relations between Morocco and the Vatican, there have been contacts and consultations between us, particularly in 1967, when I sent an envoy with a letter to His Holiness the Pope after the 1967 aggression. In view both of the importance of the authority from which it derives and of the many ideas it contains, His Holiness the Pope's proposal deserves to be studied with all care and attention. However, I cannot see how the three religions can be responsible for the status of Jerusalem, when they are less well armed than the United Nations itself; they can provide neither police nor an army. Furthermore, their decisions will not have any executive effect and will thus be no more than pious hopes.

As far as the Arabs and Muslims are concerned, there is no problem; they have affirmed that it is

essential that the pre-1967 status of Jerusalem should be restored. However, I believe that contacts between the Islamic world and the other two religions are desirable, because it is the duty of the Muslims to respect the People of the Book — the Christians and Jews. It is our duty to respect and to protect them in our lands and within the framework of our laws; we must respect them, and guarantee them freedom of worship, property and person. This is one of the most important reasons why Muslims should not reject a dialogue.

But I believe that in this field consultations will be very limited, because we Muslims support the restoration of the pre-1967 status of Jerusalem. In any case, dialogue between the three religions is desirable.

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Memorandum Submitted by the Islamic Committee to the Israeli Prime Minister Meir Protesting against Excavations in the Aqsa Mosque and the Sanctuary of Abraham.¹

Jerusalem

... The Islamic Committee feels itself in duty bound to declare to the responsible Israeli authorities and to announce to Arab, and Muslim public opinion, and indeed to the whole world, that it is intended — and this intention can no longer be concealed — to desecrate the Aqsa Mosque, to wrest it away from its Muslim custodians and owners and to change its character.

Deeply conscious as it is of its duties and responsibilities in these critical times, the Islamic Committee wishes to affirm categorically that Al-Aqsa Mosque includes all the land surrounded by the wall, together with everything on and under this land. It wishes to make clear that Friday prayers often used to be held in the undercroft of Mosque during the months of Ramadan when its courtyards were not large enough to hold those who came to pray. It wishes to register its utter condemnation of and opposition to the building of a synagogue under the old Shari'a Law Court building, which is Muslim Waqf property.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 16/10/1969.

In making its opposition public, the Islamic Committee wishes to draw the attention of the authorities to the necessity of stopping the excavations, which have begun to threaten the foundations and structure of the Mosque; acts of such a serious nature must be stopped.

It believes that it has the right to call upon the responsible authorities to issue a statement declaring their official attitude to these matters and their implications, and to these intentions and plans. Otherwise, the Islamic Committee will have no choice but to regard this extreme position as the official position of the authorities.

It also would like to draw attention to the serious nature of what is happening in Sanctuary of Abraham in Hebron, including the opening of a new door leading to the tombs of the prophets and the holding of prayers by Jewish colonists in the Haram of the Mosque at the Hebrew New Year and on other occasions, by force of arms.

In insisting that all such activities and acts of sacrilege should cease immediately, the Islamic Committee declares that it will continue to make known all that is taking place if such activities do not cease, and it holds the authorities responsible for the consequences of these activities.

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Letter from Mr. Muhammad Hasan al-Zayyat, Head of the United Arab Republic Delegation to the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant on the Permission Given to United States Citizens to Join the Israeli Armed Forces.²

New York, October 17, 1969

Mr. Secretary-General,

I was extremely disturbed and surprised by the official statements issued by the American embassy in Tel Aviv, which make it clear that American citizens can retain their American citizenship even if they become Israeli citizens and are recruited into the Israeli Army. This means that American citizens can have a double

² *Al-Muharrir* (Beirut), 18/10/1969. A copy of this letter was given to Lord Caradon, President of the Security Council for the month of October 1969.

loyalty to both Israel and the United States, and can participate in the military acts of aggression which Israel is committing against the Arab countries.

The United States, which continued its political, economic and military assistance to Israel, after the latter's aggression against the Arab countries on June 5, 1967, is now embarking on a new stage in its help for Israel by allowing American citizens to join the Israeli armed forces. By this the United States is taking part in the war of aggression which Israel is waging against the Arab countries. This method does not differ greatly from that employed by the United States at the beginning of its war in Vietnam. This new development constitutes a very dangerous stage and frustrates attempts to reach a peaceful settlement within the United Nations.

The United States, which undertook to support the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, is now undermining that resolution and endangering peace by fighting under the banner of Israel against the Arab nation.

When Israel declares its defiance of the Security Council resolution, by refusing to withdraw from the territories of the Arab countries and insists on its expansionist plans and the annexation of these countries' territories, it only does so because of the material and moral support which it receives from the United States of America.

What makes America's policy and its continued support for Israeli aggression even more serious is the fact that the United States is a permanent member of the Security Council, and has a particular responsibility for the safeguarding of international peace and security. By pursuing this policy, the United States is contravening the Charter of the United Nations and thereby undermining the international organisation.

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Memorandum Submitted by the Committee of Expelled Palestinians in Jordan to the Jordanian Prime Minister Talhuni on the Israeli Authorities' Eviction of Arab Citizens to the East Bank.¹

Amman, October 18, 1969

H.E. The Prime Minister,
Amman.

1. The Israeli occupation authorities are continuing to drive Arab citizens from the West to the East Bank. As legal basis for this action the occupation authorities appeal to the 1945 Emergency Regulations which were enacted by the British Mandatory Government in Palestine and have been enforced by the Israeli authorities in the Arab territories occupied in the June 5, 1967 war. In the case of the eviction orders issued by the Minister of Defence or the Military Governor of the West Bank, the Israelis allege that the individuals expelled are a threat to public safety and a danger to Israel's security. But no specific charge is made, there is no trial^a and the man charged is given no chance to defend himself. The military security forces convey him by force to the cease fire-lines and expel him to the East Bank.

2. So far the number of people expelled totals sixty-eight, men and women of prominence and influence in most of the sectors of West Bank society: Muslim and Christian religious leaders, doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, engineers, teachers, students, union workers, farmers, heads of municipalities, and others from different walks of life.

3. It is clear that the object of the Israeli authorities is to drive out and expel all elements of leadership and influence who reject the occupation and its projects as harmful to the people and their homeland. Among these Zionist schemes are the creation of a puppet regime in the West Bank, a token local administration or an economic union with Israel and other similar projects. The expulsion of people of influence or leadership is intended to fragment the people's unity, lower their morale and undermine their resistance to

¹ *Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.*

the occupation. It is to be observed that the occupation authorities have recently begun to step up their programme of expulsion from the West Bank, following a course of evicting all the elements of influence and leadership. The situation demands that your government should take rapid action to frustrate this Zionist scheme. Failing this, the occupation authorities will continue to increase the number of citizens expelled.

It is surprising that the occupation authorities expel citizens to the East Bank as if the East Bank were also under occupation, or within its sphere of influence, or actually belonged to it, just as the British Mandate used to send citizens of Palestine into exile in one of its colonies, to the Seychelles for example.

4. It is an irony of fate and history that the rulers of Israel, themselves signatories of the Geneva Convention, now totally ignore the provisions of Article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949, which was drafted chiefly because of the way the Nazi authorities expelled Jews and others and forcibly transported them from one place to another in Europe. Now the Zionist occupation forces, following the example of their Nazi mentors, are carrying out the same measures against the Arabs as the Nazis carried out against them and others.

a) Article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949 absolutely forbids the occupying authorities, for whatever reason, to expel citizens of occupied territories to any other country, including the home country of the occupiers.

b) The Security Council resolution of June 14, 1967, known as the "Humanitarian Resolution", enjoins upon Israel the duty of upholding the security, rights and interests of civilian population in Arab territories occupied in the June war, throughout the period of occupation. It further stipulates that they must not be expelled and that refugees must be allowed to return.

c) Irrespective of all this, Israel cannot compel Jordan to accept expelled civilians and the Jordanian authorities have the right to refuse to accept them and to return them back. The Jordanian authorities can ask for representatives of the International Red Cross, the Truce Supervision Organisation and the United Nations, from their mission in Amman, to be present to protect

civilians, who have decided to return, from being fired upon by the Israeli army.

d) The Jordan Government was in the past able to frustrate Israeli plans to evacuate Arabs from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank when these plans were disclosed. It refused to admit the large numbers of citizens from the Gaza Strip whom the Zionists had herded to the cease-fire lines and were about to expel across the river, when it closed the bridge at the crossing point. All previous governments in Jordan have prevented the Israelis from expelling Arab citizens from territories that have come to be called Israel since 1948. Governments used to return anyone who crossed the cease-fire lines and refuse him a residence permit or Jordanian nationality.

Hence, the Committee of Expelled Palestinians, in implementation of the resolutions adopted at a meeting of all those expelled, held on October 12, 1969 requests the following:

1. That a complaint be lodged with the Security Council against Israeli violation of the provisions of the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949 and especially of Article 49, which forbids expulsion, and against Israel's violation of the Security Council's "Humanitarian Resolution" of June, 1967, and that the Council should adopt another resolution forbidding expulsion and calling for the return of all civilians expelled;

2. That immediate steps be taken to prevent Israel from expelling more citizens, by issuing orders to all security posts at crossing points to refuse to admit any person expelled, and to call representatives of the International Red Cross, the Truce Supervision Organisation and the United Nations to be present when the person expelled is returned;

3. That a vigorous information campaign to rally world public opinion against expulsion be planned and executed to expose all forms of injustice and persecution practised by the forces of occupation against civilians in the occupied homeland.

Respectfully
(Signatures)

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Text of the Second Letter Sent by Mr. Muhammad Hasan al-Zayyat, Head of the United Arab Republic Delegation to the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant on the Permission Granted to the United States Citizens to Join the Israeli Armed Forces.¹

New York, October 19, 1969

In accordance with instructions received from my government, I addressed a letter to you on October 17, 1969 to acquaint you and members of the United Nations with a dangerous new development in the Middle East which has arisen as a result of the permission which the United States Government has granted its citizens to join the Israeli armed forces and to fight under the Israeli flag against the Arab countries, while still retaining United States citizenship. This, at a time when Israel is occupying Arab territory and declaring its intention of absorbing it, and continuing its daily attacks against Arab towns and villages in violation of the United Nations Charter and United Nations resolutions.

We would have welcomed an assurance from the United States government that this dangerous development, which increases tension in the region and endangers world peace, was in fact not true. Unfortunately the letter addressed to you on October 17, 1969, by the permanent United States delegate to the United Nations contained an official acknowledgment of this new development, which can serve only to escalate the tension in the Middle East. The letter of the United States delegation clearly indicates that the United States government has taken a legal position which permits any United States citizen to join the Israeli army and fight under the Israeli flag against countries which are not in a state of war with the United States of America.

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Speech by the Algerian President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister Boumedienne on the Principles of Algerian Foreign Policy.² (Excerpt)

Algiers, October 20, 1969

What concerns us about the eastern wing of the Arab homeland is the dangerous problems which beset the whole Arab nation. This, as you know, is the painful problem, the problem of the Palestinian people, the problem of aggression and the occupation of Arab lands by the Zionists. Our policy in this field, as regards this serious subject, is a clear policy, based on objective analysis of all elements of the problem which have led to the continued occupation of Palestine or to the occupation of new Arab territories. It is a policy derived from the philosophy of a country which has a history we can never forget and will never neglect. As you know, brothers, every country, when thinking of ways and means of action, takes into consideration special interests, general interests and the international situation, and considers its own special view.

In most cases, in arriving at solutions this country draws on its own experience. Its own experience has established, as has that of many countries in the world, whether in Africa or Asia or Latin America, that issues like these cannot be solved by ordinary methods because they are not ordinary cases.

An attempt to tackle these problems by ordinary methods is, in our opinion, a mistake, an unwise and wrong choice. Grave and extraordinary problems require solutions commensurate with their gravity. By this I mean that the problems of occupation must be solved on the basis of struggle, even though it may be a violent and armed struggle. Immediately after the occupation, we tried in our country to use armed struggle, but the international situation at that time was more favourable to colonialism than to liberation movements. After that we tried to use peaceful methods, and pleaded with the colonialists on

² *Al-Sha'b* (Algiers), 21/10/1969. Premier Hawari Boumedienne made this speech at the opening of a club for Algerian heads of diplomatic missions, ambassadors and chargés d'affaires.

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 20/10/1969.

many occasions. But our pleading and their evasions led to no result, and we were forced to follow the right and proper course of armed struggle.

We said this before June 5—we said it on June 4—and we reaffirmed it on June 9, 1967, a few days after the terrible setback and defeat which we had never expected or imagined. We affirmed this at the Security Council and in the United Nations, and our people affirmed it on many historical occasions. The struggle is inevitable. The battle must be entered. There are those who say we must put out the fire of the battle. I say that we must feed this fire, because without escalating the battle there will be no honourable solutions acceptable to the Palestinians or the countries whose lands are occupied.

Let it be perfectly clear that this is not some kind of political overbidding, because we have no need for political overbidding in such serious issues as ours. Nor is this political extremism on our part, because time has proved that all other methods are unavailing. For more than two years passed since the setback and the enemy is still occupying our territory and violating what is sacred to us, while we have not reached any solution or conclusion.

This attitude then is not political extremism on the part of Algeria, because we have no need for such extremism. We were accused in the past, when we were under arms, of being extremists in our policy, and not wanting negotiations, because we would not agree to the political principle of accepting a kind of counterfeit independence. But history proved that the issue could only be decided by sacrifice.

We are not asking our brothers to do something we have not done. Let me be frank with you, because Algerian policy has been commented on and misinterpreted by interested intriguers who are not and will never be well-wishers of the Arab homeland and the Arab nation.

Our policy is not extremist, as we can demonstrate. I should like to support what I say with the example of the bravest people in the world, the people of Vietnam. They have been attacked, their territories have been occupied, and today they are losing hundreds of thousands of their sons, but they have not bowed their heads nor will they ever do so.

We have contacted representatives of that people both in the North and in the South, and they have assured us that they will never surrender, because the issue has become a matter of life or death involving their honour and their very existence.

Brothers, the fact that we proclaimed these principles before the setback, and reaffirmed them afterwards, does not mean that we resort to political overbidding or to extremism and fanaticism; what it means is that so far the only solution we have found is struggle. I am saying this, as I have already indicated, so that there can be no room for any doubt or ambiguity concerning our policy. All we want — and you will agree with me — is to reach an honourable solution which will restore to the Arabs their dignity, and to the Palestinians their legitimate rights, without shedding a single drop of blood. But is such a solution possible? We are a realistic people, and we are ready to make peace, but we shall never relinquish the basic rights of our country. As our Arab brothers put it, we are jealous for the safety of every inch of Arab land.

We say to our brothers that, just as they stood by our side, it is now our duty to adopt a plain, clear and courageous attitude on these issues, even though we are 4,000 kilometres away. I believe that if we had been on the frontier we should not have hesitated to enter the battle, and we should have had other duties as well. In our battle we asked for nothing more than material support, but as far as men were concerned, we said that Algerians must die first. These are historical circumstances on which we can allow no dispute. But I say this so that all may hear and be convinced, because there have been murmurings in some Arab circles recently. I must not go into the details of this because the Palestinian cause is a sacred cause to us and it is imperative that it should enjoy our moral, political and material support. We have said, even if this statement hurts some of us, that we are against whoever works to separate or disperse the Palestinians.

In fact, for as long as we are one nation and one family, we must strive to fight the danger which threatens us. Brothers, there is a movement, a force which has been working in the shadows since the commandos began their movement,

working not to unify the Palestinians, but to create new movements. Every week we hear of a new movement joining the armed struggle. During our struggle we did not allow any other movement to exist; we felt that the existence of another movement would be treason. So it is with the Palestinians. We have told the Palestinians that the existence of many movements working separately is a betrayal of the Palestinian cause.

How long then will the Palestinians continue to be the victims of exploitation and political manipulation and fragmentation? There are forces with other preoccupations which are working to create political movements capable of being used in political manoeuvring.

We have affirmed this principle in connection with our Arab policy, and we must reaffirm it here and now. We do so not in the interests of Algeria, but for the benefit of the Palestinian and Arab cause.

We say that the battle is one battle, that the issue is one issue, and that if we suffer all must suffer. If a people like the Palestinian people are consumed by fire, it is impossible that any people or government should be willing to remain at peace far from the fire of the battle and its consequences.

Clashes between the commandos and Arab forces are a grave matter which we can never accept. What weapons there are should be directed towards the real battlefield. We have no right to attack and disperse the commandos — the Zionists have done enough of that.

This is one of the principles and general lines of our Arab policy. In brief, our opinion is that commando action must be supported and the commandos must be helped to unite. We must give the commandos a point of departure; this point of departure lies in the neighbouring Arab countries.

In the past we used Tunisia, Morocco, Mali, Libya and all the neighbouring countries as a point of departure for our battle. Our use of the neighbouring countries as a rear base rested on the assumption that the enemy was one only.

As for the occupied territories, here too, Algeria's opinion is clear, and I do not need to say that the escalation of the battle will lead to the real solution. For having lost our self-respect, which is above all price, we have nothing to lose. We must therefore recover it.

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Message from the United Arab Republic President Nasser to the Lebanese President Helou on the Armed Clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian Resistance Forces.¹

Cairo, October 22, 1969

Dear Brother, President Charles Helou,

The reports from Lebanon of armed clashes between the Lebanese Army and Palestinian resistance forces arouse our profoundest concern. In these critical hours of the struggle of our nation it grieves us that Arab bullets should be aimed anywhere but at their proper targets, whatever the reasons or justifications.

We have always considered that the attitude of any Arab country, in the present struggle of destiny in which our nation is engaged, depends entirely on its attitude to Palestinian resistance. Fully appreciating as we do Lebanon's position and situation, we cannot conceive that the Palestinian resistance should be called on to cope with what is now happening in Lebanon at a time when it is being confronted with the fire and terrorism of the enemy.

I personally appeal to you to intervene to stop what is now taking place before the situation becomes more dangerous; I am confident that your word will be sufficient to prevent the occurrence of complications which could prove most unfortunate for all of us, including the great Lebanese people.

Furthermore my hope is unshaken that the Lebanese Arab Army will continue to be a reserve for the critical moments of the battle, because it is aware that danger is not far from Lebanon and that nothing but the Arab nation and its resources can ensure the protection of its territory.

With my sincerest wishes for your success.

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 23/10/1969.

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Message from the Lebanese President Helou in Reply to the United Arab Republic President Nasser's Message to the Former.¹
Beirut, October 22, 1969

Dear Brother, President Abdel Nasser,

Your Ambassador, Mr. Ibrahim Sabri, has conveyed your message of 22/10/69, on the armed clashes which took place between the Lebanese Army and our brethren of the Palestinian resistance forces, which have profoundly grieved us all.

In thanking you for your continued concern for the issues of Arab destiny and for bearing such heavy responsibilities whenever joint Arab interests so demand, I cannot but express my regret over the fact that the truth has not been presented clearly enough to the Arab public.

Fully confident as it is of the soundness of its intentions and actions, Lebanon sincerely desires to present the realities of the case, with the object of arriving, through sincere brotherly cooperation with its Arab brothers, at solutions which will ensure the interests of all Arabs and lead to clear victory and the establishment of right.

For this reason, we have instructed our ambassador to you to acquaint Your Excellency both with the details of the situation and with the over-all atmosphere which surrounds it. We have also provided your ambassador in Lebanon with detailed information to be conveyed to you. We are prepared to exert every possible effort to acquaint all the Arab countries, collectively and individually, with the facts of the case.

While continuing the dialogue with the Palestinian resistance organisations, and taking all measures to relax the tension of the crisis, we declare that Lebanon, as it has always done, continues to regard the Palestine problem as the first and foremost object of its concern. Lebanon also believes that the struggle of destiny in which the Arabs are engaged requires of every Arab country that it should assist in the achievement of unanimity and contribute to every joint line of action aimed at winning the battle. It also fully believes in the need for sincere brotherly coopera-

tion, to ensure that every problem may provide an opportunity to demonstrate sincere brotherhood and strengthen mutual ties. This positive cooperation is the best safeguard for every Arab country and the best framework within which to ensure the highest possible level of effectiveness for the great struggle in which we are all engaged, along with the Palestinian people.

With my sincerest wishes for your prosperity and success.

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Speech by Shaikh Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah, Ruler of Kuwait, at the Opening of the Fourth Ordinary Meeting of the Second Legislative Session of the National Assembly.² (Excerpt)

Kuwait, October 28, 1969

In the Name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate,
 Honourable Members,

The problem of Palestine and of Zionist expansion in the Middle East is still the major concern of all Arab states and of a great part of world public opinion. This latter no longer views the problem of Palestine as a problem of refugees appealing in vain to the conscience of the world. It sees it, rather, as the problem of struggling people determined to liberate their homeland from those who have usurped it after twenty years of agony and displacement, a people whose resolve was not shaken by the events of June 1967 but made stronger and more intrepid. Today, this people do not stand alone in the field of struggle. They are fighting alongside other Arab countries which are also determined, after the shock of defeat, to drive the enemy from their lands and to recover Arab rights in Palestine, whatever the cost or sacrifice. Similarly, the responsibility for checking Zionist expansion into the Arab countries and liberating the occupied territories rests not only with the Arab states that are in confrontation with the enemy; it is the responsibility and the duty of all the Arab countries.

¹ *National News Agency Bulletin* (Beirut), 23/10/1969.

² *Al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), 29/10/1969.

Efforts at the United Nations and elsewhere over the past two years to reach a solution of this problem based on the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 on the so-called "Middle East problem", have not achieved any positive result. It has been our belief from the start that such efforts would be in vain and that only force could settle the issue. The government and people of Kuwait continue to support the Arab forces and the struggle of the people of Palestine to exercise their legitimate right of self-defence and to resist Zionist occupation by all means at their disposal. We have followed with the deepest regret and distress recent events in Lebanon where many valuable lives have been lost, lives which should have been saved for the battle of destiny. Kuwait lost no time in offering to mediate between the two sides with a view to compounding the discord and stopping the civil strife before it goes any further. Efforts are now being made, both by Kuwait and by other Arab countries, to arrive at a solution which will maintain the unity of the Arab nation and ensure freedom of movement and efficacy of commando activity.

France gave proof of its good faith at the time of the 1967 aggression when it adopted a just and equitable attitude under the regime of former President Charles de Gaulle. The new French administration has continued this wise policy. On the other hand, United States policy as recent events have shown, has disappointed the hopes which the Arabs had entertained that the new American administration would adopt a less biased and more equitable policy than its predecessor. In a speech made by its Foreign Minister to the United Nations General Assembly, Kuwait has condemned these regrettable trends in the new American policy.

But for the aid and support which Israel receives from certain influential great powers, it would not have been able to persist in its arrogant intransigence and its continued defiance of United Nations resolutions, including the almost unanimous resolution on Arab Jerusalem. For all the excuses it makes and the sham trials it stages, Israel cannot evade responsibility for the burning of the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque, a crime which sent waves of shock and anger reverberating throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds and all over

the globe. By this crime Israel has given ample proof of its intentions towards Islamic holy places and the Arab presence in the territories it is occupying and trying to Judaize by force of arms.

The fire in Al-Aqsa Mosque was the prime cause for the holding of the first Islamic Summit Conference at Rabat last September, where several resolutions were adopted calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories and to give up Jerusalem and restore it to its rightful owners. Whatever may have been said of this Conference and its resolutions, the meeting of such a large number of representatives of Islamic states, separated from each other by distance, policies and objectives, and united only by the light and guidance of Islam, is in itself an important event in the history of the Islamic community.

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Statement by the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party on the Situation in the Arab Area.¹ (Excerpts)

October, 1969

The situation in the Arab area cannot be separated from the grave and continuous developments which are now taking place on the world scene.

Interaction is increasing between the Arab liberation movement and the international struggle for democracy and socialism. The World Conference of Labour and Communist parties, held in Moscow in June, 1969, dealt with the situation in the Arab area, and stated in its communiqué:

"By their aggression against the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, the Israeli invaders created a dangerous international crisis, with the object of overthrowing the progressive regimes in the Arab countries and crushing the Arab liberation movement, so that they might maintain or recover their positions in the Near East. In this

¹ *Al-Akhbar* (Beirut), 14/12/1969. At a conference held in October 1969 the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party discussed all aspects of the political situation, and an evaluation of it was issued in a report.

they were unsuccessful, but in spite of that, ruling circles in Israel, with the support of international reaction and particularly of Zionist circles, are continuing to ignore the demands of the Arab countries, the peace-loving peoples and the United Nations resolutions, for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories. They are pursuing a policy of annexation, and are constantly committing new acts of military provocation. The Communist Party and other progressive forces in Israel oppose this policy. The Arab peoples are resolutely continuing their struggle in defence of freedom, independence and national progress, to recover all the occupied territories, and to secure recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people. The movement of resistance to occupation is expanding; it is assuming a variety of forms and is receiving ever-increasing support. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries stand by the Arab people, and the Communist Movement, the national liberation forces and ever-widening circles in capitalist countries sympathise with it."

This statement in the report of the International Labour and Communist Movement is an eloquent and concise indication of the link, which is increasing in depth and scope, between the Arab liberation movement and the world revolutionary movement, led by the International Communist Movement and its Parties. It also shows how great is the support provided by this movement to the struggle of the Arab people against colonialism and reaction, and for social progress, and particularly to the struggle of the Palestinian people and the armed resistance movement against Zionist occupation.

The appalling aggressiveness of ruling circles in Israel, and their attempts to achieve their aggressive and expansionist ambitions, the Fascist arrogance of their treatment of the Arab people in the occupied territories, their defiance of Security Council and United Nations resolutions on the withdrawal of their forces from the territories they have occupied and on their annexation of Jerusalem; their attempts to annex the occupied territories and to regard them as part of Israel, and recently the burning of Al-Aqsa Mosque: the whole of this aggressive attitude is linked with the aggressive policy of world colonialism and its continued support of Israel.

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The appearance of the Palestinian Arab nation and its armed forces (the commando movement) on the field of battle, will have a great effect on the regular Arab armies organised on modern lines, which will continue to play the main and decisive role in containing Israeli aggression and liberating the occupied territories.

On August 8 our Party issued a statement on the situation in the Arab area and Israel's new attempts at aggression against the Arab countries. In this statement the Party pointed out that the successes achieved by Arab military forces, particularly the forces of the United Arab Republic on the Suez Canal front, against the aggressive Israeli forces, were due to the fact "that their defensive capacity has undergone a change; from being purely defensive it is now to some degree offensive... and Israel is no longer as free to aim blows as it was when it was safe from fear of reprisals". The Party's statement also warned that Israel, colonialism and Zionism will not stand idly by. It called on the progressive forces to study all past, and possible future, developments with the utmost seriousness and alertness, and said that they must take all necessary steps to confront these grave challenges. Naturally the question of strengthening, arming, training and mobilising the Arab armies, co-ordinating their operations on the various fronts, and raising the standard of Arab resistance operations, forms a cornerstone in the great battle against imperialism and Zionism. Furthermore, the alliance with the socialist camp which has played in the past, and is now playing, a decisive role in frustrating the schemes of colonialism and Zionism, can, if it is strengthened, lead to the defeat of any attack on the Arab countries, and to the transformation of the June 5 setback into a new victory for the Arabs, on condition that the gaps in the home front are closed. The biggest gap through which all imperialist and reactionary conspiracies succeed in penetrating is the fragmentation of the home front, the division of the parties and progressive national forces and the absence of democratic regimes as a result of this anomalous situation. This was the main cause of the June 5 setback.

As for the situation in Iraq, the Party statement called on the Arab countries, and Iraq in particular, to reinforce the Jordanian-Syrian Eastern

Front, so as to lighten the burden borne by the Egyptian army, against which the enemy always concentrates his aggressive fire.

In its concern for the development of the Palestinian armed struggle movement, (the commando movement), our Party has always called, and will continue to call in the future, on all the liberated Arab countries and all the Arab peoples to support this movement and to assist it with material, military and technical resources, such assistance to be unrestricted and unconditional; to encourage Arab youth to join the Palestinian commando organisations; to strive to achieve unity in the armed struggle movement on a revolutionary nationalist basis; to lead it and to help it to conquer its internal difficulties, the most prominent of which are the divisions which have reached alarming proportions as a result of the policy pursued by certain Arab countries of forming their own commando organisations instead of supporting the Palestinian organisations. In the opinion of our Party nothing can do more to strengthen it and bring it nearer to the achievement of its objectives than the unity of the forces of the Palestinian armed struggle and the unification of the national political organisations of the Palestinian people, on the basis of a national front.

As time passes the Palestine problem is acquiring an international significance. The task of carrying on the struggle against Zionist aggression for the liberation of the occupied territories, in all its forms, and particularly in the form of armed struggle, is not the task of the Palestinian people alone; it is also the duty of all revolutionary and progressive forces in the Arab countries.

The enlarged Conference of the Central Committee of our Iraqi Communist Party notes with appreciation the efforts that have been made, and are still being made, by the Jordanian Communist Party, to foil the Zionist-imperialist scheme to force the Arabs to leave their homeland and the efforts of progressive forces, led by the Jordanian Communist Party, to mobilise the Palestinian Arab people in the occupied territories to engage in all forms of struggle against Israeli occupation, and against terror and intimidation.

The elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression is the most urgent task which faces

the Arab liberation movement in its struggle against colonialism, Zionism and reaction, if it is to continue on its course as the movement of Arab liberation. The achievement of this task depends not only on the serious efforts being made by the Arab countries to strengthen and develop their military capacity, but also on every measure being taken to isolate the aggressive Israeli ruling circles and their expansionist policy, and to win for the Arabs more international support and sympathy for their just cause. This requires the rejection of extremist slogans which obscure from world opinion the justice of the cause for which the Arabs are fighting.

The implementation of the United Nations and Security Council resolutions and the supporting of the Soviet proposals, whose basic aim is to compel Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories, does not depend on the international bodies which adopted these resolutions, and which Israel has rejected, but on the Arabs continuing their struggle and their firm alliance with their real friends, led by the Soviet Union.

The strengthening and developing of the progressive Arab regimes, which are at present on the front line in the Arab liberation movement, is a major task, which can be achieved by granting democratic freedoms, by forming an alliance of all revolutionary progressive parties and forces in a national front, by establishing progressive governments on the basis of a coalition with these forces, and by mobilising the capacity for struggle of the Arab toiling masses against imperialism and aggression and on behalf of social progress.

If Arab solidarity is to be achieved and strengthened in accordance with a programme of struggle against Zionist aggression, colonialism and reaction, the most serious factors of weakness in the battle against the enemy must be overcome.

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Speech from the Throne at the Opening of the Third Session of the Ninth Jordanian National Assembly.¹ (Excerpt)

Amman, November 1, 1969

Senators and Deputies:

There has been no appreciable improvement in the political field, as far as the crisis of aggression is concerned, despite the continuous efforts made by my government towards this end, in cooperation with the other Arab countries. From the start our policy has been characterised by straightforwardness and balance. But it has always been and will always be free of any suggestion of negligence, laxity or submissiveness. In all stages of our political effort we still adhere to the action as one way in which the present battle could be fought.

Our first and main objective is the recovery of our occupied territory, and the liberation of our captive people. We have agreed to try to achieve these aims by the way of peace, and showed the world our good intentions by going as far as we could on that way. But now that our enemies, and those who back them, have closed that way for us, we impress on them, and the whole world, that we shall not hesitate to follow the way of liberation, no matter how long and hard. The liberation of our land, and its jewel, Jerusalem, is our objectives, and the liberation of our patient, struggling people is our goal. And no obstacle, however great, will turn us aside or prevent us from achieving these objectives.

We accepted the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 as a formula for peaceful settlement, and we accepted the principles it contains and asked that they should be accepted and implemented by all. The efforts we have made to that end are known to all. We have visited many capitals of the world, attended many conferences and meetings, and cooperated with the other Arab countries both at the United Nations and elsewhere, but none of this has served to curb Israel's defiance or to bring about any change in its policy of openly challenging the

World Organisation, and flagrantly disregarding justice, right and public opinion throughout the world.

We have declared our position to the whole world, and affirmed it to the Great Powers, stating that we shall not go a single step beyond accepting the Security Council resolution and the principles it contains. We have all the time insisted on two basic principles which are the foundations of the just national policy we pursue in our political struggle. The first is the recovery of all occupied Arab territories, complete and undiminished, and the second, recognition of the just and legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in their lost homeland.

In our great zeal to protect our national interests and aspirations, and in our struggle to preserve these interests and aspirations, we are acting on a basis of our sacred trust to God, to the nation, and to history, and of our firm conviction that, when it tries to achieve both peace and territorial gains at one and the same time, what Israel wants is not peace but surrender. We have therefore declared in no uncertain terms, and we repeat this declaration today, that if Israel wants peace it cannot have the land, and if it wants the land it cannot have peace.

Senators and Deputies:

Situated as we are in one of the most dangerous stages of our national history, let us look at the picture from all angles. We shall then observe the following facts:

Firstly: The United Nations, as the highest international organisation, has so far proved unable to effectively implement its resolutions.

Secondly: The Great Powers have so far not dealt with the crisis seriously and responsibly to the extent of putting an end to aggression, establishing right and rescuing peace. In their talks they have not managed to overcome the basic differences between them, and in the contradictory attitudes they have adopted during these talks they have tended to concentrate less on the principles and values of right and justice than on their own perverse whims and sick prejudices.

Third: Israel depends on its military superiority, but this is entirely due to American aid and military, economic and political support.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 2/11/1969.

Faced as we are with this regrettable situation which overshadows the opportunity that is offered of attaining peace, we cannot allow ourselves to be faced with a similar regrettable situation in our great Arab homeland. The indifference and procrastination displayed by the Arabs in the face of the situation can only lead to foreign countries being convinced that the Arabs are not up to the standard demanded by the battle which they keep talking about, and that the domestic situations in the countries which were the victims of aggression are liable to dissolution and collapse, so that none of them will be able to resist any longer, and will very soon accept whatever terms are required by the situation and dictated by force.

Such impressions of the present Arab situation must be dispelled from the minds of those who hold them, once and for all. Only the Arabs themselves can do this. Therefore, in our earnest wish to achieve this, we have laid down the main lines for action on both the Jordanian and the Arab levels:

Firstly: The home front; genuine and continuous efforts must be made to build it up into a strong, united and immovable structure, in which there is no place for 'disunity, disagreement or dissension, so that it becomes a single, free national force working under a single leadership, advancing on a single course which, at this stage, leads towards a single goal, which is liberation.

Victory can be imposed and achieved by such a front which makes it impossible for foreign conspirators to bring the battle from the line of confrontation to within our ranks. I therefore declare forcefully and unambiguously that both our highest national interests and our responsibilities to ourselves and to future generations, and the nature of the battle which our enemies have forced upon us, demand that the government should meet its great responsibilities, by striking mercilessly at all forms of conspiracy and at anything capable of weakening or impairing the home front, so that the enemy and his supporters may not imagine that we are fighting among ourselves, rather than fighting aggression.

At the same time, the government will make every effort to continue the battle of construction, side by side with the battle of endurance. It will continue to supervise the various government

organisations, and to execute the projects and plans for building up the nation, as far as available resources permit. Today we are more determined than ever that our home front should be secure, solid and steadfast, so that all loyal forces which are capable of benefiting us in any way may be organised to form a cohesive and coordinated whole which, working for the common good, will serve as our armament and our source of supply in our bitter struggle.

Secondly: The Arab front. Here we shall redouble our efforts and continue to call for action to make it a firm and tightly-knit structure capable of performing its role to the full in our battle for national existence. Often enough in the past we have invited the Arab countries to meet and come together, and we repeat today that we have no alternative to unified Arab action if the Arabs are to be offered the hope of victory and the means of achieving it, rather than the spectre of defeat and a situation that can only result in defeat, and if we are to demonstrate to the whole world a fact that it seems to be ignorant of — that it is by Arab hands, Arab wealth and Arab blood that Arab right is everywhere protected.

Senators and Deputies:

Israeli aggression has sparked off in our ranks, and in the ranks of the Palestinian people, armed struggle and legitimate resistance with the object of liberating our territory and recovering our usurped rights. Our struggle is a sacred struggle for God and our homeland only, and our resistance is armed with honour, sacrifice and readiness to die for the country. It is certainly the duty of others to support and back this struggle, but as far as we in this country are concerned, it is our right to affirm that we ourselves are this struggle; it is part and parcel of our steadfastness, of our very existence; it is not something to which we have a specific attitude, for you do not have a specific attitude to something which is yourself.

We want this fact to be clearly understood by all, and we wish it to be clearly understood that the sacred soil of Jordan, both that part of it which is occupied and that which is confronting the enemy, is the battleground of courage and struggle, the stronghold of patriotic self-sacrifice, and will remain so until the banners of victory and honour are unfurled, until justice is established, until

right prevails and until the wings of peace fly in our clear skies.

But in this holy war which we, our armed forces and the armed forces of the other Arab countries are destined to wage, we are determined that the struggle should have at its command all the organisation which is essential if all of us, and our armed forces in particular, are to hold out. We are determined that its ranks, like those of the armed forces, shall be free of all suspect elements that do not appreciate the true significance of the struggle. We are determined that the struggle shall, like the armed forces, avoid all conduct liable to injure it and detract from its splendour and sanctity. We are also determined that not a drop of Arab blood shall be spilt, here or in any other Arab country, and that not a single Arab shot shall be fired, here or in any other Arab country, except in the battle of honour, heroism and martyrdom.

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Unofficial Text of the Cairo Agreement between the Lebanese Authorities and Palestinian Commando Organisations.¹

Cairo, November 3, 1969

On Monday, November 3, 1969, a meeting took place in Cairo between the Lebanese delegation, headed by General Emile Bustani, and the delegation from the Palestine Liberation Organisation, headed by Mr. Yasser Arafat, head of the Organisation. The United Arab Republic was represented at the meeting by Mr. Mahmud Riyad, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Lieutenant General Muhammad Fawzi, Minister for War.

In keeping with the principles of brotherhood and common destiny, Lebanon's relations with the Palestinian Revolution should always be characterised by trust, frankness and positive cooperation; this is in the interest of both Lebanon and the Palestine Revolution, while also respecting the sovereignty and security of Lebanon. Both delegations agree to the following measures and principles:

The Palestine Presence

It is agreed that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon shall be reorganised along the following lines:

1. Palestinians at present residing in Lebanon shall have the right to work, reside and move about in Lebanon.

2. Local Palestinian Committees are to be set up in refugee camps to look after the interests of Palestinian residents of the camps, in cooperation with the local authorities and in keeping with the principle of Lebanese sovereignty.

3. There shall be Palestine Armed Struggle Posts in the camps which will cooperate with the local Committees so as to ensure good relations with the authorities. These Posts shall be responsible for controlling and limiting the presence of arms in the camps, in keeping with the requirements of Lebanese security and the interests of the Palestinian Revolution.

4. Palestinians residing in Lebanon are to be allowed to take part in the Palestinian Revolution through the Armed Struggle while acting in conformity with Lebanese sovereignty and security.

Commando Action

It is agreed that commando action is to be accorded the following facilities:

1. Passage for the commandos is to be facilitated. They are to be assigned crossing points and observation posts along the frontiers.

2. The commandos shall have the right of passage to the Arqub district.

3. The Armed Struggle Command is to control the activities of all those belonging to its member organisations and is responsible for ensuring that they do not interfere in Lebanese affairs.

4. A joint disciplinary board is to be set up comprising members from the Armed Struggle and the Lebanese Army.

5. Both sides are to stop their propaganda campaigns.

6. A census is to be carried out of the number of elements in the Armed Struggle in Lebanon, through the Armed Struggle Command.

7. Representatives of the Armed Struggle are to

¹ *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 20/4/1970. The text of this agreement remained secret until it was published by *Al-Nahar* on April 20, 1970.

be attached to the Lebanese General Staff to help resolve sudden difficulties as they arise.

8. The distribution of commando bases along the frontiers is to be re-examined and determined after agreement with the Lebanese General Staff.

9. The entry, exit and movements of all elements belonging to the Armed Struggle are to be regulated.

10. The Jirun base is to be evacuated.

11. The Lebanese army shall facilitate the activities of medical evacuation and supply centres belonging to the commando movement.

12. All detainees and confiscated arms are to be released.

13. It is understood that all Lebanese civil and military authorities shall continue to exercise their authority and discharge their responsibilities in full throughout Lebanese territory under all circumstances.

14. Both sides affirm that Palestinian Armed Struggle is in the interest of Lebanon, the Palestinians and all Arabs.

15. This agreement shall remain top secret. It shall only be accessible to the commands.

Signed:

Head of the Lebanese Delegation

EMILE BUSTANI

Head of the Palestinian Delegation

YASSER ARAFAT

November 3, 1969

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Excerpts from a Private Interview with Mr. Nayef Hawatmeh, Central Committee Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, on the Status of Jews in the Proposed Palestinian State.¹ (Excerpts)

Amman

Q. What sort of cultural or perhaps national rights is the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine prepared to recognise as pertaining to the Jewish community once Palestine is liberated, i.e., within the context of a revolutionary popular democratic state of Palestine? In other words, as an ideological consideration, is the Popular Democratic Front of the opinion that Judaism is a religion, pure and simple, or would you grant the right of leftist, non-religious Israelis (such as the supporters of the Israeli Socialist Matzpen Organisation) to adhere to "Jewishness" as a national culture?

A. The Popular Democratic Front put forward a counter proposal stipulating the need for a popular Democratic state of Palestine in which Arabs and Jews alike would enjoy full equality in their rights and responsibilities, including the right to propagate and develop their national cultures along progressive and democratic lines which would purify Arab culture from ethno-centric and reactionary tendencies regarding Jews while also liberating the Jews from their own ethno-centrism and reactionary tendencies as represented in the Zionist culture. The Popular Democratic Front furthermore submits that if a revolutionary or popular democratic state is to be set up in Palestine, then the regime in such a state will necessarily have to be socialistic, for it is the socialistic orientation of this popular democratic state that shall guarantee the elimination of class or national subjugation among Arabs and Jews in any shape or form and enable each of the two sides to enjoy the same, undiminished rights and responsibilities and to propagate and develop their

¹ *Al-Hurriyya* (Beirut), No. 488, 3/11/1969, p. 12. This interview was conducted by Mr. Jean Pierre Viennot, Secretary of the Committee for Solidarity with the Yemen Revolution and with the Liberation Movements in the Arab Peninsula.

national cultures along progressive democratic lines. This is why the Popular Democratic Front, as part of its programme for solving the Palestine problem, has called on all progressive Jews in the world and on all progressive Israelis to take part in the Palestine national liberation movement and in Palestine armed struggle so as to do away with the Zionist entity, while rejecting all proposed racist and reactionary solutions and fighting together for the liberation of Palestine so as to set up this democratic state. For we strongly believe (and events clearly bear us out on this point) that democratic and peaceful means for setting up this popular democratic Palestinian state are non-existent, in view of the nature of Zionism and of the Israeli state which is affiliated with colonialism and imperialism. It is possible, however, to set up such a state by expanding the scope of joint armed struggle in which Arabs and progressive Israelis and Jews shall take part. To this end, as part of the proposal we submitted to the Palestinian and Arab masses and the draft resolution we submitted to the Sixth National Palestine Council, we advocated that progressive Jews and Israelis should take part in this Palestinian front for armed struggle and in a long-range joint struggle to liquidate the Zionist entity, while rejecting all proposed racist and revolutionary solutions for the Palestine and Israeli problems, so as to set up a popular democratic Palestine in the future.

That answers the first part of the question. As for the second part, the Popular Democratic Front is of the opinion, as an ideological consideration that Judaism is a religion, pure and simple. The Front does, however, recognise the legitimacy of "Jewishness" as a culture for Jewish communities, particularly in the case of the Jewish community that is found in the land of Palestine today, with special emphasis on the post-1948 generation that was born and raised in the land of Palestine. We believe that this generation fully has the right to live side by side and enjoy full equality in rights and responsibilities with the Palestinian people under the auspices of a state that rejects class or national subjugation in any shape or form.

Concerning this matter, the Popular Democratic Front has been observing the positions adopted by progressive leftist forces in Israel with great

interest. The Front believes that the Israeli Socialist Organisation, (the Matzpen Group) is a leftist group that has been coming up with progressive solutions for the Palestine and Israeli problem, at least when compared with other parties in Israel. We have shown great interest in the lines along which the position of the Israeli Socialist Organisation has been developing. At first, the Organisation had put forward a solution based on the continued existence of a de-Zionised State of Israel, but recently it has proposed setting up a bi-national state in Palestine. For our part, we believe that such a bi-national state conflicts with the progressive, proletarian approach for solving the Israeli and Palestine problems. What we think should be proposed is the establishment of a Palestinian state in which both Arabs and Jews would enjoy full equality of rights and responsibilities and in which each side would have the right to develop their own local culture.

Q. Are there any links between the Popular Democratic Front and the Israeli Socialist Organisation within the occupied territories? Is the Front receptive, in principle, to the presence of revolutionary, leftist and anti-Zionist Israelis within its ranks (if such people are actually to be found in Israel)? On what basis could this take place? Does the Front have a Hebrew language internationalist propaganda campaign in the occupied territories to win the Israeli left over to its side and emancipate it from Zionist ideology?

A. In keeping with the internationalist principle to which the Popular Democratic Front is committed and which stipulates the necessity for an international solution to the Palestine and Israeli problem, a solution which shall be conditional on the right of the Palestinian people to self determination in their own land and on the rejection of any form of class or national subjugation (as suffered by the Palestinian people in 1948) as well as racist or reactionary solutions to the Palestine and Israeli problems in any shape or form, the Popular Democratic Front welcomes, in fact advocates and is earnestly striving to develop links between it and any progressive, leftist and revolutionary group within the Israeli community. In pursuance of this objective, the Front has established a dialogue with the Matzpen Organisation outside the occupied territories, for the opportunity for such

a dialogue is more favourable there than within the occupied territories. In fact, a dialogue has been in progress for some time now, in more than one country in Europe, between the Popular Front and the Matzpen group. Concurrently with this, the Front has made it clear in the proposals it submitted to the masses and to the Sixth Palestine National Council that it is in favour of progressive Israelis and Jews joining its ranks, whether it be within Israel or outside it, and is working toward that end. The Front is also trying to get all those with anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist convictions and those opposed to the forces of Arab reaction to join the ranks of Palestine armed struggle. Particularly where the Front is concerned, it is strongly in favour of revolutionary leftist Israelis joining its ranks or the various supporting committees of the Popular front throughout the world.

Concerning the second part of your question, as to the position of the Front and whether it has a Hebrew language internationalist propaganda campaign within the occupied territories to explain that position to the Jewish population and to progressive Israelis in particular, the position of the Front on the Palestine problem is currently being publicised inside the occupied territories in the Arabic language only. So far we have not been able to do the same in Hebrew for we are short on people with sufficient mastery of the Hebrew language to publicise the ideological and political attitudes of the Front toward all the proposed solutions for the Palestine and Israeli problem as well as the Arab and world liberation movements. We hope, within the near future, to have such people within our cadres who will be in charge of publicising the political and ideological position of the front in Hebrew as well as other foreign languages.

Q. In the course of its dealings with the Central Committee of the Iraqi communist party, which has adopted a radical internationalist position toward the Palestine and Kurdish problems, has the Popular Democratic Front for its part defined its position on the Kurdish problem which is not only an Arab phenomenon but is to be found in Turkey and Iran as well. The Kurdish people in these two countries are exposed to the ugliest forms of class and national persecution at the hands of the chauvinistic, reactionary and dictatorial

regimes in Tehran and Ankara. What is the position of the Popular Democratic Front on this issue?

A. Prior to any dealings with the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party, the Popular Democratic Front has been committed regarding nationalist issues, to a proletarian internationalist position based on the right of each people to self determination in its own land. As Marx said: "A people that persecutes other peoples cannot be a free people." In keeping with the internationalist position of the Popular Democratic Front, which involves the rejection of class or national subjugation in any shape or form, the Popular Democratic Front has already defined its position quite clearly on the Kurdish problem. Our attitude is that the Kurdish people in Iraq, Turkey and Iran as well as the Kurdish community in Syria have the right to self determination in their own land. The Kurdish people satisfy all the prerequisites for being one people, including a common language, history and psychological make-up, as expressed in common customs and traditions. For this reason, the Front has advocated that the Kurdish people be granted the right of self determination in its own land. The Front is prepared, furthermore, to support the Kurdish liberation movement ideologically, politically and even materially if the need should arise. As concerning the crisis that the Kurdish problem has caused in Iraq, the Front has advocated granting the Kurdish people home rule within an Arab-Kurdish federation. The Front has denounced all military campaigns designed to subdue the Kurdish national movement, stressing that the Kurdish problem cannot be solved through repression or national persecution. That problem can only be solved through democratic means by granting home rule to the Kurdish people in Iraq.

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Speech by the United Arab Republic President Nasser at the Opening of the Second Session of the National Assembly.¹(Excerpts)
Cairo, November 6, 1969

Fellow citizens, Members of the National Assembly,

I do not believe that, in the history of this land, a popular assembly has ever faced responsibility of the nature, extent and gravity as that which confronts this honourable assembly today as it begins the work of its second session.

This is because it has now become clear to all of us, without exception, no matter how diversified our previous efforts may have been, that there is no alternative to war. For, despite the enemy's losses, he is still exerting pressure and maintaining his arrogant attitude. Besides this, the enemy's friends, led by the United States of America, are continuing to supply him with assistance, which enables him to continue his aggression.

We have left the door open to all attempts at a peaceful solution. We have made no conditions except those which honour, national self-respect and the most elementary demands of the security of homeland and nation make imperative.

We have said that peace does not mean surrender, and that the enemy's claims that he wants peace cannot coexist with his expansionist schemes.

We have said that the solution, according to the Security Council resolution, can only mean the total withdrawal of the forces of aggression. If this does not take place, it can only mean that, while talking about the solution, they really intend to impose a *fait accompli*.

We have said that there is no way out of the crisis based on a settlement involving Egyptian territory only, and that all Arab territories occupied by the enemy, first and foremost Arab Jerusalem, and including the West Bank, the Gaza strip and the Syrian Golan Heights, must be liberated.

We have not just passively accepted the Security Council resolution; we have made efforts to get it implemented. We have done this

through our contacts with the envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and by encouraging the Great Powers, at both two-power and four-power level, to face up to their international responsibilities and to perform their role in the Security Council which passed the November 22, 1967 resolution. Despite all this, so far our efforts have been unavailing.

The conclusion which we must draw from this by ourselves and for ourselves, is that the only way left for us is to force our way through a sea of blood and beneath a sky blazing with fire. No matter how harsh this conclusion appears, no matter how great the cost and sacrifice it involves, we can see no alternative to it if we are to safeguard our honour, our freedom, our life and our future.

Fellow citizens, Members of the National Assembly,

If we are fully aware of the responsibilities this conclusion lays upon us, we shall be able to make a new beginning to our struggle. Firstly the challenges and demands of the battle will impose on us the task of renewing ourselves in order to be able to meet them. Times of danger always give nations that have life the opportunity of bringing into play all their human resources, all the resources of their material strength and their civilisation, in order to defeat danger, and we must rise above it, but we shall only be able to do this if we are ready to renew ourselves from within, with understanding and knowledge.

Secondly: The fact that the battle is inevitable must give us, and it shall give us, a determination and a resolution, that derive from the choice that lies before us. We are faced with the simple and basic question involved in any struggle: Are we to be or not to be?

Our Arab nation, including our people, have, in the past, fought many battles. But the coming battle will be one of the few which our nation will fight with its back to the wall and with no way out except fighting.

One characteristic of our enemy's attitude has been his appreciation from the first that if he lost once, he would lose everything. In our case, on the contrary, one of our weaknesses has been our belief that we should continue to exist, and that no blow, however violent, could uproot us.

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 7/11/1969.

The attitude, intentions and policies of the enemy have now given us a new and profounder appreciation of the situation. We now realise that if he was fighting with his back to the sea, we are now fighting with our backs to our villages; and if he could not afford to lose a battle, we can no longer afford to lose a battle. Thirdly, the way of battle must, and shall, provide us with a rare opportunity to realise both Egyptian and Arab unity. In the past, we held different views on many matters. Who are those who have an interest in the future? The way of battle gives us the answer:

The people who have an interest in the future are those who are able to fight for it. They are the working forces of the people struggling behind the line of battle, whose sons and young men are in the firing lines.

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Who are our friends, and who are our enemies? Once again the way of battle gives the answer:

Our friends are those who see right in our position, and who assist right when they support our position.

Our enemies are those who have the same interests as our enemy, whom we are fighting and who is fighting us. Good and evil can never be equated, nor can the friend be equated with the enemy.

Those who stand by us at international level, who assist us by providing us with weapons, and who offer support, these are our friends.

And those who stand by the enemy at international level against all principles of the community of nations, and who give the enemy the weapons to fight us — to kill us if he can — these are our enemies.

To put it more plainly and clearly:

The Soviet Union stands by us as a friend. The United States of America stands against us as an enemy. We have weapons from the Soviet Union, and Israel has weapons from the United States. Soviet experts place their knowledge at our disposal, and American soldiers in the Israeli army fight us with artillery and planes which misleadingly carry the insignia of the Star of David. No Arab must deceive himself about this, or allow anyone to deceive him about it.

Which is the way to solve the crisis?

There have been a variety of views on this too. But, for the third time, the way of battle provides the answer:

All those who once believed in the possibility of finding a peaceful solution have now no alternative to accepting the other point of view, which has maintained from the start, that what was taken by force can only be recovered by force.

Each of us has acted according to his lights. At the end of the road all of us, without exception, are confronted by the same conclusion — that it is useless and hopeless to try to ignore the nature of things.

Why should our enemy in the struggle — or any enemy in any struggle — give up the advantages he has achieved unless he is forced to do so, and unless a will stronger than his is imposed on him? In the past we have wandered far from the point, but when at last we all really appreciate who are those who have an interest in the future in our land, and who are our friends and who our enemies, and what method we should adopt to confront the crisis which has us by the throat — when all of us truly appreciate this, we shall have achieved something invaluable, something irreplaceable. We shall have achieved unity at both Egyptian and Arab levels, the unity of strength of unity at one and the same time.

Fellow citizens, Members of the National Assembly,

For this unity of strength and strength of unity to be effectively embodied, there must be sure guarantees at Arab level. The viability of the Arab nation — the vitality of its men, women, young people and children — of itself exerts pressure, and effects tremendous miracles through the sheer force of development. We need only cite the example of the outbreak and success of the revolution in Libya, and recall our sentiments when the first statement concerning the establishment of the Arab Republic of Libya was issued. There is no better indication than this of the vitality of the Arab nation; there is no better criterion than this of the extent of the pressure for development exerted by this vitality.

It is then that we see things in their true perspective — when we become certain that it was their determination to realise the Arab

identity of Libya, and their insistence on taking part in the battle of destiny, that were the strongest reasons which led our brother, Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi, and his heroic companions, the members of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council, to take such great risks. To accept these risks was one of the noblest and most honourable acts; that their acceptance led to success was a kind of miracle.

Another illustration is to be found in the significance of the revolution in the Sudan, when young fighting elements took over the reins of power and shouldered their responsibilities like men.

The vitality of the Arab nation creates in the depths of the Arab entity something that cannot be seen before it shows itself under the bright lights. But at the same time our respect for the vitality of the Arab nation demands that we should not allow the Arab entity to move without planning, for such movement would partake more of emotion than of action, of violent feelings than effective will. I mean that we must make a calculated effort to bring the effective embodiment of the unity of strength, the strength of unity.

I should be failing you, and falling short of the historic responsibility which every Arab bears in the present struggle, if I did not tell you honestly that a great part of Arab resources is still being utterly wasted.

But in all honesty and with full awareness, we understand that, while urging to follow the road to the battle, we are facing a decisive moment when we can prevent the wastage of a large part of Arab resources and redirect and mobilise them in the service of the battle of destiny which our nation is fighting; we must strive to achieve this in the following manner:

1. The battle can only be served with the necessary efficiency and trustworthiness through the pooling of all the Arab nation's resources. Only unity of political will can bring about the attainment of this goal. Unity of political will can only be embodied by an Arab meeting at summit level. All obstacles and excuses previously used to delay this meeting are now invalid.

The Joint Arab Defence Council will meet in Cairo the day after tomorrow, on the basis of a resolution adopted by the Arab Foreign Ministers who met in Cairo after the crime of the burning of Al-Aqsa Mosque. We hope that this

Council, which will be attended by Arab Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Staff, will realise that the demands of confrontation dictate that they should issue a call for an Arab meeting at summit level.

The situation has undergone a decisive change since we met in Khartum in 1967. The new situation imposed by the fact that the battle is inevitable requires a different approach and closer cooperation, because none of us is far from the battle. The states on the line of confrontation have a special responsibility, the responsibility for the front line. But the main support of this front line is the wide expanse of Arab territory, and the vast resources of the Arabs. Without this expanse of territory, and without these resources, the front line loses much of its effectiveness, as happens to the front line of any fighting army that does not have solid domestic support on which it can rely and from which it can draw.

The same is the case with the enemy. For the advanced garrison that is Israeli society is no more than a front line which relies on tremendous forces that provide it with its needs; these forces are world Zionism and international imperialism.

We must all remember that the enemy is not a danger to any one of us in particular, but that he is a danger to all of us, because his ambitions involve all of us. The fact that he concentrates on one of us before the rest is merely a question of priorities, which he chooses because they happen to suit him.

2. Battles irrelevant to the main issue in the Arab world must cease, or we shall lose control of the situation and exhaust our efforts against ourselves instead of saving them up and mobilising our enemy.

It was with this in mind that the United Arab Republic strove to solve the bloody crisis between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinian resistance. Other states, such as the Syrian Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic, the Republic of Iraq, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Kuwait, joined in this effort. These states, and the United Arab Republic, also showed genuine understanding of the conditions of struggle which existed between the Palestinian Resistance Command and the Lebanese political and military leadership.

What has happened in Lebanon in the last few weeks has been an Arab calamity. For what is more difficult to bear than that we should see Arab weapons being aimed at the wrong target, and to see falling, on the two sides — both of them Arab — young men who should have been in the vanguard of the advance against the enemy?

The Arab nation was in the unenviable state of having to stand on the sidelines of this calamity, which could have changed into a great tragedy and still could so change, if good will and good intentions do not prevail.

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3. Palestinian resistance — and this all must know and believe — has come to stay, and stay it will until it has re-established its Palestinian homeland, and until it is certain that this homeland can play its role within the framework of the struggle of the whole Arab nation to which it belongs.

It is no longer possible for anyone to suppress Palestinian resistance, let alone attempt to liquidate it. It is no longer possible for any one to go back to the old attitude to the refugee problem which, for too long, claimed that it was only a problem of refugees, or a merely human problem. The problem has become, first and foremost, the problem of a homeland that has a people.

We always distinguish friend from enemy on the following basis:

Who is helping us and providing us with the weapons with which to defend ourselves? And who is assisting the enemy and providing him with the weapons with which he practises his aggression against us? But we have all the more reason — at Arab level — to distinguish between those who take part in the battle and those who shirk it on the basis of their attitude to those who are fighting the enemy in the occupied territory and aiming blows at the enemy in the hidden recesses of his power and the strongholds of his terror.

4. The situation is such that half-solutions can no longer be tolerated, and nothing now avails but clarity and frankness. I have so far been talking to you in general terms, not in terms of particular issues. But I promise you that, from my appreciation of historic responsibility, and in the interests of the battle, from now on I shall speak

of particular issues, not generalities.

The time has come for every Arab to face up to his responsibility. The time has come for every Arab to raise his hand and be taken into account, or else be completely discounted; the time has come for the Arab nation, while on the way to battle, to arm itself with the strength of unity and the unity of strength.

Fellow citizens, Members of the National Assembly,

So far we have been talking at Arab level. The time has now come to consider our action in terms of our own homeland. Our people have not fallen short in their preparation for the battle, and they know full well that they are the first target for the enemy's schemes, because the Egyptian people alone amount to more than one third of the Arab nation, and constitute the greater part of its resources.

The Egyptian people have always been a target for all kinds of raids and incursions by colonialism, which has been aware of the value of their geographic location, the role they have played in civilisation, and the position they occupy in the forefront of the social, scientific and intellectual progress of the whole Arab nation. They are still the first target. They are still in the front rank of the firing line.

I shall not be divulging secrets if I say that the best indication of the efforts of the Egyptian people, if these efforts are translated into figures, is that this year they have contributed £E500 million to the battle and have put 500,000 of their sons under arms.

The significance of these figures lies in the fact that they have been achieved no more than two years after the dark day when the Egyptian people found themselves standing unarmed face to face with an enemy armed to the teeth.

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Our guns have fought an extremely dangerous battle against the enemy positions. When the enemy attempted to protect his positions by building an impregnable line of defensive fortifications, our guns, once again, destroyed and wiped out these fortifications. And now our special forces and the forces of our armies in the field have begun crossing the Canal to make life for the enemy impossible on the other side of the line.

Our people did not expect the battle to end with this. What they expected, and this has proved to be correct, was that the enemy would intensify the war against them. In fact, the enemy took two decisions last July:

The first decision was to throw the air force into the battle.

The second was to extend the front, so that instead of covering the Suez Canal line only it would include the entire Gulf of Suez and the Egyptian coast on the Red Sea. The enemy's aim was both to exploit the effect of the air force and to force the Egyptian military command to disperse its forces. But the Egyptian people and the Egyptian army accepted the escalation, and entered the confrontation.

Then the Egyptian air force entered the battle.

Incursion by the special forces into the occupied territories ensured that the enemy would also be forced to widen his front.

The movement of escalation will continue until, with God's help, the day dawns, the day so eagerly awaited by the Egyptian people and the Arab nation, when right is re-established.

Fellow citizens, Members of the National Assembly,

At Egyptian level, our advance along the road to battle confronts us, here in this country, with many problems, which I will summarise as follows:

1. The masses of the people, one and all, must be informed, truthfully and unequivocally, that the battle has its dangers, and that the enemy who is fighting us and whom we are fighting will extend the front to every part of our territory, and that we have no choice but to accept this escalation.

If the enemy is capable of extending the front to cover all our territory, we are also capable of extending the front to cover all the territory the enemy occupied before and after June 1967. To be more specific, we must accept danger and live in its shadow.

2. The masses of the people cannot be expected to face the danger in passive inactivity, content merely to watch their armed forces performing their role.

Soon, therefore, after the debate of the Central

Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, I shall issue a statement to the effect that "Citizens' Committees for the Battle" are to be formed. These are the committees I suggested should be formed at the last National Congress.

The battle demands the efforts of many behind the lines; it needs them to volunteer for public work for the battle in the fields of positive defence, civil defence, public service, the welfare of soldiers' families, and in the field of intellectual and technical action.

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3. By their activities in all fields of the economy the masses have achieved brilliant results. It is these results, in agriculture, industry, economic direction and scientific planning, that have made it possible to bear the burdens of the battle. But in spite of the records achieved by production in all fields — and I hope that you will hear about them from the Ministers concerned — there is room for further productive efforts on the part of all those who work in this homeland, to meet the demands of the battle.

4. The situation may necessitate measures of reorganisation which will better serve the battle. And conditions best suited to the interests of the battle must be achieved.

5. All this can result in an exuberant vitality through the stimulation of political action, inasmuch as the role of political action will not be restricted to particular occasions and circumstances, but will extend to cover every position at every moment. It will help us to achieve this if all of us realise that there is no longer time for petty quarrels or idle chatter.

The battle needs the minds of all those capable of sound and scientific thinking. Attempts have been made to justify idle chatter by claiming that it is a sort of self-criticism, and therefore useful. But we must not forget that the threat of our enemy is more important even than the necessity for subjective self-criticism.

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Statement by the Joint Arab Defence Council.¹**Cairo, November 10, 1969**

In the eleventh session of its meeting in Cairo from November 8-20, after discussions and consultations in connection with the historic stage through which the Arab nation is now passing, the Joint Arab Defence Council announces the following resolutions:

Firstly: At its third sitting held on Sunday, November 9, the Council agreed on the following:

After evaluating the general situation, listening to the speakers of the Joint Arab Defence Council in its eleventh session, and on the basis of what was decided at the meetings of the Foreign Ministers and the Arab League Council, it is clear that, although we have benefited, and are still benefiting greatly from winning over world public opinion through the serious and sincere political action which we initiated two years ago, we are faced with a reality. This ever present reality, which is constantly impressing itself on our minds and consciousness, is the fact that the peaceful solution has failed and reached an impasse, so that the liberation of Arab territories by this means has become impossible because of the obduracy of Israel and the material, political and military support it receives from the United States of America and other colonialist powers.

Now we must act on our conclusions; our course lies through the mobilisation and massing of our forces and the preparation of new organised material actions in which each of us shoulders to the full his clearly defined responsibilities.

We, who have reached these conclusions as people responsible for the will and destiny of the Arab countries, are aware of the historic trust that is ours. This trust demands that we shoulder our responsibilities and realise the Arab people's aspirations for wide-scale political mobilisation and total and comprehensive military preparation for the inevitable conflict.

Secondly: The Council recommends that the Arab Summit Conference be invited to meet in Rabat, the capital of Morocco, on December

20, 21 and 22, the meeting to take place within the framework of the Arab League.

Thirdly: The Joint Defence Council decides to support the Palestinian revolution with all the strength of the Arab nation. In this context it supports, in principle, the memorandum of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Fourthly: The Council approved the memorandum, after studying what it has to say about our duty to support Arab resistance in the occupied territories.

Fifthly: The Joint Arab Defence Council discussed the attitude of the government of the United States of America in allowing American citizens to serve with the Israeli army and still keep their American citizenship — an attitude which places the United States of America in a state of open defiance of and confrontation with the aspirations of our Arab nation for liberation and progress, especially as the United States continues to supply weapons and planes to Israel and thus supports Israeli aggression against the Arab nation.

The Council therefore condemns this unfriendly attitude and urges the conscience of the world to reject this move and to resist it with all available means.

Sixthly: In addition to the above, the Council adopted other highly secret resolutions, which it is not in the general interest to divulge.

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Press Conference Statements by the Saudi Foreign Minister al-Saqqaf on Some Current Arab Issues.² (Excerpts)**Jedda, November 18, 1969**

Q. Talks about a peaceful solution of the crisis have been revolving in a vicious circle for over two years without achieving anything, yet some countries still insist that they should be continued. What do you think of these talks and what they have achieved so far?

A. Since the last meeting of the Joint Defence Council, no one is talking of, aiming at, or working

¹ *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 12/11/1969.

² *Al-Bilad* (Jedda), 19/11/1969. Mr. Omar al-Saqqaf's press conference was attended by a number of Arab and foreign correspondents.

for a peaceful solution any longer, since there is no such solution prepared, defined, or ready for implementation. You must have observed that the statement issued after that meeting said that attempts to find a peaceful solution had failed and reached an impasse. This was the main reason why it was unanimously agreed that a summit conference must be held.

Q. Will a summit conference be held this year, and if so what results can it be expected to lead to?

A. I shall not be divulging a secret if I say that it has been agreed that the Secretariat General of the Arab League should be instructed to make arrangements for a conference this December.

Q. As we know, our country has an uncompromising attitude to the holding of Arab summit conferences at a time when the search for a peaceful solution for the Middle East crisis is still going on. Certain newspapers and news agencies have reported this attitude, which has remained unchanged since the Khartum Conference, which rejected peace, negotiation and recognition. Since then our country's policy has been dedicated to support that Conference's resolutions. Could you explain to us the significance of our country's attitude, about which there has been so much talk recently?

A. Naturally, as we all know, the catastrophe of June 5, 1967, had far reaching effects on the Arab nation. One of its consequences was that the Kings and Presidents met at a summit conference. They adopted unambiguous resolutions, which I am sure are well known to all of you, and there have been no secret resolutions since the Khartum Conference. As you know these resolutions contained four main points: firstly the elimination of the consequences of aggression, and this means the withdrawal of the aggressors from the lands they seized on June 5, 1967. The second means that there will be no negotiations with the enemy; the third that there will be no peace with the enemy; and the fourth that nothing will be done which may harm the Palestine cause. This is a summary of the resolutions of the Khartum Conference. Saudi Arabia did its duty at the Conference. I shall not be revealing a secret, for it has already been broadcast and published, if I say that it was His Majesty, King Faisal, who was the first to give aid, or rather support, as His Majesty prefers to call it, for the endurance of his Arab

brothers, so that the Arab front might not be adversely affected, and that the Arabs who are Israel's neighbours, and others, might be able to endure. He was extremely generous in the support he gave. Saudi Arabia's attitude to such support remains unchanged, as is its attitude to the resolutions of the Khartum Conference. It has not, and will never, act on any other basis.

Q. What is the role of the Saudi Forces in Jordan? Are they in the front line with Israel? And is it true that they are there merely as a token force, as some Lebanese newspapers say?

A. Certainly Saudi Arabia has forces in Jordan, but it is not permissible to publish details of their numbers and capabilities, or the operations they are engaged in, as this would be information useful to the enemy. However, I can assure you that Saudi Arabia has got substantial well-equipped forces in Jordan. They are stationed in key positions, not on the periphery; thus in no way can they be called a token force.

Q. Since the last visit to Washington of his Highness, Prince Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz, the American attitude towards the Middle East has developed. Do you believe that the United States would adopt a more moderate attitude if a more moderate approach to the problem was made?

A. You have answered your own question. There is no doubt that the visit of his Highness, Prince Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz, was successful and fruitful, and I believe that in the present circumstances it produced all the results we could hope for. As for its effect on America's attitude, I cannot discuss this any further.

Q. As you have said, it is understood that an Arab summit conference will be convened as a result of the Joint Defence Council's statement on the failure of attempts to find a peaceful solution. Does that mean that the conference will not discuss a peaceful solution, even though the Arab States concerned believe that international trends are encouraging?

A. As I said the main reason for holding such a conference is that attempts to find a peaceful solution have failed and reached an impasse. For this reason, as far as Saudi Arabia, at least, is concerned, if it attends this conference it will not be to discuss a peaceful solution which more than two and a half years of negotiations have

failed to achieve. Most unfortunately we have not been able to secure the full support of the Security Council or that of some of the Great Powers; another factor has been the enemy's obstinacy and overweening arrogance, especially as regards Jerusalem.

Q. Can you tell us what this conference is expected to do? Is it to prepare for the elimination of Israel?

A. The Arab Nation, whether, as a whole, it likes it or not, is confronted with a situation; the Arab Nation, the Arab States, the Arab peoples and the individual Arab are all confronted by this situation. There was a defeat, there was a setback and, whether I was a party to it or not, I and the others adopt a unified attitude in the interests of the cause and of that situation. The Arab States have tried their best to find a peaceful solution for this problem, but without success. Before they meet, I, as the representative of a single Arab country, cannot tell you what attitude will be adopted, what the circumstances will be, what resolutions will be discussed or what agreements will be reached. However, I can tell you one thing as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, it only agreed to attend this meeting after it had been announced that attempts to reach a peaceful solution had failed. As for the destruction of the enemy and the annihilation of Israel, these are matters which we have never discussed. But we have rights and we want to recover our usurped rights. As you know, throughout the long history of the Arabs, there has never been a case of annihilation. In this respect, thank God, Islamic history has a clean record; there have never been examples in our history of killing for the sake of killing, or of the annihilation of a people. We merely want to regain our rights, and we have never called for, nor are we now calling for, the annihilation of anyone or the killing of anyone, whatever the circumstances.

Q. Some newspapers have claimed that you made it a condition, in the secret discussions of the Joint Council, that Arab armies should not be asked to take part in the battle until the battle had actually begun. How much truth is there in this claim?

A. By the nature of things I take part in all the secret discussions of the Joint Defence Council.

But I do not think that it would be reasonable or logical for me to make a condition of entering a war first and then for the armies to proceed to fight in it. This would be illogical and unreasonable, and does not accord with Saudi Arabia's attitude on this matter.

Q. In your answers to earlier questions, you said that Saudi Arabia had decided to attend the summit conference on the basis of there being no peaceful solution, meaning that all efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution had failed. Another of my colleagues asked whether this meant that Saudi Arabia would only attend the summit conference on the basis of a general war against Israel, and your answer was: "We are not calling for war, we are demanding our rights." Are we to understand from this that the conference will concentrate on support for the Palestinian resistance rather than on the mobilisation of Arab forces or the declaration of a war involving all the Arabs?

A. When I talked about our conditions we had defined our objectives. When His Majesty King Faisal attended the Khartum Conference, Saudi Arabia defined a number of objectives for the Arabs at that Conference. More than two years have passed, and it is clear that none of these objectives have been realised. We have always had our own attitude to the summit conferences; we have always said that a summit conference must always be at summit level, and that its decisions must be made only by the heads of state attending it. For this reason we refused, or rather we did not accept, the invitation to attend this conference as long as there were other solutions which could be discussed with a view to solving the problem peacefully in accordance with the resolutions of the Khartum Conference. But as time passed, it became clear to us, as it became clear to our brothers, that these solutions were going to end nowhere. Therefore the Joint Defence Council met and decided, after long discussion, that the peaceful solution had failed. As a result of this the Kings and Presidents must review the decisions they made at the Khartum Conference and adopt a new attitude. The so-called peaceful solution will not be on the agenda of this conference. As to whether or not there is to be general war, this is not the time to answer or discuss such a question, because all these matters concern the summit conference which will meet at the appointed time in December.

Q. Three solutions have been proposed for a solution of the Palestine problem in general and the problem caused by the war of June 5, 1967 in particular: the peaceful solution, the military solution and the commando solution. Which of these solutions has been adopted by His Majesty's Government?

A. When I come to think of it I do not believe that there is any difference between a military solution and a commando solution. It seems to me that there is only a peaceful solution or a military solution. The military solution, in my opinion, involves the commandos as it involves others, and you know about the peaceful solution. We do not say that we believe in any particular policy; what we do say is that we intend to recover certain well-understood rights that have been usurped. We cannot say precisely in what way they will be recovered, but we do know that one way which has failed is the peaceful way, and even those who advocate this solution have officially admitted that it has failed. Naturally, the first thing that comes to mind is that if the peaceful solution is ruled out there only remains the military solution. Whether this solution will be achieved through commando action, partial war, general war or consultations, we cannot say; this must be left to the summit conference to discuss. The one thing I cannot take a decision on, cannot either accept or refuse, is commando action, as this is not in my hands or yours. Commando action is the right of the people of Palestine.

Whether we want them to engage in it or not, it is not in our hands, because it is their natural right, and, under God, it is their will that will decide.

Q. The Islamic Summit Conference acknowledged the usurped rights of the Palestinian people and declared its full support for the Islamic countries in their battle for liberation. To ensure that its resolutions should be effective, it entrusted the Foreign Ministers with the task of following them up; it had already achieved unanimity, and affirmed the principle of cooperation between the Muslim states.

Your Excellency attended the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly directly after that, and then had several meetings with your fellow Foreign Ministers there. Would you tell Arab and Islamic public opinion what your follow-up of the Conference's resolutions has achieved?

A. Certainly the Summit Conference at Rabat was something new in the Islamic World. Many Muslim countries met there despite their very different views of affairs and their differing political inclinations. These states met with one objective, to discuss the abominable Jewish crime of the burning of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Thus the Conference was really held to discuss Jewish crimes committed in Palestine against the Holy Land and Jerusalem. The Conference passed resolutions which you all know. One was to the effect that the delegates should make efforts to ensure that they were implemented. In March 1970, there is to be a meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Jedda in Saudi Arabia to review what has been done about the resolutions, and to consider the possibility of establishing a secretariat general for the Islamic Summit Conference. Saudi Arabia will make preparations for this conference to be held at the time and place decided on by the secretariat.

Q. Is it true that Saudi Arabia intends to discontinue its support for the states that suffered from the aggression, now that efforts to achieve a peaceful solution have failed?

A. There has never been any question of our discontinuing our support. In view of the state the nation was in after its defeat in June 1967, support was an urgent necessity. As you know, Saudi Arabia has provided, and is still providing, the greater part of that support — presumably the support you are referring to is that provided by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya. Certainly, Saudi Arabia provides support to Egypt and Jordan, as do Kuwait and Libya; but Saudi Arabia provides more, and also provides support to the Jordanian front, over and above the support provided by the Saudi army stationed there. It has never occurred to us to discontinue this support, because it is one of the means we have so far discovered of inflicting defeat on our common enemy. We shall only think of discontinuing this support in exceptional, extremely exceptional circumstances. These circumstances, as you know, are:

First — God gave us oil. If it stops, we shall not be able to provide support. If it is damaged we shall not be able to continue providing support at the present rate. This is our position as far as support is concerned.

Q. Western estimates, I mean estimates in the Western press, say that Saudi Arabia is probably giving commando resistance more than half the support it receives from all the Arab states together. Are these estimates correct?

A. That we support the commandos is true, and that we provide them with all the support we can is also true. As for the statistics, I can not give them to you or talk about them; firstly because they must not be made public, and secondly because I myself am not sure of them.

Q. It is being said in political circles that the bilateral talks between America and Russia may result in some progress and that, as a result of this progress, the representatives of the Big Four powers will soon meet to discuss the Middle East problem. Do you expect these meetings to succeed, and is it expected that a just solution can be reached which will satisfy the parties concerned?

A. It is very difficult to decide what is a just solution and what is an unjust one. The entire Palestine problem was caused by the Zionists; and every aspect of it has overwhelmed the Arabs and Muslims with injustice and malice. Any solution of the problem is bound to be at the expense of the Arabs. So there is nothing that can be termed a just solution. There are political settlements, but these can only be termed "settlements". There exists an actual situation for which there could be a "settlement". This is a possibility. But if we are talking about justice, there can be no justice if you drive a people from their country, seize and occupy their lands by force and stay there, and then claim that your staying there is the precondition for any just solution to the problem.

As regards the second part of your question, certainly the Four Powers and the Americans and the Russians are now trying, and have been trying for a long time, to find a solution to this problem. But as far as I have been able to discover, none of these solutions will satisfy the Arabs.

Then there is the extremely difficult problem of Jerusalem. This is a matter on which, as far as Saudi Arabia, at least, is concerned, there can be no giving way. Unless the question of Jerusalem is one of the main points in any solution, that solution can never be accepted; nor can one in which Jerusalem is merely a side issue. The same also applies to the other holy places. This is what

led us to agree with the other states that no peaceful solution can be expected, that efforts to reach one have failed, and that it has become an absolute necessity for the Arabs that a summit conference should be convened.

Q. After the issue of the Arab Defence Council's statement, which announced the failure of efforts to find a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem, and called for an Arab summit conference on that basis, the head of the United Arab Republic delegation to the United Nations, Mr. Hasan al-Zayyat, stated that his government hoped that the Great Powers would continue their efforts to reach a peaceful solution so that the desired objective might be attained. Does that mean that there is a possibility of the forthcoming Arab summit conference being postponed, inasmuch as the representative of the United Arab Republic has expressed his government's hope that the efforts of the Great Powers to reach a peaceful solution would continue?

A. As I told you, the Joint Defence Council adopted a resolution; it did so for many reasons. All the Arab countries were represented at the Joint Defence Council by delegates of the highest level of responsibility in this field. Saudi Arabia is not concerned with what anyone says in a statement. What concerns us is what this Council decides and agrees on, and the agreement on the failure of the peaceful solution was unanimous.

Q. Your Excellency, the resolutions of the Islamic Summit Conference have been received with a considerable measure of approval in international circles. However, some of the states which attended the Conference have been attacking the resolutions, expressing misgivings about them and belittling their importance. As Your Excellency has told us, the Conference was expressly convened to discuss an extremely important Muslim problem, the problem of Jerusalem. Could you tell us the reason for these attacks?

A. Most regrettably, the Arab Islamic countries are pulled this way and that by a number of different currents. It was, therefore, clearly understood, before any conference was held, that there would be many different, very different, points of view. When the summit conference met it was hoped that at least minimum agreement would be reached, but the achievement of minimum agreement does not mean that there should be no further efforts on behalf of the

problems under discussion. The Islamic Conference certainly succeeded, nor would I say that this success was restricted to Palestine or the holy places only. The success of the Islamic Conference was a momentous event for the contemporary Islamic world, because no one had imagined that Muslims could meet at summit level in modern times, in view of all the trends and currents that toss them this way and that. But the Conference did meet, and it was successful, and it was able to discuss far more than had been hoped. Of course it is something new for the world to see the Muslims meeting like this. This meeting is a proof that the Islamic peoples, and the Islamic individual, still have good will and are still prepared to urge their officials and leaders to attend meetings in the interests of their nation, their religion and their countries. This success achieved by the Conference has proved distasteful to many people who have described it as reaction.

I would not say that it was reaction, I would describe it as an illustration of the Islamic peoples' enthusiastic devotion to their religion, which makes them urge their leaders to work for Islam and the Muslims. The strongest elements to oppose this Conference have been those who do not believe in God, the same godless and materialist elements which have been fighting against Islam for centuries. Some of them have fought with the same weapons as have been used for centuries, and others with the recently introduced ideologies of modern times.

Q. In the information field Israel is very clever at convincing world public opinion of the justice of its cause, while Arab information, unfortunately, has long been confused and absorbed in side issues. Your Excellency has attended major international gatherings. How much influence does Arab information have at these gatherings, after the crippling setback suffered by the Arab nation?

A. Certainly, Arab information, if not weak, is fragmented, with various sections fighting each other. Even that insignificant section which has been working, or claiming that it was working, on behalf of general issues which concern the Arabs and the Muslims, has not been honest; it has tended to destroy unanimity, because it has employed haphazard methods not in accord with the present climate of international public opinion. Israel has been aware of this Arab mentality and has exploited it to the full. Though in fact it has not

really needed to do so; there has been no need to point out how ineffective, mistaken and careless Arab methods have been. We have made many mistakes in the past, and we have suffered for them. However, now at last we are beginning to feel that world public opinion is starting to listen to the Arabs more than it did before.

Q. It is obvious that France is the only great power which supports the legitimate rights of the Arabs and persists in maintaining its attitude of support for the Arab cause, which attitude is based on a real grasp of the facts of the case. How does Saudi Arabia intend to take advantage of this attitude on the part of France so as to impress the facts of the Arab case against Zionism more firmly on the French government in particular and the French people in general?

A. Certainly, since the setback France has adopted its own attitude to the Arabs; France calls on Israel to withdraw from all the territories it has occupied and regards it as an aggressor. But this attitude does not involve recognition of Arab rights to all of Palestine. As far as France is concerned, Israel exists; and Russia, the communist countries and the countries in their sphere of influence hold the same view. However, Saudi Arabia thanks France for its attitude, which it regards as sound, at least, in that it is in conformity with United Nations principles and with the rights of the case, at least insofar as France understands them.

Q. There are trends of opinion which are trying to contain commando action and to narrow its sphere of activity. What is the attitude to such attempts?

A. You mean Saudi Arabia's attitude?

Q. Yes.

A. In answer to an earlier question I said that we have no right to interfere in commando action. Commando action imposes its own conditions on itself, and insofar as it is sincere, efficient and unanimous, it can achieve much. We do not believe in restricting or limiting it. All we are interested in is that commando action should succeed and perform its mission as well as possible, and that it should not be exposed to shocks capable of leading to anarchy and disintegration within it, as happened as a result of some Arab states' attitudes to each other before the setback. Of course, in every movement there are destructive

elements which attempt to exploit it, and there are other elements which try to destroy it and use it for their own purposes, but we, God willing, shall never support such an idea; we support commando action because it means self-sacrifice, liberation and the recovery of the rights and the land that have been usurped and plundered.

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Statement of the Policy of his New Government by the Lebanese Prime Minister Karami.¹ (Excerpt)

Beirut, December 4, 1969

Arab Affairs

In the realm of Arab affairs, the Palestine problem, which we consider to be the foremost issue facing the Arab world, has always been prominent in our thoughts and been a primary object of our concern. This is still the case today. We have devoted much effort and sacrifice to it, and we shall continue to do so, not only because Zionism poses a threat to our very existence, but also because the Arab claim to Palestine is, in essence, a legitimate and just cause. Everyone who holds to the principles of right and justice is under obligation to come to the aid of that cause, whatever the sacrifices involved.

It is in this spirit that we greet the call for an Arab summit conference to be held in Rabat. We hope that it will give rise to unanimity and that positive resolutions and measures will be adopted to ensure the realisation of common Arab objectives. Foremost among these are the promotion of the capacity for endurance in the face of the aggressor, bringing about a withdrawal of enemy forces from the occupied territories and rallying behind the Palestinian people so that they may continue to discharge their great national obligation and work for the restoration of their usurped right to their homeland.

The Cairo Agreement and National Sovereignty

It is a well known fact that Lebanon has never

held back its support from the people of Palestine. Lebanon reached an agreement in Cairo with the leaders of Palestinian resistance organisations, in which due consideration was given to two different factors at one and the same time: the demands of national sovereignty and security on the one hand and the obligation to render all possible aid and support to the Palestinian resistance movement on the other, so that it may be true to its mission and in order that it may play a part in the confrontation with the Zionist enemy.

In keeping with the principle of the indivisible sovereignty of the state, we guarantee that governmental authority shall reign supreme under all circumstances over the whole of the homeland, as it has done in the past.

My government is determined that the Cairo agreement shall be implemented in the spirit in which it was formulated. We are certain that this determination is shared by everyone. In this manner, the implementation of that agreement will provide the desired results.

The vote of confidence we ask from this honourable assembly will enable us to provide for these matters along the lines which we all regard as desirable.

For the time being, the nature of the agreement that has been concluded necessitates that it should remain secret. We shall, however, see to it at the appropriate time that this assembly and the committees concerned shall be informed of its provisions.

We feel certain that the trust and confidence we extend to our Palestinian brethren is reciprocated; that this will clear the tension in the air and provide a firm basis for cooperation between us.

Increasing the Country's Defensive Capacity

Honourable Members,

My government hereby pledges that, in keeping with that policy, it will devote its efforts to increasing the size of the army and improving its equipment so that Lebanon may have the capacity to defend its territorial integrity and may live up to its commitments in the Arab world, within the framework assigned by the Supreme Arab Command. While awaiting the ratification of the conscription bill which is before this honourable assembly, my government will continue to improve

¹ *National News Agency Bulletin* (Beirut), Arabic edition, 4/12/1969.

the defensive capacity of this country through various means and will take whatever measures are necessary to ensure the safety of all citizens, particularly those living near the frontiers. This will take place in conformity with a carefully studied plan.

My government hopes that these principles will be adopted by all Lebanese and that we shall act as one man in defeating the threat of sedition and in safeguarding the unit of Lebanon and keeping it out of the reach of danger.

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Radio Interview with the Lebanese President Helou, on the Lebanese Crisis and the Palestine Problem.¹ (Excerpts)

Beirut, December 6, 1969

Q. Your Excellency, the French people are very interested in Lebanon. There is no need to stress something so obvious, and there are many reasons for it. However, their interest and curiosity do not mean that the French people would ever go so far as to interfere in the affairs of your country or to meddle with the political problems that confront you. But we do feel that we are involved, even from a personal point of view, in what is taking place in your country. There are many others who also feel, as we do, that what is taking place in your part of the world is just as important to the Western world as it is to the Middle East.

Obviously a change is taking place; there are already clear indications of it. Does this change mean the end of a certain view of the world, of its organisation, of the distribution of its resources, its moral standards, its economy and its equilibrium? In asking this question I am not trying to make an appraisal of the situation, but it did take you a long time to gain control of the factors which led to the crisis. Does not this prove how serious is the subject under review? In other words, is it true that the extraordinary equilibrium which had been operative in your country for some time has now become unworkable?

A. It is only natural that France should show an interest in Lebanon today, as it has always done in the past. We are happy to see this interest and

we appreciate it. For our part, we have always maintained our friendship for France, a friendship which is growing stronger today thanks to France's continuing policy of assisting Lebanon in every possible way, and thanks also to France's understanding and sympathy for all the Arab countries, particularly since the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967. I can assure you that this has aroused in us feelings of admiration and gratitude for your great and noble country. It is this which has given us the opportunity to widen the scope of the French-Lebanese dialogue, and the occasion to reaffirm the feelings of the Arab world for France, feelings which you are already well aware of.

I can very well understand that what is happening today in Lebanon should be object of concern to our French friends. I would go further than that and say that the example of human fusion that the people of this country have provided might well deserve the attention of all the other countries of the world. It has been a successful experiment in fraternal coexistence between elements with divergent beliefs and ways of thinking. This example of harmony, even in a country so small in area, nevertheless has worldwide implications. The continued success or the failure of this experiment will determine many things in the East, in the West and throughout the world. What is more, Lebanon is by nature a crossroads and a meeting point for people, for ideas and for capital investments. It is one of the most important crossroads of the world in terms of ideology, economics and geography. In view of this, we in this country are all aware of the interest and concern that the crisis which we have to face and overcome must have aroused in our friends throughout the world.

The crisis we face is indeed serious. I am not pessimistic, however, regarding the chances of a positive outcome. First of all, I do not think that this is a question of the end of a world or of the end of a view of the world as far as we are concerned. Generally, I do not have any great faith in absolute beginnings or ends, or whatever goes by that name. I believe that the life history of a people is like that of an individual, it consists of constant renewal, rejuvenation at every instant and a ceaseless effort at adaptation to problems that are constantly changing. In this sense then, the question before us is nothing more than a

¹ Lebanese Ministry of Information, *National News Agency Bulletin*, 6/12/1969. This interview was broadcast by ORTF from Paris.

temporary phase of development which has been aggravated by prevailing circumstances. I am convinced that the wisdom and courage which Lebanon has always displayed, particularly during the past few months, are an adequate guarantee of our ability to emerge successfully from the present phase, as we have done so often at times of severe difficulty throughout our long history.

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Q. Your Excellency, the presence of commandos in Lebanon, which is the source of the crisis, is not a new factor. But a few years back the problem was not there; now, on the other hand, the problem, in simple terms, seems to be insoluble. I am not bringing this up in order to go into the past; I want to know, after what you said, whether you think this new situation is a permanent one on the Lebanese political scene, which will always have to be taken into account in any process or development. Or is this new factor a by-product of the state of war, which will eventually die away, after making some impact?

Since my arrival, I have frequently heard it said that Lebanon is an "Arab Country". Not that it would have ever occurred to any foreigner to deny Lebanon this epithet, but formerly it did not occupy such a prominent place in the preamble to every statement. Lebanon used to be the "country of hospitality", in which Arab and foreigner alike were welcome. We had not pictured Lebanon as taking sides in a struggle. It is clear that many Lebanese support the Palestinian cause; I am avoiding any specific references here so as not to get entangled in endless distinctions. Nevertheless there are many people with the firm opinion, or at least so they have told me, that Lebanon's destiny is decisively bound up with the way it conducts itself as regards the Palestinians and the attitude it adopts to commando action.

A. While the Palestinian refugee problem has been an issue facing us for the past twenty years, it was certainly never a pressing or acute problem in the past. It still remains unsolved for reasons which cannot escape anyone who has been following the development of the situation. Here in Lebanon we have had two to three hundred thousand refugees living among us for a long period of time, because they cannot return to their homeland. The reason why their problem has not been solved is obvious: not even the first steps have been taken to implement United

Nations resolutions dealing with the refugees. The United Nations has decided to follow another, and to its thinking, less complicated course; a point of view which is shared by certain of the heads of state of the Great Powers. Rather than make it possible for the refugees to live in their homes and their homeland — there were many obstacles that made this difficult — they thought it better, rather than simply ignoring the problem, to approach it with a modicum of charity. They have financed the miserable and despairing existence of the refugees, their dispersal over a period of twenty years; and this is what they have created.

In the wake of the June war, the whole Palestinian people, of all walks of life, and the various groupings within that people, decided, under the influence of certain factors, that they had to play their part in the struggle. For one thing, they did not want to be excluded from possible solutions which concerned them; for another, they wanted to contribute their share to whatever collective sacrifice the Arab peoples might agree to undergo for the sake of a solution. Doubtless, the Arab defeat in June 1967 had the same effect on the Palestinian people as it did elsewhere, causing them to despair, to despair of the ability of Arab states and armies to mount a victorious offensive in the near future. Therefore the Palestinian people took up arms on their own behalf and decided to try to recover their usurped rights by themselves.

The problem posed by the Palestinians is an issue which faces Lebanon and the entire Arab world; every Arab country, in fact, has to come to grips with it. Each and every Arab country has defined its attitude to the Palestinian people under the impact of the awakening of that people from their slumbers and their transformation from refugees into resistance fighters. All Arab countries today feel the impact of this resurgence of the Palestinian people. This shows itself either in a call to arms or the adoption of a certain policy or political trend. One can hear this on the radio, read it in the press or see it in the attitude of Arab governments to any conflict that arises between an Arab country and the Palestinians living in it.

As far as Lebanon's position is concerned, the accusations levelled against it, especially by Israeli

propaganda, are unfair and partial. There are hundreds of thousands of people who, unable to return to their homes by peaceful methods, if one can use the expression, are thinking of doing so by force of arms.

Lebanon is accused of harbouring Palestinian resistance members or of allowing them to pass through its territory. In actual fact, these people came to us as refugees and stayed with us. Many of them remained in Lebanon because they were unable to recover their homeland; because of Israel. I think that it is probably too soon to tell what consequences this may have for us. I believe that once the Arabs, particularly the Palestinians, succeed in regaining their rights — this is inevitable — the problem of the Palestinians in Lebanon will have been solved. The natural consequence of victory in war will be that our Palestinian brethren are able to return to their homes.

Of course, until that happens, the presence and the activities of the Palestinian resistance in our country will lead to political, sociological and perhaps even military repercussions. I mean that the Palestinians, even after they return to their homes, will have left their imprint on Lebanon. This is something we anticipate.

Q. Being a foreigner and being moved by your words and your analysis of the situation; moreover, feeling concerned not only with your country but also with the changing situation in this part of the world, the first question that comes insistently to my mind is: How can your country avoid the consequences of opting for a solution through war? For your country lives in peace, wants peace, has reached a certain level of development and is still developing. How can such a country face up to the economic problems and difficulties involved in development, considering, moreover, that the disturbances that are taking place clash with the will of the nation? In asking this question I do not mean to belittle the importance of the Israeli phenomenon which has come into your life. However, can Your Excellency give me an idea of what the effect of those economic problems and that political alignment will be?

A. Naturally I do not want to ignore the danger we face or to belittle its importance. We have to face up to the danger and wake up to the fact that we are not the only ones who will be involved in the event of the outbreak of war

between Israel and the Arab world. If an armed confrontation were to take place, considering also the cold or hot war that would precede it, any country, even if it were not Arab and not the neighbour of either Israel or the Arab world, would find it difficult not to be affected by the war and its consequences. Any country in the neighbourhood of such a tragedy could not but be affected in some way or other.

This applies to all countries, but to an even greater extent to Lebanon which is Arab and which has been able to achieve its development in times of peace by virtue of its Arab character. Lebanon is under an obligation, then, to maintain its Arab outlook in time of war. I shall go even further and say that few countries will remain outside the scope of the Israeli-Arab confrontation.

One of two alternatives could result from such a confrontation; either a just solution will be found to all the problems arising from the conflict, and peace and tranquility will return to the whole area as a result, or the whole area will go up in flames. In the case of the first alternative, which is what we would wish for ourselves and for our Arab brethren, particularly the Palestinians, I believe that Lebanon would be the least affected by the confrontation. It is difficult at the moment to determine what harm Lebanon would suffer in such a case; it would be possible, however, to neutralise whatever harm might be done through a number of precautionary and protective measures. Perhaps we should then become better aware of certain facts relating to the communal life we lead in Lebanon, while remaining naturally receptive to fraternal cooperation with the Arab peoples. So much for the first alternative.

The second alternative, namely the outbreak of a bloody struggle in the area, unfortunately seems to be becoming more likely. If such a conflagration comes about, I do not believe that any people in the world will be able to escape its repercussions. The Arab-Israeli conflict is by nature, in view of its origin and in view of what it entails, a conflict on a world-wide scale. Such was our appraisal of the situation in 1948.

Perhaps, at the time, this was not quite so clear to others. Nevertheless, there were some Lebanese who had the acumen and vision to reach that conclusion. In 1947, a man who was one of my spiritual teachers, Michel Chiha, was so bold as

to say: "The world will learn one day that a problem that seemed so small at first may lead to a conflict that will shake the world to its foundations". At the time this seemed an exaggerated view, and even at the present stage of the conflict it may still seem exaggerated; such is the opinion of certain observers who are not sufficiently aware of the true nature and scope of the conflict.

The conflict is not a purely political or territorial one. It is a racial and religious conflict. This has come very much to the fore with the question of Jerusalem. Because of it, five hundred million Muslims, both Arab and non-Arab, rallied behind the recent Islamic Summit Conference in Rabat. On the other side, we find between fifteen and twenty million Jews who despite their small numbers, exercise a decisive influence over hundreds of millions of human beings. For them, Jerusalem is the city of the covenant with God, their prayers centre on it three times a day in every synagogue in the world. As for the Christian world, Jerusalem is the city in which Christ died and rose from the dead.

The conflict which is in progress, particularly because it involves Jerusalem, is related not only to our beliefs about this world but also to our concepts of the next. For this reason it seems to be a struggle between prophets. There is something absolute in this, which touches our conscience and speaks directly to our hearts. This is a conflict that involves half the population of the world, yet only too often they are not aware of it.

On the other hand, as far as the possible practical repercussions of the conflict are concerned, we need only point to the Big Four discussions on the subject. These are not being held merely from feelings of friendship for one or the other of the parties to the conflict; there is also the need to fend off the undesirable consequences that the conflict might have for the Great Powers.

It seems to me, moreover, that the dialogue in progress between Washington and Moscow has two objectives. The intention is to arrive at a solution, but it is also to avoid a direct collision between the two giants. These aims counter-act each other.

This example alone is sufficient to indicate the international scope of the problem, which may well expand further and further.

There are several other indications which tend

to confirm what has been said so far. Under no circumstances do I wish to meddle in the internal affairs of France or the United States. But it is evident that certain negative developments which have taken place even at Presidential level in France and the United States are connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Can we truthfully deny that such a connection exists and, this being the case, can we in Lebanon feel secure against what may take place? It is not possible for any responsible Lebanese either to ignore or belittle such a grave and widespread danger. Our duty is to face these difficulties and perils with courage and to do everything in our power to safeguard the qualities that are characteristic of this country and the necessary conditions for the continued existence of the country.

We feel confident in ourselves. The difficulties we have experienced so far have not exceeded our defensive capacity; moreover, this realistic way of looking at things should help us to perform our duties.

To quote William the Silent, "It is not necessary to hope in order to act". But I do not agree; I say, "Action begets hope".

Whenever the future of this or any other area looks dark to me, I see all the more clearly the need to dedicate myself to my daily work on the basis of doing to day's duties in the light of thoughts for the morrow. This is the spirit that guides me in my work.

To return to the comments we made at the beginning of this interview: the Arab-Israeli conflict has world-wide repercussions; it is also of concern to the civilised world from yet another angle, insofar as Lebanon is in danger of having to cope with more than it can.

We said at the beginning that Lebanon was a crossroads, that it was a pattern, a successful experiment with relevance for the whole world. If, God forbid, we are unable to continue this experiment, we should not only be doing a grave disservice to our own country but also to the interests as well as the feelings of those who would like to see us continue.

However, we shall not fail.

To quote the words of the French author Ernest Psichari: "If we fail, we are wrong", But I do not think that we shall be wrong.

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Press Conference Statements by the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister al-Saqqaf.¹
(Excerpts)

Beirut, December 6, 1969

Q. What is Saudi Arabia's attitude to the Fifth Summit Conference?

A. Saudi Arabia has never opposed any Arab conference and does not intend to do so now or in the future, whether such conferences are at summit level or any other level. But we do have certain reservations: in our opinion, a summit conference should be our last resort, something to turn to in the event of the failure of the efforts that are now being made.

With the Khartum Conference, the main lines of Arab policy after the aggression were laid down, and we said that we would not depart from that policy; that we should consider other alternatives only in the event of new developments or the failure of that policy. We were told that there would be United Nations resolutions, and were asked to wait for the resolutions to be adopted. We did so, although we had already decided on our own attitude to the issue.

All that we said was that we could not attend a summit conference at which we should be told that the resolution had not been implemented and be asked how it could be implemented. We do not want to say that we have agreed to this resolution, because we have made up our own minds about it. In brief, our point of view is that if the peaceful solution fails and the countries concerned announce that it has failed, we shall be perfectly willing to attend any such conference, because it will deal with the problem in another way.

The only alternative to a peaceful solution will be war. This does not mean that we can expect a victory tomorrow; what I mean is that we must mark out our course on this basis.

We are not frightened or worried; as far as we are concerned, the peaceful solution has already failed; our attitude has been that once the parties concerned admit that fact, we shall attend. We

have been given to understand officially that this is so, so we shall come to the meeting.

Q. What is your opinion of the statements issued by some of the parties concerned on renewed attempts to impose a peaceful solution?

A. Personally, I neither make an issue of what people say in public speeches nor do I hold them to account for their public statements. When I am at an official meeting, however, I do hold them to the letter of what they say, so that there may be no room for differences of interpretation or wording. We shall attend this conference on the basis of what the others have said, namely, that the peaceful solution has failed.

Q. Is Saudi Arabia, considering its prominent position as an oil-producing country, willing to increase its contribution to the Arab states that are in confrontation with the enemy, in view of President Nasser's statement in his recent speech that the defence effort will require half a million soldiers and 500 million pounds?

A. We must not think that wealth is confined to oil-producing countries. Certain countries, such as Algeria, derive their wealth from other natural resources as well as from oil; other countries, such as Iraq, are oil-producers, yet none of these countries makes any financial contribution to the countries that are in confrontation with Israel.

As for President Nasser, I believe he said that the defence budget should be 500 million, but not that the contribution of oil-producing or any other countries should be that much, nor that it would be asked of them.

As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, we have given all that we can in the way of financial support; we cannot afford any more. We are paying 60 million sterling a year, in addition to the special aid we give Jordan in the form of arms. We are also contributing to several fronts, all of them connected with the Palestine cause. It must be remembered that Saudi Arabia is not a small country nor is it anyone's private purse. It is no exaggeration to say that it is a vast country with a population of over 8 million. Saudi Arabia spends millions of rials on defence and is quite capable of playing an effective role in any battle. We are building up our armed forces, equipping

¹ *Al-Hayat* (Beirut), 7/12/1969. Mr. al-Saqqaf gave the press conference in Beirut during a stopover for a private visit on his way home from a trip abroad.

them with new arms and preparing an excellent army for defence purposes which will probably be one of the best in the Middle East.

We give support to our brethren because they are in need, and not because we are unable to play our own part in the battle. Our army has been described as merely a token force, but it has been playing an effective and serious, although not large role, since the beginning of the war. It is well coordinated, it is situated in advance positions along the line of battle, its numbers are by no means symbolic and its armament is not meagre; in fact, it is well armed. Our army has repeatedly come under attack and it has proved itself in its engagements with the enemy. But we regard it as part of the Jordanian army, so we do not issue separate communiqués describing what it has done or what engagements it has taken part in.

It is no idle boast to say that the Saudi Arabian soldier is among the bravest, the most competent and the best trained the Arabs have.

Every country has its own resources. If the oil were to stop flowing, we should cut down our aid, for where would we get the money from? If the pipelines are blown up again we shall cut off the aid we have been giving. We are not afraid to attend the summit conference. We shall go to it proud in the knowledge that we have fulfilled our obligations. Should we be asked at the conference to make further financial contributions, we shall say that we will not pay any more than we have already.

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Interview Statements by the Libyan Foreign Minister Saleh Abu Yaser on Some Current Issues.¹ (Excerpt)

Cairo

Q. In what way do you think the Zionist-imperialist challenge to the Arab nation should be confronted?

A. The present situation in the Arab world may be compared to a champion who has tripped and then picks himself up to shake off the pain of his fall. But he has already shown that his

heroism is not a mere attribute, but has been an innate quality from the start. Similarly, the Arab nation which the enemy imagined to have collapsed in the June battle, is now beginning to realise its potential and to prepare itself for eventual and inevitable victory.

Q. What is your assessment of the Palestinian revolution and of the means necessary to support it and to enable it to continue?

A. The Palestinian revolution is the correct procedure for a people who have suffered so much violence and injustice, who have been ignored by their friends and plotted against by their enemies, and who today, by putting their situation to rights, are proving that the Palestinian revolution has been in existence ever since the imperialists first disclosed their designs upon Palestine. The Palestinians are, of all the Arabs, among the most ready to sacrifice their lives and to shed the blood of the enemy. Hence support for the Palestinian revolution, represented by *Fateh*, is a sacred duty for every Arab and Muslim. The battle will not be decisive unless every member of this great nation feels that he is threatened and realises that his duty requires him to do no less than what the Zionists do, everyone of whom is assigned a duty to perform, even if it is the end of the world. It is the duty of our government to provide the commandos with definite budgets and it is the duty of our people to deduct from their own property sums of money to contribute to the Palestinian fighters. It is the duty of these fighters, on the other hand, to close their ranks and abstain from rash action which might harm the cause instead of helping it. For this reason, we consider that the strategy of *Fateh* is closest to the strategy of the great Algerian revolution and to the Libyan revolution against Italian imperialism, when we challenged them in their homes, farms and barracks. This strategy is guaranteed to achieve victory and recover Arab Palestine...

¹ *Al-Sha'b* (Algiers), 16/12/1969.

Press Conference Statements by Dr. George Habbash, General Secretary of the Central Committee for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, on the Question of Palestinian National Unity and the Population Problem in the Democratic State of Palestine.¹

Q. How, precisely, do you envisage the future of unified Palestinian action?

A. First I would like to emphasise once again that the Popular Front — both its leadership and bases — is anxious that its attitude to the Liberation Organisation and the Armed Struggle Command should not be understood as meaning that it does not regard the issue of national unity as a fundamental and pressing one, or that it has shelved the matter. Our attitude is an attitude to one specific formula, the present formula. It is by no means a rejection in principle of the idea of national unity; on the contrary, it involves insistence on an effective, strong and progressive formula for national unity.

Therefore we are anxious that our standing aside from "joint" action in its present form should be seen as evidence that we adhere firmly to the principle of striving to achieve positive and effective Palestinian national unity, and before that, a proper formula for it.

National unity cannot be the product of improvisation, nor is it a question of emotional feelings; even less is it a matter of temporary and ephemeral tactics. The Popular Front believes that this issue must be linked to its intellectual position and its strategic analysis of the battle, and that if this is not the case any measure in this field, if it is radically severed from the intellectual foundations of some kind of organisation, is doomed to failure. If we link the subject to our intellectual outlook, we shall reach the following position: It is difficult to mobilise all the classes capable, in different ways, of participating in the battle for national liberation, in a single political organisation. For a number of classes are involved in the battle: the workers, the peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie, and, in view of the actual situation of

Palestinian national action, it is not easy to mobilise all these classes together in a single organisational frame-work. The Popular Front intends to organise the workers and the peasants in the national field, a task it is thoroughly qualified to perform by virtue of the ideology of its organisational structure. What is certain is that the petty bourgeoisie cannot be organised, as a class, within the framework of the Popular Front. The Popular Front can organise individuals from this class, but it cannot — and does not intend to — organise the whole or even the majority of this class. For, in any scientific analysis, the petty bourgeoisie does not restrict itself and does not agree to being restricted to the framework of a specific revolutionary ideology, and it tends, by the nature of its structure, to be loose in form.

The organisational formula of scientific socialist ideology is a steel-strong organisation firmly directed and tautly organised, and governed by the relations of a centralised democracy. Such a situation is not compatible with the nature of the petty bourgeoisie, which tends to work through a formula that enables it to move without difficulty from one side to the other, or to be more precise, to indulge in the vacillation which is one of its basic characteristics.

We are well aware that there is a class and a social cadre which it is difficult to recruit and mobilise by means of the Popular Front's formula, but we also know that this cadre is a force which must be mobilised in the interests of the battle as a whole. We are capable of seeing that in addition to the Popular Front's formula for the mobilisation of the working and peasant classes to the utmost extent possible, there are other formulas for mobilising sectors of other national classes, after which it will be possible to deal with them through the framework of a front which comprises all the classes capable of taking part in the revolution.

Failure to take such a view may lead to serious consequences; it may result in national tasks which could be performed, to varying extents, by other sectors, not being performed at all. The essential outlines of all battles for national democratic liberation within a socialist framework all over the world are now well known and clearly defined: there is a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary party which must provide leadership, and a wide national front achieved through armed struggle.

¹ *Al-Hadaf* (Beirut), 10/12/1969.

This triple formula is the natural and most effective one, and experience has proved that it is capable of succeeding. It consists of a commanding Party which recruits the workers and peasants, and which is based on scientific socialist ideology; some form of front capable of recruiting the other national classes for the battle of liberation, and the employment of guerrilla warfare which will eventually develop into a popular war of liberation. These are the main features that characterise the stage we are discussing — the stage of battles for national democratic liberation within a socialist framework.

Q. Has unified action faltered and failed because in the past it did not take this view of the situation?

A. In the fifties the Arab nationalist movement did not act in accordance with this view. But now the matter is so extremely simple and clear that there is no escaping it, and it would be a great mistake if enthusiasm, improvisation or tactics were to lead to our disregarding it or not facing up to it fully.

What is the present formula for national unity? It is the Executive Committee and the Armed Struggle Command. Everything about it is ill-defined. Therefore if we were to join it, we should do so on an ill-defined basis, — ill-defined political views and ill-defined relations.

This question of ill-defined relations is something basic. If relations are clearly defined it is possible to some extent, to avoid many of the dangers which can result from an ill-defined political view of the nature of the present stage, the stage of national democratic liberation, and consequently of the nature of the revolution as a democratic revolution for liberation within a socialist framework. The present formula is ill-defined in all its aspects — its political views, its programmes and its relations. It is ill-defined as regards both major matters — strategy — and minor matters (take, for example, the question of unified contributions — it does not even offer a basis for discussing this subject).

We have constantly stressed the fact that there is a whole collection of organisations in the field of Palestinian action which have different strategies. We stress this fact, because it is useless to ignore it. There are differences on the question of how the camp of the enemy is to be defined:

we made it clear, with the most cogent precision, in the political report of the Front, which we distributed to the masses, that the statements and literature of the other organisations do not answer this question clearly. Political ideology is not an abstract subject, nor is it a luxury. Now, for example, as a result of energetic commando action and real struggle we are daily being made aware of the solid link between political thinking and the problems that face us. The solutions to these problems are to be found in clear political views; this is what makes them so important and indispensable.

Political thinking is of tangible practical value. Each of its basic lines of policy has its own distinctive characteristic: We say that the enemy is Israel, world Zionism, imperialism and reaction, and this is not just talk. It is reflected in plans of action, whether for protecting or escalating the revolution, or for the way its problems should be faced. Similarly it is by defining things in this way that we get a clear idea of the battle and its dimensions in both time and place.

Thus we are committed to a definite line as regards our beliefs, our conceptions and our convictions with respect to the forces of the revolution. What we say — and we cannot emphasise this too strongly — is that the basic classes of the revolution are the workers, the peasants, and the progressive sectors of the petty bourgeoisie led by a scientific socialist organisation. This is reflected one hundred per cent in the action we take, in every detail, both great and small. How is it possible to forge ahead without a clear view? For example, how is it possible to take action at organisational level? A group comes along, starts organising, with no basis of political thinking. It organises students, teachers, small shopkeepers and clerks and then proceeds to mobilise them for the battle. Only then does it discover that this class material is ready to support the revolution, but not to fight. Suddenly it discovers that the organisation which it has built up is not going to fight; it is only trying to get into a position which will eventually justify its failure to take part in the fighting.

What do we mean when we say that the working class can be mobilised to the utmost extent through Marxism-Leninism? It means raising its political awareness to the highest possible

level, through a form of organisation which increases its capacities to the greatest possible extent. We give a precise definition of our attitude to this question. But some of the other organisations say: "We are all commandos". This is a misleading slogan and scientifically incorrect for, if taken seriously, it would imply the enlistment of two million combatants... And how is this to be done? There is another question which is of basic importance to our understanding of national unity: the fusion of the Palestinian revolution and the Arab revolution. This is something fundamental. Now, for example, it is clear to us that, when we think of the future of commando action, the dangers that surround it, and the challenges that confront it, the conclusion we come to is that provided by scientific political thinking — that the solution lies in extending commando action until it assumes the form of Arab armed struggle. For the strategic picture at present is the following: commando action has put Israel thoroughly on the alert, it has put imperialism and reaction on the alert, and it has confronted the nationalist regimes with objectives which they find themselves incapable of attaining. What conclusion does this picture lead us to? Is the problem to be dealt with by a few thousand commandos only? No, this picture must be confronted by another — that of the Arab people. This is a real parting of the ways. For even on this line there are differences of opinion. There are also differences of opinion about the world's view of the problem as our political report makes clear.

These differences over issues which are clear, authentic and, without exaggeration, of the very greatest importance, lead us to the conclusion that cooperation between organisations which have different strategies is only possible if it takes the form of a front. This will make cooperation possible while preserving independence; it will enable any party to express its own clear view, and to maintain its convictions without paralysing the whole.

Disagreements must not lead to our strategy being crippled. It is possible to draw up joint plans for dealing with those aspects of the problem on which there is agreement, and to develop them within a common framework. As regards questions on which there is no agreement, each party can

be allowed to pursue its own policy. The present formula for national unity — the Armed Struggle Command — does not provide explicit enough assurances of this.

Q. What about the future in this field?

A. The question of national unity is of fundamental importance to us, and the fact that we have not joined the Armed Struggle Command does not prevent us from continuing our efforts to achieve an effective front. We are now ready to establish a national front which will include both the Popular Front and the Armed Struggle Command. If this is not possible at the moment we shall continue meetings and discussions, until either the Armed Struggle Command changes and adopts a clearly defined formula, or all admit that the existing formulas have failed, and go on from there to build a national front in accordance with a clear-cut and scientific formula.

Q. In view of the challenges which confront commando action and of the dangers which surround it, do you not think that if there is to be a cordon of the Arab masses around commando action to protect it, every effort must be made to establish national fronts in all Arab regions? What steps is the Popular Front taking in this direction?

A. For such a cordon to be formed there must be armed revolutionary organisations. In this field we must first evaluate the forces ready to play this role, and then try to establish a front of national forces which all nationalist elements could join, provided their aim is to protect the revolution — we should not be over-particular in imposing conditions. Before there is a national front, there must be armed struggle. As a popular front, the value we accord to any Arab political organisation depends on its ability to carry arms in the battle of liberation. As we said before we should not be over-particular in imposing conditions for the admission of nationalist forces into the protection front. However, the character of the national force which will lead the battle by bearing arms and fighting, must be most precisely defined. On this basis, viewed objectively, this front will be a front of liberation and socialism, it will rely on the vanguard forces represented by the Palestinian resistance movement, the nationalist leftist parties and the Arab communist parties. The effective entrance of these groups

into the battle is a positive action which will have great consequences that cannot but please progressive nationalists who are anxious to support the Arab revolutionary movement and increase its capacity to confront world imperialism.

Q. Does the speed with which commando action has grown, and the way it has spontaneously oriented itself towards the toiling masses who have been crushed for generations, involve "subjective dangers", if I may use the expression?

A. The question of "subjective dangers" in commando action is one that must be faced frankly and courageously. Perhaps the greatest of these dangers is the present plurality, which we maintain must be resolved in an effective national front based on clear views, well-defined relations and a clear and mutually accepted programme.

Then there are "subjective dangers" of another kind. After the June defeat a number of slogans were employed in the different Arab theatres, especially in the Palestinian theatre. They were sound slogans, but the efforts made to implement them were in most cases unorganised. In fact, so far no effort at the required level of mobilisation, organisation and ideology has been made to achieve real mobilisation.

There has obviously been a change in the class structure of the battle. There is a great difference between the fifties and the present day. In the fifties any observer could see that in any demonstration in Amman (against Templer, against Glubb... etc.) most of the demonstrators came from the petty bourgeoisie. Now it is the poor who form the majority which is at the forefront of the battle, with sections of the progressive petty bourgeoisie. But this does not mean that the operation of putting things to rights has been completed. The material of the revolution is one thing, but changing that material into an effective force is another thing. A great revolutionary effort must be made, an effort which has not yet been made effectively enough.

What is happening is that the impoverished masses, who are being crushed, exploited and kept in a state of backwardness, carry with them into the battle the impress of backwardness in one form or another — this is what usually happens. What do I mean by this? What I mean is that they carry round with them an indifference to the

value of time, non-objective relations, a lack of discipline, emotionalism, and so on. An exhaustive operation must be undertaken to bring about the greatest possible degree of revolutionary change, and this operation must be based on a political, educational and organisational plan and on daily conduct of a kind calculated to make the combatant an active element in the rallying of the masses. The combatant who is politically unaware, or undisciplined, or who does not know why and against whom and for whom he is under arms, is liable to commit errors of conduct which damage the image of commando action in the minds of the masses; this is very serious.

Q. The Popular Front affirms its belief in a democratic solution of the Palestine problem. Can we go into the details of this important matter?

A. This subject is dealt with very thoroughly in our political report, which is a statement of the avowed strategy of the Popular Front. This principle has been fundamentally established as an integral part of the political views of the Popular Front — it is not just a propaganda slogan or vague talk. In this connection the Popular Front adheres to the following concept: We are fighting a battle of national democratic liberation within a socialist framework, with the object of putting an end to the Israeli entity as an aggressive, racist and usurping state linked with world imperialism. With the elimination of this entity, along with its links and its specific characteristics, we shall be confronted with a situation in which it will be natural for every citizen to have equal rights to live in conformity with the socialist framework of the revolution and the Arab identity of the Palestinian theatre. I want to emphasise that the battle of national democratic liberation must be fought to the end and won. That is a necessary condition if liberation is to be genuine and if we do not insist on its fulfilment it is irresponsible of us to talk of democracy after the destruction of the imperialist, aggressive, and racist entity of Israel, along with all its links and special characteristics.

Every Jew living in Palestine, when the battle comes to an end under these conditions, will have full and equal rights. When we say this we really mean it. And the slogan of Palestine, as part of the Arab homeland, and of its unity and socialist

life, must be implemented. What we must not do is to present the issue as if it was a question of tearing Palestine from the homeland, and building a special separate entity with dual nationality, without an Arab identity, and calling it democracy. For it would not be democracy.

Q. How is a solution to the population problem possible under these conditions? The return of the Palestinians is a basic requirement; what will be the fate of the usurping force which now lives in and exploits the places and resources which belong to the Palestinian people?

A. When we limit our view of the picture to the Palestinian theatre, in its present geographical framework, we are certainly confronted with a real problem, the problem of the majority of the population within that framework and their loyalties. This a real problem and it will not be solved by the slogan "the Democratic State of Palestine". In my opinion, this subject must be treated in Arab terms, that is to say the problem must be viewed within an Arab framework. It is impossible to continue the battle in its present regional form, and there is no doubt that the process of liberation will lead to the removal of artificial entities. It is precisely this that will provide the framework of a valid democratic solution for all nationalities and minorities not only in Palestine, but also in all the other Arab areas. After the destruction of Israel as an aggressive and racist entity the problems arising from the presence of a number of people who want to stay and live within the framework of the progressive socialist state will have to be faced democratically. The success of the revolution throughout the whole of the Arab world will make it possible to cope with this problem and solve it.

In any case, the whole question is linked with the phases which the battle for democratic liberation will have to pass through — so far it has only just begun. It seems to me that, from the nature of things, it is too early to go into details of implementation. What is important is that we should lay down the general lines of strategy; the aim of the battle for national democratic liberation is to destroy the racist, settling and colonialist presence in Palestine through total liberation achieved without falling into the snares of settlements and compromises. The problem of the numbers, culture, religion and democratic

rights of various groups is one that the successful revolution will be able to cope with in a democratic manner and solve in conformity with the principles of scientific socialism.

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Speech by the United Arab Republic President Nasser at the Closed Session of the Fifth Arab Summit Conference.¹ (Excerpt)

Rabat, December 21, 1969

We are not begging for mobilisation for the battle, we are demanding it.

We might beg from others who are not menaced by the danger, but we do not beg from Arab countries, we make demands of them.

Tell me, does the danger threaten Egypt alone, or is the entire Arab nation threatened?

Is it Sinai alone that we seek to liberate... or more than that?

If our aim was to liberate Sinai alone, then we should want absolutely nothing from you... we are capable of liberating Sinai by ourselves, whatever the means employed, whatever the sacrifice involved.

If it was a matter of liberating Sinai, then what you gave us at Khartum would be enough; we would be content with it and thank you.

However, the Egyptian people do not consider the objective to be the liberation of Sinai. They consider it to be the liberation of all occupied territory. That is why they set no limits to what they offer for the battle.

The Egyptian people have half a million soldiers on the battle front and supporting it. They are in the process of increasing that number to one million.

The Egyptian people are spending 500 million Egyptian pounds on the arms budget.

The Egyptian people have lost 250 million Egyptian pounds as a result of the closing down of the Suez Canal and the factories in the Canal Zone.

In other words, the Egyptian people have given

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 4/1/1970. This part of President Nasser's speech was quoted in an article by Muhammad Hasanain Haykal in *Al-Ahram*.

750 million Egyptian pounds to support the battle. They do not regard this as an act of generosity, they consider it to be their duty, for they are aware of the extent of the danger.

We want to know whether you are in this battle only to help us out... or because the danger threatens the entire Arab nation?

Those who help others might place a limit on the help they give.

Those who are helping themselves know no limits.

What we must agree on here, in the first place, is: what is the extent of the danger?

If we agree on that, our way is clear. If we fail to agree, we have lost the way.

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Speech by the United Arab Republic President Nasser at the Fifth Arab Summit Conference.¹ (Excerpt)

Rabat, December 22, 1969

It seems to me that, in fact, the Conference has not accomplished anything at all. It is my honest opinion that we should tell the people in our final joint communiqué that the Conference has failed so as not to deceive them by giving them false hopes.

I should like to know whether you want to fight the battle or not? I have no intention of complaining, but I want to know and I am prepared for either alternative. Do you want to be faithful to your obligations and enter the battle alongside the United Arab Republic? Or do you want to declare that you are not bound by these obligations? If so I will draw up my plans on the understanding that I shall be fighting the battle alone. We do not ask for money; the United Arab Republic has not made such a request. But it believes that the responsibility is the responsibility of all and this requires total mobilisation by all the Arab States with each state performing its duty. It is not only Egypt's problem; if it had been we should have solved it long ago. But the battle involves all of you.

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 24/12/1969.

And this is why I appeal to you to be frank with me. First, do you want to fight?

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Speech by General Abd al-Ghaffar, President of the Iraqi Delegation to the Fifth Arab Summit Conference.² (Excerpts)

Rabat, December 22, 1969

The resolutions of the Joint Arab Defence Council, which met in Cairo on November 8, 1969 have made it quite clear that attempts at a peaceful solution have failed. The only way left for the Arab nation to deal with this critical issue is through the use of force; it must mobilise and concentrate its forces in preparation for the inevitable battle that is to come. To be brief and explicit, the plan of action we must follow consists of three points relating to the Palestine problem, which, in our opinion, should be dealt with as a unity.

As a result of the events of June, 1967, a new military situation has been created for the Arab countries surrounding Israel which suffered from the aggression.

If we are to seek a military solution, and that is what we are here to discuss, let us approach it positively and do it justice.

The countries against which the aggression was directed have exhausted all their resources in efforts that have left them far short of the level of attainment required for the battle of liberation. Logically then, the other Arab countries should fulfil their national obligations as regards this fateful issue by providing whatever resources are required by the battle. The responsibility, as we have said, belongs to all of us; each must do his share according to his means and the resources at his disposal. We are confident that all will respond in this way. For the danger that menaces our nation is not directed at any one specific area of Arab territory rather than another.

² *Al-Ahram* (Beirut), 2/1/1970, p. 8.

As regards the report submitted by the Supreme Commander to the Joint Arab Defence Council, despite my sincere appreciation of the efforts expended in drafting it, it is my opinion that there must be a reappraisal of the size of the forces required by the Supreme Commander, in the light of the objective that is to be agreed on by us all and which, in our opinion, is the liberation of Arab territory.

There is another basic matter that claims our attention: the Palestinian struggle. This struggle, which has become an important element in liberation, has made its presence felt and has proved to be effective at both Arab and international levels. It is therefore our duty to provide it with material and military support so that it may be capable of sapping the enemy's strength, establishing itself inside the occupied territories and becoming the vanguard of liberation, along with the Arab armed forces in the battle with Israel that lies ahead of them. We must pay serious attention to the battle that lies ahead of us; the very least we can do in this field is to make every effort to ensure the success of any possible measure leading to the unification of the armed forces of the Arab countries that want this, and to take all necessary steps for the coordination and unification of the Arab economies.

From what has been said so far, it is quite clear that the forthcoming battle requires that we all live up to our responsibilities, each according to his means and financial resources. Furthermore, there are other Arab forces, not represented at this meeting, but endowed with considerable resources which ought to be made use of in the service of our military effort; I am thinking of the emirates of the Arab Gulf. We believe that this distinguished gathering should broach the subject to them. We therefore make the following proposals:

1. That we define the objective of the battle as the liberation of Arab territories and that "the elimination of the consequences of the aggression" should be only an interim objective for one phase only of the Arab plan.

2. That the Supreme Commander be entrusted with the task of drafting a plan for this.

3. That all Arab countries should play their part, each according to its revenues and resources,

in complying with the requests of the Supreme Commander.

4. That the resistance movement should be supported and allocated whatever it needs to strengthen and escalate the role it plays in the battle.

5. That a "Conference Fund" be established and entrusted to a body to be appointed by the Council of Arab Heads of State which shall supervise the expenditure of funds for the creation of new military formations and units and the purchase of the new arms needed for the battle.

6. That all necessary steps be taken to ensure the unification of the Arab war effort, as a preliminary to the establishment of Arab military unity, which the nature of the battle makes essential.

7. That there be an Arab economic union. All Arab countries should be called on to cancel the remaining uncompleted stages in the creation of an Arab common market, and a permanent coordination committee should be set up to supervise the coordination of the major economic potentials of the Arab states.

These are our views on how the Palestine problem should be dealt with. We submit these views to this distinguished gathering, confident that they will meet with the desired response now that all our efforts are dedicated to the battle.

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Joint Communiqué on the Talks between the United Arab Republic President Nasser, the Libyan President of the Revolutionary Council Colonel Qadhafi and the Sudanese President of the Revolutionary Council General al-Numairi.¹ (Excerpt)

Tripoli, December 27, 1969

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The meeting of the three presidents creates a revolutionary Arab front which combines the potentialities of Libya, Egypt and the Sudan in a cultural harmony. It is committed to progress and is prepared to adopt and face the challenge of the spirit of the modern age in order that a

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 28/12/1969.

material and spiritual life proper to the individual Arab may be realised.

The three leaders, meeting in revolutionary Libya, which has been able, through its revolution and the struggle and determination of its revolutionary vanguard, to liquidate foreign military bases, affirm that their meeting broadens the fighting front against the enemy who is desecrating our soil. The front now extends from Cairo to Tripoli and Khartum, inasmuch as all potentialities are being massed and organised to bring about victory, repel aggression and liberate Arab territory. The three leaders are convinced that the responsibility for facing the Zionist challenge and Zionist attacks falls jointly upon all the Arab states. Hence it is imperative to continue the efforts being made to marshal all Arab potentials for the battle of Arab destiny.

The complete agreement in thought and intention of the three leaders at their meeting in Tripoli provides absolute support for the brave Palestinian revolution and its legitimate rights, and for the heroic struggle of the Arab people in the occupied territories to recover their legitimate rights and their land.

The Israeli enemy continues in his obstinacy and his expansion of aggression. In this he receives all kinds of support from the forces of world imperialism. This requires greater sacrifice and readiness and a greater degree of coordination among the three revolutions and their masses of workers, in the light of their principles and progressive objectives. This must be done in order to turn these revolutions into an effective force in the hands of the Arab masses as they face their Zionist enemy.

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Speech by Mr. Yasser Arafat, President of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, at the First International Conference of the Committees for Solidarity with the Palestinian People.¹ (Excerpts)

Algiers, December 27, 1969

More than once our people have been tragically dispersed as refugees by the atrocious savagery of a people who have always employed such inhuman methods as the mass blowing up of houses, mass arrests, different forms of torture and mass execution.

I only need to tell what the Zionist occupation forces have done since the battles of June, 1967 to give you some idea of the conspiracy against our people and the sufferings it causes them.

The inhuman measures carried out against our small and peaceable people by the Zionist occupation forces are the following: 8,000 houses and homes have been blown up and demolished. 16,000 citizens, among whom were 1,700 young girls, have been interned, detained and imprisoned, 6,000 have been killed as the result of frightful torture, mass executions and napalm bombs; the methods used have surpassed Nazi methods of terror, torture and killing.

Add to this the destruction of our people's economy, the confiscation and appropriation of land by the occupation authorities, the policy of starving our people by depriving them of the simplest necessities of daily life, such as food, medicine and water.

These authorities have also attempted to destroy all traces of the national heritage of our Palestinian nation, to disfigure our culture and to wipe out all vestiges of our civilisation and our monuments. In doing this they are merely implementing the terrible Zionist plan to annihilate our Palestinian people as a civilisation and a human

¹ *Al-Sha'b* (Algiers), 29/12/1969. The conference was attended by representatives of Committees for the Support of Palestine from France, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Britain, the United States of America, Holland, Italy, Brazil, the German Federal Republic, Austria, Ceylon and Scandinavian countries, officials from the Palestine Offices of the *Fath* organisation in Europe, and a number of observers.

community, regardless of all laws of right, justice and humanity.

My friends, there has never been any hostility between us and the Jews, and we have never oppressed them. On the contrary, our country has always provided them with a refuge where they could find justice, peace of mind and safety from the oppression they have experienced at different times in other lands.

For twenty long years our people have waited for the results of the resolutions of the United Nations, the Security Council and international conferences; but their waiting has meant further hunger, further injustice, further displacement and further implementation of the Zionist colonialist plan for the annihilation of our people and the destruction of their name and identity. Faced by indifference, by colonialist and imperialist encouragement of these oppressive forces, and by a world conscience which has been misled for too long and too far about the justice and humanity of our cause, our people have been compelled to take up arms to fight and struggle as the only way to liberate and return to their usurped country and their occupied territories.

Our people have taken up arms because they believe in their objective and their right to a free and honourable life, and the right of all future generations to live on the soil of their homeland with all who believe in this homeland, its heritage and its ideals.

We are not against the Jews as such, but we are against international Zionism which exploits Jewish ideology and which uses the Jewish individual to achieve the goals and ambitions of Zionist capitalism which is organically linked to international imperialism. By so doing, they are sacrificing the individual Jew in order to preserve and defend the interests and monopolies of Zionism and world colonialism and imperialism.

We have always declared, and we now declare, that we are fighting for a specific goal, which is the establishment of a Palestinian Democratic State on Palestinian soil in a homeland where Jewish, Christian and Muslim citizens may live in justice, brotherhood and equality; a homeland where there is no place for racialism, Fascism, fanaticism or hatred. The fact that this conference is meeting in Algeria is of great significance to us, for the people of this country fought their

armed revolution and succeeded in liberating their homeland from colonialism and enslavement, thereby restoring real peace to the heroic Algerian people.

Inspired by these examples of heroic struggle and great sacrifice, our Palestinian people refuse to bargain over, or even discuss, a cause which involves their very existence.

Attempts are being made to impose so-called peaceful solutions, which our people see as solutions amounting to surrender that will lead to the termination of the existence of our Palestinian nation and our Palestinian homeland. They are solutions based on injustice and we therefore reject them, and we shall continue to fight and struggle until our people return to their homeland, free and honoured, having achieved real peace, real justice, and a democratic society in which there is no racial or religious discrimination of any kind.

We hope that our noble friends throughout the whole world will stand by our small struggling people until they regain their homeland.

Our people hold a rifle in one hand and an olive branch in the other; we are not fighting for the sake of war but for the sake of freedom that is indivisible, the freedom of peoples who are fighting for their liberty and existence, the freedom of the people of Vietnam who are suffering like the people of Palestine, the freedom of all humanity from oppression, discrimination and exploitation.

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Statement of Policy Released by the First International Convention for the Support of the Palestinian People.¹ (Excerpt)

Algiers, December 28, 1969

The First International Convention of Committees for the Support of the heroic Palestinian People, held in Algiers between 26 and 28 December, 1969, declares its full and unshakable support for the armed resistance of the Palestinian

¹ *Al-Sha'b* (Algiers), 30/12/1969.

people for the liberation of its homeland, the whole of Palestine.

The Convention unconditionally supports the objectives of the Palestine liberation movement for the establishment of an independent democratic Palestinian state in which all citizens, whether Muslims, Jews, Christians or the members of any other denomination, would enjoy the same democratic rights and share the same duties. The Convention is strongly opposed to any attempt on the part of the United Nations or any of its members, particularly the major powers, to impose a political solution in any shape or form on the Palestinian people.

The Convention furthermore opposes the so-called "Rhodes Solution" formula or any other conspiracy between Arab countries and Israel. The Convention denounces all attempts on the part of anti-revolutionary Arab forces to undermine and liquidate the Palestinian armed revolution.

The Convention consequently denounces, rejects and stands opposed to all past or forthcoming United Nations resolutions or clarifications thereof, including the 22 November, 1967 General Assembly resolutions (sic). The Convention is convinced that the United Nations is merely a tool in the hands of the major powers and that the United Nations resolutions constitute a flagrant violation of the basic tenets of human rights as well as the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

Zionism is a racist, expansionist and colonialist system that is inseparable from world imperialism, headed by the United States. It is a tool in the hands of world imperialism, directed not only against the Palestinian people but all Arab peoples and other national liberation movements in the world as well.

On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the outbreak of Palestinian armed struggle, the Convention hails all the splendid victories of the people in the field of battle that were scored under the leadership of *Fateh*.

The Convention also congratulates and supports all progressive Jews who have been outspoken in their opposition to the Zionist Israeli state in both word and deed and who recognise the full right of the Palestinian people, whether Muslims, Jews, Christians or any others, to establish a Palestinian state and to exercise its sovereignty. Progressive Jews should not only stand up for their own democratic rights and for equality in the countries where they live but should also oppose immigration to Israel in any shape or form.

The Convention categorically rejects racialism in any shape or form, particularly in the case of anti-Semitism. It affirms its faith in the equality of all peoples and supports the desire of any people to exercise its democratic rights with total equality and in freedom from discrimination on the grounds of either race or religion. The Convention unconditionally supports the right of both the military and political cadres of the Palestine liberation movement to move about freely in all the Arab countries in pursuance of their struggle against Zionism and imperialism.

The Convention is confident that the final victory shall go to the Palestinian people in that they shall succeed in liberating the whole of Palestine by sustaining the long-range struggle in which they are engaged, by relying on their own resources but also looking to the anti-imperialist Arab masses and progressive circles in the world for support.

The world imperialist system, which is headed by the United States, faces a difficult crisis today and is worried by the threat of final dissolution and liquidation. There is crucial need to organise a sizeable movement of support for the armed resistance of the Palestinian people in all countries on the basis of the policies and programmes of the Palestinian people itself. This movement could incorporate all organisations or individuals who are fighting against imperialism and racialism and should have a positive platform for its struggle against oppression, exploitation and racial or national discrimination in any shape or form.

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